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dc.rights.licenseCC-BY-NC-ND
dc.contributor.advisorLievers, Menno
dc.contributor.authorMontesano Montessori, A.A.
dc.date.accessioned2019-07-04T17:00:52Z
dc.date.available2019-07-04T17:00:52Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.urihttps://studenttheses.uu.nl/handle/20.500.12932/32819
dc.description.abstractWithin this essay, I will be discussing whether Neo-Russellian Monism can deliver a satisfying theory of the mind. This central question was divided in three sub-problems. First, can Neo-Russellian Monism accommodate mental causation? Secondly, can Neo-Russellian Monism explain consciousness? And lastly, is multiple realizability possible on the Neo-Russellian Monist account? At the end of the essay, it will have become clear that Neo-Russellian Monism can accommodate mental causation, but not multiple realizability. Consciousness could not successfully be explained either. Especially the Neo-Russellian Monist failure to explain consciousness is painful, since solving this specific problem is the main goal of the theory. The conclusion is that Neo-Russellian Monism fails to deliver a satisfactory theory of mind.
dc.description.sponsorshipUtrecht University
dc.format.extent599702
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.titleThe Status of the Mind within Neo-Russellian Monism
dc.type.contentMaster Thesis
dc.rights.accessrightsOpen Access
dc.subject.keywordsRussellian Monism; Consciousness; Mental Causation; Mulitple Realizability; Mind-Body Problem;Panpsychism
dc.subject.courseuuPhilosophy


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