| dc.description.abstract | At the EEC summit in The Hague at the end of 1969, Willy Brandt took the initiative to embark on a path toward European monetary integration. Endorsing European monetary integration was a departure from the Federal Republic’s previous monetary policy. Until only a few months before The Hague summit, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) had supported the existing transatlantic monetary order of Bretton Woods. Previous initiatives toward monetary integration had caused a strong rebuff in Germany by the Bundesbank as well as the finance ministry. The move towards EMU at The Hague, which in fact challenged the existing framework in which post-war monetary relations were managed, thus meant a clear break with the former West German policy. The central question of this thesis is how the shift in policy – from strong supporter of the Atlantic monetary system to initiator of a European order – can be understood. Was this a conscious move, away from the U.S. and towards Europe? The existing geopolitical and economic theories, explaining the German move towards monetary integration, both are lacking. To understand Brandt’s initiative at The Hague a wider perspective is needed. What is emphasized in this thesis is the importance of ‘regime change’. The synergy of a number of developments, at different levels in the international arena came together at a crucial time. The unquestionable leadership of the U.S. in the Western world was eroding. In Bonn there was serious mistrust of Washington’s long term intentions. The reduced American involvement in Europe and lack of interest in maintaining the transatlantic monetary system, combined with the German economic growth and decrease in Cold War tensions, gave the FRG space to follow a more autonomous policy. Within this setting the change of leaders resulted in a shift in foreign policy objectives, with the FRG and the U.S. moving further apart. The almost simultaneous coming to power of two rather European minded leaders in France and the FRG created room for more intensive cooperation within Europe. It is clear that at The Hague, Brandt chose for Europe: European, not transatlantic, cooperation was given top priority. The Federal Republic of Germany no longer accepted the role of compliant follower. | |
