dc.description.abstract | Following the falter of détente between the superpowers in the late 1970’s of the Cold War, suspicion about each other’s intentions rose to peak levels. Strongly held images, for instance the Brezhnev Doctrine, were key to the way in which the opposing powers reacted to each other’s moves. The Polish crisis is one of the more tense conflicts in this period, wherein such images led to grave misperceptions. This research will utilize Robert Jervis’ theory on misperception to explain major miscalculations of Soviet behaviour during the Polish crisis, looking from the perspective of the US and the Netherlands. To establish those misperceptions, this research will first look into the actual policy that the Soviets applied towards the crisis. Then, it will analyse the images of expected Soviet behaviour during the crisis as held by the American and Dutch leaderships, affecting their policies in the progress. This research is focused on the phase of the crisis during Jimmy Carter’s presidency, vividly showing his ever-changing views on foreign policy and the influence of his adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski. | |
dc.subject.keywords | Warsaw Pact, NATO, Polish crisis, intervention, martial law, 1980, Brezhnev Doctrine, Brezhnev, Carter, Brzezinski, Jaruzelski, Kania, Poland, Soviet Union, US, Netherlands, Cold War, perception, misperception, Jervis, Ouimet, international politics, detente, Politburo, CIA, intelligence, National Security Advisor, NSC, Ministerraad, Buitenlandse Zaken | |