| dc.description.abstract | At the beginning of the millennium, the EU sought a new method to encourage Third
Countries to become more cooperative on the readmission of irregular migrants. It
became a proved formula to offer countries a Visa Facilitation Agreement (VFA) if in
return they would commit to better cooperation on readmission as agreed in a
Readmission Agreement (RA). With some countries, the EU managed to quickly conclude
negotiations on both, while with others negotiations seem endless. This thesis has focused
on what the difference is between those negotiations, if the concluded RA has led to better
cooperation on readmission as well as look into alternatives to the VFA within the field of
visa to entice Third Countries cooperation on readmission. For some countries, the VFA
is very attractive and the costs of the RA limited while at the same time they are under
pressure to conclude these negotiations. With other countries this balance is different,
there is less pressure and they are more able to make use of their negotiation position.
The EU has already begun experimenting on other uses of the visa policy to encourage
cooperation on readmission, such as (the threat of) sanctions against Third Countries.
These threats seem to be effective, although a cautious approach is necessary as it could
have unexpected side-effects which lead to a bigger problem on irregular migration than
before. | |
