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dc.rights.licenseCC-BY-NC-ND
dc.contributor.advisorSchouwenburg, Hans
dc.contributor.authorOuden, M.H. den
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-03T17:01:26Z
dc.date.available2018-08-03T17:01:26Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.urihttps://studenttheses.uu.nl/handle/20.500.12932/30104
dc.description.abstractIn the debate between adversaries of either presidential or parliamentary democracies, many possible theories are given to explain the relative shorter lifespan of presidential democracies. Two of those variables, the ‘veto-player composition’ by George Tsebelis and the ‘chain of delegation’ by Kaare Strøm, are used in this thesis for an in-depth case study of the perils and virtues of either systems in the field of (sustainable) policymaking. The United States and Netherlands are compared in their implementation of the United Nations sustainability action-plan Agenda 21. The results yield the observation that the presidential system (United States) had to take a ‘parliamentary detour’ to facilitate policy congruence and an adequate implementation.
dc.description.sponsorshipUtrecht University
dc.format.extent1025126
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.titleThe Parliamentary Detour: Agenda 21 in a presidential and parliamentary context
dc.type.contentMaster Thesis
dc.rights.accessrightsOpen Access
dc.subject.keywordspresidentialism; parliamentarism; presidential; parliamentary; democracy; Netherlands; United States; sustainable development; sustainability; tsebelis; strom; strøm; veto-players; chain of delegation; Agenda 21; Rio; Earth Summit; policymaking; comparative history;
dc.subject.courseuuGeschiedenis van Politiek en Maatschappij


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