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dc.rights.licenseCC-BY-NC-ND
dc.contributor.advisorPalm, T.P.
dc.contributor.authorRavensbergen, J.
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-01T17:00:29Z
dc.date.available2019-09-01T17:00:29Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.urihttps://studenttheses.uu.nl/handle/20.500.12932/33804
dc.description.abstractThis thesis assesses the explanatory power of liberal intergovernmentalism in the context of Dutch policy towards the Common Fisheries Policy between 1976 and 1983. I construct a historical narrative based on new archival material to argue that commercial interests in resource conservation determined policy preferences of the Netherlands, and the pattern of ‘asymmetrical interdependence’ can account both for the substance of the final agreement, as well as for greater willingness on the part of the Netherlands to compromise. In line with theoretical predictions, the Netherlands attached great value to an agreement. Given the absence of unilateral policy alternatives, the Netherlands has endeavoured to advance an agreement, even to the extent that it offered further concessions on quota allocations and access conditions than was ultimately necessary. However, the history of the CFP has also shown how the institutional environment affects the calculus governments face by limiting unilateral policy alternatives. A convincing explanation must therefore also pay attention to the impact of institutional factors on the pattern of asymmetrical interdependence.
dc.description.sponsorshipUtrecht University
dc.format.extent807668
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.titleA Sea of Opportunities: The Netherlands, European Integration and the Common Fisheries Policy
dc.type.contentMaster Thesis
dc.rights.accessrightsOpen Access
dc.subject.keywordsEuropean Integration, Andrew Moravcsik, Common Fisheries Policy, Netherlands, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Political Economy, Fisheries Management, European Economic Community, EEC
dc.subject.courseuuInternational Relations in Historical Perspective


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