The capability approach as an account of minimal well-being that does justice to indigenous peoples

Abstract

In disputes over indigenous lands, there seems to be a huge value gap. Indigenous peoples see their ancestral lands as more than a commodity, unlike governments. This raises the need for finding common ground, which this thesis attempts to find in an account of minimal well-being. By drafting criteria of a Razian theory of minimal well-being that can account for both non-indigenous as indigenous values. To demonstrate the latter, I have brought the Andean indigenous based conception of the good life, Buen vivir, forward. This is a concept that is useful to verify if the capability approach can capture indigenous well-being to a sufficient extent. This thesis shows that there is a need to include collective capabilities in cases they are truly valuable, even if they at times can conflict with individual freedom. This thesis suggests not to include relational and intrinsic communal capabilities in this capabilitarian concept of well-being, as they are incommensurable with individual capabilities. One cannot justify to include values that cannot be traced back to an individual or a group of people in question to be taken into an account in a sufficientarian minimal account well-being. Due to a broad application of collective and individual capabilities, however, a sufficient extent of indigenous values can still be accounted for in a minimal concept of well-being as it meets the three drafted criteria of a theory of minimal well-being. The thesis shows that a capabilitarian theory of minimal well-being can serve as a common ground that could be used by governments in case of conflict or dealing with indigenous communities.