| dc.description.abstract | How does power play a role on the fragmentation of global governance architectures? This thesis starts with theory-based hypotheses that fragmentation creates distinctive winners and losers between the powerful nations of the Global North and the weaker Global South. Powerful, Global North nations gain from this phenomena as the proliferation of international institutions allows them to maintain dominance across a non-hierarchical international system. Weaker nations lose out due to increased transaction costs and a lack of ability to form coalitions to compete in deliberations. Weaker nations are therefore in favour of coordination, integration and defragmentation of the system. In order to test this theory, an empirical analysis of the negotiations on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction was conducted. One exemplified the degree of fragmentation each nation supports and bargains for in the context of a theoretical typology and found patterns and variations in that process. This research used a relational content analysis upon the negotiation texts, compiled by the International Institute for Sustainable Development, of all four Preparatory Committees plus proposals submitted to the committee chairs. The data gathered was coded based upon various aspects of fragmentation elucidated by theory. It was then organised based upon individual nations and then by the respective nations’ relative position in the Global North or South. This information was supplemented with data gathered from delegates to the negotiations and academics. The results show that, indeed support for full, autonomous fragmentation of the area beyond national jurisdiction architecture is purely the preference of powerful, Global North nations with one exception. Conversely, a fully synergistic, defragmented area beyond national jurisdiction architecture is not solely the inclination of Global South nations nor is it supported by all Global South nations. A selection of Global South nations are particularly defensive about maintaining the fragmentation of fishing institutions. Further variance occurs with some relatively poorer Global North nations when they amalgamate genuine concerns about global sustainability targets and marine biodiversity into support for loose integration. Overall, the vast majority of nations want some degree of integration varying from a loose degree to full centralisation of all ocean affairs. The evidence strongly supports the theory that powerful nations are gaining from this phenomenon and generally supports that weaker nations are losing out. | |
