

INDIVIDUAL TERRORISM INDICATORS OF LONE OPERATORS



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It's the lone-wolf strategy that I think we have to pay attention to as the main threat to this country.¹

Leon Panetta, CIA Director, February 2010

While nothing is easier than denouncing the evildoer, nothing is more difficult than to understand him.

Fyodor M. Dostoevsky, Russian novelist, 1821 – 1881

¹ USA Today, 'Intelligence Chief: Al-Qaeda likely to attempt attack', February 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-02-03-terror-threats-cia_N.htm (retrieved on June 22, 2011).

Table of Contents

	Page
Introduction	4
Chapter 1 – What is terrorism?	
Introduction	9
1.1 US State Department definition of terrorism	10
1.2 European Union definition of terrorism	11
1.3 Dutch Criminal Law definition of terrorism	12
1.4 Definition of terrorism by Alex Schmid	13
1.5 GTD definition of terrorism	14
Conclusion	15
Chapter 2 – What is lone operator terrorism?	
Introduction	17
2.1 The history of individual terror	17
2.2 Individual revolutionary terrorism in Russia	19
2.3 Iviansky’s definition of individual terror	20
2.4 Individual terror in the twenty-first century	20
2.5 Definitions of lone operator terrorism	22
2.6 Leaderless resistance	22
2.7 The COT definition of lone operator terrorism	23
2.8 Definition of lone operator terrorism in The Netherlands	23
Conclusion	24
Chapter 3 – Research frame	
Introduction	26
3.1 The Pandora-model	26
3.2 The categories of the Pandora-model	27
3.3 Operational profiling and scientific categorization	37
3.3 Data collection and questions of validity	38
3.4 Analysis: three typologies	40
3.5 Selection of cases: The four waves of terrorism	41
Conclusion	43

Chapter 4 – Four waves, three typologies	
Introduction	45
4.1 The first wave	
4.1.a Protagonists of the first wave	46
4.1.b Antagonists of the first wave	47
4.1.c Crucial factors in the first wave	48
4.2 The second wave	
4.2.a Protagonists of the second wave	51
4.2.b Antagonists of the second wave	53
4.2.c Crucial factors in the second wave	54
4.3 The third wave	
4.3.a Protagonists of the third wave	57
4.3.b Antagonists of the third wave	59
4.3.c Crucial factors in the third wave	59
4.4 The fourth wave	
4.4.a Protagonists of the fourth wave	61
4.4.b Antagonists of the fourth wave	63
4.4.c Crucial factors in the fourth wave	63
Chapter 5 – Comparison	
Introduction	66
5.1 Cross-wave analysis of the protagonist	66
5.2 Cross-wave analysis of the antagonist	69
5.3 Cross-wave analysis of the crucial factors	70
Conclusion and recommendations	72
Literature	76
Appendices	
Appendix A Pandora-model	
Appendix B Data-collection of lone operator terrorists	82

Introduction

Although terrorism is usually viewed as a collective activity,² the threat of individual terrorist actors frightens democratic states and calls for action within the nation's counter-terrorism strategy. Preventative counter-terrorism approaches often rely on intelligence, the visibility of actors within a network and the possibility to detect a threat in order to eliminate it. 'Lone wolves', the appellation for individual terrorists, operate outside of a network, which makes it difficult for law enforcement agencies and intelligence services to discern radicalization and terrorist aspirations. Since the terrorist attacks on the United States on 9/11, 2001, and the attacks on European soil in Madrid (2004) and in London (2007) the European urge to strengthen its counter-terrorism policy has increased. In recent years the media reported extensively on several cases of terrorist acts or planned terrorist acts by individuals, not necessarily linked to terrorist organizations. The failed suicide bombing attack in Stockholm by Taimour Abdulwahab in December 2010 is one of the most recent examples.³ This incident and the murder on Dutch columnist Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam on November 2, 2004⁴ are both examples of lone operator terrorists posing a threat to (inter) national security in Europe.

State of the art and relevance

It seems clear to counterterrorism organizations that these respective incidents were acts of terrorism carried out by 'lone wolves'. Strikingly, other high-profile cases, which include the murder on Anna Lindh (2003) and the attack on the Dutch royal family (2005) were not labelled by government and media as terroristic acts performed by lone-operator terrorists. Both cases were political and had significant impact on their host societies. Depending on the definition, one could argue these incidents were acts of lone-operator terrorists. This ambiguity in framing poses an interesting subject that is often politically motivated. Also, this ambiguity in framing shows the need for a clear definition in order to contribute to the research on lone-

² Instituut voor Veiligheids-en Crisismanagement (COT), "Lone Wolf Terrorism. Citizens and governance in a knowledge-based society", June 2007, <http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/Lone-Wolf%20Terrorism.pdf> (retrieved on April 14, 2011).

³ BBC News UK, "Stockholm suspect Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly profiled", December 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11981228> (retrieved on April 12, 2011).

⁴ Hans Wansink, De Volkskrant, "De moord op Theo van Gogh was niet te voorkomen", November 2004, <http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2824/Politiek/article/detail/711072/2004/11/16/De-moord-op-Theo-van-Gogh-was-niet-te-voorkomen.dhtml> (retrieved on April 5, 2011).

operator terrorism.

Not only is the topic of lone operator terrorism relevant out of personal interest, governments are also increasingly worried by the threat posed by lone-operator terrorism. The United States of America (USA) set up a specialized FBI 'lone wolf initiative', part of a broader 'operation vigilant eagle', to increase its potential to detect lone operator terrorists.⁵ In Britain, Minister for State for Security and Counter-Terrorism Pauline Neville Jones, addressed the problem of lone wolf terrorism and the role of internet in one of her recent speeches and stressed the importance of developing a countering strategy.⁶ With its glossy websites and 'how to' manuals Al-Qaeda has tried to inspire Muslims to become lone operators; to stay out of the spotlights and to prepare, plan and perform the attack alone.⁷ Marc Sageman calls this a new form of 'leaderless movement':

“The new generation of terrorists consist of home-grown wannabes, without leadership, and globally connected through the Internet. And their lack of structure and organizing principals makes them even more terrifying and volatile than their terrorist forebears.”⁸

Also, in The Netherlands, threats posed by individual terrorists toward public figures are considered to increase rather than decrease.⁹

All these developments strengthen the need for further research on this subject. Surprisingly however, very little research has been done into the phenomenon of lone operator terrorism, its definition or an in-depth analysis of a sub-set of these loners within a set of terrorism. Within terrorism studies the main

⁵ Gary Fields and Evan Perez, The Wall Street Journal, “FBI seeks to target lone extremists”, June 2009, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124501849215613523.html> (retrieved on March 12, 2011).

⁶ Speech delivered at the Wilton Park Conference by Pauline Neville Jones, “Tackling Online Jihad: Understanding issues and How to Respond”, on January 31, 2011, <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/media-centre/speeches/online-jihad> (retrieved on March 20, 2011).

⁷ Shaun Waterman, The Washington Times, “In online journal, al Qaeda pushes 'lone-wolf' attacks. Jihad abroad discouraged.”, October 2010, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/13/online-journal-al-qaeda-pushes-lone-wolf-attacks/> (retrieved on March 20, 2011).

⁸ Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-first Century*, Pennsylvania, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008, p. 37.

⁹ Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding (NCTb), *Individuele bedreigers van publieke personen in Nederland. Fenomeenanalyse en een beleidsverkenning*, June 2010, pp. 9-10.

focus has been on a general understanding of terrorism,¹⁰ on group dynamics and origins,¹¹ on specific country or group cases,¹² on analysis of counter-terrorism strategies¹³ or on evaluation of counter-terrorism policies.¹⁴ Evaluations of counterterrorism (CT) policy are usually carried out by the administration or organization that implemented them.¹⁵ Looking specifically at counterterrorism approaches from a lone operator perspective we find that very little relevant literature is available. Exploratory studies have been made on threats posed by individuals, providing an overview of 'lone wolf' terrorism cases and their major implications.¹⁶ Several attempts have been made to develop a clear terminology or a set of definitions describing the threat by Harvey Kushner and Christopher Hewitt,¹⁷ who both refer to this type of terrorism as 'freelance terrorism'.

Research question (and explanation of terms)

My research will focus on an analysis of lone-wolf terrorism, based upon data gathered for a research-project I participated in for the Dutch national police corps, the *Korps Landelijke Politie Diensten* (KLPD). This master thesis will be the result of a comparative study in lone operator terrorists. The main research question is: *What is the time-independent profile for lone operator terrorists?* Underneath this research question lies the assumption that there is in fact such a profile for lone operator terrorists and that this profile is time-independent. Being aware of this

¹⁰ See Martha Crenshaw, 'The Causes of Terrorism', *Comparative Politics*, vol. 3, no. 4 (July 1981), pp. 379-399; Max Abrahms, 'What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy', *International Security*, vol. 32, no. 4 (April 2008), pp. 78-105; Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2006.

¹¹ Max Abrahms, 'What Terrorists', pp. 78-105; Marc Sageman, 'The Next Generation of Terror', *Foreign Policy*, no. 165 (April 2008), pp. 37-42.

¹² Klaus Wasmund, 'The Political Socialization of West German Terrorists', in: Peter H. Merkl (ed.), *Political Violence and Terror: Motifs and Motivations*, Berkely, University of California Press, 1986, pp. 191-228; Edwin Bakker and Leen Boer, 'The evolution of Al-Qaedaism: Ideology, terrorists and appeal', *Clingendael Security Paper*, no. 4 (December 2007), pp. 1-97.

¹³ Ronald D. Crelinsten, *Counterterrorism*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2009; Marianne van Leeuwen (ed.), *Confronting Terrorism: European Experiences, Threat Perceptions and Policies*, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2003.

¹⁴ Hans Nelen, Frans L. Leeuw and Stefan Bogaerts, *Antiterrorismebeleid en evaluatieonderzoek: Framework, toepassingen en voorbeelden*, Den Haag, Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2010.

¹⁵ Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding (NCTb), *Antiterrorismemaatregelen in Nederland in het eerste decennium van de 21^e eeuw*, January 2010.

¹⁶ Instituut voor Veiligheids-en Crisismanagement (COT), "Lone Wolf"; Ramon Spaaij, 'The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, vol. 33, no. 9 (2010), pp.854-870.

¹⁷ Harvey W. Kushner, *Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, Thousand Oaks and London, Sage, 2003; Christopher Hewitt, *Understanding Terrorism in America. From the Klan to al Qaeda*, London and New York, Routledge, 2003.

assumption leads to a better understanding of the direction this research will take. In the end the possibility of refuting the assumption still exists.

From a counter-terrorism perspective the phenomenon of lone wolf terrorism is relatively new and the question arises if it is also a new threat to western society¹⁸. Nevertheless, if one takes countering the threat of terrorism and with that, lone operator terrorists as a starting point, one can distinguish an ambiguity in the categorization of certain incidents as terrorism or certain criminals as terrorists and this ambiguity only increases when lone operators are considered. When governments sense an increasing need to make policy fit the contemporary situation, the first need is for a clear definition of terrorism and lone operator terrorism. The term 'lone wolf terrorist' is used to portray individuals operating alone, but the term often draws the wrong picture. Not only is it biologically contestable (wolves are pack animals) but this popular term also gives the impression of an aggressive individual in isolation: a wild perpetrator. Although some individuals acting as lone wolf terrorists might suffer from mental disorders, this is no accepted prevailing factor that determines their radicalization or could explain their terrorism. I prefer the term *lone operator terrorist*, which would not only include the traditional individual 'lone wolf', but also the smallest networks (e.g. two persons, autonomous cells, leaderless jihadism) almost undetectable by intelligence agencies; individuals part of a larger network but who solely decide, plan and perform their act, inspired rather than instructed.

Structure of thesis

It has been said that good (political) science ought to start by asking two questions and, once these are answered, proceed to the third: (1) What do we know? (2) What are we going to learn? And (3) How can we learn?¹⁹ This thesis tries to address all three of these questions. Its main purpose is to synthesize existing knowledge regarding the concept of lone operator terrorism – its typologies, theories, and data as well as general literature on lone operator terrorism so that we first find out what we know (1). In addition, this thesis poses a question derived from the gathered knowledge to provide guidance in the research process (2). As for the 'how': by collecting data from lone operator attacks and comparing typologies in lone operator

¹⁸ Ramon Spaaij, "The Engima".

¹⁹ Asbjorn S. Norgaard, 'Political Science: Witchcraft or Craftsmanship? Standards for Good Research', *World Political Science Review*, vol. 4, no. 1 (2008).

terrorism this manuscript provides an opportunity to learn (3).

These questions automatically lead to the following structure. In chapter 1 and 2, existing literature on definitions of terrorism and current studies on lone operator terrorism will be analyzed in order to answer the question: what do we know about this phenomenon? Chapter 3 provides the research frame for the comparative study carried out and thus answers the question: what are we going to learn? In chapter 4, the results of this analysis will be presented and discussed. This answers the question: how can we learn? Finally, in the conclusion, a summary of the thesis will be provided, stating its main results and implications and suggestions for further research.

Chapter 1: What is terrorism?

Introduction

Terrorism is, in the words of Walter B. Gallie, an ‘essentially contested concept’.²⁰ A concept which meaning inescapably leads to endless discussion and which cannot rely on empirical data to reach agreement on its definition. According to Alex Schmid, ‘Terrorism definitions generally tend to reflect the political interests and the moral judgment (or lack thereof) of those who do the defining’.²¹ The use of broad definitions of terrorism is and has been a constant problem in the field of terrorism research.²² Terrorism as a concept seems to suffer from membership and border-issues.²³ Where does terrorism stop and do other forms of political violence begin? When does guerrilla warfare turn into terrorism? Why are some acts (assassinations, cyber crime) considered terrorism on some occasions but not on others? The more all-inclusive usage of the concept of terrorism leads to confusion because different people will be talking about different things under the banner of terrorism – which is one of the reasons why the United Nations has not yet reached a consensus on the definition of terrorism.²⁴ In choosing a definition one important question is: Who does the defining? And, turning that into a normative question: Who should do the defining? Governments often hold power when it comes to defining terms with operational consequences. In my opinion, in defining such an influential and often misused concept as terrorism, academics have a big role to play.

In this chapter, I will look at different definitions of terrorism and see how they overlap with – and relate to – each other. First, the US State Department definition of terrorism will be analyzed because that definition has guided much of counterterrorism policy in the US – the country that has been the frontrunner in counterterrorism measures and research over the last decade. Second, we will look at the definition of terrorism used by the European Union. Third, we will look at the definition of terrorism under Dutch criminal law because that is the definition used

²⁰ Walter Bryce Gallie, ‘Essentially contested concepts’, in: *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. 56 (1956), pp. 167-198.

²¹ Alex. P. Schmid, ‘Terrorism: The Definitional Problem’. *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, vol. 36, no. 2-3 (2004), p. 384.

²² Anthony Arblaster, ‘Terrorism: Myths, Meaning and Morals’, *Political Studies*, vol. 25, no.3 (September 1977), pp. 414, 421.

²³ Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, Ami Pedahzur and Leonard Weinberg, ‘The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism’, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 17, no. 1 (2005), p. 3.

²⁴ Patrick Goodenough, CNS News, “Almost 10 Years After 9/11, U.N. Still Grappling to Define Terrorism”, April 2011, <http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/almost-10-years-after-911-un-still-grapp> (retrieved on August 11, 2011).

by the Dutch counterterrorism organizations, such as the KLPD. Fourth, a definition proposed by Alex Schmid will be looked at because he created a definition based upon scientific research, providing an academic perspective. Finally, the definition used by the Global Terrorism Database will be taken into account because that definition has been used in order to create a database for different types of terrorist acts. At the end of chapter one a conclusion will be drawn as to what definition of terrorism I will use in this paper.

1.1 US State Department definition of terrorism

The US government upholds more than twenty different definitions of terrorism, terrorist activity, acts of terrorism and (federal) crimes of terrorism.²⁵ The US State Department currently defines terrorism as “Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents [usually intended to influence an audience]”.²⁶ The US Government has used this definition for analytical and statistical goals since 1983. This definition captures some essential points of terrorism: political motivation, the violent act as a message, premeditation as opposed to an accident or a *crime passionel* and the goal of extending influence. While on the surface a clear and manageable definition, it nonetheless has been criticized for various reasons. According to Thomas Badey, the inclusion of *clandestine agents* is problematic in that clandestine activities of agents related to other governments are subject to their own taxonomy; covert action, sabotage and espionage or direct involvement in activities that are classified as international terrorism is extremely rare.²⁷ On the other hand, one could also argue that the reference to clandestine agents serves to include state-sponsored terrorist groups.

While this definition covers the phenomenon of ‘political terrorism’, not all forms of terrorism are politically motivated. Terrorism can be motivated by revenge, religious purposes or personal reasons as well. It will be more difficult to include those terrorist acts in this definition unless one finds a way to label them under political terrorism. Also, the relative merit of the sentence ‘usually intended to influence an audience’ can be questioned. It does not specify or distinguish any

²⁵ Nicholas J. Perry, ‘The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many Grails’, *Journal of Legislation*, vol. 30, no. 2 (2004), pp. 249-274.

²⁶ US Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2006*, April 2007, Code 22, Section 2656f(d), <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82726.htm>, (retrieved on March 29, 2011).

²⁷ Thomas J. Badey, ‘Defining International Terrorism: A Pragmatic Approach’, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, (10) 1, 1998 p. 92.

characteristics and thus, it does not add anything to the clarity of the definition.

The biggest debate concerning the US State Department definition of terrorism centers, however, on the interpretation of ‘non-combatant’. In the definition provided above, the State Department further explains this term:

“For purposes of this definition, the term "non-combatant" is interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed or not on duty. (...) We also consider as acts of terrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site, such as bombings against US bases in Europe, the Philippines, or elsewhere.”²⁸

The implication of this addition is that military personnel are also considered to be non-combatants (even if they are armed) if they are not on duty. In other words, the US State Department adapts a very flexible interpretation of the term ‘non-combatant’.

All in all, this definition has its merits in that it includes a couple of essential elements of terrorism and because it is a short, manageable definition. Its weaknesses are its narrow focus on politically motivated terrorism, the vagueness of the sentence ‘usually intended to influence an audience’ and the controversy about the nature of non-combatants, blurring the distinction between armed conflict and terrorism.

1.2 European Union definition of terrorism

After the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the European Union Council decided to create a framework decision on combating terrorism, the first article of which contained a legal definition of terrorism. In this article, acts of terrorism are defined as:

“intentional acts that are committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization”.²⁹

²⁸ US Department of State, *Country Reports*.

²⁹ European Union Council, “Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism”, June 2002,

One of the main criticisms concerning the EU definition of terrorism is that this definition, coupled with the planned new operational measures, could treat protestors and other groups as if they were ‘terrorists’. After the terrible terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the United States, many measures were taken by the US against other states that can also be defined as terrible. It is in the aftermath of these events that the EU framework decision on combating terrorism was defined, which dramatically widened the usual understanding of terrorism. According to Thomas Mathiesen, there are two main consequences of the EU framework decision on combating terrorism. First of all, the definition, if implemented, will have marginal importance in the prevention of terrorist acts like the one experienced in the US. And second, the definition will be of great importance in the prevention of legitimate but – what he calls – ‘perhaps somewhat boisterous’ protests within the EU.³⁰

While the danger of this definition lies in the possible adaptation of this definition to peaceful protest movements and groups, it also has its merits. According to a large European research project entitled ‘Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law’, this definition includes six key quality elements that are necessary for a sound legal definition of terrorism. These elements are: the intentional character of the committed acts; the purpose of the act(s); a qualification of the act itself; the specification of both the perpetrator and the target; and the scope of the act (including its exceptions).³¹ Applying this qualification to the EU definition of terrorism, we can conclude that it meets these basic requirements.

To summarize, the weakness of the EU definition lies in its broad scope, allowing for the inclusion of peaceful protest groups. Its strength is that it contains the six basic elements needed for a sound legal definition of terrorism.

1.3 Dutch criminal law definition of terrorism

Under Dutch criminal law, terrorism is defined as an ‘offense characterized by terrorist intent’. In article 83a of the Dutch criminal law, ‘terrorist intent’ is further described as:

http://eurlex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=32002FO475&model=guichett (retrieved on August 11, 2011).

³⁰ Thomas Mathiesen, ‘EU: Expanding the concept of terrorism?’, *Statewatch*, vol. 11, no. 5 (August-October 2001), p. 3139.

³¹ Transnational Terrorism Security and the Rule of Law, ‘Common EU definition of terrorism will work only if adopted by all’, *Policy Brief*, no. 2 (November 2008), p. 2.

“The intent to spread terror among (part of) the citizenry of a country; or to force a government or international organization to [illegally] do or not do something or to allow something; or to gravely destabilize the fundamental existing political, constitutional, economical or social structures of a country or an international organization”.³²

This definition closely follows the proposed EU definition. One of the differences is that the EU definition speaks of ‘seriously intimidating a population’ whereas the Dutch legal definition speaks of ‘spreading terror among the citizenry’. One could argue that ‘spreading terror’ has a stronger connotation than ‘seriously intimidating’, thereby creating a qualitative difference in the characterization of when something is to be considered terrorism. On the other hand, both definitions do not further elaborate on this so the meaning of terror and intimidation is up for interpretation. Besides this difference, the Dutch legal definition has the same implications as the EU definition, sharing its strengths and weaknesses. The Dutch counterterrorism organization NCTb defines terrorism as:

‘Threatening, making preparations for or perpetrating, for ideological reasons, acts of serious violence directed at people or other acts intended to cause property damage that could spark social disruption, for the purpose of bringing about social change, creating a climate of fear among the general public, or influencing political decision-making’.³³

In this definition, the question remains what entails ‘serious violence’ and what qualifies as ‘ideological reasons’ and ‘social disruption’.

1.4 Definition of terrorism by Alex Schmid

Alex Schmid, in his *Handbook of Terrorism Research* is helpful in providing an academic definition by gathering the answers from 91 respondents active in the academic study of terrorism.³⁴ He defines terrorism as:

³² Wetboek van Strafrecht, “Wetboek Online”, <http://www.wetboek-online.nl/wet/Sr.html#1028> (retrieved on August 11, 2011).

³³ Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding (NCTb), “Wat is terrorisme?”, http://www.nctb.nl/onderwerpen/wat_is_terrorisme/ (retrieved on August 11, 2011).

³⁴ Alex. P. Schmid, ‘The Definition of Terrorism’. *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*, 2011, pp. 39-98.

“(...) An anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought”.³⁵

Clearly, this definition is too long to be manageable for counterterrorism organizations. However it does provide a strong academic definition, placing the focus on the intermediate nature of terrorist acts. This definition follows the so called ‘double victimization principle’ (a principle proposed by Ronald Crelinsten in response to a questionnaire sent by Alex Schmid) meaning that the immediate target of the attack is not, in fact, the real target. The real target is a second entity that may or may not be connected to the victim, whose behaviour should be influenced by the act.³⁶ The symbolic nature of terrorist acts is what distinguishes terrorism from other forms of political violence.

1.5 GTD Definition of Terrorism

The data for the Global Terrorism Database was collected by a private security agency, the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service. The aim of the PGIS database was to record and summarize every known terrorist event across space and time in order to create a database ready for risk analysis for US businesses. The data would be analyzed drawing on international multi-lingual news sources, in other words: open source information. Incidents were collected according to the following definition of terrorism:

“The threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non state actor

³⁵ Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman (eds.), *Political terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories and literature*, Amsterdam, Transaction Books, 1988.

³⁶ Ronald Crelinsten cited in Alex P. Schmid, *Political terrorism*, p. 23.

to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.”³⁷

While the original GTD1 employed the definition of terrorism utilized by PGIS, the second phase of data collection for the GTD (GTD2: 1998-2007) coded each incident so as to allow users to identify only those cases that meet their own definition of terrorism. Based on the original GTD1 definition, each incident included in the GTD2 had to be an *intentional act of violence or threat of violence by a non-state actor*. In addition, two of the following three *criteria* also had to be met for inclusion in GTD2: (1) The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal; (2) The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) other than the immediate victims; and (3) The violent act was outside the precepts of International Humanitarian Law.³⁸

The second principle again refers to the symbolic nature of terrorism and the double victimization principle. The first principle includes the motivational aspect of terrorism, although it leaves out personal goals. The third principle at first sight seems to make good sense but when analyzed, it only stresses the fact that state actors cannot be viewed as possible terrorist actors. These principles combined with the definitions seem to cover the earlier mentioned six qualitative elements required for a sound definition of terrorism. However, it is odd that only two out of the three criteria have to be met for inclusion in GTD2. One could argue that if the first principle (the violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal) is not applicable to a criminal offense, then one cannot speak of a terrorist act.

To conclude, the GTD2 definition provides a good starting point for a sound definition of terrorism. However, the exclusion of state terrorism is a weakness, and the fact that only two out of three criteria have to be met makes it an unqualified definition of terrorism.

Conclusion

While certain broad elements of terrorism are generally agreed upon (such as the

³⁷ Global Terrorism Database, “Data Collection Methodology”, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/> (retrieved on June 20, 2011).

³⁸ Global Terrorism Database, “Data Collection”.

intentional use of violence); many other factors (such as whether the victims of terrorism must be non-combatants, whether terrorism requires a political motive and whether states can be terrorist actors) continue to be debated. Indeed, even where there is some consensus at the broadest level, there is often disagreement on the details. It is well recognized that divergent definitions of terrorism abound and that both governments and scholars hotly contest the nature and causes of terrorism. The biggest common denominator in the definitions of terrorism mentioned above is the (intentional) use of violence combined with a political motivation.

I choose to use the definition proposed by Alex Schmid for this paper, because his definition provides an academic base upon which a proper analysis of lone operator terrorism can be build. Taking his definition of terrorism as a starting point, in chapter two the phenomenon of lone operator terrorism will be analyzed into further detail.

Chapter 2: What is lone operator terrorism?

Introduction

There have been numerous ways throughout history to describe lone operator terrorism: revolutionary terrorism, individual terrorism, anarchism, leaderless resistance, vanguard movements, phantom cell structures and guerrilla warfare. All these different labels are context-specific but have many things in common. In this part of the thesis we will look at the evolution of individual terror and at what we perceive as lone operator terrorism.

No doubt Timothy McVeigh, the US army veteran who was responsible for the terrorist strike known as the Oklahoma City Bombing, killing 168 and injuring 450 people, is the most famous lone operator terrorist in history.³⁹ After his terrorist act, Timothy McVeigh became the prototype lone operator, even though he did not act entirely on his own; he had two companions.⁴⁰ Today, lone operator terrorism is not seen necessarily as a new strategy, but it is definitely a form of terrorism that demands our attention. As CIA-director Leon Panetta said in a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing in February of last year: ‘It’s the lone wolf strategy that I think we have to pay attention to as the main threat to this country’.⁴¹

In this chapter we will look at the history of individual terrorism from the 18th century in Italy and France, throughout the 19th and 20th century (the wave of anarchy in Russia, Europe and the United States) into the twenty-first century. Based upon that history we will look at different definitions of individual and lone operator terrorism in order to adequately define and describe the phenomenon under study in this paper.

2.1 The history of individual terror

Individual (lone operator) terrorism is often linked to the early anarchists at the turn of the 19th century in Italy and France. These anarchist movements interpreted propaganda by the deed as a means to convey their feelings to a larger audience. According to Ze’ev Iviarsky, modern terror can be traced back to the slogan

³⁹ Wikipedia, “Timothy McVeigh”, June 2011, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timothy_McVeigh (retrieved on June 18, 2011).

⁴⁰ Jeffrey Kaplan, ‘Leaderless Resistance’, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 9, no. 3 (Autumn 1997), p. 90.

⁴¹ USA Today, ‘Intelligence Chief: Al-Qaeda likely to attempt attack’, February 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-02-03-terror-threats-cia_N.htm (retrieved on June 22, 2011).

‘propaganda of the deed’.⁴² This slogan was first used by the Italian anarchists and referred to acts of violence that demonstrated revolution, i.e. the act itself could be seen as a manifesto, a sign of protest and confrontation.⁴³ He traces the roots of individual terror to the late nineteenth century, when a continuous wave of –new– revolutionary violence lasted until the First World War and the Russian revolution. The French anarchist Paul Brousse popularized the slogan by publishing an article by that title in 1877, interpreting the slogan as a method ‘intended to show them [the weary and inert masses] that which they were unable to read, to teach them socialism in practice, to make it visible, tangible, concrete.’⁴⁴ The historian Walter Laqueur, in his book on ‘new terrorism’, has referred to this ‘propaganda of the deed’ as a form of political action. According to him, the underlying idea is that a terrorist act that has a major public impact has a twofold result. First of all, it establishes the importance of the intended message and second, it gives the implication of power that echoes beyond the immediate political target.⁴⁵ What all of the definitions and interpretations cited have in common is that they view propaganda of the deed as a tactic, a means to convey a message, an idea or the implication of power. Also, these manifestations of individual terror are all very much linked to revolution; acts that were intended to sweep up the masses and make revolution visible. The well-known Russian anarchist and revolutionary, Mikhail Alexandrovich Bakunin, described propaganda of the deed most clearly in his *Letters to a Frenchman on the Present Crisis*, writing: ‘We must spread our principles, not with words but with deeds, for this is the most popular, the most potent, and the most irresistible form of propaganda’.⁴⁶

At the end of the nineteenth century, a wave of (attempts of) anarchist assassinations occurred in Europe in Germany, Italy and Spain and later spread to the United States and France. What distinguished this form of anarchist assassination from other, earlier, forms of individual terrorism is that it was carried

⁴² Ze’ev Iviarsky, ‘Individual Terror: Concept and Typology’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 12, no. 1 (January 1977), p. 45.

⁴³ Ze’ev Iviarsky, ‘Individual Terror’, p. 45.

⁴⁴ James Guillaume, ed., *L’Internationale. Documents et Souvenirs 1864-1887*, IV, Paris, 1910, p. 114. Cited in Ze’ev Iviarsky, ‘Individual Terror’, p. 45.

⁴⁵ Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 3-4.

⁴⁶ Mikhael Alexandrovich Bakunin, *Letters to a Frenchman on the Present Crisis*, 1870, edited and translated by S. Dolgoff in *Bakunin on Anarchism*, Montreal, Black Rose Books, 1996, <http://marxists.org/reference/archive/bakunin/works/1870/letter-frenchman.htm> (retrieved on May 18th, 2011).

out by lone operators, not initiated or backed by any underground organization or anarchist movement. The other distinguishing feature of this form of individual terrorism was that the act of rebellion was an end in itself; the only aim was rebellion. Because of the impossibility of striking directly at abstract entities such as authority, society or the establishment, one of the consequences of this rebellion was degeneration into robbery and other crime. According to Iviansky, this wave of anarchist violence ended in different ways in different countries. In France, it degenerated into murder and robbery by the *Illegalistes* group; in Spain into lawlessness and murder by the *pistoleros*; in the US into *gangsterism*; and in Russia into a wave of nihilistic *bezmotivnyi terror*: ‘terror without motivation’.⁴⁷

2.2 Individual revolutionary terrorism in Russia

Towards the end of the 19th century, propaganda by the deed was used both within and outside of the anarchist movement and came to indicate a variety of individual violent acts such as bombings, the killing of monarchs or so-called ‘regicides’ and the assassination of tyrants, the ‘tyranicides’. This indicates a second type of individual terrorism, which finds its most vivid expression in the Russian revolutionary movement: ‘terrorist political warfare’. The *Narodnaya Volya Party* in Russia deliberately called upon their members to engage in ‘destructive and terroristic activity’, stating:

“Terrorist activity consists of the destruction of the most harmful persons in the government, the protection of the Party from spies, and the punishment of official lawlessness and violence in all the more prominent and important cases where it is manifested. The aim of such activity is to break down the prestige of government, to furnish continuous proof of the possibility of pursuing a contest with the government, to raise in that way the revolutionary spirit in the people, the family, to form a body suited and accustomed to warfare.”⁴⁸

This Russian method of political warfare by means of terror did not go uncontested however, as some individuals in the Russian anarchist movement distanced

⁴⁷ Ze’ev Iviansky, ‘Individual terror’, p. 52.

⁴⁸ ‘Programma Iсполnitel’novo Komiteta’, *Literatura Socialno Revolucionnoi Partji ‘Narodnoj Voli’*, (Paris 1905), p. 165. Cited in Ze’ev Iviansky, ‘Individual Terror’, p. 46.

themselves from this form of individual terror. One of them, Peter Kropotkin, wrote that ‘a structure based on centuries of history cannot be destroyed with a few kilos of dynamite’.⁴⁹ Nonetheless, the Russian method had a lot of supporters that adhered to its organizational framework and the presence of the revolutionary intelligentsia. In general, the feeling was that this form of terror was ‘the way of realizing the aims with the least numbers of victims and in the shortest possible time’.⁵⁰

2.3 Iviansky’s definition of individual terror

Iviansky defines individual terror as ‘a system of modern revolutionary violence aimed at leading personalities in the government or the Establishment (or any other human targets’.⁵¹ In his explanation of the definition he emphasizes the importance of the ideological/strategic rather than the personal motivation, the impersonal character concerning its targets and the scale and intensity of this new form of terrorism. In his opinion, the motivation behind terrorist acts is always political instead of personal. And when he differentiates three different types of terrorism in the modern era: anarchism, social revolution and national liberation types of terrorism, he is quick to point at their commonalities in that they all share the impersonal character in choosing targets and they all take place on a growing scale and with more intensity.

2.4 Individual terror in the twenty-first century

The study of terrorism has a tendency to be event-driven.⁵² If we start with that assumption, an overview of individual terrorism in the twenty-first century should be easily found when looking at terrorism research in the twenty-first century.

Terrorism associated with the far left and/or national resistance was the focus of research in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. After that, terrorism from the extreme right took the centre stage in the late 1980s and the 1990s. Other forms of terrorism that attracted attention during that period were extreme right anti-immigrant groups in Europe and Jewish guerrilla terrorism in Israel. And since the late 1990s and the 2000s, most research has focused on what Laqueur describes as a new terrorism that is “motivated by religious belief and is more fanatical, deadly and pervasive than the

⁴⁹ Peter Kropotkin, ‘The Spirit of Revolt’, 1880, edited by R.N. Baldwin in *Kropotkin’s Revolutionary Pamphlets*, New York, Dover Press, 1970, pp. 35-43.

⁵⁰ Lev Sternberg, *Politicheski Terror v Rossii*, Hectograph ed., 1884 (copy in Institute for Social History, Amsterdam), cited in Iviansky, ‘Individual Terror’, p. 55.

⁵¹ Ze’ev Iviansky, ‘Individual terror’, p. 50.

⁵² Martha Crenshaw, ‘The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century’, *Political Psychology*, vol. 21, no. 2 (June 2000), p. 410.

older and more instrumental forms of terrorism the world had grown accustomed to”.⁵³ The idea is that this new form of terrorism, religious terrorism, differs from the old terrorism in the way it is organized, and in its goals and methods. Whereas the old terrorism placed political revolution and national liberation at the centre of its pursuit, the new terrorism aims at changing the world.⁵⁴ Driven by their religious motivation, these new terrorist adhere not to an earthly authority but claim to be accountable only to a deity – and its prophet. When it comes to their methods, they use highly lethal methods in order to spread their message and draw attention, focusing on destroying that or those who oppose their religion, viewing them as impure. The strategies of the old terrorists were discriminating: they saw their actions as propaganda of the deed, and usually focused on specific victims in order to reach social and political change as soon as possible. The new terrorists seek a change throughout the whole world, not something that can be accomplished on a short term. Thus, they cause high numbers of casualties and they do not fear to commit suicide. In fact, they are often inspired and instructed to do so. Finally, concerning their organizational format, this new terrorism is organized more loosely and decentralized compared to the old, hierarchical and centralized organizations of terrorism. Power is diffused through different terrorist cells, that all keep in touch but operate on their own. It is personal conviction, beliefs and inspiration that its followers share, not institutions and organizations.

This new organizational structure of terrorism highly accommodates lone operator terrorism. Lone operator terrorists can find all the inspiration they need through the Internet and through examples; they can receive training and learn about terrorist strategies and still plan their act on their own, not commanded by outside structures. In fact, lone operator terrorism is stimulated by terrorist organizations because it is such an effective tactic in the worldwide struggle for the establishment of the Islamic state, the Caliphate. After the death of Osama bin Laden, on May 2nd 2011, al-Qaeda issued a statement calling on their followers to use the tactics of individual terror.

“We call for the Muslims in Pakistan on whose soil Sheikh Osama was

⁵³ Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism*, 1999.

⁵⁴ Martha Crenshaw, ‘The Psychology’, 2002, p. 411.

killed to rise up and revolt, and cleanse this shame imposed on them by traitors and thieves who sold everything to the enemies of their nation.”⁵⁵

2.5 Definitions of lone operator terrorism

The question at hand is: what exactly is a lone operator, or when does someone become a lone operator terrorist? Looking at the history of individual terror, we can conclude that lone operator terrorists operate worldwide and come in all shapes, sizes and adhere to all different kinds of ideologies. Anarchist revolutionaries, religious zealots, white supremacists, Islamic fundamentalists, environmental and animal rights extremists all have engaged in lone operator attacks. Thus, we must be careful not to limit ourselves by putting our focus on one group. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the focus within terrorism studies has been largely on Islamic terrorism and jihadism. It is tempting, when studying the phenomenon of lone operator terrorism, to make the same mistake by focusing mainly on Islamic fundamentalists or Jihadists.

We will look at different definitions of lone operator terrorism in the same way we analyzed different definitions of terrorism in the previous chapter. We will look at Kaplan’s leaderless resistance definition, COT’s working definition utilized in its lone wolf research paper and at the Dutch counterterrorism organization (NCTb)’s way of defining individual terrorism.

2.6 Leaderless resistance

According to Ehud Sprinzak, leaderless resistance may be defined as ‘a kind of lone wolf operation in which an individual, or a very small, highly cohesive group, engages in acts of anti-state violence independent of any movement, leader or network of support.’⁵⁶ This violence may take the form of attacks on state institutions or operatives, or it may take the form of random targets of opportunity selected on the basis of their perceived vulnerability and their symbolic importance.’⁵⁷

This definition shows the strong connection between the concept of leaderless resistance and lone operator terrorism. In this definition, leaderless resistance can be

⁵⁵ Al-Qaeda, ‘A statement about the dignity and martyrdom of Sheikh Osama bin Laden, may Allah have mercy on him’, translated and published by The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR), <http://icsr.info/news/attachments/1304701772AQ.pdf> (retrieved on May 11th, 2011).

⁵⁶ Jeffrey Kaplan, ‘Leaderless resistance’, 1997.

⁵⁷ Ehud Sprinzak, ‘Right-Wing Terrorism in Comparative Perspective: The Case of Delegitimation’, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 7, no. 1 (Spring 1995) pp.17-43.

viewed as a wider encompassing concept within which individuals (or small groups) use lone operator terrorism as a strategy to reach their goals. What distinguishes leaderless resistance from lone operator terrorism is that leaderless resistance is defined in terms of anti-state violence, whereas lone operator terrorism can be used against the state but also against other targets.

2.7 The COT definition of lone operator terrorism

According to the *Instituut voor Veiligheids-en Crisismanagement (COT)*, drawing on the EU definition of terrorism, acts of lone operator terrorism are “intentional acts committed by persons:

- a. who operate individually;
- b. who do not belong to an organized terrorist group or network;
- c. who act without the direct influence of a leader or hierarchy;
- d. whose tactics and methods are conceived and directed by the individual without any direct outside command or direction.”⁵⁸

The difficulty of this definition lies in the question where to draw the line between direct and indirect influence of a leader, hierarchy, terrorist group or network. Basically, the core question is: how *lone* is a lone operator? The merit of this definition is that it clearly distinguishes between terrorist acts committed by one person (lone operator terrorism) and terrorist acts committed by more than one person (not lone operator terrorism). However, we can also question whether small terrorist cells or individuals operating within a larger network should be part of a lone operator definition.

2.8 Definition of lone operator terrorism in The Netherlands

In the Netherlands, lone operators are usually referred to as ‘individual terrorists’.⁵⁹ The Dutch counterterrorism organization NCTb divides this group of individual terrorists into several subgroups. Grouping lone operators under ‘lone individuals who pose a threat’, it further divides them into the categories ‘confused people’ (*verwarden*), ‘confused-frustrated people’ (*verward-gefrustreerden*), ‘lone individuals who pose a threat through the use of slang’ (*straattaal dreigers*) and

⁵⁸ Instituut voor Veiligheids-en Crisismanagement (COT), “Lone Wolf”, p. 6.

⁵⁹ John Tamerus, Peter Horsten and Edwin van den Bogert, *Terrorisme ontrafeld*, 2007, Deventer: Kluwer.

‘other’ (*overigen*). Lone individuals who express threats just for fun are also grouped under this last category.⁶⁰ This categorization was adapted after research into the Dutch situation, leading to this seemingly arbitrary categorization. However, if we look at a research project carried out by the *Verwey-Jonker* Institute for the Department of Internal Affairs, we find a similar categorization into: ‘powerless-frustrated people’ (*de machteloze-gefrustreerde*), ‘highly-strung people’ (*het korte lontje*), ‘confused people’ (*de verwarde*), ‘violence as lifestyle’ (*geweld als leefstijl*), ‘easily influenced people’ (*de beïnvloedbare*) and the ‘incidental perpetrators under influence’ (*de incidentele pleger onder invloed*).⁶¹

Basically, the NCTb does not provide a clear-cut definition of lone operator terrorism but instead groups several specific typologies under the phenomenon of individual terrorism. The advantage is that we get a clear categorization of people who might be considered as lone operators. The downside is that not everyone who would fall in one of the subcategories provided by the NCTb or the Verwey-Jonker Institute is necessarily a lone operator, let alone a terrorist.

Conclusion

The different definitions of lone operator – or individual – terrorism all have their own strengths and weaknesses. In my opinion, the COT-definition provides the most concise and clear description of lone wolves. However, I prefer the term *lone-operator terrorist*, because it clearly points to the difference with group-operating terrorists and focuses upon the operational aspect of the terrorist act. Defining lone wolves as lone-operator terrorists enables us to include the traditional individual (the ‘lone wolf’), acting solely on his own initiative. Yet this definition also enables us to include the smallest networks (e.g. two persons, autonomous cells, leaderless jihadism) almost undetectable by intelligence agencies. Lone-operators are individuals who are not part of a larger network but who solely decide, plan and perform their act, inspired rather than instructed.

If we look back to the definition of terrorism by Alex Schmid, we can see how the definition of lone operator terrorism is a subgroup within the broader category of terrorism. Schmid defined terrorism as:

⁶⁰ NCTb, *Individuele bedreigers*, 2010, p. 10.

⁶¹ Inge Bakker, Lisanne Drost and Wouter Roeleveld, ‘Wat hebben geweldplegers gemeen? Een typologie van plegers van geweld tegen de publieke taak en van publiek geweld’, Verwey-Jonker Instituut, *Programma Veilige Publieke Taak en het Ministerie van Justitie, Programma Geweld in het (semi-)publieke domein*, Juli 2010, p. 5.

*“(...) an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine **individual**, group or state **actors**, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. (...) (Emphasis added)⁶²*

Thus acts of lone operator terrorism may be aimed at targets as diverse as inter-racial couples, gay bookstores or clubs, or indeed, at government agents or buildings. Despite the vast differences between all these different types of lone operators, there are certain commonalities that many lone operator terrorists share. It is those commonalities that will be explored into further detail in the next chapters.

⁶² Alex P. Schmid, *Political terrorism*.

Chapter 3: Research frame

Introduction

In this chapter, the research frame will be laid out and explained. In the Pandora-model, data about terrorist incidents was gathered and categorized to enable the comparison of large amounts of data and to provide insight in processes of radicalization and terrorist planning. By gathering data on lone operator terrorist incidents, I was able to use Pandora to compare and contrast lone operator terrorists over time. First, the Pandora-model and its underlying ideas will be explained. Second, the data-collection and the way in which the database was constructed will be discussed. Third, the four-waves-of-terrorism theory by David C. Rapoport, that was used in order to provide a framework for the dataset, will be summarized. This will answer the question of how to find out whether there is a time-independent lone operator profile.

3.1 The Pandora-model

The Pandora-model is a model that creates scenarios based upon collected data from earlier scenarios. A scenario can be completely detached from reality, as is the case in the creative industry of movies, theatre and literature. However, even in those cases the scenarios follow a certain pattern. They do not serve to predict or forecast the future, yet a good scenario must also be imaginable. Sudden changes in the storyline or certain events that are not realistic within the developing story undermine the scenario.⁶³ According to Peter Berenschot, a proactive scenario always consists of a number of basic narrative elements such as: the protagonist, the antagonist, the premise, the arena, the time (zone), the framework, the motivation, the target, the change of circumstance, the modus operandi, the symbolism and the red herring.⁶⁴ The protagonist is the main character or the main characters and the antagonist is the enemy (which may or may not be a person). The premise is the development: what happens exactly at what point in the storyline? The modus operandi refers to how something happened, in what order, and the arena is the physical area in which the story takes place. The framework refers to the context (the arena can be a concentration camp and the framework can be the Second World War). The change of circumstance is the moment at which the story or scenario takes a surprising turn

⁶³ Peter Berenschot, *Scenario's in de strijd tegen terrorisme*, p. 26.

⁶⁴ Peter Berenschot, *Scenario's*.

and symbolism refers to the way in which significance is attributed to certain events (or places or people). Finally, a red herring refers to a false indicator, an indication that leads the reader or the watcher to a wrong conclusion.⁶⁵

Based upon the idea that all scenarios contain a number of basic story elements, Berenschot designed the Pandora-model to gather data by analyzing these different story elements in events that already took place. When it comes to the process of terrorism, acts of terrorism can be described using these basic elements. According to Stephen Sloan, “An act of terrorism is like a theatrical performance where the terrorists write the scenario”.⁶⁶ The idea of describing a terrorist act as a scenario is not new. However, the idea to describe several terrorist acts as scenarios and place them in a model is something that has not been done before.

Berenschot used the different story-elements to create a storyline that can be filled in with the details of an actual terrorist event. In Table I-X the main categories (story-elements) and their subcategories, their meaning and examples are summarized.

3.2 The categories of the Pandora-model

Table I summarizes the general information about the case to classify the terrorist act. Every terrorist act is attributed a case-ID, and is assigned to a category to clarify to the reader what type of terrorist act the case refers to. For example, in the case of the assassination of Van Gogh, the label for the case is ‘Van Gogh’ and the act falls into the category of ‘Lone Wolf’ terrorism. Next, the variable ‘Background’ refers to a short summary of what has happened, for example: ‘assassination of Theo Van Gogh’. Another characteristic of the case is described in the first section of the Pandora-model, namely whether the act should be classified as an attempt (not successful) or an attack (successful), which allows the reader to distinguish between the two.

Another important element included in the first section is the ‘Peripeteia’ or ‘change of circumstance’. This variable refers to the moment at which the situation changed and turned into an actual terrorist attack. Finally, the variables of the ‘red herring’ and ‘symbolism’ are added to indicate whether the act was symbolic or whether there the act turned out to be a red herring. Since the red herring and symbolism are included in most categories, I will not explain the two variables again when discussing the other categories. Symbolism always refers to any symbolic value

⁶⁵ Peter Berenschot, *Scenario's*.

⁶⁶ Stephen Sloan, *Simulating Terrorism*, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1981.

concerning the time, date, antagonist or whatever category it belongs to and red herring always refers to false indicators concerning the category it belongs to.

Table I – Pandora-model: general information

Name of category	Name of subcategory	Explanation	Example
Case ID	Name	Label of terrorist act	Van Gogh
Category	-	What type of terrorist act?	Lone wolf
Background	-	Short summary of terrorist act	Assassination of Theo van Gogh
Successful attack	Attack/attempt	Was it an attempt or an attack (and thus a succeeded attempt)	Attack
Peripeteia (change of circumstance)	Description	What changed at the moment the attack started?	Van Gogh was assassinated
	Red Herring	Was there a false indicator (another moment that indicated an attack or a diversion during the change of circumstance)	-
	Symbolism	Was the moment symbolic?	-

In Table II, the category of the protagonist is presented and explained. In this category, we find all the information about the perpetrator(s): whether they are known, whether they claimed their act(s), and whether there was a leakage before the act was carried out. Also, we are provided with the factual information about the perpetrators: number of assailants, male or female, age, terrorist group and background.

Two important variables concerning the protagonist are the variables ‘known previous incidents’ and ‘known subsequent incidents’. These variables also refer to the background of the protagonist(s), but this time the question is specifically whether they were involved in earlier incidents. Whereas the variable ‘background’ asks for a more general summary of the protagonists background, these variables mean actual (known) criminal or illegal incidents, such as alcohol or drug abuse, earlier attempts to carry out terrorist acts etcetera.

The variable ‘link with third parties’ asks for possible connections with any terrorist, criminal or clandestine groups that the protagonist(s) were not officially affiliated with. Finally, the category of the protagonist concludes with the variable ‘primary purpose of incident’, that refers to a limited range of possible motives the

protagonist might have had. In the case of the assassination of Van Gogh, the primary purpose of the protagonist, Mohammed Bouyeri, was ‘applying pressure’; meaning that Bouyeri explicitly killed Van Gogh to spread fear among the people of The Netherlands, to prevent further insults to the Prophet and Islam.

Table II – Pandora-model: the protagonist

Protagonist	Known protagonist	Yes/no	Yes
	Incident attributed to	Name of protagonist	Mohammed Bouyeri
	Incident claimed by	Who claimed the incident? It can be the protagonist or someone else or a terrorist group or no-one at all	Mohammed Bouyeri
	Claimed by means of	How was the responsibility claimed?	A letter knifed to Van Gogh
	Leakage	Was there a leakage before the terrorist act?	No
	Red Herring	Were there any false indicators as to who was the protagonist?	-
	Symbolism	Was the protagonist a symbolic figure?	-
	Number of assailants	How many protagonists?	1
	Male/female	Either/or category	Male
	Age (group)	Either specific age or age group	20-30
	Terrorist Group (GTD)	Member of terrorist group known by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD); the answer here can be elaborated upon in the next column ‘text’	
	Category	What is the nature of the terrorist act? Nationalistic, religious, ideological, lone wolf, miscellaneous or unknown	Lone Wolf
	Description	Further explanation of the category; mostly needed when the answer was miscellaneous	-
	Background/history	Significant information about the background/history of the protagonist	-
	Known previous incidents	Is there any known previous incidents in which either the protagonist or the group to which he/she belongs was affiliated with?	-
	Known subsequent incidents	Is there any know subsequent incident in which either the protagonist or the group to which he/she belongs was affiliated with?	-

	Ties with third parties	Are there ties between the protagonist and third parties?	Hofstadgroup
Primary purpose of incident	-	Applying pressure, media attention, oppression, emphasizing cause, extending influence, eliminating opponent(s), training, miscellaneous, unknown	Applying pressure

In Table III, the information about the antagonist is presented. The first variables ask for general information about the target, namely whether the target was a person or an object, whether the target was specific or generic and what type of target the terrorist act was directed against. In the case of Van Gogh, the target was a specific person, and the type of target was ‘journalists/media’. The target type is based upon the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which distinguishes between twenty-three different target types⁶⁷, derived from their databank.

The last two variables elaborate on the antagonist, asking for its name and a description of the target. In Van Gogh’s case, the answers are ‘Theo van Gogh’, and ‘Director of movie about Islam entitled ‘Submission’’. That shows it is possible already in describing the target to hint at the motivation of the protagonist, since Theo van Gogh is a lot of things besides the director of that specific movie, but in this case, his directing that movie was the reason Mohammed Bouyeri wanted to assassinate him.

Table III – Pandora-model: the antagonist

Antagonist	Primary target	Person or object	Person
	Specific/generic	Specific or generic	Specific
	Target type (GTD)	Target type, based on Global Terrorism Database (GTD): abortion related, airports/airlines, business, educational institution, food/water supply, government (diplomatic), government (general), journalists/media, maritime, military, NGO, other, police, private citizens/property, religious figures/institutions, telecommunication, terrorists, tourists, transportation, unknown, utilities, violent political party, miscellaneous	Journalists/media
	Name	Name of antagonist	Theo van Gogh

⁶⁷ The twenty-three target types can be found in Table III and are based upon the GTD database

	Description	Description of antagonist	Director of movie about Islam entitled 'Submission'
	Red Herring	Was there a false indicator as to who was the antagonist?	-
	Symbolism	Is the antagonist of symbolic value?	-

In Table IV the category 'time' is described. This category contains all the general information concerning the time and date at which the event took place: what day, date and time.

Table IV – Pandora-model: time

Time	Day of the week	On which day of the week did the event take place?	Tuesday
	Date	Day/month/year	2 November 2004
	Time	Hour/minutes/AM-PM	8.30 AM
	Red Herring	Was there a false indicator as to on which day the event would take place?	-
	Symbolism	Is the day, the date or the time symbolic?	-

The category 'arena' is summarized and explained in Table V. This category describes where the terrorist act took place, in what geographic location (region, country, city) and what type of environment (rural/urban). The next variable asks for the static location, whether the terrorist act took place at a home address, a workplace or somewhere else.

The variable 'en route' refers to whether the terrorist act was committed while the antagonist was on his/her way, either from work, home or a social event or vice versa. This question is important because experience indicates a lot of terrorist acts and liquidations/assassinations take place while the victim is en route; a route that is often known by the protagonist(s). The next variable asks whether the location was public or not and the last variable allows for further elaboration upon the location. In the case of Van Gogh, the geographic location was Amsterdam in The Netherlands, in the region Western Europe. The environment was urban, the static location was a street (other) and the event took place en route from home to work, on a public street.

Table V – Pandora-model: arena

Arena	Region (GTD)	Region, based upon the Global Terrorism Database (GTD): Australasia & Oceania, Central America & Caribbean, Central Asia, East Asia, Eastern Europe, Middle East & North Africa, North America, South America, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, USSR & the newly independent states (NIS), Western Europe	Western Europe
	Country	In which country did the event take place?	Netherlands
	City	In what city?	Amsterdam
	Kill zone	Urban or rural?	Urban
	Static location	Home address, workplace, social location, hotel, other, N.A., unknown	Other
	En route	Did the event take place en route?	Home-work (or vice versa)
	Public route/location	Was the route public?	Yes
	Description	Further details on the location	Work address was public, home address was easy to find through OSINT/HUMINT
	Red Herring	Was there any false reference as to what location would be used?	-
	Symbolism	Was the location/arena symbolic?	-

In the next table, Table VI, the context is described based upon three variables: type of context, (possible) motive and further explanation of motivation. To exemplify: the context of Van Gogh's assassination was a religious one, namely the debate on the nature of Islam Van Gogh contributed to by making the movie Submission. The (possible) motive of Bouyeri was the iconic value of Van Gogh, not necessarily Van Gogh himself but what he, as a person, represented. In the further explanation there is room for a short summary of the reason behind the terrorist act.

Table VI – Pandora-model: context

Context	Type	What was the context of the event: political, economical, religious, personal, miscellaneous, unknown	Religious
(Possible) motive	Motivation	What was the motivation of the protagonist: significance of target, target vulnerability, level of grievance, level of exposure, significant date event, iconic value of target, miscellaneous,	Iconic value of target

		unknown	
	Motivation	Further explanation of motivation	Protagonist was offended by Van Gogh's film 'Submission' and wanted to kill the person that insulted the prophet. Primary target was Ayaan Hirsi Ali but she turned out to be too well protected

Table VII summarizes the information about the security during the terrorist act. The first variables all refer to specific, factual information about security, such as: was there any form of security; was the antagonist accompanied by a driver; what was the number of protectors; were they armed etcetera. Next, the variable 'procedure' refers to what procedure the protectors followed, if any. The last variables ask if there was any previous breach in the security and whether a security invention has been made – either before or preceding the terrorist act.

Van Gogh did not have any security at the moment he was shot by Mohammed Bouyeri. He was riding his bike on his way to work when Bouyeri attacked. No security intervention happened during or preceding the attack.

Table VII – Pandora-model: security

Security	Protection	Was there any form of protection?	No
	Driver	Was there a driver?	N.A.
	Number of protectors	How many protectors were there?	-
	Armed protectors	Were there any armed protectors?	-
	Number of armed protectors	If yes, what number?	-
	Procedure	What procedure did the protectors follow?	
	Protection	Armoured car, travelling in convoy, advanced protection team, counter surveillance team, guarded compound, body armour, RF jammers, unknown	-
	Previous security breach	Was there an earlier breach in security?	-
	Security intervention	Has there been an intervention during/preceding the attack?	-

In Table IIX, the method used by the protagonist is described. The first variable, 'incident', refers to the classification of the incident: was it an assassination, a

bombing, a kidnapping or something else? The next two variables, ‘means’ and ‘weapon’, ask for the specific details of the instruments used. Often, the instruments were either conventional explosives or firearms but in some cases the instrument was a vehicle, as in the case of lone operator terrorist Hussam Taysir Duwait, who used a bulldozer to attack pedestrians on Jaffa Street in Jerusalem. The details about the instrument used can be described under ‘weapon’. A handgun, a Croatian HS 2000, killed Van Gogh. Later, the protagonist slit his throat and stabbed him in the chest with a kukri machete and a butcher’s knife.

The variables ‘type of primary explosive’, ‘amount of primary explosive’ and ‘detonation’ all refer to a bombing or an attack in which either conventional or self-made explosives were used. The variables ‘delivery method’ and ‘description of explosives’ also refer to a situation in which explosives were used. There are two more questions concerning the method, namely whether it was a suicide mission or not and if there was any transportation used. Mohammed Bouyeri, the assassin of Van Gogh, was on a suicide mission. He deliberately opened fire at the police, hoping to die as a martyr. Bouyeri transported himself by riding a bike, just like Van Gogh.

Table IIX – Pandora-model: method

Method	Incident	Assassination/liquidation, armed assault, bombing, hijacking, hostage taking/kidnapping, vehicle attack, computer network attack/electronic warfare, CBRN, other, miscellaneous, unknown	Assassination/liquidation
	Means	Biological, nuclear, radiological, chemical, conventional explosive(s), self-made explosive(s), firearms (handguns, rifles, automatic weapons, sniper rifles, unknown), RPG(s), knife/blade/sword, fake weapons, incendiary, sabotage equipment, vehicle (not vehicle born), melee, other, miscellaneous, unknown	Firearms: handgun(s)
	Weapon	What specific weapon was used?	Croatian HS 2000, Kukri machete, butchers knife
	Type of primary explosive	If explosives were used, what type? Choose out of a list of explosives	-
	Amount of primary explosive	How much was used? Choose out of a list of amounts	-
	Detonation	In what way was the explosive detonated: timer, radio frequency, pressure, manually, motion or trip-wire controlled, miscellaneous, other, unknown	-
	Suicide Mission	Was it a suicide mission or not?	Yes
	Delivery method	In what way was the explosive delivered?	-

	Description of explosives	Further details on explosives	-
	Description of transportation	Was there any transport?	Bicycle
	Red Herring	Was there any false indicator as to what weapon(s) would be used?	-
	Symbolism	Were the weapons used of symbolic value?	-

The ‘modus operandi’, how it happened and in what order, is presented in Table IX. The first variable, ‘level of intelligence’, refers to how much knowledge the protagonists needed or attained for their actions. This can either be low, medium or high. To clarify: in Van Gogh’s case, his home address could be traced easily through the Internet and his work address was known. It was also known that he frequently used his bike to go to work and he would take roughly the same route. This means it was easy for the protagonist, Bouyeri, to plot and carry out his terrorist act; he did not need much intelligence.

The variable ‘modus operandi’ itself asks for a short storyline, in what order did the actual act of terrorism take place? The storyline for the assassination of Van Gogh can be found below, in Table IX. The following variables, pre- and post-incident actions refer to what happened right before and right after the actual act of terrorism. These are important variables because they provide us with information about terrorist plans and how they are carried out; especially if Pandora shows similarities in pre- or post-incident actions, this could be of great importance to the practice of tracing terrorists before they act – instead of the conventional post-incident investigation approach. The pre-incident factors of Van Gogh’s assassination are surveillance and terrorist training, meaning that Bouyeri observed Van Gogh, his route and his behaviour before the actual attack and that he received training. Right after the attack, Bouyeri tried to flee and was engaged in an exchange of fire with the police, instigated by himself.

Finally, the last variable concerning the modus operandi is the variable ‘communication’, referring to any form of communication by the protagonist before, during or after the attack. This can often reveal something about their motivation, as in the case of the anarchist revolutionary terrorists, who would often use the slogan ‘Courage, comrades! Long live anarchy!’. However, communication can also refer to the process of communication itself, whether it be a lone operator who

communicated with an internet network group or a terrorist like Theodore Kaczynski, who would leave metal plates inscribed with the letters ‘FC’, meaning Freedom Club, in his explosive devices as a clue for the investigators. These different ways of communicating can provide a lot of useful information about terrorists’ motivations, their plans and their actions.

Table IX – Pandora-model: modus operandi

Modus Operandi	Level of intelligence	How much Intelligence did the protagonists need/attain for their actions: low, medium or high?	Low
	Modus Operandi	Explanation of what happened exactly	Protagonist shot antagonist eight times with an HS 2000 handgun, and antagonist died on the spot. Protagonist then cut antagonist’s throat, nearly decapitating him, and stabbed him in the chest. Two knives were left implanted in his torso, one attaching a five-page note to his body. The note threatened Western governments, Jews and Ayaan Hirsi Ali (who went into hiding). The not also contained references to the ideologies of the Egyptian organization Takfir wal-Hijra.
	Pre-incident actions	What happened right before the terrorist act: weapons/material movement, terrorist travel, terrorist training, surveillance, infiltration, test of security, illicitation, other, miscellaneous, unknown	Surveillance, terrorist training
	Pre-incident actions: text	Further explanation	Route of antagonist was well known by protagonist
	Post-incident actions	What happened right after the terrorist act: subsequent attack(s), subsequent action(s), incident claimed, successful exfiltration, other, miscellaneous, unknown	Subsequent action(s)
	Post-incident action(s): text	Further explanation	Protagonist tried to flee and shot at several policemen and civilians
	Communication	Was there any form of communication during, before or after the attack?	-

Finally, the last category in the Pandora-model is the category ‘casualties’, referring to the victims of the act. The variables are all very straightforward, namely: ‘antagonist dies from attack’, yes or no; ‘other fatalities’, yes or no; and ‘total fatalities’, ‘total injured’, which can be answered by a number. In Van Gogh’s case: the antagonist (Van Gogh), died from the attack and there were no other fatalities so the total

number of fatalities is 1, whereas there were 2 injured.

The variable ‘further comments’ can be used for any other information that seems to be of importance but cannot be included in one of the categories.

Table X – Pandora-model: casualties

Casualties	Antagonist dies from attack	Yes/no	Yes
	Other fatalities	Yes/no	No
	Total fatalities	Number	1
	Total injured	Number	2
Further comments			

3.3 Operational profiling and scientific categorization

A source of tension in research on terrorism is the insistence of some policymakers on the existence of an unchanging and clear-cut terrorist profile.⁶⁸ They believe in the possibility to measure certain characteristics on a scale and, through that method, the possibility to identify (potential) terrorists.

“Scholars adopting the psycho-social point of view sought to locate terrorism’s origins in character traits predisposing individuals to rebelliousness and violence, in conditions of poverty and political powerlessness leading to disaffection and disengagement from society at large, and in the social dynamics of terrorist groups themselves.”⁶⁹

Nonetheless, until now most attempts in creating a personality profile of the ‘average’ terrorist have failed. When discussing terrorist profiling, a popular opinion in particular is that terrorists must be either insane or psychopathic.⁷⁰ In a research carried out by Pearlstein, for example, he came to the conclusion that “the individual who becomes and remains a political terrorist generally appears to be psychologically

⁶⁸ Jerrold M. Post, ‘Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces’, in: Reich, W. (ed.) *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, Woodrow Wilson Center: Washington, DC, and Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore and London, 1999, pp. 25–40.

⁶⁹ William F. Shughart II, ‘An analytical history of terrorism 1945-2000, *Public Choice*, vol. 128, no. 1-2, p.7.

⁷⁰ Frederick J. Hacker, *Crusaders, criminals, crazies: Terror and terrorism in our time*. New York: Norton, 1976; see also Max Taylor, *The terrorist*. London: Brassey’s, 1988.

moulded by certain narcissistic personality disturbances”.⁷¹ However, as several reports have shown, while insane individuals sometimes lead terrorist groups, and while some acts of terrorism might be attributed to undeniably insane persons, terrorists rarely meet psychiatric criteria for insanity.⁷² But as Martha Crenshaw noted, it is not enough to simply propose hypotheses. She argues that, “the study of terrorism still lacks the foundation of extensive primary data based on interviews and life histories of individuals engaged in terrorism”.⁷³

In doing so, we must note the difference between operational profiling and scientific categorization. On a policy-level, organizations try to devise methods for investigation. One of those methods is profiling: listing characteristics of criminals based upon experience. The dangers are adamant: all too often profiling leads to prejudice and stigmatization of certain groups or individuals. However, there are obvious advantages to this practice as well. It allows for early indicators that enable investigators to observe potential criminal behaviour and, if necessary, intervene.

In scientific research, the goal is not to provide a list of characteristics and thus to provide a profile. The aim of scientific research is to compare and contrast data with each other in order to classify and categorize it. In this thesis, the individual lone operator terrorists will be grouped, analyzed and compared and within their groups, following a scientific approach.

3.3 Data-collection and questions of validity

To gather data for the Pandora-model I first had to establish definitions of terrorism and lone-operator terrorism. I used the definitions I proposed in this thesis as the criteria for selecting cases. As said before, the goal in defining lone-operator terrorism was to gather as much data as possible, so I carefully chose a broad definition. The gathered data for the research project was collected based on open source intelligence (OSINT), meaning publicly available information, through the Internet, newspapers or other media. By using open source intelligence, the methodology of the database allows for an initial test where gathered data can be checked and corrected if necessary. At the same time, other scholars are working on testing the Pandora-model using classified information. I mainly used Internet

⁷¹ Richard M. Pearlstein, *The Mind of the Political Terrorist*, Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1991, p. ix.

⁷² Jeff Victoroff, ‘The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches’, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 49, no. 3 (2005), p. 12.

⁷³ Martha Crenshaw, ‘The Psychology’, p. 410.

sources because that was the fastest way to find information and it enabled me to compare articles from different sources about certain lone operator terrorist acts.

This brings us to the most important question concerning the data-collection, namely the question of validity. The concept of validity generally refers to

“the extent to which a measurement, concept or conclusion is well-founded and corresponds accurately to the real world. The word "valid" is derived from the Latin *validus*, meaning strong. Validity of a measurement tool (i.e. test in education) is considered to be the degree to which the tool measures what it claims to measure.”⁷⁴

In the gathering of data for Pandora, the question of validity can be best illustrated through an example. When I analyzed the lone operator terrorist act committed by Baruch Goldstein, a Jewish settler who killed thirty Palestinians in what is now known as the Cave of the Patriarchs Massacre⁷⁵, there were several questions I had to ask concerning the trustworthiness and the validity of the information. For example, concerning Goldstein’s age, one source said he was thirty-eight, while other sources said he was thirty-seven. And a person’s age is factual information, implying that if factual information is not necessarily true or valid information, then how can we ever be sure what is? In the case of contradictory information I chose to adopt the fact(s) supported by the majority of the sources, unless there was no majority. In this example: because only one source claimed Goldstein’s age was thirty-eight, while all other sources (six in total) contended it was thirty-seven, I concluded it was the latter.

It became more difficult, however, when I had to analyze the motivation behind lone operator acts of terrorism. Since motivations are – contrary to factual information such as age and sex – already open to interpretation, I expected to find different statements about lone operators’ motivations. In the case of Baruch Goldstein, one article provided an overview of his life, based on interviews with friends and relatives.⁷⁶ According to this overview, it became clear that Goldstein’s

⁷⁴ Wikipedia, ‘Validity’, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Validity_\(statistics\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Validity_(statistics)), (retrieved on June 29, 2011).

⁷⁵ See BBC, “1994: Jewish settler kills 30 at holy site”, February 1994, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/25/newsid_4167000/4167929.stm (Retrieved on August 11, 2011); see also Richard Lacayo, Lisa Beyer, Massimo Calabresi and Eric Silver, Time Magazine, “The Making of a Murderous Fanatic”, March 1994, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,980282,00.html> (retrieved on August 11, 2011).

⁷⁶ Richard Lacayo, “The Making of”.

religious views as a Jew inflicted his rage against Arabs, whom he referred to as Nazis. At the same time, the article also speaks of a personal crisis Goldstein experienced, after two of his friends were ambushed and killed by Arab attackers near his hometown on the West Bank settlement. This fact led me to conclude that besides a religious motivation, Goldstein also had personal reasons or motivations to carry out his act. In other articles I found alternative or complementary explanations for his motivation: he might have gone insane from all the misery he had seen and experienced as a doctor; he tried to re-enact the story of Purim-day; and/or he had political motivations for wanting to get rid of as many Arabs as possible, as he wrote earlier in a letter to the *New York Times*.⁷⁷

In this case, I chose to describe his motivation as ‘miscellaneous’, implying more than one motivation drove Goldstein to commit his acts. I described his motivations by saying he possessed a deep hatred towards Arabs and he had personal reasons because his friends died in an Arab assault. This is a very short summary of a man’s motivation about which a book can be written. However, the model asks for short and concise statements to enable comparison. All in all, I tried to analyze the open-source information and chose to accept as true what most sources agreed upon. In cases where no agreement was found I listed ‘unknown’ or left the box blank.

3.4 Analysis: three typologies

The questions addressed in this thesis concern three dimensions of lone operator terrorism, based upon the Pandora-model: protagonist, antagonist and crucial factors. The reason I chose these dimensions is because together, they provide the most important overview of lone wolf terrorism over the last century. The protagonist-dimension tells us who the lone operator terrorists are; in a sense this answers the main question of the time-independent profile for lone operator terrorists. However, as the title of the thesis indicates, we are not just looking for the characterization of the terrorists themselves, we also want to know what targets (the antagonist dimension) they chose over time and what they seem to have in common in the preparation of their acts (the crucial factors dimension). The three dimensions and their prospective key questions are summarized in Table XI.

⁷⁷ Avi Issacharoff and Chaim Levinson, “Settlers remember gunman Goldstein; Hebron riots continue”, February 2010, <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/settlers-remember-gunman-goldstein-hebron-riots-continue-1.263834> (retrieved on August 11, 2011); Richar Lacayo, “The Making of”; see also Baruch Goldstein, “A History of Anti-Arab Feeling”, *The New York Times*, February 1994, <http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/26/world/l-a-history-of-anti-arab-feeling-326254.html> (retrieved on August 11, 2011).

Table XI – Framework for the study of lone-operator terrorism

Dimension	Description	Key questions
Protagonist	The individual terrorist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who are the perpetrators? • What are the demographic characteristics (age, sex) • What is their background? What motivation lies behind their acts and what other factors driving their behaviour are at work? • What are the links between the perpetrator(s) and terrorist organizations or third parties?
Antagonist	The target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who or which are the main targets of lone operator terrorism? • What is the symbolic value of the target?
Crucial factors	Factors of importance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Based upon the Pandora-model, which variables stand out (happen repeatedly, are deviant from the normal pattern etc.)? • What differences in modus operandi are there between the lone operator terrorists?

3.5 Selection of cases: The four waves of terrorism

I will address these questions by analyzing selected data for lone operator terrorist acts. I based the selection of cases for the database first of all upon the two chosen definitions for this thesis of terrorism and lone operator terrorism. Second, I used a theory proposed by David C. Rapoport, the ‘Four Wave theory of terrorism’, to make sure I included cases that represent the whole period included in this research project.

According to David C. Rapoport, ever since the start of modern terror, the world has witnessed four waves of terrorism, starting in the 1880s and lasting until the 1920s. It started with the anti-colonial wave, from 1945 to the 1960s; the new-left

wave, 1960s to 1990; and the jihadi (religious) wave from the 1990s until now. Rapoport claims that modern terrorism began in the 1880s in Russia with anarchist assassinations of prominent officials, to bring down the czarist autocracy.⁷⁸ The anarchist strategy was adopted by all other revolutionary anti-state groups of that time and resulted in a wave of terror. With some exceptions, most terrorists of this anarchist era tried to avoid indiscriminate attacks on civilians or non-combatants who were not related to the cause the assailants wished to advance. This would appear curious to today's terrorists, whose preferred strategy is exactly that: violence upon non-combatants.⁷⁹

Ever since this first wave of modern terrorism, the world has experienced three additional waves of terrorist violence. While the first wave was driven by the cause of anarchism, the second wave, which began in the 1920s but really gained strength in the aftermath of the Second World War, was dominated by the cause of national liberation. The ultimate goal of this anti-colonial wave was to win (national) independence from the European colonial forces. In this second wave, terrorism was intertwined with guerrilla warfare, such as Viet Minh resistance against the French colonizers and the struggle of Palestine to become independent from Great Britain.

The third wave of terrorism was driven by the goal of social revolution and national self-assertion. This wave was triggered by the war in Vietnam and was characterized by small groups, so called 'urban guerrillas', who sought to overturn the capitalist system: the Red Brigade in Italy, the Red Army Fraction in Germany, and the Weather Underground in the US. This form of revolutionary violence started in the late 1960s and continued until 1990. Also, developments in the Basque region of Spain and Northern Ireland brought the goal of national/regional separatism to the forefront. In Palestine, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) attempted to establish a pan-Arab liberation by organizing a struggle to destroy the state of Israel. At the same time, they framed their efforts as part of a wider struggle against Western neo-imperialism. In the third wave, the quest for national self-assertion was thus often mixed with the struggle against capitalism and the prosperous industrialized democracies of the West.

⁷⁸ David C. Rapoport, 'The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism', in Audrey Cronin and James Ludes (eds.), *Attacking Terrorism*, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004, pp. 46–73.

⁷⁹ Leonard Weinberg and William Eubank, 'An End to the Fourth Wave of Terrorism?', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 33, no. 7 (June 2010), pp. 594–602, p.595.

The roots of the fourth wave of modern terrorism can be traced back to the late 1970s, more specifically, to the year 1979. In that year, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, spurring violent resistance under the Afghan people and their neighbouring countries. The invasion inspired the call to jihad, which led to the recruitment of mujahideen from all over the Muslim world; which eventually led to the emergence of Al Qaeda. Also, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 led to the establishment of a Caliphate, an Islamic theocracy, under the reign of Ayatollah Khomeini. This, in turn, led to the radicalization of certain Shi'ite organizations in Iraq, such as al-Dawa, and most especially in Lebanon (the formation of Hezbollah). The Iranian revolution and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets invoked religious radicalism that justified the resort to violence. After those major events, the fourth wave of terrorism, the jihadi or Islamist wave, started and lasts until today.

What is missing in Rapoport's four waves of terrorism is terrorist campaigns waged by groups on the far right of the political spectrum, such as the American Ku Klux Klan, the various East and West European fascist groups of the 1930s, the neo-Fascist groups in Italy during the 1960s and the lone extremists bound to right-wing factions, such as Timothy McVeigh in the US and David Copeland in Britain. It seems that far right terrorism has never really been missing from the scene. It appears that the major 'motivations' Rapoport identifies in his four waves (anarchism, anti-colonialism, new-leftism and jihadism) then may allow for alternate forms of terrorism to coexist with dominant waves.

Conclusion

Based upon the four waves category of Rapoport I gathered ten cases for every group. The cases were selected based upon five criteria: the first two criteria are the definitions of terrorism and lone operator terrorism; the other three are: (1) their successfulness (whether the act resulted in an actual attack leading to casualties); (2) the distribution over time and (3); the high profile, or the impact the case has had either domestically or internationally. A case ID is assigned to every case, mostly the ID will be the name of the person who was assassinated because that is usually what the incident is known for. However, there are two exceptions to the rule: some lone operator terrorists did not kill a specific person but they chose to kill numerous people, regardless of who they were (Karst Tate in his attack on the Dutch royal family, Nidal Malik Hasan in the Fort Hood Shooting, Hussam Taysir Duwait in the Jerusalem Bulldozer Attack and Buford Furrow in the LA Jewish Community Center

Attack); and some lone operator terrorists perpetrated several attacks over time (Theodore Kaczynski (the Unabomber), David Copeland (the London Nail Bomber), Joseph Christopher (the .22-Caliber Killer) and Franz Fuchs) For every wave, I will first provide an explanation for the selected cases out of the total population.

Contrary to the other case ID's, their case ID is their own name.

In Chapter 4, I will analyze the data and answer the questions concerning the three dimensions (protagonist, antagonist and crucial factors) for the individual waves. In Chapter 5, the results of the analysis of the individual waves will then be compared and contrasted with each other, allowing us to analyze the development of lone operator terrorism across time and space. It is important to note that the cases presented in this research are by no means an exhaustive or complete list of lone operator terrorism. However, they do represent the *zeitgeist* of the different waves of lone operator terrorism and they are used to explore the nature and development of the phenomenon over time.

Chapter 4: Four waves, three dimensions

4.1 Introduction to the first wave

Assassinations of prominent political leaders have occurred throughout history. According to a research carried out by Benjamin F. Jones and Benjamin A. Olken, a national leader has been assassinated in nearly two of every three years since 1950.⁸⁰ According to them, ‘from Julius Caesar to Abraham Lincoln, from John F. Kennedy to Yitzhak Rabin, many leaders have met violent ends – and many others have escaped assassination narrowly’.⁸¹ Whether it is deemed illegal or not, or objectionable, (attempts to) assassination comprise a lasting feature of the political landscape.

The first wave of terrorism, starting in the 1880s and lasting until the 1920s, is characterized by anarchist assassinations. In the following part, I will assess ten cases of lone operator terrorism of the first wave of terrorism, presented in Table II. The data gathered concerning these cases can be found in Appendix A. I will assess the cases by using the three dimensions and their prospective key questions. I chose these ten cases out of a larger dataset that can be found in Appendix B.

Table I – ten cases of lone operator terrorism: 1880s to 1920s

Case ID	Description	Time
Assassination of Czar Alexander II	Czar Alexander II was assassinated by members of the revolutionary Russian party Narodnaya Volya	1881
Assassination of French President Marie Francois Sadi Carnot	After delivering a speech in Lyon, president Carnot was stabbed by an Italian anarchist in his carriage, on his way to a gala	1894
Assassination of Antonio Canovas del Castillo	Angiolillo found Canovas alone at the thermal bath resort in Mondragon and shot him	1897
Assassination of Empress Elisabeth of Austria	Empress Elisabeth of Austria was stabbed in the heart by an anarchist	1898
Assassination of King Umberto I of Italy	On a visit to Monza, King Umberto I was shot four times and killed by	1900

⁸⁰ Benjamin F. Jones and Benjamin A. Olken, ‘Hit or Miss? The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War’, *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, vol. 1, no. 2 (2009), p 55.

⁸¹ Ibidem, ‘Hit’, p. 55.

	Gaetano Bresci	
Assassination of US President William McKinley	US President McKinley was shot when he was standing in line shaking hands at an exposition	1901
Assassination of Pyotr Stolypin	Stolypin was assassinated in the Kiev Opera House	1911
Assassination of Spanish Prime Minister Jose Canalejas	Canalejas was assassinated while window shopping in Madrid	1912
Assassination of King George I of Greece	While on an afternoon walk, King George I of Greece was shot	1913
Assassination of Simon Petliura	Petliura was shot by Schwartzbard five times while walking in Paris	1926

4.1.a Protagonists of the first wave

If we look at the data presented in Appendix A, we can conclude that concerning the dimension of the protagonist, in all cases the perpetrators are known by name. The perpetrators of the first wave are all men and all under fifty years old. The majority of the perpetrators are aged between twenty and thirty years (7), whereas only a small portion (3) is between thirty and forty. The perpetrators claimed all acts as well, usually through a confession in court (5) and sometimes through an investigation (2) or a personal statement (1). 9 out of 10 protagonists of the first wave acted on their own, only in the case of the assassination of Czar Alexander II from Russia, the number of assailants is 3. None of the lone operator terrorists were member of a terrorist group but they were all either part of an anarchist network or known as individual anarchists. Nonetheless, it must be noted that in many countries at the time, anarchism and anarchist movements were regarded as clandestine organizations.

When we look at the protagonists, a factor that draws the attention is that the first wave of anarchist terrorism seems to centre very much on the Western world, meaning West Europe and the US. Out of the total of assassinations, 70% took place in Western Europe, 20% in Russia and 10% in the US. This confirms Iviasky's theory about the history of individual terror, claiming that modern terror started with the anarchist wave at the turn of the 19th century in France and Italy, and then spread to

Russia and the new world (the US).⁸² Also, if we look at the background of the lone operator terrorists, we find that the biggest group consists of Italian anarchists (4), followed by the Russians (2) while the other four were Ukrainian, American, Spanish and Greek.

Also, the protagonists of the first wave were very much involved with the anarchist movements throughout Italy, France, Russia and the US. In Russia, the anarchist party Narodnaya Volya provided a significant, well organized, liberation movement in Russia that helped spread the ideological anarchist principles. In the US, the anarchist movement played a big role in inspiring Czolgosz, the assassin of US President McKinley, who named a speech by Emma Goldman as one of his main motivations for carrying out his act. And when we look at Alexandros Schinas (assassin of King George I of Greece) and Manuel Pardinás (the person who assassinated Spanish prime minister José Canalejas) we find that, even though not much is known about these perpetrators, they were both involved with the anarchist movements, read socialist literature and had radical friends.

4.1.b Antagonists of the first wave

When we look at the dimension of the antagonists of the first wave, we can conclude that the lone operator terrorist cases are remarkably similar. The targets of the assassinations were in all cases persons (as opposed to objects). Also, in all cases the targets were specific persons out of the general government category. And all antagonists were high profile members of the general government: prime minister (3), president (3) (I included Simon Petliura, head of the Ukrainian government in exile in this subcategory) and king (2). The two other antagonists were a czar (Alexander II of Russia) and an empress (Elizabeth of Austria, otherwise known as 'Sisi'), arguably the high-profilest cases.

As to their symbolic value (when known), the antagonist was either assassinated because of his or her being part of the oppressive regime (3). For example, the assassin of Cánovas del Castillo held him responsible for the Montjuïc repression. The Montjuïc repression refers to a religious procession that took place in Barcelona in 1896, where a bomb was thrown and the government immediately arrested three hundred men and women, some anarchists but mostly socialists and trade unionists, subjecting them to horrible tortures in the Montjuïc prison. Another

⁸² Ze'ev Iviánsky, 'Individual Terror', p. 56.

symbolic value of the target was their belonging to the upper or privileged class, the elite of society (2), to which the anarchists were opposed. Emma Goldman, a renowned anarchist in the US in the 1890s, compared the assassination of US President William McKinley by Leon Czolgosz to the assassination of Julius Caesar by Marcus Junius Brutus and she called McKinley “the president of the money kings and trust magnates”.⁸³

4.1.c Crucial factors in the first wave

Crucial factors can be anything that stands out or deviates from the normal pattern. It can, however, also refer to pre-incident or post-incident actions that are apparently crucial to the carrying out of the lone operator terrorist act. One thing that immediately stands out is the inspirational factor present in the assassinations of the first wave. As noted before, the protagonists of the first wave were all involved or in touch with anarchist movements. This means that even though they acted as lone operators (they planned their own acts without direct command from outside), they were surrounded by a movement that shared, supported and spread their anarchist, revolutionary principles. Many of them acted solely upon their anarchist inspiration: to avenge earlier repression, torture or massacres (3) (the Montjuic repression, the Bava-Beccaris massacre and the anti-Semitic pogroms); to avenge the death of earlier anarchists (1) (Caserio); or out of hatred against governments, elite and aristocracy (3) (Schinas, Czsolgosz and Lucheni).

Concerning the arena, there are three variables that stand out because of their high score. During the first wave of terrorism, the ten cases analyzed happened mainly in an urban environment (9), mainly en route (7) and mainly in public places (9). Something else that draws the attention in the analysis of these ten cases is that 8 out of 10 were inspired by political motivations and only 2 by miscellaneous reasons. Clearly, placing this observation in the context of the anarchist wave, terrorism during the 1880s until the 1920s was very much motivated by anti-government sentiments. It is striking that even the two outliers, who had more than one motivation, are for a great deal motivated by political reasons. Alexandros Schinas, who assassinated King George I of Greece, declared that he hated government and aristocracy, both political reasons. However, there were doubts regarding his

⁸³ Emma Goldman, ‘The Tragedy at Buffalo’, *Free Society*, (October 1901), <http://ublib.buffalo.edu/libraries/exhibits/panam/law/images/tragedyatbuff.html>, (Retrieved on July 5, 2011).

motivation and it was speculated that he was an alcohol addict. Sholom Schwartzbard, the assassin of head of the Ukrainian government-in-exile Simon Petliura, said his main reason for killing Petliura was to avenge the anti-Semitic pogroms that had taken place in Ukraine under Petliura's rule. This is clearly a political reason. However, he lost many family members and relatives in those pogroms, which makes his motivation partly personal. Summarizing, based upon our data, we can conclude that almost all lone operator terrorism during the first wave of terrorism were solely politically motivated.

Some last observations concerning crucial factors concern the level of intelligence, the use of weapons and the aftermath. It is striking that almost all lone operator terrorists (9) only needed a low level of intelligence to carry out their act. This could mean two things. First, it could mean they explicitly selected targets that were easy to track or follow. Second, it could mean that information concerning the whereabouts of potential targets for assassinations was too easily accessible for perpetrators. The first explanation is supported by the assassination of Empress Elizabeth of Austria. Her assassin, Luigi Lucheni, had actually decided to kill a prince from the House of Orleans: Phillippe the Duke of Orleans. But when he found out the Duke of Orleans had already left Geneva and he read about another royalty (Empress Elizabeth) being in town, he decided he would assassinate her.

Concerning the use of weapons, we observe that most lone operator terrorists used a firearm (7), only a small part used a knife or a dagger (2) or an explosive (1). Firearms allow for an assassination where the protagonist is able to stand from a further distance from the victim than a knife or a dagger. Finally, when we look at the aftermath of the terrorist act, we can conclude that almost all protagonists were arrested (9) (one committed suicide right after his act) and that almost all were sentenced to death (8) and only one was acquitted in trial.

4.2 Introduction to the second wave

According to Rapoport's four waves theory, the second wave started in the 1920s and lasted until the early 1960s. This wave, dominated by national liberation aspirations, gained its momentum in the aftermath of the Second World War but the interwar period also witnessed the beginnings of the bloodshed that would engulf, among others, Palestine, Transjordan and Lebanon for the remainder of the century and beyond. The ultimate goal of this anti-colonial wave was to win (national) independence from the European colonial forces. In this second wave, terrorism was

intertwined with guerrilla warfare, such as the Viet Minh resistance against the French colonizers and the struggle in Palestine to become independent from Great Britain.

In Palestine, *Irgun Zvai Le'umi*, an armed wing of the right-wing Revisionist Party was founded in the late 1930s and led by Menachem Begin, who later became Israel's sixth Prime Minister.⁸⁴ In Ireland, the Irish Republican Army was formed in 1916, although this was at first not a terrorist organization.⁸⁵ Other groups that become active during or in the years following the First World War included the Russian group *Black Hundred*, whose terrorist actions were targeted against the Bolsheviks; in Italy the *Ustasha*, a group in pursuit of national independence for Croatia, responsible for the murders on French Prime minister Barthou and King Alexander of Yugoslavia in 1934⁸⁶; and the *German Freikorps*, a loosely organized group, consisting mainly of ex-soldiers and students, whose most prominent targets were Karl Liebknecht in 1919 and German (Jewish) foreign minister Walter Rathenau in 1922.

However, the struggle for nationalism and ethnic separatism during the second wave of terrorism was mainly fought between terrorist, militant organizations and governments. Even though I was able to find lone-operator terrorist incidents for that period, it was a difficult search because most acts of terrorism were carried out by groups or small groups of individuals helped by larger terrorist networks. In the following part, I will assess ten cases of lone operator terrorism of the second wave of terrorism, presented in Table III. The data gathered concerning these cases can be found in Appendix A. As in the analysis of the first wave, I will assess the cases by using the three dimensions and their prospective key questions.

Table II – ten cases of lone operator terrorism: 1920s to 1960s

Case ID	Description	Time
Assassination of Anastasio Somoza Garcia	Somoza was shot at a campaign reception	1956
Assassination of Liaqat Ali Khan	Ali Khan was shot while addressing a gathering of 100,000 in Municipal Gardens, Rawalpindi, Pakistan	1951

⁸⁴ Walter Laqueur, *The New*, p. 22.
⁸⁵ David C. Rapoport 2004, 'The Four Waves', p. 48.
⁸⁶ Walter Laqueur, *The New*, pp. 21–22

Assassination of Hendrik Verwoerd	Verwoerd was stabbed in the neck and chest in the House of Assembly	1966
Assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan Ayala	Gaitan was assassinated after a lunch with friends	1948
Assassination of Carlos Castillo Armas	Castillo Armas was killed while taking a stroll with his wife	1956
Assassination of Mohammed Nadir Shah	Mohammed Nadir Shah was assassinated by a teenage boy while attending a high school graduation ceremony	1933
Assassination of Luis Miguel Sanchez Cerro	President Sanchez was killed when reviewing recruits at Santa Beatrice racetrack	1933
Assassination of Mohandas Gandhi	Gandhi was shot on his way to a prayer meeting	1948
Assassination of Alvaro Obregon	Obregon was shot in a café where he was celebrating his electoral victory	1928
Assassination of Huey Pierce Long	Politician Huey Long was assassinated by being shot	1935

4.2.a Protagonists of the second wave

If we look at the data presented in Appendix A concerning the second wave, as in the first wave, all protagonists are known. Also, they were all male and all under fifty years old (for three cases the variable age could not be found). Most of the perpetrators ages are between twenty and thirty years old (5) and only one protagonist was aged between thirty and forty years old. The information on the unknown cases (3) does in two cases not reveal any hint as to their prospective ages; the assassins could have been aged anywhere ranging from sixteen to eighty. In one case, the assassination of Mohammed Nadir Shah, we know that the protagonist was a teenage boy, even though we do not know his exact age. Not all acts of lone operator terrorism were claimed (6), but in those cases that the incident was claimed it was either claimed through a confession of the protagonist (3) or through an investigation afterwards (3). In almost all cases the lone operators acted individually (9), only in the case of the assassination of Mohandas Gandhi, there was a small group of protagonists. When looking at terrorist organizations, none of the lone operator terrorists were member of a (known) terrorist organization although some did have

or were suspected to have ties to third parties (4).

Very little information was found on the backgrounds of the protagonists. The information I was able to find does not present notable similarities between the terrorists. Some protagonists were communists (2) (of which one was declared to be a communist by the government (1)) and some were catholic (2) but these numbers are too small to base conclusions upon them. Two protagonists have a history of medical problems. The first one, Juan Roa Sierra, who assassinated Colombian liberal leader and presidential candidate Jorge Eliecer Gaitan in 1948, was suffering from schizophrenia and had illusions of being mighty. The second one, Dmitri Tsafendas, the assassin of South African Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd in 1966, had been hospitalized several times before the assassination due to 'irrational behaviour'.

Geographically speaking, the second wave of lone operator terrorism does not necessarily has its focus on one continent or country, although the 30% of the assassinations took place in Central America and the Caribbean. South Asia (20%) and South America (20%) are represented, as is Sub-Saharan Africa (10%), Middle East & North Africa and North America (10%). If anything, we can state that the second wave of terrorism was geographically very widely distributed, although Europe and Australia are missing in the equation. However, this geographic distribution seems to support the idea of a colonialist wave of terror, which would logically mainly take place in parts of the world that were colonized by Europe such as South (east) Asia, Africa, South America and Central America and the Caribbean.

The motivations of the protagonists of the second wave of terrorism are diverse. Some protagonists had very clear motivations (5), about other protagonists' motivations, fierce discussions evolved (3). In two cases, the assassination of Peruvian president Sanchez Cerro by de Mendoza and the assassination of Afghan King Mohammed Nadir Shah by Khaliq Hazara, the motivation of the assassin is unknown. In the 3 cases where lots of theories developed concerning the motivation of the protagonist, it is interesting to note that most conspiracy theories pointed at the possible involvement of the same actors. The possible conspirators were generally believed to be either the government of the US or the CIA, or the government of the Soviet Union or the Soviet Secret Police. Thus, it seems that the US and the USSR were – or were believed to be – the biggest players in the international political arena. This point can be illustrated by the assassination of Colombian liberal leader and presidential candidate Jorge Gaitan. Juan Roa Sierra, who was later said to be

suffering from schizophrenia according to Scotland Yard, assassinated him on April 9, 1948. However, after the assassination, claims were made by the Colombian president that Gaitan was assassinated in a plot, carried out by the USSR in a Cold War conspiracy to gain more influence in the Caribbean. Another theory, supported by Gloria Gaitain, the presidents' daughter, is that the CIA was somehow involved in the assassination as part of an anti-leftist plan. However, that theory does not have a lot of evidence to support it. Also, the Colombian communist party and the liberal party were accused of being behind the murder. This brings us to the other possible conspirators in general, that were often believed to be the communists, the government (of a specific country) or other political parties (in a specific country).

4.2.b Antagonists of the second wave

When we look at the dimension of the antagonist we can conclude that the overwhelming majority of antagonists of the second wave of lone operator terrorists are similar, just as in the first wave. In all cases, the targets were specific persons and in almost all cases (9), the targets were chosen from the general government category. Only in one case, the assassination of Mohandas Gandhi, the target was not part of the government; Gandhi was a prominent leader of the Indian independence movement. And, resembling the first wave, the 9 antagonists that belong in the general government category were all high-profile members of the government: king (1), president (4), prime minister (2), governor/senator (1) or prominent politicians (1) (Gaitan, the Colombian leader of the liberal party and presidential candidate).

Only in two cases, a symbolic value is attributed to the antagonist. The first one is the Anastasio Somoza Garcia, president of Nicaragua, who was assassinated by Rigoberto Lopez Perez because he thought Somoza to be an icon of the oppressive regime. The second case, the assassination of South Africa's Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd by Dmitri Tsafendas, listed that Tsafendas saw Verwoerd as one of the architects of the Apartheid-regime and held him responsible for the racist policies of the regime. Tsafendas was the son of a Greek and a Mozambican of mixed race. In white circles, he was rejected for his dark skin but under the Apartheid's racial laws he was classified as white.⁸⁷ Throughout his life, he faced mocking from the white South African society; and he held Prime Minister Verwoerd responsible for this.

⁸⁷ Ely J. Kahn, *The Separated People: A Look at Contemporary South Africa*. New York City: W. W. Norton & Company, 1968, p. 149.

4.2.c Crucial factors in the second wave

When we look at the data presented in Appendix A concerning the second wave of lone operator terrorism, we can conclude several things. First of all, when we look at the arena of the incident, in all the cases (10) the lone operator terrorist act was carried out in an urban environment. Also, it is interesting to note that in the majority of the cases, the arena was a public place (6). However, the exact location within that category differed substantially. The assassinations took place at a restaurant (2), on the street (2), at a public event (2) or in a state building (1). Out of the cases in which the assassination did not happen in a public place (2), one assassination took place on a home address and one in a parliament. Contrary to the first wave of terrorism, not much information could be found on whether analyzed cases happened en route or not.

Another category that demands our attention is the category of security. In most cases, security was present (5) but whether the security guards were armed or not is unknown. Something else that draws the attention is the category of the method. Concerning the weapons used, in the majority of the cases firearms (rifles, handguns) were the chosen means (9). In one case, a dagger was used.

The level of intelligence needed or used by the protagonists was, in most cases analyzed, low. When we look at the pre-incident indicators, again a lot of information is unknown (6). Nonetheless, in the cases where we do have information, we find that in two cases the protagonist infiltrated the antagonists' environment and in one case, the protagonist used surveillance to explore the arena of the act beforehand. The cases where infiltration was used all differ substantially in their method. Tsafendas infiltrated in prime minister Verwoerds' environment by being hired as a parliamentary messenger, allowing him to come near to the prime minister. Vasquez Sanchez, the assassin of President Carlos Castillo of Guatemala, infiltrated Castillo's palace guard. Finally, concerning the aftermath of the terrorist act, we can conclude that most protagonists were killed right after the act (5) some (4) were arrested, of which two served time in prison and in the other cases, the protagonists were hanged (assassins of Gandhi) or executed by being cut into pieces (assassin of Nadir Shah) after the assassination. One protagonist committed suicide right after his act.

4.3 Introduction to the third wave

According to Rapoport, the third wave of terrorism was driven by the goal of social

revolution and national self-assertion. The third wave of revolutionary violence started in the late 1960s and continued until 1990. The struggle for social revolution and national self-assertion was often framed as part of a wider struggle against Western neo-imperialism. In the third wave, the quest for national self-assertion was thus often mixed with the struggle against capitalism and the prosperous industrialized democracies of the West.

When we look at the ten cases of lone operator terrorism during the third wave, presented in Table IV, we find that most cases do not really fit into the framework of national self-assertion and a struggle against Western neo-imperialism. This can be explained by the fact that in most places where that struggle took place, it was fought between organizations or movements and governments, not between lone operators and the government. The third wave of terrorism incorporates terrorist movements such as the *Rote Armee Fraktion* in Germany, the *Brigate Rosse* in Italy, the Weather Underground in the US and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Within these movements, small groups of individuals have perpetrated terrorist acts. However, these do not count as acts of lone operator terrorism. I was able to find ten cases of lone operator terrorism that occurred between the 1960s and the 1990s. In Table IV, the cases are presented and we will analyze the three dimensions of the protagonists, the antagonists and the crucial factors of this wave.

Table III – ten cases of lone operator terrorism: 1960s to 1990

Case ID	Description	Time
Assassination of J.F. Kennedy	J.F. Kennedy, US president, was travelling in a presidential motorcade in Dallas, Texas, when he was shot by Lee Harvey Oswald	1963
Assassination of Maximilliano Hernandez Martinez	Hernandez, president of El Salvador, was stabbed to death by his driver in his home-in-exile in Honduras	1966
Assassination of Martin Luther King	Martin Luther King, a prominent leader of the Afro-American Civil Rights movement, was shot while standing on the balcony of his hotel room	1968

Assassination of Robert Francis Kennedy	R.F. Kennedy, US presidential candidate, was shot while walking through a hotel kitchen	1968
Assassination of Rudi Dutschke	Alfred Willi Rudi Dutschke was the most prominent spokesperson of the German student movement of the 1960s. He was shot while getting on his bike.	1968
Assassination of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia	King Faisal was assassinated by his cousin, Prince Faisal, while he was greeting him in his palace in Riyadh, Saudi-Arabia	1975
Assassination of Larry Flynt	Larry Flynt, American publisher of porn magazines, was shot while he was leaving the court building with his lawyer	1978
Theodore Kaczynski (a.k.a. 'The Unabomber')	Theodore John "Ted" Kaczynski (also known as the Unabomber (university and airline bomber), is an American mathematician, social critic and primitivist, who engaged in a mail bombing spree that spanned nearly 20 years, killing three people and injuring 23 others.	1978-1995
Joseph Christopher (a.k.a. 'The .22-Caliber Killer')	Joseph Christopher was an American serial killer who was active from September 22, 1980 until his arrest on May 10, 1981. He was known as the ".22-Caliber Killer" and the "Midtown Slasher." It is believed that he killed twelve individuals and wounded numerous others, almost all of them African American with one Hispanic male.	1980-1981
Assassination of John Lennon	John Winston Ono Lennon was an English musician and singer-songwriter who rose to worldwide fame as one of the founding members of The Beatles, one of the most commercially successful acts in the history of popular music.	1980

4.3.a Protagonists of the third wave

If we look at the category of the protagonist in the data presented in Appendix A, we can conclude that for the third wave, all protagonists are known. In the third wave, we find two lone operator terrorists who have operated over a span of time, killing and injuring more than one person in the process (20%). The most well known 'lone wolf' is probably Theodore (Ted) Kaczynski, also known as the 'Unabomber' (university and airline bomber). Kaczynski engaged in a mail-bombing spree that started in 1978 and continued until 1995, when he was finally caught and arrested. The second lone operator terrorist operating over a period of time is Joseph Christopher, also known as the '.22-Caliber Killer'. Christopher was a serial killer who killed at least twelve individuals and injured five, during the period from September 1980 until his arrest in May 1981. Again, as in the first two waves, all protagonists are male. When we look at the subcategory of age we find that most protagonists were between twenty and thirty years old (6), some were between thirty and forty years old (2) and for one case the variable age is unknown. Kaczynski started his mail bombing spree when he was thirty-six and it lasted until he was fifty-two years old, so he falls into two categories. Most acts of lone operator terrorism were claimed (8). In the other cases (2), one of the protagonists denied everything after being arrested and he was shot two days after his arrest (Harvey Lee Oswald). In the other case, the case of Prince Faisal who assassinated his uncle, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, the protagonist never officially claimed his act. The acts that were claimed were either claimed through a confession (in court) (5) or through an investigation (2). In the case of Kaczynski, he claimed his mail bombs by putting little pieces of material encrypted with the letters 'FG', meaning 'Freedom Group', in his mail bombs. However, those hints made clear the same person sent the mail bombs but they did not lead to Kaczynski until his arrest in 1995.

All lone operator terrorists acted individually and no one was a member of a terrorist organization. The majority of the protagonists had no links with third parties either (8) but in two cases the protagonists were linked to other organizations. In the case of the shooting of US 'porn king' Larry Flynt, the protagonist (Joseph Paul Franklin) held membership in the National Socialist White People's Party and the Ku Klux Klan. Lee Harvey Oswald, the assassin of US president J.F. Kennedy, was involved with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, an activist group supporting Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution in the 1960s.

Concerning the background of the protagonists, we find that most protagonists had a troublesome youth but there are large differences between their backgrounds. In some cases, the protagonists were (high) school drop-outs (4) had physically abusive fathers (2), divorced parents (2), joined the US army at some point (2), had a want to be famous (2) or visited a psychologist (2). The two perpetrators who were treated or tested by a psychologists had different outcomes: one (Chapman) was diagnosed with clinical depression while the other (Oswald) was diagnosed as having a ‘vivid fantasy life, focused on omnipotence and power to compensate for personal shortcomings and frustrations, personality pattern disturbed with schizoid features and passive-aggressive tendencies’. It is interesting to note that many protagonists have some kind of ideological component that either provides a motivation for their actions or comforts them. I listed the following background-characteristics as ideologies: interest in Marxist and socialist literature (1), white supremacist sentiments (1), hatred of communism (1), hatred of progress (1), evangelical Christianity (3), interest in Nazism (1), obsessions (such as an obsession over John Lennon or the book by Salinger: ‘The Catcher in the Rye’) (1), the idea that one has a special task in this world (1) and/or the want to be famous (2). Some protagonists combine different variables. For example, Mark David Chapman, the assassin of John Lennon, was the child of a physically abusive father; he skipped classes, was a drug abuser, became a born-again Christian, attempted to commit suicide and was treated for clinical depression. Later in life, he developed several obsessions, one being John Lennon, his eventual target.

If we look at the motivations of the protagonists of the third wave, we can conclude that in some cases, the motivation is either vague or unknown (3). The protagonists whose motivations were known committed their acts mainly out of racism or white supremacist tendencies (3) or because they wanted to be famous (2). The other listed motivations were revenge (1), political reasons (1) or a hatred of something (communism or technological process) (2). As in the second wave, there were some cases where conspiracy theories developed after the incidents. The murders of J.F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King are well known examples where many people believed the government and/or the CIA was involved. Also, in the case of the assassination of King Faisal of Saudi-Arabia, it has been said that the CIA was involved.

4.3.b Antagonists of the third wave

The antagonists of the third wave differ from the antagonists in the first and second waves. This is the first wave in which the majority of the targets were not chosen from the general government (4) but from the category 'private citizens and property' (6). The antagonists in the government category are – again – high-profile members of the government: president (2), king (1) or presidential candidate (1). In all cases, the targets were specific persons. The antagonists in the private citizens and property category are diverse, but all specifically chosen by their assassins. Theodore Kaczynski targeted people who, in his opinion, were involved in the process of technological development, such as university professors and businessmen. Chapman killed John Lennon, probably out of obsession and his psychological problems. Joseph Christopher targeted black people, because of his pathological racism. Franklin chose to kill Larry Flynt, the porn-king, because he portrayed racially mixed couples in his porn magazine. Bachmann selected to assassinate Germany's most prominent student leader of the time: Rudi Dutschke. And James Early Ray targeted Martin Luther King, probably because of his white-supremacist tendencies. So even though the target-categories changed, the targets were still specific, as opposed to generic.

In three cases, a symbolic value was attributed to the antagonist. The first one is Martin Luther King, prominent leader of the Afro-American Civil Rights movement, who was assassinated by Ray because he thought King to be an icon of the Afro-American community. The second case, the lone operator attack on US porn king Larry Flynt by Franklin, listed that Franklin saw Flynt as a symbol of the new inter-racial tolerance in the US. The last case, Rudi Dutschke, who was killed by Bachmann, was symbolic because for Bachmann Dutschke represented the communists and the red danger in Germany.

4.3.c Crucial factors in the third wave

When we look at the geographic spread of the third wave, we can conclude that the majority of the lone operator attacks were carried out in North America and, more specifically, in the United States (7). The three other attacks took place in Honduras, Germany and Saudi-Arabia. A further look at the arena of the incident tells us that all cases (10) happened in an urban environment, as in the second wave. Also, in the majority of the cases, the arena was a public place (6). In five cases, the antagonist was *en route*, on his way, to a social, a private or a work-related event. Of those *en*

route incidents, most (4) terrorist acts were carried out on the street. The other assassinations took place at a home address (2), a hotel (1), a work place (1) or unknown.

The data presented in Appendix A also demands our attention concerning the methods used. In the majority of the cases, a fire-weapon was the weapon of choice (7). In two cases, a knife was used and in one case, the protagonists used self-made explosives in mail bombs to carry out his acts. And if we analyze the *modus operandi*, we find that most lone operators needed very little information (low intelligence) to perpetrate their acts (8). If we look at pre-incident indicators, we can conclude that some protagonists used surveillance (5) before their act. Finally, concerning the aftermath of the terrorist act, we can conclude that most protagonists were arrested right (or some time) after the act (7), all of which served time in prison and in one case, the protagonist (prince Faisal) was decapitated after the assassination. One protagonist committed suicide right after his act. Kaczynski is an extraordinary case, since he managed to keep out of the FBI’s hands for over fifteen years, hiding in a cabin in the woods of Montana.

4.4 Introduction to the fourth wave

The roots of the fourth wave of modern terrorism can be traced back to the late 1970s, more specifically, to the year 1979. In that year, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, spurring violent resistance under the Afghan people and their neighbouring countries. The invasion inspired the call to jihad, which led to the recruitment of mujahideen from all over the Muslim world; which eventually led to the emergence of Al Qaeda. Also, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 led to the establishment of a Caliphate, an Islamic theocracy, under the reign of Ayatollah Khomeini. This, in turn, led to the radicalization of certain Shi’ite organizations in Iraq, such as al-Dawa, and most especially in Lebanon (the formation of Hezbollah). The Iranian revolution and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets invoked religious radicalism that justified the resort to violence. After those major events, the fourth wave of terrorism, the jihadi or Islamist wave, started and lasted until today.

Table IV – ten cases of lone operator terrorism: 1990s – now

Case ID	Description	Time
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Assassination of Salman Taseer	Assassination of Pakistani governor Salman Taseer	2011
Karst Tates	Attack on Dutch royal family	2009
Fort Hood shooting	Shooting of US soldiers on military base Fort Hood, Killeen	2009
Jerusalem Bulldozer Attack	Attack on pedestrians with bulldozer on Jaffa Street, Jerusalem	2008
Assassination of Anna Lindh	Assassination of Anna Lindh	2003
Assassination of Pim Fortuyn	Assassination of Fortuyn	2002
London Nail Bomber	The London Nail Bomber was a former member of the British National Party and the Nationalist Socialist Movement who perpetrated a 13-day bombing campaign in London	1999
LA Jewish Community Center Shooting	Buford O. Furrow Jr. attacked a Jewish Community Center in Granada Hills	1999
Assassination of Rabin	Assassination of Rabin	1995
Franz Fuchs	Between 1993 en 1997 Franz Fuchs killed four people and injured 15 against foreigners and people who were friendly to foreigners	1993

4.4.a Protagonists of the fourth wave

If we look at the data presented in Appendix A concerning the fourth wave, as in the first three waves, all protagonists are known. Also, they were all male and all under fifty years old. The majority of the perpetrators ages are between thirty and forty years old (6), some were between twenty and thirty years old (3) and only one protagonist was older than forty years old. Not all lone operator acts were claimed (6), but in those cases that the incident was claimed it was either claimed through a

confession of the protagonist (2) or through a statement afterwards (4). This is the first wave in which we see other protagonists (than the actual protagonist) claim the act (2). In the Jerusalem Bulldozer Attack, where Hussam Taysir Duwait drove a bulldozer into the traffic on Jaffa street, several terrorist groups claimed the act: Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, the Galilee Freedom Battalion and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). And in the case of the London Nail Bomber, where David Copeland perpetrated a thirteen-day bombing spree on foreigners in London, the acts were claimed by two right-extremist groups: Combat 18 and the White Wolves. In all cases the lone operators acted individually (10). When looking at terrorist organizations, three of the lone operator terrorists were member of – or linked to – a (known) terrorist organization; about the other seven their possible ties to third parties are unknown. Buford O'neal Furrow jr., the protagonist who opened fire in the LA Jewish Community Center, belonged to (or was once associated with) Aryan Nation, a white-supremacist group. Nidal Malik Hassan, a US Army major serving as a psychiatrist, shot thirteen people and wounded numerous others in what is now known as the Fort Hood Shooting. Before his terrorist act, he had contact with Anwar al-Awlaki, who is classified by the US Government as a Designated Global Terrorist and who is associated to Al-Qaeda. Finally, David Copeland (the London Nail Bomber) was a member of the far-right organizations British National Party and the National Socialist Movement.

Concerning the background of the lone operator terrorists of the fourth wave, we note several things. Relatives, friends and medical experts described many protagonists as suffering from mental illness (4) and/or socially inept loners (4). The mental illnesses varied from obsessive-compulsive disorder (Volkert van der Graaf) to passive-aggressiveness tendencies (Mijail Mijailovic and Buford Furrow) and paranoid schizophrenia (David Copeland). Some protagonists were in the army (3), abused drugs and/or alcohol (3), were school drop-outs (2), served time in jail (2), were (second-generation) immigrants (2), or were described as highly intelligent (2). What is interesting to note is that a large part of the fourth wave protagonists are described as right-wing/xenophobic/racist (5). That brings us to the category of the context and the possible motive. What stands out is that most protagonists' motivations were political (6), sometimes mixed with personal motives (3). When the motive was political, in half of the cases (3) the motive was racist or xenophobic. In some cases, the motivation was religious (2) or unknown (1). Only in one case, the

motivation was strictly personal, and that was the case of Karst Tate, a Dutch man who drove a car into the crowd on Queen's Day. He allegedly meant to harm the royal family but since he died after his attack, the police concluded his motivation was of personal nature. In the ten cases of the fourth wave of terrorism, no conspiracy theories were developed concerning who carried out the terrorist act.

4.4.b Antagonists of the fourth wave

When we look at the dimension of the antagonist we can conclude that this is the first wave in which the majority of the targets were still specific (6) but the rest was chosen generically (4). What is similar to the other waves is that the antagonists are all persons. The target-categories differ substantially: Private citizens and property (4), General Government (4), Diplomatic Government (1) and Military (1). So for the first time, most targets are not anymore located in the category of the General Government. The antagonists of the General Government category were Anna Lindh, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden; Salman Taseer, Governor of Punjab and member of the Pakistan People Party; Pim Fortuyn, member of political party *Lijst Pim Fortuyn*; and Yitzchak Rabin, Prime minister of Israel. Thus, we can conclude that the targets within that category are still high profile targets.

In three cases, symbolic value was attributed to the antagonist. David Copeland, the London Nail Bomber, targeted the Black, Asian and gay community in London, viewing specific places and people as symbolic for the whole community. For Buford Burrow, the LA Jewish Community Center was a symbol for the Jewish community in general. Finally, Franz Fuchs, a racist man who engaged in a mail bomb spree from 1993 to 1997, his targets were either foreigners or people who were friendly to foreigners.

4.4.c Crucial factors in the fourth wave

Concerning the crucial factors of the fourth wave of lone operator terrorism, the data presented in Appendix A teaches us several things. The incidents in the fourth wave are geographically distributed over Western Europe (5), North America (2), Middle East and North Africa (2) and South Asia; which seems to indicate that this wave was most intense in the Western world. Rapoport deems the fourth wave of terrorism the jihadi or Islamist wave of terrorism, spurred by religious violence. That might lead to the erroneous assumption that most lone operator terrorism would take place in

countries where the Islam is the main religion, i.e. in the Middle East and North Africa. However, that claim is not supported by the data, as we found that most acts of lone operator terrorism took place in Western Europe.

When we look at the arena of the incidents, almost all cases (9) took place in an urban environment. The exception is the Ford Hood shooting, which happened on a military base (Fort Hood) in a rural area in Texas. Also, in the majority of the cases, the arena was a public place (7). The attacks were mainly carried out on the street (7). The Fort Hood shooting took place on a US military base, as said before. Buford Burrow perpetrated his act in a religious institution, the LA Jewish Community Center. And Franz Fuchs sent his mail bombs to many people, sometimes at their home or work address, but in many cases the exact location is unknown. Contrary to the first wave of terrorism, not much information could be found on whether analyzed cases happened en route or not (2).

Another category that demands our attention is the category of security. The information found on security was very diverse: in some cases there was security, in others there was no security and for some cases the information could not be found. However, it is interesting to note that in two cases (Karst Tates and Salman Taseer) security was present but the terrorist acts had two very different outcomes. Karst Tates was most likely after the Royal Family, who were visiting the Dutch city of Apeldoorn on Queens Day. However, there were many police officers and other security officials present. To make his way to the Royal Family, Tates drove his car through the crowd that was gathered and crashed his car into a monument. In this incident, the intended target of Tates was not hurt. In the attack on Pakistan's governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer, there were also many security guards present, seven to eight in total. Still, Taseer was assassinated by one of his guards. This could indicate that security helps but not if the security itself is infiltrated.

The weapons used in the fourth wave of lone operator terrorism are very diverse. Firearms (rifles, automatic weapons, handguns) still dominate (5), but new methods were used as well. Two attacks were carried out using a vehicle: Karst Tates' attack on the Dutch Royal Family with a Suzuki Swift and Hussam Duwayt used a front-end loader in what is now known as the 'Jerusalem Bulldozer Attack'. David Copeland used self-made explosives, manufacturing very deadly nail bombs. Also, Franz Fuchs created his own mail bombs. In one case, a knife was used to kill Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs Anna Lindh.

The level of intelligence needed or used by the protagonists was, in most cases analyzed, low (8). When we look at the pre-incident indicators, we find that in two cases the protagonist infiltrated the antagonists' environment and in five cases, weapons and/or material was moved before the attack. The two 'infiltration' cases differ substantially. Malik Qadri infiltrated very deliberately into Governor Taseer's security by signing up for Pakistan's elite police and requesting to be on Taseer's security service. Nidal Hasan, the Ford Hood shooter, already worked for the US military for quite some time but radicalized while working there. Finally, concerning the aftermath of the terrorist act, we can conclude that most protagonists were arrested right after the act (5). One protagonist was shot during his attack and one turned himself in a day after his act.

Chapter 5: comparison

In this chapter, I will compare and contrast the information found in the previous chapter concerning the four waves of lone operator terrorism. I will do so by analyzing every dimension (the protagonist, the antagonist and crucial factors) from an overall perspective, allowing for a comparison over time and space. The same approach used for the analysis of the separate waves will be used. When analyzing the protagonist, we will look at the demographic characteristics of the protagonists, their backgrounds and motivations and possible links to third parties. In the category of the antagonist, we will analyze who the antagonists were and whether they had any symbolic value. In the crucial factors dimension, we will ask ourselves what variables are noteworthy over time and what the differences are between the modus operandi of the lone operator terrorists in the different waves.

5.1 Cross-wave analysis of the protagonist

The first comparison of our data of the protagonists in lone operator terrorism from 1880 until today concerns the demographic characteristics. The first conclusion is that all protagonists are male and under fifty years old. This confirms Walter Laqueur's famous statement that "most terrorists have been young, some very young", and "the vast majority have been male".⁸⁸ However, when we compare the variable age for the different groups, we find that in the first wave 70% of the protagonists were aged between twenty and thirty years old; in the second wave, the percentage decreased to 50%; the third wave stabilized at 60%; but in the fourth and last wave of terrorism the percentage decreased further to only 20% of the protagonists whereas during that period 60% of the analyzed protagonists were aged between thirty and forty years old. This indicates that the old adagio of terrorist being young males might no longer be true.

When we look at the number of lone operator terrorist acts over time, we can conclude that the majority of the acts was claimed, but that percentage is decreasing to, from 100% in the first wave, through 70% and 80% in the second and third wave, to 60% in the last wave. Also, the way in which the acts were claimed differs over time. In the first three waves, most acts were claimed through a confession (sometimes in court) but in the last wave, only 20% of the incidents were claimed through a confession and 40% was claimed through a statement. The fourth wave is

⁸⁸ Walter Laqueur, *The New*, p. 80.

also the period during which other groups and/or individuals claimed the act instead of the actual perpetrator. This seems to indicate a shift in the way lone operator terrorist acts are claimed from personal confessions to more general statements, often through the internet, telephone, radio or television and more often from terrorist groups who did not carry out the act themselves.

None of the lone operators in the four waves of terrorism were official members of terrorist organizations (if they were, they would not be lone operators). However, there have been many links to third parties. In the first wave, all the protagonists belonged to an anarchist network which did not officially exist as an organization but consisted of individuals and loosely organized interest groups, linked by their shared ideology. In the second wave, 40% of the protagonists were linked to third parties; in the third wave 20%; and in the fourth wave 30%. These percentages do not convey a pattern or lead us to the conclusion that the number of lone operator terrorists linked to third parties is significantly changing over the years. It is significant that the third parties are often right-wing parties such as the National Socialist White People's Party and the Ku Klux Klan in the third wave Aryan Nation, the British National Party and the Nationalist Socialist Movement in the fourth wave.

Looking at the geographical spread of the incidents, we can conclude that over time most lone operator acts were carried out in Western Europe and the US. On average, 62.5% of the acts happened in Western Europe and the US. Only the second wave of terrorism, from the 1920s to the 1960s, deviates from the pattern. During that wave, the majority of the lone operator terrorist acts took place in Central America and the Caribbean whereas only 10% happened in the US (and none in Western Europe). This might lead us to think the focus of lone operator terrorists has been on Western Europe and the US throughout the twentieth century. However, that conclusion is too soon since it could very well be that this is the result of the availability (or lack thereof) of sound data for lone operator terrorist acts outside the Western world. To validate this, more data should be gathered, especially about cases in countries outside Europe and North America.

When we consider the backgrounds of the protagonists we have to lay our focus on those indicators that seem to present themselves more often, creating perhaps a pattern of indicators. But before we start analyzing the similarities or differences in protagonists' backgrounds over the four waves, it must be noted that very little information was available about the protagonists of the first wave. That

being said, what we can conclude is that a large percentage (32.5%) of the protagonists were communists. However, this is historically skewed to the first (100%) and the second (30%) wave. This can partly be explained by the focus in the first wave by the anarchist movement on propaganda of the deed. The communists within the anarchist movement inspired one another, leading to many so-called 'copycats'. Also, because the anarchist movement is the most well known movement within the history of terrorism during the first wave, more information about these lone operators is found. So the high percentage of communist perpetrators does not necessarily say anything about the lone operator profile; rather, it says something about the absence of information on non-communist related terrorist incidents. Another variable within the background/history category that has a high positive score is having a mental illness. Almost 20% of lone operators over time were diagnosed or said to be suffering from mental illnesses; schizophrenia being the most common diagnose (37.5% of the total dataset of protagonists with mental illnesses). Also, 17.5% of the protagonists were (second generation) immigrants in the country where they performed their terrorist act. Other variables that appear over time and draw our attention are the number of protagonists who joined the army (15%) at some point in their lives and the number of (high) school drop outs (15%).

Finally, the motivation of the protagonists throughout the twentieth century has changed over time, though no clear pattern can be derived from the data. First of all, in 35% of all cases of lone operator acts, the motivation could not be determined. This can mean the motivation was unknown or there were several implications but no definite clarity concerning the actual motivation. Nonetheless, the number of cases of lone operator terrorism where the motivation is vague or unclear declined over the years, if we look at our data. In the first two waves, 50% of the motivations are vague or unclear; in the third wave this percentage decreased to 30% and in the last wave, the percentage was only 10%. Even though the motivations in the first wave were often vague or unclear (50%), we still know that some lone operator terrorists were inspired by communism, and some lone operator terrorists were part of the anarchist network. In the second wave, only 30% of the perpetrators were motivated by communism and 20% were motivated partly by political and partly by personal reasons. The third wave saw racism or white supremacist tendencies as the most prominent motivational factor (30%), followed by a want to be famous (20%). In the fourth wave, political reasons were the main motivational factor (60%), of which 50%

were labelled as racism or white supremacist tendencies. Overall, we can conclude that political reasons, often mixed with personal motivations are the main factor behind lone operator terrorists' behaviour. We have to bear in mind, however, that the validity of the data on terrorists' motivations is questionable. Since we concluded that a significant number of lone operator terrorists were diagnosed with mental illnesses, we should be critical of their own statements concerning their motivations. At the same time, we can never be too sure how trustworthy the information provided by friends, family or other sources about the perpetrators' motivation actually is.

5.2 Cross-wave analysis of the antagonist

A first glance at the results of the cross-wave analysis of the antagonists tells us that one variable scored 100%, namely that the chosen targets were all persons – as opposed to objects. However, this does not mean that lone operator terrorists only select human targets. In the dataset, at least one case can be found where a lone operator terrorist attacked a building: US citizen Joseph Andrew Stack used a small plane to crash into the Echelon Building in Austin, Texas, in February 2010. He wanted to attack the office of the International Revenue Service (IRS) because he blamed the IRS for his financial problems. However, we can conclude that almost all cases of lone operator terrorism are direct against human targets.

Another category that shows remarkable similarity over time is the 'generic/specific' category. 90% of all targets from 1880 until 2011 are specific persons. Only in the fourth and last wave of terrorism, the percentage of specifically chosen targets by lone operator terrorists dropped to 60%. The third category that scores high over time is the 'general government' category, containing 67.5% of all cases. Within the general government category, the percentages are divided amongst presidents (and presidential candidates): 37% of the targets; prime ministers: 22.2%; kings (11.1%) and others (governors, prominent politicians etc.): 30%.

But the pattern changed over time. In the first wave, 100% of the targets were specifically chosen persons out of the general government category. In the second wave, 90% were specifically chosen and in the general government category. And in the last two waves, that percentage dropped to 40%. So the data seems to indicate a trend towards more generically chosen targets; and the target-category itself is switching to 'private citizens and property'. The cases that belong to the private citizens and property category show no similarities in their target selection.

When we analyze the symbolic value of the antagonists of lone operator

terrorism in the four waves of terrorism, we find that 32.5% of the antagonists are considered to have symbolic meaning. This percentage changed over time: from 50% in the first, to 20% in the second and 30% in the last two waves; indicating a certain measure of stability. The type of significance attributed to the antagonists is diverse, but it is noteworthy that 38% of the 'symbolic antagonists' have a right-wing significance, representing the black, Asian, gay, Jewish or foreign community etc. Another symbolic value that was often named as a target selection criterion was whether the antagonist was a member of the oppressive class or regime in a specific environment (30%). All in all, symbolic value is an important factor in determining the target of lone operator terrorist acts.

5.3 Cross-wave analysis of the crucial factors

The first crucial factor we will compare is the arena in which the lone operator terrorist acts were carried out. There are many similarities over time between the different cases. First of all, 95% of all the incidents happened in an urban environment. Another high score is the 72.5% of incidents that were carried out in a public place. The third and last high score in the category of the arena is the 35% score of terrorist attacks that were perpetrated en route. And if we analyze the combined score of these three we find that the chance is 32% that a lone operator terrorist attack will be carried out en route, in a public place and in an urban environment. If we look at the actual place where the terrorist incident happened, it seems that they often happen on the street (32.5%). Other locations are quite randomly distributed over places such as restaurants, public events, home addresses, work addresses etc.

Other variables in the crucial factors dimension that score high are the level of intelligence lone operator terrorists used for their acts (in the majority of cases low (77.5%)); the choice of weapon (65% firearms and 20% knives, blades or daggers); and the presence of security (in 55% of the lone operator terrorist attacks, security was present). Considering the pre-incident indicators, we find that many lone operator terrorists (30%) use surveillance to observe the environment right before the attack. 17.5% of the lone operator terrorists infiltrated the environment of their antagonist to carry out the attack and 12.5% of the terrorists travelled from one place to another to perpetrate their act.

Finally, when we analyze the aftermath of the lone operator incidents over time, we find that in most cases the protagonist was arrested (some time) after the act

(60%). Of those arrested, the majority served time in jail but 22.5% was sentenced to death. In the case of the death penalty we find that this percentage can be almost entirely traced back to the first wave of terrorism (1880-1920), in which 90% of the lone operator terrorists were sentenced to death. In the other waves, only two more protagonists were sentenced to death. In the second wave, Khaliq Hazara who killed the Afghan King Nadir Shah, was executed by being cut into pieces. In the third wave, Prince Faisal who killed his uncle, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia was executed by being decapitated. Not all lone operator terrorists get arrested, however. Quite a large number of perpetrators (17.5%) was killed right after the attack, often in an exchange of fire with the police or the army. Finally, a small but interesting fact is that 7.5% of the protagonists committed suicide right after they carried out their terrorist act.

Conclusion and discussion

The goal of this thesis was to answer the question: What is the time-independent profile for lone operator terrorists? In order to answer this question I selected and analysed cases of lone operator terrorism – using Rapoport’s four waves theory – to compare and contrast lone operator terrorist incidents within and between the four waves of terrorism from 1880 to 2011. In the analysis, I focused on three key-dimensions: the protagonist, the antagonist and the crucial factors.

The main conclusion of the analysis is that the data does not indicate a clear time-independent profile for lone operator terrorists. Even though some variables could be found that indicate certain commonalities or shared characteristics, in general the data shows a broad variety in lone operator terrorist profiles over time. Nonetheless, some initial findings are worth discussing.

For the category of the protagonist, the main conclusion is that all analyzed protagonists are male and they are all under fifty years old. However, we also concluded that the average age of the protagonists seemed to increase, rather than decrease, over time. Whereas 70% of the protagonists in the first wave were aged between twenty and thirty years old, only 20% of the protagonists in the fourth wave fell into that category. Another factor that draws our attention is the arena of the incident; we concluded that 62.5% of the incidents took place in Western Europe and the US. Nonetheless, we also concluded that this might be the result of the availability (or lack thereof) of lone operator terrorism data for regions outside the Western world. Protagonists suffering from a mental illness are the last factor in the protagonist-dimension that demands our attention. Overall, we find that 20% of the analysed protagonists suffered from a mental illness, of which (paranoid) schizophrenia accounts for the largest part (37.5%).

The category of the antagonists shows more common characteristics over time. First of all, the selected targets of the analyzed lone operator incidents were all persons, a score of 100%. Within the human target category, we find that 90% of the antagonists were specific persons, although we also concluded that the fourth wave of terrorism shows a tendency towards a more generic selection of human targets (the percentage of specifically chosen targets dropped to 60% during that wave). Another variable that draws our attention is the general government category, containing 67.5% of all the cases. Purely based upon the analyzed antagonist cases, we could argue that the average target is a specific person who works within the general

government (presidents, prime-ministers, politicians etc.). Finally, we concluded that in 32.5% of the cases, symbolic value is attributed to the target, indicating that symbolism is an important factor in the target selection of lone operator terrorists.

The third dimension, the crucial factors dimension, shows a large variance in the analyzed data. However, even in this dimension, we were able to find some noteworthy variables. First of all, we found that 95% of the lone operator terrorist incidents happened in an urban environment; 72.5% were carried out in a public place; and 35% of the attacks happened while the antagonist was *en route*. We concluded that the combined chance of these variables (a lone operator terrorist attack in an urban environment, in a public place and en route) is 32%. Other variables in the crucial factors dimension that score high are the level of intelligence lone operator terrorists used for their acts (in 77.5% of the cases they only needed a low level of intelligence) and the choice of weapon: 67.5% of the protagonists used a firearm.

When we look at existing literature on lone operator terrorism, some of these findings are supported while others are not. The most important findings in the protagonist dimension (sex and age) are supported by Laqueur, who stated that “most terrorists have been young, some very young”, and “the vast majority have been male”.⁸⁹ Also, William F. Shughart II concluded that “no common threads of race, ethnicity, education, income, employment or social status run through the individuals and groups who have engaged in terrorist activities, either now or in the past”⁹⁰. Nor, apparently, does terrorism have systematic causes rooted in “genetic factors, psychological difficulties in early childhood, a disturbed family life, or identification with the underclass”⁹¹. As a unique personality type, the representative terrorist does not exist; “there never was such a person”⁹². This supports our conclusion that there is no clear time-independent profile for lone operator terrorists.

Concerning the crucial factors dimension, we find that research has been done into the environment of the terrorist attacks⁹³, the use of weapons in terrorist

⁸⁹ Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism*, pp. 3-4.

⁹⁰ William F. Shughart II, ‘An Analytical History’, p. 7.

⁹¹ Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism*, p. 79.

⁹² *Ibidem*, p. 79.

⁹³ Donald E. Brown, Jason Dalton, and Heidi Hoyle. ‘Spatial forecast methods for terrorist events in urban environments’, *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, vol. 30, no. 73 (June 2004), pp. 426–435;

incidents⁹⁴ and the level of intelligence available and used by terrorists⁹⁵. However, even though conclusions have been drawn about the successfulness of weapons used in terrorist incidents and how to prevent terrorist incidents in urban environments, these findings do not correspond with the research done in this thesis, where I specifically look at shared characteristics over time.

We must realize however, that the findings presented in this thesis are entirely dependent upon the case selection of the data. This has important implications for the conclusions drawn. The question is: to what extent does the conclusion of this research say something about lone operator terrorism in general. It might be the case that it mostly says something about the case selection. This point can be illustrated by some examples. The most prominent example is the finding that 62.5% of the selected cases took place in Western Europe and the US. As noted before, this could indicate that the focus of lone operator terrorists has been on these two regions of the world, but it could also mean that data outside those regions is more difficult to obtain or simply non-existent. Another limitation of this research is to be found in the set of variables presented in the Pandora-model. Many variables were open for interpretation, making a comparison between lone operator terrorist incidents more difficult. This point can also be illustrated by looking at the example of the variable 'background' of the protagonist dimension. In this variable, I described the various backgrounds of the lone operator terrorists by noting all the relevant information and at the same time by being as concise as possible. However, if we want to allow for a more quantitative approach based upon large datasets, it would be a large improvement to split up the variable 'background' into several variables that can be categorized into simple 'yes or no' categories.

With a case selection of forty cases, I was able to set out an exploratory path into the world of lone operator terrorists and make some first observations concerning the nature of this phenomenon. I looked into the background, target selection and important factors of lone operator terrorists. Although I did not find a time-independent profile for lone operator terrorists, I was able to find some interesting shared characteristics between the incidents over time. But these findings are largely conditional on the target selection and I cannot base general conclusions

⁹⁴ Andrew O'Neil, 'Terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction: how serious is the threat?', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 57, no. 1 (2003), pp. 99-112; see also Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, *Terrorists – Their Weapons, Leaders and Tactics*, New York, Facts on File, 1979.

⁹⁵ Quan Li, 'Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 49, no. 2 (April 2005), pp. 278-297.

about lone operator terrorism upon them. More research needs to be done, especially into lone operator terrorism outside the US and Western Europe. The questions deduced in the research process of this thesis are important questions and demand adequate answers in order to counter the threat of lone operator terrorism worldwide. Incidents such as the recent Norway attack by lone operator terrorist Anders Behring Breivik, who killed seventy-seven people in one day⁹⁶, illustrate in a gruesome way the need for a better counterterrorism strategy concerning the phenomenon of the 'lone wolf'. This thesis is step one, adding some new insights to existing literature and offering recommendations for further research. However, counterterrorism experts and organizations still have a long way to go, by doing research and improving counterterrorism strategies, in order to adequately face the challenge of lone operator terrorism in the twenty-first century.

⁹⁶ The New York Times, 'Norway – Breivik Attacks, July 2011', (July 25, 2011), <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/norway/index.html> (retrieved on August 14, 2011).

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Appendix B – Data collection of lone operator terrorists

Date	Attempt/ attack	Summary
May 11, 1878	Attempt	Max Hodel attempts to assassinate Kaiser Wilhelm I of Germany by shooting him. He fails twice, is apprehended and executed
August 4, 1878	Attack	Sergey Stepnyak-Kravchinsky stabs General Nikolai Mezentsov, head of the Tsar's secret police, to death in response to the execution of Ivan Kovalsky
February 1879	Attack	Grigori Goldenberg shoots Prince Dmitri Kropotkin, the Governor of Kharkov in the Russian Empire, to death
April 20, 1879	Attempt	Alexander Soloviev attempts to assassinate Tsar Alexander II of Russia. The monarch spots the weapon in his hands and flees, but Soloviev still fires five shots, all of which miss. He is captured and hanged on May 28
February 17, 1880	Attempt	Stepan Khalturin successfully blows up part of the Winter Palace in an attempt to assassinate Tsar Alexander II of Russia. Although the Tsar escaped unharmed, eight soldiers were killed and 45 wounded
March 1, 1881	Attack	Tsar Alexander II of Russia is killed in a bomb blast by <i>Ignaty Grinevitsky</i>
July 23, 1892	Attempt	Alexander Berkman tries to kill American industrialist Henry Clay Frick in retaliation for Frick's hiring of Pinkerton detectives to break up the Homestead Strike, resulting in the deaths of seven steelworkers. Although badly wounded, Frick survives, and Berkman is arrested and eventually sentenced to 22 years in prison
December 9, 1893	Attack	Auguste Vaillant throws a nail bomb in the French National Assembly, killing nobody and injuring one. He is then sentenced to death and executed by the guillotine on February 4, 1894, shouting "Death to bourgeois society and long live anarchy!" (<i>A mort la société bourgeoise et vive l'anarchie!</i>). During his trial, Vaillant declared that he had not intended to kill anybody, but only to injure several deputies in retaliation against the execution of Ravachol, who had engaged himself in four bombings

February 12, 1894	Attack	Émile Henry, intending to avenge Auguste Vaillant, sets off a bomb in <i>Café Terminus</i> (a café near the Gare Saint-Lazare train station in Paris), killing one and injuring twenty
June 24, 1894	Attack	Italian anarchist Sante Geronimo Caserio, seeking revenge for Auguste Vaillant and Émile Henry, stabs Sadi Carnot, the President of France, to death. Caserio is then executed by guillotine on August 15
November 3, 1896	Attack	In the Greek city of Patras, Dimitris Matsalis, an anarchist shoemaker, attacks banker Dionysios Fragkopoulos and merchant Andreas Kollas with a knife. Fragkopoulos is killed on the spot; Kollas is seriously wounded
August 8, 1897	Attack	Michele Angiolillo shoots Spanish Prime Minister Antonio Cánovas del Castillo dead at a thermal bath resort, seeking vengeance for the imprisonment and torture of alleged revolutionaries at the Montjuïc fortress. Angiolillo is executed by garotte on August 20
September 10, 1898	Attack	Luigi Lucheni stabs Empress Elisabeth, the consort of Emperor Franz Joseph I of Austria-Hungary, to death with a needle file in Geneva, Switzerland. Lucheni is sentenced to life in prison and eventually commits suicide in his cell
July 29, 1900	Attack	Gaetano Bresci shoots King Umberto I of Italy dead, seeking revenge for the Bava-Beccaris massacre in Milan. Due to the lack of capital punishment in Italy, Bresci is sentenced to penal servitude for life on Santo Stefano Island, where is found dead less than a year later
September 6, 1901	Attack	Leon Czolgosz shoots U.S. President William McKinley at point-blank range at the Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo, New York. McKinley dies on September 14, and Czolgosz is executed by electric chair on October 29
November 15, 1902	Attempt	Gennaro Rubino attempts to murder King Leopold II of Belgium as he returns in a procession from a memorial service for his recently-deceased wife, Marie Henriette. All three of Rubino's shots miss the monarch's carriage, and he is quickly subdued by the crowd and taken into police custody. He is sentenced to life imprisonment

		and dies in prison in 1918
May 31, 1906	Attempt	Catalan anarchist Mateu Morral tries to kill King Alfonso XIII of Spain and Princess Victoria Eugenie of Battenberg after their wedding by throwing a bomb into the wedding procession following the ceremony. The monarchs are unhurt, but some bystanders and horses are killed. Morral is apprehended two days later and commits suicide while being transferred to prison
February 1, 1908	Attack	Manuel Buíça and Alfredo Costa shoot to death King Carlos I of Portugal and his son, Crown Prince Luis Filipe, respectively, in the Lisbon Regicide. Both Buíça and Costa, who were both eventually shot dead by police officers, were sympathetic to a republican movement in Portugal that included anarchist elements
March 28, 1908	Attempt	Anarchist Selig Cohen aka Selig Silverstein tries to throw a bomb in New York City's Union Square. A premature explosion kills a bystander named Ignatz Hildebrand and mortally wounds Cohen, who dies a month later
September 14, 1911	Attack	Dmitri Bogrov shoots Russian prime minister Pyotr Stolypin at the Kiev Opera House in the presence of Tsar Nicholas II and two of his daughters, Grand Duchesses Olga and Tatiana. Stolypin dies four days later, and Bogrov is hanged on September 28

1922	Attack	Michael Collins, IRA leader, killed in an ambush firefight near the end of Irish Civil War
1922	Attack	First Polish President Gabriel Narutowicz. Killed five days after his inauguration, while attending the opening of an art exhibit at the Zachęta Gallery in Warsaw
1926	Attempt	Attempt to assassinate Italian president Benito Mussolini by Violet Gibson
1933	Attack	Anton Cermak, Mayor of Chicago, killed in Miami, Florida during a visit of president-elect of Franklin Roosevelt
1934	Attack	First king of Yugoslavia, Alexander I of Yugoslavia, killed in Marseille during a state visit by a member of

		the International Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO)
1935	Attack	US senator Huey Long, shot in a Louisiana State Capitol hallway by Carl Weiss
1940	Attack	Ramon Mercader, sent by the Russian secret police, killed Lev Bronstein Trotsky, by a pick-hit on his head
1941	Attempt	Attempt by Vasil Laci to kill Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy and member of the House of Savoy
1942	Attack	SS-Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich, shot by Jan Kubiš and Jozef Gabčík
1944	Attempt	Chancellor and Führer of Germany Adolf Hitler narrowly escapes in the July 20 plot, initiated by Claus von Stauffenberg
1948	Attack	Nathuram Godse kills political and Spiritual Leader of India, Mahatma Gandhi
1950	Attempt	Attempt to kill US President Harry S. Truman in order to draw attention to the Puerto Rico independence movement, in which both attempted killers were active. See Truman assassination attempt
1959	Attack	Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Solomon Bandaranaike, Assassinated by a Buddhist monk as part of a conspiracy
1960	Attack	Inejiro Asanuma, member of Japanese Socialist Party. Asanuma was pierced to assassin's bayonet while making a speech
1960	Attempt	Fidel Castro, Cuban leader. Attempts to introduce poison supplied by the CIA into Castro's food; Castro supposedly survived 638 assassination attempts in all
1960	Attempt	Attempt to assassinate US President-elect John F. Kennedy by lone wolf Richard Paul Pavlick
1962	Attempt	Attempt to kill French President Charles de Gaulle by Jean Bastien-Thiry and the OAS
1962	Attempt	An attempt to kill President of the Republic of Vietnam Ngo Dinh Diem in the 1962 South Vietnamese Presidential Palace bombing fails

September 11, 1973	Attack	Salvador Allende Gossens, President of Chile, killed by the Chilean Army
March 21, 1983	Attack	Benigno (Ninoy) Aquino Jr., Politician, Philippines, killed by the Army
October, 1986	Attack	Gerald (Gero) Hermann Johannes Von Braunmuhl, German diplomate, killed by the Rote Armeefraktion
April 7, 1979	Attack	Siegfried Buback, German General prosecutor, assassinated by the RAF
May, 10, 1979	Attack	Roque Dalton, Writer, El Salvador, Regime executed
November 1, 1963	Attack	Ngo Dinh Diem, Politician, South Vietnam, assassinated by the Vietnamese army
November 10, 1979	Attack	Gunter Von Drenkmann, President of the Berlin Court, killed by the RAF
April 11, 1968	Attack	Alfred Will Rudolf Dutschke, German student leader, shot in his head on the street while leaving his house. Survived the attempt but died ten years after the incident due to brain damage caused by the attack
June 11, 1963	Attack	Medgar W. Evers, American civil rights fighter, killed by the Ku Klux Klan
March 25, 1975	Attack	Feisal Ibn Abd Al-Aziz Ibn Saoed, King of Saudi Arabia, shot by his cousin, Prince Faisal, when he bowed forward to greet him
May 6, 1978	Attack	Larry Flint, American director of porn, shot when he was leaving the court building by sniper Joseph Paul Franklin
September 22, 1975	Attempt	Gerald Rudolph Ford, President of USA, two attempts on his life by different women
October 31, 1984	Attack	Indira Shrimati Gandhi, Indian politician, stabbed in the chest by own guards, attributed to the Sikhs
1958 - 1966	Numerous Attempts	Charles Andre Joseph Marie de Gaulle, president of France
November 30, 1989	Attack	Alfred Herrhausen, German banker, kidnapped and killed by the RAF

May 11, 1981	Attack	Heinz-Herbert Karry, German politician killed by RZ
November 22, 1963	Attack	John Fitzgerald Kennedy, President of the US, assassinated by Harvey Lee Oswald while he was traveling in a presidential motorcade in Dallas, Texas
June 15, 1968	Attack	Robert Francis Kennedy, American politician and US presidential candidate, was shot by Sirhan, a Jordanian immigrant, while he was walking through the kitchen of the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles to celebrate his electoral victory
April 3, 1968	Attack	Martin Luther King, American civil rights activist, was killed while standing on the balcony of his hotel room in Memphis. Shot by James Earl Ray, who was captured two months after the shooting
December 8, 1980	Attack	Mark Chapman shot John Lennon, British musician and front man of popular band The Beatles, on the entrance of the building where he lived on December 8, 1980
January 18, 1961	Attack	Patrice Hemery Lumumba, Congolese politician, killed by the army
February 21, 1965	Attack	Malcolm (X) Little, American civil rights activist, allegedly killed by organization Black Muslim
November 27, 1975	Attack	Ross McWrither, producer of Guinness Book of Records, kidnapped and killed by the IRA
March 16, 1978	Attack	Aldo Moro, Italian politician, assassinated by the Brigade Rosse
August 27, 1979	Attack	Louis Mountbatten, First Earl of Burma, kidnapped and assassinated by the IRA
January 28, 1968	Attack	Sven Olof Palme, Swedish president, unknown perpetrator
October 16, 1979	Attack	Park Tsjoeng Hee, South-Korean General and politician, killed by the KCIA
July 30, 1977	Attack	Jorgen Ponto, German banker, kidnapped and assassinated by the RAF
October 19, 1984	Attack	Jerzy Popieluszko, Polish catholic theologian, killed by the regime

March 29, 1981	Attempt	Ronald Wilson Reagan, President of the US, was struck by gunfire from would-be assassin John Hinckley, outside the Washington Hilton hotel. Although close to death during surgery, Reagan survived the assassination attempt
October 6, 1981	Attack	Mohammed Anwar al-Sadat, president of Egypt, killed by the Muslim Brotherhood
September 5, 1977	Attack	Hanns-Martin Schleyer, German businessman, assassinated by the RAF
September 17, 1980	Attack	Anastasio Somoza Debayle, president of Nicaragua, unknown perpetrator
May 30, 1961	Attack	Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Y Molina, Dominican Republic politician, assassinated by the CIA
May 15, 1972	Attempt	George Corley Wallace, US governor and presidential candidate, lone wolf, survived attack

1990	Attempt	German Federal Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble; shot in back and face after an election campaign event in Oppenau by Dieter Kaufmann. Has been paralysed and using a wheelchair ever since
1991	Attempt	British Prime Minister John Major, attacked by IRA. Mortar attack during a meeting at 10 Downing Street
1991	Attack	Former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Killed in an explosion triggered by a LTTE suicide bomber. First head of state to be killed by a suicide bomber
1993	Attack	South African Communist Party leader Chris Hani, killed by Janusz Walus in an anti-communist killing
1993	Attack	Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa. Attack carried out by an LTTE suicide bomber on May Day parade.
1994	Attack	Mexican Candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio was killed by Alberto Martinez in what is widely believed to be a conspiracy by the Mexican president at the time
1994	Attack	Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira. Plane carrying the two leaders shot down by unknown

		attackers with a surface-to-air missile. The attack was the catalyst for the Rwandan Genocide
1995	Attempt	Attempt to kill Pope John Paul II by Ramzi Yousef, part of Operation Bojinka. A large-scale planned Islamist terrorist attack to blow up 12 airliners and 4,000 passengers
1995	Attack	Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was killed. Attack carried out by Yigal Amir, an Israeli opposed to Oslo Accords. See Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin
1999	Attempt	Attempt to kill George Harrison, lead guitarist of popular band The Beatles, by Michael Abram. Abram broke into Harrison's house and repeatedly stabbed him
2000	Attack	Member of the Basque Parliament Fernando Buesa, killed by ETA
2001	Attack	King Birendra of Nepal and other royal family members of same country were killed by his son, Prince Dipendra in what is known as the Nepalese royal massacre
2002	Attack	Volkert van der Graaf killed Dutch Election Candidate Pim Fortuyn. The attack took place in a parking lot outside a radio studio in Hilversum, where Fortuyn had just given an interview
2002	Attempt	French President Jacques Chirac was almost killed by Macime Brunerie. Brunerie attempted to shoot the President during the Bastille Day Military Parade
2003	Attack	Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh was stabbed by Mijailo Mijailović while visiting a shopping centre in Stockholm. She died the following morning
2003	Attack	Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić was killed by Zvezdan Jovanović. Jovanović killed his victim with a sniper rifle; he is suspected to have acted for organized crime backers
2004	Attempt	President of Republic of China Chen Shui-bian was shot by Chen Yi-hsiung in what is known as the 3-19 shooting incident
2004	Attack	President of Chechnya Akhmad Kadyrov was killed along with about 30 others in a football stadium during a Soviet Victory Day parade, by a bomb that had been built into the concrete of one of the stadium's supporting columns. Presumably by Chechen Islamists

2005	Attack	Former Lebanese Prime Minister and billionaire Rafik Hariri, assassination via car bomb in Beirut. Allegedly by Hezbollah and Syrian intelligence services
2005	Attempt	U.S. President George W. Bush and Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili. Attempt by Arutyunian, who threw a hand grenade at Bush, which failed to detonate
2006	Attack	Journalist Anna Politkovskaya, shot in the elevator block of her apartment in Moscow. Unknown perpetrator; widely believed to be the Russian secret police
2006	Attack	Former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko was killed by Acute radiation syndrome via ingestion of polonium-210. Perpetrators unknown, though believed to be figures within the government of Russia
2007	Attack	Former Prime Minister of Pakistan and Pakistan Peoples Party Chair and Opposition Leader Benazir Bhutto. Killed while entering a vehicle upon leaving a political rally for the Pakistan People's Party in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. Perpetrators unknown, widely believed to be Islamic militants
2009	Attack	President of Guinea-Bissau João Bernardo Vieira was hacked to death during armed attack on his residence in Bissau by the army
2009	Attempt	Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands and royal family. Karst Tate attempted to ram the Queen's bus with his car
2010	Attack	Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, senior Hamas military commander. Exact cause unknown; possibilities include suffocation, strangulation, and electrocution. Perpetrators unknown, widely believed to be Mossad agents
2010	Attempt	Missouri Governor Jay Nixon was stabbed by Casey Brezik. He mistakenly stabbed a college dean in a hallway by a lecture where Nixon was to speak. Brezik told police that he thought he had stabbed Nixon
2011	Attack	Salmaan Taseer, 26th Governor of Punjab was killed by Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri, one of his security guards, due to Taseer's opposition to Pakistan's blasphemy laws
2011	Attempt	Gabrielle Giffords, U.S. Representative from Arizona.

		Shot, along with several staffers and U.S. District Judge John Roll (killed), at a constituent event in her district by Jared Lee Loughner. There were a total of at least 6 deaths and 12 injured
2011	Attack	Shahbaz Bhatti, Federal Minister for Minorities of Pakistan. Killed due to his opposition to Pakistan's blasphemy laws by the Taliban
2011	Attack	Osama bin Laden, leader of terrorist organization Al Qaeda, killed in a raid by U.S. Navy SEAL Team 6
2011	Attack	Ahmed Wali Karzai, half-brother of Afghan president Hamid Karzai. Shot twice in the head and chest by his security guard as he was coming out of his bathroom
2011	Attack	Anders Behring Breivik, a right-wing Norwegian, killed 77 people in a car-bomb attack in Oslo and a simultaneous attack with an automatic weapon on the island Utoya, where the youth-party of the Norwegian Socialist Party was gathered