Virtue Epistemology and the Ethics of Profiling in Electronic Coaches

Abstract

Electronic coaches are devices that function like coaches. My thesis evaluates the profiling practices of e-coaches from a virtue epistemological perspective. I argue that electronic coaches can be seen as independent machine agents, but also that they can be seen as hybrid agents, together with their user. This hybrid agency can be described either as distributed or extended agency. In section 2, I describe different views one can have about the possibility of these different modes of agency. I argue that they are all possible and which is the most appropriate description of agency depends on the level of integration between the e-coach and the user. In section 3, I evaluate the possibility of ascribing virtue and vice to e-coaches in the modes of agency I described. I argue that virtue ethics is suitable for evaluating agents in all modes. I also argue that since e-coaches are epistemic agents that profile human users, it is extremely important for an e-coach to be a virtuous epistemic agent. I also argue for the importance of epistemic humility in all three modes of e-coach agency, particularly with reference to self-knowledge. In section 4, I argue that epistemic arrogance becomes more morally deplorable when the agent is being epistemically arrogant about a person over whom she has power. As power grows, bad epistemic practices become more deplorable.