| dc.description.abstract | The mainstream bioethical discourse on germline editing, intervening in the genome of a human embryo, has tended to focus on arguments of safety, benefits, autonomy and social justice, and to be universalist in kind. Rehmann-Sutter has recently argued that attention should be paid to the lifeworld and relational perspective of parent and child, because they will be most directly affected by the technology. In this thesis, Rehmann-Sutter’s argument of relationality, which holds that what is morally troublesome about germline editing is that it might negatively change the parent-child relationship, is critically discussed. Rehmann-Sutter bases this argument on a theoretical framework that takes into account a biology and phenomenology of the germline. The germline is conceptualised as a vulnerable entity that is the embodiment of the relationship between generations, relating them backwards and forwards in time. While Rehmann-Sutter’s claim that germline editing burdens the parents with a plethora of choice is rejected, it is argued that germline editing might be experienced by parent and child as intrusive in a manner that other reproductive technologies might not be. It is concluded that, in opting for germline editing, parents should make a decision that allows for a loving parent-child relationship to be maintained. | |
