The Dutch and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process during the Second Intifada A swift transition towards security?

Abstract

This research is focusing on the transition of both Dutch and EU policy from a human rights/international law driven policy towards a policy dominated by security/stability risk. During the 1990’s, the EU were ambitious in increasing their role in the Middle East Peace Process, but were sidelined during the Oslo and Camp David negotiations. The EU tried to set up their own initiative by implementing the Barcelona process, in which they tried to create an economic and political network within the Mediterranean region, as well as providing large financial support to the Palestinian Authority. However, the violence of the Second Intifada destroyed all possibilities for the EU’s soft approach. Hardliners were in charge and the EU was too divided to formulate an effective policy. Furthermore, the EU was not willing to implement economic sanctions on actors, but maintained their soft approach of negotiations. Their approach may have stayed the same, but their motivations changed. They were now less interested in bringing justice to the unstable region, but were focusing on creating a fragile stability. They were less willing to take initiative, but instead followed the US led peace talks. The Dutch supported the EU approach, seeing it as a way of increasing their own influence. National politics, as well as international circumstances, drove the Dutch towards a more security focused policy.