Fractured Narrative Self-Understanding

Abstract

In this thesis, I will argue against two related propositions concerning the narrative conception of personal identity: (1) we necessarily see ourselves as a diachronic whole; and (2) we must see ourselves as a diachronic whole in order to live the good life. In order to do so, I will introduce the concept of Fractured Narrative Self-Understanding, meaning that one's personal experience can no longer be made intelligible under a single narrative. I will maintain that psychologically healthy people can experience themselves of having different selves at different times, which does not imply that these people take themselves to be more than one person. I will argue that there is no reason to presuppose that FNSU necessarily decreases either hedonic or eudaimonic well-being. The importance of FNSU is that it is attentive to the consequences of contextual shifts, thereby providing a conceptual analysis that helps to capture the experiences of several underrepresented groups such as former Scientology members.