| dc.description.abstract | This thesis focuses on the heightened level of political violence within Basque and Catalan nationalism during and after the Spanish transition to democracy (1975-82). During the democratisation process, these peripheral nationalisms, firstly, became legitimate claim-makers that could defend their demands through democratic forms of contention, and, secondly, advanced on their demands by obtaining regional autonomy. Paradoxically, at this moment in time, the Basque ETA and Catalan Terra Lliure embraced a strategy of political violence as the preferred way to voice their demands. Moreover, ETA intensified its armed activity over the years 1978-80, while Terra Lliure stepped up its armed actions in 1987-88.
To understand the puzzling dynamic of democratisation and political violence, I used two theoretical lenses outlined by social movement literature: political opportunity structures on the macro-level and research mobilisation theory on the meso-level. Additionally, to balance these rationalist lenses with a constructivist note, I included movements’ perceptions and frames of these notions.
Looking at the choice for political violence during the transition to democracy, I discerned different motivations for ETA and Terra Lliure. ETA perceived no fundamental change in the Spanish political regime: rather, it observed a continuation of Francoism. This perception, in combination with its strong commitment to the armed struggle and popular support for its radical discourse, motivated ETA to continue its political violence. Importantly, Basque society was characterised by a ‘culture of violence’ as well as a critical stance towards ‘Madrid’ and the democratisation process. In contrast, the transition was broadly supported in Catalonia, and the united Catalan political parties showed a willingness compromise in their negotiations with the Spanish government. In this context, radical Catalan independentists felt ‘sold out’ and frustrated with their inability to change the outcomes of transition and with their failure to enter into parliamentary politics. Hence, for Terra Lliure, this disenchantment and position at the political fringes incited political violence as both a tactic of last resort and a strategy designed to mobilise resources.
Zooming in on the escalation of political violence by ETA over the years 1978-80, I pointed out that ETA deliberately stepped up its armed activity to pressurise the Spanish government to accept its demands formulated in the KAS Alternative. Importantly, ETA perceived a certain sense of urgency due to the increasing consolidation of democracy: at this moment in time, it could still prevent what it termed “the stabilisation of the reform”. While ETA stepped up its political violence explicitly to advance its political demands, Terra Lliure did so in 1987-88 as a last effort to trigger a broader independentist movement. More specifically, Terra Lliure aimed to show the viability of its struggle in light of different setbacks: the split within its political branch, the emergence of ‘decaffeinated independentism’, and the extensive popular criticism of political violence triggered by an ETA action in Barcelona and Terra Lliure’s first, and only, deadly victim | |
