| dc.description.abstract | Abstract
Structural injustices are forms of injustice which constrain people’s possibilities, which do not emerge from specific wrongful actions, but from social structures. Because structural injustice emerges from a complex system like a social structure it is difficult to point out the culpable wrongdoer. Young argues that not the common liability model, but her social connection model must evaluate the agents contributing to structural injustices. In her model these agents are not guilty, a judgement which is assigned to the agent(s) who undertook the action resulting in the injustice, but share political responsibility, because they have the responsibility to take collective action to reorganize the structure. In this thesis I want to look at two distinctions between the two models. In the first chapter I argue that, from Young’s conception of a responsible agent, not all agents are responsible, but some are guilty on the basis of the causal connection they have to the injustice. Therefore, the distinction between guilt and responsibility does not coincide with the distinction between injustice from wrong interactions and structural injustice. In chapter two I argue that the distinction between a backward-looking focus and a forward-looking focus cannot be upheld in the way Young wants to, but it is possible to weaken this distinction, without weakening the social connection model. | |
