Seeing if his papers are in order: On self-refutation and truth in the work of Michel Foucault

Abstract

Michel Foucault has often been criticised for being self-referentially inconsistent. His thought on discursive formations and how they form the way we have historically produced truth has been at the centre of such critiques. If what we call true at a given time is contingent on discursive formations and if that what we think is universal is instead historical, is it not also the case that Foucault’s work itself is subject to these concerns? How can we come to call Foucault’s work true? Is Foucault’s conception of truth self-referentially inconsistent? In this thesis I consider one of these critiques, that of Charles Taylor, and a response to it by Gary Gutting. Gutting tries to counter Taylor’s argument but, I feel, ultimately falls short of giving a satisfying answer by relying too much on politics. Instead, I will argue that one needs not look at politics to ground Foucault’s thought on truth. Building on Foucault’s most methodological and philosophical book, The Archaeology of Knowledge, I will set out to interpret his philosophy of language and historical method as a project that is not sceptical but ultimately agnostic when it comes to issues of truth and validity.