

KEEP YOUR FRIENDS CLOSE BUT YOUR ENEMIES CLOSER

Building sustainable peace in times of
repression

Simone van der Post

3138305

Utrecht University

12th of August 2011

A Thesis submitted to the Board of Examiners in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in Conflict Studies & Human Rights

Supervisor: Chris van der Borgh

Date of Submission: 12th of August 2011

Programme Trajectory followed: Internship (15 ECTS) and Thesis (15 ECTS)

Word Count: 14,944 words

List of Abbreviations

ACIN	Asociación de Cabildos de Indígenas Norte del Cauca
ANDI	Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia
AUC	Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
CIMA	Comité de Integración del Macizo Colombiano
CINEP	Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular
CNAI	Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris
CRIC	Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca
ELN	Ejército de Liberación Nacional
EPL	Ejército Popular de Liberación
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
Fensuagro	Federación Nacional Sindical Unitaria Agropecuaria
FuCuDe	Fundación Cultura Democrática
FIP	Fundación Ideas para la Paz
Indepaz	Instituto de estudios para el desarrollo y la paz
ISMAC	Instituto María Cano
M-19	Movimiento 19 de Abril
NGO	non-governmental organisation
REDEPAZ	Red Nacional de Iniciativas por la Paz y contra la Guerra
USO	Unión Sindical Obrera

Table of Contents

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	I
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	V
INTRODUCTION	1
§ 1 PEACEBUILDING AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION.....	1
§ 2 CHAPTER OVERVIEW	3
CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	4
§ 1 ASSUMPTIONS	4
§ 2 ANALYSIS	5
2.1 <i>Actors</i>	5
2.2 <i>Intervention levels</i>	6
2.3 <i>Timeframes</i>	7
§ 3 STRATEGY.....	8
§ 4 CRITIQUE	10
4.1 <i>Peace as an end-state</i>	10
4.2 <i>Building relationships</i>	11
§ 5 CONCLUSION	12
CHAPTER 2: ORGANISATIONS	14
§ 1 METHODOLOGY	14
§ 2 ORGANISATION SAMPLE	17
2.1 <i>Sector organisations</i>	18
2.2 <i>Specialised organisations</i>	19
2.3 <i>General development organisations</i>	19
2.4 <i>Other</i>	20
2.5 <i>Sample used for analysis</i>	20
§ 3 RELATIONAL APPROACH	21
§ 4 CONCLUSION	21
CHAPTER 3: COLOMBIAN CONFLICT AND PEACE CONTEXT	23
§1 THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT	23
§ 2 ATTEMPTS TO PEACE	24
§ 3 CONCLUSION	27
CHAPTER 4: PEACEBUILDING IN THE COLOMBIAN CONTEXT	29
§ 1 SPECIALISED ORGANISATIONS	29

1.1 <i>The organisations</i>	29
1.2 <i>Activities</i>	31
§ 2 SECTOR ORGANISATIONS	35
2.1 <i>The organisations</i>	35
2.2 <i>Activities</i>	37
§ 3 CONCLUSION	38
CHAPTER 5: DIFFICULTIES IN THE RELATIONAL APPROACH	40
§ 1 REPRESSION	40
§ 2 RELATIONSHIP BUILDING UNDER THE REPRESSION	41
§ 3 RELATIONSHIP BUILDING CAPACITIES	45
§ 4 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE CAPACITY FOR BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS	46
4.1 <i>Cauca</i>	46
4.2 <i>Bogotá</i>	47
§ 5 CONCLUSION	48
CONCLUSION	50
§ 1 RELATIONSHIP-BUILDING CAPACITIES DURING TIME OF REPRESSION	50
§ 2 LEDERACH'S MODEL AND REPRESSION	51
BIBLIOGRAPHY	54
PRIMARY SOURCES	54
<i>Video</i>	54
<i>Documents via Internet</i>	54
<i>Unpublished electronic documents</i>	55
SECONDARY SOURCES	55
<i>Published and unpublished sources</i>	55
<i>Documents via Internet</i>	57
ANNEX 1	60
TOPIC GUIDE	60
<i>Objetivos</i>	60
<i>Introducción personal</i>	60
1. <i>Datos personales</i>	60
2. <i>Actividades de paz</i>	60
3. <i>Actitud enfrente del conflicto</i>	61
4. <i>Visión resolución del conflicto</i>	61
5. <i>Relaciones</i>	62
6. <i>Cierre</i>	62

ANNEX 2 63
LIST OF INTERVIEWS 63

Acknowledgements

Esta tesis no hubiera sido posible sin la ayuda de algunas personas. Primero quisiera expresar mi agradecimiento a Luis “Lucho” Celis de la Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris. El hizo posible que pude hacer una pasantilla en la Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris. Ahí pude observar el trabajo de organizaciones de construcción de paz desde adentro. Además Lucho fue el que me ayudo hacer los contactos con casi todas las personas necesarias para la investigación para esta tesis. Lucho, muchas gracias por todo el apoyo.

También quisiera expresar mi agradecimiento a Donka Atanasova, Henri Caballero, Walter Aldana y Alhena Caicedo por su ayuda en establecer el contacto con los sujetos de mi investigación.

Además quisiera agradecer los representantes de ANDI, FIP, FuCuDe, Justapaz, Indepaz, USO, CRIC, ACIN, Planeta Paz, CNAI, Fensuagro, Congreso de los Pueblos, Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres Cauca, CIMA, Casa de la Mujer, Asamblea Permanente de la Sociedad Civil para la Paz y los Congresos Comunitarios Afro-Colombianos del norte del Cauca por su tiempo, paciencia y voluntad para hablar conmigo.

Últimamente quisiera agradecer mis colegas pasantes en la Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris por la compañía, la risa y apoyo moral durante la pasantilla y mi investigación.

Simone van der Post
Utrecht, August 2011

Introduction

Looking back on the 1990s and 2000s, the post-Cold War world has not become a more peaceful place. The 1990s were plagued by conflict in the Balkans, Rwanda, Somalia and many other regions of the world. The end of the 1990s was more hopeful, with the end of most of the conflicts in the Balkan, the peace agreement in Ireland and other achievements of peace builders. The hope with which the new millennium started was of a short lifespan, however. The attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent War on Terror with all its violence marked the 2000s.

This global trend can also be discerned in Colombia, where the 47-year old conflict, one of the oldest in the world, still rages. After the peace agreements with several, but not all, (factions of) guerrilla groups which culminated in the new Constitution of 1991, the 1990s were filled with army, guerrilla and paramilitary violence. However, the peace-movement flourished, culminating in the election of President Pastrana, giving him a clear mandate to negotiate with the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), Colombia's biggest guerrilla group. These negotiations took place at the beginning of the 2000s, but were a failure. Uribe was elected President and, influenced by the global War on Terror, started a heavy military campaign against the guerrilla throughout the remainder of the 2000s. A part of this military campaign was to declare all those against his war-tactics terrorists, including peace builders and human rights defenders. However, the peace-movement continued its work: Colombia has hundreds of national, regional and local peace initiatives.¹

§ 1 Peacebuilding and conflict transformation

Since the 1990s, 'peacebuilding' provides the framework in international literature on how to attain lasting peace. In 1992, Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros-Ghali presented his report *An agenda for peace*, in which he introduced the term peacebuilding as a post-conflict activity aimed at building sustainable peace.

¹ For an interesting overview of some of these initiatives, see Bouvier (2009).

Building on this notion, Lederach (1997) devised a framework for peacebuilding during war. He argues that in order to build sustainable peace, a conflict must be transformed by addressing both short-term issues of the conflict as producing social change that addresses the underlying causes of the conflict. Middle-range actors have the best potential for conflict transformation, as they have capacities to build bridges between adversaries. This relational approach is central to Lederach's theory, as he argues that relationships are central to both conflicts and their solutions.

The peacebuilding framework suggested by Lederach gives a toolbox for those working in the field of peacebuilding. As a matter of fact, various organisations use Lederach's concepts and model directly in their day-to-day work. Lederach's work was mentioned explicitly in various interviews I held and at meetings I attended. Also, his ideas underlie many of the discourses of the peacebuilding organisations I spoke to. It seems therefore interesting to take a look at the daily practice of peacebuilding organisations in Colombia through Lederach's model to see if it's strategy holds up in the Colombian context.

Extensive research by García-Durán (2006), Rettberg (2006) and Sandoval² demonstrates that the peace work done by organisations and movements in Colombia can be considered a peace-movement. It is therefore possible to group the efforts in this area together, and analyse their work on the basis of Lederach's model.

I have done this based on the question:

How do selected organisations of the peace-movement on Colombia seek to transform conflict through a relational approach in a political context that is adverse to peacebuilding efforts and what does this say about the usefulness of Lederach's approach?

² Luis Sandoval, an academic affiliated to the ISMAC (Instituto María Cano) and REDEPAZ (Red Nacional de Inicitivas por la Paz y contra la Guerra), published an extensive diptych study on the Colombian peace-movement in 2004: *La paz en movimiento Volumen 1: Realidades* Bogotá: ISMAC and *La paz en movimiento Volumen 2: Horizontes* Bogotá: ISMAC. Unfortunately both studies have gone out of print, so I could not review them. I did however, have an extensive interview with Luis Sandoval, Bogotá 9th of May of 2011, in which we, amongst other things, discussed this study.

Based on four months of research in Colombia with and on various organisations engaged in peacebuilding, I will argue that Lederach's framework is indeed useful to analyse the Colombian peace-movement. However, there are some aspects of the daily work of the organisations that comprise this peace-movement that are not taken into account in Lederach's model. My field research revealed that there are certain contextual aspects in the Colombian reality that seriously hamper or contribute to the effectiveness of the relational approach to peacebuilding undertaken by these organisations, leading to clear differences between two types of organisations.

§ 2 Chapter overview

In Chapter 1 I will first explain Lederach's model on the basis of an analysis of the assumptions, analysis and strategy underlying his framework. I will also provide a critique on the weaker points of his model. In Chapter 2 I will present the organisations studied in this research and make some methodological remarks, including on the relevance of the selection of the organisations I will use to support my main argument. Chapter 3 will take a look at the Colombian context of conflict and peace dynamics. I will provide a short overview of the conflict, its roots, actors and mayor developments, and take a closer look at the peace dynamics, describing the official peace negotiations, failed and successful. Continuing in Chapter 4, I will show how the two types of organisations fit into the Colombian context through their emergence and the work they do, focusing on the how and what kind of relationships these organisations have and seek. In Chapter 5, I will present an analysis of the difficulties the organisations under scrutiny face in their work. I will demonstrate how three contextual aspects of the Colombian conflict affect the work of the organisations, with clear differences between the two types of organisations mentioned. In the Conclusion I will conclude with an answer to the research question posed in this Introduction with an analysis of the implications the difficulties mentioned in the aforementioned chapter have on Lederach's framework.

Chapter 1: Theoretical framework

The theory Lederach (1997) presents in his book *Building Peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies* can be characterised as both positive as normative. As Richard Solomon states in his foreword to the book “The framework in *Building Peace* is conceptual in nature, but it has a distinctly practical orientation” (Lederach 1997:xi). To be able to achieve both these goals, Lederach’s theory consists of three dimensions: assumptions, analysis and strategies. In the following I will take a look at all three of these dimensions, constructing with them the framework under scrutiny in this thesis.

§ 1 Assumptions

As all theories, Lederach’s conflict transformation theory is based on assumptions. The first assumption is that peace is achievable: Lederach ends his book with the words “The house of peace can be built” (1997:152). Further, peace is not only achievable; actors within a conflict can construct peace. As Lederach puts it, peace is a “dynamic social construct. Such a conceptualization requires a process of *building*, involving investment and materials, architectural design and coordination of labour, laying of a foundation, and detailed finish work, as well as continuing maintenance.” (Lederach 1997:20)

He argues that reconciliation forms the basis of sustainable peace and that relationships are the basis of reconciliation. Reconciliation is therefore a place in which adversaries can build relationships and envision a joint future. Relationships form the basis for conflict and its solution, so it is very important to build relationships between adversaries to reach this reconciliation necessary for sustainable peace (Lederach 1997:23 - 35).

§ 2 Analysis

In his model, Lederach makes an analysis of three aspects that are relevant to the building of sustainable peace through reconciliation. These aspects are: 1) the actors involved in peacebuilding activities, 2) the levels in which these peacebuilding activities can be employed and lastly 3) the timeframes in which the actors implement their peacebuilding activities.

2.1 Actors

Lederach divides a society in conflict in three levels of leadership that can be involved in peacebuilding activities: the top level, the middle-range level and the grassroots level, see figure 1.

Top-level leaders are generally high-level military, political and religious leaders. They are highly visible in national and international media, making their workspace limited. In general, their peacebuilding activities are centred on high-level negotiations and ceasefires. Middle-range leaders are respected in society and generally not connected to the formal powers such as the government or the opposition groups. Usually they are people respected in certain sectors of society, ethnic/religious leaders, academics and NGO leaders. Their peacebuilding activities are focused on building the “infrastructure for achieving and sustaining peace” (Lederach 1997:46). Lederach identifies problem-solving workshops, conflict resolution training and peace commissions as peacebuilding activities to create that infrastructure for peace. The middle-range leaders have a special position in society, as they are able build bridges between all levels of leadership. They can build relationships with both top-level as well as grassroots leaders and build bridges between the adversaries through their central position in society. The last category of leaders Lederach mentions is the grassroots leadership. This category consists of local leaders that represent the masses, generally the segments of the society that are affected the hardest by the conflict. The peacebuilding efforts by grassroots leaders concentrate on local efforts in a bottom-up approach and pragmatic peace efforts (Lederach 1997:38 - 55).




Figure 1: Taken from Lederach (1997: 39)

2.2 Intervention levels

Lederach continues his analysis of peacebuilding efforts by identifying four system levels in which peacebuilding activities can try to intervene. There are 4 levels of intervention: issue, relationship, subsystem and system. The issue level deals with the resolution of specific issues that lead to the conflict. This generally entails that the spark that lead to the eruption of the conflict is being addressed. The relationship level deals with the restoration of broken relationships, viewing the conflict as a rupture of relationships within a society. This goes a step further than the issues that sparked the conflict, but does not address or uncover underlying issues. The system level deals with the broad social structures that have lead to the conflict, addressing precisely those underlying issues. However, the system level is too broad to deal with a specific conflict, as conflicts have more aspects to them than only the

problems arising from the broad social structures. As mentioned before, the issue and relationship levels lack a broader perspective. To be able to deal with *all* issues and address a conflict constructively, an intermediate level is necessary: the subsystem level. This level seeks to address all the other levels of intervention through focussing on the immediate surroundings of the conflict parties, in that sense trying to incorporate the issues that lead to the conflict, the broken relationships between the conflicting parties and the broader structural problems that feed into the conflict (Lederach 1997:55 - 60).

2.3 Timeframes

The last aspect of Lederach's analysis concentrates on the timeframe in which peacebuilding activities are implemented. He distinguishes four different time frames, each with their own objectives. The first is a 2-6 month frame of crisis intervention. Peacebuilding activities in this timeframe are directed to efforts to stop the violence, brokering ceasefires to save the lives of those in the middle of the conflict. The second timeframe of a 1 to 2 year period deals with preparation and training to develop the necessary capacities to evaluate and address the conflict. In this timeframe peacebuilding goes beyond the pure humanitarian to be able to lay the first stones for a sustainable peace. The last frame encompasses generations and deals with the desire to imagine a future and to prevent future conflict. This timeframe is mainly focused on setting the ultimate goal of where the society that is now in conflict would want to be in a better, peaceful future. The gap between the first two short-term approaches and the last very long-term approach needs to be bridged, to be able to link stopping the violence to actually achieving the desired future. For this, Lederach suggests the third timeframe of 5-10 years. This encompasses the design of social change by linking the resolution of the immediate crisis to structural changes. The idea is that in this timeframe the humanitarian necessary work is linked to a deeper level of changing structures in society to be able to realise the desired future (Lederach 1997:74 - 79).

§ 3 Strategy

With the three units of analysis mentioned above: actors, intervention levels and intervention timeframes, Lederach devises a strategy of how to engage in peacebuilding activities that lead to a sustainable peace. The strategy is captured in a model (see figure 2), which puts the system-levels of intervention and the interventions timeframes on two axes. Between the two axes, Lederach discerns five points of intersection, which represent different communities of thought and action in the peacebuilding field: root causes, crisis management, vision, prevention and conflict transformation.

The first intersection occurs on the system level of response with the crisis intervention timeframe. This intersection deals with uncovering the root causes of the conflict. The second intersection arises in between the issue/relationship level of response and the crisis intervention timeframe. This crisis management deals with managing the immediate crisis at hand. The third intersection, prevention, is also on the issue/relationship level but this time crossed with the desired future timeframe. It deals with the question how to prevent the crisis from reoccurring in the future. The fourth intersection also deals with the desired future timeframe but looks at the system level of response. This intersection deals with the vision of the social structures and relationships that are desired in the society. The last intersection is in the centre, crossing the subsystem level of response with the design of social change timeframe. Here the question deals with how to get from a crisis to desired change, in other words, how to transform the conflict (Lederach 1997:79 - 81).

Lederach points out that conflict transformation holds the biggest potential for sustainable peacebuilding, as both the subsystem level of response and the design of social change timeframe hold the potential to link all levels of response and timeframes. This seems the most effective points to intervene in a conflict. Middle-range actors hold special potential for conflict transformation, as they are able to build bridges between all levels of a society and build bridges between them (Lederach 1997:81).




Figure 2: Taken from Lederach (1997:80)

Lederach defines conflict transformation in two ways: descriptive and prescriptive. Looking at it descriptively deals with the effects of conflict on society. Prescriptively, conflict transformation deals with deliberate intervention in the conflict to effect change in it. Both perspectives describe conflict transformation across four dimensions: personal, relational, structural and cultural. The personal dimension deals with efforts to minimize the destructive effects of the conflict on personal growth, on a physical, spiritual and emotional level. The relational dimension deals with minimizing poor communication and maximizing mutual understanding between conflict parties. Structurally, conflict transformation deals with providing insight into the root causes of the conflict and promoting non-violent conflict management through minimizing and eventually stopping the violence and providing for substantive (basic human needs) and procedural (participation in decision-making) justice. Lastly, the cultural dimension tries to identify the cultural

settings that lead to and/or sustain violence and build on the cultural settings that provide resources for non-violent conflict management (Lederach 1997:82 - 84).

The strategy Lederach for sustainable peacebuilding is thus, as Lederach puts it:

[an] integrated framework [that] provides a platform for understanding and respond to conflict and developing peacebuilding strategies. The overall process of conflict transformation is related to [the] broader theme of reconciliation inasmuch as it is oriented toward changing the nature of relationships at every level of human interaction and experience. (1997:83-84)

§ 4 Critique

The model of peacebuilding through conflict transformation presented by Lederach (1997) has two theoretical implications that seem to be problematic: first the idea that there is a quantifiable end-state called 'peace' and second that middle-range actors are able to build relationships and build bridges between actors in a conflict.

4.1 Peace as an end-state

In Lederach's theory, he seems to argue that if a conflict is transformed correctly, the transformed conflict turns into the desired end-state of peace. This is a problematic assumption. Lederach defines peace, if you could consider it a definition, as a dynamic social process that needs to be constructed. This implies that if you construct it properly, by transforming a violent conflict through social change, you can attain peace. This assumption seems a bit odd.

Richmond (2005) explains the conceptualization of peace. This is nowhere near clear, but there is a loose peacebuilding consensus based on the liberal peace framework. This framework is based on 4 types of peace: victor's peace, institutional peace, constitutional peace and civil peace. These four approaches to peace are united in the liberal peace framework, in the sense that a fine balance between these different, and sometimes contradicting, aspects of peace lead to liberal peace. This peace rests upon the resultant framework provided by democracy, the rule of law, human rights, free

trade and development. The liberal peace model has led to the current notion of peace-as-governance. The four approaches to peace each have their advantages and limitations, leading to different graduations of the application of the liberal peace model: the conservative model, the orthodox model and the emancipatory model. The peacebuilding consensus tries to combine all three approaches, but it only exists on very general terms and cannot stand up to close scrutiny. Furthermore, and maybe more importantly, Richmond (2005) points out that peace is subjective. What constitutes 'peace' is not alike for all, especially not for different actors in an armed conflict. As peace is a subjective term and the liberal-peace model does not bring a consensus about the term, speaking of peace as an end-stadium is impossible.

When applying this to Lederach's conflict transformation strategy, it seems that there will exist various desirable futures of peace and various ways of getting to one of those desired peace-futures. In his strategy, Lederach does not acknowledge this, nor does he provide a way of dealing with these different conceptions of peace or methods of reaching peace.

4.2 Building relationships

As mentioned before, Lederach puts a strong emphasis on relationships. He believes relationships between actors in a conflict are both the basis of the conflict as of its solution (Lederach 1997:26). For the solution of the conflict, it is not only important to have relations between actors in a conflict, but also encounters between them. There must be space to confront the differences between the actors and make room for their joint struggle for the solution. Lederach calls this space, or locus, reconciliation (Lederach 1997:27). His conflict transformation model is based on the premise that middle-range actors are able to build the bridges between actors and provide the space for reconciliation in order to work together towards peace. However, this line of thinking implies that deep down all actors are willing to cooperate with each other. As long as there is a middle-range actor that can tap into that willingness, obscured by the conflict, and can provide space for the encounter, actors will be able to reconcile and work together towards peace. This is a very optimistic position, at best.

During conflict, the essence of the violence is generally that actors are not willing to relate, encounter or reconcile. Asking middle-range actors to work through all that malice towards the well-hidden core of the actors in the conflict that *does* want to reconcile, is a very heavy task. This will only be possible if the actors themselves are also willing to cooperate, on their own accord. However, if this is not the case, or if, even worse, actors have decided that they will not cooperate, this task is an impossible one. Even more so when the actor(s) that have decided not to cooperate are those that have considerable power, also over the actions of middle-range actors, such as the state/government.

Dayton (2009) argues that third-party interventions can only be effective at certain points in the development of a conflict. He points to Zartman's 'ripe moment'. Third parties cannot force peace upon conflicting parties, but they can use windows of opportunity in the conflict dynamics that allow for a peaceful alternative to the violent contention (Dayton 2009:69-70). "Both sides have to be ready to engage before intermediary pressures, inducements, or assistance is likely to push them toward dramatic de-escalation" (Dayton and Kreisberg 2009:7).

Applying this to Lederach's peacebuilding strategy, it seems that putting all the emphasis on middle-range leaders seems unrealistic. They do not have the power to compel more influential actors to participate in their social change exercise.

§ 5 Conclusion

The core of Lederach's model for sustainable peacebuilding can be described as the strategy that middle-range actors should engage in transformative activities, in which they tie the issues that need immediate attention to a long-term vision of how a society should be. The activities should be directed at a subsystem level, keeping an eye on underlying structures, broken relationships between the adversaries as well as issues that sparked the conflict. Thus the activities should be directed towards achieving social changes that encompass all these levels in society, leading to a sustainable peace. To be able to achieve these social changes, it is very important to build relationships with all sectors of society, building bridges between them to be able to jointly implement the social change desired. This part is essential in building

sustainable peace, as relationships are both the basis of conflict and its solution. Middle-range actors hold a special potential for this relationship-building because of their central position in a society.

However, it should be kept in mind that there are two fundamental critiques on Lederach's model. First, the idea that transforming the conflict properly by building relationships between different sectors in society to implement social changes leads to sustainable peace seems a bit oversimplified. Richmond (2005) describes well that there is no one conception of peace, making it very difficult to attain 'peace' through social changes. Second, the relationship building capacity of middle-range actors is questioned by Dayton (2009), as he argues that conflict parties cannot be forced by outsiders to change their attitude towards the conflict. This change has to come from within the actors and, at best, can be aided by the outsiders.

In the following chapter I will take a look at the middle-range actors that form the basis for this research. I will describe my methodology in finding and researching these actors and will then introduce the sample used in this thesis. I will also take a closer look at the relational approach as understood in this thesis.

Chapter 2: Organisations

§ 1 Methodology

In order to investigate the practical implementation of Lederach's conflict transformational peacebuilding strategy, I conducted research in Colombia as a part of an internship at the Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris (CNAI). This is a Colombian NGO (non-governmental organisation) working on conflict analysis, victims of the conflict and political lobby³ for a public policy on peace. Here I got to observe the field of peacebuilding in Bogotá (Colombia's capital) from the inside, specifically how CNAI functioned. These observations serve as good triangulation data for the data I collected with my other techniques: interviewing and document analysis.

I held 18 official and 5 unofficial interviews with representatives from 16 organisations/movements that engaged in peacebuilding in one way or the other and 2 academics who published about peace organisations in Colombia. I selected these organisations on the basis of several criteria.

The first criterion was access. My supervisor at CNAI has many contacts in the peace-work world in Colombia. He helped me devise a list of interesting people/organisations to talk to and helped me initiate the contact with them. This method has advantages and disadvantages. Making contact with the people I was going to interview through my supervisor gave me easy access and, more importantly, created confidence with my interviewees, making it possible for me to ask difficult questions and getting straight answers. Of course it should always be kept in mind that interviews are subjective and should always be cross-referenced.

³ The term 'political lobby' is a translation of the Spanish term *incidencia política*. This term is used to describe an activity often pursued by NGOs. It is an activity in which an organisation (or person) actively tries to present their proposal on a specific topic to politics (this can be political parties, congress or the government). The goal of the activity is to have the proposal considered and adopted. However, the term encompasses the whole process of formulating, debating and presenting the proposal as well.

The disadvantage of selecting my interview-subjects through the contacts of CNAI is that I might have left out organisations that do important work in the area of peace-work for the simple reason that they do not have contact with CNAI. However, as I was doing my interviews, my interviewees did suggest other candidates for interviews. I had already considered most of these suggestions and had them on my list of interviewees. Those that were not on my list, I either contacted or I had considered them before and already decided not to include them in my research, for several reasons.

The second criterion for selecting these organisations was that they have a direct or indirect link with peace-work. My research is centred on the notion of peacebuilding and therefore it is logical to only interview those organisations that work on peace. However, it is not necessary for the organisations to have peace-work as a central activity. *Au contraire*, I actively searched for organisations that did not have peace-work as a central activity. This way I could take a look at organisations that use different approaches. It is, however, necessary that these organisations have a clear link with peace-work. For this qualification I relied on the expertise of my supervisor. He has been working in the peace-movement for many years and knows if organisations engage in peace-work or not. I did a very brief research into the organisations I chose, consisting of a visit to their webpage, to verify this qualification.

The third criterion was that the organisations I was going to interview are middle-range actors as Lederach argues that middle-range actors have special potential for conflict transformation. To be able to research the practical application of Lederach's model, it is therefore necessary to research these middle-range actors. Lederach (1997) defines these middle-range actors, or leaders as he calls them, as those who have access to the top-level leaderships in a conflict but also have good contact with grassroots levels. Furthermore, these leaders should not have or want political or military power and usually have pre-existing relationships with counterparts that cut across the divisions of the conflict (Lederach 1997:41-42).⁴

⁴ The last characteristic of middle-range leaders posited by Lederach is a difficult one in the Colombian context, as the conflict has been going on for so long (since the 1960s). I have therefore decided not to use this criterion too strictly when looking for middle-range leaders.

In the sample of organisations I researched, there are two categories of middle-range actors. The first category consisted of organisations in Bogotá. These organisations fitted into the classical definition of middle-range actors as stated above. The second category of organisations does not fit into the classic middle-range actor definition at first sight, as they are organisations representing grassroots communities. They are based in Cauca, one of the provinces of Colombia most harshly affected by the conflict.⁵ Next to these harsh effects, this province has a very high degree of social organisation.⁶ The level of organisation these organisations display makes them more than grassroots organisations. They are locally based, but are not based on individual membership. These organisations group together other leaders' structures, forming a step above them in the organisational hierarchy. Also, these organisations all have direct contacts on national level, precisely because of the high level of organisation. Therefore, they do fit into the definition of middle-range actor given by Lederach.⁷

The last criterion for selecting my sample is based on Barnes' (2005) categorisation of organisations working in the area of peacebuilding. She discerns three categories: organisations rooted in specific civil society sectors, organisations focused on policy and/or structural changes in society and organisations focused on specific conflict situations. For my sample I tried to get organisations from all three categories to get a diverse sample. Within the category of organisations rooted in specific civil society sectors, it naturally seemed important to get organisations from different of such civil society sectors. I therefore also paid attention to getting a diverse sample within this category.

The interviews I conducted were semi-structured. I made a topic guide to guide myself during the conduction of the interviews. In this topic guide I listed questions I

⁵ In Ávila Martínez and Núñez (2010) it is demonstrated that the ELN has a strong presence in Cauca. Ávila Martínez (2011) demonstrates the undiminished presence of the FARC in Cauca. Romero Vidal and Arias Ortiz (2011) demonstrate the strong presence of neo-paramilitary groups in the region. See also Barreto Henríquez (2009).

⁶ See Barreto Henríquez (2009) and Cortés Landázury and Sinisterra Rodríguez (2009).

⁷ The organisations in Cauca have held several mobilisations over the years of their existence. In one of the recent massive mobilisations in 2004, the CRIC, CIMA and others demanded a talk with President Uribe, and they got it. On two occasions the President sat down to talk to them. This shows that these organisations have influence on the top-level.

could ask during the interview in a logically structured order (see the topic guide, in Spanish in annex 1). However, the questions within the topic guide were not etched in stone. I used them to get a certain consistency between my interviews, but I gave sufficient room to the interviewees to tell their own story. This created a more relaxed setting for the interviewees and gave them the opportunity to add topics to the interview. This gave some interesting, and reoccurring, new topics adding to the relevance of my research.

The documentation I analysed consists mainly of texts written by the organisations I interviewed, displaying their views on peacebuilding. Further I analysed some academic texts of Colombian scholars who studied the Colombian peace movement. These texts serve as a great contextualisation of my data and also help to triangulate the data I gathered from the organisation under scrutiny in this research. Their academic outsiders perspective helps to take a step back and make a more objective analysis of the data collected.

§ 2 Organisation sample

The organisations that that I interviewed are:

- Asociación de Cabildos de Indígenas Norte del Cauca (ACIN);
- Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI);
- Asamblea Permanente de la Sociedad Civil por la Paz (Asamblea Peramamente);
- Comité de Integración del Macizo Colombiano (CIMA);
- Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris (CNAI);
- Congreso de los Pueblos;
- Consejos Comunitarios Afro-Colombianos del Norte del Cauca (Consejos Comunitarios);
- Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca (CRIC);
- Federación Nacional Sindical Unitaria Agropecuaria (Fensuagro);
- Fundación Cultura Democrática (FuCuDe);
- Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP);
- Instituto de estudios para el desarrollo y la paz (Indepaz);
- Centro Cristiano para Justicia, Paz y Acción Noviolenta (Justapaz);

- Proyecto Planeta Paz (Planeta Paz);
- Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres del Cauca (Ruta Pacífica); and
- Unión Sindical Obrera (USO).

These organisations can be categorised into the categories introduced by Barnes (2005) in the following manner. I included the gist of their work in the area of peacebuilding.

2.1 Sector organisations

The category of sector organisations consists of eight organisations: Fensuagro, ANDI, USO, CRIC, ACIN, Ruta Pacífica, CIMA and Consejos Comunitarios. Fensuagro is a national peasant organisation grouping many regional peasant organisations. They mainly work in the area of agrarian reform and giving voice to the needs of the agrarian community. They see their work as a precondition for peace, in that sense working as peace facilitators.⁸ ANDI is the largest national entrepreneur association in Colombia. They were present at the peace negotiations with the FARC in 1999-2002. Now they work with demobilised combatants and their reintegration into Colombian working society.⁹ The USO is the petroleum union of Colombia. They have a peace and human rights commission and were co-founders of the Asamblea Permanente.¹⁰ The CRIC is the regional *indígena*¹¹ organisation in Cauca grouping together the traditional leaders of all most all the different *indígena*-tribes in the region. They have an active peace programme.¹² The ACIN is an *indígena* organisation of the biggest tribe in Cauca and is part of the CRIC. However, they also have a strong, own peace programme.¹³ The Ruta Pacífica is the Cauca faction of a national women's organisation. They work with the effects of the conflict on women

⁸ Interview with a representative of Fensuagro, Bogotá 18th of May 2011 and the Fensuagro website: fensuagro.org (last viewed 01-08-11).

⁹ Interview with a representative of the ANDI, Bogotá 30th of May 2011 and an ex-representative of the ANDI, Bogotá 4th of May 2011.

¹⁰ Interview with a representative of the USO, Bogotá 5th of May 2011.

¹¹ The word '*indígena*' in Spanish is used to indicate ethnic groups that lived in the country before the Spanish invasion. The word has a connotation of pride and therefore I chose to not translate the word into English.

¹² See the CRIC website www.cric-colombia.org (last viewed 25-07-2011).

¹³ Interview with a representative of the ACIN, Bogotá 20th of May 2011.

and have a strong presence in the peace movement in Cauca.¹⁴ The CIMA is a peasant' organisation grouping together peasant communities in the south of Cauca. They work on mobilisation for peace and creating peace territories.¹⁵ The Consejos Comunitarios are organisations of Afro-Colombian communities. They are not formally recognised yet as the representation of the Afro-Colombian communities but have major conflicts over land with large companies.¹⁶

2.2 Specialised organisations

The organisations specialised in the specific conflict situation in Colombia are the FIP, Indepaz, Planeta Paz, CNAI and Asamblea Permanente. FIP is a research institution founded by Colombian entrepreneurs to research the Colombian conflict. Their focus lies on the consolidation of the territory and Security Sector Reform.¹⁷ Indepaz is a research and analysis centre focused on peace policy proposed from a citizens' point of view.¹⁸ Planeta Paz is a programme focused on grouping together and giving voice to peace policies coming from the regions.¹⁹ CNAI focuses on political lobby for a public policy on peace. Their proposals are based on their work in five themes: analysis, victims, development, land rights and democratic participation.²⁰ Finally, the Asamblea Permanente is a platform which groups together the peace movements and organisations to coordinate the Colombian peace movement.²¹

2.3 General development organisations

The organisations that mainly work on general development are FuCuDe and Congreso de los Pueblos. FuCuDe focuses on the democratic implementation of the

¹⁴ Interview with a representative of the Ruta Pacífica, Popayan 24th of May 2011.

¹⁵ Interview with representatives of CIMA, Popayan 24th of May 2011.

¹⁶ Informal interviews with leaders of Consejos Comunitarios of the north of Cauca at a trainingsweekend for Consejos Comunitarios leaders in Asnazú, Cauca, from the 28th to the 29th of May 2011.

¹⁷ Interview with a representative of the FIP, Bogotá 1st of June 2011.

¹⁸ Interview with a representative of Indepaz, Bogotá 11th of May 2011 and González Posso, Herbolzheimer and Montaña Mestizo (2010).

¹⁹ Interview with a representative of Planeta Paz, Bogotá 19th of May 2011.

²⁰ Interview with a representative of CNAI, Bogotá 1st of June 2011.

²¹ Interview with a representative of the Asamblea Permanente, Bogotá 18th of May 2011.

1991 Constitution. It sees the Constitution as a partial peace agreement and thus also seeks to achieve an integrated peace in the country. The Congreso de los Pueblos is a congress that groups together sectors of society that do not feel represented in the current policies and laws from the National Congress. The goal is to create and implement own laws and policies. One of the themes on which they plan to legislate is peace.²²

2.4 Other

There is one ambiguous case: Justapaz. It is an organisation specialised in conflict/peace but is set up from the Mennonite church and mainly works with church communities. It can be seen as both a sector as a specialised conflict/peace organisation.

2.5 Sample used for analysis

After re-examining my data, I realized that the most interesting data came from the sector organizations and the specialized organizations. The sector organizations are mainly based in Cauca. The sector organizations not based in Cauca did not have sufficiently relevant peacebuilding work for this research. Fensuagro and the ANDI are not working on peacebuilding directly and their indirect work is very small in comparison to other organisations in my sample. The USO does work with peacebuilding, but the mayor part of their work on peacebuilding is done in the context of the Asamblea Permanente, so I took their work together with that of the Asamblea. The Consejos Comunitarios are still struggling with their recognition as actual representatives of their communities and have very big problems with international companies and their land rights. This leaves them little to no time to work on peacebuilding. Also, compared to the other organizations in Cauca, their level of organization is not sufficient to be considered middle-range actors. In the interest of a concise and focused thesis, I have therefore decided to focus on 10 organisations for my analysis: CRIC, ACIN, CIMA and Ruta Pacífica as sector organizations in Cauca and FIP, Indepaz, Planeta Paz, CNAI, Asamblea Permanente and Justapaz as specialized organizations at national level.

²² Interview with a representative of an organisation, which forms part of the Congreso de los Pueblos, Bogotá 11th of May 2011.

§ 3 Relational approach

In this research the organisations mentioned above were researched on their relational approach. As discussed in Chapter 1, Lederach (1997) described the relational approach as building relationships with all sectors in society to transform a conflict. However, building relationships is a very broad term. In this thesis, building relationships is seen as the capacity to bring different sectors together to talk and get them to agree on issues. In order to transform a conflict, all sectors in society have to agree on implementing social changes that lead to sustainable peace. In order to implement social change, it is necessary to agree upon which changes need to be made. In order to agree on the changes to be made, it is necessary to get the crucial sectors together. Therefore it seems logical to see relationship building in the context of conflict transformation as the capacity to bring together crucial sectors and have them agree on issues of social change.

§ 4 Conclusion

After applying four criteria, access, engaging in peace-work, being a middle-range actor, and having organisations of all three categories of organisations described by Barnes (2005) (sector, specialised conflict and general development organisations), I ended up with a sample of 17 middle-range actors. I conducted 18 official, semi-structured interviews and 5 informal interviews with representatives of the organisations comprising these middle-range actors and looked at their websites and any relevant documentation.

Reviewing the results of my research, I came to the conclusion that certain organisations were more interesting for analysis than others. Therefore, I will apply my analysis to the following 10 organisations: CRIC, ACIN, CIMA, Ruta Pacífica, FIP, Indepaz, Planeta Paz, CNAI, Asamblea Permanente and Justapaz.

For my analysis, the term relationship building means the capacity to bring together crucial sectors of society and have them agree on issues of social change.

In the following chapter I will give a brief overview of the context of the Colombian conflict, to be able to situate the organisations relevant to my thesis in this conflict context.

Chapter 3: Colombian conflict and peace context

§1 The Colombian conflict

Ever since its independence from Spain in 1810, Colombia has been plagued by political violence.²³ The cycle of violence that initiated the current protracted conflict is known as '*La Violencia*' during the 1950s and 1960s. This civil war between the Liberal and Conservative party was fought in rural areas forcing people off their land. The civil war ended when the Conservatives and Liberals made a political pact creating a closed political system with alternating Liberal or Conservative President.²⁴

In the 1960s, inspired by the Cuban revolution and the general Cold War dynamics, several leftist guerrillas rose up against the closed political system and the land-right problems of the rural poor. In 1962 the Castroite Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) was established (Palacios 2006:191), followed by the Communist Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FARC) in 1964 (Palacios 2006:266). In 1967 the smaller Maoist Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL) was created (Palacios 2006:191), followed in 1972 by the Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19). The FARC, ELN and EPL were based out of farmers-communities' self-defence groups fighting for land-rights and economic participation for peasants.²⁵ The M-19, however, was created after, by them considered, robbed elections in 1970 and fought for democratic participation (Palacios 2006:190). Palacios describes the guerrillas' wishes very concisely:

The guerrilla sought to build on two exclusions. First the social exclusion of the rural poor, which the agrarian reform of the 1960s did nothing to

²³ Naturally, before its independence from Spain, what is now known as Colombia had its fair share of violence as well, such as the *Conquista* by Spain and its independence war.

²⁴ For a nice overview of Colombian history, including *La Violencia*, see Palacios (2006).

²⁵ For a detailed description of how the FARC arose from the Colombian Communist party, see Brittain (2010:1-15). For a broader description of the origins of the FARC see Leech (2011:4-24). For a time-line with an overview of Colombian history relevant to the FARC, see Leech (2011:vii-xii).

address; second, the political exclusion represented by the two-party National Front, according to the radical politicians and intellectuals of the period. (2006:266)

From 1970s onwards, paramilitary groups arise, financed and created by wealthy landowners to protect their property from the guerrillas. Also owners of emerald mines and coffee and banana plantations made use of private armies to protect their economic interests. These practices arose from the earlier use of paramilitary forces by the government in their war with the guerrilla to be able to use dirty war tactics.²⁶ In 1997 the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia) were formed to group together several of these paramilitary groups.

During the 1990s, both the paramilitaries and guerrillas get involved in the drug trade, taking over the business of the infamous Medellin drug cartel (of Pablo Escobar) and the Cali drug cartel (who took over business from Escobar). This was also a time of large-scale violence, including many massacres, perpetrated by army, guerrilla and paramilitaries.

§ 2 Attempts to peace

President Betancur (1982-1986) made the first negotiation intent with the guerrillas. In 1984-1985 he brokered a ceasefire with the FARC and called for 'negotiation tables' with civil society, in which proposals were made of how to rearrange Colombian society to reintegrate eventually demobilized guerrillas.²⁷ During this time there were also shorter ceasefires with ELN and M-19. The ceasefires did not hold as parties accused each other of not being sincerely committed to a peace process.

In 1985 the M-19 seized the Palacio de Justicia (the Justice Palace), taking everyone that was in the building at the moment hostage. When the army intervened to liberate the hostages and recapture the Palace, it turned into a blood bath and the Justice Palace burnt down. This disaster lead the M-19 to decide to demobilize in

²⁶ For a detailed description of the rise and use of paramilitary forces, see Hristov (2009a) and Hristov (2009b) and Bergquist, Peñaranda and Sánchez (2001).

²⁷ Interview with a representative of the Asamblea Permanente, Bogotá 18th of May of 2011.

1989, when it signed a political pact of peace with the government leading to the formation of the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente (General Assembly of Constituents) which drafted the 1991 Constitution of Colombia (Villarraga Sarmiento 2011).

In 1987, the Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar (Guerrilla Coordination Simón Bolívar), the coordination committee of the ELN and the FARC, was created. This umbrella organisation of the guerrilla negotiated with the government in 1991 in Venezuela and in 1992 in Mexico to be included in the peace negotiations between the government and the M-19, but these negotiations failed. However, the EPL and factions of the ELN did demobilise and participated as Constituents for the new 1991 Constitution. The FARC did not participate in any of these political actions.

Between 1993 and 1999 the peace movement flourishes. People retained hope that the partial peace process leading to the new constitution could be continued as to encompass all conflict parties. Many organisations working on peace were established and, especially towards the end, massive popular mobilisations for peace were held (García-Durán 2006:141-150). These mobilisations led to the election of President Pastrana in 1998, giving him a clear mandate to go and negotiate with the FARC.²⁸

Responding to the society wide call for peace, President Pastrana initiated negotiations with the FARC in 1998. A 42.000 km², demilitarised zone was established in San Vicente del Caguán (also referred to as El Caguán), where the military left the area so that the FARC could negotiate with the government. During these negotiations a 12-point agenda was concerted. Parallel to these negotiations between the guerrilla and the government, many sectors of society converged in the Mesas Ciudadanas por la Paz (Citizens' Round-Tables for Peace), where they gathered proposals for the main negotiation table. However, real negotiations on these points and proposals were never held.²⁹

²⁸ For a chronology of events during the 1990's, see Bergquist, Peñaranda and Sánchez (2001:xi-xxv).

²⁹ For an analysis on how and why these negotiations went as they went, see Kline (2007) and González Posso (2009).

In February 2002 the FARC hijacked a plane and kidnapped a senator. President Pastrana blows off the by constant struggles plagued negotiations. The government blames the FARC for not wanting a ceasefire and the FARC blames the government of not seriously wanting to talk about social and economic changes. The military regains control over the demilitarised zone, only to find out that the FARC has used the negotiations to regroup and strengthen their troops.

The failed negotiations with the FARC created a strong anti-peace and pro-war sentiment in the Colombian society, leading to the election of President Uribe in 2002. He won the election with his promise to military vanquish the FARC. He implements a policy he dubs Seguridad Democrática (Democratic Security) which is focused on attacking the FARC and regaining military and institutional control over areas under guerrilla governance. His war tactics include framing the FARC as terrorists and all whom disagreed with his policy were signalled as terrorists or terrorist helpers themselves.³⁰

In contrast to his all-out war policy towards the FARC, Uribe managed to sign a peace agreement with the AUC in 2003. In 2005 the paramilitaries were officially demobilised completely. In the same year the Ley de Justicia y Paz (Justice and Peace Law) came into force, providing the legal framework for the transitional justice/amnesty provisions agreed upon during the negotiations with the AUC.³¹ However, the paramilitary did not demobilise completely, leaving various neo-paramilitary structures behind.³²

Also in 2005, Uribe initiates peace negotiations with the ELN. Between 2005 and 2007 8 rounds of negotiations were held in Cuba and Venezuela. Uribe also authorises the creation of the Casa de la Paz (Peace House). This was an initiative of ELN veteran Fransisco Galán to create a space where sectors of society could dialogue with each other to come up with peace proposals. Unfortunately the negotiations with the ELN

³⁰ See International Crisis Group (2009) and Human Rights Defenders Under Threat (2009).

³¹ See Human Rights Watch (2005), International Crisis Group (2004) and International Crisis Group (2006).

³² The government does not acknowledge the fact that these armed groups are neo-paramilitaries, calling them BACRIM (*bandas criminales*, criminal bands). However, Human Rights Watch (2010) made a very strong case of these groups being neo-paramilitary groups.

fail after the government raises their demands for further negotiations in 2007.³³

In 2010 the Constitutional Court rules that Uribe may not be re-elected again³⁴ and his partisan Santos wins the elections. He promised to continue Uribe's security politics, with a 'friendlier coating'. He breaks with Uribe's policy of dismissing human rights and peace activists and workers as terrorists. However, in 2011, President Santos announces that the door to negotiations with the guerrilla is closed and locked, even though the key is not at the bottom the ocean. At the same time, both the ELN and FARC leaders release messages opening the possibilities for talks.³⁵

§ 3 Conclusion

The current Colombian conflict finds its roots in cycles of political violence, large inequality, marginalisation of the rural poor and almost non-existent political participation. However, the conflict is very complex, also encompassing right-wing defence groups and the illegal drug trade by almost all parties in the conflict. The main actors currently are the FARC, the ELN (both guerrilla groups), neo-paramilitaries and the Colombian state. At the end of the 1980's, two guerrilla groups, the M-19 and the EPL, and a faction of the ELN demobilised and were part of the drafting of the 1991 Constitution. In the 1990's the violence peaked, but so did the peace movement. This culminated in the election of President Pastrana in 1998 and the subsequent negotiations with the FARC from 1999-2002 in Caguán. These negotiations ended in a disaster. The positive climate for achieving peace from the 1990's changed into the war on terror after the election of President Uribe in 2002.

³³ See Oficina Alto Comisionado para la Paz (2007).

³⁴ The 1991 Constitution states that a President can only rule one four-year term and cannot be re-elected. In 2006 Uribe's first term ended and through a referendum his re-electoral candidacy was declared legal and he won the 2006 elections. His second term ended in 2010 and again a referendum was held to get him to have the possibility for a third term. The Constitutional Court, however, declared this referendum, and the figure of the second re-election unconstitutional, blocking Uribe's candidacy for the 2010 presidential elections.

³⁵ See for example <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bW1N9fhaJX0> (last viewed 8th of August 2011). The first part contains a part of a speech of Alfonso Cano, the leader of the FARC and the second part is a message from Nicolas Rodrigues Bautista, the leader of the ELN. Both express their willingness to engage in a dialogue with the State.

His Seguridad Democrática policy pushed the conflict out of the mayor cities and economic centres, but came with a harsh crackdown on all that opposed his tactics, including the peace-movement. In 2010 Santos was elected President. Up to now, not much has changed; save that peace organisations are no longer labelled as terrorists. The ELN and the FARC have given assists to start talking, but the government has not taken these up.

In the following chapters I will take the organisations mentioned in Chapter 2 and situate them in the context presented in this chapter. I will describe how these organisations try to make use of the relational approach in the context presented above.

Chapter 4: Peacebuilding in the Colombian context

In the previous chapter I have shown how from 1991 onwards the peace-movement has seen an incredible peak in the end of the 1990s and a great crash in the 2000s after the failed negotiations with the FARC at the beginning of that decade. In this chapter I will take a closer look at the organisations under scrutiny in this research, (see Chapter 2). I will first discuss their origin and then take a look at their work, including their implementation of the relational approach.

§ 1 Specialised organisations

1.1 The organisations

The specialised organisations as identified in chapter 2, CNAI, Indepaz, FIP, Planeta Paz, Asamblea Permanente and Justapaz, were all created in the peak years of the peace-movement, up to the negotiations in Caguán.

Justapaz was founded in 1990, thus a bit before the Colombian Constitution of 1991. It is based in the Mennonite Church and is a funds-organisation in the areas of peace, non-violent conflict resolution and human rights.³⁶ Their work is mainly directed towards Evangelical Christian Churches, but also towards other organisations working in the area of peace and non-violent conflict resolution.³⁷

CNAI comes directly from the negotiations leading up to the peace agreement and new Constitution in 1991. It was founded in 1994 as part of the negotiations with a faction of the ELN that demobilised as part of the peace talks. The Executive Director and public face of the organisation, León Valencia, is an ex-guerrillero of the ELN.

³⁶ Justapaz has had very close contact with John Paul Lederach. In fact, his work as discussed in Chapter 2 is based in part on his work with this organisation. It is therefore clear that their vision on conflict resolution and peacebuilding is the same as Lederach's. A representative of Justapaz in an interview also confirmed this, Bogotá 31st of May 2011.

³⁷ Interview with a representative of Justapaz, Bogotá 31st of May 2011.

Their main aim is to work on and promote peace initiatives from civil society. To attain this aim, they work four angles of the conflict: analysis, through their Observatorio del Conflicto (Conflict Observatory), victims, development and political lobby for a public policy on peace.³⁸

Indepaz was founded in 1994. It is a research centre, focusing on areas of development and peace. Its objective is to contribute to an integral peace by providing through analysis in the area of peace and development.³⁹ One of its main projects centres on the notion that peace initiatives should come from the citizens, instead of from the state and the guerrilla. These peace-initiatives should build spaces for peace at all levels of society (González Posso et al 2010).

The Asamblea Permanente was founded in 1998. It was an initiative of various organisations working on issues of peace, including the USO, Justapaz and La Comisión de Conciliación Nacional (The National Conciliation Commission, a commission of the Catholic Church working on peace) and others, to unite the broad peace initiatives that arose in the 1990s. It is not (meant to be) another organisation in the area of peace, but a permanent platform where organisations can interact and have a fluid dialogue to build joint peace initiatives.⁴⁰

FIP is a research centre created in 1999 by several Colombian companies to come up with analysis and policy proposals to end the conflict. It is still being financed by a large group of Colombian and international companies. Their focus lies specifically in the link between public policies and private initiatives. They work in the areas of conflict dynamics and peace negotiations, peacebuilding and post-conflict, business-sector, conflict and peacebuilding and security and defence studies.⁴¹

Planeta Paz started out in 2000 as a project financed by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign affairs to gather proposals of different sectors in society for the peace negotiations with the FARC in Caguán. After these negotiations failed, the project

³⁸ Interview with a representative of CNAI, Bogotá 1st of June 2011 and personal observations during my internship from February - May 2011.

³⁹ See website of Indepaz: www.indepaz.org.co (last viewed 02-08-11).

⁴⁰ Interview with a representative of the Asamblea Permanente, Bogotá 18th of May 2011.

⁴¹ See the website of FIP: www.ideaspaz.org (last checked 01-08-11).

continued to gather local proposals for public policy to attain development and sustainable peace.⁴²

1.2 Activities

Even though these organisations have different backgrounds, objectives and methods, they share a common practice: all organisations engage in political lobby.⁴³ From their different backgrounds they formulate public policy proposals centred on peace. Some organisations have this as a very central goal, such as (a part of) CNAI and Planeta Paz.⁴⁴ For them, political lobby for a public policy for peace, is a goal in itself. This way they try to build bridges between society and the state, which has an important power to achieve peace. For the other organisations, Justapaz, Asamblea Permanente, FIP and Indepaz, political lobby is not a central goal on its own, but forms an indispensable part of their work.⁴⁵

The organisations mainly engage in political lobby through organising a wide variety of meetings. As a part of my internship with CNAI, I attended many of these meetings. First of all it should be noted that the peace-movement in Colombia organises a large amount of these meetings. During my internship I would attend at least 2 meetings a week. Obviously I did not have access to all meetings, meaning that there were many more than the ones I got invited to. Naturally, there are different types of meetings, ranging from small to very large. In the following I will discuss a few different types of meetings. As I did my internship at CNAI, the examples mainly come from meetings organised by them. However, the other organisations analysed in this thesis participated in many of these meetings as well.

⁴² Interview with a representative of Planeta Paz on the 19th of May 2011.

⁴³ Interviews with representatives of Justapaz (Bogotá, 31-05-11), CNAI (Bogotá, 01-06-11), Indepaz (Bogotá, 11-05-11), Asamblea Permanente (Bogotá, 18-05-11), FIP (Bogotá, 01-06-11), Planeta Paz (Bogotá, 19-05-11) and with Luis Sandoval of ISMAC and REDEPAZ (Bogotá, 09-05-11). Personal observation in various meetings attended with different organisations during my internship from February - June 2011.

⁴⁴ Interviews with representatives of CNAI (Bogotá, 01-06-11) and Planeta Paz (Bogotá, 19-05-11).

⁴⁵ Interviews with representatives of Justapaz (Bogotá, 31-05-11), CNAI (Bogotá, 01-06-11), Indepaz (Bogotá, 11-05-11), Asamblea Permanente (Bogotá, 18-05-11), FIP (Bogotá, 01-06-11), and Planeta Paz (Bogotá, 19-05-11).

The smaller meetings are generally meetings called by one or a few of the peacebuilding organisations, and are held amongst peacebuilding organisations themselves. A good example of this type of meetings is a meeting I attended on the 11th of May 2011. It was a meeting called by CNAI, FuCuDe and CINEP (Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular, another conflict analysis and peacebuilding organisation) with the theme 'What are the peace initiatives doing?' The goal of the meeting was to get an overview of what different peace initiatives were doing and to start coordinating their actions again. Not very many people attended the meeting, to the disappointment of the organisers. During the meeting it was discussed that there was a need to start coordinating actions again and that all initiatives should be included, but that this should not turn into a new platform for peace initiatives, as there were so many of them already. However, at the end of the meeting, nothing substantial was really agreed upon and the parties had a great difficulty planning the next meeting.⁴⁶

A middle-size meeting is generally a meeting called for by one or a few peacebuilding organisations, but aimed at a wider public, including academics and representatives of the international community and the government. A good example of this type of meeting is the cycle of open dialogues organised by CNAI, CINEP and Rosario University. The theme of the cycle of open dialogues was the armed conflict and alternatives for peace. The idea was to organise an open dialogue every fifteen days, each with a different topic. I attended two dialogues, one about the possibilities for peace under President Santos and one about the negotiations with the ELN in 2005-2007. Unfortunately, after the open dialogue about the ELN, a lot of time went by and the third dialogue was not held during my time in Colombia. The first dialogue attracted many people from different sectors: peacebuilding organisations, academics, an ex-general, the government representative during the

⁴⁶ Peacebuilding organisations also have one-on-one meetings with actors in society, such as the government, political parties or international organisations. I have attended a meeting between CNAI and Polo Democrático (a left-wing political party). This was a meeting to ask the support of the Polo Democrático for a proposal of CNAI for a signed agreement between all political parties promising to uphold several democratic minim standards. Polo Democrático reacted to the proposal in pure political discourse, leaving little room for the proposal.

liberation of hostages by the FARC in February of 2011,⁴⁷ representatives of the international community and special guest Vinceç Fisas of the Barcelona Escuela Cultura de Paz (the School of Peace Culture). It was an interesting open dialogue in which many interesting themes and ideas were brought up that could be discussed further in the cycle. The second dialogue, however, was very poorly attended and did not build upon the conclusions of the previous dialogue.

A large meeting is generally called a forum. It is an event that can be organised by a (group of) peacebuilding organisation(s), but also by universities or the press. It is open to a wider public, even though I recognised many faces at the different forums I attended. A good example is the First Colombian Forum on Peacebuilding, State and Citizenship for Peace. It was organised by Jorge Tadeo Lozano University, which has a Peacebuilding Observatory. It was a daylong event with two presentations in the morning and two panels in the afternoon. The topics of the presentations were 'negotiations in peace processes' and 'peace dialogues and their routes'. The topics of the panels were 'citizen alternatives in peacebuilding: initiatives, social movements, the private sector and unofficial dialogues' and 'the role of the State in peacebuilding: negotiations, public policies and institutional infrastructure'. The people speaking came from a variety of background: academics, church leaders, international organisations, local and national peacebuilding organisations and government representatives. It was an interesting forum with potentially interesting topics, but what was said in this forum, I had heard before and would hear again in other events.

These meetings are the places and times when the peacebuilding organisations implement their relational approach. Through the different types of meetings the organisations want to build relationships with different sectors in society. It seems that they are mainly focused on building relationships with top-level actors, such as the government and other peacebuilding organisations. However, the organisations do claim to have relations with grassroots organisations to obtain the information of the conflict reality, on which they base the proposals they formulate and the research they do. For the relations amongst peacebuilding organisations they do not only rely on the meetings mentioned above. The Asamblea Permanente is an example of a

⁴⁷ In the second week of February 2011, the FARC released 5 hostages to a commission composed by ex-senator Piedad Córdoba and the International Red Cross, facilitated by the Brazilian government.

platform in which the peacebuilding organisations come together to coordinate their work. It is interesting to note that all these meetings have no representation of the illegal armed forces whatsoever. There were no representatives of the guerrilla or the neo-paramilitary forces in any of the meetings I attended. Some organisations I interviewed also specifically denied having relations with illegal armed forces.⁴⁸

Engaging in political lobby also implies that the organisations have proposals to present. These proposals are generally a combination of social change and promoting a negotiated settlement of the conflict with the guerrilla.⁴⁹ CNAI for example has a clear vision of the four areas in which social change is immanent for the conflict to come to a sustainable peace-end: rural development, decentralised policies, guarantees for political participation and reparation for victims. CNAI is working on these themes specifically to produce proposals in these areas. Next to that they are working hard to put the idea of peace negotiations back on the agenda. For example, through the cycle of open dialogue mentioned above. FIP has very different ideas about what social changes should be implemented. They focus mainly on control over the territory and tackle the illegal economy.⁵⁰ However, they also participate in a platform called La Paz Pendiente (the pending peace), which propagates the negotiated settlement of the conflict with the guerrilla.⁵¹

These organisations do not only engage in political lobby. They also engage in research and analysis of the conflict. All organisations produce reports about (a part of) the Colombian conflict, not only giving their analysis of the current situation, but also giving recommendations on how to deal with the situation.⁵² The different niches of the organisations contribute to a better understanding of the conflict and bring social change and the solution of the conflict closer.

⁴⁸ Interviews with representatives of ANDI (Bogotá, 30-05-11), USO (Bogotá, 05-05-11), and Planeta Paz (Bogotá, 19-05-11).

⁴⁹ It is interesting to note that the interviewees almost always only referred to the conflict with the guerrilla when they talked about a political solution or negotiated settlement.

⁵⁰ Interview with a representative of FIP, Bogotá 1st of June 2011.

⁵¹ Personal observations during my internship at CNAI from February until May 2011.

⁵² Interviews with representatives of Justapaz (Bogotá, 31-05-11), CNAI (Bogotá, 01-06-11), Indepaz (Bogotá, 11-05-11), FIP (Bogotá, 01-06-11) and Planeta Paz (Bogotá, 19-05-11) and personal observations during my internship with CNAI February – June 2011.

§ 2 Sector organisations

The situation of the organisations in Cauca is different from the situation of the organisations of Bogotá. In this province the conflict is still a part of daily life. All conflict parties, FARC, ELN, neo-paramilitaries and army, are present and active in the region. Cauca is a strategic area, forming the corridor between the central mountain range, the stronghold of the FARC, and the Pacific Ocean. These geographical assets also make it an area of mayor drug production.⁵³

2.1 The organisations

The organisations that deal with peace and peacebuilding in Cauca are all organisations that originate from specific sectors in society: *indígenas*, peasants and women. Peacebuilding is therefore not their *raison d'être*, but it does form an important part of their work.

The oldest, and arguably the most important, organisation in the region is the CRIC. It was founded in 1971 to protect and promote the rights of *indígena* groups in Cauca. There are 8 tribes in Cauca, each with their own traditional leaderships, recognised by law. The CRIC represents and unites 115 *cabildos* (the traditional leadership structures), which form 90% of *indígena* communities in the region. Their work is concentrated on the development and advancement of the rights and needs of the *indígena* population, with an emphasis on their autonomy and traditional ways of life.⁵⁴ Their strength has been and still is their ability to organise massive mobilisations to put pressure behind their demands.

The CIMA is a peasants' organisation grouping together 12 municipalities in the south of Cauca and the north of Nariño (a province south of Cauca). The organisation started in 1985, but was officially constituted as CIMA in 1991. The organisation was formed to confront three problems: poverty, difficult relations with

⁵³ In Ávila Martínez and Núñez (2010) it is demonstrated that the ELN has a strong presence in Cauca. Ávila Martínez (2011) demonstrates the undiminished presence of the FARC in Cauca. Romero Vidal and Arias Ortiz (2011) demonstrate the strong presence of neo-paramilitary groups in the region. See also Barreto Henríquez (2009).

⁵⁴ See the website of the CRIC: www.cric-colombia.org (last viewed 25-07-2011).

corrupt local authorities and the dispersed character of the peasants' communities in the region. As with the CRIC, the CIMA uses massive mobilisation of its members as a central method to add force to their proposals.⁵⁵

The ACIN was founded in 1994 and is the organisation representing the Nasa people in the north of Cauca. The Nasa are the biggest *indígena* tribe in Cauca. The ACIN groups together 16 *cabildos* and is a member of the CRIC. The organisation seeks to represent the needs and wishes of the Nasa-people in the north of Cauca.⁵⁶ They have national relevance through their strong leadership and mobilisation capacities.⁵⁷

The Ruta Pacífica has a slightly different origin than the organisations described above. It arose in 1996 when a group of women organised a march to Mutatá, a village in the province Antioquia, as a protest against the violence perpetrated by paramilitaries against women in that village. This initiative grew out to a national movement feminist movement, focussing on the effects of war on women and their bodies.⁵⁸ The Ruta Pacífica has 9 regional factions, including the one in Cauca, which I included in my research.⁵⁹

As one can derive from above, the organisations I researched were not set up to deal with the Colombian conflict and its consequences primarily, except the Ruta Pacífica. The organisations were set up to represent and give voice to vulnerable groups in society, *indígenas* and peasants. These groups have always been marginalised throughout Colombian history. This marginalisation has also led to the systematic victimisation of these groups in the conflict.⁶⁰ The organisations were forced to deal with the conflict, as its resolution is essential for the realisation of their core goals and activities. The basic human rights, including the right to life, of the

⁵⁵ Interview with three CIMA representatives, Popayan 24th of May 2011.

⁵⁶ See the website of the ACIN: www.nasaacin.org (last viewed 25-07-2011).

⁵⁷ A representative of the ACIN was one of the leaders of the Congreso de los Pueblos (mentioned in the chapter on organisations). In an interview with him on the 20th of May 2011 in Bogotá he clearly mentioned their participation in the CRIC, but it also became clear that the ACIN has its own initiatives and strong representation in the region and the country.

⁵⁸ Interview with a representative of the Ruta Pacífica, Popayan 24th of May 2011.

⁵⁹ See the website of the Ruta Pacífica: www.rutapacifico.org.co (last viewed on 25-07-2011).

⁶⁰ See Safford and Palacios (2002).

groups these organisations represent are being threatened constantly. This has given these organisations a strong voice of peace as they try to protect their members from the effects of the conflict.

Basically, the abovementioned observations about the peasant and *indígena* organisations, also applies for the Ruta Pacífica. The Ruta Pacífica represents and gives voice to a vulnerable group: women. They also work from the idea that the conflict and the violence have to stop for the advancement of women in society to be able to be realised. They also work from the compelling reality of a systematic infringement of the basic human rights of the people they represent, trying to protect them from the effects of the conflict.

2.2 Activities

As with the organisations in Bogotá, the organisations in Cauca have political lobby as one of their core activities. On both local as national level these organisations try to present their proposals. As with the specialised organisations, the sector organisations build relationships with different sectors of Colombian society to do their work. They do this through meetings as well, but these are not as extensive as in Bogotá. The scale is smaller and the organisations are able to have more direct contact with, for example, governing structures. The meetings in Cauca have resulted in an interesting network.

Since 2010, various organisations, including the ACIN, CRIC, CIMA and Ruta Pacífica, work together to achieve humanitarian dialogues with the FARC in Cauca. As a reaction to the grave human rights violations committed by the FARC in the region, the organisations decided to join forces and try to reason with the FARC to save lives. The preparations of these dialogues are in an advanced state. The organisations have agreed upon a four negotiation themes: 1) violence against women, 2) anti-personal mines, 3) forced recruitment of minors and 4) respect of territorial autonomy of *indígena* land. They have elaborated and agreed upon definitions of these themes/notions. They have exchanged letters with local and national leaders of the FARC and have received negotiation training from a Swiss

NGO (SUIPPCOL). They are now at the point that they want to plan the negotiations with the FARC.⁶¹

Next to the attempt of humanitarian dialogues with the FARC, the collaboration between these organisations has also led to other peace-related activities. The organisations try to involve other sectors of society in Cauca to cooperate and promote peace. They have had meetings with the Catholic Church and have a meeting planned with the Chamber of Commerce. The Catholic Church has already agreed to help put peace on the agenda again, by asking their priests to preach about peace at least once a month.⁶² Also, the organisations are working on a joint proposal for peace. It is under construction, but it will be presented locally and nationally within a reasonable time. In the draft version I have seen, the organisations present their initiative for humanitarian dialogues, situating the document in the conflict and peace dynamics of Colombia. They explain the relevance of both the initiative as a whole, as the four chosen themes individually. The document states that they started the process of dialogues with the FARC, as they are the biggest threat to the population at the moment. In a later stage, the organisations would like to extend the initiative to dialogues with the government and neo-paramilitary armed forces.

§ 3 Conclusion

Both the organisations in Bogotá as in Cauca rely for a large part of their work on political lobby, their implementation of the relational approach. The effectuation of the political lobby lies in organising meetings with different sectors in society in which the peacebuilding organisations present their proposals. These proposals are meant to instigate social change to reach sustainable peace. In general, these proposals are centred around strategies to eliminate root causes of the conflict and to get the idea of a negotiated peace back on the agenda.

⁶¹ Interviews with representatives of ACIN (Bogotá, 20-05-2011), CRIC (Popayan, 25-05-2011/La María, 26-05-2011), CIMA (Popayan, 24-05-2011) and Ruta Pacífica (Popayan, 24-05-2011). It was interesting to note that the representatives of the different organisations talked about this initiative in similar terms. It seemed clear that they were really working together on the issue and had reached mutually accepted conclusions and action plans.

⁶² Interview with a representative of Ruta Pacífica, Popayan 24th of May 2011.

In Bogotá the political lobby leads to a wide variety of meetings in which the peacebuilding organisations try to build relationships with the government and other peacebuilding organisations. It seems that these organisations, in general, are not willing or capable of building relationships with illegal armed forces or grassroots communities.⁶³ The meetings these organisations organise and attend do not seem to have clear, substantive outcomes. As Angelika Rettberg, Professor of Political Science at Los Andes University, observed, the peacebuilding organisations seem to be only talking to and with them selves.⁶⁴

The organisations in Cauca have built relationships with a different result than the organisations in Bogotá. They have joint operations in the area of peace, making individual action almost unnecessary. They are working on humanitarian dialogues with the FARC and on putting peace on the agenda by talking to all different sectors of society. In this the organisations work together so closely that they have very similar discourse on the issues.

In the following chapter I will take a look at the limits of the relational approach of the organisations that I described above.

⁶³ This generalisation does not fly for Planeta Paz, as they specifically work with grassroots organisations and Justapaz who acknowledged to have had contact with illegal armed forces in the past.

⁶⁴ Interview with Angelika Rettberg, Professor of Political Science at Los Andes University, Bogotá 16th of May 2011.

Chapter 5: Difficulties in the relational approach

In the previous chapter I discussed the relational approach as implemented by the organisations under scrutiny in this thesis. However, this approach is not always easy. In this chapter I will take a look at the problems that arise when organisations have to work in the context of Colombia's conflict dynamics (see Chapter 3).

§ 1 Repression

As described in Chapter 3, Uribe implemented a war policy towards the FARC after the failed negotiations in 2002. This policy included the denial of the existence of an armed conflict, dubbing it a war on terror instead. As part of this war on terror, the subversive groups are treated as terrorists. Alongside this, also those people and organisations that opposed his tactics were labelled as terrorists or terrorist-helpers. This included the organisations I researched.⁶⁵ CRIC, Planeta Paz, Ruta Pacífica and CIMA specifically mention their organisation, and the peace movement as a whole, to be stigmatised, labelled and marked as such.⁶⁶ As the representative of Ruta Pacífica mentioned "We were cornered for 8 years, all the people of the peace movement, with the marking, with the stigmatisation, with the shadowing, with the imprisonment, with all that happened."⁶⁷ This labelling had severe effects on the work of the organisations. As a representative from the CIMA said, all the organisations had to lower their profile.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ The labelling of peace organisations as terrorists (helpers) was taken a step further by the secret service (DAS), See an article in *Semana 'Confirma-DAS'* of the 18th of December 2010, available at: <http://www.semana.com/nacion/confirmadas/149128-3.aspx>. In 2010 it was revealed that the DAS had illegally, but probably with the knowledge of Uribe, been tapping phones of NGOs and their employees, robbed data from their offices and visibly followed them around. A representative of Justapaz representative mentioned that the organisation had been victim of information-robbery in an interview, Bogotá 31st of May 2011.

⁶⁶ Interviews with representatives of CRIC (Popayan, 25-05-2011), Planeta Paz (Bogotá, 19-05-2011), Ruta Pacífica (Popayan, 24-05-2011) and CIMA (Popayan, 24-05-2011).

⁶⁷ Interview with the representative of Ruta Pacífica, Popayan 24th of May 2011.

⁶⁸ Interview with representatives of CIMA, Popayan 24th of May 2011.

This climate of repression of peace organisations from the formal powers also resulted in repression from illegal powers. In the Uribe-period, many leaders of victim groups, human rights defenders and other people identified as terrorists (helpers) received death-threats from neo-paramilitary groups or other illegal armed groups. In 2010, 174 individual cases of aggression towards human rights defenders were recorded. Of these 174 cases, 32 cases resulted in the death of the defender, 11 defenders were injured and in 10 cases it stayed with an attempt of injuring or killing the defender. 109 defenders received death-threats. In the same period, 168 organisations were victim of similar aggressions (Programa Somos Defensores n.d.). These aggressions made those under threat flee the country. The ones that remain have (often inadequate) police protection. Most of the time this protection is only given as a result of an order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.⁶⁹ León Valencia, head of CNAI, for example, has a permanent bodyguard and a bulletproof car.⁷⁰ The realistic death-threats clearly interfere with the ability of these organisations to function properly.

Another issue leading to problems in the relational approach is the fact that Uribe's administrations upheld a strict, criminal, prohibition on contact and negotiations with the subversive groups without authorisation of the government. Justapaz, CRIC, ACIN, Ruta Pacífica and CIMA made a clear point of this problem.⁷¹

§ 2 Relationship building under the repression

The abovementioned practices of repression had a clear effect on the relationship between the government and the peace organisations I researched.⁷² The government

⁶⁹ Informal talks with human rights defenders during my internship at the Dutch Embassy in Bogotá, February 2010 - July 2010.

⁷⁰ Personal observations.

⁷¹ Interviews with representatives of Justapaz (Bogotá, 31-05-2011), CRIC (Popayan, 25-05-2011), ACIN (Bogotá, 19-05-2011), Ruta Pacífica (Popayan, 24-05-2011) and CIMA (Popayan, 24-05-2011).

⁷² The FIP did not mention any problems with relations with the government. However, since their research and policy recommendations are close to the policy of the government, they were not labelled as terrorists, since they were not disagreeing with the government. This probably explains the difference with the other organisations I researched.

did not trust the organisations and therefore had no interest in listening to their proposals or engage in their meetings. Many of the participatory mechanisms of the 1991 Constitution are not in place, such as the Consejo Nacional de Paz.⁷³ Logically, also the organisations lost the trust in the government as they were being framed as terrorists and a threat to society. So from their side it was difficult to get them to talk to the government.⁷⁴ This makes an important relation to be built in a war-torn society impossible.

Not only the relationship with the government suffered from the negative climate surrounding peace-work. Also the relationships with other sectors in society became difficult. The economic power in Colombia is strongly tied to the government, who has a strong neo-liberal economic policy (Worldbank 2011). Uribe's Seguridad Democrática policy finds many followers in this sector, as it pushed the armed conflict, and thus the security threats to business, out of the economically important areas. The conflict is no longer a worry for Colombian entrepreneurs.⁷⁵ The only time organisations engaging in peace-work seem to be able to build relations with economic sectors is during times of official negotiations.⁷⁶

The trend of working together during times of official negotiations seems to apply in general. During these negotiations all most all sectors of society come together, including the armed groups. Outside of official negotiations, many organisations do not have contact with the guerrilla.⁷⁷ Caguán is the best example of this. However, after the negotiations broke off, all organisations returned to their own priorities.⁷⁸ This, however, seems to be the other way around for the strength of the Asamblea Permanente, the platform for organisations engaging in peace-work. It was stronger

⁷³ Interviews with a representative of Planeta Paz (Bogotá, 19-05-11) and Luis Sandoval of ISMAC and REDEPAZ (Bogotá, 09-05-11).

⁷⁴ Personal observations during my internship at the Dutch Embassy, February 2010 – June 2010.

⁷⁵ Interview with a representative of the ANDI, Bogotá 30th of May 2011.

⁷⁶ Interviews with representatives of the ANDI (Bogotá, 30-05-11), Planeta Paz (Bogotá, 19-05-11) and an ex-representative of the ANDI during the negotiations of Caguán (Bogotá, 04-05-11).

⁷⁷ Interviews with representatives of ANDI (Bogotá, 30-05-11), USO (Bogotá, 05-05-11), FIP (Bogotá, 01-06-11) and Planeta Paz (Bogotá, 19-05-11).

⁷⁸ Interviews with representatives of ANDI (Bogotá, 30-05-11), Indepaz (Bogotá, 11-05-11), Justapaz (Bogotá, 31-05-11), and Planeta Paz (Bogotá, 19-05-11).

when there were no negotiations and lost its power during the official negotiations in Caguán.⁷⁹

The harsh climate of repression has also led to problems in relations between different groups within the peace movement. As representatives of the CRIC, ACIN and CIMA mentioned, in Cauca the repression led to tensions between *indígenas*, peasants and Afro-Colombians.⁸⁰ When I was in Cauca, in the end of May 2011, a serious incident between *indígenas* and Afro-Colombians a short time before was keeping people busy. Apparently, two years ago the Colombian government had bought a farm within Afro-Colombian territory and given it to an *indígena* community as compensation for a massacre many years before. The Afro-Colombian community was very unhappy about the situation, especially since the *indígena* community refused to grant them access to a certain piece of land that the Afro-Colombian community had been using for many years. A week before my visit to the region the situation exploded. As a consequence of an unclear incident between the two communities over a cow, several Afro-Colombian men attacked the farm. In the resulting fight, an *indígena* ended up dead.⁸¹ This incident is a good example of the way the central government has a hand in dividing the communities amongst each other.

Sadly, this division is not only perceivable in Cauca. The relations between the different organizations I researched have become difficult. The two academics and some of the representatives of the organisations characterised the Colombian peace movement as scattered and weak.⁸² At the end of the 1990s the Asamblea Permanente, for example, flourished; 40–50 people attended the meetings.⁸³ The

⁷⁹ Interview with a representative of the Asamblea Permanente (Bogotá, 18-05-11).

⁸⁰ Interviews with representatives of CRIC (Popayan, 25-05-2011), ACIN (Bogotá, 19-05-2011), and CIMA (Popayan, 24-05-2011).

⁸¹ This case was discussed during a leadership workshop of Afro-Colombian leaders of Consejos Comunitarios I attended in Asnazú, Cauca from the 28th to the 29th of May 2011.

⁸² Interviews with Luis Sandoval of ISMAC and REDEPAZ (Bogotá, 09-05-2011), Angelika Rettberg Professor Political Science at Los Andes University (Bogotá, 16-05-2011), the representative of Indepaz (Bogotá, 11-05-2011), Planeta Paz (Bogotá, 19-05-2011) and the Asamblea Permanente (Bogotá, 18-05-2011).

⁸³ Interview with representatives of FuCuDe (Bogotá, 11-05-2011) and Asamblea Permanente (Bogotá, 18-05-2011).

three meetings I attended as part of my internship at CNAI had 6-7 attendants, of which half were my fellow interns from CNAI. Also, the meetings were conducted in a hurry and had no apparent purpose or result. Initiatives such as the Asamblea Permanente have suffered under the impossibility to talk about peace. As mentioned above, the Asamblea Permanente lost its momentum during the peace-talks of Caguán. Because of the negative climate, it never regained it.⁸⁴ As the government declared peace taboo and those that talk about it terrorists, the public opinion has lost interest in peace-rhetoric.⁸⁵ The organisations have therefore lost their arenas in which to propagate their vision on war and peace. This pressure has reflected on the relations between organisations. Each organisation retreated into their own line of work, needing all their energy to keep those running. Luis Sandoval (Instituto Maria Cano: ISMAC and Red Nacional de Iniciativas por la Paz y contra la Guerra: REDEPAZ) sees the articulation of the Colombian society sectors as very weak. Each is working on their issues, making peacebuilding a difficult task.⁸⁶ Representatives of Indepaz and Asamblea Permanente both mentioned the fluctuations in both the general enthusiasm for peace as the fluctuation in the strength of the peace movement. They both conclude that the peak was in the end of the 1990s and at the moment there is a dip in both the general enthusiasm as the strength of the peace movement.⁸⁷

Last, but not least, the prohibition of talking to illegal armed groups has repercussions on the possibility to build relationships. The prohibition leaves no room for peace organisations to build bridges between the adversaries before they engage in (eventual) negotiations. Furthermore, this criminalisation of talking to subversive groups impedes local negotiations on humanitarian grounds to save the lives of people caught-up in the violence. This is for many organisations the reason that they only talk to the guerrilla during official negotiations; see below. The result of this situation is that the organisations only have contact with the guerrilla in settings orchestrated by the guerrillas and the government. This seriously hampers

⁸⁴ Interview with a representative of the Asamblea Permanente, Bogotá 18th of May 2011.

⁸⁵ Interview with Luis Sandoval of ISMAC and REDEPAZ (Bogotá, 09-05-11) and a representative of the Asamblea Permanente (Bogotá, 18-05-2011).

⁸⁶ Interview with Luis Sandoval of ISMAC and REDEPAZ, Bogotá 9th of May 2011.

⁸⁷ Interviews with representatives of Indepaz (Bogotá, 11-0-2011) and Asamblea Permanente (Bogotá, 18-05-2011)

the possibility to build bridges between adversaries as mentioned in the relational approach propagated by Lederach.

§ 3 Relationship building capacities

As described above, both the organisations in Bogotá and in Cauca have had serious difficulties performing their tasks under the restrictions resulting from the Uribe-administrations. However, it seems that the organisations in Cauca handle these difficulties differently than the organisations in Bogotá.

As mentioned in Chapter 4, the organisations in Cauca have come together in these difficult times and forged alliances. They are working together in different settings. The two most interesting activities are the abovementioned humanitarian dialogues with the FARC and the joint attempt of the organisations to get peace back on the agenda. They have a network in which they approach different sectors of society, such as the Catholic Church, the municipality of Popayan and local businessmen.⁸⁸ In the interviews I had with these organisations, it was clear that the organisations were very determined to continue their cooperation, even under the pressure from the central government. It was especially notable that the organisations all referred to the necessity of the humanitarian dialogues with the FARC as indispensable to protect the lives of people in their communities, even though they all knew and explicitly mentioned that these dialogues are illegal under Colombian law.⁸⁹ This way the organisations in Cauca displayed a large capacity to build relationships under repression.

The organisations in Bogotá have not displayed such resilience towards the repression. As described in Chapter 4, the peacebuilding organisations seem to be able to bring different sectors of society together in a wide variety of meetings, but these meetings have no tangible results. The organisations seem to be caught in a loop, going to a lot of meetings where they discuss and hear the same things. New initiatives pop up, such as the meeting about were the peace initiatives stand

⁸⁸ Interview with a representative of the Ruta Pacífica, Popayan 24th of May 2011.

⁸⁹ Interviews with representatives of ACIN (Bogotá, 20-05-2011), CRIC (Popayan, 25-05-2011/La María, 26-05-2011), CIMA (Popayan, 24-05-2011) and Ruta Pacífica (Popayan, 24-05-2011).

described in chapter 4, but they do not seem to be able to change the way things are going with these initiatives. This keeps the peace movement fragmented and unable to join forces against the repression. This way the organisations in Bogotá seem to display a smaller capacity to build relations than the organisations in Cauca.

§ 4 Factors influencing the capacity for building relationships

4.1 Cauca

There are various factors that influence the capacity of the organisations to build relationships under the repression they are confronted with. In the following, I will discuss the proximity to the conflict, the capacity for mobilisation and the origins of the organisations. However, it is difficult to make clear distinctions between these factors, as they all influence each other and therefore I will not discuss them separately.

It seems that the fact that the organisations in Cauca live the conflict on a daily basis positively influences their capacity to build relations. As described in chapter 4, the people in Cauca are affected by the conflict at first hand. The representatives of all four organisations mentioned specific cases of violence that motivated their struggle for peace.⁹⁰ Personal and emotional connections to a cause have always proved to be more effective than pure moral connections to a cause. This personal link to the effects of the conflict also enhances the capacity of these organisations to mobilise people to support their claims and proposals.

All four organisations in Cauca were explicit in mentioning that they had large mobilisation capacities. Ruta Pacífica was born from a nationwide mobilisation against violence against women and is keeping this up regionally with symbolic demonstrations. Often women organise demonstrations during which several of them appear nude and body-painted, displaying the message of the mobilisation on their bodies.⁹¹ The *indígena* movement has always been known for its mobilisation

⁹⁰ Interviews with representatives of ACIN (Bogotá, 20-05-2011), CRIC (Popayan, 25-05-2011/La María, 26-05-2011), CIMA (Popayan, 24-05-2011) and Ruta Pacífica (Popayan, 24-05-2011).

⁹¹ Interview with a representative of the Ruta Pacífica, Popayan 24th of May 2011.

capacities. In Cauca, the *indígena* communities have a reserve along the Panamericana (the main high way that travels across Colombia, connecting Panama to Ecuador), La María. This has been the centre of many mobilisations including blockades of the Panamerica to add force to their claims. In 2004 a very large mobilisation was held and a large group of people marched along the Panamerican to Cali⁹², where they demanded an encounter with President Uribe, who was in Cali at that time.⁹³ The CIMA was also born out of mobilisations, and have mobilisations as one of their core principles. They joined forces with the *indígenas* and also participated in the 2004 march to Cali.⁹⁴

The mobilisation capacity also has to do with the origins of these organisations. All four organisations originate in mobilisations of specific sectors of society: *indígenas*, peasants and women (see Chapter 4). The origins of the organisations also have another positive effect on their relationship building capacities in times of repression of the peace movement. As these organisations are not peacebuilding organisations at the core, they can continue their other work, more or less, when talking about peace is repressed. Sadly this does not fly completely, as the Uribe administration also targeted these organisations because their way of life and ideas did not fit in with his policy.⁹⁵

4.2 Bogotá

For the organisations in Bogotá it is a completely different story. First of all, Bogotá is not close to the conflict. Uribe's *Seguridad Democrática* policy effectively removed the conflict from the big cities and economic centres. Therefore the strong emotional and personal connection the organisations in Cauca have with the cause is not available in Bogotá.

Furthermore, the organisations in Bogotá are not able to rely on mass mobilisation. The public opinion is not in favour of the work these organisations do. The people in the big cities have heard 8 years of Uribe's war rhetoric, which was very welcome

⁹² Cali is the capital of the province Valle del Cauca, which lies at the northern border of Cauca.

⁹³ Several informal conversations with participants of the *Junta Directiva* (General Assamly) of the CRIC, La María 26th of May 2011.

⁹⁴ Interview with representatives of CIMA, Popayan 24th of May 2011.

⁹⁵ Interview with a representative of the CRIC, Popayan 25th of May 2011.

after the negotiation disaster in Caguán. The large cities are generally war-free, pushing the conflict to the rural areas. For the people in Bogotá, the war is no longer a factor in their daily life.⁹⁶ Therefore it is very hard for the peacebuilding organisations to mobilise large groups to add force to their claims and proposals.

Also the origins of the peacebuilding organisations cannot help them out. They were all established in the 1990s, during a time everyone had hope the conflict would end soon (see Chapter 4). In that period the organisations did manage to get large mobilisations for peace. However, when the negotiations in Caguán failed, they lost their connection with both the public as the government, as described above. The methods they had used in the 1990s and still use today no longer work under the repression from government and other forces.

Mauricio García-Durán describes this trend in his book. He already saw the repercussions of Caguán in the 2000-2003 period, saying that the national peace-movement was in crisis, but that the local peace-movement was dynamic (2006:150-158). Luis Sandoval (ISMAC and REDEPAZ) also mentioned the importance of the regional peace work, emphasizing that the conflict is fought in the regions and should be solved in the regions.⁹⁷ Furthermore, the collected examples of peacebuilding efforts in Colombia (Bouvier 2010) underline the importance of regional and local efforts for peace. In the conclusion to the volume, Bouvier (2010) concludes that the regional and local efforts deserve more recognition, especially from the central government, noting that the regional context is central to Colombia's conflict, and thus likely to be central to its solution.

§ 5 Conclusion

During Uribe's presidencies, a system of strong repression of peace initiatives was put in place. The work of the peacebuilding organisations suffered under this repression, not in the least their relationship building capacities. Even though the repression was effectuated evenly strong against both the organisations in Bogotá as the organisations in Cauca, the organisations in Cauca seem to have more resilience

⁹⁶ Interview with Luis Sandoval of ISMAC and REDEPAZ, Bogotá 9th of May 2011.

⁹⁷ Interview with Luis Sandoval of ISMAC and REDEPAZ, Bogotá 9th of May 2011.

in their capacity to build relationships. In Cauca de organisations joined forces and have two interesting projects: humanitarian dialogues with the FARC and a network that works to put peace back on the agenda and builds relationships with more sectors of society. In Bogotá the organisations seem to be stuck in a loop of building relationships through many meetings that do not have any substantial outcomes. The differences in the capacity to build relationships are influenced by three interconnected factors: proximity to the conflict, capacity of mobilisation and the origin of the organisations.

Conclusion

The question I set out to answer in this thesis is *How do selected organisations of the peace-movement on Colombia seek to transform conflict through a relational approach in a political context that is adverse to peacebuilding efforts and what does this say about the usefulness of Lederach's approach?* In this section I will try to give an answer to this question and present some additions to the theoretical framework set out in the first chapter of this thesis.

§ 1 Relationship-building capacities during time of repression

Colombia has a very dynamic and complicated conflict. Even though peace-agreements were signed at the end of the 1980s with several guerrilla groups and a new Constitution enforced in 1991, the conflict still rages on. Negotiations with the remaining guerrillas, first in 1999-2002 with the FARC and later in 2005-2007 with the ELN, have failed to bring peace. Even the demobilisation of the paramilitaries in 2005 has left the country bands of neo-paramilitary groups that still threaten the population.

In this complex and violent conflict, a peace-movement has managed to surface. The 1990s were their golden years, in which most of the peacebuilding organisations were established and massive mobilisations forced the government to start negotiations with the FARC in 1999. The main activity of the peace-movement can be characterised as political lobby. Especially the organisations in Bogotá engaged in political lobby through organising and attending many meetings with other peacebuilding organisations, academics, government representatives and representatives of the international community. At these meetings the organisations can present their proposals for social change that can lead to a sustainable peace. The organisations in Cauca have created a strong network between peacebuilding organisations with which they initiated humanitarian dialogue with the FARC and work on a joint peace proposal.

After the failed negotiations with the FARC in 2002, the political and social climate changed completely. The new President, Uribe, started a war on terror against the FARC, which included a strong repression system against all those working with peace. All those against his politics were labelled terrorists, including peacebuilding organisations that did not agree with his war tactics.

When analysing how peacebuilding organisations use the relational approach to effectuate their proposals under such circumstances, a division between peacebuilding organisations in Bogotá and in Cauca becomes visible. Both organisations seem to be able to bring different sectors in society together to dialogue. The organisations in Bogotá seem to have a bit more success in bringing the government to the table, but the organisations in Cauca are able to initiate a dialogue with an illegal armed group. However, the organisations in Bogotá are not really able to get the sectors in dialogue to agree on things and actually *do* something, more than just talk. The organisations in Cauca, on the other hand, have managed to join forces and get organisations from different backgrounds, *indígenas*, peasants and women, to agree upon a strategy to confront the FARC on humanitarian grounds and upon a common peace strategy.

The factors that have influence on the difference in the capacity to build relationships under repression are threefold and interconnected. The organisations in Cauca have three advantages⁹⁸ on the organisations in Bogotá: they have to live the conflict daily, giving them an emotional and personal connection to the cause. Furthermore, they have a large mobilisation capacity, partly because of the proximity to the conflict, and partly because of their origin. The sectoral origin of the organisations also gives them a broader base of activities from which they can work during the time that peacebuilding is repressed.

§ 2 Lederach's model and repression

Lederach's (1997) model of conflict transformation is based on the idea that middle-range actors have special conflict transformation potential because they possess the

⁹⁸ It must be said that that being closer to the conflict cannot be seen as an advantage on itself. However, in the context of relationship-building capacities, it is an advantage.

biggest relationship-building capacities because of their central position in society. When we look at the Colombian context, this idea is valid, but not complete.

First of all, Lederach does not take under consideration that forces in society could repress these middle-range actors in their work. This has been the case in Colombia and has had serious repercussions on the work these organisations could do. The golden years of the peace-movement in which peacebuilding organisations could fill the streets with mobilisations and pressure the government to start negotiating with the FARC are over. Now the organisations are being ignored at best and labelled as terrorists as a worst-case scenario.

Secondly, Lederach's model assumes that middle-range actors have the highest potential for conflict transformation because of their position in society. As mentioned above, this middle position in society is not always a guarantee that they have the highest relationship-building potential. Furthermore, not all middle-range actors are alike. In the Colombian case, the organisations in Bogotá and in Cauca had very different relationship-building capacities based on three factors, as mentioned above: proximity to the conflict, mobilisation capacity and their origin.

These two points add on to the critiques on Lederach's assumptions I presented in Chapter 1. First the idea that transforming the conflict properly by building relationships between different sectors in society to implement social changes leads to sustainable peace seems a bit oversimplified. Richmond (2005) describes well that there is no one conception of peace as it is a subjective term, making it very difficult to attain 'peace' through transforming a conflict. Second, the relationship building capacity of middle-range actors is questioned by Dayton (2009), as he argues that conflict parties cannot be forced by outsiders to change their attitude towards the conflict. This change has to come from within the actors and, at best, can be aided by the outsiders. He calls this 'ripeness', after Zartman.

Adding all this up, it can be concluded that Lederach's model has some serious critique against it. To confront this critique, the model should undergo certain adaptations. First of all, the model should incorporate a discussion about the concept of 'peace' and those engaging in conflict transformation should keep in mind that discussing the concept of peace is necessary when having a dialogue with different

actors in society and that agreeing upon a definition is a necessary step towards a sustainable peace. Second, middle-range actors cannot be the central actors of conflict transformation. Middle-range actors (and the donors that finance them) should realise that they are not all-mighty entities. They are not able to change the will of the conflicting parties unless these parties are willing to give in themselves. Furthermore, there are actors in a conflict that have the power to seriously hamper the relationship-building capacity of middle-range actors. Last, but not least there are three factors that can influence the relationship-building capacity of these actors: proximity, mobilisation capacity and origin. When applying the model of conflict transformation it is therefore important to incorporate and build on a wider variety of actors than middle-range actors alone. Some middle-range actors still have a high potential to build bridges, such as the organisations in Cauca in the Colombian context. However, they are not able to single-handedly transform the complete Colombian conflict. For example, the government also have to be willing to engage in conflict transformation. The organisations in Bogotá have better access to the government, so they can help keep the issue of peace on the agenda so that the government eventually has to acknowledge the possibility of a negotiated settlement with a basis in social change.

From the above it might seem that Lederach's model has that fundamental critiques and necessary additions that it better disregarded completely. However, I do not think that is wise. Lederach's model has a very practical approach, which probably explains why his work was, explicitly or indirectly, mentioned by the organisations I researched. Also, the core idea that building bridges and relationships across society is essential for sustainable peace is a plausible one. However, reality is more complex than portrayed in Lederach's model. The additions I mentioned above could help make the model more realistic and keep it relevant for the daily practice of building sustainable peace.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Video

Córdoba, Piedad. 2011 Compilation of speeches of FARC leader Alfonso Cano and ELN leader Nicolas Rodrigues Bautista about their willingness to engage in a dialogue with the Colombian State. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bW1N9fhaJX0> (last viewed 10-08-2011)

Documents via Internet

Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas del Norte del Cauca – ACIN CXAB WALA KIWE
2011 Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas del Norte del Cauca: Çxhab Wala Kiwe [online] available at: www.nasaacin.org (last viewed 25-07-2011)

Consejo Regional Indígena Cauca C.R.I.C.
2011 Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca [online] available at: www.cric-colombia.org (last viewed 25-07-2011)

Fensuagro
2011 Federación Nacional Sindical Unitaria Agropecuaria [online] available at: fensuagro.org (last viewed 01-08-2011)

Fundación Ideas para la Paz
2011 FIP: Fundación Ideas para la Paz [online] available at: www.ideaspaz.org (last viewed 01-08-2011)

Indepaz
2011 Indepaz: Instituto de estudios para el desarrollo y la paz [online] available at: www.indepaz.org.co (last viewed 02-08-2011)

Oficina Alto Comisionado para la Paz

2007 Proceso de Diálogo Gobierno Nacional - ELN. (Report available at http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/publicaciones/proceso%20de%20dialogo/NOV%2029-07%20CARTILLA%20FINAL-GOBIERNO-ELN_CONFESHAADICIONAL.pdf last viewed 10-08-2011)

Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres

2011 Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres [online] available at: www.rutapacifica.org.co (last viewed 25-07-2011)

Unpublished electronic documents

Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca, Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres, Red de Iniciativas y Comunidades de la base

In press Diálogos Humanitarios Regional y Negociación Política, caminos para la Paz en Colombia (strategy paper to be brought out soon, given to me by the Comité de Integración del Macizo Colombiano)

Secondary Sources

Published and unpublished sources

Ávila Martínez, Ariel Fernando. 2011. De la Guerra de 'Jojoy' a la Guerra de 'Cano'. *Arcanos* 16:28-47

Ávila Martínez, Ariel Fernando and Magda Núñez. 2010. Las dinámicas territoriales del Ejército de Liberación Nacional: Arauca, Cauca y Nariño. *Arcanos* 15:22-33

Barnes, Catherine. (2005) 'Weaving the Web: Civil Society Roles in Working with Conflict and Building Peace', in: Paul van Tongeren et al. (eds.). *People Building Peace 2, Successful Stories of Civil Society*. London: Lynne Rienner, p. 7-24

Barreto Henríquez, Miguel. (2009) 'El Laboratorio de Paz del Cauca/Nariño: ¿una salida indígena para la paz en Colombia?' in: Jorge A. Restrepo and David Aponte, eds. (2009) *Guerra y Violencias en Colombia: Herramientas e interpretaciones*. Bogotá: Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, pp. 544-585

- Bergquist, Charles, Ricardo Peñaranda and Gonzalo Sánchez, eds. (2001) *Violence in Colombia 1990-2000: Waging War and Negotiating Peace*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. (1992) *An agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*. Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations (A/47/277 - S/24111)
- Bouvier, Virginia M. ed. (2009) *Colombia: Building peace in a time of war*. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace
- Brittain, James J. (2010) *Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia: The Origin and Direction of the FARC-EP*. London/New York: Pluto Press
- Cortés Landázury, Raul and Monica María Sinisterra Rodríguez. (2009) Colombia: capital social, movilización social y sostenibilidad del desarrollo en Cauca. *Revista Cepal* 99:151-173
- Dayton, Bruce W. (2009) 'Useful but insufficient: intermediaries in peacebuilding' in Bruce W. Dayton and Louis Kriesberg eds. (2009) *Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding: Moving from violence to sustainable peace*. New York: Routledge
- Dayton, Bruce W. and L. Kriesberg eds. (2009) *Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding: Moving from Violence to sustainable peace*. New York: Routledge
- García-Durán, Mauricio. (2006) *Movimiento por la Paz en Colombia 1978-2003*. Bogotá D.C.: CINEP, Ediciones Antropos Ltda and PNUD Colombia
- Garry Leech. (2011) *The FARC: The Longest Insurgency*. London: Zed Books
- González Posso, Camilo, Kristian Herbolzheimer and Tathiana Montaña Mestizo. (2010) *La vía ciudadana para construir la paz: Más allá de la derrota o la negociación*. Bogotá D.C.: Punto de Encuentro

Hristov, Jasmin. (2009a) *Blood and Capital: the paramilitarization of Colombia*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press

- (2009b) *Coercion Incorporated: paramilitary Colombia* New York: North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)

Kline, Harvey F. (2007) *Chronicle of a Failure Foretold: The Peace Process of Colombian President Andrés Pastrana*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press

Lederach, John-Paul. (1997) *Building Peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies*. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace

Palacios, Marco (translated by Richard Stoller). (2006) *Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia 1875-2002*. Durham & London: Duke University Press

Rettberg, Angelika. (2006) *Buscar la paz en medio del conflicto: Un propósito que no da tregua: Un estudio de las iniciativas de paz en Colombia (desde los años 90 hasta hoy)*. Bogotá D.C.: Universidad de los Andes and PNUD Colombia

Richmond, Oliver P. (2005) *The Transformation of Peace*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Romero Vidal, Mauricio and Angélica Arias Ortiz. 2011. A diez años del inicio del Plan Colombia: Los herederos de las AUC, la geografía del narcotráfico y la amenaza de nuevos carteles. *Arcanos* 16:4-27

Safford, Frank and Marco Palacios. (2002) *Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society*. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press

Documents via Internet

González Posso, Camilo.

2009 El Caguán Irrepetible. (Analysis, available on http://www.indepaz.org.co/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=294:el-caguan-irrepetible&catid=58:guerrilla&Itemid=73)

Human Rights Defenders Under Threat

2009 Climate of Fear. (Report available of <http://www.usofficeoncolombia.org/>)

Human Rights Watch

2005 Smoke and Mirrors: Colombia's demobilization of paramilitary groups. (Report available at: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/07/31/smoke-and-mirrors-0>)

Human Rights Watch

2010 Paramilitaries' Heirs: The New Face of Violence in Colombia. (Report available at: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2010/02/03/paramilitaries-heirs-0>)

International Crisis Group

2004 Demobilising the Paramilitaries in Colombia: An Achievable goal? (Report available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/008-demobilising-the-paramilitaries-in-colombia-an-achievable-goal.aspx>)

International Crisis Group

2006 Colombia: Towards Peace and Justice? (Report available on: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/016-colombia-towards-peace-and-justice.aspx>)

International Crisis Group

2009 The Virtuous Twins: Protecting Human Rights and Improving Security in Colombia. (Report available on <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/b021-the-virtuous-twins-protecting-human-rights-and-improving-security-in-colombia.aspx>)

Programa Somos Defensores

n.d. Informe 2010: Sistema de Información sobre Agresiones contra Defensores y Defensoras de Derechos Humanos en Colombia- SIADDHH. (Report

available on:
<http://www.somosdefensores.org/attachments/article/90/SIADDHH%20OTAL%202010.pdf>)

Semana

2010 Confirma-DAS. (Article of the 18th of December 2010 available on:
<http://www.semana.com/nacion/confirmadas/149128-3.aspx>)

Villarraga Sarmiento, Álvaro.

2011 ¿Cómo fue el proceso de paz que precedió la Constituyente de 1991? (Article in Semana, available on <http://www.semana.com/nacion/como-proceso-paz-precedio-constituyente-1991/159376-3.aspx>)

Worldbank

2011 Country Partnership Strategy for the Republic of Colombia. (Policy paper available at: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/07/01/000333037_20110701023421/Rendered/PDF/606200CAS0P1230e0only0900BOX361497B.pdf)

Annex 1

Topic guide

El rol de la sociedad civil colombiana en la construcción de paz por medio de transformación del conflicto.

Objetivos

- Explorar la actitud transformativa de la sociedad civil colombiana
- Explorar las actividades de construcción de paz para evaluar su poder transformativo
- Explorar la visión del conflicto de la sociedad civil colombiana, especialmente sobre los temas de interés inmediato y de largo plazo y el enlace entre estos temas
- Explorar las relaciones que la sociedad civil colombiana tiene en la sociedad colombiana

Introducción personal

Yo, estudios, trabajo con Arco Iris, investigación, confidencialidad, registro de datos, uso de material, tiempo de la entrevista

1. Datos personales

- Nombre
- Entidad
- Que hace la entidad (breve)
 - o sector
- Historia en el movimiento social
- Historia laboral

2. Actividades de paz

- Que actividades de paz ha iniciado la entidad por que trabaja en el pasado?

- Que era el objetivo de estas actividades?
- Que actividades de paz esta desarrollando la entidad hoy?
- Que es el objetivo de estas actividades?
- A quien fue/son estas actividades dirigidas?
- A que problemas tenían/tienen que dirigir estas actividades?

3. Actitud frente del conflicto

- Como califican el conflicto armado entre el estado y la guerrillas?
- Que es su visión sobre conflicto en general?
- Que es la visión de la entidad por cual trabaja en materia de conflicto y cambio social?
- En que medida esta dispuesto la entidad de trabajar con el conflicto y cambio social?

4. Visión resolución del conflicto

- Que, en su opinión, son los temas pertinentes del conflicto que necesitan atención inmediata?
- Por que?
- Que, en su opinión, son los temas pertinentes del conflicto que necesitan trabajo a largo plazo?
- Por que?
- Ve usted una manera de hacer un enlace entre los temas que necesitan atención inmediata y los temas de largo plazo?
- Su entidad esta trabajando en este enlace?
- Por que?
- Como se vería el futuro de Colombia?
- Que cambios se necesitaría para llegar a ese futuro?
- Por que?
- Piensa que es posible llegar a ese futuro?
- Que estrategia esta implementando la entidad para llegar a ese futuro?
- En que sectores de la sociedad esta enfocada esa estrategia?

5. Relaciones

- Con que entidades tiene su entidad un relación (dialogo/intercambio mas o menos sostenible)?
 - o gobierno/ estado
 - o iglesia
 - o empresarios
 - o elites
 - o grupos armados
 - o ciudadanía
 - o comunidades de base
 - o otros sectores de la sociedad civil
 - o otras organizaciones del mismo sector
- Como surgieron esas relaciones?
 - o Quien inició el contacto?
- Como califica el carácter de esas relaciones?
 - o Amical/difícil
 - o Frecuente/de ves en cuando
- Esas relaciones son efectivas?
- Como califica la necesidad de esas relaciones?
- La entidad busca esas relaciones?

6. Cierre

- Hay algo que hace falta en la entrevista?
- Confidencialidad
- Uso de datos
- Gracias

Annex 2

List of interviews

- Ex-representative of the ANDI, Bogotá 4th of May 2011
- Representative of the USO, Bogotá 5th of May 2011
- Luis Sandoval, academic affiliated with the ISMAC and REDEPAZ, Bogotá 9th of May 2011
- Representative of FuCuDe, Bogotá 11th of May 2011
- Representative of an organisation that is part of Congreso de los Pueblos, Bogotá 11th of May 2011
- Representative of Indepaz, Bogotá 11th of May 2011
- Angelika Rettberg, Professor of Political Science at Los Andes University, Bogotá 16th of May 2011
- Representative of Fensuagro, Bogotá 18th of May 2011
- Representative of the Asamblea Permanente, Bogotá 18th of May 2011
- Representative of Planeta Paz, Bogotá 19th of May 2011
- Representative of the ACIN, Bogotá 20th of May 2011
- Representative of the Amablea Permanente and the Casa de la Mujer, Bogotá 20th of May 2011
- Three Representatives of CIMA, Popayan 24th of May 2011
- Representative of the Ruta Pacífica, Popayan 24th of May 2011
- Representative of the CRIC, Popayan 25th of May 2011
- Representative of the CRIC, La María 26th of May 2011
- Various *indígenas* attending the Junta Directiva of the CRIC, La María 26th of May 2011
- Various representatives of Consejos Comunitarios, Aznazú 29th of May 2011
- Representative of the ANDI, Bogotá 30th of May 2011
- Representative of Justapaz, Bogotá 31st of May 2011
- Representative of CNAI, Bogotá 1st of June 2011
- Representative of the FIP, Bogotá 1st of June 2011