Nonconceptual Content in Perception

Abstract

Since the publication of Gareth Evans’s The Varieties of Reference in 1982, in which Evans introduced the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content, there has been an ongoing debate in the philosophy of perception about the nature of the content of perceptual experiences. At first sight, the debate between conceptualists and nonconceptualists does not seem that difficult to get a grip on, as most proponents or opponents of nonconceptual content use versions of the same arguments to argue for and against one of the two positions. However, this thesis shows that there is a complication: methodological disagreements between conceptualists and nonconceptualists cause the participants in the debate to talk past one another. In response to this complication, this thesis argues that (1) philosophical accounts of perception must meet two conditions if a more constructive debate between conceptualists and nonconceptualists is to be realized, and that (2) given my conditions for philosophical accounts of perception, perceptual content can best be understood as nonconceptual.