| dc.description.abstract | The majority of the most poverty-stricken and marginalised civilians in the world live in the most fragile states. As such, NGOs committed to assisting the most marginalised through the direct implementation of development programmes, are required to operate in what are often inherently fragile settings that frequently experience the onset of violent conflict. In this regard, this thesis presents the example of ####, a development NGO not traditionally geared to work in conflict-affected fragile states (CAFS). Nonetheless, frequently confronted with the onset or escalation of conflict that impacts on its programmes, and in the absence of a strategy or policy to guide its decision-making, #### is faced with the strategic decisions as to whether it should retain a presence in country and, if opting to remain, how it should adapt its programmes.
This thesis sets out to develop an understanding as to how #### has reached the above strategic decisions, focusing on the case studies of Liberia (from 1989-1993) and South Sudan (from December 2013 to February 2014). Evidence obtained in relation to these cases is primarily qualitative, with a focus on interview testimony from a selection of key #### staff in each case study, coupled with documentary evidence in relation to the strategic decision-making processes, where available. Adopting Vivienne Jabri’s theory of purposive agency as the analytical lens for this thesis, the strategic decision-making processes are unpacked in each case with a view to developing an understanding as to how #### has reached decisions. Ultimately, four general claims are made regarding #### strategic decision-making: that #### decisions to remain in CAFS are heavily influenced by a perceived responsibility to the communities it works with; that, nonetheless, #### will not work in the conflict-affected areas; #### programming decisions are heavily influenced by donor preferences; and, that, over time, bureaucracy has played an increasing role. | |
