

From a moral discourse to adequate action

The implementation of a Human Security approach into the reaction of the international community and The Netherlands towards humanitarian crises

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Introduction

After the cold war the role of the international community and the UN changed significantly when it comes to maintaining international peace and security. The devastating events that took place in the Balkans and Rwanda in the 1990's instigated the debates about neglecting state sovereignty and the use of military force to protect the lives of innocent civilians. As a consequence, there is a growing recognition worldwide that the protection of Human Security, including human rights and human dignity, must be one of the fundamental objectives of modern international institutions (ICISS 2001:6). The underlying idea is to maintain international peace and security by focusing on the interrelatedness of development, peace and the promotion of human rights. The UNDP's *Human development report* of 1994 pioneered in capturing the new notion of Human Security into a policy discourse. The report's main argument is that the concept of security has far too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy (UNDP 1994:22). Now that the state itself is often at the root of human insecurity, more important are the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who seek security in their daily lives.

Several attempts are made to integrate this new Human Security discourse into the reaction of the international community towards humanitarian crises. During the implementation process the Human Security approach is accused of being too comprehensive and too vague to guide international policy on how to deal with a humanitarian crisis. A key development in trying to create a policy discourse with more direct utility is the report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001: *The Responsibility to Protect* (R2P). The core argument of the report is that a state has the responsibility to uphold its citizens' human rights. When a state is unable or unwilling to fulfill this responsibility, such as in cases of mass killing, its sovereignty is temporarily suspended (Pattison 2010:3). In these cases, the responsibility to protect the security of citizens transfers to the international community. This means not only that we have "the right to intervene" but that it is our duty to do so.

Despite overall acceptance of the strong international discourse on Human Security and sovereignty as responsibility some argue we still fail to put these norms into a legal framework and react properly to serious humanitarian crises. The ideas on why we fail to implement the Human Security discourse in this context differ significantly and the ideas are

predominantly based on theoretic reasoning rather than systematic research. I devoted my Master thesis to filling this information gap by providing the Dutch actors' perspective on the implementation problem and answered the following research question: what aspects of implementing the Human Security Discourse within the responses of the Dutch government towards Humanitarian crises and violent conflict fail according to the Dutch (non-) state actors involved? How can we improve the implementation of a Human Security approach in the Netherlands and the international community to ensure adequate action? The methods used to give substance to this thesis are conducting semi-structured interviews with experts of the different organisations involved in the Netherlands and discourse analysis on policy documents published after the rise of the Human Security approach. The analysis of this obtained data combined with a case study uncovered the role of *agency, power and discourse* within the implementation problem.

The content of this thesis will be as follows; first will a descriptive chapter outline the problem area by providing the problem context, the research objectives and the relevance of the topic; the second chapter will make up the theoretic framework that the research problem is located in; additionally, the components that constitute this theoretic frame will be discussed separately to configure the relationship between the problem statement and its theoretic frame; the third chapter will discuss methodological issues, including, methods of data collection, analysis and operationalization techniques; the following results chapter will provide the findings of the data analysis including the case study of the action in Afghanistan; those findings will be used to answer the research questions in the concluding chapter that follows; finally, the last chapter will provide recommendation on future research related to this research topic.

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I. Problem statement

This introductory chapter will describe the problem area in more detail in order to provide the necessary background information on the research topic. This will include: placing the research topic in the problem context; outlining the research objectives and the guiding research question that will be used to achieve these objectives; ending with explicating the moral, academic and political relevance of the chosen research project.

A. Problem context

This descriptive part of the chapter will be used to expound the problem context by: describing the rise of the Human Security discourse; outlining the Sovereignty-Intervention debate that stands at the core of the reformulation of security concepts captured within the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine; depict the current level of the implementation of Human Security into policy practice and describe the problem area that still needs to be explored.

1. The rise of the Human Security Discourse

In the 1990’s two key contextual factors encouraged the search for new concepts of security: the ending of the Cold War and the effects of globalization (Von Tigerstorm 2007:18).

In the post-Cold War world, most conflicts find their origin in problems within the societies concerned and not so much in relations between states (Holsti 1996:37). As Von Tigerstorm argues, in the 1990’s the states were supposedly more secure than during the Cold War, but their citizens were not (2007:18). This implies that the causes of those wars can be found predominantly within the polity or society itself. Therefore the focus of concern shifted to internal conflict and the increasing proportion of civilian victims in those conflicts as a central source of insecurity. This and the increasing importance of universal Human Rights within the international community caused the notion on international security to shift its focus from the state towards communities and the individual.

Besides the ending of the Cold War, globalization played an important part in the emerging of a new security concept as well. The dark side of globalization is the source of new threats to security and of increasing interdependence of states and people (Von Tigerstorm 2007:19).

The new threats to be dealt with include: transnational organised crime; illicit trafficking of goods and human beings; and terrorism. Additionally, the interdependence of states and people in our globalized world causes that threats in one part of the world influence the perception of security of people in other parts. This became obvious when oil prices rose in the west when there were riots in the Arabic world. This idea of “mutual vulnerability” motivated the search for a new security concept to guide foreign policy.

Particularly in the field of policy practice, traditional instruments of peacemaking and conflict resolution such as those embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, were felt to be unsuitable to deal with contemporary conflict, as those instruments were largely focused on conventional interstate wars and could not easily be applied to the intrastate character of the violent conflicts nowadays (Mack 2005 in Frerks and Klein Goldewijk 2007:23).

The UNDP’s *Human development report* of 1994 pioneered in capturing the new notion of Human Security into a policy discourse. The report’s main argument is that the concept of security has far too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy (UNDP 1994:22). Now that the state itself is often at the root of human insecurity, more important are the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who seek security in their daily lives. For many of them, security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, employment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards (ibid). The report explicitly linked Human Security to development issues, as improvement in one will increase the chances of progress in the other. The UNDP with this new “people-centric” approach to Human Security aimed for multi actor, integrated action focused on the interrelatedness of Development, Peace and respect for Human Rights in order to create a situation where State and Human Security complement each other.

Although the UNDP report points out that Human Security is not a concern with weapons and that it is not a concept which can be brought about by force (UNDP 1994:24), several attempts are made to integrate Human Security aspects within the Humanitarian Intervention debate. According to Evans (2008:35) the trouble with the concept of Human Security in the context of Humanitarian Intervention is that it has produced too much consensus: so many different issues and themes nestle comfortably under its wings that it is difficult to extract any prescriptions about how to deal with any of them other than to look at problems in a “people

first” kind of way. So, as a way of framing issues in a contemporary context Human Security is useful, but as Evans puts it, in answering questions as to who should do precisely what and when in response to an emerging mass atrocity situation, it seems destined to never have immediate operational utility (2008:35).

However, the Human Security approach did influence the Sovereignty-Intervention debate significantly as it forms the foundation for a new doctrine that specialises in responding to a humanitarian crisis according to the overarching Human Security principles, “The Responsibility to Protect” (R2P).

2. The Sovereignty-Intervention debate and the R2P

The struggle of the international community with the mass killings in the 1990’s also led to redefining the terms of intervention. In 2000, reflecting on the UN’s devastating reports on international inaction in Rwanda and Srebrenica, Annan challenged Member States to “forge unity” on the matter of humanitarian intervention and to identify a basis for preventing future catastrophes (Holt & Berkman 2006:25):

The central question of the debate at this point was formulated in 2000 by Kofi Annan:

“If humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica... to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?” (Millennium Report of the Secretary-General of the UN 2000 in Evans 2008:31)

In a legal context the sovereignty-intervention debate is about the contradiction between Article 2 of the UN Charter that prohibits interference with internal affairs by external forces and Article 24 of the UN Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security. The way we reconceptualised security from a state-centred to a human-centred approach is linked to a particular view of moral value of states and individuals (Von Tigerstorm 2007:3). Our preference for one security concept over another is therefore potentially important in our moral judgments about how we see international law and which of the Charter Articles should be prioritized when they seem to contradict.

Before the 1990s, the emphasis was on state sovereignty and intervention was seen as interference and therefore impermissible because of the underlying conception of sovereignty. The content of the sovereignty-intervention debate at this point was whether or not actors have “The Right to Intervene”. As outlined in Article 2 of the UN Charter the principle of sovereignty emphasizes a state’s freedom from external interference:

“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” (UN charter, Article 2 (4))

“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter” (UN charter, Article 2 (7))

Pattison argues that this conception provides states with a free hand to violate its citizens’ human rights with impunity and therefore the notion of sovereignty should be revised (2010:2). The emerging concept of Human Security has created additional demands and expectations in relation to the way states treat their own people (ICISS 2001:7).

After several attempts in the 1990’s to reach consensus on the above question formulated by Annan, the breakthrough came when the concept of “the Responsibility to Protect” was introduced into the debate by the ICISS in 2001 (Evans 2008:31). The report states that when the world faces a serious humanitarian crisis it is not about whether we have the “right” to intervene but it is our “duty” to do so. A modern understanding of the meaning of sovereignty is of central importance in the Commission’s approach to the question of intervention for human protection purposes. This new notion is described as sovereignty as *Responsibility*. In the R2P this responsibility is formulated by the ICISS as follows:

“State sovereignty implies [that] the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies within the state itself. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question

is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect ” (ICISS 2001:XI [my emphasis]).

The emphasis of the ICISS within their R2P doctrine is not on military intervention but they accentuate that it embraces three responsibilities: to prevent; react and rebuild, and prevention should be preferred at all times. In cases of large scale loss of life or large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’ the international community has the responsibility to react by undertaking a military intervention as a last resort. The ICISS determined precautionary principles the intervener must follow:

- A. **Right intention:** The primary purpose of the intervention must be to halt human suffering.
- B. **Last resort:** Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option of ending the crisis has been explored.
- C. **Proportional means:** The scale, duration and intensity should be the minimum necessary to secure the human protection objective. And the rules of engagement involve total adherence to the *Jus in Bello* principles.
- D. **Reasonable prospects:** There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering which has justified the intervention.

ICISS 2001:XII)

These redefined moral principles caused the legal exceptions of the non-interference principle within the UN charter to gain importance over state sovereignty. Those exceptions can be found in Articles 24 and 39 of the Charter.

“In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.” (UN Charter, Article 24 (1))

“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” (UN charter, Article 39)

With growing acceptance of human-centred security and sovereignty as responsibility, the Security Council might decide, when preventive measures prove ineffective, a military intervention with a humanitarian objective is necessary as a last resort. The question is whether or not intra-state wars and internal oppression by a state can be defined as international threats to peace and security. As Article 39 states that the Security Council determines what constitutes an ‘international threat to peace and security’ it might broaden its interpretation of this threat, based on the moral arguments outlined above and the “mutual vulnerability” principle that derived from the increasing globalization. Moreover, as Pattison argues the recent discussion of the R2P seems to indicate that states view the Security Council as empowered to authorize humanitarian intervention, even in the absence of a clear threat to international peace and security (2010:47).

The question now is: can a shift in normative language change the reaction of the international community in cases of gross human rights violations or violent conflict?

3. Implementing the Human Security approach

With the growing recognition of the importance of the Human Security discourse within policy practice, how is Human Security ensured and enforced within the reaction of the international community towards humanitarian crises? Before answering this question, this part of the chapter will be used to provide an overview of how Human Security terminology was adopted by different governmental- intergovernmental- and non- governmental organisations. After that, the same will be done for the “Responsibility to Protect” terminology. Ending with how the adoption of the moral language influences action.

a) Human Security terminology

In the late 1990s, the Human Security concept began to be adopted by governments, regional and international organisations, and some NGOs. Human Security has been implemented as important element in foreign policy of a number of countries, the most prominent of which have been Canada and Japan (Von Tigerstorm 2007:21). The concept has been used as a framework for addressing such issues as anti-personnel mines, establishment of the International Criminal Court and the protection of civilians in armed conflict (ibid.). In 1998 Canada and Norway formed a partnership on Human Security, which formed the foundation for an informal coalition of a dozen states (including the Netherlands) with the objective of

strengthening Human Security as the Human Security Network. In their annual ministerial meetings they apply a Human Security approach to development issues, the role of non state actors, small arms, peace support operations, HIV/AIDS, and food security (Von Tigerstorm 2007:21).

In 2001 the Government of Japan contributed to this effort by initiating the establishment of the Commission on Human Security (CHS), an independent international commission of experts. The goals of the commission were:

1. to promote public understanding, engagement and support of Human Security and its underlying imperatives;
2. to develop the concept of Human Security as an operational tool for policy formulation and implementation; and
3. to propose a concrete program of action to address critical and pervasive threats to Human Security.

(Ministry of foreign affairs of Japan: posted on the website visited on 8 August 2011)

It was Co-Chaired by Sadako Ogata, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees and economist Amartya Sen. Its final report was released in 2003, entitled *Human Security Now*, containing definitions, research and policy recommendations. The recommendations included the establishment of an Advisory Board on Human Security to assist the UN Trust Fund for Human Security with the broadening of its donor base (Commission on Human Security 2003). To carry this recommendation forward the Human Security Unit (HSU) was established in 2004, with the overall objective of placing Human Security in the mainstream of UN activities (Human Security Unit newsletter 2007: posted on UN website visited at 8 August 2011). As a result, the concept was introduced in various parts of the UN system including the UNDP, where it originated, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and within the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) (Von Tigerstorm 2007:22). Additionally, several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) within the field of development, peace and human rights or other topics relevant to Human Security have adopted the concept into their framework.

b) R2P Terminology

The ICISS report itself has made a substantial impact, receiving high-level attention and endorsement of its framework by governments, non-governmental organizations, and scholars worldwide (Holt & Berkman 2006:30). Five years after the Commissions' report there is an increasing use of the "Responsibility to Protect" terminology. Human Rights Watch, the International Crisis Group, Refugees International, Oxfam and others referred to the R2P frequently in their statements about the inaction in Darfur and elsewhere (ibid). However, NGOs alone do not possess the capacity to undertake adequate action; therefore the adoption of the R2P terminology by UN member states is essential.

After firm negotiations between UN member states, the 2005 UN World Summit embraced the "Responsibility to Protect" as part of their Human Security framework.

"The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means...to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity." (World Summit Outcome 2005: 30)

This final submission is consistent with the ICISS document regarding the conditions for intervening, as a military intervention must be the last resort and authorised by the UN Security Council and with total adherence to international law. It even added an extra dimension by stating that we should also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out (World Summit Outcome 2005: 30)

However, as Evans (2008:31) puts it, unfinished business still remains as the 2005 report failed to adopt any criteria for the use of military force. The discussion about those criteria

still goes on today and putting the heads together for an intervention in for example Burma or Darfur failed despite the duty to react.

c) **Saying or Acting**

After the R2P was adopted in the World Summit Outcome of 2005 it looked like this new approach gained overall acceptance. Nevertheless, some argue that the concept of a “responsibility to protect” is far from achieving universal acceptance as adopting normative language is not the same as acting by it. As Holt and Berkman stated:

“Fundamental to the question of how far [implementation] will go is the ICISS argument that in cases where the appropriate threshold and criteria for intervention are met states should feel, indeed are, compelled to act. A “responsibility” is therefore more than an option to protect.” (2006:32 [my emphasis])

The analysis of Holt and Berkman of the different documents that adopted the R2P language, from the initial ICISS report to the Summit Outcome Document, reveals that the strong ICISS language is diluted along its way (ibid.). *In Larger Freedom* argues that the Security Council “*may out of necessity*” authorize military intervention, the Summit Outcome describes only to act on “*a case by case basis*”. Both these contributions support action, but do not suggest it is a requirement or duty to do so. Besides, in spite of the agreement on the 2005 World Summit, some governments rejected the R2P early in 2008 as the Latin American, Arab and African delegates claimed that the R2P was never accepted or approved as a principle by the General Assembly (Evans 2008:52). This new discussion weakens the chances that any government or other actors will accept the responsibility to react as an obligation.

Equally important in translating language to action is the reaffirmation of the World Summit by the Security Council in a thematic resolution on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in 2006, as the Council is the institution that matters when it comes to executive action. In an operative paragraph, the protection of civilians is described within a Human Security context, as the priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources, including information and intelligence resources, in the implementation of the mandates (Security Council 2006:4). This stronger translation of the concept of protecting civilians within action is a good start to enforce Human Security or the R2P within peace missions.

However, the question remains whether or not this is enough to encourage the relevant international actors to act in cases of large scale loss of human lives?

4. Information gap

Despite all the efforts listed above, the growing amount of literature on Human Security and its implementation has sought to address difficulties that continue to surround the implication of the Human Security concept, especially how to deal with armed conflict. An extensive literature review of recent books that deal with the implementation problem, led me to conclude that there is no consensus within the academic world about the causes of the lack of implementation. The ideas differ significantly, detecting failure within the implementation process at four points:

1. the Human Security discourse is accused of being too vague and comprehensive to be captured in a policy discourse within international law system or direct action (Kaldor 2007; Frerks 2007; Von Tigerstorm 2007; Evans 2008);
2. there is a lack of coordination between different implementation efforts with a different area of focus (Evans 2008; Holt & Berkman 2007);
3. self-interest of the state-actors involved block the successful adoption of HS principles within the international law system and their actions directly (Evans 2008; Homan 2008; Pattison 2010) and;
4. the existence of a military counter discourse, “the war on terrorism” overshadows adequate action based on Human Security principles (Frerks 2007; Holt & Berkman).

Than again, when the authors do agree on the cause of the lack of implementation, ideas on how to solve this problem differ significantly. Besides, their findings are predominantly based on the analysis of past events and theoretical reasoning rather than systematic research.

Therefore, past measurements of the level of implementation of Human Security concepts into the responses of the international community towards humanitarian crises, were only based on the absence or presence of an intervention and the adoption of Human Security principles within the international law system. This leaves us with incomplete information about the

implementation process, as actors can be influenced by discourse directly without adoption of this discourse within the international law.

B. Research objectives

The main goal of this research project is to fill this information gap by conducting systematic research to find out 1) where the implementation of a Human Security approach into the reaction of the international community towards humanitarian crises fails and 2) how to improve the implementation of a Human Security approach within this reaction.

In order to achieve this goal I would like to aim my research project in the Netherlands on the actors' perspective. Based on the suggestions within the existing literature on where the implementation process got stuck, the actors' perspective seems important because their significant role in promoting and the enactment of a Human Security approach and the R2P. The *state* actors' perspective is important to measure political motivation and will to enforce and assure Human Security by undertaking peace missions. The *non state* actors' perception is important because of their assumed role as providers of knowledge, concern and confidence in order to mobilize political will to engage in an intervention with a humanitarian objective were national interests are just a secondary motivation. The focus will be on the Dutch actors involved for feasibility reasons including the amount of time and resources available within this MA research project.

This information will show how the important relationship between state and non state actors is now, and how it can be improved. As multi-actor action on different levels of society is the key to successful implementation of the Human Security approach and the R2P, this will provide us with knowledge about where the implementation of the Human Security approach got stuck instead of concluding that adequate action was absent.

C. Research question

The related research question is a logical derivative of these goals:

What aspects of implementing the Human Security Discourse within the responses of the Dutch government towards Humanitarian crises and violent conflict fail according to the Dutch (non-) state actors involved? How can we improve the implementation of a Human Security approach in the Netherlands and the international community to ensure adequate action?

The sub-questions that help answering the main question above contain descriptive and analytical elements. The descriptive questions unravel the current level of implementation within the policy discourse of the actors involved and the analytical questions will test the theoretical explanations within the current academic debate about where implementation goes wrong and how to improve adequate action. The sub-questions that derive from this can be formulated as follows:

1. How did the *Human Security* policy discourse of the UNDP influence Dutch foreign policy from 1994 until now?
2. How did the R2P policy doctrine of the ICISS influence Dutch foreign policy from 2001 until now?
4. Why does the international community still fail to react to humanitarian crises regarding R2P and *Human Security* principles according to the Dutch actors involved?
5. How to achieve a successful Human Security policy within the reaction of the international community towards humanitarian crises according to the Dutch actors involved? What are the roles of what particular actors?

D. Moral, Academic and Political Relevance

In this chapter the relevance of the chosen research puzzle will be explicated. The relevance of the project will be outlined regarding three different contexts: moral; political; and academic.

1. Moral Relevance

First of all, detecting problems and improving the reaction of the international community towards humanitarian crises is of great moral relevance because of the many lives that depend on the international agent that intervenes. When national interest will remain more important than humanity or a military counter terrorism discourse will overshadow a Human Security based intervention, those suffering will be the ones to pay.

Second, the current discussion around the responsibility to protect indicates the growing moral relevance of the subject. The new concept of security, where the individual and the rights and dignity of the individual are of central importance, asks for new policy implications. Detecting problems at the implication level and solving these problems within this research project are a small step forward in adopting the moral norms within the international system. Besides, improving action of the international community towards a crisis might be morally relevant as well as an obligation. The responsibility to protect Human Security of the individual is increasingly seen as a duty assigned to the international community when the state in question is unwilling or unable to act. Fulfilling this duty might include conducting research to improve action so the chances of success of an intervention with a humanitarian objective increase.

2. Academic Relevance

Besides the obvious moral relevance of improving action intended to save lives, this research puzzle will add to academic knowledge as well. Despite the growing amount of literature that is devoted to the implementation problem of a Human Security approach, this research can still be seen as a gap-bridging project.

The growing amount of literature on Human Security and its implementation has sought to address difficulties that continue to surround the implication of the Human Security concept, especially how to deal with armed conflict. However, as mentioned above, their findings are predominantly based on the analysis of past events and theoretical reasoning rather than systematic research. Therefore, past measurements of the level of implementation of Human Security concepts into the responses of the international community towards humanitarian crises, were only based on the absence or presence of an intervention and the adoption of Human Security principles within the international law system. This leaves us with

incomplete information about the implementation process, as actors can be influenced by discourse directly without adoption of this discourse within the international law.

This causes two theoretical gaps that need to be filled: first of all, there is no link between the ideas on where implementation fails and the underlying processes within the analytical frame the implementation of a moral discourse is located in. When trying to solve the implementation problems, knowledge about the processes that underlie the implementation of a discourse or the empowerment of agency is essential. In this context, the knowledge will enlighten the possible role of agency in the promotion and enactment of Human Security and sovereignty as responsibility and the relation between power and the adoption of a moral discourse into a political system or policy practice.

Second, the assumed implementation problems are not based on evidence obtained by first hand data, therefore the conclusions not reliable nor detailed. Detailed conclusions will add to the accuracy and precision of the policy recommendations related to those conclusions. The Dutch actors' perspective will provide a detailed set of data about who is expected to do what; what goes wrong; and what we can improve in practice. This contextual approach will stand closer to reality than abstract theoretical debates.

Thus, the academic relevance of this research derives from its systematic character that implies a strong link between theoretical debates and data obtained in the field. This will provide clear knowledge about the level of implementation of a Human Security approach in the Netherlands.

3. Political Relevance

Besides its moral and academic relevance, this research project is of political relevance as well, especially within the Netherlands. As a successful intervention provides the actor with a positive political appearance and failing to react does the opposite, knowledge, concern and confidence might be a push towards undertaking action. Research will contribute to knowledge about how to create an integrated network of actors on different Human Security issues. This will provide the Dutch government with knowledge and confidence about how to deal with a humanitarian crisis in the future. This confidence within the decision making process around modern international peace missions will improve the political appearance of the Netherlands within the EU and the whole international community.

Additionally, broader political relevance of solving the implementation problem of a Human Security approach lies within the international political system. In order to put this Human Security approach into practice by undertaking an intervention, authorization by the Security Council is of central importance as Article 41 of the UN Charter states the Council decides to legitimize action. Unfortunately, due to the national interests of its powerful members the UN Security Council is not always working as it should be. Therefore, when the Security Council decides not to authorize an intervention, it doesn't automatically mean that the intervention is illegitimate, and the other way around. According to Evans (2008:139) the decisions about authorizing or supporting military intervention should be made on solid evidentiary grounds and for the right reasons of morality or principle: in short, ensuring that they are not just legal, but legitimate as well.

“A corollary of this argument is that if there is a widespread perception that action is illegitimate, making it formally legal will not do anything to change that, and may in fact do even more damage to the reputation of the legalizing body” (Evans 2008:139)
than when the Security Council fails to legalize a legitimate intervention.

When conditions for who should intervene when, stay unclear and agents use their right to intervene for the wrong reasons, it might undermine UN credibility and its decision making on when the use of force is permissible. Therefore, minimizing the tensions between legality and legitimacy by adopting agreed criteria for intervention in order to maximize the possibility of achieving Council consensus around when it is appropriate or not to use military force in name of humanity, will improve UN credibility.

Research on how to improve the implementation of a Human Security approach on different levels in our global society might eventually improve the political system of the world. This research project will not add to UN credibility or the adoption of agreed criteria directly, however, knowledge gathered in different countries about the processes that underlie the decision-making around modern peace missions might on the long term contribute to the establishment of a strong international system that knows how to act when.

II. Theoretic frame

This chapter will outline the theoretic framework that the research problem is situated in. First will a brief literature review shed light on the reoccurring theoretical ideas on the origins of the implementation problem and its solutions. Second, the broad analytic frame of structure and agency within the interpretative epistemology will be described. Additionally, the components that constitute this theoretic frame will be discussed separately to configure the relationship between the problem statement and this theoretic framework.

A. Literature review

The most dominant ideas on the causes of the implementation problem will be used as a theoretical guideline for this research. This means the ideas are adopted within the theoretic frame that constitutes the topic list for the interviews and the analysis of documents to discover how these ideas fit as a possible explanation according to the Dutch actors involved. This doesn't mean however, that other explanations aren't taken into consideration. The ideas on the causes of the implementation problem that are highly represented within the academic literature are: the conceptual vagueness of both the Human Security approach as the R2P that causes operationalization difficulties; a lack of coordination of the implementation efforts bar multi actor- integrated action; national interests of states are still considered more important than humanity when deciding to act; a military counter discourse created after 9-11 and the war on terrorism blocks a Human Security discourse.

1. Conceptual vagueness

a) Human Security

A first issue relates to the concept of Human Security itself. When the Human Security concept received more and more attention of the different international organizations, governments and NGOs, its definitional heterogeneity increased. No universally accepted definition of the concept exists. Therefore some critics argue that “every one is for it, but few people have a clear idea of what it means” (Paris 2001: 88).

Even those organizations who are quite familiar with the use of a Human Security discourse acknowledge difficulties that arise when trying to define the concept properly. As Frerks points out, part of the problem derives from the fact that UNDP in its seminal report of 1994,

where the concept originated, uses a circumscription rather than a definition of the concept (2007:34):

“Several analysts have attempted rigorous definitions of Human Security. But like other fundamental concepts, such as human freedom, Human Security is more easily identified through its absence than its presence. And most people instinctively understands what security means” (UNDP 1994:23).

When it comes to implementation of the concept, a circumscription like the above is not very useful as conceptual clarity is needed to operationalise the notion. Von Tigerstorm as well argues that “the difficulty of defining the concept and its broad scope have led to concerns, that is too vague or broad to be practically or analytically useful” (2007:27).

The analysis of both Von Tigerstorm and Frerks indicates, that within the policy documents of the various actors there is a broad diversity of natural and men made threats to be dealt with (Frerks 2007:35). Which of these global threats can be described as a risk to Human Security and when are they critical enough to deserve extra attention of the international community? The Canadian government for example distanced itself from the UNDP definition as it is too broad and ambitious to be practically relevant; instead the Canadian position has focused on protection from physical violence, ignoring structural forms of violence (Von Tigerstorm 2007: 28-29). Japan on the other hand defended a more broad definition of Human Security and its use of the concept in foreign policy has emphasized development assistance (ibid). Thakur and Newman state that Human Security does not include all health, welfare and development issues we face, they suggest:

“..these issues become security concerns when they reach crisis point, when they undermine and diminish the survival chances of significant proportions of the citizens of society, and when they threaten the stability and integrity of society” (2004:3 in Frerks 2007:36)

Threshold approaches like the one above are accused of lacking a clear preventive agenda which a Human Security discourse emphasizes. However, an argument in favor of a “security as crisis” perspective could be that the Human Security discourse already includes a long term development agenda. The adoption of a timely conflict-sensitive development approach could

very much function as a preventive measure, and only if the threats pass the threshold they also become security issues.

b) Human Security within peace missions

When crisis or conflict already broke out, the lack of defining and operationalizing Human Security concepts continues. According to Kaldor, in addition to the adoption of the principle of “the R2P” by the United Nations general assembly, there is a need to put more emphasis on the method of implementation by elaborating the ways in which force should be applied as to distinguish methods to be adapted for the protection of individuals from war fighting methods (2007:175).

Protecting civilians is nowadays seen as one of the most important objectives within peace missions; however, the meaning of protecting is not the same for everyone. As formulated by Holt & Berkman:

“When talking about protecting civilians, a humanitarian worker with Oxfam is likely to have a separate understanding than a Brazilian peacekeeper in Haiti or a staffer within the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Imagine the different views...for a protecting officer in the UN Mission in Sudan, a colonel in the US Marine Corps, for a UN Contingent commander, and for a human rights expert from Amnesty International” (2007:35).

With the existence of varied ideas on how to protect civilians in a mass atrocity situation, it is not easy to pin down the exact role of military forces within peace and stability operations. Multiple tasks and activities fit the civilian protection label if formulated right; this might cause military forces to be pulled in different directions. In order to establish an effective mission, military planners rely on clear concepts of operation, distinct operational goals, a definable end-state, and realistic means to measure the effectiveness of their efforts (Holt & Berkman 2007:36). It is clear that in this stage, neither the Human Security approach nor the R2P provide clear operational tools for military personnel to work with.

The lack in explicating what “civilian protection” means has direct implications for the troops deployed in today’s peace missions, because no military doctrine is developed, that addresses the concept of civilian protection as a goal of a military mission. Weiss describes this

situation as a lack of institutional adjustment, at least as is indicated by military doctrines, that have failed to specify ways to meet the need for coercive protection of civilians, the challenge of the responsibility to protect (2004 in Holt & Berkman 2007:103). The currently existing military doctrines generally lack clear guidance in important operational areas. No peace mission doctrine contains for example how to stop a belligerent from committing gross human rights abuses, when that action is not a threat to the operation itself or to an important party in the peace process (ibid: 131).

A more clarified military doctrine on the protection of civilians within peace missions will help the implementation and operationalization of Human Security and the responsibility to protect by formulating clear military responsibilities and tasks. According to the different authors this new doctrine should address the use of force, the concept of protection and the role of military actors when providing this protection.

2. Lack of coordination

The defining issue described above, together with the comprehensiveness of the Human Security concept, contribute to different ideas on what international action to establish peace and stability should look like. Are the actors involved speaking the same language and working towards the same ends? The answer to that question within the academic literature on the subject implies: no.

The Human Security discourse ambitiously tries to deal with threats within different policy areas that contribute to sustainable peace, development and the promotion of human rights at once. This comprehensive nature of the Human Security concept seems to cause implementation difficulties as comprehensive action has not yet been undertaken in practice. As mentioned above, Evans states the trouble with the concept of Human Security is that it has produced too much consensus: so many different issues and themes nestle comfortably under its wings that it is difficult to extract any prescriptions about how to deal with any of them other than to look at problems in a “people first” kind of way (2008:35). As formulated by Frerks:

“[T]his [comprehensiveness] has definite analytical advantages in view of the interrelated nature of current problems, it may also imperil conclusive action as such complexity is difficult to handle in practice. How to respect the multidimensionality of

Human Security without becoming paralysed in the face of all those challenges that demand simultaneous and integrated action” (Frerks 2007:37).

So, instead of producing integrated action, its comprehensiveness might lead to inaction as providing Human Security within all social domains at once, seems the impossible mandate. Von Tigerstorm argues this difficulty is hardly unique to the Human Security concept as efforts to ensure some kind of security always requires multiple strategies, difficult judgements, and the taking of calculated risks (2007:37). Therefore, the Human Security discourse cannot be dismissed based on the challenges that come with its comprehensive nature.

“Narrowing the scope of security to military threats and military means does limit the field, but the complexity of strategic choices remains significant” (Von Tigerstorm 2007:37).

Answering questions as to who should do precisely what in response to an emerging situation of large scale loss of human lives, remains problematic. Therefore, policy experts on security threats within different social domains should combine their expertise in order to achieve effective integrated action. Likewise, Evans claims there are legions of individual NGOs working on these issues in many countries, but there remains a real need to coordinate and focus their efforts (2008:239). The same is true on the government side:

“There are many like minded governments in both north and south who are keen to work in a more systematic way on...building the appropriate diplomatic, civilian, military, and general organizational capability that is needed...ensuring that no new R2P situation goes unnoticed or, until it is too late, undressed.” (Evans 2008:239).

We need to overcome challenges that are a consequence of definitional issues and the comprehensive nature of Human Security, by cooperation and coordinating efforts of the relevant state and non-state actors involved by means of proactive leadership of the right kind. If we won't overcome these challenges, many observers fear that due to its multidimensionality Human Security will become a bran-tub from which policy actors select the bits they like or can use for their own purposes or constituencies, while ignoring the rest (Frerks 2007:37).

3. National interests

The problems at different stages within the implementation process of the Human Security approach can be partially assigned to the national interests of the state actors involved. Even the conceptual defining issues are partly the consequence of governments that frame issues according to their national interests. Additionally, national interests play a significant role in the decision-making about undertaking action in cases of large scale human rights violations. This makes solving the implementation problem hard, because self interest is not easy to overcome.

First will be discussed how politics and framing issues influence the implementation of a Human Security approach into the reaction of the international community towards a humanitarian crisis. Within the academic world some authors claim that definitional heterogeneity has more to do with policy priorities than defining concepts of Human Security per se. The interests of particular countries are served in different ways by their respective approaches:

“A narrow definition allows governments to engage with a limited set of humanitarian and conflict issues while avoiding larger –and politically more difficult– questions about development and equitable distributions in the global economy. It has also been noted that Japan’s development-focused approach has allowed it to maintain a more traditional position in its security policy and thereby avoid alienating its major security partner, the United States.” (Von Tigerstorm 2007:30)

The above quotation indicates that the concerns, that the multidimensionality of the concept might leave room for interpretation as fits the purposes of the policy actors, are valid. However, when we limit our scope to protection from civil wars, large scale human rights violations and other bodily security issues, national interests keep influencing implementation efforts.

In the context of humanitarian interventions, the decisions to act of the international actors, especially states, are highly motivated by own interests rather than the moral discourse. The traditional international law system limited the possibilities of the actors’ chase of their national interests by prohibiting interventions in the UN Charter. Since the right to intervene became more and more accepted, opportunities of states to misuse the Human Security

discourse to intervene militarily without a legitimate purpose increased. Therefore, adopting the R2P conditions for intervening as outlined above is important to protect countries from other countries' national interests. The contemporary debate about the vagueness of the Human Security concept creates additional demands to revise definitions and coordinating implementation efforts in order to minimize this abuse, however, there will continue to be some variation in the ways in which Human Security is used. Does this mean that the Human Security approach should be dismissed because its content is so unclear that abuse of a Human Security label is unavoidable? According to von Tigerstorm this criticism seems unduly hard as:

“it may be difficult or impossible to prevent individuals or governments from attaching the label ‘Human Security’ to arguments that seem inconsistent with its conceptual basis...[I]f we can distinguish between uses of the concept which are or are not consistent with a commonly understood meaning... this suggests that it does indeed have some stable content against which those [mis-]uses can be evaluated ” (Von Tigerstorm 2007:210)

The military invasion in Iraq by the Bush administration for example, is hardly recognized as an attempt to restore Human Security for the Iraqi people apart from the semi-R2P rhetoric used in the attempt to receive Security Council authorization. In this case, the US lost their credibility as humanitarian intervener in the eyes of the world, after their wrong purpose intervention. Nevertheless, redefining concepts and coordinating implementation efforts will contribute to integrated effective action and minimizing misuse of a Human Security label.

The absence of any narrow self-interest at all may seem ideal, but as Evans points out it is not likely always to be reality: “mixed motives, in international relations as everywhere else, are a fact of life.” Besides, as the commitment to an intervention brings costs and risks to personnel involved, some degree of self interest must be permissible (2008:143). Some even argue that the motives of an intervener are not as important as they might seem at first glance. This quotation will clarify this argument:

“South Africa might intervene to stop a humanitarian crisis in Mozambique, but its reason for doing so is because it desires to reduce the number of refugees entering its borders.” (Pattison 2010:154)

The intention here is humanitarian in nature but the motive is based on self-interests. However, although this primary motive is not to halt human suffering, the intention (proper purpose) and outcome (consequence) of the intervention are still humanitarian, so its effectiveness is still sustained. Some even argue that self-interest strengthens the commitment of the intervener so effectiveness increases. Additionally, when national interests can not be part of one's motivation to intervene the risk that every actor will wait for someone else to stand up and do something grows. As Pattison argues the lack of willingness and commitment of interveners is exactly why we fail to undertake adequate action (2010:9).

Adopting the clear defined Human Security principles and conditions for intervention in the international law system will minimize illegitimate action out of self interest, however, inaction might increase. Evans idea to tackle the lack of political will to do what need to be done is to link the moral arguments to the interests of the actor by providing knowledge, concern and confident belief in the utility of action. As a successful intervention provides the actor with a positive political appearance and failing to react does the opposite, knowledge, concern and confidence provided by national and international NGOs and intergovernmental organizations might be a push in the right direction (Evans 2008:224).

4. Counter discourse

Finally, the rise of a counter discourse damaged the implementation of a Human Security approach as it overshadowed the moral arguments the legitimacy of action is based on. As different authors argue, the timing of the ICISS report, coming shortly after 9/11 2001, initially blunted its impact (Holt & Berkman 2007:26).

The upcoming debates about the necessity of humanitarian interventions waned with the rise of a coercive military discourse shaped by the “global war on terror”. The increasing concerns of the US that failed states would become homes to terrorist groups aligned American strategic interests with support for peace operations and humanitarian issues (Holt and Berkman 2007:27). However, compared to the Human Security approach, the War on Terror consists of more coercive measures and this militarised discourse neglects the underlying causes of terrorism and thus prevents an effective response (Frerks 2007:13):

“[m]any forms of terrorism find their roots in adverse socio-economic conditions, more or less legitimate political grievances...Instead of working on such problems, the

War on Terror discourse has impeded successful action in terms of Human Security”
(ibid).

Frerks acknowledges the need for military expertise and instruments when dealing with the contemporary security challenges, however, the War on Terror relegated the security of ordinary people to a secondary position (2007:13). Additionally, much aid became subsidiary to political and military interests and the room for the promotion of Human Security based approaches by civil society organisations was significantly reduced (ibid).

Despite the fact that the War on Terror discourse in no way fits under the Human Security umbrella, the US labelled the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan an act of humanitarianism in order to justify these coercive military operations. Thereby the Human Security approach was not only incorrectly linked to the “War on Terror” discourse; it provided the Human Security discourse with a negative connotation by which fruitful integrated action on multiple social domains was blocked. As a consequence the Human Security discourse gained unpopularity; this undermined efforts to establish an international consensus on the legitimacy of saving civilian lives with force (Holt & Berkman 2007:27).

B. Analytic frame: between Structure and Agency

The previous chapter outlined the influence of globalization and the end of the cold war as external factors that influenced security-policy change, however, external factors alone are not enough to understand changing social policy. As formulated by Long, a more dynamic approach to the understanding of social change is needed which stresses the interplay and mutual determination of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ factors and relationships, which recognizes the central role played by human action and consciousness (2001:13).

The contemporary debate about the implementation problem can be situated in the interpretative epistemology where structure and agency influence each other guided by a (moral) discourse. The underlying assumption here derives from the idea of the duality of structure by Giddens (1984). He argues that structure and agency constitute and complement each other, they are mutually depending concepts. Actors can act purposively, but they are constrained to do so within the social structures we are situated in. These social structures are socially constructed by our own actions so: we make them, and we are made by them. Discourses produced by actors can be seen as a medium that influences this relationship.




Figure 1: *causality model analytical frame*

In the context of this research: the Human Security approach can be seen as a moral discourse that aims for structural changes within the domains of Development, Peace and Security and changes in the behavior of actors related to those subjects. In order to achieve these changes agency is the most important factor. The actors involved are expected to change their actions and the structural framework (International Law) based on the moral discourse (Human Security), so their future actions (intervention with humanitarian objective) will be a logical consequence of the new structure (Adoption of the HS approach into the international law system) and internalization of the moral arguments related to the Human Security discourse.

As outlined above, according to the existing literature this process fails at four points:




Figure 2: *Causality model implementation problem*

The underlying theoretical frames of these problems can be found within *discourse*, the power of *agency* and the relationship between *discourse and power*.

1. Discourse

In this part of the chapter we will discuss discourse as a variable within the implementation problem by answering what a discourse is; what it can do; and why it is relevant within our problem context. Unlike discourse analysis, this is not a methodological instrument but a theory based on certain assumptions about the role of language within foreign policy change. Theories that centralise discourse in social policy argue that policy change comprises changes in discourse practices, in language. The underlying idea of discourse theory is that language is not a reflection of reality and meaning but an interpretive image of social reality:

“It is only through language that ‘things’ –objects, subjects, states, living beings and material structures-are giving meaning and endowed with a particular identity ”
(Hansen 2006:18)

Multiple definitions of *discourse* exist. One definition that captures the above fundamental ideas related to its policy implications is formulated by Epstein:

“A discourse is a cohesive ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations about a specific object, that frame that object in a certain way and, therefore, delimit the possibilities for action in relation to it. It is a structured yet open and dynamic entity”
(Epstein 2008:2)

As this quotation shows, the process of framing of an object or event limits the choices for a proper course of action. An example related to the problem context is, when an event is framed by policy makers as ‘genocide’ inaction might not seem an available option any more. This way, discourse contributes to the construction of systems of knowledge and belief that constitute social identities of policy subjects and make up relations between people and institutions (Marston 2004:36).

These discourses that frame the identity of the policy subjects are important within policymaking, as the legitimacy of action depends on these discourses. As argued by Hansen, the goal for foreign policymakers, and others that try to influence policy, is to present a foreign policy that appears legitimate and enforceable to its relevant audience; at the centre of political activity is the construction of a link between policy and the identity of the policy subject that makes the two appear consistent with each other (2006:28). As an example

Hansen describes the post 9-11 context in which Bush constructed a discourse about Iraq. The identity of Saddam Hussein was framed as ‘a dictator that commits atrocities’ and that of the Iraqi people as ‘oppressed and longing for freedom’.

“This representation gave Bush’s policy of military intervention a stable underpinning: the materiality of nuclear weapons in the hand of a ‘mass murderer’ discursively linked with terrorism attacking the ‘free world’ warranted ‘defending our own security’.” (Hansen 2006:29)

The above passage shows how apparent stable links between identity of policy subjects and actual policy are made in order to justify foreign policy. As argued by Epstein, the ultimate product of a powerful discourse is common sense; a discourse whose statements are experienced as “obvious”, “true” and “necessary” with no room for alternative meanings (2008:10). At first glance this discourse might seem stable, but policy is not a closed system, and discourses change. Opponents of a particular policy discourse try seek for instabilities within the identity-policy link. Bush for example, claimed a just cause of his intervention by the representation of the Iraqi people as oppressed and waiting for liberation. However, the eventual policy did not include Human Security based action for the protection of those innocent civilians. When a policy discourse is destabilised governments can react in three ways: change the policy-identity construction –which might happen in cases were neglecting that action is necessary is not possible any more because of media- or some other kind of pressure-; Second, more commonly, official discourses might acknowledge new facts but explain them within the discursive framework that already existed –as Bush acknowledged the violence against coalition forces but framed the perpetrators as Islamic militants and not the grateful Iraqis they liberate-; and third, seek to pass by the facts in silence -this might be hard because the fierce criticism they will face but when weapons of mass destruction could not be found, Bush shifted the focus in order to legitimize intervention to ‘Iraq as a possible haven for terrorists’ without acknowledging his failure on the nuclear weapon issue (Hansen 2006:32-33).

Besides internal instability, competing counter discourses might destabilise each other by challenging the formulations of identity that underlie a policy discourse or the policy itself (Hansen 2006:30). The Human Security discourse for example, frames security of all people in the world equally important and therefore, we have a responsibility to act when our fellow

global citizens face a humanitarian crisis. In contrast, the war on terror includes an Us-Them construction of identity that separates people in America and the west from the Islamic world. Although both discourses might ask for military interventions, the content of those missions will differ significantly. So, when the war in Iraq was framed with a Human Security jacket to gain moral legitimacy, supporters of the Human Security discourse were able to uncover the instability within the relationship between identity and the derived policy.

Discourse theory is important to understand how facts are formed and how they impact policy debates. Stable links between identity of the policy subjects and actual policy are constructed through discursive practices that vary and depend on human agency.

2. Agency

A first observation might be that discourses ‘belong’ to institutions, however, it is the actors who use them, manipulate them and transform them (Long 2001:49).

“A focus on agency is important in these accounts because in studies of policy making significant attention must be paid to the social actors, not simply to the constructive properties of the text itself. In sum, the theory of discourse used in studies of policy change must be dynamic and include a core focus on contestation and the social actors that produce and interpret policy text” (Marston 2004:36)

Therefore, an actor oriented perspective offers valuable insight into these processes of social construction and reconstruction.

Theories of agency are based on the idea that the individual is perpetrator of events and he or she could have acted differently (Dyck & Kearns 2006:87). On that account, different social forms develop under the same structural circumstances, and such differences reflect variations in the ways in which actors attempt to come to grips, cognitively, emotionally and organisationally, with the situation they face (Long 2001:20). Generally, the actor is seen as a self reflective entity that between the limiting boundaries of social structures give substance to their agency freely. The question that remains is: what than determines the actors’ action?

There are several actor oriented approaches, which would answer this question differently. For example, approaches that contradict culturalist and structuralist views by concentrating on

innovative behaviour of individual decision makers and the mobilisation of resources through the building of social networks. Those approaches have a tendency to adopt a voluntaristic view of decision-making (Long 2001:14) which overestimates an actors rationality or utility maximisation. According to Long, within approaches like these, insufficient attention goes out to the examination of how individual choices are shaped by larger frames of meaning and action (ibid). Therefore, I will use an actor oriented approach which stresses the role of agency in the production and reproduction of social discourses according to their objectives. These objectives derive from the social identity of the actor and that of their supporters, not from the instrumental rationality of individuals. As argued by Long:

“Rationality is not a property of individuals, but is drawn from the stock of available discourses, that form part of the cultural milieu of social practice” (Long 2001:15).

Within this approach available information and the interpretation of norms and values within the social structures are cultural variables that determine ones action. By formulating new interpretations of norms and translating them into action, agents are actively involved in the reproduction or change of social meanings and discourses.

a) Collective Action

However, for the international community to act properly towards a humanitarian crisis, more than one actor needs to adopt a Human Security or R2P discourse into their policy programmes. The implementation of a policy discourse depends on the actions of a chain of agents each of whom “translates” discourse in accordance with his/her own projects (Jabri 2006:68).

“Agency then entails the generation and use or manipulation of networks of social relations and the channelling of specific items (such as claims, orders, goods, instruments and information) through certain nodal points of interpretation and interaction. Hence, it is essential to take account of the ways in which social actors engage or are locked into the struggles over the attribution of social meaning to particular events, actions and ideas” (Long 2001:17).

Here, *a network* refers to a coalition of actors that share some common definition of a situation, or similar goals, interests or values and who agree to pursue certain courses of social

action (ibid). For the implementation process of the Human Security discourse this means a chain of actors needs to implement the Human Security norms and principles into their actions in order to influence others. Besides, a chain of agents will increase the capability and resources of the actors, which will contribute to the effectiveness of action. As mentioned earlier, a big part of the implementation problem of the Human Security approach is a lack of these actor chains, due to bad coordination of -and cooperation between- implementation efforts.

Nevertheless, even if there is a strong Human Security network, some actors might be stuck in a struggle over the attribution of meaning, because this involves waiving traditional conceptions of reality (which might have been dominant for decades) and adopting new ones. As mentioned above, the most common response by governmental actors to this situation is trying to fit the new Human Security principles to their traditional approaches to security. Therefore, the fear that policy actors select the bits of the Human Security approach that don't contradict their traditional concepts of security, while neglecting others, is a legitimate fear. As mentioned in earlier chapters, Japan adopted a Human Security approach only towards development issues while neglecting Human Security issues that contradict the traditional conception of sovereignty.

3. Discourse and Power

The relationship of the production of discourses and its related policies are not as simple as presented above. There is not a one-on-one relationship between identity and policy, and 'genocide' does not automatically lead to the deployment of troops (Hansen 2006:214). Material factors, like; capability, resources and other interests do not produce policy, but influence the relationship between identity and action (ibid). Thus, although agency is important in reproducing and changing discourses and the implementation of those discourses, capability and resources -or power- partially determine the course of action. Therefore, not all agents are able to influence others.

Theory around the production of discourses indicates a strong relationship between the production and reproduction of discourse and power. Whether produced discourses will be copied by others depends on the translation of discourse by powerful actors. As formulated by Jabri (2006:68) the ability to influence a political agenda is an important dimension of power defined by the ability to adjust the rules of the game in one's favour before the game starts.

“This ability can reside with the individual’s own resources or may derive from the role or social position that is held by that individual” or organisation. The moral question about how to deal with mass atrocity situations when sovereignty is absolute, encouraged an international discussion between policymakers and scholars partially because it was formulated by Kofi Annan. The position of Annan at that time as secretary general of the United Nations provided him with the ability to produce a discourse that influences others. Local NGOs or the prime minister of the Netherlands wouldn’t have made such an impact when asking similar questions.

However, according to Jabri the relation between discourse and power is a positive as well as a negative one. The power roles in society contain both constraining and enabling elements.

“The constraining elements derive from the normative expectations associated with every [social] role... [and enabling elements derive from] that roles provide decision makers with legitimating reasons for their preferences in situations of conflict with external parties”. (Jabri 2006:69 [my emphasis])

In the case of Humanitarian Interventions this means that the power roles provide actors with the legitimacy to misuse a Human Security discourse to act out of self interests. Less powerful actors, like the Dutch government, might join in because their relation with the intervening actor creates the normative expectations for them to do so.

To conclude, even under homogeneous external circumstances, there is a wide range of cultural repertoires and social actions. It is necessary to study how such differences are produced, reproduces and transformed, rather than just analysing the structural outcomes. Such an approach requires an actor-oriented theory of discourse and agency. Actor oriented theories imply that agency stands at the core of the implementation process of a Human Security discourse, as a chain of actions of the different powerful actors involved produce and reproduce discourses and influence how others will be guided by these discourses in the future.

III. Methodology

In the Netherlands there are several state- and non state actors involved in the promotion and enactment of a proper reaction towards humanitarian crises. This chapter will describe how their perspective is obtained by outlining the data collection techniques used and the research subjects approached. Besides, when outlining the methods of data analysis this chapter provides answer to the question; how can the theoretical framework described above help mapping the challenges these organisations face within the implementation process of a Human Security approach? Finally, the Human Security concepts will be operationalised to provide a clear understanding of the discursively constructed identity and policy that constitute a Human Security discourse.

A. Research subjects

The research subjects are the (possible) actors involved in the promotion and enactment of the Human Security approach in the Netherlands. Because Human Security includes a wide range of elements, there is a wide range of possible actors. The state-actors involved in the enactment of Human Security are: the Dutch government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. The non governmental actors involved in the enactment, promotion or information of Human Security that were willing to participate, are the following five:

- The Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael is an important knowledge institute for international relations that provides the government and the general public with information by conducting research and organising courses and training programmes. Although it is a non-profit foundation that is partially funded by the Dutch ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, it is an autonomous organisation not allied to any political party, denominational group or ideological movement.
- *Pax Ludens foundation* is a non-profit organisation, specialised in training and research in Good Governance, International Relations and Sustainability. The foundation's core activities include the design and execution of seminars and simulation exercises based on case studies.
- *IKV Pax Christi* is a partnership between Pax Christi and IKV that works as one peace movement for reconciliation and justice in the world. Solidarity with the victims of violence and with those working for peace inspires this organisation to influence policy, by preventing and resolving conflicts, by strengthening their partners'

capacities, by building peace and by profiling their mission and expanding and mobilising their support base.

- *Rode Kruis Nederland* is part of the *International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)* with the mission to prevent and decrease human suffering in all parts of the world; the protection of lives and health, and warrant the respect for every individual, especially during violent conflict and other crisis situations. Therefore, they mobilise the strength of solidarity by uniting volunteers, funders and the local population of crisis areas in order to give substance to the responsibility of all to help others.
- *Micro Justice 4 all* is an innovative, sustainable way of delivering legal assistance to poor people, to enjoy their basic rights, empowering them to participate in society in full dignity. The innovative model addresses basic needs by providing the legal services demanded at a price level that even poor people can afford, allowing the disadvantaged to access a whole range of opportunities, and facilitating a long-lasting, sustainable way out of poverty.

These (and other) organisations were contacted through e-mail and asked whether they were available to share their perspectives on Human Security, the R2P and the implementation problem. The ones listed above confirmed to be familiar with the relevant discourses and approved participation. Other organisations that have been contacted are: *Human Rights Watch (HRW) Netherlands* that did not possess the required knowledge on the subject as it concerns a Development and Outreach office in the Netherlands only; and others did not respond or were too busy to participate, like *TNO*, *Cordaid* and the related ministries.

B. Data collection techniques

The Data collected through these organisations consists of two sets of data.

- 1) *Discourse analysis*: Comparing policy documentations and published articles of the selected organisations from 2001 until now.
- 2) *Semi-structured interviews with experts of the different organisations*: this will provide more detailed information on the process of implementation.

The first set of data consists of a number of published documents by the different organisations. The most important documents are the annual reports of the Dutch ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence which provide insight on the level of implementation within their actual policy. Second, the published documents of the ministries that guide foreign

policy are analysed to gain insight about the theoretic framework behind Dutch policy. Additionally, the advice documents of the Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (AIV) and the government responses to these documents provide knowledge about the current debates around the implementation of the Human Security framework and the R2P into future policy. Besides published documents of the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, the documents of the organisations that influence policy will be analysed. These documents provide the actors' perspective on the Human Security discourse and its implementation. Based on these documents, and the theoretic framework described earlier, the topic lists were customised for each organisation that participated in the interviews.

The second set of data is obtained first hand, by semi-structured interviews with experts related to the organisations mentioned above: *Clingendael*, *IKV Pax Christi*, *Pax Ludens*, *The Dutch Red Cross and Micro Justice 4 All*. These five interviews will provide information about the actors' perspective in more depth and detail. Appendix I will provide a list of the respondents and contact information.

1. Discourse analysis

The methodology used to analyse the data is discourse analysis. As Hansen describes “the contextual constraints and creative aspects involved in foreign policymaking imply that discourse analysis has to proceed methodologically by investing empirically the constructions of identity of foreign policy subjects and the formulations of policy within a given debate” (2006:30).

Therefore the main analytical question of discourse analysis is: how are facts coupled with representations of the policy subject identity and to particular policies? The focus of the rest of the analytic questions depended on the research design of this thesis. As the focus here lies with the process of implementing the Human Security discourse, the analytical questions are formulated in order to compare current and previous policy documents of relevant actors on their representations of identity and related policy. This analysis provides information on the development of the contemporary policy discourse. This way we were able to detect difficulties within the implementation process and formulate concrete questions to the experts about the absence of a direct link between identity representation of policy subjects and actual policy.

The analytical questions that will guide the presentation of the results in the following chapter will be:

- What do the identity representations of the different actors look like?
 - How do they frame the identity of their policy subjects?
- What is the course of action (policy) related to this identity representation?
- Is the theoretic frame behind the policy in line with that of the Human Security approach?
- How did the representation of identity and policy change over the years?

As the relationship between identity representation of policy subjects and policy is not as simple as it seems, these sub-questions provide insight on constraints that limit the creation of a stable link between policy and identity representation of policy subjects:

- Are the actors in power/or do they possess the resources, to build policy on this identity representation?
- Do the actors face institutional or media pressure to follow a course of action?
- Are there recent experiences that influence the identity-policy relationship?

These factors are not to be seen as objective material factors but as part of the discourse or products of previous discourses.

2. Semi-structured interviews

In order to answer the ‘why-’ and ‘how-’ questions that guide this research, a data set that provides in depth information about the implementation problem is needed. Some published documents provide insight to current debates within policy chambers, as the AIV advice documents, but this is not enough to constitute the actors’ perspective on *why* reacting properly regarding Human Security principles goes wrong and *how* implementation can be improved in the Netherlands. The aphoristic way to record the actors’ perspective on the ‘why-’ and ‘how-’ questions, is by conducting interviews. Those interviews are semi structured to ensure some generalisation possibilities *and* be able to specify interview questions according to the expertise of the different actors and their past public statements at the same time.

The structured parts within the interviews consist of three elements; first I paid attention to the vision of the organisation in question on Human Security and the R2P and how the enforcement of this vision is assured; secondly, the implementation of the Human Security approach within Dutch foreign policy is discussed including the factors that might block successful implementation; and third, their perspectives on who needs to do what in order to improve Dutch foreign policy by implementing a Human Security discourse is questioned. The topic-list and question examples can be found as appendix II to this thesis.

C. Concept Operationalisation

In order to answer the research questions the Human Security concepts need operationalization.

Identity Representation of policy subjects

The Human Security discourse is said to be a people-centric approach to foreign policy with the main objective to provide security within different social domains to all global citizens. Therefore the identity representation of the policy subject that fits a Human Security approach must contain elements that refer to the subjects as human beings with the same rights that deserve protection. So the policy actors act based on the responsibility that comes with shared identity, equality and solidarity. Mixed motives are inevitable within foreign policy but the identity representation described above must dominate instead of a state or national identity.

Theory

With the eye on sustainability, four clear theoretical ideas underlie Human Security action.

- Attention must be paid to the underlying causes of the conflict.
- There must be recognition of the interrelatedness of development, peace and respect for human rights.
- State- and Human Security must complement each other.
- It is our responsibility to protect the security of the global citizen.

Practice

In practice this theoretical frame leads to the following principles to guide action:

That attention is paid to the underlying causes of modern conflicts is assured by;

- preventive action;

- regional approach (contributes to stability);
- security not through coercion, but cooperation (repression not sustainable);
- end violence by deducting the soil for violent action (equality, no marginalisation, human rights, equal development etc.);
- long term commitments;
- justice without impunity (deals with past grievances);
- Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants.

Action that recognises the interrelatedness of development, peace and respect for human rights;

- focus on action that lays on the boundaries between the three domains: conflict sensitive development and development to stimulate the peace process;
- cooperation between the different ad hoc organisations or ministries.

To assure that state- and Human Security complement each other;

- bottom-up approach;
- building of local institutions and a legitimate government to assure future Human Security;
- empowerment of local population and government;
- Security Sector Reform (SSR)

To give substance to our responsibility to protect;

- The protection of civilians as essential objective

IV. Results

In this chapter the results of the data analysis are presented. The results of the analysis of the policy documents can be divided in three stages of implementation with different difficulties: first of all the adoption of the norms and moral values; second the decision making to act or the transformation of norms into action; and third, the actual enactment of a Human Security approach. First, as exploration of the norm adoption, the contemporary general policy framework of the ministries of Defence and Foreign affairs that guides Dutch foreign policy will be presented, focussing on the ‘Human Security’ and ‘responsibility to protect’ aspects within three domains within that framework: Crisis management; counter terrorism strategies; and enforcement of the R2P. Second, the results of the analysis on the transformation of norms into concrete policy examples of the enforcement of this framework will be presented; the Human Security elements of the Dutch general course of action will be pointed out. As a concrete example of Dutch enactment of a Human Security approach the Dutch presence in Uruzgan Afghanistan will be discussed including the difficulties they faced. After these descriptive sub-chapters, the actors’ perspectives on the questions that derive from this policy analysis and the problems regarding implementation of the Human Security approach will be presented.

A. Human Security in Dutch policy

In this part of the chapter the results of the analysis of the contemporary framework or discourse that guides foreign policy in the Netherlands will be described focussing on the elements that indicate the implementation of a Human Security approach. Secondly, the analysis results on how this discourse has influenced action will be outlined by presenting; the general Dutch course of past action and Human Security within the Dutch Uruzgan mission.

1. Contemporary Dutch Policy Discourse

Policy documents, annual reports and AIV (Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken) advice documents, including the government’s responses to the conclusions, were analysed within three domains of Dutch foreign policy: crisis management operations; counter terrorism strategies; and the enforcement and promotion of the R2P. The result of the discourse analysis on these documents will be presented including; the identity presentation of policy subjects

and how these are linked to a particular course of action and the similarities between the theoretical ideas that support the Dutch course of action and the Human Security discourse;

a) **Peace- and State building**

The most recent released documents on general principles to guide peace- and state building policy are the 2005 document “*Notitie: wederopbouw na gewapend conflict*” and the 2008 document:” *security and development in fragile states 2008-2011*”. Within the 2005 notion, attention is paid to the development of the contemporary policy framework and the valuable lessons learned in the past that constitute the new policy approach. The 2008 document describes the strategy to deal with fragile states in a Human Security context.

Identity Representation

The representation of identity of the policy subjects within the 2005 document is two sided; first the emphasis lies with the national importance of peace and state building elsewhere; and secondly, the solidarity with the local population within conflict areas and the importance of human rights is mentioned.

“Conflicten kunnen ook een uitstraling hebben op onze eigen veiligheidssituatie, bijvoorbeeld doordat conflictgebieden vaak een toevluchtsoord en uitvalsbasis zijn voor criminele organisaties en terroristische netwerken, internationale vluchtelingenstromen veroorzaken, of de toevoer van grondstoffen en andere economische belangen bedreigen. Steun aan het wederopbouwproces is daarom in ons eigen belang, alsmede gerechtvaardigd vanuit het oogpunt van solidariteit met de bevolking, de bescherming van de mensenrechten, regionale stabiliteit en de bevordering van de internationale rechtsorde.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005: 10)

As formulated here, it seems that national identity is the identity this new policy is based on. Humanity, human rights, solidarity and international peace and security are additional factors that justify the course of action. Therefore, although human rights and solidarity are mentioned as additional motives, the Dutch approach on peace- and state building in 2005 is not people-centric enough to be part of the Human Security discourse when it comes to identity representation.

The identity representation in the 2008 notion on security and development clearly meets the Human Security discourse standards:

“The ultimate aim is for the government to be able to protect people from conflict, so that the rule of law functions properly, human rights are upheld and basic services are delivered. This also serves the Netherlands’ interests. Where possible, the Netherlands will therefore support state-building initiatives in fragile states. If governments are unable or unwilling to embrace such initiatives, international leadership will be needed and international and civil society organisations will have to assume these responsibilities themselves” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008: 9)

This quotation shows the importance of the human rights of people and their Human Security. Besides, it shows a clear R2P element as well; the ultimate aim is to protect civilians and the responsibility to do so is explicitly assigned to the international community. The national interests of the Netherlands are mentioned as additional justification for this new policy discourse and not as main objective.

Theory

Besides the identity of the policy subjects, the underlying theories determine the course of action. Compared to the 2002 notion on peace and state rebuilding the 2005 document claims more integrated Dutch policy is needed (2005:20). The new comprehensive approach is described in line with the theoretical ideas behind the Human Security discourse; attention is paid to the underlying causes of the conflict and there must be recognition of the interrelatedness of development, peace and respect for human rights.

The document explicitly refers to the attention paid to the underlying causes of conflict. Regarding peace- and state building, the Dutch ministries strive towards a contextual approach to determine the measures to tackle the causes as well as the consequences of the conflict (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005:14). Additionally, it shows a strong interrelatedness of Development, Security and Peace:

“wederopbouw [kan] niet effectief plaatsvinden en duurzaam zijn in een situatie van voortdurende onveiligheid. Aan de andere kant kunnen politieke stabiliteit en veiligheid ook niet gerealiseerd worden zonder merkbare vooruitgang in de

levensomstandigheden van de plaatselijke bevolking. Dit betekent dat de verschillende inspanningen goed op elkaar afgestemd moeten worden. Deze onderlinge afstemming kan verbeterd worden zowel nationaal als internationaal.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005:21)

That successful peace- and state building policy depends on the stabilisation of both state and Human Security and that state- and Human Security must complement each other is explicitly mentioned and the importance of local agency on both sides is emphasised.

“De bevolking en de autoriteiten van het getroffen land zijn het beste in staat de noodzakelijke prioriteiten te stellen voor de besteding van schaarse internationale fondsen en deze in te bedden in de specifieke politieke en sociaal economische context” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005:15)

So, based on the theoretical framework that guides peace- and state building policy, we could say that there is a great overlap between the theories that underlie the 2005 policy discourse of the Dutch government and the Human Security discourse; although, the protection of civilians does not stand at the core of successful policy, and is not mentioned as a requirement to achieve state security.

The 2008 document on fragile states relates to an integrated Human Security approach literally with the following spear points:

- 1. an integrated approach; [security and development]*
- 2. local partners, local priorities;*
- 3. sensitivity to context and political issues;*
- 4. speed, flexibility and long-term commitment;*
- 5. multilateral where possible, bilateral where necessary;*
- 6. prevention;*
- 7. taking responsible risks.*

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008: 19 [my emphasis])

While describing the implementation, this report does emphasise that the goals and activities within various sectors must tie in closely with one another. In contrary to the 2005 notion, this

document does refer to how development of men and women on the ground affects the stability in their daily lives and how they take active part in the search for the country's peace and stability (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008:16).

Policy

The Dutch ministries strive towards a contextual approach regarding peace- and state building, to determine the measures to tackle the causes as well as the consequences of the conflict (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005:14). Therefore there is no blue print policy plan that fits every unstable situation in every region of the world. The 2005 document does contain however, some general policy recommendations that suit the Dutch foreign policy discourse. The guidelines for effective reconstruction policy depend on three dimensions; Security and Stability; Governance; and Socio-economic Development. These building blocks are related to the ideas the new Human Security concept of the UNDP is based on; the interrelatedness of development, peace and human rights. The way substance is given to successful measures within these dimensions correspond to the Human Security approach as well, as attention is paid to the durability and sustainability of peace by local empowerment of institutions and people.

However, although the 2005 *wederopbouw na gewapend conflict* document does contain all elements of the Human Security triangle, the interrelatedness of the different dimensions is not enough described. The socio-economic development within a country for example, is said to be important to minimize dependence on international humanitarian funding but nothing is mentioned about how this increases welfare of the people and reduces the chances of future conflicts. Besides, a "detailed poverty strategy" is said to be an important instrument but it is not mentioned that this strategy needs to be conflict-sensitive. So, although the measures indicate a Human Security approach to peace and state building, the people-centric character of the Dutch approach stays behind *or* is not outlined explicitly enough. Besides more attention could be paid to the protection of civilians and the measures that are located on the borders between the different dimensions that constitute an integrated approach. Regarding peace- and state building the Dutch discourse can be best described as Human Security from a state perspective.

The 2008 notion on security and development in fragile states proves a better job in operationalising an integrated approach. The three domains that need work to achieve security

and development are; enhancing the security of citizens; contributing to a legitimate government with sufficient capacity; creating a peace dividend (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008:9). Within the operationalisation to achieve these objectives, ensuring bodily security by contributing to stabilisation and conflict management missions of EU, NATO and the UN comes first. Besides, strategies like SSR, DDR and Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) should provide additional security. Second, capacity building can start with stimulating fair elections to establish a legitimate government and support; the establishment of the rule of law; a monopoly on the legitimate use of force; administrative control; investment in human capital through education and health care; etc. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008: 13). The third domain, creating a peace dividend, focuses again on the local population and their security and economical stability in their lives.

“Short-term results are essential. It is therefore important to link development cooperation as closely as possible to humanitarian assistance. The peace dividend must lead to the development of social services such as infrastructure, health care, education, clean water and basic sanitation. It must also generate employment and economic opportunities through activities in the agricultural or small and medium enterprise sectors. Another important aspect is the removal of obstacles to legal certainty and land registration... In the long term, it is important to attain the macroeconomic conditions for economic development.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008: 15)

The difference between the 2005 notion and the 2008 document is that the new notion does explicate the importance of conflict sensitiveness within a development strategy. Besides, the new strategy is described from a citizen’s perspective in addition to how such a strategy benefits The Netherlands.

These subtle differences between the two documents indicate the difference between a Human Security strategy and a state security strategy with a Human Security jacket. Human rights were important in the 2005 document as well, but only in 2008 the security of the local population stands at the core of the policy strategy. Therefore the people-centricity of the newest report is more obvious and the protection of the global citizen a central objective. State interest will remain an additional motivation to justify a particular course of action, but the Dutch policy strategy is no longer build around these national interests.

b) Counter terrorism strategy

Counter terrorism policy is a sensitive policy domain as it highly concerns national- and state-security as well. “A terrorist” is an identity label that refers more to “state enemy” than “Human Security”, although the underlying causes of terrorism are similar to other insurgency situations that are not labelled terrorism. Because of the sensitivity of the matter, the implementation of a Human Security approach in this context might be problematic and therefore interesting. There is no document on the Dutch counter terrorism strategy, so the contemporary Dutch discourse will be derived from the government’s responses to the most recent relevant AIV advice; the 2006 AIV advice No 49 on Counterterrorism from an international and European perspective.

Identity representation

The innocent victims of terrorism are the main policy subjects; however, to determine whether this policy fits a Human Security approach the identity representation of the terrorist is essential, as the identity of the perpetrator guides policy on how he should be stopped and whether or not this policy is in line with the Human Security approach. No definition of terrorism is internationally recognised (AIV 2006:10) and therefore there is no identity representation to consolidate the international consensus and to function as a basis for action. As outlined by the AIV, the terminology around terrorism knows two different forms; the first type of terminology such as “the war on terror”, creates the impression that we are dealing with a recognisable movement with its own ideology, organisational structure and strategy to take down the West; the second type of terminology emphasises the analysis of terrorism as a policy, a modus operandi, a tactic or a tool (AIV 2006: 8). The first terminology fits a more primordialistic identity representation of a terrorist as a natural enemy we cannot negotiate with, which automatically leads to certain coercive measures to end terrorism. Terrorism as a tactic or tool adopted by anyone with a particular goal, other than to destroy the West, leaves more room for different counter terrorism strategies as it is open to the diversity of the underlying causes of terrorism. Although there is no explicit use of terminology or identity representation of “the terrorist”, the advice request of the government indicates the government was stuck between the two types of terminology, as it contains elements of both.

First the Dutch government presents itself as dedicated to achieve human rights for all, including terrorists. Besides, the government renounces torture and strives towards total adherence of humanitarian law in its fight against terrorism. Therefore you could say “a

terrorist” is a label that is similar to “war criminal”, which is an approach that fits the terminology of terrorism as a tactic. At the same time, the request for advice concerns uncertainty or doubt regarding this approach.

“The Dutch government also requests the AIV to advise on how human rights and the rule of law can best be safeguarded in the struggle against terrorism. The government is especially interested in whether the AIV finds there is justification for restricting human rights and international humanitarian law and, if so, to what degree and in what circumstances.”(Bot 2005)

To conclude, although the Dutch government is committed to the protection of human rights and adherence to humanitarian law, the request for advice on this matter indicates uncertainty about whether or not “a terrorist” is more than a war criminal and less than someone with full human rights. After the AIV advised to emphasise a “terrorism as a tool” terminology within a Human Security context, the government intensified its human rights perspective; it refers to terrorism as a cross-border crime and everyone in situations of armed conflict has a right to humane treatment as mandated by article 3 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and article 75 of the First Additional Protocol. The principles underlying these provisions are inviolable (Bot 2007).

Theory

The response of the Dutch government to the advice of the AIV contains a clear theoretical basis for action that is in line with the Human Security approach; attention must be paid to the underlying causes of the conflict; there must be recognition of the interrelatedness of development, peace and respect for human rights; state- and Human Security must complement each other; and it is our responsibility to protect the security of the global citizen.

“The Dutch government supports the Secretary-General’s view that combating terrorism calls for an effective response from the international community. This response should not only focus on terrorism but also on the strategic elimination of the roots of terrorism and radicalisation. The international response should be reflected in regional and national measures. The Dutch government adds that the measures we take should be in compliance with our obligations with respect to human rights and under international humanitarian law.” (Bot 2007)

The AIV refers literally to the Human Security context that a counter terrorism strategy should be located in, meaning that the approach to counter terrorism cannot be separated from the approach to deal with other dangers and threats like poverty, inequality, human rights violations, disease, genocide and crimes against humanity (Bot 2007). The government responds by endorsing this integrated approach and committing to tackle the underlying causes of terrorism besides repressive measures only.

Policy

The factors contributing to international terrorism identified in the AIV report are: unstable states, isolation, conflicts, the cultural and historical context, and the marginalisation of minorities (AIV 2006:14). These factors do not have direct implications for policy but describe the areas of focus of counter terrorism policy. The AIV describes policy in this context the global responsibility to deal with problems, based on solidarity with the affected population groups and, ultimately, self interest (AIV 2006:17).

The policy implications that give substance to this responsibility within the areas of the identified factors adopted by the government are the following; in order to combat ideology behind terrorism, dialogue between government authorities and civil society groups of different backgrounds and cultures should be promoted. At the international level, strife for more pressure on governments in the Middle-East to comply with human rights standards. In doing so, Western countries need to make clear that they are promoting universal values and not applying double standards. Additionally, integrating conflict prevention, conflict mediation and post-conflict reconstruction into counterterrorism is important, as it is not simply the direct experience of violence but also the perception that related groups are being treated unfairly that increases the likelihood of terrorism (Bot 2007). Besides tackling these underlying causes of conflict, attention must be paid to human rights and adherence to humanitarian law within the repressive measure to counter terrorism.

The implications for policy described above are a start of implementing a Human Security approach within a counter terrorism strategy, as the basis for policy is solidarity and unity. However, more attention could be paid to the importance of economic welfare to reduce the attractiveness of the economic benefits that comes with joining Jihad; ideology and isolation are not the only motives for turning radical. The annual reports analysed later will provide

more insight to the actual policy of the Dutch government around counter terrorism and whether or not it fits the Human Security discourse.

c) **Responsibility to Protect**

The implementation of the R2P could be the most problematic because the costs that come with an R2P intervention are high and national benefits are minimal. The implementation of a Human Security approach in this context is therefore obviously based on the identity representation of policy subjects related to solidarity, equality and protection of the innocent global citizen instead of national interest. Almost five years after its acceptance, it is important to examine the conceptual and operational issues connected to R2P and consider what role it should play in Dutch foreign policy. The government response on the advisory report No. 70 that is entitled '*the Netherlands and the Responsibility to Protect*' is a relevant indicator to identify where the Netherlands stands in adopting this discourse or doctrine.

Identity representation

The identity representation that is linked to R2P action is based on common humanity. The government's emphasis lies with human rights as basis for action. The R2P concerns protecting a part of these rights, which asks for bodily protection against: genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes. By claiming the international community *must* assist and *has the responsibility* to act collectively when states cannot or are not willing to uphold its citizens' human rights, the government acknowledges that the human rights of the policy subjects come with a duty for states and the international community to protect.

Theory

The identity representation and the main objective of R2P policy suits two of the theoretic assumptions underlying a Human Security approach period; state- and Human Security must complement each other; it is our responsibility to protect the security of the global citizen. The two theoretical ideas left are less self-evident within R2P policy. Although the R2P doctrine does not focus on socio economic human rights, preventive R2P measures within a Human Security discourse should still acknowledge the interrelatedness of security, human rights and development and must pay attention to the underlying causes of mass atrocity situations. The Dutch government seems to be well aware of development as important factor and strategy to prevent humanitarian crises; in their policy to assist the capacity building of

states to protect their own citizens, the interrelatedness of security, human rights and development is highly emphasised:

“Capacity building for R2P is usually addressed as part of the development policy of international organisations and individual countries: programmes that help to build the rule of law, promote good governance, reform the security sector or target socioeconomic development. These programmes equip countries to protect their populations independently and also contribute to conflict prevention....The government also believes that promoting human rights should be an integral part of programmes to develop good governance and the rule of law. In its human rights policy for the coming years, the government will opt for an approach that integrates human rights, peace and security”(Government response 2010).

Policy

As the analysis shows, the identity representation and the theory underlying the Dutch approach exhale a Human Security discourse and R2P doctrine as it was intended by the pioneering UNDP and ICISS reports. The enactment however, is not yet perfect. The actual policy is guided through the three pillars identified by the 2005 report of the Secretary General of the United Nations. Pillar one stresses that sovereign states bear primary responsibility for protecting their populations against the four R2P crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Pillar Two addresses the commitment of the international community to assist states in meeting their obligations, notably through capacity building. Finally, Pillar Three focuses on the responsibility of member states to respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a state cannot or will not protect its population against the four R2P crimes.

From 2009 the R2P occupies an important place within Dutch foreign policy, which particularly aims at promoting human rights and developing the international legal order. The efforts that contribute to the first pillar that constitutes the R2P framework predominantly consist of outreach activities and promotion of human rights. The government’s response represents the second pillar as well; the duty to assist the sovereign states with the protection of their civilians. The implications for policy consist of preventive measures like deployment of UN officials to monitor human rights and other early warning methods. Additionally the integrated peace-human rights-development approach in weak and failed states should add to

capacity building and to the prevention of violent outbreaks. Pillar three policy consists of stimulating regional action and inter organisational cooperation. Among other efforts, this is done by co-chairing the Group of Friends of R2P in New York which addresses concerns of critics that the right to intervene will be abused, through bilateral talks and seminars. In addition, the government advocates for reform of the legal order to improve decision-making to undertake action by limiting the veto powers of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council in case of mass atrocity situations. Less is said about what needs to be done on the ground to end large scale ethnic cleansing or other R2P situations. The government claims to invest in civil-military cooperation, but no attention is paid to an operationalised doctrine that is specialised in the protection of civilians on the ground. There is no policy that describes how our national forces should be prepared to participate in such missions.

Therefore, we could say the norms and underlying ideas that constitute the R2P doctrine receive Dutch government support. Besides, the government is dedicated to promote these norms and human rights laws; invests in preventing R2P situations; and minimise big power interests in decision-making to act. However, the promotion of norms is not the same as actual action.

2. From Discourse to Action

In the previous part of the chapter the guiding discourse that influences Dutch foreign policy was outlined. However, as mentioned earlier, discourses never influence actions directly and it is therefore necessary to compare the policy discourse with the eventual action to see whether there are discrepancies or not. In this part of the chapter the results of the analysis on the actual course of action of the Dutch government will be presented, focussing on the relationship between identity presentation and policy objectives in line with the Human Security approach. First the general policy enactment will be analysed based on the annual reports of the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, followed by a case studies on Dutch action in Uruzgan.

a) Human Security in Dutch Foreign Policy

The analysis of the annual reports of the related ministries shows a significant policy and policy discourse transformation between 2002 and 2010. The nature of humanitarian assistance, conflict resolution and counter terrorism policy changed, including more Human Security elements along the way.

Although recognition of Human Security elements and empowerment strategies was possible within Dutch foreign policy long before, the interrelatedness of peace, security and development was first mentioned in the annual report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 2006. Not yet as a theory to guide Dutch foreign policy but as an operational goal that is part of a bigger objective: regional stability through effective conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction. Implementing the integrated approach for peace, security and development was at this point not directed at the local population of (post)conflict areas directly but only implemented through effective utilisation of the Stability fund and active advocacy within the UN, EU and OESO policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006: 33). Within the other main objectives of the Dutch 2006 foreign policy, countering terrorism, humanitarian assistance and good governance, no attention is paid to the implementation of an integrated approach.

As the 2006 integrated policy proved successful, the interrelatedness of peace, security and development gained more importance since 2007. Improving cohesion and effectiveness of security- and development policy became one of the main operational objectives from 2007 onwards. The 2007 policy focussed on two additional spear points compared to the 2006 policy. first, streamline cooperation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Agriculture, Internal Affairs and Justice, and with NGOs; second, the transmission of civil experts from different departments (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007:30). The cooperation with NGOs and the transmission of civil experts improve the civil character of policy; therefore it comes closer to the implementation of a Human Security approach. However, not all policy areas fit under the Human Security umbrella yet; counter terrorism is not yet mentioned as a policy domain where an integrated approach is significant. Repressive methods in order to counter terrorism remained more popular until 2008.

In line with the 2008 notion on security and development the actual policy of the Dutch ministries off Foreign Affairs and Defence is said to be built around the Human Security or integrated approach. As formulated within the 2008 annual report: integrated policy has the future and the document on security and development in fragile states will remain the basis for future action (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008: 45). Therefore, in order to measure the current level of implementation of a Human Security approach in foreign policy, the annual reports describing the 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 policy suit for analysis

Identity Representation

In 2008 the main policy subject of Dutch foreign policy remains the Dutch population. The introduction of the annual report points out the national importance of foreign policy:

“De gevolgen van de crisis, die begon in de Verenigde Staten, zijn voelbaar in heel Europa. Veel burgers hebben zorgen om hun inkomen, maar hebben vertrouwen in de rol van de overheid bij het beschermen ... spaartegoeden tegen de gevolgen van de crisis. In een eerste reflex zijn veel mensen in deze onzekere tijden geneigd naar de eigen omgeving te kijken. Maar juist in deze tijd, waarin we merken dat we ons niet kunnen onttrekken aan de negatieve gevolgen van globalisering, is een open blik naar de wereld noodzakelijk en wenselijk ... Een extern gericht Nederland kan de positieve gevolgen van de globalisering vergroten ten gunste van de eigen bevolking.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008: 20)

However, as the Dutch government is responsible for its citizens, it is aphoristic they are accountable towards the population, especially in times of insecurity as a consequence of the financial crisis.

Within the policy domain of peace and security the policy subject is the local population; the unfortunate citizens of fragile states. The main goal of the mission in Uruzgan for is example is said to be: improving the situation of citizens regarding their human rights, poverty and security (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008: 22). Besides, the promotion of human rights for every global citizen has a significant role in this year's foreign policy. So, as the description of the policy subjects shows, in these policy domains Human Security seems to be important.

Within the 2009 annual report introduction, the explicit national interests within foreign policy is absent and solidarity and cooperation emphasised:

“grote grensoverschrijdende problemen vragen om een gezamenlijke aanpak. Het afgelopen jaar werd vooral ook beheerst door de financieeleconomische crisis, die zich in alle hoeken van de wereld deed voelen; ook in ons land dat een recessie doormaakte en de werkloosheid zag oplopen. Maar ook klimaatverandering, armoedebestrijding, proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens, internationaal terrorisme, massale migratie en ziekten bleven onze aandacht vragen ... Eén ding

hebben deze problemen gemeen: geen enkel land kan ze in zijn eentje te lijf. Collectieve actie is noodzakelijk.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009: 20)

The security and development policy do not contain a representation of a particular identity of the policy subjects. The enactment of the approach will prove whether Dutch policy concerns a Human Security approach.

Policy

The tables bellow indicate which Human Security principles are present within Dutch foreign policy, followed by a brief description of the prominent observations.

That attention is paid to the underlying causes of modern conflicts is assured by;

Policy/year	2008-2009	2009-2010
focus on action that lays on the boundaries between the three domains	Yes: through the <i>stabilisation fund</i> (Funding)	Yes: through the <i>stabilisation fund</i> (Funding), and conflict sensitive development.
cooperation between the different ad hoc organisations or ministries	Yes: and created a coordinating department within the ministry: fragility and peace building.	Yes

Table 1: *Aspects of Human Security action: Underlying Causes.*

Action that recognises the interrelatedness of development, peace and respect for human rights;

Policy/year	2008-2009	2009-2010
Preventive action	Yes: supporting the <i>Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery</i> of the UNDP	Yes: Operational in Jemen and through funding of the UNDP.
Regional approach	No	Yes: Africa
Security not through coercion, but <i>cooperation</i>	Yes: incl. civic-military cooperation	Yes: incl. civic-military cooperation
End violence by <i>deducting the soil</i> for violent action	Yes: Uruzgan	Yes: Counter Terrorism and Uruzgan
Long term commitments	Yes: Uruzgan	Yes: Uruzgan
Justice without impunity	Yes: through the ICC	Yes: through the ICC
DDR	Yes: DRC, Rwanda and Burundi	Yes: DRC, Rwanda and Burundi

Table 2: *Aspects of Human Security action: Integrated Approach.*

To assure that state- and Human Security complement each other;

Policy/year	2008-2009	2009-2010
Bottom-up approach	No: local input is not mentioned	No
Building of local institutions and a legitimate government	Yes: Election monitoring, SSR programmes	Yes: Electoral assistance and SSR programmes
SSR programmes	Yes: Burundi and Uruzgan	Yes: Multiple
The protection of civilians as essential objective	No:	No: Contribution to peace missions seemed not enough
Empowerment of local population and government	Yes: Uruzgan	Yes: Uruzgan, and South-Sudan through funding

Table 3: *Aspects of Human Security approach: complementation of state- and Human Security*

Almost all aspects of enacting a Human Security approach are present within the Dutch foreign policy regarding fragile states or a crisis situation. Still there are three related observations that indicate the implementation of a full Human Security approach is not there yet; the policy predominantly concern the promotion of norms and funding rather than actual Human Security action on the ground; when a contribution to a mission is made not enough attention is paid to the protection of the local population; and the only region where an integrated approach is said to be fully enacted is Uruzgan. These observations will be made plausible through a few policy examples.

In order to achieve the operational goal: “a modern military force that is able to provide customised services worldwide in larger and smaller crisis management operations and contribute to rebuilding of security organisations in countries we wish to support”, the actual policy mainly concerns promotion and reforming efforts. Within the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) for example, the Netherlands lobbied for the improvement of the European military capacity to undertake peace missions, and the realisation of a European security strategy including the establishment of an integrated civil-military strategic planning unit, keep the improvement of EU-NATO cooperation on the international agenda, and campaign against the use of cluster ammunition. The policy to “improve effectiveness and coherency of security and development policy”, predominantly contains the funding of *the Stability Fund*, the *UN department for Political Affairs*, the *Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery* of the UNDP and *the Stabilisation and Peace building Fund* of the Worldbank.

In 2009-2010 the way substance was giving to these operational objectives expanded. For example by transforming NATO to deal with the contemporary security threats and operationalising EU-NATO cooperation in Afghanistan, which will lead to increasing effectiveness on the ground. However, policy to enforce the R2P does not go further than keeping the discussion on the international agenda. Besides, military action to protect civilians in crisis situations is not a central objective when providing humanitarian assistance. The promotion of norms and donations is important but not enough to improve the security situation on the ground. Close involvement within peace missions is necessary to assure a successful integrated approach.

“Nederland leverde een voortgezette bijdrage aan de vredesmissies United Nations Missions in Sudan (UNMIS) en African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in

Darfur (UNAMID) om de veiligheid in de regio's te verbeteren. Via wederopbouwprogramma's van de Wereldbank, VN en NGOs werden in Zuid-Soedan basisvoorzieningen en capaciteitsopbouw van de overheid gesteund. De veiligheidssituatie in het land blijft echter precair, waardoor het niet in alle gevallen mogelijk bleek om geplande activiteiten te ontplooiën en de geraamde financiële middelen in te zetten” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009:39)

This quotation indicates that the protection of civilians and the stabilisation of security need more emphasis before rebuilding efforts prove successful. As the AIV advised: a requirement for a good, adequate contribution to a mission is that The Netherlands, in every case, possesses an overview of the international comprehensive approach in the region to make sure that the Dutch input contributes to this integrated strategy (AIV 2009:61). The one region where a full Human Security approach is said to be case is Uruzgan Afghanistan.

b) Human Security in Uruzgan.

As formulated on the website of the Dutch government, the international community, including the Netherlands, started to counter terrorism and radicalisation in Afghanistan in response of the 9-11 attacks (Rijksoverheid website: last visited 10 June 2011). First substance was given to the counter terrorism policy by the US and UK, through the contested mission “*Enduring Freedom*” in October 2001; an international operation against military installations of the Taliban and al-Qaeda training camps. In December 2001 the UN Security Council authorized an international peace force; also known as International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). NATO is in command of the peacekeeping mission since August 2003 and the Netherlands one of the participators. The Dutch forces are active in different parts of Afghanistan but the focus of the Dutch policy is located in the province Uruzgan. This brief case study will discuss whether or not the Dutch contribution in Uruzgan can be seen as the enactment of a Human Security approach, whether or not there are implementation problems and where those problems are located. First I will outline Dutch policy action based on the annual reports and policy fact sheets, secondly different policy evaluations will be discussed to detect problem areas. Within the following part of the chapter, the opinion on Dutch foreign policy in Uruzgan of the Dutch organisations that participated in the interviews will be discussed to clarify any implementation problems.

Policy

From 2009 on, the Dutch policy in Uruzgan is said to be an integrated approach of security, peace and development in order to achieve sustainable security, good governance and effective reconstruction (Ministry of foreign affairs 2009:38). The Dutch support is divided over different operational areas:

- **Security;** SSR, Police Mentoring Teams, Supply goods, Infrastructure, Checkpoints
- **Education;** Education Quality Improvement Programme, Quality Primary Education Project, agricultural education, with special attention for girls.
- **Health care;** Basic health care, Female doctors, Special care for disabled persons and mental health care.
- **Rural development;** provide alternatives for poppy production, improve infrastructure, provide micro-credits.
- **Water;** River bank protection, Drinking-water, equal distribution of water, (re)construction of irrigation channels.
- **Empowerment of women;** through education, scholarships and investing in women healthcare.
- **Saffron;** as alternative for poppy production, providing supply and culture courses.
- **Micro-credits;** and Business courses for women, air connection Kabul-Tarin Kowt, Business Development Centre Uruzgan to provide knowledge, and funding through Fonds Economische Opbouw Uruzgan (FEOU).
- **Media;** stimulating press freedom through the establishment of the Government Media and Information Centre (GMIC) and Nawa radio station.

(Rijksoverheid website: last visited 10 June 2011)

In all those areas attention is paid to sustainability, equality, conflict sensitivity and empowerment of local government and population, so the dependence on Taliban cash flows decreases. Besides, cooperation between local non governmental organisations is an essential element within each operational domain.

Evaluation

On paper, these efforts indeed fit a Human Security approach, but do they prove to be effective? Different organisations evaluated the Dutch 3d approach in Uruzgan, which can help detecting any implementation problems. The evaluations discussed here include the findings of Homan related to the Conflict Research Unit of Institute Clingendael and the evaluation report of a local NGO and partner The Liaison Office- Afghanistan (TLO) based on interviews with the local population. Both organisations discuss the Dutch comprehensive approach regarding the three domains and the relation between the domains; defence/security; development; and diplomacy/governance. TLO as well as Clingendael find the development policy to be effective; however, TLO foresees sustainability problems of the development improvements as the mission came to an end before a providing government was established.

Following the lead of the millennium development goals, TLO reports improvement over the past four years in terms of agricultural and rural development, livelihood issues, education, health care, media and communications (TLO 2010:6). According TLO, the Dutch approach understands the provision of security and development assistance to go hand in hand; the military providing an enabling environment for civilian development actors, and the other way around, development projects contribute to a more stable and secure environment. This has increased access for local and international NGOs in the three focus districts of Tirin Kot, Deh Rawud and Chora, bringing visible improvements (TLO 2010: 6). Homan however, concludes these improvements in bodily security are highly concentrated in those areas of focus and even deteriorated in the rest of Uruzgan and Afghanistan (Homan 2010). This is not due to failure of the Dutch security policy, but it does contribute to the lack of success in improving local governance. Despite the Dutch, Australian and US government support and funding of sub-national (reform) programs, four years was not enough time to install a functional civil servant culture in Uruzgan (TLO 2010: viii).

“In 2006, only an estimated 20% of district positions were filled. Four years later only 30% of district level government positions are filled. While all districts, even Taliban controlled Char China, have a district governor and chief of police, other government departments including education, public health, and agriculture, remain understaffed. The lack of personnel capable and willing to fill government positions in insecure areas remains a fundamental problem” (TLO 2010: viii).

Unwillingness of the population to fill government positions indicates distrust of the electoral system and that the underlying causes for conflict did not fade. According to TLO, provincial government in Uruzgan needs to be seen as monopolized by pro-government elites, who increase their own power and that of their tribe by practising a policy of marginalizing members of the former Taliban regime (or their associates) and weakening other power holders by excluding them from access to political positions and economic opportunities (2010: 28). Therefore, there is a concern among the local population about transferring governance support from the Provincial Reconstruction Team to Afghan actors, now that the Dutch mission is finished:

“Residents say the main problem confronting the province is not a lack of development, but the continued weakness of the government. Locals see development and reconstruction projects as something that is done by ‘foreigners’, while the state is largely unresponsive to their needs” (TLO 2010: 28).

This is why training programs as well as close monitoring of provincial government were seen as particularly important by provincial residents to improve the performance of civil servants and curb corruption and mismanagement (ibid.). To conclude, the lack of personnel able or willing to fill government positions in insecure areas, staffing of government offices remains a fundamental problem. Furthermore, the prolonged absence of governors from their offices also contributed to widening of the gap between the state and the people instead of filling it (TLO 2010: 31).

According to the TLO report, governance is not the only policy domain where traditional power structures and perceptions hamper policy effects. When it comes to the empowerment of women for example, traditional perceptions moderate the progress. Although healthcare and education seem more accessible for women and the number of female employees in these sectors increased, men and women are far from being perceived equals.

“Despite these achievements, the attitudes of communities towards the employment of women, especially the link between women’s work and a man’s honour, still hampers the advancement of women. It might be one thing to allow a woman to get educated and work, but altogether another one to engage with women as equal, possibly taking on board her opinions” (TLO 2010: 25)

This is no prove that the Dutch Human Security approach didn't function, but it confirms the difficulty of changing attitudes and Us-Them boundaries and therefore it proves necessity of long term commitments when it comes to rebuilding efforts. The establishment of a strong justice system will help dealing with past grievances and a strong social midfield will add to uphold human rights. Obviously, these developments will take time, as it took over 12 years to implement a Human Security approach into Dutch policy. Within the complex fragile state contexts modesty in policy goals is necessary. As both the AIV advice on fragile states and Homan conclude: the world cannot be remade to suit us (Homan 2010, AIV 2009:55). However, there is always room for improvement. Within the following chapter the actors' perspective on the implementation problem will be discussed, ending with the problems regarding Human Security enactment in Uruzgan.

B. The actors' perspective on the implementation problem

The actors' perspective confirms the implementation problems mentioned within the literature that forms the theoretical basis for this thesis; besides it provides a clearer image of which problem is located within which part of the implementation process. Further more, the interviews produced additional knowledge on problems that occur during the actual enactment of the Human Security approach. The results of this analysis are divided in three stages of implementation with different difficulties: first of all the adoption of the norms and moral values; second the decision making to act or the transformation of norms into action; and third, the actual enactment of a Human Security approach. The analysis of the policy documents above triggered several analytic questions that guided the interviews conducted in this research. Here the analytic questions within the three stages of implementation will be answered from the actors' perspective and discussed within the theoretical framework of agency, discourse and power.

1. The adoption of norms

The analysis of the Dutch discourse indicates that the norms and underlying ideas that constitute the R2P doctrine receive Dutch government support. Besides, the government is dedicated to promote these norms and human rights laws; invests in preventing R2P situations; and minimise big power interests in decision-making to act. However, the UNDP report that gave rise to the *Human Security* concept dates from 1994 and the adoption of

norms within Dutch policy was postponed with over 10 years. In 2006 the concept of Human Security was first mentioned and not until 2008 it constitutes the guiding framework on how to deal with fragile states. This observation triggered the following analytical question: *How come it took over 12 years to adopt the normative language related to the Human Security concept within Dutch foreign policy?* The answers provided by the different organisations are theoretically located between discourse and power. One answer that is given is related to the political process of adopting norms in general and second, the actors do seem to agree with the existing literature that the counter discourse around the war on terror influenced the adoption process.

In general the Dutch organisations recognise or share the conclusion that the norms imbedded in the Human Security approach and R2P are endorsed by the Dutch government. *IKV Pax Christi* confirms that these concepts fit the Dutch position as the Netherlands, like Canada, is a state with a sense of international justice which makes these norms appealing.ⁱ Then again, why did it take so long to officially adopt Human Security and R2P language in their policy discourse?

The Dutch actors answer this question by describing the political process of adopting new norms and strategies in general. Within politics, several factors influence the adoption of new norms and strategies. *Power* seems to be an important factor in this regard. First of all it seems politically wise to await the international reaction to a new policy concept like Human Security or R2P. As *IKV Pax Christi* explains:

“Dat heeft er ook mee te maken met hoe populair is het beginsel, want er zijn natuurlijk ook in de VN een heleboel landen die de R2P maar een gevaarlijk instrument vinden....Je kunt het dan wel helemaal omhelsen maar dan plaats je jezelf voor een deel buiten de discussie, dus ik denk dat dat voor een deel ook politiek slim optreden is om je positie daarin een beetje te beperken.”ⁱ

Secondly, several actors refer to the political system as ‘a *slow bureaucracy*’ and within those bureaucracies changing sentiments is hard. *Pax Ludens* indicates that change might jeopardise powerful positions and maintaining ones job is more important than following new norms.ⁱⁱ *Micro justice 4 all* adds to that by stating moral obligations like the R2P hardly influence action of political figures.ⁱⁱⁱ As described by *Clingendael*, normative views are rather used as a

compass in order to balance interests and settle priorities. Interests of individual countries and moral ideals of concepts like the R2P will not always be in line with each other. There will be a consideration in each case which, as practice shows, will not always result in favour of the R2P^{iv}; which confirms that identity representation and discourse do not influence foreign policy directly.

The events on 9-11 seem to be an important influence on this relationship before the new norms were fully adopted. As a consequence the “war on terror” became the guiding discourse and Human Security and R2P norms became secondary motivations, or as some say, just false legitimisations of the use of force. *Clingendael* concludes that this process also indicates that foreign policy is not a matter of clear-cut positions, but that priorities may emerge that politically and from a security point of view (seem) to be more important than others, resulting in priority shifts.^{iv} Other actors see the “war on terror” as a quick first reaction out of anger or fear without a clear theoretical or strategic foundation. In line with the findings of the document analysis above, *IKV Pax Christi* notices that the counter terrorism strategy related to the war on terror is slowly changing in the past two years towards one that contains more elements regarding the protection of civilians; they conclude that a Human Security counter terrorism strategy might be next step.ⁱ

This process of shifting discourses could as well be seen within the Dutch contribution to the mission in Iraq. According the actors perspectives this is not only a consequence of discourse, but of the relationship between discourse and power. As formulated by *Pax Ludens*:

“dat heeft deels te maken met de war on terror maar dat heeft ook deels te maken met onze relatie met amerika, want amerika is een van onze grootste trading partners. Zij zijn toch the security captain van europa, waardoor wij ook meegaan in het verhaal van hun, dat is gewoon een transactie. Volgens mij exporteren wij voor 65 biljoen euro naar amerika, dat is een relatie die wil je graag zo houden.”ⁱⁱ

Micro justice 4 all acknowledges that the guiding discourse partially depends upon the powerful individuals in the world, and some of those individuals, like Bush at that time, do not get (or do not want to get) Human Security and the R2P as it was intended.ⁱⁱⁱ To conclude, it took over 10 years for the Dutch government to adopt Human Security within their foreign policy discourse because besides the bureaucratic problems that hamper the adoption of al

kinds of innovative strategies and norms, the relationship between discourse and power is essential within the endorsement of Human Security and the R2P. The events on 9-11 instigated a shift of the powerful policy discourse towards one which prioritises state-security.

2. Transforming norms into action

The second stage of the implementation process starts with transforming norms into policy or action. Although the norms imbedded in the Human Security approach and R2P are adopted as guiding policy discourse within Dutch foreign policy, the actual implementation still faces difficulties especially within the decision-making process. As mentioned above, the relationship between identity representation and policy is not direct. Several factors seem to influence this relationship. The factors that guide the decision-making process in foreign policy that are mentioned by the actors include: the media, electoral success, and personal interests of policy makers. Besides those politically related factors, the lack of capacity and the lack of operationalisation of the normative concepts are suggested problems.

The political factors are outlined by *Pax Ludens*, *IKV Pax Christi*, *Micro Justice 4* all and *The Dutch Red Cross*. A generally shared idea is that political institutions always face difficulties complementing national interests and moral idealism. Especially in times of the financial crisis the state perspective might gain importance over the people-centric perspectives of Human Security and the R2P.

*“Alles wat je doet in het buitenland, dus ontwikkelingssamenwerking, inzet van de krijgsmacht, moet allemaal bijdrage aan de positie van NL en het nationale belang van NL... zodat het hier banen en geld opleverd. De vraag is hoe zich dat de komende jaren gaat ontwikkelen. Ook omdat je ziet dat de focus op het nationale belang zo groot is en omdat er in sommige gevallen strijdigheid is tussen het bevorderen van Human Rights in een land en het nationaal belang in een ander land”.*ⁱ

The other actors described similar processes during the interviews. The state perspective seems more important when it comes to decision-making in order to legitimise cash flows to their electoral adherents. According *IKV Pax Christi* this is a logical process as Human Security fits a long term strategy; the advantages and effectiveness of such a strategy might not be obvious on the short term which might result in decreasing electoral support.ⁱ

Additionally, as mentioned by *Pax Ludens*, the political figures and policy makers do not want to lose their jobs, especially not in times of a financial crisis.ⁱⁱ

Besides the political processes that hamper pure Human Security action, a lack of capacity and the vagueness of the discourse seem to influence the relationship between discourse and policy. First of all, especially when looking at R2P enactment, the Netherlands is a small country with limited military capacity and resources. All actors acknowledge the fact that they are not able to undertake action on their own. *Pax Ludens* even states that we are already punching above our belt when it comes to acting in the international arena.ⁱⁱ So the decision-making process around R2P missions depends partially on the Security Council and willingness of other states with larger capacity. As we like to put ourselves on the map, the decision to participate within missions of others is not enough based on a shared vision on how to deal with problems within the complex context of fragile or failing states, but again on power relations within the international system. Within the decision making process, the actual cause and content of the mission should be more important than the drive to improve our position within the international system. Which leads me to the following problem: what does the content of a Human Security and R2P mission look like?

The Human Security approach and R2P are seen as normative concepts and not as strategy. In line with what is described within the literature review this causes implementation problems according to the interviewed actors. All actors that work with the concept mention the comprehensiveness of the Human Security discourse as its weakness.

“Nu kun je heel makkelijk zeggen wij werken daar en daar aan Human Security omdat alles Human Security is, en dat is de grote valkuil, dat je altijd kan zeggen dat je werkt aan HS. Dat is denk ik de zwakte...ook daar zou niet alleen door overheden maar ook door het maatschappelijk middenveld nog wel een slag kunnen worden gemaakt. Ik bedoel, een strong discourse is één ding maar hanteerbaar voor praktisch beleid is weer wat anders.”ⁱ

Or as formulated by *The Clingendael Institute*:

“Er wordt door veel organisaties verwezen naar het concept, en het duikt ook regelmatig op, maar het probleem is dat het concept erg breed is (vage definitie) en

weinig operationeel, daardoor kan iedereen het claimen zonder verantwoordelijk te zijn voor het oppakken en uitwerken ervan. Daardoor blijft het veelal bij verwijzingen en algemene acceptatie ervan als een “doel” waarmee niemand het oneens kan zijn.”^{iv}

The results of the policy document analysis discussed above show however, that the Dutch government made a good start with the operationalisation of Human Security concepts. The problem is that the undertakers of the missions in which they participate do not share the Dutch strategy; getting on the same page on an international level is the main problem and the vagueness of Human Security and R2P as strategy contributes to that.

3. The enactment of Human Security

The case study on Uruzgan showed that getting on the same page, or achieving a shared strategy remains problematic when committing to action. When it comes to the actual enactment of a Human Security approach in Uruzgan the respondents of this research detect two lacks in the implementation efforts that are in line with the additional findings of the TLO discussed earlier. The problem areas are theoretically situated between incoherent agency and changing local power structures. More concrete, there is a lack of cooperation between the lead nations within ISAF which influenced the perceptions of the local population negatively and created distrust among the population towards the government.

That cooperation between the different organisations and different organs within these organisations seems problematic was already mentioned by the advisory council in its 2009 report on fragile states:

“In the case of the crisis management operation in Afghanistan, it is noteworthy that each of the lead nations contributing to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) lends its own national interpretation to the operation...On paper there is a high level of cooperation within ISAF, in the form of Unity of Command, but in practice there is considerable scope for independent decision-making...In Afghanistan, it is barely managing to establish a coherent approach. International organisations like the UN, NATO and the European Union, and even different departments of each organisation, do not cooperate well with each other” (AIV 2009: 55).

This seems to be a typical problem in almost all international interventions when only effective agency will lead to structural change. The findings of TLO confirm this incoherence. The respondents of their research, for example, mentioned the selective engagement of strongmen as allies by US-led Coalition Forces and the Dutch tried to counterbalance this by engaging those Tokhi and Barakzai leaders that were excluded from this alliance (TLO 2010:50) This indicates that neutrality and inclusion of all communities within the reconstruction process is only present within the Dutch mandate which is not shared with their US companions. The data collected though the interviews in this research confirm the problems with separate mandates of different organisations involved. *Pax Ludens* even indicated that some problems concerned with strategy are a consequence of the differences in mandates of our own Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs.ⁱⁱ

These cooperation problems shine through in the perceptions of the local population. As TLO puts it; despite efforts of cooperation, the local perception is that the Dutch engagement is frequently at odds with that of US-led Coalition Forces under Operation Enduring Freedom focussing on counter-terrorism (TLO 2010:50). The local population predominately perceives contradictions between the Dutch approach of ‘reconstruction where possible, military action where necessary’ and the more aggressive counter-terrorism strategy of US troops (ibid.). According TLO, Australians are perceived in between, supporting both Dutch development efforts as well as providing man power to the American-led contingent in capture and kill missions (ibid.).

Although the Dutch are generally seen in a favourable light, there is an ambivalence perception regarding the international presence in Uruzgan as a consequence of the cooperation lack (TLO 2010: 52). The interviews of TLO with the local population indicate that at times community distrust increases because of different IMF mandates and independent operations, which is locally interpreted as “*lacking coordination*” or “*internal disagreements*” (ibid.). With these bad perceptions of the international community intervening the distrust in the government might increase as well as this government is supported by the international military forces. This is how a lack of cooperation and shared strategy might influence local perceptions and therefore influence the results of the Dutch efforts in establishing good governance. *The Dutch Red Cross* confirmed in the interview the importance of local perception in order to succeed. According to them, this is a reoccurring problem within humanitarian assistance provided by states; military forces will always remain

a political instrument and therefore their motives will always be questioned. A neutral position in humanitarian interventions is very hard to obtain by a political institution.^v Therefore it is important to only participate in an intervention or rebuilding efforts when we intervene under shared mandate and strategy, so the Dutch efforts cannot be associated with contested missions like “*enduring freedom*”.

To conclude, the Dutch are able to enact in a mission with the operational objective to develop and assure future Human Security of the local population. However, due to a lack of successful cooperation the local perceptions are negatively influenced and distrust might increase which in this case led to moderate results when it comes to good governance. The absence of shared discourse or strategy led to insufficiently coherent agency in order to change structure.

4. Recommendations

Besides detecting the location of the implementation problem, the participants were asked how to solve the above mentioned problems and how to concretely improve implementation and policy. Together with my own recommendations, the suggested improvements to be made within the different areas of the theoretic framework: Agency, Structure and Discourse, will be presented.

Agency

Agency is the most important factor in order to transform discourse fruitfully into action. Now that there is theory the focus should lie on finding concrete action that gives substance to this theory within a specific context. An evaluation of the local context will help to decide what needs to be done in order to start an effective conflict sensitive development process.

- We recommend, be more pragmatic within this operationalisation process.

“Anders werkt het allemaal op een abstract niveau.. We moeten veel pragmatischer worden in de aanpak. Je moet je werk niet uitzonderingen maar op de massa van mensen. Over de hele linie moet je mensen helpen en daarin moet je pragmatisch zijn”. (Micro Justice 4 all)

Further operationalisation of concepts will transform Human Security from a norm to a strategy. Once there is a strategy implementation within structure becomes easier.

Implementing Discourse in Structure

Besides operationalising concepts, institutionalising them will contribute to a more direct relationship between identity representation and policy. An example of transforming structure internationally as mentioned above is by limiting the veto powers of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, so the decision to act is more likely. However, this thesis concerns the Dutch implementation problem and international structure reform as described here will not contribute to the improvement of the Dutch implementation efforts per se. In order to implement the concept of protecting civilians in times of a humanitarian crisis, the Dutch military forces need reform. The Dutch already chose a new profile: a multiple deployable military force. However, due to all the cuts that need to be made, a multiple deployable force might be able to contribute to a short term intervention only, and not to a long term Human Security strategy.

“Want als je daadwerkelijk bij wilt dragen aan de R2P, mensen rechten en Human Security, dan moet je langdurig bij kunnen dragen aan verschillende missies, door een krijgsmacht die zich specialiseert in het beschermen van burgers”. (IKV Pax Christi)

- Therefore, we would recommend to specialise the Dutch institutions to protect civilians in times of crisis, so the military force can contribute to R2P and Human Security efforts with the limited capacity it has.

Promote Discourse

When there is a clear Dutch strategy and operationalisation of a Human Security approach which is fully implemented in Dutch policy and structure, this discourse should be promoted so it might become a shared view in future international action. As the mission in Uruzgan shows, the Dutch approach lies ahead when it comes to the implementation of a Human Security approach compared to the strategies of the US, Germany and Australia.

- We recommend to explicate this Dutch strategy within future missions and promote the importance of a Human Security approach in order to achieve sustainable results. Besides, the Netherlands should only join missions when equality and neutrality are guiding principles shared by forces of all lead nations.
- A second recommendation is to never react to an event or a direct state security threat with a quick first reaction. The reaction to an event similar to 9-11 should be part of a long term political strategy in order to be effective. Take away the soil for state insecurity instead of instigating a cycle of violence.
- We therefore recommend to inform other state actors on the complementary character of state and Human Security.

As formulated by *IKV Pax Christi*:

“wij zien geen directe tegenstelling tussen Human Security en state security, maar Human Security is het enige dat bijdraagt aan state security met dat mechanisme dat ik net uitlegde dat je bijvoorbeeld de voedingsbodem wegneemt voor terrorisme, dan werk je aan state security door te werken aan Human Security. Ik denk dat het heel goed mogelijk is dat internationale organisaties de Human Security strategie gaan gebruiken en dat ze er van overtuigd raken dat dat uiteindelijk de enige manier is ook in statelijke belangen”. (*IKV Pax Christi*)

5. Additional results

The literature on how to improve the above problems indicates that a network of (non governmental) agents should be responsible for the promotion of Human Security norms and pushing action in the right direction. The findings of this research however, indicate the network of actors in the Netherlands faces the same problems as the government; selective selection of the use of the concept; self-interests (maintenance of jobs, lobbying for funding instead of ideology), and a lack of coordinating efforts. Besides, in order to promote a policy discourse properly it must be the guiding, or at least an important, policy discourse of the actors themselves. This was only the case with one of the participating organisations *IKV Pax Christi*; and together with *Clingendael* they are as well the only organisation that engages in attempts to operationalise the Human Security discourse on a regular basis. The most actors

recognise these problems but *IKV Pax Christi*, *Micro justice 4 all* and *The Dutch Red Cross* still see it as their job to provide governments with the people-centric perspectives so future action is based on the needs of the local population on the ground.

V. Conclusion

In this concluding chapter the research questions and related sub-questions will be answered according to the above presented results. This information will clearly answer; whether or not the Dutch government and the international community face an implementation problem of the Human Security discourse and the R2P doctrine; where the implementation problem is located within the process; and how those problems should be solved in order to achieve adequate action according to Human Security and R2P principles in case of humanitarian crises.

1. How did the Human Security policy discourse of the UNDP influence Dutch foreign policy from 1994 until now?

First, the new people-centric policy discourse of the UNDP influenced Dutch foreign policy by adopting Human Security concepts into the normative language within the identity representation of policy subjects and policy objectives. Later, when this language became the guiding policy discourse, the Human Security approach started to influence Dutch foreign policy.

In 2005, the first attempt to integrate this new approach within the Dutch foreign policy discourse took place. At this time, the Human Security approach served as an additional perspective besides state-security. This new policy is still based on national interests, and humanity, human rights, solidarity and international peace and security are additional factors that justify the course of action. Therefore, although human rights and solidarity are mentioned as additional motives, the Dutch approach on peace- and state building in 2005 is not people-centric enough to be part of the Human Security discourse when it comes to identity representation. In order to be fully adopted, Human Security should be seen as the strategy perspective that automatically leads to state-security. When this idea is adopted within the policy discourse, the theory on what needs to be done in order to achieve human- and state- security will change and future policy will be focussed on Human Security.

In 2008 the Human Security perspective gained importance and became the guiding approach on how to deal with fragile states and how to give substance to counter terrorism policy. The responsibility to assure welfare of others was accepted and believed to be serving the national interests as well. Besides the people-centric perspectives, the theoretical ideas on how to achieve Human Security were adopted; attention is paid to the underlying causes of the conflict and there must be recognition of the interrelatedness of development, peace and respect for human rights. As the analysis results show, the government now does emphasise that the goals and activities within various sectors must tie in closely with one another. And the new policy discourse does refer to how development of men and women on the ground affects the stability in their daily lives and how they take active part in the search for the country's peace and stability

Now the identity perspective and theory behind the Human Security approach is adopted, the policy discourse of the UNDP started to influence actual policy. The three domains that need work to achieve security and development are; enhancing the security of citizens; contributing to a legitimate government with sufficient capacity; creating a peace dividend (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008:9). Within the operationalisation to achieve these objectives, ensuring bodily security by contributing to stabilisation and conflict management missions of EU, NATO and the UN comes first. Together with strategies like SSR, DDR and Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) that should provide additional security. Second, capacity building can start with stimulating fair elections to establish a legitimate government and support; the establishment of the rule of law; a monopoly on the legitimate use of force; administrative control; investment in human capital through education and health care; etc.

Despite the growing influence of the Human Security policy discourse on Dutch foreign policy, there are three observations that indicate the implementation of a full Human Security approach is not there yet; the policy predominantly concerns the promotion of norms and funding rather than actual Human Security action on the ground; when a contribution to a mission is made not enough attention is paid to the protection of the local population; and the only region where an integrated approach is said to be fully enacted is Uruzgan from 2009 onwards. As this study indicates, there seems to be some selectivity in the usage of a state- or Human Security perspective when deciding to act according to the Human Security principles or to act at all.

To conclude, the Human Security approach of the UNDP did induce the transformation of the Dutch foreign policy discourse AND the actual foreign policy when it comes to good donorship and Human Security action on the ground. However, there is still room for improvement both within the implementation of the approach as within the actual enactment.

2. *How did the R2P policy doctrine of the ICISS influence Dutch foreign policy from until now?*

This influence of the R2P doctrine on Dutch foreign policy can be discussed relatively brief. The moral norms that are imbedded within this doctrine are highly appealing to the Dutch government as it fits their emphasis on human rights; however, its military capacity limits the possibilities for the actual enactment. Therefore, the influence of the R2P doctrine on Dutch foreign policy consists mainly of adopting norms which has led to Dutch efforts to promote the international acceptance of this responsibility.

The actual policy is guided through the three pillars identified by the 2005 report of the Secretary General of the United Nations. Pillar one stresses that sovereign states bear primary responsibility for protecting their populations against the four R2P crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Pillar Two addresses the commitment of the international community to assist states in meeting their obligations, notably through capacity building. Finally, Pillar Three focuses on the responsibility of member states to respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a state cannot or will not protect its population against the four R2P crimes.

From 2009 the R2P occupies an important place within Dutch foreign policy, which particularly aims at promoting human rights and developing the international legal order. The efforts that contribute to the first pillar that constitutes the R2P framework predominantly consist of outreach activities and promotion of the human rights norms. The second pillar provides the additional motivation for effective Human Security policy in fragile states. The influence of pillar three instigated the new R2P promotion policy of the Dutch government. Among other efforts, this is done by co-chairing the Group of Friends of R2P in New York which addresses concerns of critics that the right to intervene will be abused, through bilateral talks and seminars. In addition, the government advocates for reform of the legal order to

improve decision-making to undertake action by limiting the veto powers of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council in case of mass atrocity situations.

Less is said about what needs to be done on the ground to end large scale ethnic cleansing or other R2P situations. No attention is paid to an operationalised doctrine that is specialised in the protection of civilians on the ground. There is no policy that describes how our national forces should be prepared to participate in such missions. To conclude, we could say the norms and underlying ideas that constitute the R2P doctrine receive Dutch government support. Besides, the government is dedicated to promote these norms and human rights laws; invests in preventing R2P situations; and minimise big power interests in decision-making to act. The influence of the R2P doctrine reaches Dutch foreign policy as far as the adoption and promotion of norms which is not yet the same as acting by it.

3. *Why does the international community still fail to react to humanitarian crises regarding R2P and Human Security principles?*

First of all I would like to state that the literature that instigated this sub-question is a little backward in the sense that this study indicates that implementation efforts do not fail completely. As described above, the Netherlands does undertake action regarding the normative principles that constitute the Human Security approach. Besides, some argue the intervention in Libya to be a pure R2P mission. Therefore, in order to provide a better answer this question should be reformulated into: *Why is the international community still facing trouble to react to humanitarian crises regarding R2P and Human Security principles.* I will be answering this, by focussing on what hampers the effects of Dutch R2P and Human Security policy with some comments on what troubles the whole international community to act according these principles.

This study shows that the Dutch policy discourse is highly influenced by the Human Security approach of the UNDP. However, there is no direct link between the policy discourse and the actual policy or actions. The results of this research show how several factors within *Discourse, Structure and Agency* influence the relationship between policy discourse and action; contextual factors, like the current recession and the 9-11 events; material factors, like the capacity to undertake action; limited agency, like the lack of cooperation; and insufficient operationalisation due to vagueness of concepts.

In general, the contextual factors determined the popularity of a particular policy discourse at that time. After the terrorist attacks on 9-11, it seems legitimate to choose a counter terrorism strategy that deals with state-security on the short term; especially in times of a financial crisis, state-security discourses will gain popularity over a Human Security discourse. Once dealt with the immediate state security threat, the Human Security approach gained popularity and adoption within the Dutch policy discourse a fact. Transforming this policy discourse into actual policy however, remains problematic. First of all, due to a lack of capacity, Dutch policy highly depends on the willingness of others to act. Reaching international consensus on the decision to act is a tough political process, especially without clear guidelines within the doctrines on how to act when. Besides, when the international community does decide to act, the normative concepts prove to be too broad or too vague to provide operational utility directly and reaching a shared strategy seems hard. In practice, this vagueness of concepts and the lack of a shared strategy leads to bad cooperation between the different actors on the ground. In the case of the mission in Uruzgan this instigated distrust among the local population which hampers local access to provide services and therefore the effectiveness of action. Besides the self-interests of all political actors, this is why the international community still faces trouble when it comes to acting according to the normative principles imbedded in the Human Security and R2P doctrine.

4. *How to achieve a successful Human Security policy within the reaction of the international community towards humanitarian crises according to the Dutch actors involved? What are the roles of what particular actors?*

As this study shows, in order to achieve successful implementation of the Human Security approach and the R2P doctrine, the problems within *Discourse, Structure and Agency* as described above need to be solved.

First of all, the Human Security *discourse* should be transformed into a strategy with direct operational utility. This operationalisation process should take place within the different levels of society; on the international level the UN member states need to reach consensus on how to act when in order to protect civilians in a more pragmatic way; the Dutch government as well should continue to work on a Dutch civil-military pragmatic strategy to protect the

Human Security of civilians; and civil-society organisations should contribute to unite policy and discourse by designing activities that fit the Human Security approach.

Second, when moral norms are transformed into strategy, the decision-making process should be optimised in favour of action. This should be done by transforming *structure* on UN and state-level. On UN level, the veto rights of the permanent members of the Security Council should be limited in cases of large scale human rights violations in order to reach consensus to undertake action more easily. On state level, the Dutch military forces should reform to optimise the enactment of this new strategy. By specialising the Dutch institutions to protect civilians in times of crisis the military force can contribute to R2P and Human Security efforts with the limited capacity it has.

The implementation and reform processes need to be encouraged by *agency*. The Dutch government and social midfield organisations should contribute to that by keeping structural reform and R2P strategy development on the international agenda and inform state-actors on how Human Security will add to state-security on the long term. When the discourse has transformed into strategy with immediate policy implications, and structural reform contributes to the likeliness that the international community will act by it, good *agency* will assure the effectiveness of action. A recommendation is to never react to an event or a direct state security threat with a quick first reaction. The reaction to an event similar to 9-11 should be part of a long term political strategy in order to be effective. Take away the soil for state insecurity instead of instigating a cycle of violence. The Netherlands should only join missions when a similar sustainable strategy is shared by forces of all lead nations. Besides, cooperation between the different (state-) actors needs to be optimised by explicating this shared strategy.

What aspects of implementing the Human Security Discourse within the responses of the Dutch government towards Humanitarian crises and violent conflict fail according to the Dutch (non-) state actors involved? How can we improve the implementation of a Human Security approach in the Netherlands and the international community to ensure adequate action?

As this study indicates, the implementation process encounters problems within three stages of implementation; first the adoption of norms within the policy discourse; second, the

decision-making to act by these norms; and third, the problems within the actual enactment of effective Human Security or R2P action.

The implementation of the Human Security approach had a slow start due to the events on 9-11. This research shows that in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks the discourse around the “war on terror” gained popularity, which hampered the adoption of the Human Security and R2P norms within the counter terrorism and fragile state policy discourse. Although the Netherlands shifted back towards full adoption of a Human Security policy framework, repressive counter terrorism strategies are still popular with other state actors. Therefore, the Dutch government should commit to the promotion of R2P and Human Security norms and explicate how a long term Human Security strategy will add to state security.

Decision-making to intervene is always a tough political process, especially when reaching consensus on a shared strategy on how to intervene successfully seems hard. Within this research, the broadness and vagueness of the Human Security and R2P concepts prove to be a reoccurring problem. Human Security and R2P are doctrines that are constituted by moral norms which do not contain direct policy implications. These norms need to be transformed into strategy before they are able to have operational utility. The international community, the Dutch government and NGOs should operationalise the moral concepts on different levels of society; from development activities on the ground to clear guidelines on when to intervene militarily.

The case study on Uruzgan included in this research indicates that similar factors hamper the effectiveness of the actual enactment of the Human Security approach. Incoherent agency and the lack of shared strategy contribute to distrust of the local population which negatively influences the effects of the Dutch efforts to achieve Human Security in Uruzgan. In order to improve cooperation the development of a shared strategy is essential. The Dutch government can contribute to that development by promoting the Dutch policy discourse internationally. Besides, in order to prevent negative local perceptions, the Dutch government should only join in on missions with a clear Human Security or R2P objective and strategy.

VI. Discussion

In this final chapter I will briefly discuss the strong and weak points of this research and provide recommendations for future research within this domain.

I will start positively by discussing the strong points of this MA thesis which can be found within its originality. There is a lot of literature on the Human Security approach and the responsibility to protect, but never on the actual process of implementation. Besides, the perspectives of the actors that should work with these approaches were never included. The *non state* actors' perception is important because of their assumed role as providers of knowledge, concern and confidence in order to mobilize political will to engage in an intervention with a humanitarian objective where national interests are just a secondary motivation. The case study added an extra dimension as well, because not much attention was paid before on the evaluation of the actual enactment of the approaches. A positive side effect of this thesis is that the interviewed actors were stimulated to think about these discourses again, and what they can do to promote them.

There are some shortcomings as well. Unfortunately the ministries of foreign affairs and defence did not care to share their perspectives on the implementation problems. This would add extra reliable information which is important to measure political motivation and will to enforce and assure Human Security by undertaking peace missions. Additionally, it would have shed light on the levels of cooperation between the two ministries and between international actors. Another shortcoming is that the focus of this research is on Dutch policy only. This thesis concerns a subject which is as well relevant on the international and UN level. Knowledge about the implementation all over the world is needed to guide the development of an internationally shared Human Security strategy and improve cooperation.

Therefore, I would recommend focusing future research within these domains on the elements that needed improvement; cooperation networks on state and interstate level; the implementation and operationalisation of Human Security and R2P principles within other states; and the evaluation of future Human Security enactment efforts like the Dutch Uruzgan mission.

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^{iv} Expert's interview with Luc van de Goor related to The Clingendael Institute

^v Expert's interview with Eelco Brouwer related to The Dutch Red Cross