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dc.rights.licenseCC-BY-NC-ND
dc.contributor.advisorSchaubroeck, K.
dc.contributor.authorWeelden, W. van
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-06T17:01:22Z
dc.date.available2012-07-06
dc.date.available2012-07-06T17:01:22Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.urihttps://studenttheses.uu.nl/handle/20.500.12932/10733
dc.description.abstractIn this paper I explore Darwall’s view of the second-person standpoint. My research question is: Does Darwall’s second-person standpoint provide an account of why agents should be moral? In order to answer this question I will first give an account of Darwall’s theory and how Darwall tries to answer the normative question. Next I will show how Darwall’s answer to the normative question fails and why his theory cannot but fail to answer the normative question. Lastly, I will argue for a revised form of Darwall’s second-person standpoint that does provide an answer to the normative question.
dc.description.sponsorshipUtrecht University
dc.format.extent273663 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.titleThe Second-Person Standpoint and the Normative Question
dc.type.contentBachelor Thesis
dc.rights.accessrightsOpen Access
dc.subject.keywordsSecond-Person Standpoint
dc.subject.keywordsDarwall
dc.subject.keywordsKorsgaard
dc.subject.keywordsNormative question
dc.subject.keywordsmetaethics
dc.subject.keywordsmoral skepticism
dc.subject.courseuuWijsbegeerte


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