


# **Migration effects on civil society and institutional landscape: the case of Morocco**

A study on migration related Moroccan civil society



## **Master Thesis**

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<b>KEY INFORMANT</b>	<b>ORGANISATION</b>
Emmanuel Mbolela	ARCOM
Raoul Mvita	ARCOM
Fabien Didier Yene	ADESCAM
Jeremi Mbiya	Associations de demandeurs d'asile et sans papiers au Maroc
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## Chapter 1 - Introduction


In the last two decades, the shift of Morocco from an emigration country to a migration transit country has changed and is still changing Moroccan civil society as is evident from two concurrent phenomena: the increasingly stringent border tightening policies which have been dealing with a continuous flow of migrants and the proliferation of civil society formations.

A clear link between Moroccan civil society, as part of the institutional landscape, and migrants' changing movements, routes, timing and origin countries exist and needs to be studied.

This connection is of utmost importance because it reveals two changes:

- one in Moroccan, and to some extent European, civil society;
- one caused by civil society in the reference institutional landscape.

*Figure 1 - Process of change in Moroccan society due to migration*



As a matter of fact, other organisations which are not part of civil society, better described as institutions, are changing as well. If not only Moroccan civil society is changing, but the whole scenario, including population base and institutional landscape, a process involving the entire Moroccan society is taking place. Such a change can be understood using a civil society study framework, which generally describes what processes are triggered or influenced by civil society. Especially in Maghreb countries, the focus is on the democratisation path and how civil society fosters the institutional landscape in this sense.

Migration issues are not usually treated in relation to civil society or institutional landscape. Migratory flows are only seen from a migration management or freedom of residence perspective. Lately, literature focuses more on the potential contribution of migration to development. One of the strong, as well as challenging, points of this research is the study framework, which positions it within civil society studies considering a migration related perspective.

This study focuses on the question: **how has migration been affecting the Moroccan institutional landscape?** A comprehensive analysis of the past from a civil society perspective would tremendously be of use in order to answer this question and to understand the present and future scenarios.

Some tremendous changes are modifying the Moroccan institutional landscape and very little is known about this. As a matter of fact, some studies already treat the alignment of Moroccan policies with European ones and the phenomenon of migration change (from emigration to transit country), but analyses usually try to link these two latter facts. What is of utmost importance is to understand what kind of changes have been triggered in Morocco. Very little is known, not only because, the literature tends to focus on other aspects, but also because the Moroccan government migration “non-

policy” and the strong control it has on mass media usually hinder the spread of information related to migration.

Scholars should focus on this aspect of migration, linking with civil society, because a great deal of knowledge can be acquired if such mechanisms are studied. In particular, from a democratisation perspective, it would be possible to link migration with civil society and institutional landscape and, in turn, to those processes that started animating Arab countries’ societies.

The potential of such an analysis is also related to the spread of information amongst migrants in sub-Saharan countries, where little is known about Morocco, and in Europe, where a transnational dimension of Moroccan civil society has been developing in order to lobby with European institutions and because of the weaker democratic processes in Morocco.

This study intends to be pioneering in this field, because the literature has not covered such a topic yet. A general description of the migration related Moroccan institutional landscape will be provided, together with a general analysis of what the migration change is inducing in this latter and in the democratisation process.

The general picture highlights the presence of a number of different entities, diversely positioned according to their goals, their way of acting, their level of institutionalisation, and several other dimensions. This varying set of formations and institutions will require different methods of analysis in order to gain a deeper understanding.

In order to study Moroccan government and international institutions’ (e.g. EU UNHCHR) positions and roles, an analysis of relevant literature and a review of policies and declarations will provide a general picture of the current scenario, while interviews with key actors will be beneficial to the research as they can shed more light on some matters that are not as clear. A different approach is to be followed in order to study the less structured part of the civil society:

NGOs (operating at national or local level) and migrants associations, informal elements have to be considered to a bigger extent. The interaction between these key players, also stimulated by changes in migrants' behaviour, and the formalisation/evolution of some of them require a multifaceted approach (analyses of funding dynamics, lobbying focus, daily activities, interest representation and consequential actions) to acquire comprehensive information on such a diverse set of organizations driven by diverse interests. Moreover, migrants are obviously the most concerned actors in such a scenario and an analysis of current literature and new interviews will be able to clarify several aspects as well as the cause of the current institutional landscape's change.

These are only some of the actors involved in the functioning and the evolvement of civil society as part of the Moroccan institutional framework. As a matter of fact, this latter keeps interacting and being modified by migratory flows: this brings us to some sub-queries that help to break down some of the aspects of this relationship and to better investigate the main research question. For each of the actors that are going to be taken into consideration, this research will try to answer the following questions.

- How has the Moroccan migration change been influencing this entity and its links implied by being part of the institutional landscape?
- What are the economic aspects of such connections?
- What are the related socio-political elements?
- What are the institutional constraints affecting those actors?

In order to answer these questions, this body of research introduces the topic, firstly by positioning it within civil society studies in **Chapter 2 – Civil society**, analysing its possible contribution, possible point of views and the potential for democratisation processes. **Chapter 3 – Methodology** describes the techniques this study uses, which are innovative in both migration and civil

society studies. **Chapter 4 – Geographical and chronological context** contextualises the research topics suggested in Chapter 2 focusing on Moroccan specificities and migration related aspects, summarising Morocco's major events of the last two decades. **Chapter 5 – Institutional landscape network** describes how the migration related institutional landscape is shaped, considering all the entities taking part in the migration related debate in Morocco. **Chapter 6 – Institutional landscape future perspective** summarises the findings and put them in relation with each other and the theories behind institutional landscape change and democratisation, also highlighting gaps and overlaps. **Chapter 7 – Conclusion** highlights the main findings of this study.



## **Chapter 2 – Civil society**

Migration in Morocco has been a very important and changing phenomenon. In the last two decades migration has developed new features and brought about new issues and consequences. It is clear that the new dynamics and mechanisms of migration are triggering something within Moroccan society, which makes this migration change different from any other previous one - migration is inducing a transformation of Moroccan civil society. This body of research looks at these new phenomena within Moroccan society related to migration, approaching both topics from an innovative joint perspective (migration and civil society approach). The literature on migration is extensive, especially because lately scholars are studying globalisation induced changes in the world or the potential contribution migration could make to development issues. The approaches that can be used to study migration are many and the current literature might be misleading in the assessment of the new phenomena present in Moroccan society. This study analyses the link between migration and civil society as part of the Moroccan institutional landscape. That is why a civil society perspective is considered and only migration aspects related to this latter will be taken into account.

This chapter will briefly introduce the concept of civil society and will try to link it to migration studies in order to understand the theoretical approach that will be used for this research. It will also discuss the reasons why the change induced by migration is so important for civil society and the institutional landscape and, in turn, why these latter are so important for Moroccan democratisation processes.

### *Civil society studies*

To understand Moroccan civil society, how institutions are connected to a complex network of entities and how these latter are interlinked to each other, in sum, in order to understand the Moroccan institutional landscape, different

steps need to be taken. Firstly, civil society needs to be defined as a general concept.

The notion was introduced in the XVIII century in Europe to explain the bourgeois democratic transition, although it was used in the past by Hobbes and Kant to depict the distinction from natural society, one rule by the law of nature. This time, instead, the concept was used not only for that purpose, but also to oppose it to the one of primitive society: civil society's meaning was then the one of civilised society (Roque, 2004). Today's definition is by no means simplistic as it has been influenced by events which have occurred in the last twenty years. Most scholars dealing with civil society studies use the concept in order to separate it from political society, that is the state and the institutions to which civil society addresses its claims and demands.


How the modern connotation of civil society was born needs to be considered. Some factors have influenced the birth of such an idea, whose conceptualisation is not yet definite, but still underway. The fall of the Berlin Wall and, consequently, the fall of totalitarianism in Eastern Europe, the weakening of the nation-state, the democratisation processes, the increase of the number of NGOs and transnational corporations (Ibrahim, 1998) are some of the elements that have been fostering the general proliferation of civil society organisations in the past two decades. Considering this process, Sater defines it as increased societal participation and deems the bottom-up change triggered by the citizens towards a different balance of power between "governors and the governed" (Sater, 2007: 1). The social formations he considers part of the civil society have specific characteristics: for instance, he excludes those which are not "self-limiting" but "power seeking". Norton takes into account some other features such as tolerance, respect for human rights, citizenship and democracy promotion (Norton, 1995: 4-24).

Cavatorta defines civil society as an associative space between state, market and family (Cavatorta, 2006), in which free and spontaneous institutions,

formations and movements “are entered freely rather than imposed either by birth or by awesome ritual” (Gellner, 1994). Ibrahim reports the following definition:

*“Civil Society is the totality of self-initiating and self-regulating volitional social formations, peacefully pursuing a common interest, advocating a common cause, or expressing a common passion; respecting the right of others to do the same, and maintaining their relative autonomy vis-a-vis the state, the family, the temple and the market.”* (Ibrahim, 1998).

FIGURE 2 – State, market and family



From this definition, the spontaneous initiative of such movements emerges as another important element. The description of the position, taken on by CSOs within the social debate, appears to be similar to the one considered by Cavatorta from this perspective. The focus is on voluntary associations other than kin relationships which, separated from the state and

the market (Hawthorne, 2004), help democratic transitions.

Understanding civil society in Morocco is not that simple. As shown above, different definitions exist: Ibrahim considers some 76 ones. Defining the concept and taking into account the differences considered by several scholars highlight that the conceptualisation needs to be considered from different perspectives.

From Ibrahim's definition it is possible to extract some dimensions that need to be considered while defining civil society:

- Representation: this factor is important to determine whom the concerned movements act in favour of. According to many scholars, CSOs can be considered so only if they are mass based.
- Scale: social formations can be classified according to their size. Those as small as families can or cannot be considered part of the civil society; family as part of the society cannot be included in the definition. The scale of social formations matters, but only if considered together with other elements.
- Goals and principles: civil society as such advocates a societal cause and pursues a common interest. What the latter is may be controversial as well. This aspect, among others, needs to be taken into account.
- Way of interaction: some scholars assert that CSOs act peacefully and respect the right of others to participate in social debate, although this can be fully true or only to some degree.
- Independence: the extent to what financial and political independence exists within social formations is also one of the elements to take into account. For instance, it is debatable whether political parties and trade unions belong to civil society or not.
- Initiative: the self-initiative character is another factor that is not considered by all scholars, but who the founders are and whether civil society organisations' birth is spontaneous are of utmost importance in order to classify a formation.
- Position: given the triangle family-market-state, the position a movement or an organisation takes on within this is fundamental to define the extent to which a social formation is identifiable as a civil society organisation.

Some other elements are also of key importance in order to define the concept of civil society, but each conceptualisation and each environment present

different characteristics. Nevertheless, the extraction of the main ones helps to give a general idea and, starting from Ibrahim's definition, it is possible to try to contextualise the concept. In fact, the next necessary step after conceptualisation is to understand the point of view that best fits the research on the link with migration issues. Civil society organisations are identified also by their way of acting, their position within civil society, in sum, by their links with other CSOs, which may be a very powerful tool, especially for some unstructured and informal segments of civil society. But what is the right perspective from which to look at civil society? Are only cooperating organisations involved? Or does civil society imply also competition between different entities? And, if so, to what extent?

### *Social conflict and public sphere*

The Maghreb region is nowadays experiencing strong change resulting in a process of progressive democratisation (Roque, 2004). According to many, this process is driven by the increased extent to which civil society is present in these countries. Civil society is a relatively old concept which has become popular in literature because of its recent acceptance, but whose definition is not simple and has triggered debate between scholars. Civil society refers to the increasing vibrancy of associationism and the proliferation of social actors. However, besides its definition, there is a clear connection between this phenomenon and the process of democratisation. Highlighting and understanding this link is of utmost importance in order to better grasp what the emergence of the civil society means and to deal with its definition.

Firstly, the empowerment of civil society can be seen as a paramount condition on which democracy is built up (Havel, 1993:3). Keane (1988a) identifies civil society organisations as the associations maintaining the link and the distinction between actual society and the state. These are the intermediaries of two processes: a bottom-up one encompassing the improvement of social freedom and expression and a top-down one that entails institutional change

and democratisation. Hence, it is here that the link between the role played by civil society and democracy is established. Considering the different actors involved in those two processes, Flyvbjerg (1998b) discusses consensus and power (in the sense of conflict) as the two possible ways to approach the analysis of the driving forces. Keane (1988b) states that power issues are already built into the rise of civil society as this latter represents a part of the population which is excluded from social debate and its empowerment. But Habermas' analysis is different and considers the processes of an ideal situation, where all stakeholders have the possibility to express their opinions and influence the social debate from which no one is excluded. This normative approach "sees the new social movements as agents of communicative rationality and of change in the public sphere" (Flyvbjerg, 1998b). Habermas describes the ideal situation of an empowered civil society but says nothing about the process of empowerment. He does find some causes that can undermine the correct development of what Flyvbjerg defines as a utopian scenario: the presence of obstacles such as abuse and degradation and the lack of "crucial institutions" and socialisation (Habermas, 1990), which is also considered by Putnam in his work on Italian towns' social capital (Putnam, 1993).

By contrast, Foucault argues in favour of non-rational communication and the presence of domination and power issues rather than consensus-seeking behaviour (Foucault, 1988). Along with Foucault, Flyvbjerg criticises Habermas' work on taking into consideration how politics and democracy function as well as the features of the implied "individual acts of communication" (Flyvbjerg, 1998b). He analyses the type of communication that is present in politics and in the process of democratisation and almost considers it as the logic behind them: the type of communication is the one aspect that needs to be understood to determine the most appropriate perspective to understand and study the dynamics of social debate. This is the main characteristic which is considered by several thinkers to be the key characteristic to compare the two approaches. Furthermore, a similarity exists between the works of Habermas

and Flyvbjerg, although the latter looks like a critique of the former from many perspectives: because of the normative feature of communication with respect to democracy and social debate, understanding how social players interact is crucial to the analysis.

Power issues better explain social behaviour, also according to a realist vision of history, but at the same time, if individual acts are considered, people know how to be "tribal and democratic, dissidents and patriots, experts at judging how far a democratic constitution can be bent and used in non-democratic ways for personal and group advantage" (Flyvbjerg, 1998a; Flyvbjerg, 1998b). Habermas' normative approach undermines the content of its work and induces a strong critique. His study of an ideal situation is not of any help in daily actions (Heller, 1984) and drives many scholars to reject his theories. Picturing the actual social debate as driven by consensus and active social players involved in the process with equal representation and rights is what leads to an unrealistic description of reality. Civil society is a concept that was born in Western societies and an ideal situation scenario can barely apply to them. Countries in the Middle East and North Africa have generally a lower degree of representation and more stakeholders are excluded from the social debate: so a Habermasian formulation is even less pertinent and significant. Flyvbjerg, in line with Rorty (1991), states that communicative rationality is only helpful in the case of modern liberal democracies characterised by "freedom from domination, more democracy, a strong civil society" (Flyvbjerg, 1998b). With the rejection of universal rational communication, it is easier to think that "all men are wicked and that they will always give vent to the malignity that is their minds when opportunity offers" (Machiavelli, 1983).

On the contrary, Foucault correctly sees a freedom based theory stemming from an ideal situation analysis as quite dangerous to apply to real case scenarios, as history has shown. In a Foucauldian vision of the reality, freedom is not an ideal but a practice (Flyvbjerg, 1998b) that can help social dynamics. A way to determine the rule of law and make sure that only a minimum of

domination is present is through freedom, resistance and struggle. Civil society's task is to be neutral from institutions and criticise them, fighting against political violence and oppression. This thought does not describe a Habermasian situation, but just discusses how to achieve more democratic institutions. Foucault argues for a democratisation bottom-up approach rather than a top-down one bringing democracy to a society. In his work, Flyvbjerg shows how the analysis of a real civil society situation can be biased if it starts from what Habermas posited in his work and how negative the outcome can be if it is compared to a case with transparent communication and perfect involvement of all social parts. It is rather advisable to base an analysis, especially of countries differing from modern liberal democracies, on the democratisation process. Both consensus and domination-power issues exist to some extent as well as transparent and non-transparent communicative rationalities and one cannot discern from any of those concepts. Hann correctly states that there are some common elements amongst different civil societies as well as aspects on which they differ (Hann, 1997). A non-normative and inductive approach would test the extent to which each of them applies to reality.

But the differences between Habermas and Foucault are not only about the logic and the rationality behind their works, but also about the methods. To study institutional change and civil society empowerment the former one uses mainly institutional development and constitution writing, as these formally represent the evolution of a society. Foucault, on the other hand, states that law and institutions "provide no guarantee of freedom, equality or democracy" (Flyvbjerg, 1998b). History offers different examples in which institutions have been weakly adapted to ideal situation standards with theoretical concepts of freedom when ideal and reality enormously differed: for Foucault there is no room for idealism.

According to his work, there are two main means of dealing with a real situation: history and context. History is knowledge and provides examples of

working and non-working social arrangements, those creating problems and those which actually empower civil society and are beneficial to the democratisation process. Therefore, Foucault focuses on context analysis and the study of strategies and the basis of power. His materialist approach is more useful and better depicts a concrete situation. It is easier, therefore, to stay away from misleading top-down institutional change studies.


In addition, Hirschman (1994) looks at social conflicts to contextualise because they are the real forces that keep together a democratic society. In line with Foucault, he correctly thinks that the suppression of social conflict equals the suppression of freedom. If, on the one hand, the repression of social movements, excessively strong institutions and the lack of mechanisms to settle conflicts are not good signs for the process of democratisation, looking at those characteristics of a society can be seen as a proxy for it (Catusse, 2002; Diamond, 1994). Social movements' autonomy and the extent to which they are self-determined, the presence of social conflict and its relationship with society (whether it has a societal basis and sustains society) can actually give an idea of where a society is in its democratisation process. Public life and social debate are better off with social conflict, despite the fact that social movements were considered as a political pathology in the past.

Furthermore, returning to the difference between consensus and power logic, such elements reveal the inapplicability of Habermas' model and bring about the rejection of the presence of consensus and communicative rationality (Flyvbjerg, 1998b). These latter would not be able to deal with minorities and unrepresented groups. Social exclusion is generally overcome with social conflict and struggle, in order to achieve a shift or a reallocation of power.

Reallocation of power can take place within the state-market-family triangle, therefore, including civil society as one possible end of the power shift itself. Here a reallocation of power related to migration issues is considered and it implies border management, freedom of movement, human rights, migrants'

legal status, and so on, which place such a process in a more specific spot within the triangle: between state and civil society. This is generally true, although the spheres of market and family come into play as well when, for instance, projects addressed to migrants dealing with some specific aspects like SME entrepreneurship or the defence of mothers and children's rights. In general, it is possible to say that this body of research deals with a migration related shift of power between state and civil society, but the scenario, migration related Moroccan institutional landscape, includes the presence of different kinds of organisations (and not only state and CSOs). As counterparts, and sometimes allies, of civil society, institutions are considered. These have a social function, which transcends individual human behaviour and aims to enforce the rules to govern this latter. With respect to civil society, the focus on "self-initiating and self-regulating volitional social formations" (Ibrahim, 1998) is lost but a new dimension of governing human behaviour with rules arises. In particular, this research refers to institutions as the Gramscian political society institutions (law, international agreements, police, borders, etc.).

*FIGURE 3 – Civil society in the institutional landscape*



Hence, a well functioning public sphere, in a democratic sense, can be obtained also with a vibrant civil society that assures plurality and what Foucault calls political task that is the opposition and critique to political violence (Chomsky and Foucault, 1974).

Myriam Catusse considers the "*forces citoyennes*" as civil society, linking this concept with the one of citizenship (Catusse, 2002). Those forces are the ones opposed to institutions, to the political scene. In fact, the increased popularity of civil society studies has not come alone during the last few decades, but together with the concept of citizenship. Those two separate and independent notions have much in common, in the sense that nowadays civil society draws on citizenship, which is the level associated with the nature of the claims concerning political and civil rights (Smith 1989). If this is considered from an exclusion perspective, one of the last victories of civil societies in modern liberal countries is the one related to women rights, which has brought all citizens to be right holders.

It is, then, a clear progressive backward shift of social exclusion and state forces, resulting in new power equilibriums between the state and civil society. The configurations of social fragmentation evolve together with the relationship between the state and civil society (Smith, 1989). Not only are the boundaries between the two being radically realigned (Keane, 1988b), but they are also loosening. There no longer exists a clear distinction between what Linz and Stepan (1996) referred to as political and civil society, at least in a modern liberal context, but they are starting to merge into each other (Catusse, 2002).

### *Democratisation*

Especially in the case of the Maghreb, the academic literature on civil society building often deals with democratisation processes. The space and the interaction between state and civil society become extremely relevant in order to assess the extent to which a democratic transition is underway. As a matter of fact, civil society, from one particular point of view, is the expression and

the projection of citizens' ideas and interests, identifiable, then, as a democratic tool. But democracy is not fully implemented everywhere nor are civil society mechanisms fully and perfectly working. In this context, Habermas suggests that ideally all stakeholders would have an equal right to participate.

Scholars tend to focus on the casual link between civil society and democracy, the latter one being the consequence, although what influences democratisation is the way civil society interacts and limits authoritarianism. On the one hand, the analysis of this connection in the Maghreb has often reached the conclusion that the state and authoritarian institutions are still socially, economically and politically powerful with respect to their opposition (Abootalebi, 1998). On the other hand, some scholars (Norton 1995) state that this is true only to some extent, because civil society organisations' role might be in line with the institutions as they have an authoritarian nature (Cavatorta, 2006). This leads to a double sided view: civil activism in Muslim societies can be interpreted as a very particular form of expression, closer to institutions, as well as it can be seen as uncivil and its orientation anti-democratic. The reality is that no generalisation can be made and some truths of Western civil societies do not fit the Middle East and Northern Africa.

- In particular, "civil society is *per se* neither good nor bad" (Cavatorta, 2006), but it depends on social activism and the way its actors participate.
- In turn, activism is neither good nor bad for democracy as it depends on the underlying ideologies.

Yet, some academic literature shows that the expression of civil society is context dependent and, in the Moroccan case, this might be more in line with social contestation (Cavatorta, 2006; Sater, 2002). Societies which have been shaped over time by authoritarian regimes have nowadays a limited space between state, market and family. Muslim civil societies appear weak with respect to Western ones and rely more on institutions: in general, even

individuals willing to bring societal development and driven by democratic ideals tend to wait for the institutions to start reforms (Mardin, 1995).

The link between civil society and democratisation is of utmost importance, therefore, in order to foster a political transition. The recent successful involvement of civil society in a transnational context is leading institutions to lose their relative power (Geissel, 2006). The increased popularity of bottom-up rather than top-down approaches to government is of utmost importance nowadays as societies are no longer identified mainly by their institutions, but rather seen as networks of agents that lie and act in the space between state, market and family. Indeed, those networks are characterised, now more than ever, by an increasing presence of civil society organisations, which have been demanded by the individuals they represent and act in accordance with their preferences. Such a process is also facilitated by favourable participatory environments at (inter)national and local levels.

As a matter of fact, the phenomenon underway might be better represented by the contrasting forces exerted within the institutional landscape by state and civil society. Those forces interact with each other and so they shape (trans)national and/or local scenarios. Geissel identifies three factors in order to analyse the possibility for local/transnational cooperation: bottom-up demand for civil society organisations, institutionalised mechanisms and pressure from local groups (Geissel, 2006). The presence of those elements in a network society might contribute to the achievement of local/global goals, depending on the network scale. In fact, networks facilitate communication and interaction so that local actions are influenced by all involved, (inter)national and local, stakeholders. Yet, she considers the social, economic and environmental perspectives from which a scenario has to be analysed, although networks are themselves complicated and can be considered as environments where the concerned stakeholders interact trying to find common solutions, but keep as well their orientation.

Accordingly, also civil society in Islamic countries has strengthened itself in the last twenty years and, as a consequence, the birth of new socio-economic formations has been better at counterbalancing the power of autocratic and populist regimes. These latter, then, result to some extent in being weakened by this global process of democratisation (Ibrahim, 1998).

### *Moroccan civil society*

Moroccan civil society was present long before the 1980s, but efforts made by institutions towards democratisation made this concept true also from a practical and analytical perspective. The Moroccan institutional landscape has been changing towards a more liberal framework, a process triggered under the kingdom of King Hassan II. The transition seems to be smooth and orderly, at least with respect to other Arab countries, and the political weight of Islamic activists has been decreasing over the last years. Cavatorta argues that the democratisation process is also involving those latter groups, which have accepted increased pluralism and contribute positively to civil society building (Cavatorta, 2006).

By contrast, in Morocco the role of middle classes and civil society formations is increasingly important as they are increasing their legitimacy, society participation and political pluralism (Ibrahim, 1998).

Since the 1990s, civil society organizations have been proliferating and their goals diversifying, also encompassing political other than social aspects of the society. Such a phenomenon, accompanied by emerging ideas and debates (human rights, feminism, cultural and ethnic movements, and so on) that were previously silenced, and their contribution to societal work and habits, has been supported by experienced political and social leaders (Naciri, 2009). This societal landscape has fascinated several Maghrebi and European scholars who, in the last decades, have been studying the relationships existing

between civil society and the state, in such a context of political and economic liberalisation.

On the one hand, political and social environments' struggle against authoritarianism, especially in the field of human rights, and, on the other hand, the production of guides and manuals concerning civil society organizations show how important the latter are becoming to central and local government. But Moroccan society is not only influenced by the state, but also by the international community and, within itself, by civil society organizations. The relative support to some of them by international and national politics and the difficulties some others are encountering to be recognised highlight that any analysis of the relationships between civil society and state has to consider the very different sides of the same coin, in order to take into consideration both contrasting forces (institutions' top-down and civil society bottom-up approaches).

Other than the "three main taboos", the territorial integrity, the primacy of Islam and the king's legitimacy (Dimitrovova, 2009), one of the fields where behaviours towards civil society differ more evidently is Moroccan and transit migration. In fact, Morocco is becoming more and more a transit country, on sub-Saharan migrants' way to Europe, while in the past it was seen more as an emigration country. This change has several aspects and can be evaluated on a number of different levels. Because migration as an increasingly important aspect of civil society is influencing the Moroccan institutional landscape, this research focuses more on the way migratory flows' modifications are concomitant with the flourishing of civil society organisations.

In the last ten years, Moroccan institutions have been changing as well as their policies and alliances. As regards the domain of migration, they have been affected by the fact that sub-Saharan migrants have been trying to cross the Strait of Gibraltar or Ceuta and Melilla's borders or get to the Canary Islands and arrive in first world countries, despite anti-migration policies dealing

especially with undocumented migrants. As a matter of fact, migratory movements are affecting Moroccan society on a number of different levels. For instance, migration policies have been changing in the last twenty years towards increasing levels of migration control. The extent of Moroccan partnerships with the EU and European countries has also been increasing. Increased and more diversified migration has led to an institutional landscape with more and more organisations, especially NGOs, fighting for migrants' rights. Furthermore, the diversification of migrants' origin countries has brought migrants' organisations into existence that participate in the struggle for human rights and facilitate those flows, as do diaspora networks. A link of cause-consequence exists between the changing migratory flows and the flourishing Moroccan civil society, but it can only be understood if the key actors of such a process are identified and the link between them is understood.

### **Chapter 3 - Methodology**

This research analyses the Moroccan geopolitical situation with respect to the relationships occurring between migration dynamics and civil society and tries to understand to what extent and how the institutional landscape is changing.

In general, a network perspective (Davies, 2003) is adopted as several stakeholders are involved in migration and civil society studies. This methodology allows for not only an in-depth analysis of stakeholders and drivers, but also a deeper understanding about the relationships linking them. A network standpoint is of utmost importance as well to gain a time dimension and to look at how those links and connections evolve. This research uses and challenges these tools, because not only are actors' behaviours studied over time, but also the very specific case of migratory flows' change is considered as the driver of the processes under analysis.

If used coherently, the network perspective can reveal both past relationships, their evolution and current status (Tichy, Tushman and Fombrun, 1979). This methodology has been derived from and connects both micro- and macro-approaches (Crozier, 1972), allowing for even more flexibility to study processes inside and outside network's nodes. It is, then, able to deal with multilevel scenarios and break down some levels into sub-levels and so on. This research methodology also gives the opportunity to study different content areas and different dimensions of the framework's entities and connections. It is then suitable for studies which aim to examine networks where organisations and associations are the links and power conflict and politics are the issues under analysis (Tichy, Tushman and Fombrun, 1979; Pettigrew, 1972; Zald, 1970).

A network is then a very flexible tool to represent reality, but when doing research and looking for data and facts it may also be misleading in the sense that it offers a too vast variety of aspects and facets: it might bring excessive flexibility. Research must be addressed and oriented towards some of the

social network potential and a researcher has to proceed with order and know what phenomena to look at. Tichy, Tushman and Fombrun (1979) analyse an exhaustive list of properties, of which most can be investigated in a research about institutional landscape.

- *Transactional context*: in a two-actor relationship, it is important to understand what is exchanged. Each link might be similar or different from each other: flows of information, goods and services, influence and financial means. The nature of the exchange defines the nature of the connection and the whole system of connections is, in turn, defined by its set of single connections.
- *Nature of the links*: together with the links' nature, some other aspects are relevant, to consider the bigger picture of a network. Reciprocity, intensity, expectations, multiplexity and centralisation of links define not only a two-actor relationship but also the whole framework.
- *Structural characteristics*: given a set of actors, it is important to understand the way boundaries of a network can be defined, how the focal unit and other entities are linked to external domains, how they are linked to each other and whether the configuration of the network can be better explained by the presence of clusters of units more closely linked. Moreover, not all entities and their role can be defined in the same way: as the focal unit, there might be other special actors with a very particular role.

Given those aspects to be considered, the starting point of any analysis are the actors which make up networks: states, companies, organisations or people according to the level of analysis. A network node is identified as well by its links to other nodes and, as the time dimension is one of the focal points of this study, these relationships must be persistent and relatively stable.

It is true that studying organisations' connections requires stability as well as studying networks requires clear definitions, clusters and boundaries, but this kind of methodology is a way of simplifying reality that might not be so simplistic, and concepts might not be as straightforward to apply. The problem is that network analysis relies on sociometric data, whereas sociometry is a method for measuring social relationships between network units. The simplification of reality that especially relationship maps produces brings the final picture to be dependent on sociometric data and two fundamental moments, which might bias the results of the research: data collection and data analysis.

### *Data collection*

While gathering data, the researcher has to be aware of the fact that data are easy to collect (Tichy, Tushman and Fombrun, 1979) and, although this is another advantage of the social network approach, the over collection and abundance of data might yield a weighty, biased and unrealistic picture, bringing scholars to set a threshold related to the number of network entities: analyses with no more than 40 units can still be deemed accurate (Kadushin, 1978). Besides the number of observations that need to be considered, data collection can take on different meanings, being the network analysis a way to study, link and interrelate units of a different nature acting on the same ground. A researcher must be able to distinguish between the objective and subjective parts of data which he comes across. For instance, an organisation financing another one, an individual working for two organisations, a protocol of agreement between two network entities can be considered characteristics that allow describing links and nodes objectively. By contrast, influence over other parties and reputational judgements are typical examples of subjective data. Finally, it is possible to point out that data collection depends on:

- Number of entities;
- Presence of clusters;

- Limitedness of the considered field of action and clarity of boundaries;
- Presence of subjective data;
- Presence of objective data.

### *Data analysis*

Besides data collection, the researcher must be aware of what comes after it. As a matter of fact, especially if the network is vast, abundance and the degree of differentiation might mislead the researcher during the treatment of data. It is advisable, therefore to make sure that a coherent approach is followed during the collection and analysis of data and the whole research. If different approaches are suitable, then, the researcher must bear in mind the different perspectives from which it is possible to look at the studied problem and collect and analyse data accordingly. Several scholars have argued in favour of several network analysis approaches. Here follows a brief description of three methods that are deemed important and useful for their characteristics and those of this research.

1. A *positional analysis* (Tichy, Tushman and Fombrun, 1979) makes use mainly of positional data that can be found by investigating nodes and links' surface, collecting formal data, considering formal charts, statements, agreement and everything that has some degree of formality and officiality. Needless to say, these represent the easiest kind of data to collect and the most accessible ones; and mapping out only this kind of information would yield the picture of the formal side of a network, which might be or not be close to the reality the analysis attempts to describe. A positional analysis approach can be more or less informative according to the degree of formality of entities and relationships between entities.

2. The *reputational/attributional method* opens up the existence of a level of informality and actually considers this latter a better option to describe a network. It does not consider the formal position which organisations take, but analyses instead other aspects: Tichy, Tushman and Fombrun (1979) define them as overt behaviour; Rose (1968) and Hunter (1953) consider instead community power. This method focuses mostly on opinions and reputations and what really matters is not what the formal role of a unit is or should be, but what its real position is. With this method is generally associated a specific data collection method implying a selection across and within actors: in fact, only the most influential people within an organisation and the most influential organisations are selected as data sources and only their opinion is deemed informative. If not well adjusted, this technique might mislead the researcher and the research itself yielding biased results, but its potential is enormous considering that it allows for a high degree of flexibility in the data collection process and simplification during the analysis. Furthermore, besides being easily designable, giving importance to the opinion of the researcher, it allows focusing more on influence on decision making and power related areas and it is, therefore, more sensitive to phenomena that are considered important to the end of the research.
3. A *decisional analysis* approach (Polsby, 1963; Wolfinger, 1962) focuses as well on power issues, but, instead of considering the influence of reputedly important players, it stresses the significance of studying the decision making process as the core of power distribution. It focuses rather on a smaller number of issues to determine who plays a key role and actively makes decisions. It separates decision makers from influential persons, highlighting precise network connections and its concreteness as a strong point. This approach aims to exclude as many network entities as possible in order to make the decisional analysis simplistic and study overt behaviour. Abstracting linkages from only people in power gives a strong advantage to the research in terms of

directness and potential of simplification, but it might also lead to a neglect of the indirect influence of important players and draw a picture of the topic which is different from the reality.

Although the network analysis approach is a methodology to describe and simplify reality, highlighting nodes and links in an objective way, the three data analysis methods considered thus far are very different from each other and take into account very different characteristics of a network. Choosing one approach rather than the others does determine the analysis method and influence its final results. One could hypothetically apply any approach to any network, but different types of entities and nodes imply that different methods must be used. In fact, applying a positional approach to an informal network where no official positions exist would not produce any valuable information or a reputational analysis in a very vast network would be too dispersive and/or costly. Each method has its own pros and cons:

- data's easy accessibility but limited accuracy of a positional analysis would require some further assessment methods, unless network entities' real behaviour does not differ from the officially stated one. Such approach would help the researcher to draw a picture of the reality from a formal point of view, it would, then, be more indicated for networks with a high degree of formality;
- a reputational/attributional analysis by itself would capture only perceived networks, but it is highly indicated when their size is limited and the degree of informality and the importance of influence are high. It also helps to investigate more structured networks, but the research would result very costly if it entails many influential players;
- although it depends on the researcher choice of key issues and power holders and it focuses on the decision making process only, the decisional analysis helps to abstract the most important power related aspects of a network. The study of a highly vast system of which very

specific features are significant would need the high simplifying and synthesising potential of this method.

The three approaches are complementary to some extent, so much so that a fourth method, a combination of the reputational/attributional and decisional analyses, is suggested by some scholars (Clark, 1968; Tichy, Tushman and Fombrun, 1979; Whyte, 1955) and using multiple methods is generally deemed more informative (Baldrige, 1971; Kadushin, 1968). This is true especially for heterogeneous networks, whose components are hard to capture with a single method.

#### *Operationalisation and conceptual model*

The use of such methods allows for more flexibility amongst the different scales of the studied issues, but, although this three-month research is mainly based in Rabat, a major focus will be given to national rather than local phenomena.

The inductive imprint of this study implies the use of qualitative rather than quantitative methods, and more specifically literature and policies reviews as well as unstructured interviews.

Some of the aspects this research aims to analyse and on which it intends to assess the effects of the changing migration dynamics are the following:

1. The main types of institutions or social formations considered are studied as well as their current migration challenges and the underlying interconnections.
2. Attention is paid to the current status of migration policy and migration related legislation in Morocco and the way CSOs interact with institutions.
3. The current institutional and administrative structures of migration management are examined in relation to their counterpart

organisations in the civil society and the current challenges concerning migration management.

Different entities exist in the migration related Moroccan institutional landscape and it is part of the research duties to study and better define them. This study aims to improve the information on such entities, and its starting points and the network perspective will help to discover and unveil the remaining part of the network. For the moment, five main type of organisations are considered.

- *Migrant self organisations*: like ARCOM, this analysis' starting point, these CSOs are not registered NGOs and are, therefore, quite informal. They do not have access to media and, although their goal and means are stated publicly, it is not publicly visible.
- *Moroccan CSOs*: these are registered civil society players (like AMDH), mainly NGOs with a non-profit purpose. Created by Moroccans or with Moroccan initiative, they are present on the field under study, but usually their publicly stated goal is not directly addressed to migrants issues, although these latter are part of their agenda.
- *International NGOs* (like Cimade): they do not seem different, at least apparently, from Moroccan CSOs and act in the same field. They are considered as a different cluster here because of their international, usually European, roots.
- *International institutions* (like the UNHCR): they belong to the category of institutions, although, in general, they can act in favour of or against civil society interest. As international governance organisations, they defend intergovernmental interests, insuring the enforcement of international agreements and rules.
- *Moroccan government*: it is obviously present in the field under study as it represents what has sometimes been referred to as authorities. It is the institution that holds the power of enforcement of rules on its own

territory. States act in different ways and by using several means (in migration related context, it is easy to think of police, border controls, migration management, human rights' protection).

The debate about the migration related Moroccan civil society could be better understood answering some research questions about the involved network entities.

- How has the Moroccan migration change been influencing this entity and its links implied by being part of the institutional landscape?
- What are the economic aspects of such connections?
- What are the related socio-political elements?
- What are the institutional constraints affecting those actors?

The assessment of migration impacts on civil society will include as well semi-structured and unstructured interviews to migrants and key informants and experts working in the four fields. Different entities and different methods have been used to gather information on the topics under discussion. As a matter of facts, a snowball sample of involved organisations and institutions has been selected.

The research is based on thirteen interviews with key informants working or volunteering for eleven organisations present in every cluster of the institutional landscape network, with exception of the government. Other migrants and key informants have also been informally interviewed in order to objectively define the roles of some institutions or social institutions of the network under study.

ARCOM
ADESCAM

Associations de demandeurs d'asile et sans papiers au Maroc
GADEM
ATTAC
AMDH
CIMADE
Caritas Maroc
CISS
UNHCR
IOM

As a matter of fact, it is assumed that because of a different legal status, power, resources and way of acting, different groups of network entities exist and are differently positioned within the Moroccan institutional landscape.

The adoption of a network perspective entailing the analysis of those and other entities is beneficial, but not simple, as the connections to which the research will look at have a triple dimension, economic, socio-political and institutional.


Furthermore, the spatial scale of entities and networks is also of utmost importance. Although the research keeps comparability standards, the migration related dynamics might create a level of difficulty, which is indeed the spatial scale of action. The effects of the migration change on civil society and, more in general, on institutional landscape are under analysis, so the cause and consequence sides of such an influence are directly and indirectly linked, but different by nature. On the one hand, migration is a phenomenon

occurring over space and time, while, on the other side, institutions and social formations act on a different scale. However, the research aims to look at patterns and phenomena changing over time, but, in order not to disregard or misinterpret some important aspects, it is necessary to control for the spatial scale variable.

As a network analysis, to better capture the picture of the institutional landscape functioning and, more specifically, its actors' linkages, the different directions those latter can take on are also something the researcher has to be aware of, not to under- or overestimate the importance or the role of network entities or connections.

To account for the many factors involved, for the different nature of actors concerned and the multifaceted dimensions of relationships, a descriptive

FIGURE 4 – Conceptual model



analysis is not sufficient as it would have to consider way too many aspects, with the risk of losing focus. The study needs, then, a simplifying factor, whose utilisation would result beneficial to the complexity of the analysed phenomena. Network mapping is a research tool that has large potential with respect to the solution of such problems. In fact, a conceptual model is a tool that might be ideal to analyse a network, but there is one factor discouraging its utilisation: although some of the nodes of the network are known, the nature, direction and position of links are not.

This research will try to overcome the difficulties arising from drawing a conceptual model, readapting its use and exploiting its weaknesses to solve the complexity of the analysed phenomena. The study will use network mapping at different stages of the work as it aims to have clearer picture of the Moroccan migration related institutional landscape: possibly this will come at the end of the work.

This latter is intended to be a Masters' thesis at Utrecht University: hence, the starting point of the network analysis will be in the Netherlands. The transnational dimension of one entity, ARCOM, brings it to be also present in Europe. In order to better draw the network map at different stages, one or more connections will be followed to arrive to a linked entity. Again, after analysing this latter one, another link will be followed and so on. This strategy is based on the assumption that the migration related institutional landscape can be described as a network. As such, the entities analysed are linked by the connections followed, bringing the research to highlight all the components of the network and to gain a deeper understanding of it.

## **Chapter 4 – Geographical and chronological context**

The Kingdom of Morocco is a country located in the North-Western corner of Africa with a population of around 32 million people and a total surface area of 446,550 km<sup>2</sup> (710,850 km<sup>2</sup> with Western Sahara, WDI 2011). It is part of the Maghreb region with Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania, which all have common historical and linguistic roots. It is surrounded by Algeria on its Eastern and South-Eastern sides and by Western Sahara on its Southern border. On this latter region there is a territorial dispute, but it is anyway mainly administered by Morocco. The Atlantic Ocean on its North-Western side and the Mediterranean Sea on its Northern side surround Morocco as well. In fact, the country is 14 km away from Europe, through the Strait of Gibraltar, while the Canary Islands are situated 100 km west of the Morocco-Western Sahara border.

Morocco's location on the North-South border of the world, nearby some of the wealthiest nations in the world has undoubtedly favoured migration flows from and through Morocco over the years. The relatively low cost of migration and the needs of neighbouring countries for unskilled work have also contributed to foster migration to Europe. A role has also been played by colonialism, which linked Morocco with France and Spain (de Haas and Vezzoli, 2010).

Since the 1990s migration has been changing in Morocco, because of the new phenomenon of transit migration (de Haas 2005). Every year thousands of labour migrants are estimated to cross the border or the Mediterranean Sea. A major migratory flow of people coming mainly from sub-Saharan Africa heads towards European countries through the Maghreb region and, so, through Morocco. Especially after 1997/1998, the presence of migrants from Congo Brazzaville and Central Africa was becoming consistent and it has been followed by an increase in the number of migrants from Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Ivory Coast (Barros et al., 2002). It has to be added that regular flows of

Cameroonian, Senegalese and Congolese students have been moving to Morocco for educational reasons in the last few decades.

Driven by several reasons, ranging from escaping a war reality in the origin country to looking for a better job or just a change of air, migrants generally move according to their knowledge and their networks. Political turmoil and civil induced migration from the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Ivory Coast, but migratory flows come from Nigeria, Senegal, Gambia, Mali, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Niger, Sudan, the Central African Republic and Cameroon. Since the beginning of transit migration, a process of increasing diversification has been taking place with respect to transit migrants' origin countries (de Haas 2005).

Many are the possible itineraries, which may involve several stages and quite some time. The majority of migrants in Morocco enter the country from the Algerian border, especially because hiding appears to be easier following such a route. Another way to enter Morocco is by crossing the Sahara area and/or through Western Sahara.

The definition of Morocco as transit country comes originally from migrants, who deem it so, but an increasing number of them, due to the difficulties that getting to Europe implies nowadays, decide to extend their stay in Morocco for a medium or long period (de Haas 2005).


Migrants live in precarious conditions during their stay in Morocco struggling to find a job in a country with a high rate of unemployment and being socially isolated. After their stay in Morocco, there are five possibilities for transit migrants:

- Try the Atlantic way to the Canary Islands, either from Morocco or from Western Sahara;
- Cross the European border heading to one of the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla;

- Cross the Strait of Gibraltar to find their way to Europe;
- Enter Algeria and get to Europe through other routes;
- Extend their stay in Morocco.

As mentioned above, it is especially this last option that has recently become popular. As a matter of fact, the Schengen Agreement took down European internal borders and, as a consequence, pushed the European Union to look for

*FIGURE 5 – Main zones of international out-migration in Morocco (de Haas, 2005)*



an alternative border management system. Some compensatory measures were introduced, like the SIS (Schengen Information System) for national security and border controls or the SIVE (Integrated External Vigilance System) that implemented radars, sensors, cameras and other technologic tools to monitor Spanish coasts (GADEM, 2009).

In May 2003, the Casablanca bombings shook Morocco with 45 deaths. Although the attacks had an Islamic origin, the level of alert was increased in Morocco and those attacks were one of the reasons behind the law 02-03. This latter was introduced with the goal of complying with international agreements in terms of foreigners' rights, illegal stays in the country, emigration management and neighbourhood policies (GADEM, 2009). This resulted in the tightening of borders with Europe and, as a consequence, migrants getting stuck in Morocco were increasing in number.

Sub-Saharan, often undocumented and/or illegal, migrants have to cope with xenophobic behaviours and hostile authorities. In 2005, a Moroccan newspaper compared migrants to "black locusts". Frequent round-ups take place in migrant inhabited neighbourhoods and people found in illegal conditions are often deported to the Algerian border (de Haas, 2005).

Since the solution of extending their stay in Morocco was not in their original plans, hundreds of sub-Saharan migrants started crowding Northern forests nearby Ceuta and Melilla, which shelter migrants in extremely poor conditions. In September 2005, migrants tried a more or less organised massive attempt of crossing the delimiting fence. Although many made their way through it, tens died or got injured. These are known as the events of Ceuta and Melilla.

The ones who did not reach Europe in that attempt were deported to their origin countries or dropped off along the Algerian border. In December 2006, some raids of the Moroccan police amongst migrants touched the sensibility of a very young migration related dimension of civil society.

Since 2005, a new dimension of the civil society was born and part of the old one readdressed its attention to migrants' rights and living conditions. Some visible effects were, in chronological order:

- 2005: the creation of Migreurop, an organisation network to improve civil society coordination (Migreurop, 2011);
- 2006: Euro-African Manifest, with which sub-Saharan, Northern African and European civil society actors asked the reference governments to overcome their obsession with security and xenophobia and to bring back the respect of human rights as the core principle of migration policies; the Euro-African Manifest is also the founding document of the Euro-African Network (Manifeste euro-africain, 2011);
- 2011: World Charter of Migrants, in which civil society addresses all the previous proposals to defend migrants' rights, suggesting the production of an international charter based on three principles,
  - o freedom of movement,
  - o equality between nationals and foreigners' rights,
  - o establishment of a citizenship principle based on residence rather than nationality (Assemblée Mondiale des Migrants, 2011).

In sum, the evolution of migration has fostered a change in Moroccan civil society. As regards the effects that migratory flows have created in the institutional landscape, nowadays new and old entities of a different nature can be identified. Therefore, such a process needs to be evaluated considering five different types of actors:

- national and local government;
- international institutions;
- international organisations;

- Moroccan organisations;
- migrant self-organisations.

Moroccan institutional and civil society formations need, then, to be classified, in order to make the picture clearer, although categorisation may not be simple and definite. In fact, several factors and characteristics need to be analysed, making the analysis multifaceted. The following features will be considered:

- socio-political representation;
- economic links and interests;
- institutional constraints;
- spatial scale of action.

As regards this latter aspect, it is possible to note what are the sensitive areas for migration, civil society and institutional landscape. As a matter of fact, some locations are the key ones to notice how the migration change has been affecting civil society and institutional landscape.

- The Northern region of the Rif Mountains is important because it used to be under the Spanish protectorate. It one of the reasons why Moroccans have developed networks in Europe that are used by migrants and, therefore, why it is easier and more convenient to migrate to the two enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. The forests around these two areas shelter many migrants before their attempt to cross the border. Ceuta (not far from the city of Tangiers) and Melilla (near Nador) represent Europe in Africa and are separated from this latter by fenced corridors and cages. It is where smugglers operate and policemen are corrupted to let undocumented people pass through the border.

- The Northern coast and the Strait of Gibraltar is another way for migrants coming from Morocco to cross national borders. Every day many migrants try to exploit the sea to swim to Ceuta and Melilla or the 14 km distance that separates them from Europe by hiding in ferries, boats or cargo ships. As mentioned above, it is here that the SIVE system operates with patrols, radars and sensors.
- The Canary Islands, 100km west of Morocco, are the new destination of many transit migrants since the borders controls in the North have been toughened. From Southern Morocco flimsy boats and dinghies leave to face the rough waves of the Atlantic Ocean, trying to make it to the islands. Nowadays the core departure centre has moved South, to Western Sahara, because of increasing controls and there migrants have to face a longer distance and tougher waves.
- The Algerian border, over 1,500 km long, represents the best way into the country for migrants. Since it is mainly covered by desert, border controls are less tight, but, on the other hand, crossing the desert is harder and requires extra energy for migrants. The city of Oujda is important because it is the closest city to the border and some neighbourhoods are inhabited for the most part by migrants. Migrants are also deported by the police to the Algerian border not far from this city and dropped off in desert areas. Another phenomenon taking place along this border is the exit of migrants who want to try to get to Europe through Tunisia, Libya or Turkey, in sum, to find other transit migration routes.
- The Souss area is in Southern Morocco and it is, as well as the Algerian border, a region where migrants enter Morocco. Nearby the Souss region there is the border with Western Sahara delimited for a long distance by the "Moroccan Wall", a wall made of sand to control this border. For this reason, this wall even continues in part of the territory of Mauritania.

- The cities of Rabat, Casablanca, Tangiers and Oujda are extremely important because they shelter thousands of migrants. When migrants decide to revise their travel plan and settle down for a medium or long period, they choose one of these cities because it is easier to hide and to access services, to which they are not entitled. While some CSOs act in Oujda, Casablanca and Tangiers, Rabat is the core city, the capital city where the civil society debate takes place and most of the institutional landscape actors operate.

## **Chapter 5 – Institutional landscape network**

This body of research on migration related Moroccan civil society started off in the Netherlands in order to approach the study of one of the migrant self organisations. If not aware of the dynamics of the migration debate, one might result in feeling disoriented and unable to understand where to look in order to start a research on this topic. The social debate, the proliferation of civil society organisations, power management from institutions and the humanitarian emergency, which envelops and fosters these other elements that should be taken into consideration, as well as other factors are hard to grasp. The nature of information sources can result so different and multifaceted that, even when the researcher locates the key informants (people, associations, organisations, institutions, etc.), the links implied by such a network that operates at different levels might be hidden or hard to understand. This is due to several factors, affecting the whole system, some of which are cluster specific, some others common to the whole network. It is possible to consider, for instance:

- The nature of entities to be considered as well as identifying in which field they operate, and how, where and on which legal basis may prove difficult and bring some confusion;
- The level of formality, which also affects the way network nodes exist and act, considering financial issues, number of people involved, logistics;
- Different kinds of selection and being selected by partner entities and working with them;
- Distance from the migrants that are the main point of discussion and might result in being closer to or farther from the forums of debate.

- Different nationalities and legal statuses of the people involved, which lead to asymmetries and diversity of problems, ways of acting and understanding the reality.

All these factors might bias the way the researcher looks at an entity, a connection, a problem, and might hide or veil part of the network or some clusters. One of the added values of this study is that its starting point is already in what is assumed to be the least structured part of the network, the one whose formal side is kept at a minimum and whose importance is very likely to be underestimated. As a matter of fact, there is a whole part of the network one might not come across, if the research begins with the wrong angle. The network perspective will also be very helpful in such a situation, because following entities' economic, socio-political and institutional links will not allow the research to lose or skip any relevant data.

#### *Transnational character*

What has been evident since the very beginning of this study is the transnational character of the debate. Although a topic like migration already involves an international and a transnational perspective, because of people moving across countries, and the state of Morocco dealing with different nationalities in its own territory, the research has shown how the debate itself is transnational. It is actually one of the peculiarities of this scenario and the reasons why this debate crosses Moroccan borders to reach European countries, like Holland, France, Italy, Spain and sub-Saharan countries are multiple and might help to understand how to look at the network and to choose the right perspective from which to approach the analysis.

It is paramount to understand not how, but why the migration debate crosses national borders and enters Europe. European civil society is quite different from the Moroccan one because of the extent to which democratic processes exist within European countries and their way of dealing with migrants and migration debates. Therefore, the difference is to be found rather in the

institutional landscape in which the civil society can proliferate and deal with topics of public interest. It is because of this difference that this topic can be treated in a different manner in Morocco. In fact, the European presence of civil society activists and part of the Moroccan network entities suggests that the debate looks for solutions and propaganda in Europe as well. Some entities look for an increasing number of supporters or move to first world countries part of their more or less formal organisation in order to achieve the following two goals.

- Increase the popularity of the topic in order to recruit more and more people and expand their own entity: as a matter of fact many of those network entities can be considered themselves as networks because of the way they operate internally, which confirms the validity of the scalability of the network approach. Such a goal is pursued especially by those organisations which do not find any other means to bring the scope of their action to a much higher level. This is the case of migrant self organisations, especially considering that they are limited by their informal nature and whose thought is more likely to be heard where democracy and civil society processes exist to a higher extent. In fact, a European newspaper, for instance, is less likely to censor news about undocumented migrants.
- Bring their issues to the institutional landscape of European countries in order to stimulate a power shift from institutions (state) to civil society in Europe as well. In fact, European institutions are involved as well in this debate, because of connections with the Moroccan government and the outsourcing of borders. At the same time, a process of civil society proliferation similar to the Moroccan one and complementary to this latter has been advancing in Europe, where some of the migrant self organisations are spreading their connections and ideas, European institutions have to deal with a new transnational dimension of civil

society and Moroccan CSOs have to find another channel to develop their influence and themselves.

Furthermore, migrant self organisations continuously look for new channels to express and spread their ideas in order to improve their lobbying activities. In Europe, a body of literature on migration related civil society is developing. As a matter of fact, academia and publishing houses are paying more and more attention to these topics, and European scholars and journalists are becoming increasingly interested in humanitarian emergencies as well as in the lobbying activities of Moroccan civil society actors. Therefore, the coincidence of these two parties' interests has brought part of the debate to European arenas.

As a matter of fact, the attempt at developing new channels of information, spreading ideas and defending principles in new arenas is one of the reasons why the way of acting of Moroccan organisations has been changing in the last decade. They deem associationism and visibility so important that some social movements have reached Europe, especially NGOs networks have crossed the Moroccan national border to start lobbying, organising ideas and coordinating their own participants from Europe, especially in France because of language reasons. In quite a different way from migrant self organisations but approximately for the same reasons, Moroccan CSOs operate also in Europe through NGOs networks.

Other than European ones, other countries are touched by the migration related civil society debate: sub-Saharan states are also linked to this network but to a lesser extent. Their embassies and consulates are present in Morocco and are called to take action in relation to their nationals' files and applications. In fact, they do not intervene in public debates or lobbying activities, but just process applications according to existing laws.

Civil society in those countries is not involved either as this research has not found out transnational links to origin countries' civil societies other than the nationality of migrants that populate the Moroccan one. Migrant self

organisations and NGOs are to contextualise only in Morocco, Europe or Maghreb countries.

### **Migrant self organisations**

As mentioned above, migrant self organisations were and are born not necessarily with a link to the origin countries of the migrants. As part of Moroccan civil society, they contributed to the phenomenon of proliferation of CSOs and the change of the Moroccan institutional landscape. ARCOM, which is the very first migrant self organisation, and other similar entities noticed that there was a gap in Moroccan society and, together with it, some room for action. They felt that several groups of migrants were lacking several social services and the distance between them and Moroccan society was quite ample and should be reduced. However, they have not always had this characteristic, because migrants have been crossing Morocco for decades. Nowadays the situation has become more stable as the number of migrants stuck in the country on the way to Europe has sharply increased in the last years. It became clear amongst many migrants, especially around the beginning of the new millennium, that this stratus of the population was increasing and the state of social services had reached emergency levels. For quite a high percentage of migrants, the lack of services was so severe as to identify humanitarian emergencies.

With this background in mind, there were three stages bringing that situation to the current one.

1. The events of Ceuta and Melilla in 2005, which were a response to the precarious situation in Northern Morocco. Those events marked the breaking point of an extremely unstable situation and brought to civil society's attention migrants problems as problems of a specific category of the population. The absence of humanitarian and social services was

no longer attributable to Moroccan society or to some unidentifiable strata of it, but it was therefore clear that several groups of the population were suffering from this situation, because of their characteristics. Their common one was, and still is, that they can be identified as migrants. The failure experienced by them during those events and the worsening of the situation brought many to realise that the concept of mobility naturally associated with the definition of migrants had been sharply reduced in the latest years. In order for them to start a life in Morocco, some basic services were needed by this section of the population: *health care counselling, public safety, shelter and food*. This is the reason why migrants began to organise themselves in groups, by nationality at first, and to provide each other mutual **basic services** or alternative solutions.

2. The acknowledgement that, although they usually aim to hide and reduce to a minimum their participation in public life, migrants were becoming a community and, as a community, they needed to advance and upgrade socially. In other words, realising that basic services to avoid humanitarian crises were enough only considering the short term was the subsequent step. An increasing part of the migrant community is nowadays stuck in Morocco and starts planning their stay in Morocco awaiting better times. Doing so made them acknowledge that other services (such as religious) were needed as the migrant community wanted to upgrade their social conditions: some **community services** with a lower priority with respect to basic ones. So they realised that *legal and work counselling* as well as *education* for themselves and their children and other services were required. The acknowledgement of such needs is more important than it seems: this step was subsequent to the first one and unequivocally different as migrants realise and accept the reduction of their mobility, which is however kept to some extent because of the definition of migrant itself.

3. The realisation that such a big community could not advance socially without a release of power from institutions and the subsequent beginning of **lobbying activities**. This step does not come subsequently after the first two, but it involves some activities that were already present before the events of Ceuta and Melilla. As migrants went through the realisations described in the first two steps, lobbying had increased its scope and extent and it is now supported by an increasing number of people, Moroccan and non-Moroccan. As these activities have increased, the popularity of migration related civil society increased as well and brought more organisations and people into play, giving a major contribution to what has been so far defined the proliferation of civil society organisations. Migrants realised that being organised in informal groups and offering each other mutual support and community services was not enough; so they started creating thematic migrant self organisations in order to lobby with Moroccan civil society organisations and institutions. As a consequence, the subsequent modifications to those latter can be deemed as well part of the phenomenon of the proliferation of CSOs.

The three stages considered highlight not only a progressive realisation from the migrant community of being a community, but also roughly define the fields of action of the less formalised part of Moroccan civil society: migrant self organisations. But some clarifications have to be made about their activities: they do cover basic mutual help, community services and lobbying activities, but this classification is only indicative and does not pretend to be exhaustive, because the main criterion used in this research is the priority migrants give to a specific activity or service. As a matter of fact, education has been considered here as a community and non basic service, because it not strictly related to survival, even though in almost every Western democratic society this would have been deemed part of people basic needs. As well, taking action when arrests of migrants occur and putting them in touch with embassies and other institutions is one of the services provided by

migrant self organisations since the very beginning: although this service could not be generally classified as basic need of a person, it has a very high priority for this segment of the population.

Migrant self organisations were not many at the beginning, but nowadays it is possible to ascertain the existence of at least twenty of them. After the events of Ceuta and Melilla, the migrant community had not yet acknowledged its common characteristics and the potential to become a community; some migrants, the most active ones or those who were in a better legal/social position, started appealing to their sense of nationality to create smaller but more cohesive groups in order to organise the mutual provision of the above mentioned services, especially basic ones. As time went by and as the community acknowledged its own potential, migrant self organisations started to differentiate their activities and provide other migrants with more and more services. Therefore, in the years after 2005 the birth of new organisations proliferated, trying to fill the gaps left by the state between Moroccan society and migrants.

At first, these very particular civil society entities played the role of reference points for the mutual provision of basic services. In fact, they tried to build networks of migrants, calling anyone available into play by appealing to their sense of nationality. So, ARCOM (Association des réfugiés congolais au Maroc – Association for the Congolese refugees in Morocco), ACM (Association des Camerounais au Maroc – Association for Cameroonians in Morocco), URIM (Union des Réfugiés Ivoiriens au Maroc - Union of Ivory Coast people in Morocco), ASSIMA (Association des Immigrés Maliens au Maroc – Association of Malian Immigrants in Morocco) and some others recalled their nationals in order to build a network that could be mutually beneficial. As these processes became stable and migrants acknowledged some other needs had to be met in order to think with a medium-long term perspective, other associations were born, such as the Association of Asylum Seekers and undocumented migrants in Morocco (Association de Demandeurs d'Asile et Sans Papier au Maroc), the

CSM (Conseil des Migrants – Migrants Council), the SIAM (Solidarité Internationale d'Aides aux Migrants – International Solidarity of Help to Migrants), the AFVIC (Association Amis et Familles des Victimes de l'Immigration Clandestine – Association of Friends and Families of Victims of Illegal Immigration) and some others. Those latter were set up by migrants with specific purposes and were not linked to any particular nationality.

Two factors drove the multiplication of migrant organisations:

- the new needs expressed by migrants who were stuck in Morocco;
- the leadership skills of the founders of such CSOs.

In fact, these latter were the ones realising that there was some room for action and started organising themselves and other migrants around them. As the process started and new needs arose, more and more migrants got involved and created several organisation linked to or independent of sub-Saharan nationalities. This led to the existence of many CSOs that had to differentiate their tasks in order to survive. While some, like ARCOM and the Association of Asylum Seekers and undocumented migrants in Morocco got involved mainly with the provision of basic services and acted mainly with a humanitarian point of view, organisations like the Association des Artistes Réfugiés au Maroc (Association of the Artists Refugees in Morocco), the Association Horizon Migrants (Migrant Horizon Association), INFO AFRIKA (Association bringing together peer educators) focused their efforts on community services and others like ADESCAM (Association de Développement et de sensibilisation des Camerounais Migrants au Maroc – Association for the development and awareness of Cameroon Migrants in Morocco), AFVIC and CSM were and are more active in the lobbying field.

This is roughly a generalisation as many of these CSOs act and help migrants in the three different fields, but usually only one is the most important one and each of them has its own peculiarities and competences. As a consequence of

their position within this network, some organisations are closer to migrants while some others are closer to other entities of Moroccan civil society. Especially those providing basic, humanitarian or community services have a stronger link with their social base. Very interesting and specific is the role of organisations focusing more on lobbying and mobilisation activities, whose main partners are Moroccan CSOs but also have to maintain a link with the migrants they represent.

This differentiation of activities occurs also because these CSOs are represented by one or two people and group a total of no more than ten persons: they base their work on mutual help and voluntary work. Every organisation is identifiable by one or two leaders that, in order to control its reference point and make it function properly, need to assert and maintain their leadership. This might cause some confusion, because overstating one's leadership could contribute to overvalue the position or role covered and the importance, size and capacity of the concerned organisation. As a matter of fact, this also brings some conflict between leaders and between the CSO they represent and its partners, increasing the chance of miscommunication. Therefore, in the dynamics of the migrant self organisations network, both consensus and power conflict (Flyvbjerg 1998b) exist. Consensus applies when those civil society organisations cooperate and if their way of acting together on the field is considered; conflict applies when they are called to work together with other entities of a different nature in the migration related Moroccan civil society.

### *Consensus*

Bearing in mind that these organisations operate without financial means and with an occasional budget, they base their strength mainly on mutual help and information sharing. Partnerships are also occasional but continuous in time with entities of the same nature, other migrant self organisations. They act together in case of arrested migrants, if

somebody needs health care but has neither the means nor right, in case of social and religious events, practically in any case where financial issues and required capacity do not go over a certain threshold.

This situation turns out to be beneficial, especially in lobbying activities, where the presidents and secretaries of different organisations know each other and can easily coordinate their action, when mobilising, making their social basis aware and promoting events and ideas.

The logic of consensus can also be very useful in understanding how organisations' networks, like NO BORDER or Migreurop work. In fact, lobbying activities are pursued also at a higher level, where migrant self organisations coordinate their action with most civil society actors.

### *Conflict*

A Foucauldian approach is however the best fit in those situations where the growth of the organisation is at stake. In fact, when dealing with financial resources or power, a conflict perspective can better describe the dynamics between migrant self organisations, which get in competition in order to become more influential.

This logic applies to those connections between migrant self organisations and Moroccan CSOs, because of the existing competition and potential appropriation of new resources or power, as the former have no financial resources and are sometimes in precarious conditions.

This also occurs between migrant self organisations because of their leaders' leadership assertions of being the reference point of part of the population. Therefore, this might lead to an overlapping social base for some of those civil society entities.



### *Recent developments of migrant self organisations*

As mentioned above, these organisations started their activity and their involvement path bringing together the voices of migrants according to their nationality. Associationism implies in this case the peer involvement of migrants, but some might turn out more active than others. In order to involve more people and upgrade the services mutually offered by the migrant community, more organisations were born. The scenario in 2010 included two reference entities for Cameroonian people (ACM and ADESCAM), four for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ARCOM, Colonie Congolaise – Congolese Colony, Ligue des Familles Congolaises – League of Congolese Families, Association des Sages Congolais – Association of the Wise Congolese), three for the Ivory Coast (URIM, Rassemblements des Réfugiés Ivoiriens – Gatherings of Ivory Coast Refugees, Association des Femmes Ivoiriennes Réfugiées et des Demandeurs d’Asile – Association of Ivory Coast Refugee Women and Asylum Seekers) and other associations related to other nationalities and some others not linked to any specific nationality.

As migrants live in precarious conditions, especially in the case of undocumented or illegal ones, these CSOs do not have a formal position and are neither registered nor recognised by the Moroccan state. Even in those cases where leaders have a regular position, they preferred not to go through the registration process, because of the financial means required to set up an association or the added freedom from bureaucracy they can have as informal associations.

The saturation of the free gap between migrants and Moroccan society and the limited power and influence those particular CSOs can have as non registered associations brought some of the leaders to realise that this part of the civil society was becoming overpopulated by migrant self organisations in relation to their actual action potential. Furthermore, being in a precarious and often non legal situation constantly leads migrants, and also their leaders, to

relocate and/or be inactive for some periods. All these reasons determined the end or inactivity of some migrant associations (AFVIC for instance).

After the events of Ceuta and Melilla the proliferation of CSOs in this particular segment of the population took place in Morocco, but also up to a certain saturation point. This is not true for the current years, when organisations are created mainly just to fill some gaps left by some others, which abandoned the scene for some reason.

The role migrant self organisations play is crucial for Moroccan civil society, but less important for the institutional landscape. In fact, they represent the engine of civil society as they link their social base, migrants, with the part of civil society that deals and dialogues with institutions. They act mutually and their role mainly involves the provision of basic and community services to migrants, while the lobbying part of their work is limited by their legal status and their limited financial resources. None of them is linked directly with institutions or the government, but they bring up issues of a marginalised part of the population in front of other civil society actors. That is why they are the engine of civil society, stimulating ideas, issues, debate and the shift of power.

### **Moroccan civil society organisations**

As regards the number of organisations, the scene of registered Moroccan organisations and associations apparently has not changed. But their case is quite different from the one of migrant self organisations. This study investigates the changes in the Moroccan institutional landscape related to migration and, as a matter of fact, those latter are fully part of the research field. While this is true for migrant associations, Moroccan NGOs are active on several fields and identifying a migration dimension within many of them is difficult and sometimes not straightforward. Furthermore, civil society in Morocco is animated by several entities which pursue a wide range of different

goals, giving this network a very heterogeneous character. In order to deal with such a diversified network cluster, those CSOs that were born with a specific migration related purpose need to be analysed differently from the classic Moroccan ones which might have adapted or not to a changing surrounding environment. Their inner mechanisms are different because the latter ones have more extensive experience in the field and their procedures and way of acting have deeper roots. The way they manage emergencies are different as well as their partners and the way they deal with them, their channels for lobbying activities, their staff and the volunteers carrying out their duties.

A distinction needs to be made, therefore, between those organisations which were set up after the events of Ceuta and Melilla in 2005 and other NGOs already present on Moroccan soil.

The first ones are very active in the field of human rights and assistance to migrants. Their creation is attributable to the same reasons that are behind the creation of migrant organisations. There are two main differences:

- the will not to remain informal, but to be recognised and act according to law in defence of migrants, providing mainly two of three types of services offered by migrant self organisations: basic humanitarian help and lobbying activities;
- the composition, as those are Moroccan civil society organisations and act as such, although they offer their help to and receive a fundamental contribution from migrants themselves.

Not being associations or self organisations, they do not have a social base, although the reference group to which their activities are addressed and in whose defence they act is the migrant community. In fact, their similarities with migrant self organisations make their position in the civil society network not very different from the latter: their link with migrants is strong as many of

them cooperate with these CSOs and their situation is taken into account in the provision of services.

Humanitarian and first aid services, other than awareness campaigns of the population, are provided, for instance, by the ABCDS (Association Beni Znassen Culture Développement Solidarité - Association Beni Znassen for Culture Development and Solidarity, created in 2005), whose action is addressed to migrants in Oujda (North-western Morocco) but not exclusively so. Its activities are of utmost importance as it can be considered the most active NGO in an area of migration and crowded by migrants.

Monitoring the respect of human rights and lobbying are the main activities of GADEM (Groupe antiraciste d'Accompagnement et de Défense des Etrangers et Migrants - Antiracist Group for Assistance and Defence of Foreigners and Migrants), founded in 2006. This NGO is very particular in the panorama of migration related Moroccan civil society as it is the only single entity in the network registered and recognised by the Moroccan state addressing its efforts explicitly and exclusively to help migrants. This organisation is not involved in the field in terms of humanitarian help to migrants, but rather with lobbying activities. As mentioned above, migrants participate more and are aware of the work of an organisation when this latter provides basic or community services. Although GADEM does not act in this sense, its connection to the migrant community, coordinated with its partners, offers legal advice (access to law for everyone), which can be considered an extremely valuable service in a country in which most sub-Saharaners are socially excluded.

The case of those CSOs already present on Moroccan territory before the events of Ceuta and Melilla is different. All of them were, and are, acting in fields other than migration and providing services to users other than migrants. Aware of their existence and work, those latter could also benefit from these organisations' action. This used to encompass a wide range of activities, spanning from medical help and the fight against HIV/AIDS to

business counselling and the struggle for human rights. Some of these organisations have been present in Moroccan civil society and the institutional landscape for a long time, but the change occurring within the Moroccan population pushed some of them towards the acknowledgement that their relocation within this network was necessary. In fact, some NGOs decided to address their action to migrants or act in their name and, as a consequence, a new dimension of this network was created: this study aims to investigate this part of the network, that is, considering only those NGO branches dealing with the migration led changing process in Morocco. This means that some of the roles of some main actors in the global civil society might be reduced according to their involvement with migrants.

In fact, the competences put in place to help migrants' cause are several, extremely diversified and quite different from those offered by migrant self organisations.

AAU (Association Action Urgence) has as its mission the provision of medical services to the most deprived part of the population. As such, it now offers its medical and social action to foreigners, migrants and sub-Saharanans. It is also involved in the fight against AIDS and the awareness campaigns about hygiene, diabetes and family planning.

ALCS (Association de Lutte Contre le Sida – Association for the Fight Against HIV/AIDS) has been acting for a long time in its very specific field to prevent sexually transmitted infections, and to assist medically and psychologically people with HIV and to defend their rights. It has recently widened its area of action, now dealing also with the migrant community.

Those two latter organisations operate in the medical and humanitarian field providing basic health care, lobbying for people's right to health and launching awareness about some specific topics. As they are quite large organisations with extensive expertise in their own fields of action, they keep providing their services regardless of the origin or the nationality of their users. Their action

with respect to the changing surrounding environment is relatively ambiguous, in the sense that they have both adapted and not adapted to it. The number of their end users has increased, especially in the sub-Saharan segment of the population, and so has their capacity and attention to the migrant cause. At the same time their policy and structure has remained unchanged as they want to act in the same very specific field in which their expertise remains very valuable.

Organisations acting in the field of community services have instead adapted more to the change of Moroccan migration. When migrants acknowledged that their mobility had been reduced, and with a longer stay in Morocco some secondary needs had to be met, not only migrant self organisations but also NGOs addressed their efforts to the migrant community. Two very different examples can be given of these activities.

AMAPPE (Association Marocaine d'Appui à la Promotion de la Petite Entreprise – Moroccan Association for the Support of the Promotion of Small Businesses) was created in 1991 to foster economic activities, develop entrepreneurship and strengthen the driving forces of employment and welfare. Already providing expertise on small business issues (business management and legal counselling, financial means and loans), it has recently widened the scope of its actions opening its doors to migrants, in particular refugees recognised by the UNHCR.

The FOO (Fondation Orient-Occident – East-West Foundation) was created in 1994 and it was one of the first NGOs to work with the migrant community. Since the very beginning of its activity, it is the single organisation offering services, not to single migrants, but to the migrant community, facilitating access to the job market. A big welcoming building in the suburbs of Rabat hosts a social centre offering professional training, social assistance and activities, psychological help, and some other extra services for refugees.

Both these organisations were affected by the change of migration in and through Morocco, but reacted quite differently also because of their different goals and structure. While the former widened its scope of action launching new programmes for refugees, in partnership with some other organisations and institutions, the latter had only to increase its capacity as it was already prepared to help this part of the population living in precarious conditions and needing training and information to adapt and reconvert their skills in order to enter the work force in Morocco. These two organisations very specifically position themselves between the migrant community and the market trying to take down the barriers between the two.

Lobbying activities are instead one of the priorities of entities fighting for the respect of human rights and dignity or solidarity organisations. As for migrant self organisations, also in the Moroccan NGO cluster of the network there are entities that do not operate in the field with migrants, but try to change the current situation with lobbying activities and mass mobilisation. As their daily activities involve monitoring and denouncing violations of human rights, it is quite surprising that these organisations are quite close to institutions in terms of dialogue as they are the ones called by institutions most often for confrontation. They adapted to the evolving scenario by creating a new dimension within themselves, new units or working groups, which deal with migration issues. Their activities do not involve frequent meetings with migrants as they do not usually manage first aid facilities or provide basic or community services, their contact with migrants takes place through their partners and information sources.

ATTAC Maroc (Association pour la Taxation des Transactions pour l'Aide aux Citoyens Maroc – Association for the Taxation of Transactions to Help Citizens Morocco) was created with a purpose not strictly related to migration. Their main goal is to fight the adverse effect of globalisation in Morocco, increasing freedom in order to achieve social justice, joint development, dignity and democracy. Their scope of action appears quite broad, but they act only

following an economic-political approach rather than a humanitarian or human rights one. This organisation has reacted to the change in migration by joining the common cause in lobbying activities and working mainly in partnership with other network entities.

The OMDH (Organisation Marocaine des Droits Humains – Moroccan Organisation for Human Rights) carries out tasks exclusively related to human rights, from awareness campaign to human rights education, national law and international agreement application and denunciation activities. This organisation acts mainly through analysing legislative documents, organising conferences and debates, submitting reports to the Human Rights Watch and giving migrants legal advice. Their action allows them to act with several partners and to deal with the government, which is why its position in the Moroccan institutional landscape is very important for lobbying activities.

The AMDH (Association Marocaine des Droits Humains – Moroccan Association for Human Rights), founded in 1979, has roughly the same goals as the OMDH but operates in the network with different ways of action. It aims to spread information and increase public awareness through any possible means (conferences, debates, social activities, etc.), but also offers advice and brings human rights cases in front of the competent institutions. Its main strengths are its independence, although it strictly cooperates with its partners, and its structure. As a matter of fact, its ways of acting, extensive expertise and organisational procedures allow it to act efficiently and to engage in dialogue quite often with public offices. In 2003, the AMDH started working for the migrants' cause with a specific body within its organisation.

As these NGOs work in defence of human rights, they are asked to work closely with institutions and to engage in dialogue constantly with them. Therefore, they are in the most favourable position for lobbying activities. Even though they do not provide humanitarian services and are not in daily contact with the migrant community, migrant representatives and self organisations

have them as reference partners for lobbying activities, allowing them to monitor the respect of human rights. Furthermore, some development programmes addressed to migrants are also run by those NGOs and result in being another monitoring means.

AMDH and OMDH are the most active players in the field of human rights and are, in a way, the most important ones in the migration related civil society network, especially because of the position they occupy between migrants and institutions. The structure of their organisation is interesting in relation to their finances. In fact, they receive funding from institutions like the European Union or the Moroccan government, through the Ministry of Education, for instance, for what concerns education matters (AMDH is also financially linked to other entities like European embassies and NGOs). This is because of their role and the better access they have to institutions, although no funding is provided with the specific purpose of addressing it to the migrant community.

As regards the position on Moroccan territory, these organisations are the biggest Moroccan CSOs and are the only ones spread all over Morocco, with several offices and volunteers, while other NGOs are just locally based and act on farther areas through partners or migrant self organisations, which have been created within the migrant community. Logistics are important in this sense, especially for smaller organisations that do not have an adequate budget to move freely on the territory: therefore, the location is chosen according to the services provided. That is the reason why most organisations whose activity mostly involves lobbying are headquartered in Rabat.

### **International NGOs**

Not very different from Moroccan formal CSOs are international NGOs, which were or were not present in Morocco before the events of Ceuta and Melilla, but decided to widen the scope of their activities by including migrants amongst their final users. The increased importance of the migrants' cause in the Moroccan civil society contributed to the change of their policies and/or

structure. INGOs are international private players that carry out tasks related to specific topics in different countries. Their activities are always related to humanitarian or social services and, as such, they benefit from wide international experience and expertise. Their mission is usually related to the vision they have of the reality from a global perspective but specifically linked to few dimensions of reality. On the contrary, Moroccan CSOs' ideas are multifaceted and more comprehensive but related to a particular territory or field of action. Therefore, international NGOs make decisions considering a bigger international picture and decide to intervene, providing services specifically related to the goal of their action. In fact, although some INGOs are present in Morocco to improve migrants' conditions and defend their rights, they do not get involved in lobbying activities as do Moroccan CSOs, limiting their action to the provision of basic, humanitarian and community services.

As regards their distribution on the territory, INGOs aim to cover the most part of Morocco, because of two reasons:

- they provide services directly to their users, in this case to migrants, and, as a consequence, try to reach them directly on the territory and, in general, they do not need to be in the capital city where lobbying activities take place;
- their agencies in Morocco are funded and founded by the main organisation, borrowing from it structure, mechanisms of action and expertise; since they rely on the availability of budgets agreed by the main organisation, which are also more flexible than local CSOs' ones with respect to their financial requirements, they try to adapt to the current needs of the population spread all over Morocco.

As a matter of fact, while most Moroccan CSOs have their headquarters in Rabat, INGOs can have multiple offices and agencies in different locations. This is especially the case of humanitarian organisations, such as MSF or the Red Cross.

MSF (Médecins sans frontières) is an NGO providing medical services to the disadvantaged part of the population. In Morocco since 1999, it started following the migrant cause in 2003, launching different projects aimed at improving the health of mothers and children and developing socio-medical conditions in Morocco. This organisation is flexible on the territory and changes its headquarters according to the needs of the population: it is currently based in Oujda.

The Red Cross (Croix Rouge) follows and intervenes in emergency situations as well in Morocco. It also participated in the assistance of migrants during the events of Ceuta and Melilla and keeps providing medical assistance, training and information to the Moroccan and migrant population.

Another organisation which assures a high coverage of the Moroccan territory is Caritas Maroc, the regional branch of the Catholic Church social service. It is in Morocco since 1958, providing medical, social and educational services to the population. It also works on training the local population to provide the same services. As a humanitarian organisation, its policy has not changed in the last years. By contrast, the final users of its services have changed with a gradual increase of the number of migrants amongst the disadvantaged population it serves. This even brought about the opening of the CAM (Centre Accueil Migrants – Reception Centre for Migrants) which helps sub-Saharan only.

The CEI (Comité d'Entraide Internationale Eglise Evangélique), the social service of the Protestant Church, has similar origins. Acting mainly in Rabat and Casablanca, where migrants can have a more anonymous life, they provide them with humanitarian and medical assistance, business micro-projects, financial help for training and education.

The Jesuit Refugee Service is another Catholic organisation, founded in 1980. The specificity of such a NGO is that it is the only INGO to have as final users of their services sub-Saharan who got stuck on their way to Europe. The JRS

arrived in Morocco in 2008 with the project SAM (Service Accueil Migrants – Migrants Reception Service). Based in Casablanca, it offers community and social service to the vulnerable sub-Saharan migrant population (women and children).

Privately funded NGOs working on specific issues are AFL (Acting For Life), working with children, OPALS (Organisation Pan-Africaine pour la Lutte contre le Sida – Pan-African Organisation for the Fight against AIDS), fighting the spread of HIV/AIDS, and Terre des Hommes, working with women and offering pre-birth assistance. These organisations' work is not directly addressed to migrants, but being disadvantaged, the migrant community avails of their services.

These organisations cover in a more professional way the provision of the same services as migrant self organisations and Moroccan NGOs, but they exhibit a paramount difference. The system that is now in place could not exist without INGOs as they are the organisations providing the migrant part of the population with basic, humanitarian and community services. Those few organisations are the ones offering capacity, means and expertise. As a matter of fact, a system needs to fulfil basic needs of the reference population before meeting community and social needs and trying to upgrade its status by lobbying with the competent institutions.

The INGOs just described take part in lobbying activities for a power shift only marginally. Two very different international NGOs are involved in the defence of human rights and they are more similar, from this particular perspective, to the above described Moroccan CSOs that actively take part in the migration related civil society debate. However, their views are very different as the Cimade (Comité Inter-Mouvements Auprès Des Evacués - Inter-Movement Committee among Evacuees), a French NGO very active in France, has, like the Jesuit Refugee Service, the defence of repatriated people and migrants' rights as an explicit main goal, while CISS (Cooperazione Internazionale Sud

Sud – South South International Cooperation), an Italian NGO working on several projects in Morocco, has the deconstruction of the myth of the migrant as a driving goal.

This latter started working in Morocco in 2005, but its commitment to the migrant cause was the deconstruction of such a myth, meaning that migrants should be treated in the same way the system deals with other disadvantaged persons present in Morocco. This is why their commitment on the Moroccan scene has been increasing in the last years, but its programmes are addressed to migrants, but to other clusters of the population (children, awareness campaigns and civic education) or other issues (language assistance and fragile ecosystems). Lately, CISS has also got involved in the defence of migrants' human rights, taking part in lobbying activities, because as a NGO dealing with disadvantaged people they also fight for the human rights of migrants and non migrants.

As Ciss, Cimade started its action in Morocco quite recently, in 2003. Its main working field is its origin country, France, while in Morocco it carries out duties supporting the work of other NGOs or migrant self organisations, providing them with means and expertise. As a matter of fact, its main goals are the defence of disadvantaged people and especially the migrant community, for whose rights it fights in Europe by lobbying, mobilising people and questioning European immigration policies. The philosophy of the Cimade includes as one of the main means the creation of a network amongst organisations from the South and between organisations from the South and the North. That is the reason why, in 2009, it started a project trying to connect civil society actors from the Maghreb region and Western Africa.


The interpretation of Moroccan reality is quite different between these two organisations, but their position in the civil society network is quite similar, as both of them provide services to migrants directly or through their partners, as

do other INGOs mentioned above. In general, it possible to say that INGOs fill a gap between the migrant community's needs and the Moroccan system's answers to those needs. Their existence in migration related civil society is, therefore, justified by three reasons:

- the fact that health care centres, Moroccan NGOs and migrant self organisations do not have the capacity and the means to meet migrants' first needs, like health care, food and shelter, and, although some are provided by international entities, the gap between demand and supply of these services is still very large;
- the need for financial resources, not in the sense that these organisations fund other NGOs' projects, but meaning that migrants, although not officially recognised by the state, increase the part of the population in precarious conditions and their reduced mobility extends their stay in Morocco and increases their needs but not their financial means: services have a cost that cannot be covered by them, which is why it is important for the Moroccan system that INGOs finance the provision of such services;
- the lack of competences amongst many of the Moroccan entities present in the network: as a matter of fact, several organisations were created or readdressed their efforts quite recently to cope with the current situation, but their way of acting is not as efficient and their expertise is not as extensive as that of international NGOs.

As described above, these type of organisations deal mainly with basic and community needs, although they are involved as well in lobbying activities to a lesser extent. Those latter are carried out mainly by Moroccan civil society organisations, especially the ones defending human rights, but some other entities are of utmost importance when civil society needs to act together and cohesively: organisations groups and networks.

FIGURE 7 – Moroccan and international CSOs



## **Groups and networks**

Groups and networks of organisations were born in order to increase the coordination of civil society actors' activities. Although their structures are similar, these groups have different goals and histories.

Migreurop was created in 2002 as a network of activists and scholars, whose aim was to spread information and knowledge about undocumented foreigners and migrants' camps, especially because the latter was at the centre of European migration policies. Migreurop acts on four main dimensions:

- gathering information about the complex and hidden reality lived by migrants;
- deconstructing the conventional image of migrant camps, considered as processes of physical and social isolation;
- spreading information about the "Europe of camps";
- fighting against this latter and taking action at the European level.

This network of organisations includes European and non-European members and, as its actions is mainly based in Europe, it represents the best and most direct way for Moroccan CSOs to lobby at the European level.

The Réseau Euro-Africain (Euro-African Network) was created a few years later, in 2006, in Morocco and represents one of the biggest attempts of the coordination of lobbying activities. As a matter of fact this network was born directly from the Manifeste Euro-Africain (Euro-African Manifest), including amongst its members 135 organisations from Europe, Morocco, the Maghreb region in general, and sub-Saharan countries. Its main goal is to share experiences, develop alternative views on the current migration policies and spread them through the Manifeste Euro-Africain. The role of this network is twofold as it is both a tool for lobbying and an organisation to coordinate other organisations' work.

These two networks are a very interesting mechanism invented by civil society to lobby with institutions. They are also experimental, as they are an attempt to coordinate and concentrate efforts to change current migration policies and migrants' situations. As a matter of fact, they also have a structural component of activists and scholars who try to coordinate civil society organisations' actions.

Moroccan and international NGOs showed a lighter evolution than migrant self organisations, because they have just readdressed part of their structure, their staff and their competences towards the cause of migrants. Their structure and position in the Moroccan institutional landscape does not differ according to their "nationality". Therefore, they can be treated as a single cluster of civil society. They bring financial resources, competences and "legal status" to the migrant community, in the sense that they represent migrants' voice in front of institutions. On the one hand, some of them, especially but not exclusively international entities, do not participate in the public debate, but just provide services to the migrant community, which also acts through migrant self organisations. On the other hand, some organisations participate in the social debate about migration and especially some Moroccan CSOs, like AMDH, OMDH and GADEM, are called to dialogue quite regularly with the government, because of their expertise. These three entities represent the main means of communication of civil society and their lobbying activities represent so far the best way to foster a power shift. Smaller but still important roles are played by Cimade, which supports local CSOs and tries to promote cooperation within civil society, and organisation networks, which do not operate mainly in Morocco but are the reference point of Moroccan civil society in Europe and in front of European institutions.

## **International governance organisations**

The change which occurred to other actors of the migration related Moroccan institutional landscape differs compared to civil society actors. Those regulating international governance, institutions like the UNHCR, the IOM and the EU operate and influence Moroccan migration policies and the current migrants' situation. The roles, competences and involvement of these three institutions are different, but it is of utmost importance to understand and make clear what the differences are between those latter and other civil society actors mentioned above.

While the civil society actors described thus far represent the private interests of society and citizens, among which migrants' ones, international governance organisations' origin and social base are quite different, as they have been created by their member countries, in whose interest they act. As a matter of fact, although they have their own legal identity, they are intergovernmental organisations, which are strictly linked with governmental players.


The UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) is the agency of the United Nations specialised in the assistance, protection and support of refugees. This international institution has been in Morocco with an honorary representation since 1965 and with its local offices since 2007. This organism decided to enter Morocco because of the realisation that refugees and asylum seekers' conditions had worsened, especially in the latest years. In fact, after 2004 these categories of migrants were completely unprotected by national law as the Bureau des Réfugiés et Apatrides (Office for Refugees and Stateless People) ceased its activities.

The UNHCR now tries to engage in dialogue with public offices in order to improve the legislative coverage of refugees' protection as well as the respect and the application of laws and agreements already in force. Its actions are based on three pillars:

- protection of refugees and asylum seekers;
- the establishment of long lasting solutions on a voluntary base (repatriation, basic and social assistance in Morocco, resettlement to third countries);
- giving its contribution to the correct development of migration related civil society as a set of institutional partners.

**FIGURE 8 – Registered refugee population in Morocco (UNHCR, 2011)**

Origin country	Refugees	
Ivory Coast	269	34,31%
DRC	209	26,66%
Iraq	165	21,05%
Palestine	31	3,95%
Congo Brazzaville	21	2,68%
Liberia	16	2,04%
Cameroon	8	1,02%
Others	65	8,29%
<b>Total</b>	<b>784</b>	<b>100%</b>



The visibility of its action consists of the fact that nearly 800 refugees and 300 asylum seekers are under its protection, but it is hard to judge its operations in

the country as the role it covers implies that it carries out sensitive tasks. In fact, it is an organisation that has an institutional role and, as such, its tasks and duties are defined by international agreements and, as well, its lobbying activities have to respect the imposed limitations. From a lobbying perspective, its orientation is, then, halfway between civil society and the institutions where civil society organisations bring up issues and cases.

On the one hand, signing the 1951 Refugee Convention and accessing the United Nations system in 1956, Morocco is part of the countries constituting UNHCR's "social base", as it represents the reference international community. Furthermore, quite recently, in 2007, Morocco agreed to host a local office of this international institution. These are the reasons hindering the lobbying action of the UNHCR. On the other hand, the UNHCR aims to develop Moroccan civil society and, driven by this goal, it runs projects with and through civil society entities, financing them and putting its expertise and competences at its partners' disposal. Moreover, it has to be borne in mind that the UNHCR's final goal is the protection of refugees regardless of the politics and the situation of the civil society in a given country. This means that this organisation should fully represent civil society interests as regards refugees' rights, regardless of the position of other players or other hampering forces.

Concerning this latter point of discussion, the interests that UNHCR defends match the ones represented by the civil society only in the case of refugees, who are the final beneficiaries of its action. As a matter of fact, protection is also offered to asylum seekers but only temporarily.

Considering the services offered by this organisation, its role is cross-cutting in the sense that it does not offer humanitarian or basic services, but offers legal protection to refugees and asylum seekers as well as it finances civil society players offering other services and it is involved in lobbying activities, although its deals with sensitive matters as explained above.

Another international institution playing a side role in this network is the IOM (International Organisation of Migration). An intergovernmental organisation created in 1951 with a membership of 132 countries, with Morocco joining in 1998, the IOM also has offices in Rabat since 2007. As it deals exclusively with the management of migration, it operates in the field with three main kinds of activity.

- It spreads information through conferences and meetings promoting human dignity and the well-being of migrants and tries to contribute to a better understanding of migrants' issues.
- It works on the potential of the link between migration and development, financing and implementing some of its partners' development projects addressed to migrants.
- It assists migrants and other organisations on migrants logistics with the project Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration, giving legal, medical, logistic and financial assistance to those migrants who voluntarily decide to return to their home country.

This institution represents the interest of its members and, amongst them, Morocco, and this links it both to migrants and to the Moroccan government. Its involvement is marginal though, in the sense that it provides a rather limited range of services to a very limited set of users, which are those migrants who want to return to their home country. This organisation does not take part in the provision of humanitarian, basic and community services and, despite its privileged position in the Moroccan institutional landscape, it does not lobby with the competent institutions and government agencies in order to bring up migrants' issues.

The third institution playing a key role in the Moroccan migration related institutional landscape is not in Morocco, but in Europe. It is the European Union, which played an intergovernmental role that is changing towards a

governmental one. In fact, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty has given the EU power on matters of irregular immigration, which was previously wielded by national states. EU countries have agreed the following points about irregular migration:

- Prevent irregular immigration;
- Sanction any form of help to the entry, stay and employment of irregular migrants;
- Distancing of foreigners in irregular conditions.

Lately, the intention of linking immigration and foreign affairs policies has become clearer (Barros et al., 2002). In fact, the European Union has reinforced at different stages its intention of increasing border and migration controls.

In 1992, Morocco signed with Spain a readmission agreement, when the EU was not yet competent on migration issues. In 2000, the European Union started a process in order to have its own readmission agreement with Morocco, as well as than Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Russia. Such an agreement involves three main elements:

- readmission of nationals in illegal conditions on the soil of one of the agreement parties;
- readmission of third countries' citizens (or stateless people) in illegal conditions on the soil of one of the agreement parties, who have transited through that particular country;
- transit for distancing, allowing the distancing of a citizen of a third country transiting through that particular country.

Furthermore, the EU studied a Plan of Action for Morocco launched in 1999, within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, after the

indications of the European Council held in Tampere. The goals of this plan were to facilitate voluntary return, fight human trafficking, implement its readmission obligations, and better manage migratory flows.

However, a major effort to regulate migratory flows was made already in 1995 when the European Union started a process called Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, composed of three sections:

- a stable partnership to guarantee a free common space of peace and stability;
- an economic and financial partnership allowing a common area of prosperity;
- a social, cultural and human partnership to foster a better understanding of between diverse cultures and civil societies (Barros et al., 2002).

Within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the Meda Programme represents the main financial instrument. It allocated 660 million Euros for 1995-1999 and 812 million Euros for 2000-2006 (EU, 2011).

While the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Action Plan for Morocco represent a bilateral dimension of European policies, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Meda Programme act from a regional perspective on Maghreb countries in an attempt to manage EU Southern borders (Anthony et al., 2005).

The agreements between Morocco and the European Union have inevitably shaped Moroccan migratory flows and influenced migrants' mobility on Moroccan soil. The European Union has tried in the last two decades to increase its border management control, triggering a process which is modifying migratory dynamics and, as a consequence, Moroccan civil society as well, especially once European programmes started having some effects in the last decade.

It is to be stressed that the European Union neither acts in Morocco nor fosters specific behaviours in Moroccan civil society: it is only linked to the Moroccan state and, through that, to the migration related Moroccan institutional landscape. It has to be noted that only civil society organisations' groups and networks acting in Europe try to lobby at a European level, whilst the rest of the Moroccan institutional landscape is not connected to the EU, with the exception of a link with the government, which is asked to act in a particular way in order to achieve the signature of important agreement for the country itself. This is, for instance, the case of the creation of free common space and agreements trading development funds or investments in Morocco for the externalisation of the European border: as a matter of fact, the European frontier is moving outside Europe, to Morocco (Barros et al., 2002; Coslovi, 2005). As a consequence, Moroccan migratory dynamics have changed leading more and more sub-Saharan transit migrants to settle down in Morocco in a more permanent way. But is Morocco ready to accept European demands and play this role (Barros et al., 2002)?

### **The government**

In order to understand the position taken by the government, it has to be noted that Morocco is not a country with open doors. In fact, sub-Saharans entering Morocco must have a valid passport, except citizens from eight countries. Furthermore, the Southern border is not very open as the majority of migrants enter Morocco from the Algerian side (Barros et al., 2002).

As regards foreigners' stay in Morocco, before the law 02-03, rules into force dated back to 1914 and 1950. The Moroccan reaction to a changing environment was unrelated to the way this environment was changing. As a matter of fact, Morocco did not have an official policy oriented to deal with the increasing number of transit and non transit migrants on its territory. Triggered by European pressure and the terror attacks in May 16<sup>th</sup> 2003, it has

aligned its policies with European ones. The law 02-03 has been created to adapt the current legislation to international agreements on migrants and foreigners' rights and comply with its commitment towards its partners in the fight against emigration (GADEM, 2009). The way this law was created is atypical because it does not come from politics or a social debate and it has not been followed by implementing measures.

This law introduces some new elements in the domain of migration, such as:


- the creation of detention areas for migrants in illegal condition, without providing them with all the necessary guarantees to defend themselves;
- the criminalisation of emigration, setting criminal charges to a maximum of six month detention for a simple emigrant;

Some civil society players questioned the presence of this law, claiming that it helps to show that Morocco has some legislation in this domain, but without implementing measures its application is not clear and homogenous (GADEM, 2009). From an operational perspective, it sets some priorities:

- surveillance of coasts;
- management of migrants;
- surveillance and dismantlement of networks.

In 2006 and 2008, the two Euro-African inter-ministerial conferences with France and Spain recalled the principles of the partnership in terms of management of migration, made explicit the political will to cooperate with European countries and created a joint responsibility between African countries. This is especially relevant after the events of Ceuta and Melilla in 2005 and the raids in 2006.

*FIGURE 9 – International governance organisations in relation with civil society within the institutional landscape*



The issuance of the law 02-03 leaves, therefore, some gaps in the domain of management of migration: leaving much power to the Moroccan government in terms of police, allowing decisions, like escorting migrants to borders and expelling them, and without providing proper guarantees (GADEM, 2009).

The work of the UNHCR protects a category of migrants from the national law but the lack of the Moroccan recognition of the status of refugee does not assure a full implementation of this protection. As a matter of fact, the Bureau des Réfugiés et Apatrides has never been practically in function and ceased its formal activities in 2004.

The gap in the migration related institutional landscape consists of the fact that the population has been changing in the last twenty years and some measures

are needed to cope with such a change. The government has instead pleased its European partners (GADEM, 2009) without dealing with the needs of a relatively new part of the population. Furthermore, some scholars question whether Morocco is ready to play the role of external manager of European borders (Barros et al., 2002). Complying with European requests rather than migrants' ones creates a gap in the Moroccan institutional landscape, placing the government farther from migration related civil society and its social base, migrants, with respect to some other institutions, such as European Union, that are not even present in the country. Although a Directorate for migration and borders' surveillance (Direction de la migration et de la surveillance des frontières) and a Migration observatory (Observatoire de la migration) exist, no explicit policy exists in favour of the migrant community and no ministry formally deals with it. The links with other actors of the migration related Moroccan civil society are weak or nonexistent, with the exception of CSOs' lobbying activities whose goal is to reach the actors having the power to reduce the gap.

It appears, then, that the discriminating factor of two different sides of the Moroccan institutional landscape in terms of migration is not only the kind of policy implemented, but also the exertion of power.



## **Chapter 6 – Institutional landscape future perspective**

The description of the network has made clear what the main actors in migration related Moroccan civil society are. It is a scenario in which several entities play a role and this might lead to confusion if one does not know where to search for evidence. A few things are clear:

- the assumption that some clusters exist has been proven true;
- in order to identify those clusters, using organisations' legal status has helped; in fact, legal status, type of links and relative distance from power and migrants define their position within the network and the triangle state, market and family (Cavatorta, 2006);
- the migration related institutional landscape has seen an increase in the number of players because a gap existed between state and migrants;
- a gap still exists and this causes debates and concerns from civil society, placing organisations in positions more or less close to the social base (migrants) and power (state);
- some players within the network have a side role, while some players outside the network have a strong influence and their connections affect the whole scenario in a more consistent way;
- the number of players varies from cluster to cluster, but a general pattern can be identified as the closer to the social base and the further away from power an organisation is, the more likely it is to find similar network entities acting in a similar way.

### *Links*

As mentioned above, some clusters exist and help the analysis of the network. It is not only the legal status of an organisation that is used to understand the

value of its contribution to the debate of the Moroccan migration, but also the links it has with other organisations. As a matter of fact, migrant self organisations' role is to organise, mobilise and provide services to the migrant community. Their lobbying activities bring them to deal with Moroccan registered CSOs that, in turn, try to lobby with institutions and government. Lobbying takes place in a sort of pyramid where each organisation tries to bring up its issues to a higher level. Horizontal links exist too, meaning cooperation between network entities to reach the higher level. Other services provided by organisations link them directly with the migrant social base.

1. Homogeneous interactions within clusters exist in the sense that network entities cooperate with similar ones to reach higher levels of a pyramid and in the sense that they try to cover part of the gap between migrants and state according to their remit and competences.
2. Similar interactions take place across clusters connecting migrant self organisations with Moroccan and international NGOs and these latter with institutions and government. Furthermore, higher levels of the pyramid run development programmes through lower level organisations using their competences and their position, which is closer to migrants.

*FIGURE 10 – Hierarchy of the Moroccan institutional landscape*



Those links recall the debate between Habermas and Foucault (Flyvbjerg, 1998b). In their attempt to define a perspective from which it is possible to look at a practical scenario, both conflict and consensus can apply to the situation under analysis. As a matter of fact, the remarks about the links between migrant self organisations and Moroccan CSOs can explain the relations present between other clusters as well.

A Habermasian logic of consensus, accepting Flyvbjerg's sceptical view and taking a non normative perspective, is helpful when it comes to analysing horizontal links between organisations concerning lobbying activities, while a Foucauldian view is able to explain connections across clusters, where conflict and attempts of domination on similar entities can occur in an attempt to lobby with higher levels. This is especially true when an organisation lacks legal status, power and financial stability.

An additional perspective can help understanding within-cluster connections. In fact, a competence approach explains why migrants self organisations do not struggle over the same social base or why registered CSOs found a way co-exist. It has to be borne in mind that migration related civil society operates to fill a gap between state, market and family, that is the gap between state and migrants in the context analysed by this research. Organisations tend then to fill empty spaces efficiently, developing specific competences and avoiding overlaps.

### *Overlaps*

When the network was born and while it increased its scope, its main role has been to fill a gap between state and a new part of the population, migrants. Although trying to cover an empty space in the Moroccan society, some inefficiencies have arisen. This is true for different entities.

- Migrant self organisations, as mentioned above, base their role in the Moroccan civil society on a social base of migrants, to whom these organisations are quite close. As migrants tend to hide in society and mobilisation is hard, several organisations were created in order to achieve a more comprehensive coverage of the migrant community in terms of interest representation and services provision.
- Moroccan and international CSOs show overlapping competences in the sense of the final users of their services. Usually international NGOs have more expertise and better financial means, but the humanitarian and community services they offer might be similar with each other. In reality, their efforts are complementary as they act on quite a wide population of users that require high capacity and different skills.
- One might also find inefficient the presence of several Moroccan NGOs and international institutions lobbying in the same fields of human and migrants rights, like OMDH, AMDH, GADEM and UNHCR. Their action involves mutual support and implies spreading information and organising awareness campaigns. A set of organisations is definitely more effective than only one; therefore this overlap is not casual.

### *Gaps*

Civil society itself exists because a gap is present in the Moroccan institutional landscape, but are there gaps in the way organisations position themselves in the network? If one considers the competences offered by civil society players and compares them with migrants' needs, it is easy and straightforward to notice that civil society has perfectly positioned itself to match them. Absence of gaps and explainable overlaps of the system suggest that migration related civil society in Morocco has developed quite efficiently. As a matter of fact,

CSOs started operating because there was some room for action and they do operate in an efficient way given the current situation.

Three big gaps exist at the institutional landscape level. The research provides evidence of three flaws of the system that do not depend on civil society.

- Although competences offered by CSOs match migrant community's needs, the provided capacity does not match the number of users, although official statistics do not exist in this domain. The current situation still makes use of mutual help amongst migrants, implying that a consistent part of the financial resources necessary for those services is mutually collected amongst migrants, who already are in precarious conditions.
- Linked with the previous point is the lack of state social services, like health care or community services. What creates a gap between state and migrants is the lack of services provided by the state to migrants and the lack of entitlement to those services.
- Migrants are not entitled to any services, although some international agreements provide formal but ineffective guarantees, because they are not legally recognised by the state. With some few exceptions, sub-Saharan migrants live in precarious conditions in Morocco, because they are undocumented, in illegal conditions, not legally entitled to work or receive health care. Not even refugees protected by the UNHCR receive state services. The Bureau des Réfugiés et Apatrides has not recognised refugees, who are now protected from expulsion but do not enjoy any rights in the country.

This last point is especially important, because in a way it is the cause of the other two big gaps of the system. This is, therefore, a sign that a Moroccan policy addressed to an increasing part of the population, migrants, does not exist.

### *Research methodology's validity*

As the network perspective has allowed for much flexibility, it has been able to highlight different aspects of different players of a different nature within a very diverse environment. But some problems have also been identified as well.

- Some entities operating within the network act only by influencing other actors. Doing so, they do not need to be or are not anyway present on Moroccan soil. As a matter of fact, some organisation groups and networks operate mainly from Europe as does the European Union.
- Like this latter point, an issue of accessibility comes along when the research must look at some delicate aspects. In fact, the methodology used did not take into account that some key players, such as the government, do not have an official position on migration issues and makes it even harder to make some conclusions, when a reference person or a key informant does not officially exist.

### *Future perspective*

This study has described migration related civil society in relation to Moroccan institutional landscape. In sum, it is possible to note how the changing patterns of migration have changed the reference population of civil society. At the same time, the reference population of state and institutions has changed as well. The reference population is the same for both categories of institutional landscape organisations: sub-Saharan migrants have increased in number and are now part of the population residing in Morocco for a medium-long period.

While its reference population has changed, most part of institutions and social formations have adapted to the new environment.

Civil society organisations (mainly self migrant organisations and Moroccan CSOs) have increased in number as well and have readdressed their efforts towards migrants' rights and needs. While some scholars state that migrants have stimulated a continuous proliferation of civil society organisations, this research has highlighted how this phenomenon has slowed down lately, while it was definitely stronger right after the events of Ceuta and Melilla. Civil society has, therefore, followed the population change pattern.

International NGOs have also followed this change but to a lesser extent. In fact, many of them have not reshaped their policies, but just increased their capacity in Morocco and filled a gap of needs with basic and community services for migrants.

International institutions followed different patterns, according to the interests they are trying to defend. As a matter of fact, while the IOM and UNHCR have adapted to the change of migration, providing some services and the protection of some categories of migrants, the EU was the initiator of such a process of change. This latter institution defends European countries' interests and it is therefore trying to lobby with Morocco. But, while civil society is lobbying for a shift of power, the European Union lobbies for retention of power.

The government is a co-initiator of the change of migration and, like the EU, defends the status quo of power. After pleasing some European interests, the Moroccan state has not adapted and is not ready to deal with, or even recognise, a new part of the population.

Therefore, a gap existed, and still exists, in the triangle state-market-family from a migration perspective. And that is where civil society has positioned itself and how it has enriched the migration related institutional landscape.

Two questions arise:

- is it possible to say whether this institutional gap has been filled by civil society?
- and has the institutional change, triggered by the migration one, fostered democratisation processes?

Although new and old organisations that are now paying attention to the needs of the migrant community are often overlapping (especially if we consider migrant self organisations or some Moroccan CSOs which offer the same services) in terms of competence and position within the network, they are all complementary, as mentioned above. In fact, overlaps exist but there are some reasons behind them, especially considering that the gap between state and migrants is definitely larger than the capacity of CSOs.

Some perspectives can help to answer these two questions: the positional, reputational/attributional and decisional approaches. Before answering those questions, it has to be pointed out that the reputational/attributional approach has been used especially in the less structured clusters of civil society, where a positional analysis can yield ambiguous results. While for more formal and registered CSOs those two methods led to the same outcome, objective and consistent research results for migrant self organisations have been reached by using the reputational/attributional method. Therefore, these two methods have been complementary rather than competing with each other.

Looking at the institutional landscape from this joint perspective (*positional and reputational/attributional*) and, it is possible to note that civil society has *de facto* filled the institutional gap and migrants have now their reference institutions in the civil society. Such a view recalls especially the provision of basic humanitarian and community services.

A *decisional analysis* perspective highlights, instead, power mechanisms. In fact, such view values civil society for the actual contribution to the shift of

power rather than merely the position and the values stated by the organisations considered. As a matter of fact, although civil society is trying to fill an institutional gap, it has not managed yet to foster a power shift, limiting its current positive results to the provision of services to the migrant community. Therefore, such shift of power, which is pursued through lobbying activities, has not taken place yet, would define the entire institutional change. The Moroccan government has not adapted to the population and migration change and has kept power and control.

The power approach (decisional analysis) is the correct perspective from which to look at the democratisation process. Such a phenomenon would involve a top-down release of power from the state towards its social base. Even though a civil society exists and the institutional gap has partly been filled, the power scenario has remained unchanged and no institutional change seemed to occur from this particular perspective. In turn, this has not led to better democratic processes within Moroccan society.



## **Chapter 7 - Conclusion**

This brief research has investigated the migration related Moroccan institutional landscape and made clear a few things, although different methods have been used to look at different realities.

Firstly, the institutional landscape involves civil society and other entities, better identifiable as institutions. Civil society lies between state, market and family, while institutions are closer to the state role. The number of organisations varies from cluster to cluster, generally with a higher number of migrant self organisations and Moroccan and international CSOs.

Secondly, the proliferation of civil society entities has been proven a myth, in the sense that, especially after the events of Ceuta and Melilla in 2005, CSOs have increased their number in the Moroccan institutional landscape, but this was due to a gap that represented room for social action. Once, the possible gaps have been filled, the birth of new organisations has slowed down with new ones occupying empty spaces left from other ones that abandoned the scene for some reasons.

In order to identify entities a network approach has been used, which allowed the study of network entities through the study of their links. While links are of different nature and multifaceted, a way to examine them in an orderly manner exists. As a matter of fact, horizontal links within clusters represent cooperation or mutual help, letting a consensus approach better explain the situation. In order to fill all the gaps, a competence approach gives a better understanding of horizontal and, sometimes, vertical links. In a scenario where power is not spread over the whole institutional landscape, a conflict approach gives a better idea of how to interpret vertical links across clusters, especially where resources and legal status become an issue.

The migration related Moroccan institutional landscape does not show the presence of any overlapping areas that bring inefficiency to the system. A few

gaps exist and they are all ascribable to the lack of formal policies addressed to migrants stuck in Morocco. This is the main reason why migrants live in precarious conditions and keep hiding in society and why organisations within the institutional landscape have a social position close either to the reference social base or the state.

The key to read such a situation is the localisation of power, whose most part is exerted by the government and almost none is spread over civil society. In fact, it is possible to apply the same Habermas-Foucauld debate to the whole institutional network, other than only single connections. The composition of the migration related Moroccan institutional landscape is better understandable if explained from a power perspective. A consensus approach could be useful in case agreements between parties are able to actively change the current situation. At the moment, the state holds the power and a conflict perspective between this latter and other network players gives a better understanding of the current reality.

Not only a Foucauldian helps to better read the current communicative logic behind institutional landscape mechanisms, but also a decisional analysis approach can be used. In fact, this looks at power issues in order to define a network. In Moroccan society, a power shift would define and identify democratisation processes, but this body of research has shown how the migration related Moroccan institutional landscape has remained unchanged from this very perspective.

The process of democratisation, depending on the shift of power from institutions to society, seems to be stuck, at least in the domain of migrants' rights, protection and needs. Civil society is committed to fill in the gaps of the system and to struggle for a power shift that would improve migrants' precarious conditions. After the law 02-03, the environment has kept evolving, but the state "non-policy" has remained unchanged, not allowing a qualitative growth of civil society or an advancement of democratic dynamics in the

domain of migration. The change of migration has, therefore, contributed to create another sphere of civil society, which has not helped an institutional change in this direction or a democratic transition.



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