The Hard Problem for Physics: In Search of a Place for Consciousness in Physical Theories

Abstract

Although it is not endorsed by every theoretical physicist, I hold that - paraphrasing Abner Shimony - a theory of everything must 'close the circle'. That is, it must provide an account of the existence of consciousness in nature. Phenomenal consciousness, this intimate 'feel of me being me', is difficult to grasp in physical terms. David Chalmers famously distinguished the 'easy' cognitive problems of the mind from the true 'hard problem': physical theories describe worlds that could have been zombie-worlds as well, i.e. worlds occupied by creatures who act the way we do, but who do not share with us that special aspect we call phenomenal consciousness. That is to say, the facts of physics do not entail it. In this thesis I explore how we should understand the problem from the perspectives of a discipline that seems to be concerned by its very nature with 'a view from the outside'. The burden of the hard problem of consciousness for physics seems to be concerned with putting a shift from the third- to the first person's perspective somewhere into physics. A deeper analysis of two concrete proposals for a physical theory of the mind reveals that specific interpretations of quantum mechanics take this first person's perspective as fundamental from the outset. It turns out that views on the ontology of quantum theory sometimes perfectly align with perspectives on the ontology of consciousness. I conclude that the essence of the hard problem for physics must not be concerned with an explanation of the existence of consciousness, but that it rather should be about the identification of metaphysically reasonable grounds to decide where to put it into nature.