The Evolutionary Argument Against A Priori Metaphysics

Abstract

This paper will set out to give a skeptical argument against the appeal to intuitions as a justificatory means for metaphysical beliefs. First, I will give a short description regarding the current state of the philosophical debate surrounding the nature of intuitions. Second, I will describe how intuitions are used by two different philosophical traditions: the naturalist tradition and the rationalist tradition. I will argue that the a priori methods employed by the rationalist tradition are irreconcilable with the findings and current paradigm of cognitive science. Evolutionary psychology (EP) tells us that our intuitions are mechanisms that helped our ancestors survive in a specific environment. It teaches us that the categories into which we divide the world are the product of natural selection. This conclusion has radical consequences for philosophy. Intuitions might be helpful tools for survival and pattern recognition, but they are deceptive when ontological questions are considered. Consequently, metaphysicians cannot rely on a priorism in their ontological inquiry. Third, I will address several points of criticism – surrounding circularity, reductionism, and physicalism – while outlining an approach to these criticisms that is influenced by the pragmatism of Rudolf Carnap, W.V.O. Quine, Wilfrid Sellars, and Richard Rorty.