| dc.description.abstract | If we do not have a free will, this could have significant implications for our morality. Hard incompatibilism is the belief that there is no free will, and that therefore no ‘true’ moral responsibility exists either. In this thesis, I will argue for the moral desirability of hard incompatibilism by arguing for its moral revisionist implications regarding our responsibility practices. I will describe a consequentialist view of moral responsibility that is not undercut by hard incompatibilism. By doing so, I will show that hard incompatibilists still have a reliable way to hold people responsible. The consequentialist view also fits well with the hard incompatibilist ideal of revisionism, as most of these good consequences are good regardless of incompatibilism, and therefore make the incompatibilist theory more morally attractive than compatibilism and even libertarianism. This will also affect our emotional reactions that are related to responsibility. Although I accept some natural basis in our responsibility related emotions, I will argue that we have good reason for a revision in the expression of our pre-reflected reactive emotions by means of a change in cultural emotional norms. Still, a reflective stance is also at all times desirable. Both of these are thus in way to approach revisionism there. I end up taking a more moderate stance than my incompatibilist predecessors, by saying that incompatibilist blame is non-deserved, rather than undeserved. Therefore, I do not opt for full abolishment of these reactive emotions, which I think is not realistic anyway. | |
