Beyond Rationality: The Addition of Emotions to Readiness Theory to Explain Duterte's Willingness to Engage in Peace Negotiations with the Communist Rebels in the Philippines

Abstract

In this thesis, it is argued that Pruitt’s readiness theory – an adaptation of ripeness theory – is valuable, but not sufficient to understand President Duterte’s changes in willingness to negotiate with the communist rebels in the Philippines. The deductive phase of this research, using process-tracing, shows that the application of this analytical frame offers valuable insights into this case. However, when using a grounded theory approach in the inductive phase, new concepts emerge that challenge the framework’s rational choice premises. A case is made to abandon the dichotomous interpretation of decision making as either rational or emotional, and to include non-rational components on the same “level” of the framework.

As a result, this research presents "mixed readiness theory," which includes the central non-rational component "attitudes." In the analysis of three distinct time periods in the GRP-CPP/NPA/NDF peace negotiations, the relevance and potential explanatory value of this concept is explored. In Time Period 1, it is argued that Duterte's initial willingness to negotiate was the result of positive attitudes towards the communist rebels. In Time Period 2, it is argued that Duterte's cancellation of the peace talks was due to the development of negative attitudes about communists and positive attitudes about the military. In Time Period 3, it is argued that Duterte's frequent changes in negotiating position were a symptom of attitude incompatibility and attitude ambivalence. This rendered Duterte susceptible to persuasion by the so-called doves and hawks in his cabinet, who prevailed upon attitude strength and attitude salience to influence his willingness to engage in peace negotiations.