Show simple item record

dc.rights.licenseCC-BY-NC-ND
dc.contributor.advisorBacciagaluppi, Guido
dc.contributor.authorGreven, K.W.
dc.date.accessioned2017-12-20T18:01:55Z
dc.date.available2017-12-20T18:01:55Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.urihttps://studenttheses.uu.nl/handle/20.500.12932/28196
dc.description.abstractA stubborn dichotomy exists between time as it is conceived of by physics and time as it is experienced by human beings. Physics regards time as a statically extended dimension, in an everlasting unity with space. As human beings, on the other hand, we experience time as a continuous coming into being, as each now gives way to the next. In an attempt to bridge this persisting contradiction, James Hartle and Jenann Ismael have devised an explanatory approach that employs two levels of description, namely a lower level that describes the fundamental fabric of the universe, and a higher level that describes the temporal and modal beliefs maintained by an embedded agent. Their aim is to explain our experience of temporality without involving the difficult issue of human consciousness. In this thesis, I venture a look at the limits of this explanatory approach. In doing this, I go into various philosophical discussions, in order to investigate which features of our temporal experience are accurately captured by this approach. I argue that consciousness should play a fundamental role in our effort to explain the human experience of time. Now, as conscious beings, where are we in spacetime? As philosophers of science, where are we now in reconciling physical time and human time?
dc.description.sponsorshipUtrecht University
dc.format.extent7701795
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/zip
dc.language.isoen
dc.titleWhere are we now? An inquiry into the limits of an explanatory approach to bridge human time and physical time
dc.type.contentMaster Thesis
dc.rights.accessrightsOpen Access
dc.subject.courseuuHistory and Philosophy of Science


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record