| dc.description.abstract | Paternalism remains a controversial theme in political and normative philosophy. Often based on Mill’s anti-paternalist arguments, a majority of the debate seems to be against paternalism – a sentiment that is resonated in public debate as well. Distinctions between different standards of paternalism – e.g. between libertarian and coercive, soft and hard paternalism – can provide nuance to this negative reception. I argue dissimilarities between paternalism as carried out by institutions and interpersonal paternalism has gone largely unnoticed in the debate. I therefore propose a new form: peer paternalism. I introduce a preliminary definition of this standard, and provide support for the distinction by addressing five sets of objections that paternalism commonly faces, and applying these to peer paternalism. I address objections on autonomy, on disrespect, on legal and normative political challenges, on slippery slopes, and on epistemic challenges. For a majority of these objections, I argue that peer paternalism’s attentiveness, flexibility and a small scale allow peer paternalism to deal with these objections better than institutional paternalism can. I also discuss initial objections of effectiveness and patronisation to peer paternalism. I conclude that the dissimilar workings of peer and institutional paternalism at the very least seem to support my distinction into different standards, and moreover that peer paternalism seems to be a promising alternative to its institutional counterpart. | |
