Liberalizing the conception of Rational Action
dc.rights.license | CC-BY-NC-ND | |
dc.contributor.advisor | Anderson, Dr. J.H. | |
dc.contributor.author | Rutten, E.A. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-04-17T17:00:48Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-04-17T17:00:48Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://studenttheses.uu.nl/handle/20.500.12932/16536 | |
dc.description.abstract | Rational action is commonly considered to result from a concurrent better judgment. This way we lose eye for the rational aspects of actions that are not maximally rational. Shifting the focus towards deliberation preceding an action, including partial and prior deliberation, we get a better grasp on agency and autonomy. | |
dc.description.sponsorship | Utrecht University | |
dc.format.extent | 106492 | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.title | Liberalizing the conception of Rational Action | |
dc.type.content | Master Thesis | |
dc.rights.accessrights | Open Access | |
dc.subject.keywords | Rational, action, rationality, irrationality, agency, autonomy, deliberation, weakness of will, weak-willed action, all-things-considered, Davidson, Holton, Levy, Yudkowsky, LessWrong | |
dc.subject.courseuu | Wijsbegeerte |