

Thesis Report

**Living as a 'difference' in a decidedly
racist society: the case of immigrants in
Athens, Greece**



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'I think those of us who consider ourselves 'Greeks' we grew up with an inferiority complex. Even if someone doesn't realize it, we feel that the Europeans do not accept us, not just now with the economic crisis, but always. Talks about our superiority (with links to Ancient Greece) emerge when our Europeanness is being challenged; namely 'I gave you the lights of your civilization and you reject me'. In these cases, the Ancient Greek ancestry is being overemphasized in order to prove that we are not primitive, bumpkin, and all those verbal schemes used to denote cultural hierarchies. The constant 'the barbarians who stole our marbles' in front of the Elgin marbles in the British museum, I think that, in reality, it is a camouflaged complex of inferiority. Otherwise, if I believed we are equals why would I show off that much?

When the first Albanians came, the Greeks simply felt that there is someone worse than them and projected on them everything they felt about themselves. And that vicious circle has no end'.

(A Greek on Greeks)

'In the early days you simply try to keep yourself safe (from racist violence and exploitation). I have lived very bad experiences in Greece. I don't forget them but I don't want to think of them all the time and let them torture me. I say ok, if you've left your country because you had life-threatening problems there, you have to suffer all that, if you want to live. Once you have somewhat integrated in the society, you try to live somehow like a human being, enjoy your life'
(An immigrant on his life in Greece)

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Cover picture courtesy of Derek Fenix

1 Introduction

In the general elections of May 2012 the Greek far-right organization Golden Dawn entered the Greek parliament. The elections followed a rapid destabilization in economic and political life of the country; May 2010 the MP G. Papadreu signs the First Economic Adjustment Program (Memorandum), November 2011 Papadreu resigns with the subsequent formation of the caretaker coalition government of Lucas Papadimos, March 2012 the Second Memorandum is signed. Amidst this crisis N. Michaloliakos the leader of the until then, marginal extra parliamentary far-right organization Golden Dawn, from 2009, already holds a seat in the municipal council of Athens with votes of native residents of the Athenian 'ghettos'. While members of GD actively participate, and to great extent ignite, ethnic tensions in their central Athenian electoral stronghold of Patisia - with the culminating event of the closure of a playground in Ag. Panteleimonas square - Michaloliakos uses that seat to provoke controversies that would meet the news - like the infamous Nazi salute¹ - and that way to communicate party's political stances to a wider audience. As a result, in the general elections of May 2012 GD is being rewarded with its entrance in the Greek parliament, launching, the now legitimized, wave of unprecedented racist violence. It seems that the Pandora's box of the Greek far-right had been opened.

The majority of studies dedicated to the rise of far-right in Greece interpret the phenomenon as a result of the financial crisis that the country faces in the last years. Among them, those who draw on structuralist and/or post-structuralist approaches (Ellinas, 2013; Ellinas, 2015; Angouri & Wodak, 2014; Koronaiou & Sakelariou, 2013; Koutrolikou, 2015) describe Greece's social structure, which enabled the rise of racism, in terms of current socioeconomic and demographic conditions. In particular, they focus on the combination of massive influx of immigrants and the austerity reforms that Greece underwent that lead to a number of radical changes in Greek society – the impoverishment of the middle and working class, the loss of reliance on the mainstream political parties ect. Others (Dalakoglou, 2013a; Maloutas, 2007; Kandylis & Kavoulakos, 2011) add that the alleged ghettoization of particular parts of Athens is to blame for the rise of racial hatred of the locals against immigrants. Thus for the vast majority of them the vote for Golden Dawn is seen as a 'protest' vote against the old and corrupt political establishment who is incapable of tackling the problems Greece faces today. Undoubtedly these are some important factors that have contributed directly to the rise of Golden Dawn today, but are they enough to explain how certain parts of the Greek society adopted the most extreme expression of far-right stances against immigrants existing in Greece, from one day to another? Is Greek society under financial crisis the social structure that enabled the public expression of racist bigotry and allowed the engagement of a significant part of its members in racist violence or does racism exist in Greece regardless of the current circumstances?

Iganski (2008) in an attempt to interpret how individuals resort to engage in racial violence draws on ST. Statistically in the US and UK the majority of offenders of racial violence are not members of far-right organizations. The incidents contributed to

¹ 'Nazi salute by Michaloliakos' (Gr) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XCKwQMvuM74>

organized extremist groups are the most severe ones, and usually involve physical harm but they account only for a minority of the incidents (Iganski, 2008, pp. 12-13). The majority are the minor hate crime incidents that 'do not make the news' and range from 'assaults to criminal damage, to verbal abuse and harassment' (Iganski, 2008, p. 15). Those incidents are committed by ordinary people in the context of their everyday lives. Their 'opportunistic' nature, i.e. incidents occurring on random chance encounters and not due to their prior engineering by the offenders, is their main feature. They are incidents of everyday life that could be dealt differently but instead the offenders choose to incorporate specifically the racist element in their reaction. For instance, in commonplace episodes of everyday life which are not prompted by reasons regarding race, like a quarrel over a parking spot or in supermarkets, but eventually resulted in racial harassment of the racial "other". It is crucial then to understand what drives ordinary people to act in racist manner when they encounter difference.

Structuration Theory (ST) provides the theoretical framework that helps to understand action through its key concept of 'duality of structure'. According to Giddens action and structure are inseparable notions since 'structure is both the medium and outcome of the reproduction of practices that are themselves fueled by the consequences of human conduct' (Dyck & Kearns, 2006). In other words, agency is informed by structure and structure on its turn exists through action, since structure is 'regarded as rules and resources which only exist temporally when...drawn upon a stock of knowledge in day-to-day activity' (Dyck & Kearns, 2006, p. 87). For the case of racist violence, we can conclude that it is the racist element that has pervaded the rules and resources on which human beings draw upon in order to act in a racist manner. In its turn racist acts define or/and redefine those 'rules and resources', i.e. define social structure. On the matter Iganski citing Perry (2008) argues that 'there is nothing irrational or pathological about engaging in racist violence, for example, in a decidedly racist culture. It is, rather, wholly rational given the array of institutionalized practices and discourses that lend permission to minimize or victimize the "others" in our midst. Hate crime is nested in a web of everyday practices that are used to marginalize and disempower targeted communities' (2008, p. 19). It is therefore 'racist cultures' that provide the medium for racist violence.

In cultures where racism is inherent, or in the language of ST, is an element of the stock of knowledge with which individuals act on their daily life, there is a reciprocal relationship between the offenders and the wider communities they come from. As Sibbit (2008) notes 'While the wider community shapes and legitimizes the perpetrator's racism, the offender in turn serves the community in a vicarious fashion by taking their collective views to their logical conclusion and acting them out.' (as cited in Iganski, 2008, p. 101). The notion of difference is central here to legitimize racist acts. Perpetrator informed by the wider commonsense discourse on difference, by acting racist 'reinforces the prevailing structure of oppression and reinforces the boundaries of difference' (Iganski, 2008, p. 40). In the case of Greece, it is crucial therefore to define the extent of which Greece is a racist society and what constitutes 'difference' for Greeks.

In the light of the recent events in Greece, as noted before, the dominant discourse contributes the rise of GD to the financial crisis. But from personal informal conversations with locals most of them would in the end admit, in a half-jokingly manner, that 'we are a bit racist in general'. Gionakis N., the head psychologist of the

day center for immigrants' mental health, provided me with more concrete insights about racism in Greece. In our discussion over government's failure to prevent or to deal with racist violence he replied:

'I find it very difficult that thing that you call government to see it as something different (to distinguish acts of racism in attacks on immigrants), because in reality it (racism) is one of its constituent elements...About which Greek government we're talking about? When the Greek government was not racist? Racism in Greece is institutionally vested. Those guys (GD) were assisting the government at that moment. (You ask government) To react on what? To the thing that it promotes itself. Golden Dawn is a phenomenon that emerged recently. Let's go back in history. You can read the history of Greek refugee from Asia Minor settlements in Greece. They came here as Greeks, or Christians, Turkish-speaking Christians. Read about the reactions of the locals against those people. Read about the governments reaction to any other 'difference'; to the communists of the civil war, to Greeks of the former Soviet Union that we called to come here and how we treated them.. You're implying that there is a model of Greekness and everything that deviates from it has..

..has no right to exist. Read about the State Infirmary of Leros from 1958 and on, where they were putting the crazy ones. Before I started to work with immigrants I worked for many years with people with mental disorders, particularly those held in mental institutions. It was sufficient to change the word, from immigrant to crazy, and I would found myself in front of the same reality'. (Gionakis N., Head of the Day Center 'Babel' for the mental health of immigrants)

From Gionakis' statement we can see that racism is institutionalized on the governmental level and it is expressed throughout its modern history. He admits the existence of a particular Greek national identity or 'Greekness' and the fact that each time that Greekness was challenged the government and the population reacted in an exclusive manner. One can argue that the historical events Gionakis mentioned could be understood simply as intolerance to difference or xenophobia. According to Van Dijk (2014) 'Even if some people behave in a xenophobic way this is not related with the classical ideology of racism, which views other ethnic and racial groups as inferior or uses institutional practices that legally discriminate difference' (as cited in Triandafyllidou & Kouki, 2014, p. 430). But the ideological standpoints of GD, shared and endorsed by its supporters, leave no space for doubt about the fact that the notion of Greekness involves racism in its classic definition. The following speech² of E. Zaroulia, the spouse of GD's leader N. Mixaloliakos in the Greek parliament is indicative:

(over the prohibition of Greeks expats to vote in the national elections) It's a shame! To name Greeks the illegal immigrants with the 'Ragousis law' (a law that was providing, for the first time in Greece, citizenship to second-generation immigrants)...and to elect mayors with votes of immigrants who have nothing to do with Greece, the Greece of Plato and the philosophers. To equalize expatriates with all sort of subhuman that has invaded our homeland with all sorts of diseases that he carries with him. It's a shame that in the era of globalization our expatriates have no decisive role on the proceedings of their country and each Ali-Hasan or Abdul and I don't know whoever else Third Worldist...It is useful to note that two of our expatriates have won that right (to vote in Greek elections) in the European Court of Human rights. Human rights! Words that you like to use when it comes to any wretched and not for the Greeks of this country. (E. Zaroulia, member and spouse of the leader of GD)

Zaroulia in her extremely racist speech clearly depicts what she considers Greekness. For her Greek identity derives from Greece's ancient culture. Expatriates

² 'Zaroulia's racist rant' (Gr) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Y09xr846cg>

have to have the right to vote because they share with the indigenous population not only cultural but also biological heritage, in contrast to the second-generation immigrants. Cultures or societies are organized in hierarchies with Greeks, as ancestors of Ancient Greeks, holding a position among the First World cultures or societies. Immigrants that live in Greece today are considered ‘wretched’, ‘subhuman’, ‘Third Worldists’ that definitely carry diseases. The superiority of Greeks is prevalent throughout the whole speech while at the same time immigrants are seen as inferior and a threat to Greeks, politically since they are given preference to vote over Greek expatriates and physically since they can possibly infect them with their diseases.

Such extreme nationalist doctrine was considered obsolete and according to electoral results of GD from the moment of party’s establishment echoed back to a very small portion of Greek society. As a matter of fact, until 2009 GD was not counting more than 0.29 % on national elections. As Ellinas (2013) argues the majority of today’s votes to GD most likely come from another far-right party, LAOS (People’s Orthodox Alarm) that failed to enter the parliament in 2012. Indeed, LAOS’s votes were scoring inversely proportional to GD’s votes (Table 1-1). This can indicate that the nationalist conservative part of the Greek electorate turned to GD when LAOS participated in Loukas Papadimos’s government - a coalition government of ‘systemic parties’ that negotiated country’s second bailout that resulted in the Second Memorandum. The difference of LAOS is that in its understanding of Greek national identity they considered Orthodoxy as central, something that was not relevant for GD, which was defining Greek identity by drawing on Ancient Greece (Christopoulos, Kousouris, Papadatos-Anagnostopoulos, Papantoleon, & Sakelariou, 2014). It is possible that for GD it became evident that they need to approach the religious electorate of LAOS by incorporating the Christian Orthodox element in its rhetoric. A demonstration of their relatively new affiliation with Orthodox organizations was in October 2012 when they protested against the premiere of Terrence McNally’s play *Corpus Cristi* alongside with Christian fundamentalist organizations because the play is ‘blasphemous, as it offends Hellenism and Jesus Christ because it presents him as homosexual’³. The protest involved brutal physical and verbal attacks against the viewers of the play who were not allowed to enter the theater and particularly against the director of the play who is of Albanian origin. All political parties verbally, condemned the incident but the official authorities provided no actual support or protection.

Table 1-1 Far-right voters’ migration from LAOS to GD during the financial crisis, %⁴

Party	2009	2012 (1)	2012 (2)	2015
LAOS	5,63	2,90	1,58	1,03
Golden Dawn	0,29	6,97	6,92	6,28


After the incident at the theater it became clear that illegal immigration is not the main topic in the agenda of GD. By protesting a theatrical play they demonstrated to Greeks what they should and should not watch. In other words, they established

³ ‘Delirium of obscurantism from GD at HYTIRIO theater’ (Gr) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k2O5qI3nkyA>

⁴ Source: Ministry of Interior Affairs <https://www.ypes.gr/en/elections-results/>

particular ‘rules and recourses’ with which Greeks should comply. The question is how alien and irrational are those rules and recourse to Greeks. The aftermath of the event was characterized by a general silence. The play was cancelled due to the fear of secondary targeting, no one was prosecuted, the discontent that the political world expressed appears to be superficial, and police’s reaction was rather mild compared to their usual reactions on anti-racist events. Was it a simple reluctance to dig into the issue in times where the country faces more severe problems? Or was it a reluctance to bear a political and social cost that a confrontation with religious figures would bring in a country where 81% of the population believe in God (Eurobarometer, 2005) and would probably oppose even to the hint of a homosexual Jesus Christ?

On the theoretical level it becomes clear then that Greekness can lead to racism. Adapting this observation to ST we can say the structural principles of Greece – its ethnic identity in this case - (can) inform action, whose collective consequences is racism (type-4 relations, Pic. 1-1). To illustrate how, I further borrow from Coleman’s boat diagram (Coleman, 1986, p. 1322) and combine it with key concepts of ST (Giddens, 1984). The resulting conceptual model can be depicted and described as follows (Pic. 1-1). Greekness is regarded as the structural principle – the highest institutional domain of the macro-level that organizes the societal totalities of Greece. Greekness provides the micro-level of face-to-face interaction with a set of rules (generalized procedures) and recourses (forms of transformative capacity generating command over actors) that informs Greeks’ knowledgeability on how to act, in our case when encountering the ethnic/racial “other” along their daily and life paths (type-1 relations). Along Greeks’ daily and life paths social systems (relations between actors, organized as regular social practices) transform Greekness’ rules and recourses into action. This is the level of human conduct where systems and actors reflexively regulate Greekness’ properties and the conditions of their reproduction through routinized reciprocal practices in order to ‘keep things as they are or to change them’ (Giddens, 1984, p. 28) Social systems distinguished for the topic of this thesis - the education system, Church of Greece and the media have been empirically observed as central in preserving Greekness and the conditions of its reproduction by recursively informing and organizing Greeks’ practices/actions (type-2 relations). Urban space here



Pic. 1-1 Greekness and Racism

is regarded as the site that generates direct encounters between different actors. In the case racist violence of 2012 in particular, was the arena where the background racism in Greekness turned into racist action. The intended and unintended consequences of practices/actions on micro-level result in reproduction of racism, inherent in Greekness' principals (type-3 relations). Finally, racism feeds back to reconstitute the initiating circumstances (Greekness) that created it (type-4 relations). The resulting homeostatic loop reproduces Greekness and its racism throughout the Greek space for the last two centuries.

Occasionally though, in many contexts of life, the knowledge that circulates in the reproduction of social structures undergoes a selective filtering, 'whereby strategically placed actors seek reflexively to regulate the overall conditions of reproduction...(in order) to change them' (Giddens, 1984, pp. 27-28). Immigrants could be considered such actors. The presence of immigrants with their different identities among Greeks can make Greekness' contradictions tangible. Their further participation in social systems of Greece can introduce new knowledge on how to do things in Greece – 'doing difference' (type-2 relations, Pic. 1-1). The introduction of new knowledge into Greekness would disrupt its monocultural reproduction, as it would feed back to the initiating conditions with potentials to change them. Subsequently, it could change Greekness structural principles. Racist violence studied in this thesis is Greekness defensive mechanism to resist those changes. As immigrants disrupt the dominant social structures with their "different" social structures (identities), on immigrants' side of racist violence, a structural approach is also required. Immigrants responses to racist violence is their doing difference against dominant structures' attempts to maintain its homeostatic reproduction.

In general, the rise of racist violence in the Western world after 9/11 rendered imperative the necessity to distinguish the sentences of the hate crimes from parallel crimes. By arguing that hate crimes – prompted by biased motivation - hurt more, a continuously growing amount of research is attempting to prove the more corroding and pervasive nature of the consequences on its victims. That proof would justify blanket uplift in penalties of hate crime offenders (Iganski, 2008), (2015). In that attempt, numerous researches have established an array of short and long-term negative emotional effects on victims of hate crimes. Yet, few have tried to theorize its broader effects (Perry & Alvi, 'We are all vulnerable': The in terrorem effects of hate crimes, 2011). Noelle (2002) and Perry & Alvi (2011) are two exceptions that aimed to highlight the effect of hate crime on individuals' and groups' social structure.

Noelle (2002) draws on Janoff-Bulman's (1989) Assumptive World (AW) Theory to highlight the effects of Matthew Shepard's murder on members of the LGBT community from social psychological perspective. According to AW Theory 'people generally operate on the basis of unchallenged, unquestioned assumptions about themselves and the world... that are presumed to be core elements of our basic conceptual system' (Janoff-Bulman, 1989, p. 113). Those assumptions constitute a schema – 'an abstracted knowledge structure, stored in memory, that involves a rich network of information about a given stimulus domain' serving as 'preexisting theories that provide a basis for anticipating the future and guide what we notice and remember, as well as how we interpret new information' (Janoff-Bulman, 1989, p. 113).

The content of individuals' AW is described in Janoff-Bulman's model that is divided in three main categories - *benevolence*, *meaningfulness* of the world and *worthiness of self*. The first involves the extent to which people view the world positively or negatively. Positive worldviews set the basis for individual's assumptions that the world is a good place and misfortunes are rare while people are basically good, kind, helpful and caring. Meaningfulness of the world is related to individual's assumptions of fair distribution of outcomes and events. In the West, there appears to be three distribution principles – *justice*, by which personal deservingness determines outcomes, *controllability*, when individual's 'proper' behaviors (careful, precautionary etc.), instead of moral character, define his/her vulnerability against negative events and outcomes, and lastly *chance* or *randomness* which refers to the extent individual's believe that the distribution of outcomes don't 'make sense' and that nothing one can do to minimize the negative outcomes. The last category of *worthiness of self* refers to the extent individuals believe they personally deserve good versus bad outcomes. For instance, 'if the world is seen as benevolent and justice is the primary distributional principle, people could still perceive themselves as vulnerable if they had self-preconceptions of low self-worth' (Janoff-Bulman, 1989, p. 119). In addition, Janoff-Bulman distinguishes three self-relevant assumptions that parallel the distributional principles: *self-worth* –the extend people perceive themselves as good, moral etc. hence, deserving good outcomes, *self-controllability* – the extent to which an individual believes he/she engages in behavior to control outcomes and lastly the elusive self-perception of *luck* – randomness that no aspect of self can control. Traumatic events can affect these primary postulates of our conceptual system and force individuals to redefine their assumptive world.

Noelle (2002) in her turn demonstrated that the traumatic event of a hate crime such as the murder of Matthew Shepard forced non-victims of the LGBT community to redefine their Assumptive Worlds. As scholars on hate crimes have agreed (Iganski, 2008; Perry & Alvi, 'We are all vulnerable': The in terrorem effects of hate crimes, 2011; Craig-Henderson & Sloan, 2003), one of the main aims of a hate crime is to send a message of warning to victims' community or to individuals who share the same identity. Therefore, the details of this highly televised incident spread like a *ripple* across the LGBT community of USA, shattering their assumptions about the world. Assumptions about the benevolence of the world and people was the first to be sacrificed since most of Noelle's participants perceived the murder as a 'reality check' of the Western world and people that until then seemed to be increasingly accepting the LGBT community. Some accused the victim for being (too) open about his sexuality (controllability) while others adopted measures to reduce the visibility of their sexual identity, hence their vulnerability, up to halting their coming-out process (self-controllability). The shifts in self-worth here are expressed with internalized homophobia. The murder affected Noelle's participants at least in one of the three categories (benevolence, meaningfulness and worthiness of self), yet it was enough for them to reassess their previous knowledge about the world that is, the whole schema of their assumptive world.

The social context of hate crime was further developed by Perry and Alvi who conceptualize hate crime as a responding mechanism for 'doing difference'. In her perspective over identity formation, Perry suggests that we form our identities within the confines of structural and institutional norms. By doing so we further reinforce that

structural norms. However, ‘frequently, we construct our gender, or race, or sexuality in ways that in fact challenge or threaten socio-cultural arrangements’ (2011, p. 60). In that context, hate crime ‘emerges as a means of responding to the threat’ and of restoring the previous boundaries. Despite the fact that within the context of hate crime, both the victim and the perpetrator engage in identity construction process - the first by responding to racism/sexism – hate motivated crime ‘is used by the latter to ‘sustain the privilege of the dominant group, and to police the boundaries between the groups by reminding the Other of his/her ‘place’’. In a way, if Western dedication to liberal democratic values aims to create more inclusive and pluralistic societies, perpetrators of hate crime resist that change. The emotional reactions of the *ripple* or *in terrorem* effect hate crimes engender on victims, as well as the highly frequent use of strategies that aim social isolation and self-seclusion that emerge in Noelle and Perry’s studies, indicate that racist mobilization results to be successful and the Others do indeed return to their previous ‘place’ of invisibility and margins.

Both immigrants and natives engage in identity construction process in the context of hate crime. In a way, within the frames of this thesis I study the two sides of the same coin. From one side I will attempt to understand how Greekness maintains the unchangeableness of its homeostatic reproduction. On the other how (and if) immigrants disrupt it when acting to protecting themselves from Greekness’ racism. Otherwise, the research questions that this thesis aims to answer are:

1. *How does Greekness leads to racist offending?*
2. *How do immigrants in Greece deal with racism and what consequences does the rise of racist violence has on their life and identities?*

To answer the first question I will start by trying to define Greekness structural principles - namely ‘who is Greek’ (Chapter 2). In doing so I will first describe the conditions – social paradigm of the time - under which Greek ethnic identity emerged and the goals it aimed to pursue (0). Later I will investigate how the monocultural Greekness of the abstract theoretical level was transformed and dominated the micro-level, multicultural post-Ottoman space that today is called Greece (2.2). Lastly, I will learn from experiences of Greekness’ first encounters with a massive immigration wave (2.3). Consequences of that first encounter will provide valuable insides on what to expect regarding the line of reasoning and actions actors of Greekness undertake when challenged by difference. In the respective empirical section (Chapter 5) I will investigate how Greekness, through its social systems, reacts to the second immigration wave, that is comprised of immigrants whose collective identities don’t comply with none of Greekness’ principles (total alien immigrants). From observations of the Greek social reality, I have distinguished three social systems that play the greatest role in organizing country’s social life: the Greek education system (5.1), the Church of Greece (5.2) and *diaploki* (5.3) – a form of clientelistic relations that organizes the relations of the political establishment, the media and private interest.

For the second research question I will study immigrants’ daily and life paths in Athens. GD’s racist violence on the streets of Athens highlighted urban space as an important place of encounters between Greeks and immigrants. As GD’s racist attacks occur in particular neighborhoods and coincided chronologically with the deepening of Greece’s financial crisis, the interplay of features of Athenian urban space with the geographic distribution of effects of economic crisis at first glance seem to be the motive (Chapter 3). Drawing on the European experiences with racist violence (3.1.1,

3.1.2) I will investigate the dimensions of this interplay in Greek reality (3.1.3). Apart from the interplay, urban space will be regarded the medium with which the background Greekness transforms into (racist) action. Guided again by findings on the European experience (3.2) I will try to distinguish the consequences racist violence has on immigrants that use the same space while participating in Greece's social life (Chapter 6). In particular, I will explain how immigrants navigate Athenian space in order to avoid racist victimization (6.1), the consequences racist encounters have on immigrants (6.2), and the strategies they implement to reduce racism's eroding effects (6.3). Throughout the thesis particular attention would be paid on practices – of Greeks and immigrants - that do difference to Greekness, with the possibilities to bring about social change.

2 The Greek national identity as a medium for racial violence

In this chapter I will attempt to answer the question who is Greek. In ST that would mean to distinguish the structural properties of the Greek national identity. These properties are informing Greek social system and agents about the main tenets around which the Greek society is organized. In other words, they are the ideas-fundamentals of Greece's existence. This chapter will start by investigating the (initiating) conditions in which Greekness was established and the goals it aimed to serve. Later I will describe how this newly conceived concept was translated to the Greek population of the time and the consequences it entailed. Alternatively, I will describe the process of transforming a part of a multicultural Ottoman empire into nation-state.

Given the conditions - dominance of positivism in political and social theory - Greekness 'made sense' for the time it was conceived. But with today's changing social paradigm - of increased mobility of populations and multiculturalism - its practice is problematic. For instance, it's (organic) structural principles conflict with fundamental postulates of EU, like the practice of pluralism, diversity and eventually safeguard of human rights. In what follows I will highlight how the concept of Greekness of the macro-level, described in this chapter, informs practices social systems organize (legislation, policies etc.) on the micro (Pic. 1-1) that logically results in limitations or even denials of rights to 'others', In practice, those limitations provided by country's institutions will be put to test on large scale during the 90s when Greece will become an immigrant receiving country for the first time. The implications of that first 'encounter with others', discussed in the last section of this chapter, are of paramount importance in order to understand Greeks' reaction to the current migration wave.

2.1 The production of Greekness - The emergence and the ambiguities of the Greek national identity

The Greek national identity is a relatively new concept. As it is defined today, it was first introduced after Greece's independence from Ottoman Empire in 1830. It is then when Greeks had to define an autonomous national identity on which the newly independent state would ground after 3-4 centuries living under the Ottoman rule. As Tsoukalas (1999) notes, this process involves the 'imagined reconstruction of the pre-modern past', like in the case of modern European nations. Nations define and build their historical narrative only gradually, together with their collective identities. But in some exceptional cases, like in the cases of Greece and Israel, 'historical narratives have preceded the emergence of national political projects' (p. 8). 'In such cases it is not the nations that build and reconstruct their pre-modern histories but pre-modern histories develop into nations' (p. 8). The interesting point in Greece's case is that the continuum of Greekness from Ancient Greece that the modern national identity implies is not a product of Greeks' interpretation of their past. Instead 'the Greek myth was almost entirely the product of Western European Modernity' (p. 8). Simplistically we

can say that it was the West that 'reminded' Greeks of the 19th century about their glorious Hellenic past.

During the classical period there was no clear Greek identity since the Greek tribes were organized in city-states, each with distinct culture and system of values. Nevertheless, it would be rather wrong to claim that there was no Greek identity. Apart from the same language that the city-states shared, the continuum of which is the main tangible argument of today's nationalists in favor of Greeks' ancient ancestry, 'the notion of Greek paideia, a body of cultural knowledge, appeared very clearly in the Hellenic period' (Friedman, 1992, p. 838). Its development was though disrupted as 'Greek society more or less disappeared into a number of imperial structures that transformed the demographic composition and political forms of the society' (Friedman, 1992, p. 838). With the emergence of the Byzantine Empire Greeks were identified as *Romoioi* (Romans), a name contributed to all Christian populations of the empire. The word 'Greek' still existed and it referred to the state of paganism that was marginal in the dominant Christian religious order (Friedman, 1992).

The subsequent Schism of Christian churches that created the Eastern Orthodox Church and more significantly the millet system of Ottoman Empire defined Greeks as synonym to Christian Orthodox. The millet system involved the divide of the empire not on the basis of collective national or ethnic identities but rather on religious confessions. As a matter of fact, millets were more than just religious confessions. As Friedman (1992) notes they were a type of "ethnicities" since in the Ottoman Empire 'ethnicity is associated with externally defined properties of social life, territory, corporateness, religion – common practices cemented by a political organization that defines the region as a segment of a larger totality' (Friedman, 1992, p. 839) a notion close to ST's understanding of production of society since it pays more attention to the commonalities of peoples' everyday lives and practices. Within such political organization, and supported by a great autonomy that millets were enjoying, 'people were living in a world where the notion of nationalism, national identity and their exclusive narratives were virtually absent' (Tsoukalas, 1999, p. 9). It is no wonder then why Ottoman Empire is an exemplar of multiculturalist societies (Kymlicka, 2010). One of the five main millets was the Rum (Roman) Millet under which 'all the Empire's Orthodox Christian subjects are given corporate identity and are placed under the jurisdiction of the Greek patriarch of Constantinople' (Just 1989, p. 78, as cited in (Friedman, 1992)). At this point, it was predominantly Orthodox Christianity that defined Greekness, while 'Hellenism was not even a nominal issue' (Tsoukalas, 1999, p. 9).

The incorporation of Hellenism to Greeks' identity occurred after the partition of Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and, as noted before, by initiative of the West. Starting from Renaissance and picking during the Enlightenment, European intellectuals were glorifying ancient Greece as the cradle of Western civilization. Greeks were seen as legitimate ancestors of Europe of science, progress, democracy and commerce. At the same time European 'domination was based on the construction and appropriation of a racist myth of an eternally superior and indigenous proto-European civilization' (Tsoukalas, 1999, p. 8). This Western European superiority justified Europeans' expansionism but also led to the logical conclusion of a culturally divided world into the civilized, progressive West and the rest, so-called Third World. The Orient, that had defined Greeks' cultural identity until then, was described in sharp opposition to the

West as barbaric, despotic and mystic, particularly due to its strong ties to religions (Friedman, 1992). Until the Greek War of Independence in 1821 though it was this 'barbaric' Orient that was defining the Greek Identity since Greeks understood themselves as Romoioi, part of the Rum Millet that was ascribing a common identity not only to Greeks but also to Serbs, Bulgarians, Vlachs, Albanians and other Christians of the empire. From the beginning of the War of Independence though the European thought, more precisely the European version of what ancient Greece stood for, 'led Greeks to believe that they were different from other ethnic groups, in particular all those that they have been living with for centuries' (Tsoukalas, 1999, p. 9). Thus the supposed common cultural ancestry with the Europeans led Greeks to reorient towards the West. In actuality the process of turning Romoioi into Hellenes was very much the work of students returning from the West with new ideals, while it was also supported by European philo-Hellenes (Friedman, 1992).

Hellenism was more a reality for the Greek elite while the wider society was struggling to resolve the ambiguities it created. Despite the sense of pride that the imported new Hellenic identity entailed, it was contradicting Greeks' everyday reality. As Tsoukalas notes 'all living customs were closely linked to the Orthodox faith, and anti-Western feelings were vividly alive' (1999, σ. 9). The Orthodox Church was a supporter and a promoter of that divide since 'it opposed itself as much if not more to Western Catholicism than to Islam' (Michas 1977, as cited in (Friedman, 1992)). This controversy would create problems in the further development of Greece particularly when its historians would have to agree upon the historical development of the nation. The glory of the antiquity was inevitably incorporated as nations' genealogical and cultural cradle (Triandafyllidou & Veikou, 2002) but they would have to choose about how to represent its more recent, Orthodox past that was conceptually contradicting antiquity. Plus, Europeans were looking upon Byzantium with disdain since it was representing the "traditions" versus "progress", the main feature of the paradigm of the Enlightenment. Therefore, Greeks would have to choose whether they would be direct heirs of the Orthodox Byzantium, in which case they would have to 'forgo part of the universal symbolic aura they owned to their unique ancestors' and culturally alienate themselves from Europeans, or to 'reject Byzantium legacy as something 'foreign' or at least as a dark interlude' (Tsoukalas, 1999, p. 11) similar to Medieval times in Europe. Given that the Greek everyday reality was infused with religion on all levels, the latter choice would be a cultural suicide.

A compromise was achieved with the introduction of the notion of 'Helleno-Christianity'. The first official history by the father of Greek Modern History C. Paparigopoulos concluded that Hellenism did not end in the Roman times, but managed to survive and to revive with the establishment of the Byzantine Empire. That way he managed to associate Orthodoxy with Hellenism or how Tsoukalas notes, the Helleno-Christianity 'implied that the supposed "enlightened" and the allegedly "barbaric" ingredients should be integrated into a single historical synthesis' (1999, p. 11). This vague and controversial definition of Greekness has caused problems from the beginning of the independent state. An example is the official language the state would use. In an attempt to artificially introduce a more purified, 'middle way' (Katharevusa) between the ancient Greek language and the vernacular (Demotic) used at that time, the official language was inaccessible to the average Greek for the first fifty years. This eventually led to the use of both versions throughout Greece - diglossia (Tsoukalas,

1999). Yet, with education and cultural policies the “invented” Greekness became the only concept of nationhood that Greeks would identify with. The incorporation of Byzantium, hence religion, made the wider acceptance of Greekness feasible as it made it comprehensive to the predominantly rural, traditional and deeply religious Greek social structure of the 19th century (Triandafyllidou & Veikou, 2002).

The resulted three-dimensional concept of Greekness that involved common ancestry, cultural traditions and religion was not just aiming to unite the Greek populations after the decline of Ottoman Empire, but also to project Greekness’ boundaries to the “significant other”. As Triandafyllidou (1998) notes the “significant other” is any other group that poses threat to the nation. In that sense Greekness on one hand distinguishes the Greeks from the non-Christian populations of the Empire and on the other from the South Slavs living in the Balkans that would potentially raise claims to the Classical Greek culture (Triandafyllidou & Veikou, 2002). Owing to the ambiguity of its definition, Greeks were projecting either the Hellenic or the Orthodox and sometimes, like in the case of GD, both elements of that identity against the “other” that would threaten nations independence or self-determination. For instance, in the case of the “Macedonian question” Greeks confronted the neighboring country by accusing them for expropriation of the Greek Hellenic past. In doing so, they had to ‘incorporate Alexander the Great into the classical Greek tradition and emphasize his centrality to Greeks’ sense of identity’ (Triandafyllidou 1998, p. 604). On the other hand, when it comes to Turkey it is the recent past and predominantly Orthodoxy versus Islam that delineate the two countries.

Rival nations are not the only “significant others” that nation-states are cautious of. It is also the internal “others” that treat the homogeneity and hence the uniqueness of the nation. Internal “significant others” are ethnic minorities that potentially ‘pose threat to the territorial integrity if they raise secessionist claims but also to its cultural unity and authenticity when they assert their right to difference and thus disrupt the cultural and political order of the quasi nation-state’ (Triandafyllidou A. , 1998, p. 601). The notorious example of state’s discrimination and isolation of Muslim minorities in Western Thrace is reflecting state’s perception of them not only as internal “other” but also fearing their cultural and religious similarities with the neighboring Turks as external “other”. Lastly, internal “others” are considered the immigrant communities that ‘threat the cultural and/or ethnic purity of the nation’ (Triandafyllidou A. , 1998, p. 601).

Nationalism and exclusion of the ‘other’ within these frames is a natural resort. Recent Greek history has already shown that the results of an encounter with internal “others” were exclusion and isolation, as it will be discussed later. Furthermore, each time it was evident that Greekness has and maintains rigid frames, attached to the Greek tradition. This lack of flexibility of Greekness could be seen as a win of “tradition” versus “progress”. It would be expected that in the era of globalization and the increased mobility of the populations these frames would be revised or at least loosen in order to be more inclusive, as social progress demands. But the organic character of Greekness, that implies unchangeableness, theoretically contradicts Greece’ commitment to be part of those global social developments, in particular its integration into the European Community.

2.2 The Reproduction of Greekness – the rigidity and incompatibility of Greek National identity with Human Rights

The Greek understanding of individual Human rights is deviating from the Western one. This could be contributed to the non-synchronized cultural and socioeconomic transformations of the two societies. On one hand in the West from the 18th and 19th centuries ‘the notion of individualism mirrored the social reality of industrialization and proletarianization, while the individual civil and political rights responded to the demands of the emergent bourgeoisie’ (Pollis, 1992). Greece on the other hand remained rural until the decades following the WW2. Even Athens owes its sharp growth after the WW2 to the migration of people from the countryside not to be employed in the industrial labor market but in construction, personal and domestic services and artisan work (Maloutas, 2007). In other words, Greek society remained rural, from what the notion of individual rights was alien to the political philosophy of Greece in contrast to the northern industrial societies.

Apart from that, the definition of basic social unit is also different. In the West it is the autonomous individual while traditionally in Greece was, and to a significant extend still remains, the family – a social unit that is responsible for the well-being of all. In family based societies ‘rights and obligations are reciprocal, hierarchical and differentiated; they are not attributes of individuals possessed equally by all’ (Pollis, 1992, p. 173). Individual rights were eventually embodied into the structure of the Modern Greek state through its Constitution and legal system in an attempt to Westernize Greece. But the imposed Europeanization upon traditional Greek society led to tensions and contradictions that persist until today since although the legal rules are rigidly imposed, laws are often undermined by traditional claims of loyalty to the family and political clientelism (Pollis, 1992). It becomes evident then that the traditional value system persists in modern Greece, albeit in modified form, and it doesn’t have individual rights in its center.

It becomes clear then that even if the state officially guarantees individual human rights to all, it is actually Greeks loyalty to Greekness’ understandings that informs Greeks over who should be granted rights and who should not. As noted before, it starts with the family as the basic social unit, and continues with political clientelism that in its turn creates wider political and social “families”. After all, clientelism is a pattern of social organization that represents the persistence of traditional hierarchical social structure, or constitutes a response to their breakdown, in a social context where individuals are isolated, without independent access to political and economic life (Hallin & Papathanasopoulos, 2002). It is no secret in Greece, that whole families were, and to some extend still are, voting for particular political parties, as a family tradition. Whether this involved direct privileges from the politicians in exchange for voters’ support, for instance hiring a family member in the public sector in exchange of the votes of the whole family (Mavrogordatos, 1997), or



Pic. 2.2-1 Political Clientelism and the 'Family' – A child's baptism in Orthodox Christianity and in the political party of Pasok, 1981, Source: Internet

not, the affiliation of a family to particular political party was taking dogmatic forms. For instance, it was part of the normality for children to continue the voting tradition of their parents and subsequently prolong the tradition to future generations. Individual political preferences or choices in a family, if not absent, were considered heretic and could lead to confrontations inside the family. Fiercer confrontations could occur, particularly during election periods, between neighbors who support different political parties⁵. Those had more a character of a rivalry between sports clubs and religious groups and less of a political dialogue. Needless to say, that the particular dogmatic attitude was transferred and practiced to other aspects of people's lives. This social structure may imply pluralism, since it involves a confrontation of different political parties and therefore views, but the range of the topics "allowed" to be debated is limited. In reality, it would protest and isolate any different opinion that deviates from country's main wider ideological guide – the concept of Greekness, or alternatively "Ethnos", which with the establishment of Modern Greek state was added as an upper layer above the 'family' and informs the whole social structure of Greece.

Ethnos is a traditional Greek communalism, 'which articulates national unity and is understood as an organic entity for which eastern Orthodoxy is central' (Pollis, 1992, p. 174). It is a key concept that defines who is Greek and which values should be fostered and cherished in the society. But most importantly, as it is embodied in the state, Ethnos 'possesses the power to determine the requisite actions and behavior demanded of an individual for the fulfilment of his or her obligations to national solidarity' while it can also 'provide the rationale for the restriction on the exercise of individual rights' (Pollis, 1992, p. 176). The national mottos of "Greece of Christian Greeks" and "Motherland, Religion, Family" used in the military Junta and still echoes back to a significant part of the population, indicate the ethno-religious features of the nation while the organic character of Ethnos implies the rigidness of its boundaries. With regards to Human Rights, this understanding of Ethnos results in limitations of rights to those of different religions and ethnicities because 'only those of the Greek Ethnos are entitled to those rights and privileges that adhere specifically to Greeks' (Pollis, 1992, p. 179).

The central role of Orthodoxy in the concept of Ethnos renders particularly problematic the exercise of religious freedom. The Greek Orthodox Church is the main actor interested in the restriction of religious freedom and it pursues its interest by having established a relationship of mutual interdependence with the state. Its self-proclaimed mission is 'to preserve the superior spiritual ethos of Greekness by forging a symbolic relationship between the Church and the state' (Pollis, 1992, p. 179), what inevitably results in religious intolerance. The existence of the 'Ministry of Education and Religion' is one of the proofs that the Church-state relationship is not only symbolic. It equalizes the importance of the two institutions and intermingles them by affirming state's responsibility to socialize the youth into religious faith (Pollis, 1992, p. 181). As one can logically conclude, that that religious faith could be only Orthodox Christianity.

With further regards to education, the legal framework provides that the school should 'encourage student's loyalty to the country and faithfulness to the authentic elements of the Orthodox Christian tradition' (Law 1566/1985, art. 1.1, as cited in

⁵ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xCuX4xkeODc>

(Zambeta, 2000)). At the same time, a regulation of the same law provides religious freedom since 'the freedom of religious consciousness is inviolable' (Zambeta, 2000, p. 149). In practice though the rights of religious minorities are greatly violated by the educational curriculum. The most prominent example is the compulsory course of religious education. This course could be misinterpreted with what elsewhere is understood as religious studies but in Greece it has a proselytizing character and is exclusively focused on Christian orthodoxy. It aims to 'strengthen children's right faith in God...to cultivate their stable inclination to a life according to Christ and the regulation of children's behavior according to his divine will' (Presidential Decree 583/1982, as cited in (Zambeta, 2000)). Students adherent to other religions or no religion are offered the possibility of being exempt from the course but are not offered an alternative religious education. In other words, Greek students are obliged to participate in a course that disseminate them with only the Christian Orthodox religion while their knowledge of other religions is opaque throughout the whole period of the school years. On the other hand, religious minorities are stripped from their right to knowledge about their religion while their 'right not to participate' in the course in reality reflects the school's exclusive tendencies towards minorities from the mono-cultural philosophy of the school curriculum. Any proposals for modernization of the religious curriculum with the inclusion of a limited amount of attention to other religions meet the strong opposition of the Church which reacts with spreading the fear in the society that 'religious curriculum is in danger' (Zambeta, 2000, p. 149).

After school, life paths of religious minorities in Greece would be further limited by mono-cultural tendencies of societal Greekness as they would experience discrimination in the labor market, particularly in the public sector. Similarly to education system, the public sector – a domain (political) powers of Greekness - is both the outcome of practices informed by Greekness and also reproduces Greekness through practices it organizes. Most importantly though it monitors the (mono-cultural) conditions of Greekness' reproduction. With its central role in Greekness, it would be logical to conclude that the Church of Greece plays a central role in both informing and monitoring the conditions of practices in public sector. As Pollis notes 'employment of Non-Orthodox in public sectors...such as the military, the judiciary and education...is minimal and virtually non-existent in the higher echelons' (1992, p. 182). The underlying rationale for denying the right to a non-orthodox to teach in schools is based, probably on the fear that he or she would subvert Orthodox spiritual values (Pollis, 1992). By excluding though religious minorities from such pillar institutions of Greek society, their actual existence could be easily hidden.

The course of religious education is not the only course that disseminates the idea of mono-cultural character of Greekness. Greek history curriculum follows its tradition but most importantly it teaches the young population about the organic character of Greekness without allowing them to critically reflect on it. Regarding the goals of history classes, the essential picture that emerges from the history curricula implies that the main purpose of the Greek education system is 'the development of national consciousness, ethical conduct and citizenship' while on secondary importance it aims to teach 'students how to think historically, cultivating interest in the study of history and familiarizing them with techniques of historical research' (Avdela, 2000, p. 243). In reality though the priority is given to the first aim while the teaching of methods of research are greatly ignored in the classes. That way, students are being

deprived from the ability to understand how historical knowledge is produced or how the study of history is continually advancing by new findings that could add to or revise previous conclusions. Students end up simply memorizing historical “facts” that are incapable to distinguish from presentation of conclusions or opinions.

Those “facts” are being circulated as single truth in all the stages of the education system. The most centralized system of textbooks production in Europe, the detailed teachers’ guidelines that eliminate their possibilities to deviate from the information provided in the official textbooks, the inadequate external sources that are designed to appeal to students feelings and not to stimulate critical thinking (Avdela, 2000) are some main factors that contribute the unquestioned spread of those “facts” from the higher hierarchies of power (state and Church) to students while at same time to isolate any different interpretation of the “facts”. As Avdela notes this rigid procedure of producing textbooks limits considerably the opportunities of improving or modernizing the history curriculum. Since the main “facts”, reproduced in those textbooks, are agreed in the higher political echelons, the textbooks themselves are ‘reliable documents of the political and ideological choices of whatever political party that happens to be in power’ (Avdela, 2000, p. 244). Therefore, the decision to modernize the history curricular lies exclusively on the political powers and since they have limit the opportunities for modernization, the circulation of particular historical facts servers the political establishment for the time being.

The undisputed “facts” primarily involve the definition of Greekness and the narrative that surrounds it. Avdela states that the main traits of Greekness are continuity, absence of change, homogeneity, resistance and superiority. As she concludes ‘What takes shape as a result is a collective “subject” that is homogenous, undifferentiated in time and space and has boundaries that are continuously expanding.’ (Avdela, 2000, p. 247). Of course by “expanding” the author specifies all those ethnicities that have been baptized Greeks in the history curriculum, starting from Ionian and Dorian population, the Macedonians (Triandafyllidou A. , 1998) until the modern Greek communities of Australia. Their dual or more cultural identities or potential external cultural influences on the mainland Greeks are deliberately ignored because Greekness is also a homogenous entity. The superiority is contributed to the symbolic burden of the past as long as its globally recognized status of the cradle of the developed “European civilization”. In sum, young Greeks learn in history classes that they belong and are obliged to maintain an ‘airtight culture that does not change and cannot be influenced, but only defends itself and radiates it’s shining light’ (Avdela, 2000, p. 247), while they are defined by common ancestry, culture and religion (Triandafyllidou & Veikou, 2002).

The “others” are defined as all the external and internal threats that Greekness had to face throughout its history. Those threats could vary from different nations, notoriously the Turks, to ideologies, such as communism. The only reaction that such an organic entity like Greekness could generate is resistance to changes and to difference - the only other, less common, option would be to assimilate the “other”. As a matter of fact, the praised and emphasized defensive character of Greekness against threats is the main argument of the textbooks regarding stability and homogeneity of national identity. Fighting and rejecting difference in order to remain pure is the message that the textbooks convey to young Greeks. Bearing in mind that the didactic character of the curriculum does not allow critical reflection on the message, this

message could be interpreted as national duty by the students for their future. Consequently, students learn that “otherness” is a threat to Greekness. Exclusions could be assumed the changes that are accompanied with “progress”, predominantly in terms of technological and economic growth. Since the latter is associated with the “progressive West”, Westerners are portrayed in a more positive way, even though their “calculating” interest is also highlighted in the textbooks (Avdela, 2000).

The reality of course was and is different. Greeks were almost constantly co-existing with other ethnicities and religions. The arbitrary self-identification as homogeneous and pure is a product of a selective social memory. It is a product that answered the needs of the nationalism developed with the establishment of the Modern Greek state but in today’s era of European integration should be deemed problematic. Yet, Greek history textbooks are still omitting ethnic, cultural, religious and social differences that existed in the “national body” as well as the conflicts of different social groups among them over time (Avdela, 2000). The concession of their existence would threaten the homogeneity of the nation and challenge the concept of Greekness itself. The examples of ‘hiding’ and excluding minorities by the authorities and institutions in Greek history are numerous. All of the exclusive policies and attitudes towards minorities were justified with their incompatibility with Greekness, which until the beginning of 90s, when Greece became an immigrant receiving country, was understood predominantly in terms of religion. It is therefore the Greek Orthodox Church that had the leading role in persuading the perpetuation of the organic and pure character of Greekness and excluding “others”.

Having established its central role in the concept of Greekness and developed strong ties with the state, the Greek Orthodox Church has vigorously opposed to the entitlement of rights to religious minorities. Despite the fact that the freedom of religious consciousness is guaranteed in the constitution to all “known” religions, Church manages to limit the freedom of religious practice through its embodied status in state’s institutions. To begin with, the “known” religions are only Judaism, Islam and Catholicism - a status that these religions maintain as a remnant of the Ottoman millet system (Pollis, 1992). For a “new” religion to be enlisted as “known” and to enjoy the freedom of practice, state’s organs – administrative and courts – must determine them as “known” in a case-by-case basis. In practice, ‘such determination is dependent on the often inconsistent vagaries of bureaucratic and juridical actions, leading to contradictory decisions’ (Pollis, 1992, p. 181). Later, if a religious minority desires to establish a house of worship it has to apply for a permit to the Ministry of Education and Religion. But as Pollis describes ‘The procedure for granting such a permit includes consultation by the ministry with the local Orthodox bishop, a practice that inevitably results in repeated denials, even in cases where another office or court in a previous application has certified a particular religion as “known” (1992, p. 181). One such religion is – the absolute “otherness” - Islam. Islam in Greece is associated with country’s eternal enemy Turkey that is also to blame for Greece’s distance in “progress” from the West (Friedman, 1992). Therefore, the only reaction to it could be opposition. Still, in an attempt to comply with European norms and owing to the fact that Athens is the only European capital without a mosque to cater the needs of more than 120.000 Muslims, in 2003 – a year before the Olympic Games - Foreign Minister G. Papandreou announced the building of an Islamic cultural center close to Athens Airport. The reaction of the Church was fierce. The local bishop of the chosen site – the

one who according to the official procedure is the last to decide – called the believers ‘to struggle in order to prevent the establishment of foreign, dangerous and heretic elements in our region’ while other bishops “decided” that ‘the people are not ready for accepting the sight of a minaret in the center of a Christian Orthodox country’ (Danopoulos, 2004, p. 46). This reaction echoed back to the believers what made the political world to hesitate to bear the political cost of the actualization of the plan until now. Bearing in mind that 46 % of Greek respondents of European Social Survey (2003) graded the importance of Church with 10 (on a scale of 1-10) in contrast to the 1,6% who graded it insignificant, while Church’s role in Greece was rated with 8,3 (Danopoulos, 2004), it could be easily understood that Church plays a crucial role in defining and shaping Greeks attitudes and behavior towards “difference”.

2.3 Greekness on test - first encounters with the ethnic “other”

In the previous sections I tried to outline the main elements that constitute the structure of Greek society. To sum up, the social structure – the rules and resources - that informs Greek society is the concept of Greekness. It is an autonomous ethno-genealogical concept that lies above the state’s definition of national identity. Greekness’s, taken for granted, organic nature indicate that it has rigid boundaries and concrete features that are unchangeable. In ST language this could be translated as the members of the Greek society have rigidly defined rules and limited recourses that inform peoples actions on daily basis. With regards to recourses – physical environment, social relations and the stock of knowledge that human draw upon when practice day-to-day activities (Dyck & Kearns, 2006) - while practicing their daily activities Greeks stump on and encounter “Greek traits” in all places, from going to the groceries shop where they will encounter mainly Greeks, will buy predominantly Greek products and prepare with them Greek food, to simply walking on the streets and upon stumping on one of the numerous Orthodox churches, scattered all around, make the sign of a cross to denote their faith– one of the religious customs learned usually inside the family. From the point of view of rules that govern these daily activities, the rigid and organic nature of Greekness as long as the vigorous attempts of some institutions, like Church and education system, to ignore the “other”, make them static. Since Greek rules and recourses are treated as unalterable and have the traits of only one culture because the “others” are virtually absent in the public domain, population’s reaction to difference would be rejection. For instance, if Greeks don’t learn about different religions, institutions of the state ignore their existence, Greeks wont encounter them nor their houses of worship on the streets and at the same time are taught that difference is a threat to Greekness, it is more likely that they would oppose to the construction of a mosque in Athens in order to defend the so-called Greekness. With no diversity to encounter Greeks will reproduce the same social structure – Greekness - again and again.

The real picture though is different. The social structure of Greece, described above, would make sense if Greece was isolated from the rest of the world and was not participating in global processes. Particularly the increased mobility of the global population, and country’s participation in the European integration processes challenge

Greekness, and force it to redefine itself by loosening its strict borders. The greatest triggering event that pressured for the re-negotiation of Greekness though, was the massive immigration at the beginnings of 1990's with the influx of immigrants that were genealogically considered Greeks, but their cultural traits and language were significantly different, from what the Greeks of the mainland understood as Greek. Their experiences as immigrants in contemporary Greece, as well as locals' reception, are an important forerunner that would help understand Greek's reaction to visible immigrants that will follow in the next decade.

In its modern history, Greece's net immigration rate became positive for the first time in the 1970s, with the arrival of ethnic Greeks and Greek citizens from Egypt, Turkey, Cyprus and Zaire (Triandafyllidou & Veikou, 2002). The most significant changes in society occurred, though, at the beginning of 1990s, when Greece started to receive massively undocumented immigrants from ex-Soviet Union – the Pontic Greeks and Albanian Greeks - Vorioepiotes. The particularity with these groups, that scholars tend to agree were counting around 500-600 thousand people, is that they claimed their right to Greek citizenship on the basis of their ethnic and cultural origins. The inclusive character of the Greek legislation towards them was grounded on the Greek irredentist concept "Great Idea" – a 'cultural, political and ultimately military project of integration...of territories inhabited by Greek-speaking Christian Orthodox populations that had not been included in the Greek state at the moment of its creation' (Triandafyllidou & Veikou, 2002, p. 193). It therefore implied that Greece is the political and cultural basis for the Greek populations living in the Near and Middle East as well as in the Balkans (Kitromilides, 1985, as cited in (Triandafyllidou & Veikou, 2002)). With that respect, in the legislation the Pontics and Vorioepiotes were regarded Homogenis – of Greek descent – and their immigration to Greece "the return home of the unredeemed brothers". According to the Greek Constitution, as Homogenis they are entitled to a favorable status in Greece, while the state 'is thought as having the obligation to facilitate the return of those Greeks who "unluckily had found themselves living away from the mother land"' (Pratsinakis, Is difference a privilege of the similar? Soviet Greek and Albanian Immigrants in Thessaloniki, 2009).

Yet, the official policy was somewhat differentiated toward each of these groups. Pontics were given full citizenship status and benefits, while at the same time a series of integration programs were created in order to facilitate their integration into the Greek society. In contrast, Albanian Greeks were simply facilitated in getting a Temporary resident permit (Green card) easier than other alien immigrants, while in the official discourse they were seen as guest workers. On one hand, this differentiated policy was grounded on the fact that it was much easier for Pontics to prove their Greek identity. They hadn't abandoned their ethnic identity within the Soviet Union, while they also suffered oppression and persecutions from the Soviet regime, precisely because of that. Therefore, their naturalization was a simple matter of proof of their Greek origin at the Greek embassy of their previous country of residence (Triandafyllidou & Veikou, 2002). For Greek Albanians though, Greek public officials had 'reported severe difficulties in certifying the authenticity of documents presented by immigrants to prove their Greek origins' (Triandafyllidou & Veikou, 2002, p. 199), while for the vast majority of them their status remained undocumented.

In reality though, the Greek immigration policy was also informed by other factors as well. Regarding Pontics, the government was drawing on the legacy of “successful assimilation” of Asia Minor refugees of the 1923 compulsory population exchange between Greece and Turkey (Pratsinakis, Is difference a privilege of the similar? Soviet Greek and Albanian Immigrants in Thessaloniki, 2009). As envisaged by the Lausanne Convention of 1923, during that period around 200.000 Pontic Greeks were “exchanged” and



Pic. 2.3-1 Migration outflows from Pontos during and after the WW1, Source: Pratsinakis 2013, p. 49

fled to Greece while and approximately 85.000 migrated to Russia (Pic. 2.3-1). Greek government expected that Pontic returnees of Soviet Union would have maintained the same Greek-Pontic identity with their former countrymen that fled from Pontos to Greece approximately a century ago, despite their isolation from Greece behind Soviet’s “Iron Curtain”. That identity of course was considered not different from the Greekness of the mainland. Due to its understanding as an organic and unaltered concept, the government also turned the blind eye to the facts that the Pontics of ex-Soviet Union were coming from different regions of Soviet Union – north coast of Black sea (Crimea, Odessa), Caucasus and Kazakhstan – and varied significantly culturally and linguistically – Greek, Turkish and Russian speaking Pontics (Pratsinakis, 2013). That naïve expectation, that their Greekness would enable them to easily adjust to the country’s social life, and assure their devotedness to the nation, alongside with their settlement scheme in Thrace, home to the Muslim minority, that ‘aimed at the economic revitalization of country’s undeveloped region as well as at changing its religious and ethnic demography in favor of the Christian citizens’ (Pratsinakis, 2009, p. 5) defined the warm and welcoming reception of the Pontic Greeks. In other words, we can say that, the repatriation of ex-Soviet Pontics served the plans of the state in the 1990’s to “fill” the economically vacant regions of northern Greece with a population that was expected to be culturally closer to Greeks, and “hide” demographically the Muslim minorities that despite their continuous presence in the Greek state were considered alien and a potential threat to the country, due to their cultural proximity to the neighboring Turks.

On the contrary, the Albanian immigration was considered an “invasion”, in a country that continued officially the line of not being an immigrant receiving country. The size of an approximately half a million Albanian immigrant population, that was more than double the ex-Soviet Pontic population, was regarded as a threat to, the supposedly homogenous, Greece (Pratsinakis, 2009). Firstly, the impossibility to distinguish Albanian Greeks from Albanians suggested the presence of Muslim Albanians among the immigrants as well, what constituted the whole population an internal threat to the ethnocultural homogeneity of the nation. Secondly, their connotation as a threat was further informed with references to disputed border, and

ethnic minority issues between the two nations constituting them also an external threat. Finally, the “police logic” of the government was equalizing Albanians’ undocumented status with potential criminal activity, namely ‘illegal immigrant = Albanian criminal’ (Pratsinakis, 2009; Hatziprokopiou, 2003). The media took the role to reproduce that racist logic into the public discourse with constant references to activities of Albanian gangs, pointing out to the collectiveness of those criminal activities that supposedly mirrors a culture prone to criminality, and very soon the word Albanian became synonym with the word criminal (Pratsinakis, 2009). Despite the fact that in the following years more Albanian immigrants managed to obtain a permit to stay (Hatziprokopiou, 2003), that stereotype was hunting the Albanian population in Greece until recently, when the public attention was redirected to the new immigrants.

It becomes evident that the government and the media tried to construct the image of “good” and “bad” immigrant. Therefore, it would be expected that the society would react to those two immigrant groups respectfully – positively towards the ex-Soviet Pontics, and negatively towards Albanians. Pratsinakis (2009), however revealed the exact opposite findings, in his research on neighborhood level. The ex-Soviets were perceived negatively, not only by the locals, but also by the old Pontics immigrants who fled to Greece in 1923. Everyday interaction with the natives revealed the cultural differences that the government’s discourse was trying to conceal, or didn’t expect to face. At the same time, government’s integration and housing policies failed due to their insufficiency to tackle immigrants’ issues, or to governments’ inexperience in applying them (Triandafyllidou A. , 2011). For the ex-Soviets, that resulted into their spatial and social segregation. The majority of them settled in big cities, predominately Athens and Thessaloniki, creating ethnic enclaves, while their downgraded socio-economic and professional statuses, associated with migration, added the element of poverty into those enclaves. On the micro level, the use of public space became the contested issue between the locals and the ex-Soviets. The latter had developed leisure practices mostly at the neighborhood public spaces, what could possibly be related to ‘different cultural perception of open space and the rural background of the majority of Soviet Greeks’ (Pratsinakis, 2009, p. 10). In particular, they would ‘gather in pilotis and pavements just outside the private domain of the residence to play cards...drink, eat and socialize’. Moreover, they had created “spontaneous leisure-scapes” by bringing sofas, chairs, table etc. (2009, p. 10). Local Greeks were criticizing that type of use of public space, as for them leisure culture is increasingly moving towards the consumption and oriented towards the private sphere. Their attitudes towards the ex-Soviets can be summarized in the quote of one of Pratsinakis’ interviewees:

‘They are sitting outside of their houses in pilotis or they make temporary barracks and they play cards there. They speak Russian...they have different habits. They do not go out to cafeterias or taverns so as not to pay. Moreover, they are drinking a lot. They can’t have enough. How can you come together with them?’ (Pratsinakis, 2009, p. 10)

As a result, doubts were raised over ex-Soviet Pontics’ true Greekness, while the word Rosso-Pontics (Pontics of Russia) was used to delineate them from the old Pontics, and the “real” Greeks.

On the contrary, Albanians are perceived in a much more favorable way. This contradiction lies on the different ways the two groups adapted in the Greek society. For Albanians, the burden of that negative stereotyping forced the immigrants to hide the cues of their Albanian identity. Gradually they started to adapt Greek names, a part

of them were baptized Orthodox Christians, while the pattern of their settlement aimed into their dispersal - or hiding - in the cities (Pratsinakis, 2009; Hatziprokopiou, 2003) This voluntaristic, at first glance, aspect of their adaptation strategy was in reality a forced one as Pratsinakis's informants confess:

'We had our normal names. When I came here they told me 'I cannot call you Gazmend so I will call you Vasili'. Another told me 'I will call you Petro'...Eh, if you cannot, just give me my job and my daily wage and I do not care, call me as you want.'

'In the beginning you could not say that you were a Muslim, you would lose your job...that was the first thing that they asked you. 'What is your religion?' not 'What is your name?' (Pratsinakis, 2009, p. 10)

Gradually, though, those immigrants adapted to the Greek social structure. A research drawing on Berry's acculturation strategies, conducted among Albanian teenagers in Greek schools, showed that integration, and secondly assimilation were the most popular strategies immigrants tend to follow for their adaptation process in Greece (Pavlopoulos, Motti-Stefanidi, Obradovic, & Masten, 2008). The preference, of almost half of the sample, to integration strategy shows that those young immigrants chose to combine Greek elements with their native in the construction of their social structure. After all, the cultural distance between the two nations is small due the wider Balkan culture, while Albanians' Muslim elements of their identity are weak, due to their longstanding existence under communist rule. The result would be a new "ethnicity", that won't be exclusively Albania nor Greek, but a combination – "Greek-Albanian". Yet, 3 out of 10 choose to assimilate (Pavlopoulos, Motti-Stefanidi, Obradovic, & Masten, 2008), what indicates that they choose to abandon the Albanian elements in their new "ethnicity". This reflects the pressure of the wider Greek society for homogeneity.

The experience of those first immigrant groups showed that Greeks are willing to accept the difference only when that difference assimilates to Greekness' norms. For the rest, those who desire to maintain elements of their original identities the only solution is rejection. In other words, as it was stated before, the only reaction that Greekness could generate toward difference is rejection and isolation, like in the case of ex-Soviets' segregation, or assimilation. The integration strategies that the young Albanians adapt can be contributed to their cultural closeness to Greeks and to their ability to hide or negotiate their cultural traits that could "bother" the wider society. But what if that traits could not be hidden, like in the case of visible ethnic minorities, or simply the minority group does not desire to renounce that traits, like in the case of the growing Muslim population of Greece?

As the numbers of visible ethnic minorities increase their participation, thereby their visibility, in the Greek society will also increase. The education system (Chapter 5.1), the Church of Greece (5.2) and the political establishment (5.3) will have to face the challenge of accommodating a population, whose identities don't comply with any of Greekness genealogical, religious and cultural pillars. Likewise, individual and collective Greek actors informed by Greekness in their actions, through the aforementioned social systems, will have to process the new knowledge of totally alien immigrants equally participating in their society. The emergence of GD itself can be considered a response to that challenge from a certain part of Greek society. While the outburst of (physical) racist violence of 2012 on the streets of Athens was a step further, from just being racist on macro-structural level and the direct action

corresponding to that response. Urban space, where immigrants' life-paths most often intercept with those of Greeks, emerged as a battlefield on which the background Greekness was translated into action. In other words, Greeks drew on the defensive character of Greeks, Greekness implies, to battle the threat of immigrants when encountering them on the streets. The fact that racist violence was observed as more extreme in the particular time of the economic crisis and in particular neighborhoods adds the importance of other – more flexible in time and space - factors in its interpretation, like the material deprivation of neighborhoods. The next chapter will explore the socio-geographic features of urban space that facilitate the expression of racist violence. In doing so, I will firstly examine the cases of racist and racial violence of other European countries that have experienced urban conflicts for significant longer time than Greece. Secondly, I will try to distinguish areas of Athenian urban space where racist violence is most likely to occur. Finally, drawing on the European experience I will attempt to determine the effects of racist violence on victims.

3 Racist Violence on the Micro Level of Encounters with Difference

In the previous chapter I have mentioned that racist violence is part of the normality in decidedly racist societies. Greek society resulted to be one such, since it is infused with notions of superiority and exclusiveness that underlie the country's wider ideological guide – Greekness. Here we can hypothesize that immigrants will have similar chances to face racist and exclusive attitudes from the locals in any geographic part of the country, since Greekness is the dominant structural principle that had, and continues to nurture the population's understanding of self and the others. It is therefore, expected that immigrants will receive the same treatment whether they find themselves in an urban or rural environment, whether at the center or periphery of Athens etc. When we narrow down to the micro level of daily interaction, though, the literature suggests particular geographic patterns of where racial violence is more likely to occur in urban environments. These patterns are conditioned by the wider socio-cultural structure of the given society, that informs perpetrators' actions (what to think and how to act towards immigrants), but also the more flexible, in time and space, socio-economic structure that prompts perpetrators to actually act. Urban space here serves as an arena for encounters, where those actions can be materialized. Arenas where encounters with difference are facilitated are usually places where immigrants spend their daily life (work, live, socialize). Encounters that result in racist violence, along immigrants' daily paths, induce a number of negative emotional responses from immigrants that affects both daily and life paths.

3.1 Hate crime and the socio-economic structure

3.1.1 The geographic features of hate crime

Igansky (2008) has distinguished four hypotheses about the spatial dynamics of racial violence that could indicate potential locales and reasons for racial violence to occur.

The first, the *"inter-group friction" hypothesis* draws on the opportunistic nature of racial violence and suggests that it is 'proportional to the amount of inter-group contact in given locality' (2008, p. 52). The higher the levels of ethnic heterogeneity in an area the more contacts between different ethnic groups it will facilitate. The increased chances of inter-group contacts in their turn provide increased opportunities for offending the 'other' and racial victimization.

On the contrary the second, the *'power differential' hypothesis* proposes that 'the rate of race-hate crime against minority ethnic groups would be higher in those areas where minority communities account for a small proportion of the population' (2008, p. 53). Usually the dominant group is considered the white population of an area, as data provided by Iganski from UK and USA indicates, due to dominant groups' perception that 'law enforcement officials and the majority living in the neighborhood are unsympathetic to the victim group' (2008, p. 53). But Iganski's further analysis shows that the hypothesis is also relevant for the White group when they constitute a

minority in an area, as well as for any numerically inferior ethnic group in relation to other groups in a given area. This leads to the clarification that despite the fact that 'the strength of representation of the White group provides the dominant predictor variable for rates of victimization of the minority ethnic group, for any particular ethnic group the presence of other ethnic groups in the locality increases their rates of victimization' (2008, p. 58).

The third, the '*defended neighbourhoods*' hypothesis is directly linked to the wider exclusionary sentiments at the structural level of the society, which are transferred to local level. It is particularly relevant for mono-cultural societies or during periods of retreat from the narrative of multiculturalism in cosmopolitan societies. The hypothesis posits that 'in some instances race-hate crime can be regarded as an instrumentally defensive activity, defending neighborhoods from unwelcome outsiders' (2008, p. 61). According to Hesse et al. (as cited in (Iganski, 2008)) such territorial dynamics are manifestations of 'White territorialism' that involves offenders' sense of ownership of a space that they regard as 'white'. Racist violence therefore is offender's instrument to defend the traditional spatial identity or the 'ethnoscope' of the area from the threat of the 'other'.

The last, the *political economy of hate-crime hypothesis* adds the socioeconomic context to the defendant neighborhoods hypothesis. Data from UK and USA (Iganski, 2008) suggest that racial violence is more likely to occur in economically declining areas where residents compete for scarce job opportunities as well as in prosperous areas where there is a competition for housing. In these cases, the offenders perceive themselves as victims of reverse discrimination of governmental policies and practices that favors minorities on their expense.

All four hypotheses discuss the structural components of geographic areas that are likely to facilitate the engagement in racist violence. Empirical studies though, (Amin, 2002; Ray, Smith, & Wastell, Understanding Racist Violence,, 2000; Ray & Smith, Racist Offenders and the Politics of 'Hate Crime', 2001; Ray, Smith , & Wastell, Shame, Rage and Racist Violence, 2004; Virchow, 2007; Blee, 2007) suggest that the motivation for racist offending is not solely racist animus. For instance, the vast majority of the offenders - Ray and colleagues studied - lack political interest and motivation for racial offending. Most of the incidents discussed in their study involve opportunistic, and not prior engineered offences on Asian minorities. The encounters of the two parties were usually occurring in the frames of commercial transactions, since the victims were 'the typical shopkeepers, restaurant and takeaways owners and taxi drivers and the typical sites of the assaults were their places of business' (Ray et al. (2004, p. 351)). The violent incidents that result from such encounters usually follow an "escalation sequence", typical for any opportunistic violent incident, where 'one party perceives an insult from the other; he responds to the insult and escalates the confrontation; that answer evokes similar escalation; someone throws the first punch, and so it goes' (Felson as cited in (Iganski, 2008, p. 27)). The offenders have little time to choose how to act, but the choices are not fully spontaneous, particularly when they incorporate the racist element in the insults. The choice of how to act is made based on the wider social structure that informs offenders' actions. If that social structure embeds racism, then it would be more likely that the insults would involve racist animus.

3.1.2 Hate Crime in the European Socio-Spatial Structure and the role of material security in racist offending

The social structure that informs the actions of offenders that Ray and colleagues studied is not racist in its classic definition. The vast majority would distance themselves from the 'real' racism that political parties, like the British National Party stand for, while describing theirs as 'normal' racism. A proof is that they would not express animosity against the Black Brits, just for the Asians. The Blacks, as Ray's interviewees explain are 'more macho, more like us really' (Ray, Smith, & Wastell, 2004, p. 356), and had traditional working class jobs. In other words, black Brits were closer to the White populations of the periphery of the Great Manchester, studied by Ray, not only culturally, since they also display the working class masculinity but they were also of the same social class - the one that is defined by hard manual labor. On the contrary, Asians were considered the personification of capitalism and of undeserved wealth that was obtained without hard work. Asians here were 'identified with money, success and self-interest combined with communal loyalties that were absent in respondents' own experience' (Ray, Smith, & Wastell, 2004, pp. 356-357). Therefore, racism against those Asians was perceived 'normal' because Ray's offenders considered themselves victims of the working ethics of this particular ethnic group that undermines their success Ray et al. (2004). The 'real' racism at 'rational and cognitive level...was (recognized as) morally unaccepted' (Ray, Smith, & Wastell, 2000, p. 28). Ray parallelize their racist animus against Asians with that of pre-WW2 European anti-Semitic tradition - 'They hold us captive in our country. They let us work in the sweat of our nose, to earn money and property for them, while they sit behind the oven, lazy,..., eat, drink, live softly and well from our wealth, sweat and work' (Straub 1997 as cited in Ray et al. (2004, p. 357).

Today, this kind of racist animosity towards an ethnic group is contributed predominantly to people and populations that are being characterized with limited/low human capital. In that respect, Ray and colleagues (2000), (2001), (2004) revealed also the socio-economic background of the offenders. According to these studies typically offenders were 'young men who had convictions for other types of crime...tended to live in outlying part of Greater Manchester with high levels of unemployment and deprivation, and few if any ethnic minority residents - essentially in poor white estates' (2000, p. 28). The main feature of their general social profile is low educational attainment, unemployment or employment in low-paid, low-skilled casual or insecure jobs. The family background of the offenders - 'unhappy and disrupted families with presence of violence as a routine recourse for problem solving' - is also indicative of the likelihood of their resorting to violence as an approach to settling arguments and conflicts outside the family setting as well (2001, p. 217)

So far, I have attempted to outline the structural properties that shapes the individual values of white British racial offenders of the outskirts of Greater Manchester. Schematically, on Coleman's boat I have defined the type 1 relations. But, what drives people to actually act in a racist manner and especially in a violent racist manner? In other words, which is the driving force for an individual to engage in Coleman's type 2 relations? As Ray (2001) note, in a globalized post-war era Western societies underwent pacification processes, and one of its strongest expressions is the increased sensitivity and intolerance to violence and public display of hate. So what

drives racist offenders to engage in racist assaults when violence and public display of hate, theoretically, have been removed, or at least marginalized, in Western societies' social structures?

Scholars, who have studied racial conflicts in Western cities, pay particular attention to emotions in the process of taking a step further from just being racist, to actually act racist. Virchow (2007) analyses the role of emotional satisfaction that far-right demonstrations offer to its participants. Iganski (2008) mentions anger as the impetus for many of the racist incidents described in his book. Amin (2002) discusses the rage that was building up among the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities in northern mill cities of UK, due to their neglect and marginalization by the state, what eventually erupted into the riots of 2001. McDevitt and colleagues add also the 'thrill seekers' in their typology of hate crime offenders (McDevitt, Levin, & Bennett, 2002). But Ray and colleagues (Ray, Smith, & Wastell, 2004) made one of the most insightful contributions to the centrality of emotions in the motives of racist offenders. In their work, they argue that an emotional cocktail of shame, sense of failure, resentment, hostility and envy overwhelmed the White offenders and eventually impelled them to engage in racist offenses.

The source of the feelings of shame in particular for Whites lies in community decline and economic exclusion of the poor residents of the periphery of Great Manchester from the high-consumption global city life of Manchester (Ray, Smith, & Wastell, 2004). These, and other cities across the Pennine hills, with strong employment base generated by the textile industry came into decline from the 1960s as a result of modernization of the production with new technologies and the closure of the mills unable to compete with cheaper textiles from the developing countries (Amin, 2002) since 'the work once done by Bangladeshi workers in the North of England could now be done even cheaper by Bangladeshi in Bangladesh.' (Kundnani, 2001, p. 106). What followed for both White and Asian communities of those towns are mass unemployment, intense competition for public sector or low-paid and precarious work, economic insecurity in general and social deprivation.

On ethnic community level, the economic decline of those cities deprived residents from the workplace also as a site for integration. As Kundnani notes 'The textile industry was the common threat binding the White and Asian working class into a single social fabric.' (Kundnani, 2001, p. 106). When that site along with the sources of economic equality and stability were removed from the cities, each of the ethnic communities 'was forced to turn inwards on to itself' (Kundnani, 2001, p. 106). At the same time social deprivation exacerbated ethnic differences 'for it removed part of the material well-being and social worth that can help reducing jealousy and aggression towards others seen to be competing for the same resources' (Amin, 2002, p. 5). What followed is socio-economic and spatial segregation while the growing racial animosity that it entailed, removed the political correctness and 'color blindness' in public issues.

Retreat from multiculturalism and the erection of ethnic boundaries that follow modern restructurings in economy is a typical phenomenon in post-industrial societies. In those societies, prevailed with neoliberal rationale in economy, second and third generation immigrants are required to socialize in different terms than their parents. The type of socialization that would lead them to a successful integration in the host society, apart from economic stability, also involves winning of social status, the process of acculturation, national identification and political participation (Loch, 2009).

Most of the European countries though are failing to provide the possibility to achieve even the first and basic aspect of integration, the economic. Comparative studies on major European countries have shown that 'in each country (Germany, France, UK) labor market performance of most immigrant groups as well as their descendants is on average worse than that of the native population' (Algan, Dustmann, Glitz, & Manning, 2010, p. 25) regardless their acculturation approaches and policies but also regardless the fact that the educational indicators between the first and second-generation immigrants has been significantly improved. Particularly in the case of France, the second-generation of immigrants is proven to be more economically marginalized than the first-generation (Loch, 2009; Algan, Dustmann, Glitz, & Manning, 2010). The lack of possibilities for social mobility for immigrant youth population plays a great role in the erection of ethnic boundaries. On one hand 'the more successful migrants are in the labor market, the higher will be their...contribution to the host economy' what in turn 'may be important for the attitudes of the native population to immigrants' (Algan, Dustmann, Glitz, & Manning, 2010, p. 4). On the other hand, 'poor economic success may lead to social and economic exclusion of migrants and their decedents which in turn may lead to social unrest, riots and terrorism as extreme manifestations' (Algan, Dustmann, Glitz, & Manning, 2010)).

Immigrants' economic success has been crucial for natives' attitudes towards them in number of occasions. For instance, in the Netherlands the starting point of the backlash against multiculturalism is also rooted in socio-economic factors. Until recently the country was devoted to its "pillarization system" where each religious or ideological community, or "pillar", enjoys state's support and neutrality in setting up its own separate institutions (Entzinger, 2006). With the arrival of Muslim guest workers that right was extended also to the new Muslim pillar. The restructuring of Dutch industry though in the 1980s had left low skilled workers without job. Many of them were of immigrant origins that were initially invited to occupy those job positions. With no prior provision made for their integration that could potentially cover the occupation void that the restructuring created 'immigration became a growing burden for welfare and social policy regimes' (Entzinger, 2006, p. 5). Shortly after, the first voices against immigration were heard and were further enriched with narratives about the cultural incompatibility of the native and immigrant - primarily Muslim - groups.

In France, racism targets, first and foremost, young people of Maghrebin and especially Algerian origin who are also the most marginalized ethnic group in education, labor and housing market (Loch, 2009). Their additional extreme spatial segregation in the notorious suburban *banlieues* creates a fruitful ground for frustration and anger to spill out into frequent riots as a reaction against country's institutional racism. In contrast, the (relative) absence of riots and ethnic tensions in Germany, in general, is contributed to the provisional role of the welfare state. Despite the fact that the country also experienced economic modernization processes and the subsequent deterioration of the employment situation for its guest workers of Turkish origin, the welfare state interventions, alongside with integration provisions in education, work etc., worked as a safety net that ameliorated the socio-economic inequalities, inevitably created by the restructuring of the economy. And that economic protection and further integration, versus isolation, resulted to be more important for the social cohesion than the cultural integration. Turks of Germany are not under

strong pressure to assimilate while they also maintain cultural and social ties with Turkey, but are better integrated socio-economically. The exact opposite is being observed in the French case. Loch (2009) notes that this discrepancy between 'on one hand internalized French values and on the other social exclusion and racist post-colonial discrimination leads to frustration and moral indignation' (p. 795), hence the occurrences of riots in France and their absence in Germany.

Returning to the UK case – the European pioneer of neoliberal social policies – the safety net that would ensure economic equality and stability to the residents of the former mill towns of the north had started to being removed from the period of Margaret Thatcher governance. In fear of creating a workless, welfare dependent underclass in the UK, similar to the one that has been developed in deprived Black American ghettos of USA, today the government has toughened the criteria of welfare benefit entitlement (Newman, 2011). At the same time, it did little to tackle the problem of unemployment that the deindustrialization created since 'vacancies on offer in areas with concentrations of unemployment did not match the skills of unemployed...many were part time, low quality, casualized and therefore did not offer a real alternative to life on benefit' (Newman, 2011, p. 95). That has only exacerbated the antagonism between the different ethnic groups that today are competing not only for the scarce job opportunities in the area but also for the right for welfare benefit.

Limited human capital, hence stock of knowledge to inform action, has led the populations of disadvantaged cities like Oldham, Burnley, Bradford (Ray et al. 2004; Amin, 2002) to an interpretation of the problems of poverty and marginalization that they face with information accessible in their immediate environment, since narratives of crisis aim to 'find resonance with individuals' and groups' direct, lived experiences and not in terms of their 'scientific' adequacy as explanations for the condition they diagnose' (Hay, 1996, p. 255). What they see in their immediate environment is a society culturally divided in two communities that have 'turn inwards on to itself' (Kundnani, 2001, p. 106) living as two antagonistic bodies. Since those bodies experience significant cultural and spatial segregation, are perceived as solid, therefore any individual success or failure is generalized and contributed to nothing "more than meets the eye" – the cultural differences.

In reality though cultural differences don't seem to be the root of their problems. The similarities in the motives of Ray's racist offenders and Amin's accounts of the motives of Bangladeshi and Pakistani rioters of 2001 are remarkable. Recounting two sides of the same coin, both communities express frustration and anger towards each other for their perceived preferential treatment of the 'other' from the police, the media the welfare system etc. (Ray & Smith, 2001; Amin, 2002; Kundnani, 2001). Most importantly, an analysis of the Crime Survey in England and Wales of 2012 revealed that the demographic features of victims of racially motivated crimes, besides of coming predominantly from an ethnic minority group, share many similarities with the demographics of racist offenders – young age, from a household with low income and unemployed (Iganski & Lagou, 2015). In other words, in contrast to France's youth from Maghreb that have turned their fury towards the French authorities (Loch, 2009), hence their mobilization is rather an anti-government mobilization and less of racial nature, White and Asian residents of northern mill towns are putting the blame for their shared disadvantaged economic position first on each other and then on government structures, again not for neglecting them per se, but for preferential

treatment of the 'other'. The resulted picture is a community where the socio-economic deprivation arouses a cocktail of negative emotions that lead to racist violence.

3.1.3 Hate Crime in the Greek Socio-Spatial Structure, and the role of Greece's financial crisis in racist offending

The Greek case of the rise of racial violence shares many similarities with UK's case with one significant difference in the motivations of racist offenders. In contrast to UK, and to Northern Europe that is prevailed with notions of multiculturalism – at least on discourse level - the cultural structure of Greece described in the chapter 2 embeds racism in its classic definition - that is, a perceived cultural and to some extent racial superiority of Greeks over other ethnicities. In both cases racist offending is prompted by economic inequalities and marginalization but in Greece the cultural incompatibility of the Greeks with foreigners, a central belief of Greeks over their ethnic identity, is one of the main justification for racist offending for a great part of the population.

The reasoning of racist violence on the basis of cultural incompatibility is typical for the part of the Greek population that is ideologically affiliated with the center right and right political spectrum. Triandafyllidou & Kouki (2014), in their study surrounding public discourses over far-right violence in the center of Athens, have distinguished two different lines of argumentation - the political-ideological versus the cultural identity. Despite the fact that supporters of both blame the state for allowing the immigration issue to evolve into a problem, adherents of the political-ideological argumentation, and at the same time affiliated with the left political spectrum, define the problem of racism as 'a political and ideological choice' and therefore 'seek the economic and political causes to its rise' (Triandafyllidou & Kouki, 2014, p. 426). On the contrary, adherents of cultural/identity reasoning give prominence to the government, citizens are regarded passive and therefore the dominant culture is not to blame. At the same time 'migrants are constructed as a group threatening the national self' (Triandafyllidou & Kouki, 2014, p. 426) while racist violence seems to be a 'natural reaction to the problem of migration' (2014, p. 425).

If the right wing part of Triandafyllidou and Kouki's interviewees who are 'civil and political actors' (2014, p. 422), namely people of relatively high cultural capital, interpret racist violence as natural reaction to cultural differences, the same interpretation is taking a more dogmatic form among the people of the same political affiliations but with lower cultural capital. In reality, for a Greek individual to adopt this interpretation there is no necessity to be directly affiliated with right wing ideologies. It is indicative that only half of GD's voters come from the right political spectrum. The rest are drawn from the remaining left spectrum, including former voters of the allegedly radical leftist party of SYRIZA (Georgiadou, 2013). A discourse analysis (Kandylis & Kavoulakos, 2011) of the racist texts that were produced in order to mobilize the residents of the city center against immigrants reveals that those texts are constructed more or less around the same narrative that surrounds the concept of Greekness as it is taught in schools and other institutions. Having detected the main problem of the deterioration of some of the central neighborhoods of Athens, like

Agios Panteleimonas, in the presence of immigrants, those texts further develop an interpretation of their incompatibility with the natives. That interpretation discusses the impossibility of their integration in the Greek society since ‘their everyday life that is not inscribed in the normal triad “work-home-family”, their incomprehensible language and religion, their color and their immoral behavior that makes their differences always visible are factors that prevent their social inclusion’ (Kandylis & Kavoulakos, 2011, p. 171). In other words, the exclusive narrative over Greekness that has been reproduced from the establishment of the modern Greek state has been narrowed down to create the base for the exclusive narrative on the micro-level of Athenian neighborhoods.

Drawing on Coleman’s boat for the Greek case we can say that the narrative constructed for Greekness is being reproduced through those texts and informs the actions of residents that they mobilized (type-2 relations Pic. 1-1). The outcome was the establishment in the contested neighborhoods of a racist order that for immigrants involved a state of extreme fear of racial violence and for natives the naturalization of unprecedented verbal and physical racist violence (type-3 relations Pic. 1-1). As shown in the second chapter racial hierarchy and exclusive narratives towards difference are constantly present in Greek society, but this time the expresser of that order is the most extreme far-right political formation currently existing in Greece (Ellinas, 2013). More than that, similarly to the UK, expressions of racial violence occur in particular time and spaces (Koutrolidou, 2015). What mediated in between, or in other words what served as the impetus for such radical racist action seems to be, similarly to UK’s case, population’s emotional response to economic inequalities and marginalization of a significant part of the population that ensued the Greek financial crisis, alongside with inadequate responses of the government to the consequences of that marginalization and the lack of policies to tackle problems caused by increased immigration. The interplay of those factors fuels the racist animus.

The areas where natives are more at risk of social marginalization in the Athenian urban agglomeration seem to correlate geographically with those that are considered the electoral strongholds of GD. Kandylis (2015) has distinguished two areas with high risk of social exclusion⁶ for the natives – old industrial areas in the western part of central Athens and the peripheral areas (Pic. 3.1.3-1). In the same areas have been recorded most of the racist attacks on immigrants – the western part of central Athens (Pic. 3.1.3-3) and the periphery of Athenian urban fabric (Pic. 3.1.3-4). Given the general profile of GD voters which is described as that of a population group with a medium to low cultural capital – young, male, with intermediate level of education (high school or technical education), and a range of occupational statuses to indicate that voters with more precarious employment situation are more likely to vote for GD (Georgiadou, 2013), we can assume that voters of GD can be considered a part of the population group at risk of social exclusion. That fact, alongside with the geographical distribution of that group, for instance on the example of absence of university degree (Pic. 3.1.3-6) and unemployment (Pic. 3.1.3-5) - that correlates with the geographic

⁶ Kandylis uses a composite indicator (SEind) combining variables in three domains related to risk of social exclusion: *Earning of living* - % of employed in elementary occupation and % of non-economically active individuals, *Access to basic services* - % of individuals with low education qualifications and % of individuals with poor dwelling conditions, *Social environment* - % of dependent individuals, % of individuals not belonging in private households, % of households with 6 or more members and % of lone-parent households. (Kandylis, 2015, pp. 7-8)


distribution of racist attacks on immigrants - can highlight the role of financial crisis in the rise of racist violence.

For the peripheral areas of Athens metropolitan area, the most plausible hypothesis for the increased likelihood of racial violence is the *political economy of hate crime* discussed earlier. These are predominantly industrial and agricultural areas of mixed use, the development of which dates from the 70s, when Athens experienced its first suburbanization tendencies. Given the fact that social division of the city was not formed in a labor market shaped by industrial development 'but rather by a family centered model of social reproduction and its spatial translation in the relatively recent construction of city's build environment' (Maloutas, 2004, p. 199) suburbanization produced new residential areas that are to a great extent socially homogenous, yet with enclaves of poverty and wealth. The resulting social map of Athens is the continuity of social segregation of the Athenian center, dictated by 'follow-the-family' pattern: the western, working and lower-middle class, parts of the center extended to the west of conurbation and the eastern, predominately upper and middle class, to the north-east (Maloutas, 2004). The relatively low-skill demanding employment base of the Athenian West, defined by the industrial profile of the area, had also been attracting migrant workers from the 90s. A combination of their undocumented status, poor education background and lack of knowledge of Greek, tend to relegate them to the lowest ranks of labor market – construction, cleaning, street vending etc., while their illegal status was allowing them to be exploited by their employers in the informal sector (Iosifides & King, 1998). Their arrival was accompanied with locals' exclusive narratives and fears of 'immigrants stealing natives' jobs, yet public racist expressions were moderate. After all, 'the same 'undesired' populations were providing with inexpensive labor in order to build Greece and generally the Greece of the economic boom (1990s-2000s)' (Dalakoglou, 2013b, p. 518). The financial crisis though exacerbated the intergroup frictions since it increased the likelihood for both groups' social exclusion.

Owing to the vulnerability of the middle and lower classes during financial crises, the western parts of Athens were also the areas that were mostly affected by the financial crisis. An indication is the geography of social solidarity initiatives, such as soup kitchens, social clinics and pharmacies etc. emerged in Athens during the crisis (Vaious & Kalandides, 2015) that highlights the geography of social exclusion. In particular the shipyard zone of Piraeus regional unit, with its epicenter of poverty the shipbuilding city of Perama, has been described numerous times by the media and NGO's as an area that faces humanitarian crisis⁷. Within such circumstances of severe poverty and unemployment the presence of cheap labor of the new undocumented migrants from Asia and Africa for the, already, extremely scarce job opportunities intensify racist animus. Similarly, to the British National Party in the mill towns of UK (Ray, Smith, & Wastell, 2000; Amin, 2002), GD seized the opportunity to infiltrate and exercise their influence in these disadvantaged areas by promising to 'clean' the area of migrants, 'bring back the ships' and provide direct financial support for its members from the area. The brightest example of the link between economic decline and the rise of GD was the socio-economic background of the murderer of the Greek anti-racist musician Pavlos Fyssas, G. Roupakias, who is described by the press as a low-educated

⁷ 'Greek seaside town highlights unemployment drama' <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-2558462/Greek-seaside-town-highlights-unemployment-drama.html>

resident of the area, occupied in low-skilled, casual jobs, unemployed at the time of his recruitment. After his recruitment in 2012 he and his family begun to work for GD – him receiving ‘pocket money’ for various tasks he was ordered to execute, and the rest of the family members officially occupied in minor works in GD’s local office. Further evidences from his relatives and friends that Roupakias jointed GD ‘to complement his income, because he didn’t want anything to be lacking from his family’⁸ alongside with the selective physical attacks on Egyptian fishermen and members of leftist labor unions⁹ – accused by GD of discouraging investments in shipping industry - indicate that racist animus in the peripheral areas of Athens is fueled predominantly by the socio-economic downgrade of its residents. Lastly, the relatively low percentage, compared to the city center, of migrants residing in the area (Pic. 3.1.3-2) is an additional element that indicate the *political economy of hate crime* as the most relevant hypothesis for the interpretation of the rise of racist violence in the periphery of Athens.




Pic. 3.1.3-1 SEInd values per census track for Greek nationals, 2001 (Kandylis 2015, p. 10). SEInd – indicator for social exclusion comprised of 3 domains – Earning of living, Access to basic services and Social environment


⁸ ‘He did it for the pocket money of GD’ <http://www.tovima.gr/society/article/?aid=530814>

⁹ ‘Attack on KKE (Greek Communist Party) in Perama’


<http://jailgoldendawn.com/%CF%85%CF%80%CE%BF%CE%B8%CE%AD%CF%83%CE%B5%CE%B9%CF%82/%CE%B5%CF%80%CE%AF%CE%B8%CE%B5%CF%83%CE%B7-%CF%83%CE%B5-%CE%BA%CE%BA%CE%B5-%CF%83%CF%84%CE%BF-%CF%80%CE%AD%CF%81%CE%B1%CE%BC%CE%B1/>




Pic. 3.1.3-2 Percentage of foreign citizens in Athens Metropolitan Region, 2011, Source: <http://panoramaps.statistics.gr/>




Pic. 3.1.3-3 Racist Attacks against immigrants, Athens Metropolitan Region, cases, Source: Crisismap.net



Pic. 3.1.3-4 Racist attacks against Immigrants, Region of Attiki, clusters, Source: Crisismaps.net



Pic. 3.1.3-5 Levels of Unemployment in Athens Metropolitan Region, 2011, Source: <http://panoramaps.statistics.gr/>



Pic. 3.1.3-6 Education level (Possession of University degree or equivalent) in Athens Metropolitan Region, 2011, Source: <http://panoramaps.statistics.gr/>

The case of the city center though is more complex since multiple hypothesizes can predict the rise of racist violence here. Undoubtedly the financial crisis has affected the well-being of certain native groups that reside in the center (Koutrolikou, 2015), hence the *political economy of hate crime* hypothesis, to some extent, is in power here as well. Yet, here the motivational racist texts discussed earlier are targeting immigrants not solely due to the increased competition in the labor market, that allegedly immigrants are causing, but more on their presence, or their perceived overrepresentation, in the neighborhoods per se.

The city center of Athens, in particular the neighborhoods of the wider Patisia area, is a constant pole of attraction for immigrants from the first migration waves to Athens. The huge housing stock of the center alongside with the weak welfare state, that allowed the free market to 'shift and sort' its clients, directed the first immigrants of the 90s – predominantly Albanians, Bulgarians, Filipinos and Pakistanis – precisely in this areas where the housing stock was available and affordable (Maloutas, 2007). That tendency continued among the new, significantly more heterogeneous, immigrant wave as well, constituting Patisia, and neighborhoods adjacent to it, the most ethnically and socially diverse cluster of immigrants of Greater Athens (Maloutas, Arapoglou, Kandylis, & Sayas, 2012). Therefore, in neighborhoods of Patisia, where the highest heterogeneity in Athens is observed (Pic. 3.1.3-2) the likelihood of inter-group encounters is maximized. In their turn, those encounters are expected to facilitate potential racist violence as *inter-group friction* hypothesis suggests.

At the same time despite the great ethnic and social diversity and high percentages of immigrant population none of the neighborhoods of Patisia can be characterized as an ethnic ghetto, as the local, racist discourse claims. Firstly, and most importantly in almost none of the neighborhoods do immigrants constitute a majority. Where they do, in no case this majority is due to the presence of one single immigrant group (Kandylis & Kavoulakos, 2011), given the dense cohabitation of a very diverse

immigrant population. It should be noted here that anti-immigrant mobilization in the area targets predominantly the new, visible ethnic minorities that are perceived to have a big cultural distance from the Greeks (Kandylis & Kavoulakos, 2011). Hence, the old migrant groups, such as Balkans and East Europeans, can be excluded from this racist discourse and mobilization, due to their relatively successful integration and/or, as noted in the second chapter, their ability to hide their ethnic traits. This group, particularly Albanians, has a significant presence in Patisia's neighborhoods but at the same time demonstrates the highest interaction with the natives (Kandylis, Maloutas, & Sayas, 2012). Needless to say that their integration allows, some of, them to place themselves on the highest echelons in the migrant hierarchy with the adaptation of the respective racist attitudes towards the new immigrants (Nousia & Lyons, 2009). Therefore, if we exclude this group, the remaining ethnic groups are visible minorities - from South East Asia and African courtiers (Koutrolikou, 2015) – that constitute a small numerical minority in the area. It would be logical to conclude then that that small proportion of ethnic minorities, which has been defined as incompatible with the natives in racist motivational texts, is at high risk of racist violence, according to the '*power differential*' hypothesis.

The last hypothesis, the '*defended neighborhoods*', seem to be the most relevant to describe the rise of racism in the center of Athens. Apart from being relevant for mono-cultural societies, the hypothesis also involves the concept of 'White territorialism' (Iganski, 2008), which incorporates elements of ethnic hierarchies and power relations over a territory. Greekness is also a mono-cultural and hierarchical, with 'those of Greek ethnicity and Orthodox religion belonging to the inner circle of Greekness, the legal aliens to the outer circle and Pontic Greeks and Greek Albanians standing in-between' (Triandafyllidou & Veikou, 2002, p. 201). While only in May of 2015 second-generation immigrants were granted with the Greek citizenship after modifications in *jus sanguinis* principle in the Greek naturalization law (Christopoulos, 2012). That, exclusive to 'others', understanding of belonging, alongside with the firm belief in the defensive character of Greekness is narrowed down to the local, micro-level, of Athenian neighborhoods.

More precisely, in the same line with the narrative that surrounds the historic development of Greekness, the narratives of racist texts circulating in the area, define the problems of the center as a result of the disrupted ethnic homogeneity of its residents. In those texts the current disadvantaged conditions of certain neighborhoods is contrasted with a glorious past that has been identified with prosperity, high level of social status of the residents that served as a criterion for the Greeks who moved there, while Agios Panteleimonas – the epicenter of racist violence – occupied a high position in the social hierarchy of places in the city (Kandylis & Kavoulakos, 2011). The influx of the latest immigrants from Asia and Africa disrupted the social, ethnical and religious homogeneity, thus the cohesion of neighborhoods. The downgraded status of the neighborhoods is contributed solely to the over-representation of immigrants that entailed 'lack of security and hygiene, the degradation of the social infrastructure, the quality of life and the deteriorating moral profile of the area, the devaluation of the housing properties, the degradation of the social profile of the area and unpleasant aesthetics of the public space where immigrants are concentrated' (Kandylis & Kavoulakos, 2011, p. 171). Finally, the addressees of those texts are called to act by protecting their neighborhoods that 'are

under attack or invasion of illegal immigrants' since what happens in 'Agios Panteleimonas is indicative for the future of the nation' (Kandylis & Kavoulakos, 2011, p. 172), a call similar to the one insinuated in Greek history textbooks with regards to the protection of Greekness' homogeneity from the 'difference' (chapter 2).

An additional similarity of those texts with Greekness is that they are also constructed on selective social and historic memory and experiences. As narratives over Greekness deliberately ignore Greeks successful co-existence with different ethnic and religious groups in different historic times, in the same way, the developers of the narrative over the degradation of neighborhoods of Patisia ignore the fact that most of those areas had started to exhibit physical and social decay before the arrival of immigrants.

The preconditions for the physical and social degradation of the city center were set from the first decades after the WW2 by the irregular housing constructions that took place in the area. During the 1950s to 1970s Athens experienced an important urban growth – of 35% for each decade – as a result of mass rural migration to the city (Maloutas & Karadimitriou, 2001). The lack of industrial development that would pressure for collective working-class housing resulted into a rural-like housing mode with a boom of irregular individual self-constructed houses (Maloutas, Arapoglou, Kandylis, & Sayas, 2012). From the 1970s though the, already densely built, urban morphology of the center changed with the replacement of individual houses with multi-storey apartment buildings through the housing system of antiparoxi¹⁰. This system increased the overcrowding 'that induced not only congestion but also the deterioration of (public) services – especially schools - that had not been developed accordingly' (Maloutas & Karadimitriou, 2001, p. 713). The parallel sharp increase in unregulated use of private car that caused traffic congestion, parking problems, air pollution etc. resulted in rapid depreciation of centrally located residential space (Maloutas & Karadimitriou, 2001). The subsequent suburbanization of the 1980s left a socially polarized city center with 'those who could not move, entrapped by economic conditions in combination with the liberalization of the housing market (presumably the western part of Patisia); and those who would not move because their socioeconomic status left them unaffected by the degradation (presumably the eastern part)¹¹' (Kandylis & Kavoulakos, 2011, pp. 161-162). In other words, the initial factor that created the conditions for degradation was the relocation of the middle-class strata that worked as a stabilization element for the social cohesion of the area.

Even though the remaining population was greatly polarized between the upper and lower classes, none of the neighborhoods of Patisia can be characterized as ghetto or enclave of one population group. The housing stock that the middle-class left vacant were predominantly apartments of the lower floors, that were significantly devaluated due to their unattractive physical features – small, dark apartments, directly exposed to the continuously deteriorating ecological conditions of the area. On the other side,

¹⁰ '...a joint venture between a small landlord and a small builder who got a share of the build property at the end of the works. The popularity of this system was due to generous tax relief that made any other form of condominium production not competitive' (Maloutas et al. 2012, p. 275)

¹¹ Residents of the center who remained unaffected by the degradation usually rely on better services offered outside the center. Indicative is the case of schools – 'A huge bussing operation takes place every morning from most parts of Athens towards the big private schools located primarily in the north-eastern suburbs. At the same time many families manage to send their children in good public schools in different areas that they live, if the local school is not up to their expectations' (Maloutas 2004, p. 200).

apartments of the upper floors, initially designed with better amenities for nuclear-family type households, continued to be occupied by the upper class (Maloutas & Karadimitriou, 2001). The resulting vertical social segregation suggested that the same apartment building can be occupied by households that differ in terms of social class, professional statuses, apartment sizes, tenure and household types (Maloutas & Karadimitriou, 2001).

To that vertical social segregation, the ethnic element was added from the beginning of 1990s, with the arrival of the first immigrants. Their low socio-economic statuses at the time of their arrival, was the directional factor for them to start occupying the lower floors of Patisia's multi-storey apartments. The area was not only offering cheap housing to immigrants but also less expensive and easier transportation, possibility for collective residence etc. (Rontos, Mavroudis, & Georgiadis, 2006). The upward social and residential mobility of old immigrants, in its turn, emptied the lowest floors for the new immigrants from war-affected and/or poverty-stricken countries of Asia and Africa. In this latest case, immigrants' significantly lower socio-economic statuses, their visible ethnic traits and the greater cultural distance from the natives intensified the socioeconomic and ethnic segregation in Patisia. Despite the ameliorating role of the old immigrants, particularly Albanians (Kandylis, Maloutas, & Sayas, 2012), the area was eventually burdened with the stigma of a ghetto, initially in the media, then in the public discourse, policy documents and statements (Koutrolidou, 2015).

The period the ghetto rhetoric started to dominate the public discourse and the times it reached its peaks, by motivating racist action, correlates with the developments of the financial crisis. We can suggest that the apartments of the lowest floors can be considered as first, but temporary housing choice for disadvantaged population groups in the process of their socioeconomic and cultural advancement into the Greek society from the 1980s. Namely, those areas were considered disadvantaged for the last 30 years. Yet, it was only in 2008-2009 when the stigma of a ghetto entered the public discourse, regarding those areas (Koutrolidou & Siatitsa, 2011). Public's discontent with the "ghetto" reached its peak in 2010-2012 and resulted into the entrance of GD in the parliament with the subsequent local residents' support for its racist violence in the area. During the same period the consequences of the financial crisis became tangible, as the living conditions of inner-city residents deteriorated and neighborhood problems exacerbated. As elsewhere, the media played a central role in the promotion of the ghetto image of the area.

The ghetto stigma initially applied to the area that surrounds Omonoia – the square from which the main roads of Patisia start and extend to its north. Before and during the Olympic Games euphoria of 2004 the area was portrait in the media as one of the most promising gentrified areas of the city – a potential Athenian Soho (London) or East Village (New York)¹². Indeed, it fulfilled many preconditions to be characterized as such. Firstly, from the beginning it was conceived as the 'people's square', contrasting the grandest of Syntagma square where the palace was located, a character that set the basis for the development of the surrounding area as a less-expensive commercial center of the city, with its famous fruit, meat and fish market that function until today (Nousia & Lyons, 2009). At the same time as the main hub of the public

¹² 'The ghetto of Athens' <http://www.lifo.gr/mag/features/241>

transport network – direct link with Piraeus port, a major station for train, metro and buses etc. - it was the traditional point of arrival initially for refugees from Asia Minor, then for internal migrants and lately for immigrants. This fact, alongside with the corresponding industry developed in the area – cheap hotels and cafes, ethnic food stores and restaurants, travel offices, newspaper kiosks for foreign press etc. - was inevitably bringing together different social and ethnic groups what in its turn gave a multi-cultural feel to the area (Nousia & Lyons, 2009). That feel was meant to be celebrated in the renovation program planned for the city during the Olympics.

Today Omonoia and its surrounding areas continue to attract different immigrant populations, each demarcating and creating its own sub-spaces of leisure time (Nousia & Lyons, 2009), but the alleged celebration of diversity is overshadowed by the financial crisis. While the number of immigrants trapped in Greece due to the implementation of Dublin 2 agreement, increased, job opportunities became scarcer (Koutrolidou, 2015). That resulted into a boom and coming out of the obscurity of, the already traditional for the area, counter-economy – prostitution, drug dealing, protection and extortion etc.. The additional establishment of various social support infrastructures, such as a rehabilitation center, soup kitchens, a municipal homeless shelter etc. enhanced the ghetto stigma of the area. From 2009 the mass media officially started to refer to the area as a ghetto, contributing the term predominantly to the presence of migrants. Significant media time was devoted to the voices of the ‘local residents’ that now were heard not only from the, formerly gentrified, commercial and nightlife centers to the south and south-west of Omonoia, such as Gerani, Psiri, Metaxourgeio (Koutrolidou, 2015) but also from the residential neighborhoods of Patisia. Shortly after, TV viewers all around Greece became familiar with the vernacular names of Agios Panteleimonas, Attiki square, Mouseio area and the ‘struggles’ of native Greeks that are mobilizing against the ‘invasion of foreigners’ in order to ‘protect their neighborhoods’ (Kandyli & Kavoulakos, 2011).

It is rather unclear if Golden Dawn would enjoy such great success relying only on anti-immigrant rhetoric. Facilitated by the media, Greeks’ understanding of financial ‘crisis’ and the ‘crisis’ of Athenian center became entangled. Responding to that GD widened the span of their activities by organizing social solidarity events for native Greeks (Koronaïou & Sakelariou, 2013). These events had mainly canvassing purpose, since they did not constitute structural interventions to meet the actual needs of the population. Yet, their excessive promotion from the media alongside with the visible results of their anti-immigrant activation – the disappearance of immigrants from the streets – rendered GD as a serious alternative to the absent Greek government in the eyes of at least 6% of the Greek electorate. In reality, GD managed to manipulate peoples’ anxieties on many spheres. Angouri and Wodak (2014) have distinguished a number of actors, discussed by users of social media, which contributed to the rise of GD. Some are properties of Greekness and the narrative that surrounds it. For instance, the historically dogmatic divide of the left and right wing affiliated during and after the Greek Civil War (1946-1949)¹³, that has been exacerbated today with the extensive use of Horseshoe Theory¹⁴ in the media discourse, or references to historic successes

¹³ Leftism conceptually contradicts Greekness. Hence, for Greeks whose identity is informed predominantly by Greekness, leftism can be considered alien to the political philosophy of Greece, up to hostile to Greekness.

¹⁴ ‘Let’s put an end to Horseshoes Theory once and for all’ <https://psmag.com/social-justice/an-end-to-horseshoe-theory>

around which Greeks build their sense of pride and importance in times of demoralization. The lion share though of 'whom to blame' is given to the current financial crisis and its consequences – the realization of the malfunctions of the Greek political establishment and the 'traitorous' role of international institutions (Angouri & Wodak, 2014).

It would be logical to conclude then that the outburst of racist violence in Greece, and in Athens in particular, is a result of factors described above. Firstly, the financial crisis has undoubtedly impoverished, and continues to threaten, a sizable portion of the Greek population. The inability of the old political system to tackle the consequences of the crisis renders the vote in favor of a radical change, as a protest vote of an indignant population that wants to punish the old bipartisan political establishment. Secondly, the cultural structure of Greece, or Greekness, provides the ideological directives with regards to whom to follow in the process of radical change. A combination of those two factors explain the sudden outburst of far-right extremism in this period, since this particular time and this particular space allowed the emergence of GD as a 'Deus ex machina' to satisfy certain emotional needs of the population – an important manipulative instrument of the far-right (Virchow, 2007).

3.2 The effects of Hate Crime on victims

3.2.1 The consequences of hate crime on victims

Critics of hate crime laws claim that potential penalty uplift undermines freedom of speech. According to them it is unjust, since it is offenders' expressed values that attract the extra punishment. Researchers and supporters though argue that hate crime laws 'impose greater punishment for the greater harms they believe are inflicted by 'hate crimes' (Iganski, 2008, p. 75). It also differs from parallel crimes in at least two main dimensions that increase the impact of hate crime. Firstly, victims are selected not for their behavior, or character, but for specific traits that reveal an actual or perceived status (McDevitt, Levin, & Bennett, 2002). Victims are powerless to change those traits since those might involve unchangeable features like skin color, effeminacy etc., or traits that constitute main attributes of victims' identity, i.e. religious attributes. The fact that victims bear constantly those target-traits increases their vulnerability for secondary victimization – recurrent victimization with the same motive (McDevitt et al. 2002). Hate crimes' capacity for secondary victimization of people with traits that they have no power on is what distinguishes hate crimes from parallel crimes. Hence, an increasing number of researches attempts to provide empirical evidence of the gravity of concrete consequences for victims of hate crime and victims of parallel crimes.

Research on the consequences of hate crime stumbles on the ambiguities of its definition (Iganski & Lagou, 2015; Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, 2002; McDevitt, Levin, & Bennett, 2002). Different states' legislations have, more or less, agreed on the working, yet deficient, definition – 'criminal offences that are motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender's bias against a race, religion, sexual orientation,

ethnicity/national origin, or disability' (FBI, Hate Crime Statistics 2005, as cited in Iganski 2008) or – 'any criminal offence committed against a person or property that is motivated by offender's hatred of someone because of their race, color, ethnic origin, nationality or national origins; religion; gender or gender identity; sexual orientation; disability' (UK's Home Office, as cited in (Iganski, 2008)). Some scholars would argue that those definitions fail to recognize the diversity within the broad labels that are used to denote categories of hate crime victims, multiple identities, ignore other types of marginalized 'differences' that have been known to be targeted such as the elderly, the homeless, the sex-workers, drug and alcohol addicts etc. or simply eccentric urban subcultures, like the Goths, that could be targeted in conservative or rural environments (Chakraboti & Garland, 2012).

Apart from the difficulties of scholars and policy makers to grasp the complexity of 'difference', victims stumble on the definition of hate crime as well. With that respect, Iganski and Lagou noted the problems of over-reporting hate crimes 'because crimes perceived by the victim as racially motivated could have been motivated by other reasons' also problems of under-reporting 'because in some crimes victims might not be aware that they are targeted because of their "race" or ethnicity' (2015, p. 1701). For the latter Perry and Alvi (2011) and Blee suggest that for certain groups, that have been historically targeted, like the African American, hate crime is part 'of the normal vicissitudes of daily life' (2007, p. 265) what makes it indistinguishable from parallel crimes. Blee (2007) also added that victims and members of the victim community with high status (doctors e.g.) are also less likely to interpret a hate crime as such.

Despite the limitations, some recurrent themes in studies indicate the types of harm and patterns of how hate crimes affect its victims. Firstly, physical violence counts for a small minority of hate crimes reported. Victims suffered from physical attacks, apart from the physical injury itself, undergo a number of bodily reactions in the aftermath of the attack (Iganski, 2008; Krieger, 1996). Yet, these effects are present in post-victimization experience of victims of parallel crimes as well. Hence, as Iganski (2008) notes, relying on the physical consequences of the attack would not justify a greater punishment. The emotional and psychological distresses though that hate crime entails are more compelling.

The emotional and psychological effects that follow the physical and non-physical victimization are far more eroding and long lasting. Different researchers, focusing on different aspects of the crime have found an array of negative emotional reactions on hate crime. Some of the reactions though are reemerging in the findings of most of studies¹⁵ presented in the last 20-25 years (Table 3.2.1-1). Fear resulted to be the most frequently reported emotional reaction. If we add to the variable of fear other operational synonyms, like anxiety and feelings of (un)safety, as (Skogan, 1987) defines them, fear in a broader meaning seems to be dominating the post-victimization experience. Victims' fear does not involve solely fear of injury or fear for their life at the moment of the racist incident, but expands for longer period of time. Hate crime victims will also be afraid for the safety of their immediate friend and family environment that bear the same target-traits (Herek, Cogan, & Gillis, 2002; Barnes & Ephross, 1994). Studies on non-victims from victims' community (Perry & Alvi, 2011;

¹⁵ according to the literature used in the frames of the present paper

Noelle, 2002) have found that they endure the same levels, intensity and duration of fear when exposed even to the news of a hate crime incident.

When comparing post-victimization experiences of hate crime victims with those of the parallel crimes the findings indicate some important differences. One difference is that the non-victims of parallel crimes are more likely to report fear than the victims themselves. A potential explanation for this paradox may lay in the fact that 'people may "fear the worse" before they have any direct experience with crime; but when they do, and survive relatively unscathed, their anxiety may be alleviated' (Skogan, 1987, p. 138). After all, the vast majority of crimes reported in many surveys are burglaries and thefts, which are trivial in their consequences and not necessarily fear-provoking (Skogan, 1987), while the odds of a secondary victimization could be interpreted by the victim with the assumption of randomness discussed above. Another hypothesis suggests that it is exactly the increased levels of fear that leads the non-victims in fear-related behavior aimed to reduce exposure to risk, thus lower their chances of victimization.

The most important difference though is that the effects of victimization on most victims disappear in a relatively short time. With the exception of rape victims, whose consequences parallel the consequences of hate crime victims 'the consensus of opinions seems to be that the most emotional effects wear off within a few weeks or months, victims recovering more or less spontaneously or with the moral support from family and friends' (Maguire 1984, as cited in (Skogan, 1987, p. 140)). Other researches state that for hate crime victims the negative consequences can be manifested for a period as long as 3-5 years (Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 1999).

Despite the fact that we are discussing here broadly generalized findings without the numerous exceptions and other factors that influence the perception of fear for victims of parallel crimes, such as the neighborhood conditions, it is clear that we can't apply even them on hate crime victims. For hate crime victims the main fear-enduring factor is not the incident per se, nor its severity, but the possibilities of a secondary victimization. The fear of hate crime won't fade away, as time goes by, because the victim bears the reasons of his victimization constantly on or with him. Hate crime victims have no control over those reasons since most of the times they constitute traits that are inseparable parts of their identities, i.e. skin color. Exactly because those traits are unchangeable victims of hate crimes have less opportunities to reduce their exposure to risk, in contrast to the victims of parallel crimes. Those traits are constant reminders of the fact that the crime can happen anytime and anywhere, while anyone who shares the same identity with the perpetrator could be a potential attacker (Craig-Henderson & Sloan, 2003). Hence, fear is constantly present in their lives. Lastly the vicarious traumatization effect, otherwise the *ripple* (Noelle, 2002) or/and *in terrorem* (Perry & Alvi, 2011) effects that hate crimes have on members of victim communities indicate that family and friends will most likely be experiencing the same consequences, what would reduce their possibilities in providing moral support to the victim.

What also has been proven to last longer are all the other emotional and psychological consequences that entail fear. Hate crime victims are more likely to report feelings of nervousness and stress alongside with sadness, powerlessness, and vulnerability. We can speculate that a prolonged experience of those sentiments would affect the Janoff-Bulman's (1989) assumption of controllability and self-controllability,

hence the assumption of meaningfulness of the world. At the same time hate crime victims are also more likely to report thoughts of futility regarding their lives (McDevitt et al., 2002) and reduced self-esteem (Noelle, 2002), what clearly affects victims' assumption categories of worthiness of self and self-worth. Having affected two out of three categories of the AW model, hate crime affects the whole schema of victims' fundamental beliefs about the world and themselves. It is therefore more likely that victims will consider the world as malevolent, meaningfulness since they are incapable to control the outcomes of events in their lives and lastly, consider themselves as not deserving positive outcomes. Within these circumstances it should be not surprising then that victims of hate crimes are also more likely to report or exhibit symptoms of depression.

Table 3.2.1-1 Emotional reactions to Hate Crimes mentioned in literature

Emotional Responses	Studies mentioning emotional response
Fear	Iganski (2008), (2015), Barnes & Ephross (1994), Herek et al. (1999) (2002), McDevitt et al. (2002), Noelle (2002), Craig-Henderson et al. (2003), Perry & Alvi (2011), Funnell (2015), Wigerfelt et al. (2014)
Anger	Iganski (2008), (2015), Barnes & Ephross (1994), Herek et al. (1999), McDevitt et al. (2002), Noelle (2002), Craig-Henderson et al. (2003), Perry & Alvi (2011), Funnell (2015)
Depression	Iganski (2008), (2015), Herek et al. (1999) (2002), Noh et al. (1999), McDevitt et al. (2002), Noelle (2002), Craig-Henderson et al. (2003), Funnell (2015)
(Un)safety	Iganski (2008), (2015), Herek et al. (2002), McDevitt et al. (2002), Noelle (2002), Perry & Alvi (2011)
Shock	Iganski (2008), (2015), Noelle (2002), Craig-Henderson et al. (2003), Perry & Alvi (2011)
Vulnerability/ Powerlessness	Barnes & Ephross (1994), Herek et al. (1999), McDevitt et al. (2002), Perry & Alvi (2011)
Stress/Nervousness	Herek et al. (1999), (2002), McDevitt et al. (2002), Wigerfelt et al. (2014), Funnell (2015)
Trauma/PTSD	Herek et al. (1999), Craig-Henderson et al. (2003), Perry & Alvi (2011)
Loss of identity	Craig-Henderson et al. (2003), Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino (2002), Funnell (2015)
Sadness	Craig-Henderson et al. (2003), Wigerfelt et al. (2014)
Annoyance	Iganski (2008), (2015)
Anxiety	Herek et al. (1999), Craig-Henderson et al. (2003)

The long-term persistence of the aforementioned emotional responses meets the criteria for the diagnosis of the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). The disorder is traditionally used to describe the post traumatic experiences of war veterans, or people exposed to severe physical violence, such as rape, or psychological distresses of people chronically exposed to violence in their immediate surrounding, like African-American youth living in ghettos (Fitzpatrick & Boldizar, 1993). Given the fact that PTSD is being diagnosed for people who have been exposed 'to an extreme stressor or

traumatic event to which he or she responded with fear, helplessness...horror, anger, sadness, humiliation and guilt' (Yehuda, 2002, pp. 108, 110), today it can be diagnosed for hate crime victims as well (Craig-Henderson & Sloan, 2003) although the universal criteria of its diagnosis are being criticized for ignoring the social and cultural components of people's reactions to stressors (Eisenbruch, 1991).

Hate crime does not affect solely the structure of victims AW. It has also severe impacts on victims' identity practices, since 'everyday identities and routine tasks can no longer be performed in some cases' (Funnell, 2015, p. 72). Funnell discusses how the identities of a man, father, mother, child, neighbor, friend etc. are being eroded or even lost for ethnic minorities living in environments under constant racist violence. Given the fact that the main strategy hate crime victims follow is the curtailment of self from physical, social and daily activities in order to avoid any potential contact with the perpetrators, the resulting 'prisoners in their homes' are unable to maintain their distinct identities. Funnell's (2015) study has revealed that mothers limit necessary daily activities, like shopping for groceries, that provide the basics for their children, children are forbidden from playing outside, the constant stress and nervousness that each member of the affected families experience erode their interfamily relations, while the refusal of family and friends to visit them results into their complete social isolation. One of the most devastating effects though could be the effects crime has on fathers, particularly when that identity has been formed in patriarchal social structures. The account of a Muslim father is indicative:

'I was ready to leave the house and leave [my wife and daughter] because I felt I'm not good as a man, I couldn't protect them, I wouldn't be able to protect them in future. What right have I got to call myself a husband or a father to these two people? And I was ready to move out. Go. Get out.' (Funnell, 2015, p. 79).

For sexual minorities even the hearing of a hate crimes involving member of their community results to be enough to make them conceal their identities. As noted before hate crime is a mechanism of restoring previous socio-cultural arrangements. The relatively recent celebration of sexual and gender identities as a spectrum, and not in binary terms threat those arrangements. By committing hate crimes perpetrators send the message that their identity is not acceptable and therefore they should return back to their previous 'place' of invisibility. According to Noelle (2002) that mechanism successfully achieves its goals since the message signals to the LGBT community that despite the Western states' commitment to more inclusive and pluralistic societies, living your life openly as member of the LGBT community, is still life threatening. Apart from having their AW shattered, following the emotional consequences discussed above, LGBT would adopt strategies that would hide potential target-traits of their identities. For those who haven't 'come-out' yet, the trauma could influence, up to halt, their coming-out process. Others, who were comfortable with their sexual identity prior victimization, would modify their behavior and looks (i.e. effeminate mannerism for men and masculine for women) in order to be in line with the previous socio-cultural arrangements and avoid victimization. In doing so, members of LGBT community might result in blaming themselves for their identity, what otherwise could be described as internalized homophobia (Noelle, 2002).

Probably the emotional reaction that deserves particular attention, due to its potentials for dual effects on victims and non-victims, is anger. Anger is the second most cited emotional response both by victims and non-victims. As a 'transitory emotional state aroused by thwarting some ongoing activity' (Allport 1954/1979, a

cited in (Iganski, 2008, p. 2)) it could be seen similarly to shock, as an emotion response to be evoked in the first –transitory- stages of the post-victimization experience. As its effects fade out, depending on whether anger gets internalized or externalized, two outcomes are possible. When internalized, ‘perhaps due to person’s inability to redress or overcome the wrong inflicted’ (Iganski, 2008, p. 1706) it can be destructive and can simply be added to the list of negative emotional outcomes discussed above (**Error! Reference source not found.**), with the expected shattered AW. The second though, is perceived to be a positive one since anger has been observed to mobilize action (Iganski & Lagou, 2015; Perry & Alvi, 2011; Noelle, 2002). The latter case, according to Iganski and Lagou (2015) is more typical for white, young, male victims that haven’t experienced repeated victimization. Indicative are the cases of some of Noelle’s participants who described the effect hate crime had on them as ‘reactance’, and others who admitted that anger inspired them to increase their political activism.

3.2.2 Strategies and consequences of the adapted strategies

The arsenal of strategies hate crime victims are able to employ in order to reduce their chances of victimization is limited by the visibility of their ethnic traits. Just the fact that hate crime victims bear constantly the unchangeable target-traits with/on them is indicative that just their presence in the wrong time at the wrong place is enough to sparkle violence against them (McDevitt et al., 2002). Therefore, their main strategies can be generally characterized as attempts to limit their discreditable presence in their social environment. Those strategies, in their turn, bring about new negative physical and emotional consequences.

If not the most cited in studies, limitations of spatial mobility is probably the first strategy for hate crime victims to employ. After the incident victims would try to avoid physical contact with the perpetrator or other members of perpetrator’s community. In the cases where incident occurred outside victim’s house or in the neighborhood, by limiting spatial mobility, most of the times, victims result to be ‘prisoners in their own homes’ (Funnell, 2015, p. 77). Funnell – a white researcher, had the opportunity herself to experience neighbors’ hostility against her just for the fact that she enters and exits the house of her non-white informants and the increased vigilance of her informants, when they do the same because i.e. ‘the neighbor-perpetrator...routinely releases his dogs upon her (the informant) and her small daughter whenever he hears her open the front door’ (Funnell, 2015, p. 73). That way people lose the control of their lives and the socio-culturally embedded identities of a child, mother, father etc. The constant stress that these families experience under these conditions takes its toll on interpersonal relations of the family as well: frictions between partners, parents and children, alienation from the wider family environment etc. (Herek, Cogan, & Gillis, 2002; Funnell, 2015) while the physical post-victimization consequences of hate crimes, described in the previous section, are also present.

Apart from limiting their exposure there is very little that a family can do to avoid physical contact with perpetrators. The most obvious would be to move out the neighborhood or the city, to which we could refer as to an additional material cost of hate crime. Particularly for ethnic minorities the economic is the main limiting factor in favor of that decision. For those who have, or have been offered, the choice to move,

‘in many cases, safety from...(racial harassment)...was identified as the single most important factor in housing-related decision-making processes’ (Netto & Abazie, 2013). The other, more feasible, strategy would be to change the transportation mode. Given the fact that hate crime victims restrict the use of their immediate environs, they would choose to drive with a car to neighboring areas to shop and use its amenities, even if the same amenities are offered in walking distances from their home (Funnell, 2015). Probably this form of ‘cocooning’ tactic is effective, since it helps victims to control their exposure to stressors in their daily paths, hence reduces their vulnerability (McQuoid & Dijst, 2012), yet its involuntary character further intensifies their sense of social isolation (Funnell, 2015).

Table 3.2.2-1 Victims’ most commonly implemented strategies against Hate crimes

Strategies	Studies mentioning strategy
Limit social relations/Avoidance/Withdrawal	Barnes & Ephross (1994), Noh et al. (1999), Noelle (2002), Colic-Peisker & Tilbury (2003), Valenta (2009), Perry & Alvi (2011), Funnell (2015),
Retaliation/Activism	Barnes & Ephross (1994), Noh et al. (1999), Craig-Henderson (2003), McDevitt et al. (2002), Noelle (2002), Colic-Peisker & Tilbury (2003), Perry & Alvi (2011), Wigerfelt (2014)
Limit spatial mobility/Closure	McDevitt et al. (2002), Noelle (2002), Iganski (2008), Valenta (2009), Perry & Alvi (2011), Funnell (2015)
Increase alertness/Securitize house/family	Barnes & Ephross (1994), McDevitt et al. (2002), Iganski (2008), Perry & Alvi (2011), Funnell (2015), Wigerfelt (2014)
Not reporting/Mistrust of authority	Herek et al (1999), (2002), McDevitt et al. (2002), Craig-Henderson (2003), Blee (2007), Iganski (2008), Wigerfelt (2014)
Moving out house/neighbourhood	Barnes & Ephross (1994), Iganski (2008), Netto & Abazie (2013), Funnell (2015)
Hiding discredited traits	McDevitt et al. (2002), Noelle (2002), Valenta (2009), Perry & Alvi (2011)
Denial	Noelle (2002), Blee (2007)
Change Mode of Transportation	Funnell (2015)
Self-Irony/Sarcasm	Marvasti (2006), Valenta (2009)

Those who do not experience biased violence in the immediate environs of their daily activities would also restrict their mobility. In their case that would involve creating a mental map of places to avoid visiting or passing by (Perry & Alvi, 2011). When it comes to interpersonal relationships, potential victims are more likely to avoid contacts with people from perpetrators community with whom they are not acquainted with (Valenta, 2009), what limits their socialization potentials, and in the case of ethnic minorities, integration. For the remaining possibilities, hate crime victims would ‘strategically select arenas where it is easier to actualize the favorable aspects of one’s identity or at least...arenas where the possibility of ethnic discrediting is lesser’ (Valenta, 2009, p. 359). An account of a member of LGBT community is indicative: ‘I

would personally never go to a bar, in Wyoming, where there was a mixed crowd, and then be shooting out of my mouth that I'm gay' (Noelle, 2002, p. 40).

Limitations in the geography of movement would inevitably lead to social isolation. Given to the fact that hate crimes have been registered to occur in every possible place where victims conduct their activities, such as school, workplace, home, public places etc., even those that the victim would consider a 'safe haven', like gay-identified settings (Herek, Cogan, & Gillis, 2002) or mosques (Blee, 2007), victims would avoid socializing. Having their benevolent Assumptive World shattered people would see any potential social contact as a threat for their safety as one of Herek and colleagues' informant account *'you'd be in your dorm room and you felt like a prisoner because you didn't even want to go out, because it just seemed everyone was your enemy and no one would help'* (2002, p. 327). In addition, under the 'ripple' or 'in terrorem' effect of hate crime that sends the message to victim's community that they could be next, victims could isolate their social network, in order to protect them, or to be isolated by the network with the fear that they might be victimized. For instance, one of Funnell's informants recounted her how the family decided that 'only the father-in-law and not the mother-in-law would visit them from Egypt because they feared that she would be victimized too' (2015, p. 75).

The social isolation is further intensified by victim's mistrust to the official authorities. Most of the studies found that victims of hate crime are less likely to report the incident to the police than the victims of parallel crimes. In this case victims' first concern is the secondary victimization. LGBT victims are reluctant to report to the police partly because they 'don't want to be outed', fearing that a public exposure would have further consequences for their employment (Herek, Cogan, & Gillis, 2002, p. 334). Other reasons involve the inadequate response by the police or the criminal justice system, which fails to recognize the gravity or even the prejudice in the incidents and sanction them correspondingly (Herek, Cogan, & Gillis, 2002; Craig-Henderson & Sloan, 2003). For the majority of the cases though it's police's prejudice itself that influences their decision (Herek, Cogan, & Gillis, 2002).

For ethnic minorities police prejudice is the most relevant reason not to report hate crimes. Researches on UK police reports from the 80s until today have repeatedly highlighted police misconducts ranging from unresponsiveness to actually acting as perpetrators themselves (Iganski, 2008). A conclusion of a Greater London Council Police Committee inquiry of 1984 stated that 'institutionalized racism' was prevalent within Metropolitan Police Services while over minorities' perception it stated: *'...London's police are viewed by many blacks with fear, suspicion and hostility. They are seen, not only as perpetrators of racial harassment, but also as sympathetic to the individuals and groups who continue to carry out harassment unchecked by law'* (Iganski, 2008, p. 90). Of course improvements have been made ever since but they had little effect on minorities' views about the police (Iganski 2008). In the same line, Afro-Swedish informants of Wigerfet et al. (2014), of the similarly multicultural city of Malmö, provided her with their personal experiences of racist harassment by airport and hotel staff, club/restaurants' security personnel, university classmates etc. Each time the police was involved, the victims underwent a secondary victimization by the very agencies that were expected to support and protect them. Both Iganski and Wigerfelt contribute this police malfunctions to the fact that ideas of Britishness and Swedishness are closely related to appearance. Hence, appearances that diverge from

that idea, burdened by the respective stereotyping, are considered suspicious for inappropriate behavior right away.

Considering that appearance plays a great role in one's possibilities of victimization, people with discredited appearance use numerous strategies of hiding the potential target-traits. Passing for normal seems to be the most common strategies for minorities whose target-traits are known to no one and could be relatively easy disclosed from the potential contacts. Covering is a similar strategy for those who are ready to admit the possession of a target-trait, or stigma but might as well make efforts to reduce the obviousness of that trait or/and the possibility of that trait to become a target. A good examples of the distinction between passing and covering strategies could be found in Valenta's findings among immigrants in Norway - 'Those who are physically undistinguishable from Norwegian may in some situations try to pass themselves off as Norwegians, while those whose appearance makes this difficult will...attempt to present themselves in association with some "high status" foreign European country' (2009, p. 361), i.e. a Bosnian migrant who introduces himself as Italian.

The means employed in both cases are similar, if not identical. Those whose potentially targeted identity traits could be disclosed tend to pass for a member of the majority group (Valenta, 2009; Noelle, 2002). In practice, for the LGBT individuals, that means that they will try to look 'less gay' up to faking masculine/feminine mannerism (Noelle, 2002). For some, that decision is even made unconsciously, as 'something like a survival mechanism' (Perry & Alvi, 'We are all vulnerable': The in terrorem effects of hate crimes, 2011) dictated by the wider society. For ethnic minorities that would involve adapting to majority group's norms in appearance, behavior and communication. That way they can skillfully alter their identities in order to display the most optimum identity in accordance to the norms of the different setting that they would find themselves.

Those whose identities can't be disclosed, like in the case of visible minorities, the variety of identities to 'pass for' are significantly less. In their case they would rather control the variety of settings to be exposed to. Avoiding unfamiliar places and engaging in contacts with strangers is the strategy of choice in cases of casual or random interactions. Yet in settings when interaction with strangers is inevitable, visible minorities would promote the more affirmative sides of their identity. For instance, high occupational status or social class would divert the attention from the discredited traits. They would highlight those favorable aspects of their identity, not directly, but by using various symbols indicative of that status i.e., by emphasizing contemporary taste and sophisticated style in their clothing, wearing T-shirts with the logo of the company where they work, owning a car or a house etc. (Valenta, 2009).

Workplace plays a particularly great role in the life of ethnic minorities. Apart from being a site of integration, working in highly appraised positions in the occupational hierarchy, among locals, is also an indication of integration (Kundnani, 2001; Amin, 2002; Valentine, 2008). Since ethnic minorities participate on equal terms with the local population in the structure of the workplace, Valenta's informants feel most comfortable in their working environment. They experience that 'their ethnic status is less important than their position in the organizational structure of the workplace' (Valenta, 2009, p. 363). Indeed, workplaces constitute a 'micropublic' - an 'ideal site for coming to terms with ethnic difference where 'prosaic negotiations' are

compulsory' (Amin, 2002, p. 969). According to Amin (2002) in micropublics like work, school, sports clubs, drama/theater groups, people from different backgrounds are placed in settings where engagement with strangers in a common activity disrupts stereotypes and initiate new attachment. Hence, engagement in common ventures provide the opportunity for, as Valentine term them 'meaningful contacts', those contacts that 'actually change values and translates beyond the specifics of the individual moment into a more general positive respect for others' (2008, p. 235). Such environs can make ethnic minorities feel that their 'difference' is accepted and therefore they don't need to hide traits of their identities that elsewhere could be subjected to victimization.

Even in cases where meaningful contacts result in friendships between minorities and the representatives of the dominant population, the first will employ strategies to challenge the stereotypes that could lead to victimization. Firstly, they will attempt to communicate as much as possible about their life stories and supply additional biographical information. In doing so they try to highlight the normality of their identities and perhaps their similarities with the indigenous population. That way, they aim 'to demonstrate that the way they are perceived in society needs to be modified and could further argue that the identity imposed on them did not match the full complexity of their personal history' (Valenta, 2009, p. 364). The second involves the use of self-irony and sarcasm as a diversion technique of shifting the attention away from stereotypes (Marvasti, 2006). When subjected to stereotypes minorities would confront by exaggerating the stereotypes themselves, in order to 'expose the ridicule the absurdity of these categorizations (Valenta, 2009). Yet, the latter is successful mainly in interactions with people that minorities are well familiar with (Valenta, 2009; Marvasti, 2006). In different cases sarcasm does not guarantee positive results as Valenta's Iraqi informant confirms:

'...you don't know how people will react...if you say to people who do not know you well that your wife is not obedient enough and you will have to beat her soon, they will not understand that you are ridiculing Norwegian stereotype about Muslim men.' (Valenta, 2009, p. 364)

Finally, the last strategy stems from anger - the only positive emotional reaction discussed in the previous section. As noted before, numerous studies have observed that the anger provoked by hate crime could motivate victims for activism. For instance, half of Noelle's LGBT informants confessed that the anger they felt after direct or indirect victimization inspired them to react against hate crimes in a more constructive way. After direct or indirect victimization hate crime victims reported to have increased their political activism and activities aiming to community mobilization (Noelle, 2002). This active way of coping with victimization may alter the sense of helplessness, hence reduce the negative emotional and psychological consequences, such a depression etc. (Noh, Beiser, Kaspar, Hou, & Rummens, 1999). But most importantly, with the firm belief that 'if hate is learned, it can be also unlearned' with activism hate crime victims intend to alter the very social structure that enables racism. Or as Perry & Alvi note, 'with activism hate crime victims say to the perpetrator that affected communities refuse to stay in their place, but will instead fight for a reconstructed definition of what that place is' (Perry & Alvi, 2011, p. 69).

The success of the active way of coping with hate crime victimization is also dependent on the cultural background. Noh et al. (1999) notes that active ways can be considered successful in collectivistic societies, such as the Latin American ones. In a

similar collectivistic African American culture Krieger (1996) found higher levels of blood pressure when victimization was followed by a passive coping strategies. On the other hand, passive coping strategies are considered more adaptive for cultures like the South-East Asian cultures which usually resort to self-regulation rather than attempting a change in their environment. Forbearance was also found to be effective for ethnic minorities who are strongly attached to their culture and its traditional ethnic values (Noh, Beiser, Kaspar, Hou, & Rummens, 1999).

Drawing conclusions on the effects of hate crimes discussed in this section we can note the following. Hate crime differ from parallel crimes as the offenders target not the conduct of the victim – which the victim can control -, but identity traits that the victim can't control. The fact that victims bear constantly those target-traits increases their vulnerability for secondary victimization. Those two factors make the consequences of hate crimes far more eroding and long lasting for both victims and non-victims of hate crimes. Prolonged experience of fear of secondary victimization that dominates the post victimization experience, and other psycho-emotional responses affect victim's assumptions about the world and themselves towards a pessimistic/negative direction. These shifts in their turn can eventually lead to identity altering strategies to minimize the odds of their recurrent victimization.

To the attacks on their identities, immigrants respond by hiding their identities. For non-visible minorities hiding can be achieved by covering their discredited identity traits or passing for a more favorable identity. These strategies allow them to both participate in diverse social setting and avoid victimization. For visible minorities though hiding can involve strategies that aim to minimize their physical exposure up to isolation from social setting and life. Both responses seem to comply to the goals racist violence aims to achieve – the restoration of previous norms and hierarchies of domination. Victims of hate crimes who respond to their victimization with anger are disrupting offenders' desired course of event. Instead of isolation, if externalized, anger can lead to increased social participation and activism, focused on the conditions of their victimization. Awareness and action against the (racist) conditions within which racist violence is normalized (doing difference) could lead to social change.

4 Methodology

As the thesis is divided into two separate, yet intertwined topics – racism from native Greeks perspective and racism from immigrants’ perspective – the necessity for different methodological approaches emerged. Therefore, to study how Greekness informs racist actions I employ discourse analysis, while to investigate how immigrants deal with racism in Greece I conduct a fieldwork by using a combination of unstructured interviews and participatory observation.

4.1 Native Greeks’ perspective - Discourse analysis

The necessity for discourse analysis emerged during the fieldwork. In particular, the interview with N. Gionakis, the head of the Day Center ‘Babel’ for the mental health of immigrants, gave me clear indications that the racist violence of those days was not solely a result of the aggravated financial crisis. It was the Greek national identity that plays an equal, if not greater role, in the formation of a dominant discourse that was justifying racist offending. After being encouraged by the interview to investigate deeper in the elements of Greekness that can conceptually lead to racism – what resulted in Chapter 2 – it became impossible not to pay attention to those elements as they were reproduced unaltered by media, political and public actors of those days, and served as medium for racist offending. Otherwise, if in Chapter 2 I’ve outlined the structural principles of Greekness that lead to racism on micro level (type 1 relations, Pic. 1), in the empirical part I aim to see how the same discourse comes to have a meaning today and mobilizes racist action on micro level (type-2 relations, Pic. 1). More than that, the lack of counter arguments in the mainstream, versus the significantly more pluralistic discourse developing in the social and alternative media, suggested that there is an attempt by the aforementioned actors to establish a dominant discourse over the ‘phenomenon’ of Golden Dawn and the racist violence they triggered. The native Greeks that would mobilize against immigrants would later be seen to reproduce that dominant discourse, in a more simplistic and dogmatic fashion, yet almost unaltered. Therefore, with discourse analysis I aim not only to highlight the utterances and story lines of the mainstream discourse that comply with Greekness and at the same time legitimizes GD’s racism, but also the context – here through features of relations between the different key actors - within which this discourse is developing. In sum, the discourse analysis in this thesis aims to answer what those actors say (*locutionary acts*), regarding GD, the intentions behind the actors’ utterances (*illocutionary acts*) and their effects on the listeners (*prelocutionary acts*) (*Speech acts* according to J.L. Austin as cited in (Filippidis, 2014)).

Since discourses ‘consist of structures embedded in language’ it is expected that the focus on racist violence ignited by GD as the *emblematic* topic will reveal the bigger *problematique* (Hajer, 2006, p. 68) - Greekness. Triandafyllidou and Kouki (2014) who outlines the two main discourses between the – predominately centrist – right and left wing key political actors (3.1.3) have provided an initial idea

over the different discourses prevalent in Greece. Even if the two argumentation lines were 'departing from different political or ideological standpoints, the majority of interviewees adopt a discourse that enables racism to appear as normal' (Triandafyllidou & Kouki, 2014, p. 425). Their study though was conducted prior GD's entrance in the parliament. What has changed in the meantime was the move of those discourses to the extremes of the political spectrum, as the previous centrist discourses failed to answer the needs of electorate in light of the increasingly aggravated social reality in the country. It is therefore interesting to see how the dominant discourse adapted to the new socio-political reality.

The initial idea involved to trace the racist elements of the mainstream media discourse as they were produced and reproduced during the first years of GD's entrance. But that resulted insufficiently understanding how only certain ideas/concepts were formed and reached to be the dominant in the mainstream discourse, let alone the goals it aims to achieve (*illocutionary acts*). Firstly, the roots of the majority of racist concepts/events observed today would inevitably lead back to Coronels' Junta and the period after its fall in 1974. Therefore, the analysis in this thesis grasps a time span of around 50 years. Yet, the emphasis is put on the discourse developing from the 90s and on, as from then institutional actors are pressured to accommodate different migration waves in it, while at the same time preserving the organic nature of concepts used in the previous discourses regarding self and others. Secondly, the content of the mainstream discourse itself is reflecting malfunctions and conceptual inconsistencies deriving from other important aspects of Greeks' life paths that affect individual or collective decision-making processes, like the Greek education system, the Greek Church and the Media. As the decision-making processes in this thesis, first and foremost, I refer to Greeks' accommodating 'difference', close attention will be paid on those three aspects' – Media, the Education System and the Church of Greece - interrelatedness and interdependency. Their particularities in the context of Greekness (i.e. the role of Church in political life or political clientelism and the media etc.) are expected to facilitate the production of exclusive narratives that in their turn lead the addressees to respective political decisions, i.e. vote for GD. Discourses promoted by the political establishment inevitably aim to reconcile old and newly emergent concepts, and the interests different public actors pursue, yet at the same time securing that the final outcome will not diverge from the frames of Greekness. The visible results of this production and reproduction of Greekness' discourse(s) by all the aforementioned actors are manifested in the mass media coverage of the racist incidents discussed in Chapter 5.

The main criterion for the choice of material to be discussed in discourse analysis is the size of audience it can potentially reach and influence. As elsewhere, the gradual prevalence of Internet in Greece is displacing traditional sources of information – printed press, television etc. – particularly among the younger populations. Still television remains the main source for a great part of the Greek electorate. Therefore, particularly the televised interviews, speeches, key incidents i.e. Greek victory at UEFA Cup, GD's charity 'activism' etc. would consist the main inputs of discourse analysis. For most, the historic, social and political context is mentioned. Internet material collected from alternative and social media play a secondary role, most of the times in the quality of *what was* - deliberately or not - *omitted* during the

development of the dominant discourse as projected from the relevant television programs.

Later the necessity of informants that would provide me with an overview of the field emerged. The interview with N. Gionakis, in a way, resulted to be one of the first of this kind, or as Hajer (2006) names them 'helicopter interviews'. The initial aim was to obtain insights over immigrants' emotional responses to racist stressors immigrants experience on micro-level of daily life. However, our interviews resulted in him highlighting a pattern of discrimination against various forms of 'differences' he witnessed in his career, pointing to the macro-level Greekness as the *problematique*. From then, I distinguished the Education system, the Greek Church and the media, as the pillar-aspects of Greekness, that are constantly present in people's daily life and guide action. Firstly, to learn more about racism in Greek schools and how the Education system reacts to it I contacted my high-school Sociology teacher - Antigoni. A detailed explanation of the reasons I chose this particular teacher I provide in chapter 5.1 but her relevance in term of methodology lies on the fact that, as a leftist, she is informed by an additional set of rules and recourses in her action, that are conceptually contrasting Greekness. That alternative to Greekness social structure allows her to reflect more critically on the wrongdoings of Greekness in informing the school environs, perceptions and practices of racism, as she faces them in her daily life though her job.

The same rationale prevailed in the search of 'helicopter' interviewees for the other problematic pillars of the Greek society. In their case I decided to attend the 9th Antiracist Festival¹⁶ organized, among other leftist organizations, by the Sunday School of Immigrants¹⁷. Among the speakers of the panel dedicated to issues regarding GD was Pavlos Xaramis - the ex-president of the Greek Center for Educational Research and Documentation of OLME (OLME - Greek Federation of Secondary Education State School Teachers). Xaramis was invited to give accounts for the rise of GD in school environments. In his speech he focused on the material deprivation of the Greek households, the loss of their reliance in state institutions and how that facilitates the rise of far-right stances among students. His accounts were informative regarding the role of the economic crisis in the rise of GD yet were lacking information regarding the role of Greekness. Therefore, I used his accounts as supplementary to the main body of the Chapter 5.1 that was structured primarily on the accounts of Antigoni.

In contrast, the rich insights of another participant of the same panel - Alexandra Xristakaki - served as the skeleton for the Chapter 5.3. Xristakaki is a journalist that was working from 1999-2013¹⁸ in the public broadcaster ERT and was dismissed 3 months before the conservative government of Samaras, under fierce criticism dissolved and replaced ERT with NERIT. As leftist – hence, similarly to Antigoni informed by an additional to Greekness social structure - Xristakaki provided valuable overview of the political climate behind the discourse formation process with regards to GD. During her speech Xristakaki provided her own experiences and discussed the array of tools the media actors used in order to promote GD. Her accounts were

¹⁶ 9th antiracist fest of Sunday School of immigrants (Gr) <http://www.epocalibera.com/2015/05/kalesma-antiratsistikis-giortis-kyriakatikou-sholeiou-metanaston-2015.html>

¹⁷ Sunday School of Immigrants <https://www.ksm.gr/>

¹⁸ <https://christakaki.wordpress.com/bio/>

further supplemented with additional desk material. Both ‘helicopter interviews’ were recorder and later transcribed.

Lastly, material about the role of the Church of Greece in the formation of racist narratives was obtained by numerous televised interviews and events with key religious leaders. For the Church, that had cemented its central role in Greek social and political life, the potential acknowledgment, acceptance and inevitable accommodation of difference in the national body, that the leftists SYRIZA party was promising, would threat its dominance. Hence, prominent religious figures were extra vocal in defending publicly Greekness during and after the elections of 2012 when it was becoming clear that the “atheists” of SYRIZA were increasingly gaining electoral power. Greek media of those days was dedicating countless airtime in featuring priests to represent the religious/traditional wing of the public discourse. Chapter 5.2 though is built on the accounts of one of them - archbishop of Thessaloniki Anthimos. This choice was grounded not so much on the fact of him being the archbishop with the most bigoted and racist views - numerous priests had also come forward with their explicit support of GD - but on the fact that he was enjoying widespread media popularity. His overexposure by the media, whether as a constant invitee in news panels or the reproductions of his Sunday sermons, would give the impression to the consuming side of the media that he is the main representative of the Church, and therefore an important actor of country’s social and political life. Hence, in an attempt to highlight the direct ideological and political alignment of the Church with GD – at least as portrayed by the media environment, in the respective chapter, I compared the publicly expressed views of Anthimos with GD on certain pillar-topics of the Greek far-right agenda, such as controversial historic events, geopolitics, immigration etc. (5.2)

4.2 Immigrants’ perspective – Unstructured Interviews and Participatory Observation


The fieldwork of this thesis was carried out during the period of August 2013 – April 2014 in the city center of Athens, Greece. The methods that were used in this research were unstructured qualitative interviews and participatory observation. Most of the times the process involved interviews alongside with, or later combined, with participatory observation. In total, 11 male immigrants of different ethnicities and socio-cultural background participated in the research. Seven of them were, predominantly recent, immigrants from Pakistan. The rest were from India (2 participants), Afghanistan (1) and Kenya (1). The oldest of the participants was forty years old and the youngest nineteen. Most of the participants (6) could be characterized as newly arrived immigrants, since they immigrated in Greece during the last 10 years with the latest immigration wave. The rest are living in Greece from childhood ages (3) or have lived in Greece longer than 20 years (2). During the research I also had the opportunity to interview Tzaved Aslam, the President of the Pakistani

Community in Greece, whom I consider my most important informant, regarding his expertise on the issue. The duration of the interviews ranged from one hour, usually for the one-to-one interviews, up to three hours when the interviews involved participatory observations, that is interviews conducted in informal settings (bars, cafes etc.) and rather had the form of conversation. All interviews were recorded and transcribed, while notes were taken right after the participatory observation.

The research area

The area of Athens that I choose to conduct my research was not difficult to define. From the beginning of the turmoil considering immigrants (2008-2009) the media were constantly reporting incidents with immigrants mainly in the center of Athens. Very quickly the whole city center has started to be characterized as dangerous by the public, while the neighborhood of Patisia, located to the north of the central square of Omonoia as an immigrant ghetto. From Patisia also came to light the first incidences of racial violence. But the most notable attempt to record the incidences of racial violence in Greece was made by an independent research group from Greece. Within their project 'The city at a time of crisis'¹⁹ they have created a map²⁰ with which they monitor incidences of racial violence from 2009 until 2015. The map is informed by the media coverage of the incidences but also by people that report to the project incidences that they have witnessed. The map records incidences of racial attack that range from deaths of immigrants and damages of properties to verbal attacks.

Undoubtedly the map repeats the known geography of racial violence, but it also highlights new areas in the urban agglomeration of Athens. In the map we can distinguish two important areas: crudely the southwest of Athens agglomeration and a very clear geographically defined, city center of Athens (Pic. 4.2-1). The first case involves the working class areas of Athens that have been severely impacted by the economic crisis. There, the scarcity of employment has created a conflictual situation between the, mainly unemployed, natives and the immigrants that are accused of 'taking the jobs of the natives'. The situation created a very fruitful field for GD to act and recruit new members from the area and very soon dispersed racial attacks were recorded throughout the whole west and southwest



Pic. 4.2-1 Concentration of racist incidents along the three main roads of Patisia, from left to right – Liosion, Acharnon, Patision

¹⁹ <http://crisis-scape.net/>

²⁰ <http://map.crisis-scape.net/bigmap>

of Athens. But the main concentration of racial attacks can be seen in the city center.

The area of the city center of Athens, on the other side, can be characterized by a great concentration of racial attacks. As noted before, this area was named as ghetto in the media and in the public and therefore became the epicenter of racial attacks. It was clear that it was the most indicative place to conduct my research. The delineation of the borders of the problematic areas of the city center, and therefore my research area, was also a relatively difficult task. But surely they included the neighborhood of Patisia and the areas surrounding Omonoia square. Patisia is not an official administrative unit therefore does not have concrete borders. In daily use, the area of Patisia is defined spatially by three main roads that start from Omonoia square and head to the North of Athens, running in parallel to each other and crossing the whole Patisia neighborhood - Liosion, Acharnon, Patision (Pic. 4.2-1). Alongside these roads, at the level of Victoria to Kato Patisia metro stations, we can see the main concentration of racial attacks. Therefore, the main part of my fieldwork was conducted in this area. Apart from that, the two hair salons that my key informant owned are located also in this area.

The relevance of open interviews

The initial research design involved semi-structured interviews where the research questions would compose the skeleton, around which the interviews would develop. But from the first meetings with the interviewees it was obvious that semi-structured interviews weren't enough. The interviewees most of the times were either ignoring the question or even abruptly stopping me, dictating that way their pace of the interview. Therefore, it appeared difficult to maintain a structure during the interviews and, first and foremost, it wasn't necessary. Their unconstrained narratives were providing much richer insights while the openness of the interviews, and the informal character that it entailed, was giving space for the development of mutual trust that resulted to be crucial for the discussion of such a sensitive issue for immigrants. On the contrast, the interviews that were conducted on a semi-structured format ended up as a question-answer, almost interrogatory, dialogue. In these cases, the immigrants' lack of enthusiasm or even reluctance to participate actively in the interviews was evident and was adversely affecting the quality of the collected data. At this first stage of the research the data consisted of general, "copy-pasted" information, that one could find in the media reports, were repetitions of events that that were widely known to the public or accounts of other immigrants, that they had heard, while consistently avoiding to mention their own points of view and stories and most importantly how racist violence had affected their lives in Greece. That put under question the efficacy of the particular method and created the need for a new approach for contacting and conducting interviews with immigrants. Therefore, for the biggest part of the research open interviews were used, alongside with participatory observation. The choice of the method or combination of the two methods was made in each case depending on the sampling process and most importantly on the willingness to participate in the research, that each interviewee was demonstrating.

The sampling process

The sampling process presented a significant challenge of its own. In the light of tense relations between immigrants and natives, approaching immigrants straightforward usually was resulting in failure. The last two years before I started my fieldwork immigrants found themselves in the epicenter of the Greek economic crisis and had been targeted by a significant part of Greek society. This societal context provided Golden Dawn with the opportunity to inflict, unprecedented for the Greek recent history, racial violence. Most of the times racial attacks were occurring with the silent or spoken complicity of the Greek public, media and authorities and few cases were brought up to justice. As a result, immigrants had lost their trust in natives and were turning only to each other for help and support. At this point immigrants became highly suspicious and fearful and were trying to minimize potential contacts with the native Greeks. A Dutch student who was conducting her research also with immigrants in Athens warned me about immigrants' suspicious attitude toward Greeks from the very beginning of my fieldwork: *"For me it was much easier. I'm white but I'm not Greek. Therefore, when I was entering their shops to meet them, they were relieved that I'm not local and could trust and open to me easier"*, something that I could prove for myself when I started to approach my first potential interviewees.

The first attempts to approach immigrants were made during the first months (July-September 2013) through attending events of various immigrants' and antiracist organizations in parallel with spending time in the problematic neighborhoods of Athens' city center. In the first case I was attending summer music festivals, fund raising parties, public lectures and different other socio-cultural events that involved issues of immigration. There I was trying to approach different people by engaging with them in informal and rather friendly conversations. Shortly after I was telling them about my work and asking them if they were interested in participating. The first impressions and feedback that I was receiving from them were positive but despite the fact that they agreed to exchange telephone numbers, most of the times they wouldn't return my calls. I had similar experiences in the so-called 'ghetto' areas of the Athens city center. It involved scanning the area by walking, sitting on its central squares, visiting shops and cafes and restaurants owned by immigrants. Usually I was accompanied by a friend to reinforce the informal mood of the approach that I wanted to achieve and secondly, a picture of a native sitting alone for hours in a café or park bench, observing, taking notes and trying to open a conversation, would be rather an intimidating picture for the immigrants. Here again most of the contacts that I tried to make were very friendly and seemed open to an idea of an interview, but at the end they managed one or another way to evade my invitation. It became apparent that the problem was not on the way I was approaching immigrants or the venues but on the fact that they would not talk to a stranger, let alone when that stranger is Greek. From there the necessity of a key informant from the area arose.

The role of the key informant

The role of an intermediate was played by one of my interviewees. He was a Pakistani immigrant who owned two hair salons at the heart of the problematic areas. He also was one of the oldest Pakistani immigrants in Greece (immigrants from Pakistan are usually considered 'new' immigrants since the vast majority has arrived in Greece with the second migration wave) therefore knew many members of the Pakistani community in Athens. Pakistani immigrants employed in hair salons, that he owned, and customers were primarily immigrants from different countries. But the most important is that after the end of the working day his shops alongside with other similar shops owned by immigrants in the area were transforming into venues where immigrants gathered and socialized. My observations, during the whole time that I spent in the area, would allow me to define his role as one of the most prominent in the network of Pakistani immigrants that was formed in Athens. He had helped many immigrants, from assisting in finding a job to solving bureaucratic issues, and enjoys a great respect among the immigrants. His role in my research could be characterized as that of a key informant. Our cooperation was, as he proposed it, the following: he would contact his immigrant friends, acquaintances or people that he knew that would have 'an interesting story to tell', arrange a meeting with them and then call me to inform me about the time and place when I should come to conduct the interview. The reason why I couldn't follow the same or similar scheme on my own (despite the fact that I was given the contacts of various immigrants by third people) is that during his first contacts with each potential interviewee he had to reassure them that he knew me personally and therefore could trust me, I was not coming from any Greek authority - undercover police was their main concern - and most importantly I will not reveal their personal information. That way I conducted 6 out of 11 interviews. Most of the data from those interviews were later further informed by participatory observation, since I met the interviewees various times after the first interview.

The positive aspect from the cooperation with my key informant was the easy access to immigrants as I noted before. From the other hand, the main negative aspect was my complete dependence, that from one point resulted in him doing the sampling for me. With him choosing the people that I would meet and in many cases translating, and sometimes adding his views while translating, I was doubtful about the quality of data that I was gathering. Apart from that, many cases were giving me the impression that the interviewees were just making him a favor to participate in the interviews without any particular interest or willingness of their own. A reason to believe that was their lack of enthusiasm during their interviews and the feeling that I was receiving that they are not at ease with the whole happening. After my reassurance of who I am, why I want to have an interview with them and that they have nothing to fear for, their responses during the interview were still rather laconic and lacking authenticity. As I noted at the beginning of this chapter the semi-structured interview in some cases resulted into a stiff dialogue with me trying to elicit more personal accounts from the interviewees. A second negative aspect of my cooperation with the key informant was the fact that I was limited to just one group of immigrants – the newly arrived Pakistani immigrants - which more or less all of them had the same experiences in Greece and the same views and responses to the racial violence and fear that they are subjected to in Greece. From my personal experience thought I knew that other immigrant groups had different responses to the same issues and I was suspecting that their accounts would give new insight to my research.

Participatory Observation

Regarding the limitations that I had during my first interviews, I decided to supplement the interviews with participatory observation. In the case of interviewees with whom I had already conducted the interviews, the observations were made during my informal visits to the hair salon around its closing hours. My usual excuse was that 'I was in the neighborhood and decided to pass by', having secured beforehand that I had the approval of my key informant to visit anytime of the day. There, I would usually find some of the immigrants, that I had interviewed, spending their free time. Their attitude towards me this time was less rigid allowing me to participate in their conversations, jokes, listening with them Pakistani music and videos from the internet, eating with them etc. I believe the fact that I was there not for my fieldwork (I wasn't recording at that moments) but just to spend time with them also played a significant role. Having achieved a positive atmosphere in the company, I was able to observe their real attitudes towards the issues that we had discussed in the interviews. And most importantly, the directly irrelevant topics to my thesis that we were discussing were providing me with certain socio-cultural context within which immigrants' views are formed.

The second part of my field work involved participatory observation throughout the contact I had with new interviewees. In this case I was approaching immigrants in "their field", like religious celebrations, parties of immigrant organizations etc., which was providing me with the socio-cultural context from the beginning. For example, if I've met someone in a fund raising party of an antiracist organization I could have clues about his educational level, his level of integration in the Greek society and other personal information. These initial suggestions could be confirmed or not in the following interview, but they definitely were giving me a hint about immigrant's human capital and helped me better prepare for the interviews. For instance, someone I met in an antiracist festival - that are usually organized by leftist initiatives - would be most likely familiar with leftist structures of Greece and therefore the interview would include discussions about Exarcheia etc. Apart from that, in this case, the fact that I'm also an immigrant in Greece, was giving me a further access to my interviewees as an insider. By understanding that, to a certain degree, we shared a similar social reality, my interviewees were more open to discuss intimacies of their lives with me than they, perhaps, would be if someone that they've defined as an outsider were interviewing them. The interviews were started with me asking about the demographics and then they were evolving into lengthy open discussions that sometimes were lasting up to three hours. The interviewees were first-generation immigrants from Pakistan, India, Afghanistan and Kenya, residing in Greece from 7 to 30 years. All five interviews were conducted in a very unofficial setting and rather had the status of 'going out for a beer and discussing' in cafes or places of their choice.

All interviews were recorded and later transcribed. During the observations I was keeping notes right after leaving the events. I believe that keeping notes on the field would disrupt the informal environment that I wanted to achieve. In both cases of participatory observation attention was paid to immigrants' interaction with their immediate environment, especially their interaction with natives. For example, the ease with which they interact with the natives, when one was entering the hair salon as

client, or when they had to order in a drink to a native waiter. Another point of my interest was to understand the level of their integration that seemed to have a great impact to their responses to racial violence and its consequences. Here the focus was on whether and how many Greek friends they had, if they are going out in mix-race or predominantly native areas of the city, their relationships with natives at their workplace etc. Finally, they were encouraged to provide examples of concrete situations, interactions and relationships.

5 Greek institutions that legitimize racism

Having previously established the structural properties and conditions of Greekness' reproduction for the last 2 centuries (Chapter 2), this chapter will discuss the modes in which Greece's social systems and actors draw upon those structural properties in order to constitute daily social relations. Specifically, drawing on Coleman's boat, I will discuss the type-2 relations (Pic. 1-1) that govern Greeks' encounters on day-to-day life. On that micro-level, the Greek education system, the Church of Greece and the (political establishment embedded in) media environment reflexively regulate (monitor) their own actions and those of subordinate actors (i.e. students/future adults, believers, media consumers), in order to 'keep things as they are or change them' (Giddens, 1984, p. 28). As among the properties of Greekness, defined previously, is its defensive character and unchangeableness in time and space, it would be logically to conclude that their reflective monitoring would be oriented towards keeping things as they are - namely, defending Greekness from changes.

The three social systems, chosen for this thesis, are at the same time important institutions of Greece that possess Greekness recourses through which power is exercised. With that power, embedded in their resources, social systems have the capacity to enable and constrain action of the subordinates (Giddens, 1984). Drawing again on Greekness' principles and practices against the first migration wave (2.3) we can infer that the three social systems will be enabling practices that reproduce Greekness, and restraining others' agencies that 'do difference'. As noted earlier, immigrants' participation in practices social system organize (e.g. going to a Greek school) could add new knowledge on how to do things differently in Greece. That sign of an emerging immigrants' power threatens the dominance of Greekness. Therefore, in what follows I attempt to describe how Greekness' racism, reproduced in practices those three social systems organize, function as defensive mechanism against immigrants gaining and exercising their power. Particular attention will be paid on racism as an intended consequence of practices social systems organize and an unintended consequence that ensue practices Greeks undertake collectively/individually (type-3 relations). Given the unchangeableness of Greekness, each system could be regarded as homeostatic loop that reproduces Greekness through practices on micro-level of interactions (type-2 relations) and feeds back to reconstitute the initiating macro-level circumstances that created each separately (type-4 relations). Together they comprise a homeostatic loop - depicted in this thesis by drawing on Coleman's boat (Pic. 1-1) - that reconstitutes Greekness.

5.1 The education system

The role of education for individuals and society is undoubtedly of paramount importance. Apart from the fact that it influences the later employment and socio-economic status of individuals it is at the same time 'the primary institution through which children become socialized into a core set of values and norms...but also (determines) identity, the perceptions of own identity and understandings of the

‘other’” (Triandafyllidou A. , 2011, σελ. 6). In the theoretical part I have discussed that those values and norms are embodied in Greeks’ definition of their national identity - Greekness. I have also noted that the understanding of Greekness as well as of the ‘others’ inevitably involves a racist component and is being reproduced unquestioned through the education curriculum, from the beginnings of the independent Greek state (1912). On the examples of the courses of history and religious education I have demonstrated that the education curriculum holds an exclusive stance against those who are not considered Greeks (2.2). That dogmatically monocultural, and exclusive philosophy of the education curricular, has nurtured generations of Greeks that today are faced with a new social and demographic reality. The failure to prevent and deal with the negative consequences of that new reality can be directly contributed to lack of adequate education – pluralism of views, development of critical thinking, flexibility in approaches in social thought etc. This inadequate education, that the Greeks have been receiving for the last two centuries, has created a very rigid and dogmatic social structure. That structure is called today to combat the threat of GD’s extreme far-right stances. This chapter deals with how the education environment is responding to the infiltration of GD in schools and other educational institutions.

Greekness’ racism in practices inside the school environment

In 2013 The Greek Ombudsman²¹ published a report about racist violence in Greece dedicating a whole chapter about racist violence in schools. It was probably the first account of an authoritative organization about the escalation of racist rhetoric in school environment – an official recognition of the problem that was confirming respective reports circulating in mass media from different sources. The report (The Greek Ombudsman, 2013) was discussing various racist incident involving students, parents, teachers, school principals and actors outside the school environment that were fueling the racist sentiments inside schools. The overtone of the report suggests that these incidents were particularly aggravated during the economic crisis and with the later emergence of GD in the public life, while it also notes that the conflicts between racist and antiracist views are obtaining more and more violent features.

The same conclusions were pointed out by Pavlos Xaramis, a member of Greek Federation of Secondary State School Teachers (OLME). He starts to unfold the problem of the infiltration of GD’s rhetoric in schools by referring to the economic crisis and its negative consequences on households and particularly on youth:

‘Today’s youth seems to be the first after the WW2 that is projected to live worse than the previous generation. In December of 2012 a commission of social issues of the parliament presented (a report)...Findings showed a systematic violation of human right of children and youth...The same report was highlighting that around 2.500 children were undernourished only in the area of Athens. A year later the Greek committee of Unicef conducts a special report about the youth population under 18 and stresses that they undergo a significant reduction of quality of life. The Poverty Index has risen hugely particularly among children. It is important to know that in 2005 it (PI) was above the European average but we plummeted in

²¹ The Greek Ombudsman <http://www.synigoros.gr/?i=stp.en.home>

the last positions of Europe over a period of few years, particularly after 2009 and the implementations of memorandums'. (Pavlos Xaramis, member of OLME, 2015)

At the same time, he notes youth's loss of reliance in state's institutions as a result of the crisis:

'Going to the hospital and having a health insurance someone is expecting to have a medical treatment free of charge. But without fakelaki²², he wasn't receiving it. Someone is also expecting to have a free education. But the kids know that they need to go to frontistirio²³ (in order to succeed) for the exams. It was pathologies of such kind that were leveraged in order to undermine...the welfare state...and gave chances to organizations like GD to play their role.' (Pavlos Xaramis, member of OLME, 2015)

In addition, he notes as crucial the moment GD entered the parliament in the normalization of racist expressions among Greek students:

'The danger of the electoral rise of GD should not be underestimated. It constituted the expression of "fascistisation" of a great part of the society without guilt. It is exactly that...possibility of GD to participate in the parliament that legitimized the expressions of violence since the perpetrators of those assaults were feeling that behind them there is a parliamentarian party that can legalize such behavior.' (Pavlos Xaramis, member of OLME, 2015)

Indeed, between 2012-2013 the incidents of racist violence in school environments had started to increase rapidly. During the same period the media was overwhelmed with alarming reports of GD' infiltration among the young populations. In particular, at the beginnings of 2013 GD inaugurated courses aiming to the 'spiritual awakening' of 'the healthiest parts of the Greek society', i.e., kids from 6-10 years old. According to the original post of their Internet site²⁴, the kids, brought by their parents, were 'instilled with the Greek ideals', while they also participated in conversation regarding 'the birth of the Ancient world according to the Ancient Greek thought, learned about the Ancient Gods and Christian Faith'. This was probably the first attempt of GD to lay claim to their right to actually educate young people of that young age, supplementing or even replacing the official education curricular. The previous attempts were predominantly through Internet and had more or less a character of recruitment. Apart from their official subdivision "The Youth Battlefront", that organizes actions like filing the city with pro-GD banners and slogans²⁵, numerous, allegedly independent, forums were functioning to guide and encourage youth for political activism. The tracking down of one such, the 'Organization of Greek-souled (school) Students'²⁶, revealed that adolescents were encouraged by anonymous users to organize local cells in order to 'fight for their homeland' by means of 'beating the anarchists' in their schools. A 14 y.o student responds that they already have one with 11 members, 'only Golden Dawn

²² An aspect of clientelistic structure of Greek society in the example of public hospitals. Doctors and other medical workers asking or receiving bribe, usually in an envelope (in Greek fakelos), in order to provide their services.

²³ Private cram schools in Greece that after the education reform of 1999 became a permanent necessity for students aiming access to higher education, burdening financially students' families (Kazamias & Zabeta 1999).

²⁴ 'The golden dawn of Greekness that is coming' <http://www.xryshaygh.com/enimerosi/view/h-chrush-augh-tou-ellhnismou-pou-erchetai>

²⁵ 'New actions of the Youth Battlefront – Uncompromised battle until the victory (GD's official page) <http://www.xryshaygh.com/enimerosi/view/nees-draseis-apo-to-metwpo-neolaias-agwnas-asumbibastos-mechri-th-nikh>

²⁶ Organization of Greek-souled Students (blog) <http://oem-ellas.blogspot.gr/>

affiliated'²⁷. Searching further in the blog it seems that they had successfully opened regional cells, some of which announced their incorporation to GD²⁸. This particular Internet blog remains inactive since 2008, namely before GD entered the parliament, yet continues to enlist members. Its last known “activism” occurred in Cyprus in 2015, where Greek-Cypriot high school students attacked vehicles and injured three Turkish-Cypriots, an incident highly praised by GD’s official newspaper²⁹.

The Greek Ombudsman (2013) further reports incidents inside the schools during the same period. More precisely the incidents involve racist behavior and violence between students, teachers/principals and students, between parents and students, incidents involving third parties etc. In most of the cases, the report notes that while the disputes between students start for random reasons, they exacerbate with the incorporation of the race factor, i.e., a misunderstanding between students that end up in a clash between groups of students of the same ethnicity (most often Greeks versus Albanians), which goes in line with the escalation sequence of a violent racist incident described in Iganski (3.1.1). Other cases though indicate clear targeting of particular ethnic groups: a headmaster who refuses to finalize the enrolment of a student to her school by raising concerns over student’s legal status and fears over him carrying infectious diseases (pp. 59-60), parents’ boards of different schools blocked the decision of the Ministry of Education and Religion over the dispersal of Roma students, previously studying in all-Roma school, in their schools (pp. 60-61) etc.

For those familiar with the realities of the Greek public school though, the only new insight that the report and Mr. Xaramis provided is that the racist incidents in schools are increasingly obtaining a more violent character as a result of the complete collapse of reliance on the chronically disdained institutions of the state. Undoubtedly those contributed to the fueling of racism in schools, particularly when an official political party also supports it, but the vast majority of the incidents described in the report could be considered part of the normality for any Greek or migrants who has ever passed by a Greek public school. From personal school-days experiences, I remember how massive outdoor fights between Greeks and Albanians became almost a tradition after the finalization of every school parades of 25th March and 28th of October – the two main national anniversary days of Greece. The reasons for the fights were based on rumors – ‘an Albanian said something that he shouldn’t have said’, ‘someone saw an Albanian harassing a Greek’ etc. Looking back, I realize that the reason didn’t really matter, since no one cared in confirming them. Partly, as kids, we were those thrill seekers, described by McDevitt et al. (2002) in their typology of hate crime offenders, partly we wanted to ‘put them in their places’ as a culminating event of these two days, when students are expected to exhibit some extra national pride.

²⁷ ‘GD: enter schools, gums, (wherever) kids frequent’ (Gr)

<http://www.alfavita.gr/arhron/%CF%87%CF%81%CF%85%CF%83%CE%AE-%CE%B1%CF%85%CE%B3%CE%AE-%C2%AB%CE%BC%CF%80%CE%B5%CE%AF%CF%84%CE%B5-%CF%83%CE%B5-%CF%83%CF%87%CE%BF%CE%BB%CE%B5%CE%AF%CE%B1-%CE%B3%CF%85%CE%BC%CE%BD%CE%B1%CF%83%CF%84%CE%AE%CF%81%CE%B9%CE%B1-%CF%8C%CF%80%CE%BF%CF%85-%CF%83%CF%85%CF%87%CE%BD%CE%AC%CE%B6%CE%BF%CF%85%CE%BD-%CF%80%CE%B1%CE%B9%CE%B4%CE%B9%CE%AC%2%BB>

²⁸ ‘Last announcement of National Defense of Rhodes’ (blog) <http://ethnikiamyna.blogspot.gr/>

²⁹ ‘Turks that crossed the line of Occupied Territories (Northern Cyprus) were stoned!!! Greek-souled students don’t flinch in our Cyprus!!!’ (Gr) http://www.stoxos.gr/2015/11/blog-post_5221.html

Such racial tensions were not a novelty when my class started participating in national parades. On the eve of 28th October of 2000 a national debate sparked when the country realized that the best student of one of the schools, who according to the protocol should hold the Greek flag during the parade, for the first time was not Greek but of Albanian origin. Given to the



Pic. 5.1-1 20th elementary school of Athens (close to Ag. Panteleimonas square) participating in 28th October parade, 2013)

fact that ‘parading...symbolized the triumph of the ‘Greek spirit’ over its ‘enemies’ (Tzanelli, 2006a, p. 28), the Albanian student –Odise Cenaj (Greek Odysseas Tsenai)³⁰ - faced an unprecedented hostility, initially from his classmates and their parents and later from the wider Greek public, when the issue turned into a major ‘national cause’. Two years later the same student scored again the highest marks in his school but this time he refused the ‘honor’ in order to avoid the same public outrage³¹.

It was one of the numerous times in the history of Greekness that its organic definition was creating inconsistencies on the micro-level of people’s interactions. The flag ‘is handed to the best pupil of the school in recognition of pupil’s excellence’ (Tzanelli, 2006a, p. 28) in what the national education curriculum aims to disseminate students – the Greek paideia. The massive opposition against the fact that a foreigner can excel in Greek paideia, hence according to the regulations, has the right to represent its symbols, presented another challenge for Greekness. The inconsistency of its traditional narrative that defines Greeks through the organic triad of blood lineage, religion and language with everyday reality, that provides tangible proofs that an immigrant can become as Greek as Greeks are, highlights the fact that Greekness is a highly problematic concept. In particular, the incident once again showed that Greekness is conflicting with the new paradigm of increased movement of populations and globalization. It also constitutes an obstacle for the political center-right and center-left governments’ firm decision to European integration. The incident was an opportunity to start a constructive debate with the ultimate purpose of a change in the direction of multiculturalism. Instead it was consumed in TV shows and left to the society to solve its ambiguities.

In the aftermaths of the incident the society remained divided. For some, it became clear that Greek paideia, which is obtained throughout individual’s life, is sufficient for someone to be considered Greek (Pic. 5.1-1). Those are the students, teachers and school principles that in the following years embraced the fact that a foreigner is the best student in his/her school and therefore should be rightfully awarded with the honor to hold the Greek flag. Others though remained loyal to the

³⁰ A Hellenized version of the Albanian name Odhise Qena. The student was also baptized Orthodox Christian upon arrival to Greece at the age of 12.

³¹ ‘Best pupil denied the right to carry the Greek flag for being Albanian’
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/best-pupil-denied-right-to-carry-greek-flag-for-being-albanian-92822.html>

traditional understanding of Greekness and would protest parades with foreign flag-bearers.

Greekness' racism in practices outside the school environments

Among those who refuse immigrants to participate in practices of Greekness one could distinguish members of GD that probably seized the opportunity to come into spotlight. In 2004, right the next year after Cenaj's 'voluntarily' refused to participate in the parade, GD is being observed to protest violently a parade in Athens whose flag bearer is once again Albanian³². In the summer of the same year GD re-emerged during the celebrations in Omonoia square Greece's victory at UEFA European Championship in 2004. Amidst an extremely crowded square, groups of GD members attacked and injured immigrants who were celebrating the victory alongside with Greeks. The remarkable about this incident is the lack of official press coverage of the attacks on migrants. During the summer of 2004 the Greek national pride – bordering with 'banal nationalism' - had reached its zenith due to the unexpected victory in the Euro Cup and the Olympic Games that would follow in the next months. Foreign and local press was referring to that summer as the Renaissance of Greekness, while the football team and its coach were parallelized with Zeus and Olympian Gods (Tzanelli, 2006b).

Amidst the 'drunkenness' of the celebrations few would pay attention to the excessiveness of the nationalist sentiments and their expressions³³. The majority of those who paid attention was leftist media outlets, such as the grassroots media collective Indymedia³⁴. Valuable insights of the attitudes of different actors, during that time, provide the editorial team of the journal Schooligans - comprised predominately of high-school students. In an article with the title '*It would have been better if we've never lifted it (the Cup)*' students interview different actors of the society. The article starts with the personal experiences of the chief editor:

Sunday, 4th of July, 12 at night. (I suddenly see) A Pakistani man, holding a Greek flag, is running in panic. Behind him around 15 people chasing him. Tall, muscled men, some with shaved heads and a cross on their t-shirt. They reach him and start beating...5 minutes later I see another Pakistani laying down. The same people, all over him. One is hitting him with the stick of the flag. Another, is kicking him in the face. 'That's enough! Let's go' shouts someone who seems to be the leader and they leave.

The party was over for me. I start observing (from a distance)...The tactic is the same: Gather at one place of the square, scanning the crowd, and once they see a foreigner celebrating, attack. Next to them are some short-chopped hair men with military trousers. On their shoulder they wear a patch "Blue Army". I haven't seen it before. (I later learned that it's the hooligan group of Golden Dawn). The crowd whether fears to intervene, or is indifferent. At some point a passing by doctor, bents to help the, semi-conscious from the beatings, immigrant. I don't get to say 'finally' (someone helps), when I hear a group of people screaming the slogan 'You'll never gonna become Greek, you Albanian'. The man next to me is yelling "Foreigners out". "Isn't Otto Rehhagel³⁵ a foreigner?" I ask. "He is different. He is with us" he responds. "But they are also with

³² 'Michaloliakos about the parades' <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L8mRw130MOE>

³³ Based on sources available on Internet and e-archives of newspapers and journals.

³⁴ 'In Omonoia Greeks were celebrating nothingness and beating up migrants' (Gr) <https://athens.indymedia.org/post/236621/>

³⁵ The German coach of the Greek football team. Commonly referred to as Zeus, during those days.

us...they are celebrating for us". "Foreigners out" he repeats and leaves...I wrap my flag and leave...At home, I turn on the TV to see if they're reporting anything of the incidents. Only joy and celebrations. I put a song from Trupes "We don't want sad people in our party"³⁶ (Kostas³⁷, Chief Editor of Schooligans)

Other kids share similar experiences from that night:

Did you see migrants in Omonoia with Greek flags?

Yes, many.

How did you feel about it?

I liked it.

Did you see some groups with shaved heads beating them?

Yes. Each has its own mindset. I didn't have any problem. They probably have taken the whole patriotism thing way to serious.

What exactly did you see?

I saw Greeks chasing Pakistanis, 40 people to one, and beating them. I didn't like (what I saw), but I couldn't do anything.

What kind of people were they?

Normal, like us. Kids of 17-18 years old. (Thodoris and Haris, students of 11th and 12th grade)

What the students witnessed that night for the first time became an everyday reality for migrants in different neighborhoods of Athens when GD entered the parliament in 2012. Journalist D. Psarras considers that night as the night GD was testing for the first time a new tactic that was planning from 1997 – the mass pogroms³⁸. Before that, GD was limiting its 'activism' in isolated attacks on migrants and leftist. One of the most notorious cases was an attack in 1998 on an academic today, university student then, Dimitris Kousouris³⁹. Yet, the fact that a neo-Nazi organization is intensifying its activities did not seem to be receiving the right attention from the authorities. In the same article of Schooligans the interviewed actors, responsible for the policing of the event that seems to be, or act, oblivious:

Mr. Commissioner, you are aware of the batteries that we mentioned?

We've heard about them. But we didn't make arrests. How can you make arrests when you have a crowd of 300 thousand people?

But the beatings were occurring again and again!

These are overreactions. Amidst 300 thousand who were celebrating, there were a couple of fights.

Couple of fights? We saw at least 5 people in front of us, and who knows how many we didn't see...Even if they were isolated incidents, can someone be beaten up that easily at the center of Omonoia?

At that moment, it's chaos. How can you control that? (Says a Greek proverb, which means that some took advantage of fuss to create disturbances). Those Greek proverbs are wise. ...Were you there, celebrating as well?

Yes, we were there.

*I was also there. What concerns me though is the following: **Those foreigners that allegedly were beaten, what were they doing among Greeks?***

What do you mean 'what were they doing'? They were celebrating with us!

*I accept that...In any case, I saw many **blacks** (μαύροι – a derogatory vernacular term) that were celebrating and none bothered them. I mean, there were people who weren't bothered at all.*

³⁶ 'We don't want sad people at our party' <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WS4G2B8-8E4>

³⁷ Today, Kostas Skarmas is part of the legal team Jail Golden Dawn that monitors the trial of GD.

³⁸ This pogrom against immigrants was planned from 1997', Article in Eletherotypia 2011-05-22 <https://xyzcontagion.wordpress.com/2011/05/22/dimitris-psarras-to-pogkrom-1997-sxediazotan/>

³⁹ 'Golden Dawn: the gang that turned into a political party', Article in Epochi, 2012-04-29 <https://xyzcontagion.wordpress.com/2012/04/29/dimitris-psarras-xrysh-avgi-symmoria-ekanan-komma/>

But, that's the normal, Mr. Commissioner! The question is what happens with the rest that were beaten.

None came to report anything.

They are afraid, Mr. Commissioner!

Whom? Me?

You in particular no, but there is a suspicion that many police officers idle.

Idle against the offenders?

Yes.

Look...we had information...some police officers went there, found nothing...You should know that we have unfinished business with that people - particularly with GD (refers to the incident with Dimitris Kousouris, whose offenders were not arrested yet).

Have you heard of the name 'Blue Army'?

Yes, I've heard the name

We saw them as well. What are they?

The same thing with GD. (Xinarianos, Commissioner of Omonoia Police Station, 2004)

Over the question why the surveillance cameras that could help with the arrests of offenders were out of order, the responsible officer was less talkative and even less insightful:

Mr. Tsironis, did the cameras recorded the incidents that we reported to you?

No. The camera in Omonoia is broken some time now.

Doesn't that contradict the Olympic safety measures?

What Olympic safety?

It is supposed that from 1st of July 2004, namely a week ago, the Olympic safety measures are in effect.

Cameras of Omonoia are not part of the Olympic safety network. They are old. We haven't connected the new ones.

...

Did you have any reports of battery that day?

There was one, but amidst the crowd it was difficult to do something.

...

Couldn't an undercover officer search for those people?

You think we didn't search?

And you didn't find?

One hits here and then disappears, how can you find him?

But, they were coming back to the same spots!

When you have 100 thousands, can you spot them easily?

You can Mr. Tsironis!...When you have 15 people acting freely amidst 50 thousands...

(abruptly) What do you want now? What are you asking for?

We would like an answer.

I think you got it. (Brigadier General Tsironis, Responsible for the surveillance cameras, Police Headquarters in Athens 2004)

Among other public actors the journal contacted were the Minister of Public Order who refused to comment and the Mayor of Athens – Dora Bakoyannis who limited her view in simply following her political agenda by blaming the party of LAOS – the only far-right parliamentarian party in 2004.

The views of those political and policing actors reflect a mixture of incompetence, racism and attempts to reduce the importance of the incidents up to covering them up. To begin with, the argument that the surveillance cameras were not functioning during that night is clearly not convincing given to the fact that the Olympic Games, that would follow in some weeks, would be the first major international event after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in USA. The security measures were expected to be of unprecedented scale. It is also not convincing that the police forces didn't have operational planning for policing crowds, again given to the fact in some

weeks most of the squares of Athens would be filled with tourists from all around the world. The fact that the cameras were off and the police could not arrest disturbers in the crowd doesn't convince actors who had dealt before with those nationalist groups. In particular, the president of the Hellenic Football Federation, also interviewed for the article, was not surprised with the attitudes of the police forces. In contrast to the police, Mr. Gagatsis was well familiar with the phenomenon of Golden Dawn. He himself was targeted by GD due to Greece's common submission of candidacy with Turkey for the hosting of



Pic. 5.1-2 'My Bad Fucked up Greek Education System.'

Artist: Plasticobilism

<https://www.facebook.com/Plasticobilism-679534845436860/>

Euro 2008, while he also highlighted the increased racist sentiments in and out of the football fields. Additionally, in that interview he had foreseen the riots that occurred in September of the same year following the loss of the Greek national team from the Albanian national team. The riots took place all over Greece and resulted into the injuries of 5 people and the stabbing to death of a young Albanian⁴⁰. More convincing though, in explaining the passive attitudes of the police that night, is the mixture of racism and incompetence in the words of the police officers interviewed.

The decade of 00s was the first decade when immigrants of the 90s had started to become visible in the Greek society. Predominantly through the successful integration of their children, immigrants had started to claim their right to Greek concepts that they had inevitably incorporated in their identities through everyday practices, such as the right to hold the flag when exceling in Greek paideia or to celebrate the victory of Greek national team in Euro 2004. To that claim, Greeks' reaction was informed by the wider ideological guide – Greekness. As discussed in the chapter 2.2, Greekness' reaction to any 'other' is exclusion and isolation. Those immigrants who celebrated in Omonoia or wanted to hold the flag attempted to challenge the boundaries of Greekness and get out of that isolation. It was therefore nothing irrational or pathological for a decidedly racist social structure to resort to racist violence in order to restore the previous boundaries of Greekness as Perry (Ilganski, 2008) notes. After all, even in terms of legislation, it was indeed impossible for an Albanian to become Greek citizen according to the Greek naturalization law, as the racist chant 'You'll never gonna become Greek, you Albanian' states.

The incompetence here can be explained with another aspect of Greekness – the political clientelism. As one of the chronic ills of the Greek society, clientelism severely undermines meritocracy and allows non-professionals to hold decision-making positions. In an opposite case, it would rather be unacceptable to have police officers that fail or worse, blatantly refuse to recognize the racist component in the events of Omonoia square. Even worse, to have figures of the authority condoning attacks on

⁴⁰ 'Extensive incidents (of violence) across the country after the end of Albanian-Greek match' (Gr)

<http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=564336>

migrants that night by wondering *'what that blacks were doing among Greeks'*. That mindset reflects not just loyalty to Greekness but also a dangerous unprofessionalism, given the fact that they admit not being able to control a crowd but also consider fights amidst a crowd as part of the normality - *'Amidst 300 thousands who were celebrating, there were a couple of fights'*. To put the discourse and the style of the interviews into the Greek context I can suggest that it is common in informal chats among (predominantly older) men in a Greek kafenio or taverns but it's clearly unsuitable for an official statement from the head of Omonoia police station, even if the interviews are conducted by high school students. It is probably the overlook of those ills that allowed the police officers of Omonoia station to consider part of the normality to amuse themselves by ordering detained immigrants to slap each other in 2007⁴¹. It is also the same police station that will turn into an epicenter of racist violence with the entrance of GD in the parliament, and finally in 2013, together with the police station of Ag. Panteleimonas, will be subjected to special police search by the 'incorrupt' brigades of the Greek Police Forces with the aim to detect GD cells⁴². The case of Omonoia police station could be considered an exaggerated, yet, a good example of the developments in the wider society during the decade of 00s. By having first put migrants 'back in their place' with the flag issue, a whole society was celebrating the rebirth of Greekness through harmless, at first glance, banal nationalism.

Few people were realizing the dangers of that banal nationalism given to the fact that Greekness allows the turn of that nationalism into classical racism, when the celebrations are over. Those were usually people that either had dealt with the tragic consequences of racism in their field of expertise, like representatives of migrant organizations and Mr. Gagasis in the football field, or people that question Greekness itself. Among the latter we can include the editorial team of Schooligans. Interviews with prominent figures of public life, like the discussion about sex with the ex-Archbishop of Athens Christodoulos⁴³, were highlighting the disarray of Greekness, taught in schools, with daily reality of the kids today. More than that, the journal was covering topics from kids' daily life, offering a platform for high-school students to discuss their anxieties⁴⁴ and be informed about topics outside the school curriculum, in times where social media did not exist yet.

An alternative social structure to counteract Greekness' racism

Alternative initiatives, like the Schooligans, are private, undertaken by individual people, who practice their job with passion and make a "difference", in contrast to the passivity of a typical Greek public clerk, which characterizes the vast majority of Greek teachers. Particularly Schooligans and later their massive music festival Schoolwave⁴⁵

⁴¹ '150.000 euros in damages to the two immigrants for the slaps at Omonoia police station' (Gr)

<https://www.kar.org.gr/2015/11/30/αποζημίωση-150-000-ευρώ-στους-δύο-μετανάστε/>

⁴² 'The raid of the 'incorrupt' of ELAS (Greek Police) at the police station of Omonoia'

<http://www.tovima.gr/society/article/?aid=533899>

⁴³ Archbishop Christodoulos 'What else do you want (in order) to be convinced: Shall I bring Christ himself?'

http://www.theschooligans.gr/site/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=241&Itemid=5

⁴⁴ https://www.schooligans.gr/dear_schooligans

⁴⁵ Official Youtube channel <https://www.youtube.com/user/Schooligans/featured>

was an idea of a physics teacher and his two students, who noticed that ‘the energy entrapped inside the school walls should be released from times to times⁴⁶’. Today both of his co-editor students are making a difference in their fields. One continues the work of his teacher– a physics teacher who tries to improve the student-teacher relations, for instance by introducing a teachers’ evaluation forms⁴⁷. The other – Kostas (Skarmeas), that so emotionally reacted to the events of the Omonoia square, is today one of the lawyers of the independent initiative Jail Golden Dawn, that monitors the trial of GD. In other words, the micro space of the journal that Christos Ioannidis created was giving space for a critical reflection and discussion over Greekness, something that the school curricular does not provide (2.2). That space in its turn contributed to the fostering of a population of youth that today with the financial crisis did not give prominence to GD, when the trust on traditional institution collapsed and Greeks would have to rely on their own rules and recourses, obtained through their lifetime. It becomes obvious then that there is another set of rules and resources infiltrated in the Greekness of the Schooligans’ founders and audience.

One such additive set could be provided by an array of leftist ideologies. Leftism had been an inseparable part of the political history of Modern Greece, particularly during and after the WW2. But for the traditional understanding of Greekness, leftism is considered a difference until today. Therefore, in a similar way that Greekness projects its boundaries on immigrants, it also projects its boundaries on leftists. For leftists, being partly ‘outsiders’, it becomes easier to reflect more adequately on Greekness inasmuch as they are forced to participate in Greekness via states’ institutions, while at the same time being informed also by an alternative social structure for their actions.

It is not the aim of this thesis to discuss thoroughly the conceptual incompatibility of Greekness with leftist ideologies. Just the fact that most leftist ideologies reject social hierarchies, with which Greekness is strongly infused – whether in terms of religious affiliation (Orthodox Christianity on top of hierarchy), gender (family vs. individual based social structure) or race/ethnicity (relevance of blood lineage) – can give a hint of why leftists in Greece are more likely to be open to religious, gender and racial/ethnic difference. Different studies have also highlighted the positive relations between adherents to leftism and acceptance of difference (Triandafyllidou & Kouki, 2014; Agirdag, Merry, & Houtte, 2014). Yet, similarly to any other alternatives, leftist ideologies though are greatly omitted in the school curriculum. Therefore, if alternatives don’t exist in the family environment, the chances of learning anything, without the ‘filters’ of Greekness are limited to random but meaningful encounters – those that can actually change values (Valentine, 2008) - with the difference in one’s life path. Without knowing the background, we can hypothesize that one such encounter defined the relations Ioannidis and his students had, that resulted into the creation of Schooligans and Schoolwave. The latter in their turn offered a platform for different encounters to a greater reading audience.

The general picture of a Greek school is less optimistic. Regardless of their professional training, schoolteachers don’t grow in a vacuum. It is therefore expected that they will be guided by Greekness when confronted with a difference in their

⁴⁶ Excerpt from a tv show Erevna ‘The collective portrait of a generation’

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f8ikZHUTs8M>

⁴⁷ ‘Babis Chalamidis (teacher): Sir, it’s our turn to evaluate you’ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CBwlygDTeSg>

working environment. Indeed, a study conducted among schools of the Corinthian region revealed that ‘the majority of school managers did not understand the nature and extent of racism and were ill-equipped to deal with the more covert expressions of racism’ (Karakatsani & Pavlou, 2013, p. 281). Another study conducted among immigrant students and their Greek teachers concluded that the first understood their successful adaptation in terms of integration – participation in both host and native cultures - while their Greek teachers, understood it in terms of assimilation, since they ‘rated higher the performance and adaptation of immigrant students who reported higher involvement with the Greek culture’ (Pavlopoulos et al. (2008, p. 56)). In other words, we can conclude here that the Greek school and its staff are incapable of distinguishing racism when confronted with its different expressions, since some are part of the normality according to Greekness. That could be the reason behind the general absence of counterarguments to expressions of banal nationalism in the 00s, following the parades’ flag conflict and the EURO 2004. It could also explain the lack of measures undertaken by the corresponding authorities in order to avoid the transition of that banal nationalism into classic racism that is being observed today in the Greek society. Bearing in mind that the vast majority of GD supporters must have been teenagers or young adults during that period, according to the demographic features of its voters today (Georgiadou, 2013), would any direct antiracist directives or policies from the authorities prevent the spread of nationalistic stances?

To find out I decided to contact a high school teacher that was making a “difference” during my school years in my school. The choice of this particular teacher was grounded on numerous facts. First of all, she was that, rare, “different” teacher for being passionate about her job, caring and approachable. For that she was awarded with being the most popular teacher for many generations of students. Secondly, Sociology, that she was teaching, was not one of the subjects examined in Panhellenic National examinations for the entrance to tertiary education institutions. Fewer demands on subjects like this would give her a relative freedom in organizing her course. Thanks to that freedom she enjoyed, we had the rare chance to start a discussion about racism over the work of Cesare Lombroso, that would end with us discussing about the negative stereotyping of Albanians, or sexism on the example of Chinese foot binding tradition etc., through the extra-curriculum material that she would bring to class. Experiencing that freedom ourselves we would also actively participate in asking her to fill the gaps in knowledge that we felt we had. That was the case with Marxism that the official sociology textbook was covering superficially, while in my graduation year, the whole chapter of Russian Revolution in the history textbook was out of the examination literature. Lastly, she was the only teacher with whom I had maintained friendly relations that lasted some years after my graduation from high school. During that period (2003-2005) I remember her sharing her worries about the gradual prevalence of radical nationalistic stances among her students.

We started the discussion with what has mediated from the last time we met with regards to racism inside the school:

That (the presence of GD), was particularly intense before GD took those high percentages. There was a batch (of GD supporters), just for one year. The GD of Ilioupoli (a neighboring municipality) had (approached) some of the kids from here, and as a matter of fact, I'd learned that every Thursday they were going there (GD branch in Ilioupoli), where they were subjected to different 'enlightening' seminars. So, 3-4 kids had become quite wild. Of course here in Kareas they couldn't find support. Not that

Kareas' society is not racist, just the kids are lower key, plus they all know each other. Those kids had created some problems. For instance, there was an event for a celebration and some Albanians from Kesariani (neighboring municipality) had come as well. So, our kids went to fight them with 'are you Albanian' etc. where I intervened (by threatening them with expulsion). But it was just that year. Now we have some kids that throw 'why, is it bad to love your homeland?' but these are minor stuff that they hear at home or on tv' (Antigoni, Vice principal of Lyceum of Kareas, 2015)

What Antigoni described are the recruitment methods of GD and its branches like 'Organization of Greek-souled Students, discussed above, which the wider public discovered only recently. To my question why the recruitment was not met with success in Kareas while it is limited to banal nationalism she replied:

First of all its (physically) isolated. The fact that you have to cross a highway and walk a significant distance to come to Kareas is crucial. At the same time everybody knows each other. It's like a village, so, that constrains some people. But most of all Kareas is multicultural in its structure. It has Armenians, who are a closed community, yet they are very proud and preserve their cultural heritage...Pontic Greeks, Albanians, Romanians...now of 3rd or 4th generation. It has its economic inequalities - the upper-class, the middle-class, and the poor. It's a society that was developed through its differences, isolated from the rest of Vironas⁴⁸. That's why no one in Kareas feels Vironiotis or Ilioupolitis (has developed the identity of a resident of Vironas or Ilioupoli, the two bordering municipalities) (Antigoni, Vice principal of Lyceum of Kareas, 2015)

Indeed, the community of Kareas, with its unique socio-spatial conditions, is less likely to give prominence to far-right ideologies, at least on school level. This area, at the base of mount Hymettus, was initially hosting few scarcely build cottages of military personnel⁴⁹. In the 50s the government built social houses, financed by the UN, for the settlement of Greeks of Romania and Russia, Armenians, etc. who migrated to Greece from the ex-Ottoman territories and Soviet Union⁵⁰. In the following decades of Athenian suburbanization, the geographic position of Kareas – close to the city center, good ecological conditions due to the high altitudes - attracted residents from other areas of Athens. That added the factor of socio-economic diversity to the already ethnically diverse composition of the emergent community. Despite the fact that the daily lives of the old and new residents remain to a great extent separated – their borders can be considered the central road of the district – the only school of the district has become a space that facilitates meaningful contacts for all the diverse groups of the community. To them can be added students from the predominantly working class neighborhoods of municipality of Ilioupoli – the only spatial point that connects Kareas with the urban fabric of Athens. All those kids inevitably participate in activities of the official school curriculum, creating relations which are transferred outside the school in different spontaneous after school 'hang-out' spots of the district but also frequently unite for common causes of the neighborhood, like fighting wildfires⁵¹ and then organizing for its reforestation⁵². We can suggest that Kareas' school works as, Amin (2002) names it, 'micropublic' space of

⁴⁸ Officially Kareas is a district, part of the municipality of Vironas

⁴⁹ 'Our neighborhood and our school' (school blog) <http://blogs.sch.gr/lykkarea/2014/04/17/1226/>

⁵⁰ http://delalivirona.blogspot.gr/2011/09/blog-post_5996.html

⁵¹ 'Wildfires rage in Athens'

<http://www.reuters.com/news/picture/wildfires-rage-in-athens?articleId=USRTX1KPDP>

⁵² 'Kareas will become green again. We'll make sure of it'

<https://www.facebook.com/groups/844936668895268/?fref=ts>

compulsory prosaic negotiations, where children from different backgrounds participate in common ventures. That can 'disrupt easy labeling of the stranger as enemy and initiate new attachments' (Amin, 2002, p. 970)



Pic. 5.1-3 Kareas district, view from mount Hymettus. 1) Social housing complex, 2) central road, 3) elementary and high school, 4) Hymettus peripheral Motorway A64, 5) borders with the municipality of Ilioupoli, 6) Vyronas municipality

If Kareas' spatial isolation and multicultural social structure allows it to function as a melting pot, where far-right stances are marginal, how could other districts and neighborhoods of the Athenian sprawl prevent the radicalization of its youth? At least now when the far-right threat is eminent, it would be logical to expect the government to react, given that it bears the responsibility to educate the young population. To my question if the Ministry issued any special directives or the school had undertaken any particular measures, since the official school curriculum seems to be failing to prevent the spread of racism in schools, Antigoni replied:

Look, since we have a new subject introduced lately, the project 'research essays', I hear from co-workers that many work on the topics of violence, racism etc. But we the teachers will always be the adults and the other (kids) thinks that you're reprimanding him. The teenager doesn't want constant teaching. I mean, if you tell him not to take drugs the most likely is that he will take them, particularly if he is an 'eccentric' personality. I don't believe any more in those 'I make a program and tell you that you should not be racist'. I think what works for teenagers is your own example, namely 'I accept you, who have excessive weight, you who are too thin, Albanian etc.' (In other words) you have to show them that this is my way of life' (Antigoni, Vice principal of Lyceum of Kareas, 2015)

Therefore, it becomes evident that once again it's up to the judgments of the society – here on the example of teachers - to solve the problems Greekness creates. The course of Research Essays is without strict guidelines, compared to other courses, hence, allows teachers and students to divert from the rigid didactic character that the other courses have and approach it with significant freedom. How that freedom will be used could be another manifestation of Greekness. While Antigoni was showing me the projects her students did⁵³ I ask her if the rest of teachers of the school have embraced the course:

Are you crazy? The moment the bell rings they tremble each other with the students over who will leave the class first. They consider it a playtime. Why? The conditions inside the school are very difficult. Particularly with this pressing teachers' evaluation...that creates competitive relations between teachers. Namely 'I want to be evaluated better than you'. (Antigoni, Vice principal of Lyceum of Kareas, 2015)

⁵³ Antigoni Kriparopoulou's Youtube account <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCZZY7-UyCCr9x5WNVJxQ3Jg>

As someone who has graduated from the same school, I was not surprised by her reply. The vast majority of teachers would simply devolve their responsibility to educate their students on the detailed curriculum guidance. When parents are asked about teachers, similar views are expressed - *'there are some teachers who come, deliver their class and leave, and some that really think it's their vocation'* (Zouganeli, Kafetzopoulos, Sofou, Tsafos, & Matthaïou, 2008, p. 421), *'most of teachers don't have the calling to become teachers, but they choose it due to good working conditions – tenure in the public sector'* (p. 422). Teachers' lack of interest to put their personal effort to their job was further supported with the massive prevalence of private cram schools, that every high-school student would attend every day after the school to repeat the same courses. In other words, if the cram schools have replaced the necessity of public schools, the official curriculum does not demand nor motivate teachers to improve their teaching, while as public servants they have secured their employment until retirement, why should they try to improve themselves?

One could assume that that kind of dysfunctions could be solved with proper reforms based on teachers' evaluation system that would isolate those who do not contribute to the achievement of education systems' goals, at least those officially established:

When I first heard that, finally, teachers' evaluation will take place, I was glad, to be honest. Because I remember (some) clearly were not meeting the requirements *Because you thought that it will result into a cleaning up of incompetent in the public sector? Yet, I'm sure that they (the dysfunctional teaches) will stay and others will leave.*

Here I asked her to elaborate on the evaluation system.

'You are evaluated by the principal, a school counselor and a person called pedagogic supervisor, responsible for each school. You are evaluated for your credentials, for which the criteria are clear, and on the other hand, I don't know. How can the pedagogic supervisor know if I'm pedagogically sufficient by seeing me twice a year?...He will come, I'll stage an ideal class for him, will warn the kids beforehand, and I don't know what kind of conclusions he will make out of this...I'm against the evaluation unless someone guarantees that it will be objective. But again how objective an evaluation can be? I've told them that only my students and their parents can evaluate me. I was against the evaluation, even though, at the end, I have both the credentials and the (support of the) kids.' (Antigoni, Vice principal of Lyceum of Kareas, 2015)

The mistrust to governmental attempts to introduce meritocratic reforms in the public sector is a general feature of the Greek society. Particularly for public education sector, this mistrust can be grounded on its long history of misconducts in teachers' appointment systems. The first problematic system was instituted in 1970 by the military dictatorship. With a system that was imitating army lists, university graduates were appointed high school teachers in chronological order according to the date of their application to the Ministry. That way a system 'whereby the best applicants of 1995 came after the worse of 1994 (or even 1984!) was anything but meritocratic, and was largely recognized as the major source of the deterioration of public education' (Mavrogordatos, 1997, p. 5). With the fall of Junta, the succession of the parties of PASOK and ND added the clientelistic component to that system. Due to the fact that the appointment of teachers remained largely dependent on each political party in power any subsequent reforms would in reality aim to replace the teachers-'clients' of one party with the other (Mavrogordatos, 1997). Since Greece's transition from two-party to multi-party system occurred very recently, while the party of SYRIZA had

started to exhibit signs of Pasokification⁵⁴, Antigoni is certain that nothing will change in the direction of meritocracy. More than that Antigoni, as a known extra-parliamentary leftist both among students and teachers' staff, is concerned that she might fail the evaluation:

Of course I'm expecting that (the political criteria will prevail in the evaluation). I was sure that this would happen with ND (proceeding SYRIZA), and now I'm sure it will happen with SYRIZA as well. When they know from the assemblies what I am (a leftist), why would they keep me? To light fuses?

And of course the evaluation is connected to your wage development. This is a trick in order to dismiss people and to freeze wage increases. (Antigoni, Vice principal of Lyceum of Kareas, 2015)

Despite that, many of all actors involved – teachers, principles, parents - contribute the misconducts in the education system to the lack of evaluation. Yet regardless of the reasons, the vast majority expresses their 'certainty that in the current education system it's almost impossible for a meritocratic, objective and unassailable process to take place' (Zouganeli et al., 2008, p. 426).

If we summarize the findings so far we can say that there is little control over the competency of teachers in Greek public schools. The curriculum itself, heavily infused with notions of Greekness allows the expressions of racism. Therefore, the curriculum itself is incapable of stopping the spread of racist stances, and guide the future adults to non-racist action, particularly in times of political, social and economic crises. Since Greekness is an organic, unchangeable concept, individual 'differences' that students might encounter during their school years can help them to incorporate new concepts in the default structure of Greekness. A positive impact to the non-racist direction of action, in the Greek context, have individual 'differences' that are adherents to leftist ideologies. Yet, students' contacts with that particular 'difference' is a matter of random chance encounter, both in the official curriculum and among teachers' staff. Inadequate teachers' evaluation criteria, infused also with Greekness through political clientelism, undermine meritocracy. Therefore one student has the same chances to encounter a teacher-'mentor' or principles like Christos Ioannidis and Antigoni but also the same chances to encounter individuals, like those 2-3 (out of 31) school managers in Karakatsani & Pavlou's research who 'Strongly Agree' that immigrants are less civilized than local people, that it's unfair for immigrants to claim the same rights with the locals and that Greek citizenship should not be attributed to second-generation immigrants (2013, pp. 277-278).

The existence of the latter and their ideas in school environments, in parallel to the absence of any alternatives in other aspects of a youth's life, leaves little space for the development of a non-racist identity. This becomes extremely problematic when those future adults, nurtured exclusively by Greekness, seek a career in power-holding or power-enforcing positions, like police forces. In general, it is widely known in the society that those who choose a police career are whether those who, similarly to teachers, desire a secure future relying on tenure of the public servants or those who identify themselves ideologically with the ideological structure of the Greek police. Considering that the Greek police is a structure heavily burdened with conservative,

⁵⁴ In the Greek vernacular the term Pasokification is used to describe the turn of the radical left party SYRIZA to centrist stances and practices, resembling more the center-left party of PASOK. Outside Greece the term is used to describe the phenomenon of 'the rapid capitulation of a social democratic heavyweight in times of austerity' <http://wire.novaramedia.com/2015/01/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-pasokification/>

anti-leftist ideas from the Junta period and today is enriched with anti-immigrant sentiments (Christopoulos et al. (2014)), during their training, both find themselves in an environment – nursery for far-right stances. The experiences of A. Tsoukala⁵⁵, a visiting criminology professor with cadets of Greece’s police academy at Amygdaleza is indicative about the main ideas that govern the classrooms of future police officers.

Ms. Tsoukala was invited on January 2013 to give lectures on racism and xenophobia. According to her witness, after a lecture one cadet stated that he disagrees completely to the fact that immigrants are equal to Greeks. When Ms. Tsoukala answered that his ideas refer to fascists, authoritarian regimes he responded, *“Yes we’re fascists and we are proud of that. Is there any problem?”* under the cheerful applauses of the majority in the class. The discussion continued with Ms. Tsoukala explaining that their political affiliations is a private issue and all that is expected from them is to implement the law, neutrally and impersonal, to what she received the answer *‘It is unacceptable to ask a police officer to implement laws with which he disagrees. Policemen have critical spirit and can only implement laws with which they agree. The ‘law states’ is hypocritical and not binding on the police officer’* again under the cheerful applauses of the majority in the class. Ms. Tsoukala concluded and warned in her interview that *‘these kids have already graduated and are working on the streets’*.

5.2 The Church of Greece

Having established the central role of Orthodox Christianity in Greek national identity and the state in the theoretical part, it becomes evident that the Greek Orthodox Church is the main party interested in maintaining the religious homogeneity of Greece. It succeeds its goals through the long-established relationships of mutual dependence and appropriation with the state. As Sakelariou notes ‘The Church is a bureaucratic institution, attached to the State, and therefore in constant interaction with other institutions, organizations, social groups and lobbies...In that sense, not only it is inherently impossible for its members to avoid the temptation of exposing their ideological influence, but this expression...obtains a particular secular weight because of its State origin’ (Christopoulos et al., 2014, p. 82). In return the Church serves the state ‘as a complementary mechanism of legitimization and ideological prestige’ (2014, p. 82).

Greekness as power resource for the Church of Greece

It would be logical to conclude that, as public servants, the actors of the Church of Greece would identify themselves with the broader strategic choices of each ‘social regime’ in power. In Greece though the particularity lies in the fact that the Church maintains and expresses its conservative views regardless of the regime. In Greece’s modern history the Church reached its sublime importance in the society during the

⁵⁵ “Fascists” in EL.AS (Greek Police) academy <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zAlxRXHHYzc>

periods of Greek dictatorships – Ioannis Mataxas’ regime (1939-1941) and Coronels’ Junta (1967-1974). Especially the latter, with their imposed national mottos “Greece of Orthodox Greeks” and “Motherland, Religion, Family”, gave ideological prominence to the Church while the symbolic recognition of each other’s powers was also translated into the wage equalization of the clergy with public servants (Christopoulos et al., 2014). But more importantly the close ties that the Church developed revealed the ideological empathy of the Church with those fascists and authoritarian regimes. As an institution based on dogmas, thereby inflexible to changes, the interest of the Church with conservative political streams, like the dictatorial regimes align. In Greece, that cooperation was further facilitated and justified by the oversized role of Church in the public life and in the concept of Greekness that the Junta regime was highlighting. In other words, the Church had its personal interest in publicly supporting the Junta regime.

After the fall of Coronels’ Junta in 1974 the changeover that occurred in the political life of Greece did not affect the Church. The Church of Greece ‘kept up with its work and actions like before without any ideological alteration and regression’ (Christopoulos, Kousouris, Papadatos-Anagnostopoulos, Papantoleon, & Sakelariou, 2014, p. 84)). Moreover, the bishops and other church servants that were occupying privileged position during the Junta remained in their positions and continued uninterrupted their way up the hierarchical ladder of the Church. Some of the most notable names that cooperated with the Junta and continued the ultra-right rhetoric after the restoration of democracy are – the ex-Archbishop of Athens Christodoulos (1998-2008), the current Archbishop of Thessaloniki Anthimos and bishop of Kalavrita and Aigialias Ambrosios. The new democratic political parties sought for further cooperation with the Church, while any political initiatives that aimed to limit their influence, was stumping on a fierce opposition of the Church. In fact no political party dared to seriously challenge the Church because they knew that that would have an impact on their electoral results since until now the Church has a great influence on the electorate, given the big percentages of Greek believers.

In the last 20 years the Church has demonstrated in numerous occasions its power on the electorate, manipulating that way the political life in Greece. The two most notable occasions are the uprisings of the Church against the state over the issue Greek Identity Cards affair and the “Macedonian Question” where the Church acted as the initiator of a national revolution against the neighboring country. In the first case, the Greek government implemented in 2000 a law of 1997 that removed religious affiliation from national identity cards. Possibly due to pressure from the EU the center-leftist government of PASOK proceeded with this step in order to comply with Human Rights regarding religious freedom of the minorities. It was a marginal step because the law was not referring to the constitutionally grounded existence of a ‘prevailing religion’ -the main controversy with Human Rights (Payne, 2003) – it was simply moving partially the issue of religious affiliation



Pic. 5.2-1 Anthimos (1) and Christodoulos (2) with the leadership of Coronels Junta. Source: <https://xyzcontagion.wordpress.com/2011/02/25/anthimos-roussas-xounta/>

to the private sphere. Yet, in doing so the state was asserting that the Greek national identity is merely a political construct but most importantly they were sidelining the Church – the caretakers of Greekness – ‘by violating of the symphonic principle according to which the Church itself operates with regards to the state’ (Payne, 2003, p. 267). The unilateral decision of the state outraged the Church who started to collect signatures and organized protests in Athens and Thessaloniki. The Church eventually handed in 3 million signatures that were collected right in the churches after the masses⁵⁶. At the same time the massiveness of the protests was stunning⁵⁷ - people ‘filled’ the Syntagma Square in Athens where the Archbishop Christodoulos would speak. In short, in a speech full with elements of conspiracy theories, he referred to the need to protect the Greek nation from the “New World Order”, globalization, the nation-nihilists, the West and other enemies who pressure Greece to change in order to erase the uniqueness of the Greek national identity. Owing to the fact that the crowd of the square was waving Greek and Byzantine flags, that uniqueness was predominantly understood in terms of Orthodox religion. Back then, the only party that could support such views was the Christian far-right party LAOS with which Christodoulos had developed particular ties (Christopoulos et al., 2014). In a way we can say that the priest who had flourished during the Junta was now, as an archbishop, establishing relationships with the new far-right.

With that mobilization of people, the Church had demonstrated that Church’s version of Greekness, as well as its unquestioned central role in state’s decision making, echoes back to a significant part of Greeks. But most importantly, PASOK lost in the next elections in favor of the conservative party New Democracy, whose leader demonstratively had signed Church’s petitions. Exaggeration or not but it was not a secret in the country that it was predominantly PASOKS’ clash with the Church that contributed to that result. In other words, the Church had sent a message to the political establishment that it is still an important actor in Greek society and that Church’s support can be directly translated into votes. Apparently that lesson was well grasped by Golden Dawn who would start approaching the Church from now on.

Greekness in religious discourses as a medium for racist offending

The Macedonian Question was the second case the Church, and particularly Bishop of Thessaloniki Anthimos is the leading proponent of conflict, that rose between Greece and FYROM over the use of the latter of the name Macedonia. Here also the Church organized demonstrations and was calling though the Sunday masses people to participate massively. It is an important example not so much due to its role in the conflict; the conservative government of New Democracy had the primal role here, but to the fact that the Church’s rhetoric around the issue dangerously resembles the rhetoric and the line of reasoning of GD. It is also worth noticing that it is the first time that GD participated in protests alongside with the Church (Christopoulos, Kousouris, Papadatos-Anagnostopoulos, Papantoleon, & Sakelariou, 2014). Yet, throughout the years, the public interest over the issue had faded away, particularly during the years of

⁵⁶ ‘Christodoulos about the ID cards’ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c3sd9m9rzTQ>

⁵⁷ Archbishop Christodoulos, protest against ID cards, 2000 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TLJ4UOV0JJc>

economic crisis. Anthimos seems to be one of the few public actors who follow the progress of the negotiations and keep constantly reminding to the believers of the 'threat' that comes from the northern Slavic country and the other neighbors, while he skillfully manages to combine that threat with current economic crisis. In one of the Sunday masses in 2011 he stated:

I have the impression that (due to the crisis) we have left behind not only our spiritual issues but other issues as well. We have left behind the propaganda against us from Macedonia, Thrace, The Hague (final decision of ICJ 2011 that was favoring the FYROM's positions), Kastelorizo and other areas where there is a fierce fight between the countries about who will take over the land – Turkey, Cyprus, Israel, USA, EU, Greece? Since they say that the mineral resources of the sea, natural gas or oil, are products that could solve the problems of Greece for 100-200 years...There is no spiritual nor national concerns for our country (the official government ignore those threats). Do you know what a war continues over that wonderful, Greekest (the very Greek) territory of Thrace?...that today is under the propaganda of...all of those who enter freely from Bulgaria and Turkey, and create problems to the Orthodox Greeks? Greek citizens are supposed to be the Muslims as well...but they also cultivate a consciousness that is Turkish...The decision of the Hague's court also came. We've been screaming that the name Macedonia belongs only to the Greek Macedonia. We don't accept (the use of the name) to that country no matter how they combine it (derivatives of the name)...Nations don't get destroyed that easy! You have Israel that after so many years created their own state (Jews managed to maintain their identity without a state). We will be destroyed? We, who have a state and constitute a historic nation? (Metropolitan bishop of Thessaloniki Anthimos, 2011)⁵⁸

With this sermon Anthimos has defined the external enemies of Greece and emphasized the organic nature of Greekness. Starting analyzing from the end of that sermon, according to Anthimos, Greekness is a concept that cannot be destroyed because it is a historic concept that exists, apparently beyond human conduct, on the same geographic territory. The comparison of Greece with Israel, an antagonist nation, is done here to prove that the existence of such organic entity is feasible because Jews have managed to maintain their Jewishness all those centuries without being tied to their motherland. Greekness in that sense is "stronger" because Greeks have never left the land of their ancestors. The land here does not have a symbolic meaning but it is the material entity on which Greekness can be build. The choice to compare with Israel probably is not grounded only on the fact that they also constitute a historic nation but probably because they also understand their identity the same way Greeks do. After all, as Tsoukalas notes 'Probably more than any other national culture...the Jewish...(and) modern Greek culture (are) hunted by (their) history (Tsoukalas, 1999, p. 7).

Macedonia is Greek based on the same spatial principle. Significant historical figures of the Greek history, from Alexander the Great to Paylos Melas originated from that area and achieved great things on behalf the Greek culture. The significance and historical span that the "Greek" culture covers on Macedonian land is incomparable with that of the neighboring nation. Succumbing to the pressure from the International Court of Justice or to the diplomatic attempts of the two countries for a middle solution would signify that the Greeks gave to the neighbors not only parts of land but

⁵⁸ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rnH_MuJVbc0

also a part of Greekness. But since Greekness is organic it can't be dismembered. Therefore, Macedonia is one autonomous entity, like Greece, and the neighbors should not be allowed to use the name in any form or combination.

Macedonia is also important because it is the only officially open conflict front that Greece has with its neighbors. It is an example of what could happen to Greece if we don't pay enough attention to the threat that comes to us from all the other neighboring nations as well. Appropriation of the Greek cultural heritage is just the first stage of the expansionist, irredentist policies that the neighbors have developed in order to occupy in the future territories of the country that are supposedly rich in minerals. Those minerals, particularly natural gas and oil, are so abundant that their extraction could not only help Greece to overcome the current economic crisis but to secure its economic independence for many years to come. As a matter of fact, a number of geological studies surfaced in the last two decades, claiming the possibility of existence of significant underwater reserves of hydrocarbons in the Greek Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)⁵⁹. The official version is a bit vague since some draw on the confidentiality of the official research while others estimate that there is no sufficient geological data in order to quantify the estimates. At the end, the dominant view is that it would take a long time and a number of diplomatic and functional obstacles to overcome in order to start considering a national oil production industry as a possibility. Yet, the Turkish political provocations around the areas where Cyprus recently started producing oil, close to Greece's potential oil field of Kastelorizo, have rendered the rumors - enriched with conspiracy theories - as facts for the Greek nationalists.

The victims of this line of reasoning are the Muslim minorities of the Thrace. As noted in the theoretical part the organic nature of Greekness did not allow them to become full members neither of the state nor of the Greek society. A recent documentary broadcasted on the Greek tv⁶⁰ in a way familiarized these populations to the Greek society, that, unarguably, had little information about the lives of their co-patriots. The documentary also demonstrated how decades of neglect and isolation by the Greek state made these populations to orientate their social and economic lives towards Turkey despite the fact that not all of them are considered ethnically Turks; young Muslims prefer to study at Turkish universities or to immigrate as guest workers to Germany or the Netherlands, apparently following the patterns of Turkish immigration to northern Europe, they watch only Turkish TV channels because the signals from the Greek don't reach these areas etc. So, owing to the fact that the Greek Church doesn't have any influence in these areas and the Greek state is "losing" them culturally and economically, the divide between "us" and the internal "other" is further growing. Since Greeks learn in schools that the "other" is de facto a threat (2.2), particularly those who according to Anthimos are 'cultivating Turkish consciousness' – the eternal enemy of Greece – it doesn't require much effort for Anthimos to convince the believers about whom to "fight" against. Apart from that, by manipulating with the economic toll that austerity measures took on the Greek population, the idea of a Greece rich in oil sound promising. According to Anthimos the only thing that stays in the ways of Greeks to solve all their economic problems are the bordering neighbors

⁵⁹ 'Can oil save Greece?'(Gr) <http://www.tovima.gr/vimagazino/views/article/?aid=476283>

⁶⁰ 'Reportage from Pomakochoria' <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I9g11tJwPyo>

who aspire our oil fields – the Turks are already in the country, lurking though the Muslim minorities - and the government that neglects these issues.

Having defined Greece's problems in church, a part of the believers would translate the message that they received into a political action by voting those who would meet their requirements. The closest to that rhetoric is the rhetoric and standpoints that Golden Dawn presents in public. The following quotes from members of GD, as presented in the media, have remarkable similarities with Anthimos's sermon in the Sunday mass.

Over hydrocarbons (and Coronels' Junta):

'In the decade of 70-s there was a military regime. In those years the public debt was 0. It was only after 1974 (the overthrow of Junta) that the bubble of the debt started to develop...(about Papadopoulos, the leader of Junta) He did some steps that if Greece would do today it would go far. The most important was that he proceeded with the extraction of hydrocarbons in northern Aegean. In my personal opinion that's why he was overthrown.' (Kasidiaris, GD,⁶¹)

Over the Muslim minorities of Thrace:

'They are Greek citizens. But there are (among them) also agents of the Turkish government who according to our opinion should be deported.' (Kasidiaris, GD)

Over the Macedonian Question:

'Mr. Minister (of foreign affairs) in 1992...there was a common political decision not to include the word Macedonia nor its derivatives. Since until now there is no deviation from that national line we heard...the new stance that Greece would accept a compound name with geographic qualifier. First of all I would like to note that the words "Upper" or "North" are indeed geographic qualifiers but the word Macedonia is not. It refers to time and space. Its value is not just theoretical. It also refers to identity and historical existence. It's like supposing that in the future we could say "North Greece", "North Aegean". Mr. Minister Macedonia is not a brand name. We don't rent it, nor give it to anyone' (Pappas, GD,⁶²)

It is rather unnecessary to analyze each of these statements. The same line of reasoning that I've provided for Anthimos sermon could be used in order to decode GD's statements. It should be noted though that GD is the only political party that draws up its economic agenda on the certainty of the abundant oil reserves. In the eyes of those who listen to Anthimos and feel affiliated with his views, GD is understood as the only party who would turn those views into action. By "proving" publicly that only under far-right regimes Greece could prosper economically, as it did in the past, GD sends the message to the audience that they are that far-right party Greece needs today. After all, they propose the same means to achieve economic prosperity while they also demonstrate a fierce opposition to the neighbors who are lurking in the borders. The enigmatic "someone" who overthrew Coronels Junta despite that they were doing "good things" for the country, the nebulous "agents" that are hiding among the Muslim minorities further feed conspiracy theories that the Church was developing publicly before the emergence of GD, like in the case of Christodoulos and the ID issue.

The certainty that the undefined "they" are trying to harm "us" by approaching the minorities that live in Greece, leave no room for recognition of rights for those

⁶¹ GD interview , 2012 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7YND3nW93dY>

⁶² 'Question about the name of Skopje' (Greeks referred to the country as Skopje) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eX11YGknOXU>

minorities. Taking theory to action Church and GD work most of the times separately but for the same cause. Over the possible operation of a radio station that would broadcast in Slavic Macedonian language in the province of Florina of Greece, Anthimos threatened *'If they...do it, at least 40 to 50 buses have to get there and along with the brothers of Florina and Meliti we will tear the place down'* (Christopoulos et al. (2014, p. 84). More than that in 2014 in another Sunday sermon Anthimos condemned the economic relations that the bordering areas between Greece and Macedonia develop the last years, and called indirectly traitors the Greek tourists who visit Macedonia.⁶³ In parallel, GD is visiting a transportation company and interrogates the owners, in a bullying manner, over their cooperation with Macedonian companies. They ended with the threat *'Wherever we'll see a truck of Skopje, we will turn it upside down'*⁶⁴. So, it's not only about whom to fight but both GD and Anthimos teach how to "fight" the "others" – by directly confronting them even with the use of violence. In a way these views perceive legitimacy not only because they are stated by authoritative figures of the society like Anthimos, but because they go in line with Greeks' common understanding of Greekness. It is not necessary for someone to support GD directly or be religious to find these views appealing. They can be logical conclusions of Greekness when the Greek individual is asked to act.

The Church and GD also agree when it comes to the internal "others" of Greece – the old and new immigrants in Greece. The Church continues to spread fear among the believers using the same rhetoric of the "threats" against the Greek nation. In one of the Sunday sermons Anthimos was criticizing the Ragousis law – a law that was providing citizenship for the second-generation immigrants. The criteria for the acquisition of citizenship were covering only the immigrants who were born in Greece or immigrated in a very young age, namely those who had obtained the Greek paideia. It was the first time that the Greek society and authorities were discussing the possibility to divert from the *jus sanguinis* principle of citizenship acquisition that was established from the beginnings of the Greek nation (Christopoulos, 2012). The number of people potentially covered by the law range from 50.000 to 200.000⁶⁵ but this is not what people hear in Anthimos's sermon. Deliberately or not the message that he conveys is that Ragousis law aims to naturalize all immigrants living in Greece today. Similar to GD's "Turkish agents in Thrace", for Anthimos the Muslim immigrants in Athens serve the Turkish government:

'The issue is that this (Ragousis law) is not being done for the salvation of the human...That means that it's not something that God wants. You would say 'Isn't that love, to enact a law that would accommodate immigrants that we have in Greece?' No, it's not... with that system (Pagousis law) that comes the demographic problem will rise. Until 2050 it is estimated that Greek population will be reduced to 3 millions. That's why we ask the government and the responsible minister (that is present in the church) to take it back (the law)...Immigrants have occupied the islands. They will star to demand autonomy of the islands. Turks covet Thrace and the Aegean. How will we stand against them if we're not integral inside our country? With 1 m. foreigners? If we, a country of 11 m. Orthodox Christians will

⁶³ Sunday sermon 2014, Thessaloniki <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7JpFFSHKqcc>

⁶⁴ 'Lagos, Panagiotaros (GD), raid against Skopje interests' <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZpLaY1bDO5c>

⁶⁵ 'Three preconditions for the citizenship' (Gr) <http://www.kathimerini.gr/792521/gallery/epikairothta/ellada/treis-proupo8eseis-gia-i8ageneia>

import 2,5 m. of Muslims we would serve the Turks plans to turn us into Turks and eventually we will end up having a branch of Al-Qaeda in Greece...It's enough!

Of course the numbers and the “official estimates” that Anthimos presents here are not supported by official sources. The use of numbers, although greatly exaggerated, makes his points more reliable, therefore the politics of fear he practices trustworthy. The “other” now threatens not only to annex areas of Greece, which are culturally similar to them, but from country’s center it aims to decompose the organic nature of Greekness. And a decomposed and “contaminated” by internal “others” Greek society won’t be able to fight against that external “other”. That is important because, as it was noted before, exactly that defensive character of Greekness is the main factor of stability, homogeneity and eventually uniqueness of the Greek national identity, as Greeks learn from the history textbooks (Avdela, 2000). All that, are now under threat because the government attempts to equalize the “others” by naturalizing them, thus, disrupting the homogeneity and uniqueness under the, alien to Greeks, philosophy of multiculturalism:

It's being done out of the belief that all people should intermingle and become without ethnic colors and without the history and traditions that we have...their motive is not love but the political thought...That leads to 'asofia', the lack of salvation of a nation and of an ethnos' (Metropolitan bishop of Thessaloniki Anthimos, 31/1/10)⁶⁶

By not specifying which immigrant groups the Ragousis law involves, Anthimos is objecting not only to the naturalization of all the new immigrants that currently live in Greece but even to those whose lives are exclusively related with Greece, like the 200.000 second-generation immigrants. Apparently understanding that multiculturalism requires mutual recognition and respect of each other’s culture while both the majority and minority groups are required to ‘engage in new practices, enter new relationships and embrace new concepts and discourses’ (Kymlicka, 2010, p. 103), Anthimos asks its audience:

What can we take culturally from them anyway? We, who have given and still give to the world and to Europe with Hellenism and later with Helleno-Christianian culture of a thousand of years of Byzantium. What can they give us? How can we become multiculturalists? How we will coexist? (Metropolitan bishop of Thessaloniki Anthimos, 31/1/10)

The belief of the uninterrupted existence of Greekness that implies modern Greeks direct heirs of ancient Greek culture, renders that question rhetoric. Owing to the important role that ancient Greek culture played in Europe’s history and modernity, render Greeks also superior than the rest. The rest here of course are not the Europeans but the rest whose culture can’t compete with the “superior” Greek. This exactly is what defines Anthimos’s views as racist in its classical definition. And this is where Anthimos’s views dangerously coincide with GD’s views as they express them publicly. When GD’s parliamentarians were asked in a TV show about whether they think if a Greek is superior than to a Pakistani:

- *‘It's not a matter of superiority or inferiority. He is just different. A Pakistani is Pakistani, a Greek is Greek.’ (Panagiotaras, GD, 2012)⁶⁷*
- *‘We respect difference but we recognize that Hellenism produced a civilization that is unsurpassed...we must therefore maintain our cultural elements and of course*

⁶⁶ ‘Take back the ‘monster’ law’ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ISa7fHQWr6Q#t=38>

⁶⁷ GD interview, 2012 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7YND3nW93dY>

preserve our descent. GD considers that modern Hellenism is direct heir of ancient Hellenism' (Kasidiaris, GD, 2012)

As for the immigration problem that Greece faces today both propose the same solution and the same explanation for that solution:

'Those who lived in Greece for long...let them stay. But the rest...must go from here. We don't have space for more immigrants... We can feed them again and prepare them whether for their return back to their homes...or to go to other countries that accept immigrants. Greece can't take it any more...Legal immigrants don't exist in Greece. Legal immigrants were the Greeks, Turks, Bulgarians that went to Germany...Here we have only illegal immigrants. I found myself in Athens these days, in a square (Ag. Panteleimonas) 5 minutes away from Omonoia square. I lost it! I was in despair! It was not the color (of the people) but it was indicative that the scene became black (referring to immigrants skin colors) and that we've been flooded by people that are asking from us paideia. And I ask you isn't it asofia that we close our eyes to the fact that in Attica there are 650 thousands Muslims' (Metropolitan bishop of Thessaloniki Anthimos, 31/1/10)

In the same line when GD was asked if Greece should have immigrants:

No, they shouldn't be here. To begin with, for them to be here there should be an immigration policy. This country should have asked labor force, something that didn't happen. All of them invaded our country during the night through sea, land, jumping fences and now we are at the point where there are 2,5 millions of immigrants, plundering and destroying the whole social fabric (Panagiotaros, GD, 2012)

With regards to what to do with those immigrants that are already in the country:

'Immediate deportation.

With what means? Since we can't even tell where they come from.

The conditions in Greece are those that make immigrants not to want to leave and stay here. Because if someone in Afghanistan steals a loaf of bread, they cut his hand off. Here in Greece if someone goes to Acharnon and stabs a Greek person, the worst that they can do to them is to put him in jail for some months where we all will be feeding him for free' (Panagiotaros, Kasidiaris, GD,2012)

Coinciding even on the number of immigrants currently living in Greece – 2,5 mil.

- one can wonder who is coping whom in their speeches. Without naming each other, indirectly, they cite each other. After listening to Anthimos's sermon and later hearing the same views to be repeated by GD's members in the evening news it is most likely that the believers could consider GD as the political expressers of the Church. That is controversial because for those familiar with the neo-Nazi field of Greece, GD has never been an organization with an Orthodox background. As Sakelariou notes 'A number of their older texts prove that they were more amenable to the ancient Greek religion of Dodecatheon and in some cases Northern pagan worship' (Psarras, as cited in Chistopoulos et al, (2014, p. 90)). As a matter of fact, it resulted difficult to find media reports where the leading elite – Michaloliakos, Kasidiaris – would express their sympathy to the Orthodox religion, while they would also refrain from participating in the "Christian pogroms", like the one outside the theater that would present Corpus Christi. It is usually the "Christian" members of GD used to approach the Christian feelings of the voters and of course of the Church. The result is that by having covered the pagan past GD, 'like all the political forces that get stronger choose to flatter some priest of the Church of Greece. And, instead of repelling them, they enjoyed it too...' (Chistopoulos et al, 2014, p. 90).

The choice to present here predominantly Anthimos's sermons is not accidental. Anthimos is the most popular bishop of the Greek Church. His extremely bigoted views are constantly on the spotlight of public discourse. Owing to the fact that his views are

usually sparking off fierce debates, he is the preferential priest-to-call in media debates, to represent the “traditional” wing of the debate. Regardless of the topic, Anthimos’s views will be definitely recounted, recited and definitely further debated in the public discourse. For instance, it is almost expected in the respective news reports to hear about Anthimos’s reaction to Thessaloniki’s Gay Pride Parade. Despite the fact that Athens’ parade also met the opposition and condemnation of the Church, it is predominantly Anthimos’s clash over the issue with, the commonly referred to, as progressive, mayor of Thessaloniki Boutaris that dominates the news. For instance the wake against the Gay Pride Parade - a religious ritual usually performed during funerals - that Anthimos organized in June 2015 attracted more media attention than actual attendants⁶⁸⁶⁹. If for the TV channels his overexposure is a matter of “spicing up” the news reports in order to get more ratings, for the audience, that now consist not only of believers of his Sunday masses but also believers outside Thessaloniki and those who probably don’t visit churches that often, he is the voice of the Church. Similar treatment will enjoy other priests with controversial views. Unfortunately, they usually are leaders of big religious congregates with great influence. If Anthimos is supporting GD without naming them, the latter are more expressive:

- Bishop of Piraeus Seraphim along with four members of GD filled a joint complain in a police department against the Corpus Christi play. He only started questioning GD when realized their affiliation to Dodecatheon: *‘These people were very amiable, very much I would say. Of course I was unfamiliar with their “insides”, to be honest I didn’t know what they believe. As a matter of fact the Holy Synod had condemned that movement as a sect. Watching though in the meanwhile the Nazi salutes a la Hitler and their pagan ideological signs...I was compelled to ask them some questions. Instead I received a barrage of insults.’ (Seraphim, 2013⁷⁰)*. In other words, he realized that GD can question the central role of the Church in Greekness.
- Bishop of Kalavrita and Aigialias Ambrosios, one of those who had embraced Coronels Junta, today stating that the only reason he did not inaugurate GD’s offices in his region is in order *‘not to make the favor to SYRIZA’*, who would probably criticize him. As for GD his opinion is: *‘Golden Dawn right now is not a gang. It is a legitimate political party in the Greek parliament equal to SYRIZA...Didn’t it come out of legal elections and democratic processes? Of course it did. Therefore those who don’t recognize it as such are enemies of democracy. In our sick and decaying democracy you are (addresses to GD) definitely not a “Black night”. If you improve yourself and abstain from radical actions, if you modify your style, in other words if you mature, you can be a sweet hope for the desperate citizen and a peaceful power for our “rotten” political establishment.(Ambrosios, 2012⁷¹)*

It should be noted that sympathy for GD is not the attitude that all priest and bishops of the Church express. There is a number of bishops who openly criticize GD⁷² and a number of “anonymous” priests, particularly those located on border areas – the frontline of immigrants’ arrival to Greece – that do a remarkable work to help

⁶⁸ ‘See photos: the wake against Gay Pride in Thessaloniki’ <http://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/485938/deite-fotografies-agrupnia-kata-tou-gay-pride-sti-thessaloniki/>

⁶⁹ ‘We went once again, to the wake against Gay Pride in Thessaloniki’ (Gr) <http://www.vice.com/gr/read/agrypnia-kata-tou-gay-pride-sti-thessaloniki>

⁷⁰ ‘Archbishop Seraphim attacks GD’ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jrsB3zy6gm0>

⁷¹ ‘Archbishop of Kalavrita flirts with GD’ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yxEp8QVvL74>

⁷² ‘Messages of Hierarchs against GD’s actions’ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L3AWaM6uujM>

whole range of policies and decisions' (Hallin & Papathanasopoulos, 2002, p. 180). Given the fact that the ideological boundaries of the two major parties ruling the country after the restoration of democracy in Greece – PASOK and New Democracy – had started to become blurred from the 80s (Yannas, 2002), we can conclude that the information from the public broadcasters was to a great extent mono-dimensional.

The situation changed in the late 80s with the deregulation and commercialization of the Greek broadcasting system. The journalists of the private channels were not merely reporting government's official statements but were also acting as professional mediators, interpreting and drawing their own conclusions as representatives of the ordinary people and public opinion (Papathanassopoulos, 2001). In addition, the news bulletin became more sensationalists and more exclusive. From a first glance it seemed that Greek TV had become more pluralistic but 'journalism does not grow in a vacuum either: it is the fruit of the interaction between actors and systems and such differences in social structure have to be taken into account.' (Mancini, as cited in (Papathanassopoulos, 2001, p. 108)). Owing to the fact the social structure of Greece is defined by Greekness and the relations between official public actors by clientelism – one of the aspects of Greekness - it is logical to predict that the journalism in Greece is predominantly an advocacy journalism. In contrast to the Anglo-American model of professional neutrality, journalism in southern European countries tends to emphasize commentary and opinions and newspapers or TV channels to represent distinct political perspectives (Hallin & Papathanasopoulos, 2002). Newspapers and TV channels therefore can become tools with which their private owners exercise influence on the political scene. In Greece particularly there is a strong tendency for media to be controlled by private interest with political alliances, which seek to use their media properties with political ends (Hallin & Papathanasopoulos, 2002). Most of the private media is owned by industrialists with interests in shipping, travel, construction, telecommunication and oil industry while, as Hallin and Papathanassopoulos note, one of the traditional political threats is 'give me a ministry or I'll start a newspaper' (2002, p. 178).

In this clientelistic structure, commonly known in Greece as "diaploki" (entanglement), the role of the mainstream journalists is to serve the interests of the media owners or politicians that the owner is linked with. In a survey where journalists were asked if they exercise their profession freely or if they are subjected to interventions, 7,9% of Greek journalists answered that they exercise it freely, 65,7% were subjected to interventions and 24,3% censored themselves. Finally, 75% admitted that the line taken by the owner of media enterprise determined the image and politics of the mass media (Hallin & Papathanasopoulos, 2002). It becomes evident then that mainstream journalists are a tool in the hands of Greek 'oligarchs' to exercise their influence on the political scene, indirectly through the media that they own or directly through the parliament. Similar to Italian journalists who are 'very close to be active politicians themselves' (Mancini as cited in (Hallin & Papathanasopoulos, 2002, p. 182)), from the 90s there is an increase of Greek journalists participating in the parliament, who are also ranked high in the preferences of the voters. One such remarkable example is the case of the leader of the political party Potami ('river' in Greek), S. Theodorakis that emerged amidst the economic crisis. Theodorakis was a renowned journalist of the private TV channel MEGA, owned by three Greek

“oligarchs” – prominent figures of “diaploki”⁷⁴⁷⁵⁷⁶ (Pic. 5.3-1). Given the fact that diaploki is a phenomenon that Greeks are well familiar with, the current narrative that circulates around Theodorakis in the alternative and social media⁷⁷⁷⁸⁷⁹ is that he was prompted by the media owners to form a party in order to replace the old political parties that had lost the support of the voters. That way Potami would further secure the clientelistic relations of oligarchs and politicians while with his “fresh face” in the politics, in contrast to the “old” politicians that people were “tired of”, he was expected to intercept the rise in popularity of the main leftist opposition party SYRIZA.

The role of the Horseshoe Theory on the macro-level of political discourse

To cut the rise of SYRIZA also seems to be the main reason that the media “flirted” with GD. Even before the foundation of the centrist Potami politicians from the mainstream parties introduced in the public discourse the ‘Theory of the two extremes’. Drawing on the original ‘Horseshoe theory’⁸⁰ that discusses the similarities of the two extremes of the political spectrum – far-right and far left - politicians and journalist were endlessly discussing and warning in TV debates about the dangers of political affiliation with the “extremes”. As the far-right side of the spectrum was unanimously and clearly defined GD while by referring to the far left side they were implying, although most of the times without naming directly, the party of SYRIZA. One of the most indicative cases was an interview that the PM Samaras gave to another renowned journalist of MEGA channel – G. Pretenderis, also accused of being part of ‘diaploki’:

P: I will tell you my impression, which is not only mine...but also of a big part of the society. That we have two groups of people in the far-right and far left, who don't listen to anyone, don't appreciate anything, it seems that they simply hate instead of aiming at something and who with huge passion and fanaticism fight to destroy the social and democratic system...How we should confront them?

S: For me I don't care who does that. But whoever does that is exclusively responsible...and I expect all the political parties to denounce it.

P: Recently there was such denouncement and isolation with regards **the killings in N. Iraklio**⁸¹

S: It was not always like that though. I'll tell you why. An act of violence is different than an extreme behavior, (but) the latter obviously leads to acts of violence. It is

⁷⁴ Misrule of the few: How oligarchs ruined Greece' <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/greece/misrule-few>

⁷⁵ 'Greece: Syriza, Austerity and the Media' <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NseQ5eyFeM0>

⁷⁶ 'G. Mpompolas: the man who probably controls even your mother' (Gr, satiric press) <http://luben.tv/politix/55101>

⁷⁷ 'In the line of Mpompolas the “Potami” of Theodorakis' <http://info-war.gr/2014/10/%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B7-%CE%B3%CF%81%CE%B1%CE%BC%CE%BC%CE%AE-%CE%BC%CF%80%CF%8C%CE%BC%CF%80%CE%BF%CE%BB%CE%B1-%CF%84%CE%BF-%CF%80%CE%BF%CF%84%CE%AC%CE%BC%CE%B9-%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%85-%CE%B8%CE%B5/>

⁷⁸ 'The devil hides in the details and Mpompolas in the Potami (river)' (Gr)

<http://www.koutipandoras.gr/article/134142/o-diavolos-kryvetai-stis-leptomereies-kai-o-mpompolas-sto-potami>

⁷⁹ 'Stavros Theodorakis: the puppet of the publishers'

<https://unfollow.com.gr/print/from-issue/12755-marioneta>

⁸⁰ http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Horseshoe_theory

⁸¹ Refers to the murders of two GD members in 2013. An anarchist guerrilla organization claimed responsibility for the attack, as a retaliation for the murder of Paulos Fyssas – a Greek anti-fascist musician.

*an extreme behavior when **the police strips off an anarchist bolt-hole⁸² and some parties protest it...Likewise (refers to similar event contributed to the far-left)...From the other side though it is also an extreme behavior to have a party whose parliamentarians state that they feel disgusted to be present in the temple of democracy⁸³...Neither can we have statements from Thessaloniki at 28th of October⁸⁴ to...overthrow the government. Neither...(refers to similar event contributed to the far-left).***

P: Aren't you afraid that someone can tell that you put everyone in the same basket? You had made a statement at Peterson Institute of NY saying that from one side there is GD and from the other a radical opposition that wants us to leave NATO, Eurozone, Europe. Is it the same?

S: *Of course not! Us leaving Europe is not an act of violence*

P: ...if you pursue it with the votes...

S: *Exactly! The matter is that there is no bad or good violence...If you ask me directly about the leaders of SYRIZA...as a PM I wish SYRIZA condemns every extreme behavior. The 'yes, but...' is the thing that makes many to consider them an extreme.*

P: What exactly you contribute to SYRIZA? That it incites, it covers, it encourages violence?... What exactly SYRIZA does that makes us to be suspicious against them?...You had said that criminal violence was not implemented only in Perama⁸⁵, but also in (the case of) Marfin⁸⁶, Skouries⁸⁷ etc.I feel that we have violence from both sides. Where does SYRIZA stands?

S: *Look, to tolerate or to justify extreme behavior, as I said before, leads directly to violence. It is impossible not to denounce events like Marfin or Skouries...to have **parliamentarians who go as witnesses in trials that they should not go.** (I feel) that all those issues are showing that that 'Yes, I denounce, but...'is what make some people, unfortunately they are many, to consider SYRIZA as the extreme.*

P: So you are suspicious of them?

S: Yes.'

(PM Samaras and G. Pretenderis, TV show "Anatropi", 2013⁸⁸)

It is not the aim of this chapter neither to dig further in this particular theory nor to discuss the historic context of this rhetoric in Greece but the manner of its application and the consequences of the use of Horseshoe theory was aiming to lead. To begin with, both Samaras and Pretenderis were assisting each other in order to

⁸² Refers to the closure of a historic anarchist squat Villa Amalias (around 30 years of existence) in the neighborhood of Patisia. The party of SYRIZA condemned the closure with arguments concerning the benefits of the squat for a neighborhood that was taken over by GD (see more 6.1).

⁸³ Refers to the statement of the leader of GD, Mixaloliakos with regards to the corrupt political establishment that the parliamentarians were representing.

⁸⁴ Refers to the traditional parade that takes place annually for the anniversary of Greece's entrance to the WW2 on the side of the Allies Powers. Due to the public discontent that usually was expressed in these events from 2012 the government forbid the presence of bystanders in these parades including the parents of the school students participating in them. This decision further fueled the discontent of the latter which and was officially supported by SYRIZA

⁸⁵ Refers to physical attacks of GD on members of the Communist Party in the working class neighborhood of Perama - a traditional area from which GD attracts its members.

⁸⁶ Refers to the deaths of three employees of Marfin Bank during a protest in Athens against the austerity measures in 2011. The deaths were caused by asphyxiation from a Molotov cocktail thrown in the building. The incident was contributed to anarchists' groups.

⁸⁷ Refers to the protest against the gold mining in the mountain village Skouries of Chalkidiki region of Macedonia. Ecologists, leftist organizations and SYRIZA are protesting the toxic contamination of soil and waters caused by the mining technique of the company

⁸⁸ 'Samaras about the two extremes' <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hSXHgo4iNnE>

prove that SYRIZA is equally dangerous to GD for the political stability of the country, as it was implied that both had tendencies to violence and totalitarianism. Probably owing to high responsibility that a PM's statements bear and the fact that SYRIZA was already on the verge of leading the public polls, namely it was already supported by a big portion of the electorate, it could be rather a political fallacy to define directly as "the left side of the extremes" a major opposition party. Instead he was sending that message to the viewers indirectly, by stating that SYRIZA's actions are not acts of violence, yet, but extreme behavior that inevitably leads to acts of violence. Of course, the blurry boundaries of violence and extreme behavior were defined arbitrary by the PM himself. Pretenderis on the other side with his interventions in PM's the line of reasoning (e.g. '*...if you pursue it with the votes...*') shows that he is in the same line with Samaras and basically leads the interview in order to result in a common conclusion with Samaras – a typical feature of advocacy journalism. Moreover, he is less hesitated to juxtapose SYRIZA with GD. Supposedly asking on behalf of the wider society '*which had already realized that both far-right and left represent hatred and fanaticism against democracy*' he ends up asking directly if SYRIZA is the party that the PM and of course the society should be suspicious of. The fact that SYRIZA is presented here to have already been intermingled in 'extreme behavior' that will 'inevitably lead to violence' leaves no space for doubts that SYRIZA is an extreme, similar to GD.

The most problematic though is that the viewer of this interview perceives the message that SYRIZA is more dangerous than GD for the political stability. The two men during the interview brought as examples eight incidents contributed to SYRIZA (bolded) and only two contributed to GD (underlined). In parallel, the line between violence and extreme behavior was erased, since all incidents were considered of equal importance. In other words, both men were equalizing the physical attacks of GD – omitting to mention the actual severe attacks of GD on immigrants and members of the Communist party, with clashes of different leftist groups with police over the preservation of ecology in Chalikidiki – to a great extent as response to police brutality - the participation of a SYRIZA member in a court as witness etc. The fact that SYRIZA is engaging in more 'extreme behavior that inevitably leads to violence' constitute them more dangerous than GD.

Given though the fact that SYRIZA was not losing public support, or as a viewer of the interview could interpret it, the extreme left is firmly establishing its presence in the political scene of the country, it could be easily concluded that the same right has the far-right. To a great extent that logic legitimized GD in the public eye. In other words, the attempted demonization of the left failed, but as a side effect allowed GD to secure its place in the parliament.

The role of the Horseshoe Theory on the micro-level of political action: the reproduction of far-right stances

Horseshoe theory was not only discussed while forming the mainstream political discourse but also subtly practiced with attempts to equalize the importance and political impact of the two extremes. If media attention for SYRIZA was justified with its position as the main opposition party in 2012 elections, for GD it had to be artificially inflated. TV coverage of GD had started to increase both in the public broadcasters, in

'the hands' of Samara's government at the time, as well as the private TV channels controlled by Greek oligarchs. Meanwhile, as it will be discussed below, prominent figures of the extra-parliamentary far-right had reached high-ranking positions within the ND party. Secondly, GD is the only political party that could further secure "oligarch's" interests, in light of a potential electoral loss of their neoliberal (at least in terms of economic policies) ally, ND. After all, both GD and the financial elite of the country find a common ground in their negative views towards the leftists and their labor unions (see below). Therefore a combination of increased ideological proximity of ND with GD, and the fact that the interests of oligarchs - that sustain materially the whole triad of diaploki - have more chances to safeguarded if supporting the ND/GD ideological streams, in a way explains why TV channels were filled with reports aiming to humanize GD and present it as a political possibility for the future, 'in a coalition of conservative parties, under the condition it gets serious'⁸⁹.

Alexandra Xristakaki, a former journalist of the public TV channel ERT⁹⁰ that was closed down in 2013 by the government of Samaras gives us more insides about the different ways that they used. In the frames of an anti-racist festival in Athens she recounted her experiences of working in ERT under the government of Samaras. She also shares her impressions about the general political climate that media of those days should promote which according to her was considering GD as "embankment" to the rise of SYRIZA.

The first step, according to Xristakaki, was the direct promotion of the GD and its activities. Her personal experience is indicative:

'It was august of 2012. I was working in the morning news show. The presenters were on vacations and were replaced with two others. The one was extremely PASOKos (affiliated with PASOK) and the other as far-right as it can get. The head of the program was also PASOK...That summer GD organized the first give away of food only for Greeks in Syntagma square. Since I was a reporter they told me to go, not to observe, but to record live GD's distribution of potatoes. I refused, but they told me that a refusal means firing. We arrive at Syntagma and I try to come up with a mean not to promote them. The agreement that we reached the last moment was for me simply to hold the microphone while GD was discussing with the two presenters. It lasted about an hour with them discussing this social intervention and policy of GD. When I returned back to ERT, of course, I passed by the (office of) director who clarified that this (her protest) will never happen again since all of them have their personal concerns and red lines from GD but they are bonded by the NCRTV (National Council for Radio and Television) to feature them as well...In the same month Kasidiaris was featured twice, 30 minutes each, in the same TV program.' (A. Xristakaki, former journalist of ERT TV, June 2015)

Drawing on the rules of political pluralism, the TV channels are obliged by NCRTV to cover the political stances, the pre-elections rallies and other political events, the press releases etc. of all elected political parties. Xristakaki though seems to question if the exposure of events such as food distribution only for Greeks and the inadequate airtime dedicated to them are media attempts to meet the requirements of NCRTV or

⁸⁹ Journalist B. Papadimitriou, Skai channel, 2013 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SBPDiYbxnsg>

⁹⁰ The public broadcaster ERT (Hellenic Broadcasting Cooperation) was closed down in June 2013 by the government of Samaras, ND, under fierce criticism by the opposition party of SYRIZA and the local and European respective unions (<http://www3.ebu.ch/fr/contents/news/2013/06/ebu-president-philippot-ert-shut.html>). It was replaced by a new broadcaster - NERIT. After the elections of 2015, the new government of SYRIZA re-opened ERT.

are decisions of the media management with the political end to bring GD in the spotlight. Indeed, in the contentious report⁹¹ that Xristakaki mentions we can see the presenters engaging in a dialogue that was reflecting only the philanthropic character of the event, despite Kasidiaris' constant references about 'products only from Greek producers' that could be obtained only 'by showing the Greek ID card'. Most strikingly thought, the presenters were assisting them by inviting the viewers who probably were not informed about the event - 'Until what hour will this event take place, so that we inform people that just turned on the TV?' or 'Where can people be informed for similar events?'. For the last question Kasidiaris pointed to GD's official website where, apart from the details of the charity events, the visitors will inevitably be informed about the party and its standpoints. Lastly the conversation ended with Kasidiaris complaining about the supposed limited publicity that the event received, on which the presenters answered 'I hope you don't refer to us. As public TV we try, and particularly for events of such kind we are very sensitive'.

Similar media reports, which were deliberately omitting the racist components of GD's activism, were paving the way for GD's acceptance in the wider public. Their frequency in the evening news was particularly high in the years 2011-2013. In viewers' eyes they were an answer to the also extremely frequent news reports about the criminality in the center of Athens. The culminating point was probably the murder of a Greek man in the neighborhood of Patisia by two Afghan immigrants⁹². The resonance of the incident on the population overshadowed the following GD's pogroms on immigrants⁹³:

'...they featured the views of GD, their "activism" without politically coloring them, for instance when they were reporting issues of the criminality in the center of Athens'. If you check the news today (in 2015) there is no police bulletin, as if today we don't have robberies, murders. 3-4 years ago the police bulletin was in the frontline. (it felt like) The evening news were starting and ending with reports about the criminality. Back then, with command from the above, there was particular time given to the news programs to feature the criminality...and we were directed to feature the citizens who were afraid, desperate. This was happening gradually until we ended up with the story about Ag. Panteleimonas square...Particularly for that case, we were not naming GD as fascists, but we were saying that there are some criminal elements there that cause disturbances. Of course we (also) had to cover the stories about the old ladies that were assisted by the lads of GD to withdraw money from the ATMs because they were afraid to do it on their own.' (A. Xristakaki, former journalist of ERT TV, June 2015)

With regards to why the media chose to promote the "activism" of GD Xristakaki states:

'From August of 2012 there was an estimate that SYRIZA was growing. It was exactly then when they decided that a promotion of GD in a more populist manner could cut the growth of the leftists. In the past we did the same with Karatzaferis (the leader of LAOS), with the logic that he "sells" (on camera), that he is communicative, that he popularizes, that he doesn't use a 'wooden language' like the other politicians and therefore we can debate with him much

⁹¹ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s_Pa86ijgpM

⁹² 'Murder fuels fears of rising city crimes'

<http://www.ekathimerini.com/133462/article/ekathimerini/news/murder-fuels-fears-of-rising-city-crime>

⁹³ 'Racist amok of the far-right in the center of Athens' <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PkcTh1NTwCM>

easier. These are the two examples (GD and LAOS) from my personal experience, about how with command from above, namely with directions from the central management, we were promoting GD. And no one had the power to act (in order) to raise his personal “NO” because that would bear a certain price’. (A. Xristakaki, former journalist of ERT TV, June 2015)

The second way as Xristakaki notes is the indirect appropriation and promotion of GD’s standpoints with regards to the major political issues that the country was facing. Owing to the fact that GD was regarded more as a new political phenomenon, rather than a political party, whose views are echoing back to a significant part of the population, namely their views were popular as they were answering the need of a frustrated population under crisis, the media reproduced them most of the time without necessarily naming GD:

For instance GD views about the economy, where they are supporters of the absolute state control of the economy, the national unity between the employees and employers, the prominence to the color of the employees etc. ...with regards to the institutions, about the importance of the role of the army, the national motto “Motherland, Religion, Family”, the restricted role of the woman in the society...with regards to politics, that democracy is associated with corruption, crisis, decay...that the politicians are thieves. And lastly their system of values and their behavior that is defined by the logic of discrimination, the relations of blood and ancestry, the absolute ethnocentrism, that romantic believe over our glorious past that comes from the ancient times and was destroyed by the politicians, the anti-Islamism, the anti-Semitism etc. By the way, talking about our glorious pass, NERIT was broadcasting on air over an hour GD’s gathering outside Athens cathedral for the event of the Fall of Constantinople. Most of those views were subtly passing through the news to the viewer. (A. Xristakaki, former journalist of ERT TV, June 2015)

As noted before, with the example of Anthimos’ views that were in line with the relevant GD’s, such views are not alien to the notion of Greekness. Most of them are cultivated in country’s institutions such as education system, Church, army etc. as derivatives of Greekness’s properties, therefore are constantly present in the wider society. They gain a further weight though, when also expressed by the main political figures of the country, particularly from members of the ruling party – New Democracy.


The role of the Horseshoe Theory on the micro-level of political action: the modes of migration of the far-right from the political margins to mainstream

Apart from the generally conservative character of the party, some of the prominent parliamentarians of New Democracy had, until recently, direct links to the Greek far-right movements. More precisely three parliamentarians of ND – M. Vouridis, Th. Plevris and A. Georgiadis joined the party after leaving the far-right party LAOS before the elections of 2012 when it became evident that LAOS would fail to enter the parliament. The history of political affiliations and activism of the first two demonstrates their deep interminglement with the extreme far-right.

Vouridis, the former Minister of Health of Samaras government was politically broad, alongside GD’s leader Mixaloliakos, in the EPEN’s youth group (National Political Union) – a far-right party founded by the jailed junta leader G. Papadopoulos (Ellinas 2013). A photo of young Vouridis of that period holding an axe, ready to attack on leftist

groups that surfaced in 2000 forced the leader of LAOS to exclude him from the party because, as he stated in an interview, ‘Voridis has a history that I had managed skillfully to cover...the history with Le Pen, the axes etc. ...so I said, imagine if some ‘good guy’ from New Democracy, or SYRIZA would throw a (similar) video in my face. How will I explain it?’⁹⁴. New Democracy though resulted to have fewer hesitations with regards to Voridis’ past, since he was promptly enlisted in their party even though he did not deny the accusations, but simply explained the photo as an attempt to defend himself from the leftists. The fact that, that period for Voridis was not a simple ‘misstep of the youth’ indicates the establishment by Voridis in 1994 of the Hellenic Front with similar or even more radical far-right rhetoric. But its establishment coincided chronologically with the Macedonian issue what left no political space for Hellenic Front as ‘an ND splinter political party Political Spring led by...Samaras, sought to outbid the mainstream right...by adopting a tough stance towards Greece’s northern neighbor’ (Ellinas, 2013, p. 546). Having lost the opportunity to come into the spotlight in the 90s, Hellenic Front reemerged in the elections of 2000 creating an alliance with another far-right party - Front Line (Ellinas, 2013). The latter was led by, probably the most radical and controversial, theorist of white supremacy, far-right and Holocaust denier C. Plevris – the father of Th. Plevris.

The son, Th. Plevris, throughout his political career, similarly to Marine Le Pen of the French National Party, has distanced himself from the extremely radical views of his father, at least publically. But as one can witness from the questions that he posed in the European parliament he did not diverge significantly from the Greek far-right ideology. Most of those questions were concerning immigration, the rights of Christian minorities in neighboring “enemy” countries, up to the religious rights of the Kalash people of Pakistan whom he considers descendants of Alexander the Great⁹⁵ etc. A more recent example is the example that Xristakaki mentioned about GD’s gathering for the occasion of the fall of Constantinople, where Th. Plevris also expressed his support in the social media (Pic. 5.3-2).



Pic. 5.3-2 T. Plevris over the anniversary of the Fall of Constantinople ‘No matter how many centuries will pass, in our soul, our capital will be Constantinople’ Source: Twitter

Voridis and Plevris are just two examples of how the extreme right, by “migrating” from one political formation to another, is climbing the political ladder without changing significantly their ideological stances. Those stances, in their turn, infiltrate the public discourse, since now they are expressed by respected mainstream politicians, and solidify their positions in the society. The already racist notion of Greekness functions as a mean with which those stances are justified. Within those ideological frames, it is no surprise that largely unnoticed passed the fact that the former PM Samaras adopted GD’s rhetoric with regards to the immigration issue in the pre-election rally of 2012 on a TV show:

‘At Peristeri⁹⁶ a policeman came to me and told me ‘You know something Antonis (Samaras’ first name) this is the official proof of my salary. There is a man (living)

⁹⁴ ‘The story of a picture’ (Gr) <http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=226000>

⁹⁵ Parliamentary questions, 2009 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2009-4240+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en>

⁹⁶ A working class neighborhood of Athens, where GD holds strong electoral position

next to me who is illegal, was legalized in an express procedure of the Ragousis law (referring to the law in a diminishing tone), and does little shores here and there, all black (undeclared salary). Therefore his tax declaration shows that he earns less than the police officer. The kindergarten, where you go according to your declaration, is full of immigrants and a Greek can't enter. This confection that this is racism has to stop. In reality racism is to watch a pregnant woman with her child and send her away...It is worse racism when you have a whole nation waiting in the B League⁹⁷ and to put into the Superleague those who haven't left the best impressions in Greece anyway.' (A. Samaras, 2012⁹⁸)

In the same election rally GD was applauded by promising similar treatment to children of immigrants:

'After we throw out of the hospitals couple of them (immigrants) we will go outside the kindergartens. And we will demand (the rights of) the young Greek couples that struggle to survive and have 1, 2 kids and can't enter. We will go with them and will put the kids in the kindergartens.' (Panagiotaros, GD, 2012⁹⁹)

Samaras' adapting GD's viewpoints in this particular issue was partly a populist canvass act, in response to the growing public discontent with immigrants. In reality, little had changed the socioeconomic condition for both, locals and immigrants, after his re-election. But the ideological proximity of the two parties was yet to be proven in number of occasions. One of the most striking examples is the new naturalization law of SYRIZA government that replaced the Ragousis law and was successfully passed in the parliament in May 2015. Under the motto "One can only be born Greek and not become Greek" the whole right sector of the parliament, including ND, voted against the law, with GD demonstratively tearing the text of the bill during the parliament session¹⁰⁰. Coinciding ideologically with GD on the main principles of Greekness, the distinctions of the two parties lied in the images constructed for them by image makers and the media environment. But from interview extracts discussed here we can infer that back in 2012 ND was learning from GD new ways to exercise its public relations, in an attempt to align the images of the two parties. Probably because GD was the only party of the right political spectrum that enjoyed electoral rise.

GD emerged as a new political phenomenon in the political landscape, and its remarkably sudden rise from almost 0 to 7% (Table 1-1) in votes probably did not pass unnoticed from the image-makers of Samaras. Apparently, the public relations team of Samaras underwent an in-depth analysis of that success, what was reflected in his campaign. In this elections rally the viewers were seeing Samaras to be, more than ever, closer to the working class population, speaking their language (e.g. the use of football terms), sharing their worries and promising on TV to put an end to their suffering. This time though, this traditional pre-elections image was further enriched with cues that would also attract indecisive voters of the right in general or/and of GD in particular. For instance, with recounting that incident that supposedly happened with him in Peristeri - a traditionally working class neighborhood of Athens and a significant electoral stronghold of GD - he reconstructed the images that the viewers have about the "activism" of GD in disadvantaged neighborhoods. The choice of a

⁹⁷ Terms for the categories of professional football

⁹⁸ 'Saramara for the kids of immigrants' <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JnFOircZKDM>

⁹⁹ 'GD against the kids of immigrants' <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wB1P7a-i9sk>.

¹⁰⁰ 'Pappas of GD tears the bill about citizenship' <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XDY0EMKtb9g>

policeman with whom he had a friendly and informal chat (e.g. he was referring to Samaras with his first name) was also not accidental, since police and armed forces are the major supporters of GD. Finally, the decisiveness that he demonstrates alongside with loud phrases like ‘racism against the local population’ is also copied from GD.

The only logical conclusion that the viewer could result to after listening a generally respected politician, from one of the major and historical parties of Greece, is that the blaming of immigrants, for the problems that the country faces, is part of defining a solution. That solution can involve deportations, repressions of immigrants up to restricting immigrant kids from education, if that would benefit the titular population. But given the rise of popular discontent to the “old, corrupt politicians”, the same end would have more chances to be achieved by the new, fresh and until then “honest lads” of GD. It is still debatable if that line of reasoning contributed directly to the rise of GD. Most likely, Samara’s “flirting” with the standpoints of GD helped them come out of the obscurity, legitimizing their right to exist in the public discourse, since now they are not expressed only by marginal far-right bigots but also by the PM of the country.

Another way that the familiarization of the public with far-right ideology occurred is thought the so-called “small channels”¹⁰¹ of Greece. Before GD, it was A. Georgiadis - the third former parliamentarian of LAOS that joined ND - who found himself at the epicenter of their attention. Georgiadis had his own show (named “The rise of the Greeks”) in the TV channel Tile Asty, owned by the leader of LAOS, where he and his brother discuss the news agenda and sell books - of predominantly ancient Greek content - in a particularly humoristic manner. Parts of the show have been reproduced in numerous satire shows¹⁰² introducing the “phenomenon of Georgiadis” to the wider public. The fact that he is married to another TV persona also introduced him to the tabloid media. Today Georgiadis has almost the same role with Anthimos in the news shows (5.2). If Anthimos is being invited to express his opinion on particular topics, Georgiadis as a parliamentarian is a constant invitee of news panels, round tables etc. There, his flamboyant personality is expected to create controversies, give a lighter, populist tone to the conversation, engage in conflicts on air and in general to raise the rating of the TV show that hosts him. This overexposure of Georgiadis, though, has firmly secured his central role in the political life of the country, what even lead to his assignation as Minister of Health under the government of Samaras (preceding Voridis). After all, ‘candidates with strong background in TV exposure do have a lead over others’ since that adds the advantage of the ‘familiarity that their name evokes in the TV – viewing public’ (Yannas, 2002, p. 74).

With the emergence of GD though the attention of the tabloid media was directed on them. This time they attempt to portray the members of GD in a more humane, lifestyle manner. Again, Xristakaki’s observations are insightful:

‘There (the small media) they featured GD for limitless time...At Proto Thema¹⁰³ there is a photo of Panagiotaros’ wedding in a lifestyle version. If you read the article they portray him as a normal being who can fall in love, cares, goes to church, has a beautiful wife etc. ... (Similarly) In another one, the “Real”, in the

¹⁰¹ As opposed to the “big channels”, a vernacular term for private channels owned by big media groups. The small channels are also private channels, but are characterized by a more tabloid character.

¹⁰² ‘Beast of Adonis Georgiadis’ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SEvLGyNPhFY>

¹⁰³ The biggest newspaper in sales in Greece

lifestyle sections you would see (titles) 'Ilias (Kasidiaris), Voula¹⁰⁴ and the secretary of the minister' or 'The miss Tourism who stole the heart of Kasidiaris' (see Pic.). Regarding the fact that Real has so big readability and it doesn't host news about those politicians in its political section, but in the lifestyle one, it makes it evident that they try to humanize them.' (A. Xristakaki, former journalist of ERT TV, June 2015)

Indeed, after the entrance of GD in the parliament the tabloid media sought to find out who they are. Numerous lifestyle shows were dedicating significant airtime to GD members' private life, while a number of popular artist were openly expressing their sympathy for the *'drawlers who came to change the corrupt political establishment'*¹⁰⁵ sparking even greater media attention. As the superstar of GD was designated I. Kasidiaris – the protagonist of the televised infamous attack on a female MP of the Greek communist party¹⁰⁶. Indicative is an interview to the STAR channel, conducted during the GD's 'blood donation and food distribution only for Greeks' event, where the journalist was discussing with Kasidiaris about the fact that he still lives with his parents - a common phenomenon between young Greeks, particularly on the rise due to the crisis – his liaisons (Pic.



Pic. 5.3-3 Tabloid media attention on I. Kasidiaris from GD

5.3-3), the 'heroic' move of GD to reduce their parliamentary wages down to the levels of military officials, the charities of GD etc. Commenting on her report the journalist concluded that *'he is a very warm, relaxed, polite young person...a child of our generation with his own concerns and his own beliefs'*¹⁰⁷.

Those views, when circulating in such a powerful mean of information like the mainstream media, their validity further cements in the viewers' consciousness, particularly when remain unquestioned. For those views to remain unquestioned the TV shows usually seek to restrict the counterarguments against them. One of the ways to do so is though vigorously vetting panel of guests. Again, Xristakaki, through her personal experience in ERT, gives us more insides:

Mr. Kikilias¹⁰⁸, who was a municipality consultant back then (from the party of ND), comes to the morning program to discuss about Ag. Panteleiomonas square. I had prepared a video report about that square starting it with the question 'Why the playground of the square is closed?'. When Kikilias saw that we had invited mr. Elliniadis¹⁰⁹, he declared to us that he won't entre the studio unless Elliniadis leaves. When I ask him why, since he is a resident of the neighborhood who has a different opinion to juxtapose, he answered to me 'You're not going to indicate me how I will manage our policy (of the ND party). He leaves immediately or I'm not staying on the show'. Needless to say that

¹⁰⁴ Voula Papachristou is an athlete who was disqualified for the Olympic Games 2012, after a racist comment posted on social media.

¹⁰⁵ 'Notis Sfakianakis (singer): You must support GD' <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P10lwka4G7k>

¹⁰⁶ 'Greek Golden Dawn MP Attacks Another MP live: Kasidiaris slaps Kanelli' https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nte1UtRww_k

¹⁰⁷ 'Kasidiaris at a TV show' <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o6ovG4AZ1HI>

¹⁰⁸ A former Minister of Public Order and Citizen Protection with the government of Samaras, New Democracy (June 2014-January 2015), <http://www.kikilias.gr/>

¹⁰⁹ Candidate from Syriza for Athens's central district <https://elliniadis.wordpress.com/>

Elliniadis left, Kikilias entered the studio, read his poem uninterrupted and our video report was never aired. (A. Xristakaki, former journalist of ERT TV, June 2015)

Similar behavior she describes from Mixaloliakos, the leader of GD, after his arrest in 2013, in front of the interrogators, where the editors of the newly established independent newspaper EFSYN¹¹⁰ was also present. In this case, Mixaloliakos also revealed the friendly relationships that he has with some of the most prominent journalists:

'Mixaliliakos strongly objected 'I don't want those gentlemen to be present, because they never asked me for an interview, my opinion but simply slander me. In contrast to mr. Trangas, Kouris, Paulopoulos, Theodorakis (party Potami), who have interviewed me multiple times and it would be nice if you brought them as witnesses.'... he also said the following: 'my brother was informed about the initiation of the legal prosecutions against us from the journalist of the Bima newspaper, V. Lampropoulos. He said 'Be careful mr. Takis (the first name of Mixaloliakos' brother), the antiterrorist squat is preparing your spectacular arrest'. My brother's mobile phone is in your disposal, where you can check the calls from that journalists.' (A. Xristakaki, former journalist of ERT TV, June 2015)

Apart from indicating the journalists that he prefers to be present, Mixaloliakos also revealed that he is participating in the media part of "diaploki", since he was warned about the arrests from a prominent journalist of an important newspaper of the country. The political part of diaploki with regards to GD was revealed after the arrests when Kasidiaris publicized a video, secretly recorded by him, where Samaras' political advisor T. Baltakos, in an informal and rather friendly conversation, confessed that GD's legal prosecutions were politically motivated to cut the rise of SYRIZA¹¹¹. It should be noted that the prosecutions started only after the assassination of the Greek anti-racist musician P. Fyssas. Killing a Greek person was the turning point against the GD, which lost the media support and the general acceptance of the un-politicized part of Greek society. The widespread condemnation of GD after that incident was incomparable with that of migrants' assassinations and this time ND was facing a political cost in favor of SYRIZA. Unfortunately, this was not reflected in GD's electoral percentages, since they maintained the 6,9% of the votes in the elections of 2015. Finally, the role of the third part of diaploki, that of the economic elite of Greece, was revealed in 2015 when members of GD stated in the social media that they will cooperate with ship owners in the decaying shipbuilding city of Perama where they both agreed to 'bring back the ships'. In that co-operation the role of GD would be to make the 'footmen of PAME and KKE¹¹² to disappear from the port'¹¹³. The fact that G. Alafouzou – one of Greek ship owners and the owner of Skai TV channel - also admitted

¹¹⁰ <http://www.efsyn.gr/h-istoria-tis-efsyn> An independent newspaper that was established in 2012 by former employees of the newspaper Eleftherotypia that was bankrupt in 2011. As they state on their Internet site, it is a cooperative attempt that 'would enter the market without the support of the government, political party, powerful owner-publisher or being part of a business group or media group'.

¹¹¹ 'Greek prime minister facing resignation calls after aide's GD gaffe'
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/03/greece-antonis-samaras-golden-dawn-takis-baltakos>

¹¹² PAME - a labor union founded by the Communist Party of Greece

¹¹³ 'Who are the 3 shipowners that met with Lagos (GD) before he returns to jail' (Gr)
<http://jailgoldendawn.com/2015/07/21/%CF%80%CE%BF%CE%B9%CE%BF%CE%AF-%CE%B5%CE%AF%CE%BD%CE%B1%CE%B9-%CE%BF%CE%B9-3-%CE%B5%CF%86%CE%BF%CF%80%CE%BB%CE%B9%CF%83%CF%84%CE%AD%CF%82-%CF%80%CE%BF%CF%85-%CF%83%CF%85%CE%BD%CE%B1%CE%BD%CF%84%CE%AE/>

that labor unions and the communist party of Greece constitute a problem for the shipping industry in Perama¹¹⁴ further fuels the rumors that the physical attacks on members of the communist party in 2013¹¹⁵ and on Egyptian fishermen in 2012¹¹⁶ in Perama by GD occurred under the “protective umbrella” of the interests of the economic elite functioning in the area.

It is not the aim of this paper, nor within my competence to investigate further the links and relations between different actors of diaploki - the Greek oligarchy, the media and the political establishment of the country. They rather constitute speculations, whose validity cements in the society by the fact that numerous economic and political scandals involving actors of diaploki come into spotlight, but remain unsolved and the culpable unpunished. These speculations are particularly on the rise during the economic crisis, when the traditional clientelistic system seems to be collapsing - revealing itself - and the wider society, now unable to use it on its benefit, as it did before, seems to be less tolerant towards diaploki. Existing in reality or not, narratives about diaploki have certainly contributed to population’s attitudes of mistrust to the political and media establishment.

The mistrust of media indicates that Greeks are knowledgeable actors when asked to untangle diaploki. More or less, Greeks can describe diaploki on a discursive level and to a certain point acknowledge that the information they receive from media is biased, and serving the interests of actors of diaploki. In other words, they understand the motives and potential consequences of triads’ actions. The electoral success and the outburst of racist violence, alongside GD on the streets of Athens, shows though that they fail to understand that GD was also an intended consequence of the same actors. We could contribute the addition of violence in Greeks racist expressions to the media strategies described above, i.e. Greeks were motivated by the media to vote for GD and engage in racist offending, but average Greeks’ understanding of social reality coincides with that of GD, as both are informed by Greekness. Therefore, GD’s racism didn’t sound irrational when it was emitted from the TV screens. Greeks who rationalize media’s rhetoric regarding immigrants - whether within the frames of the tangible economic crisis or criminality - result in reproducing GD’s racism, this time as unintended consequence of their actions. Namely, racism is part of the practical knowledge – the one that cannot be expressed discursively (Giddens, 1984). It is masked simply as “common sense”, e.g. if immigrants are culturally inclined to criminality, we have to banish or repress immigrants in order to reduce the increased criminality, that we hear about in the media. Consequences of actions based on practical and discursive knowledge on “how to do things in Greece” feed back to the initial circumstances, going round in the casual loop of reproduction

¹¹⁴ ‘Greece anchors economic rebound on shipping’ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bp35sYC3Bh8>

¹¹⁵ ‘Attacks on KKE at Perama’ (Gr)

<http://jailgoldendawn.com/%CF%85%CF%80%CE%BF%CE%B8%CE%AD%CF%83%CE%B5%CE%B9%CF%82/%CE%B5%CF%80%CE%AF%CE%B8%CE%B5%CF%83%CE%B7-%CF%83%CE%B5-%CE%BA%CE%BA%CE%B5-%CF%83%CF%84%CE%BF-%CF%80%CE%AD%CF%81%CE%B1%CE%BC%CE%B1/>

¹¹⁶ ‘The attack on Egyptian fishermen at Perama on July of 2012’ (Gr)

<https://jailgoldendawn.com/2014/01/22/%CE%B7-%CE%B5%CF%80%CE%AF%CE%B8%CE%B5%CF%83%CE%B7-%CF%83%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%85%CF%82-%CE%B1%CE%B9%CE%B3%CF%8D%CF%80%CF%84%CE%B9%CE%BF%CF%85%CF%82-%CF%88%CE%B1%CF%81%CE%AC%CE%B4%CE%B5%CF%82-%CF%83%CF%84/>

(Pic. 1-1) not only of racism in Greekness but also of the separate loop of the political system and diaplōki.

The media and political establishment are themselves consequences of practices based on what (and how) Greeks are taught in schools and church while growing up. The education system and the Church of Greece are systems that set the fundamentals of Greeks identity – their understanding of themselves and others. Therefore, they are primal in providing the practical knowledge, that Greeks will unconsciously retrieve from their stock of knowledge each time they are asked to act Greek. This thesis has shown that the knowledge that circulates in the causal loops of both systems are highly dogmatic – the unchangeable Greekness and the Orthodox dogma itself. This chapter has described the practices power holders of Greekness – the Church and the political establishment – engage in in order to maintain it dogmatic. It has also shown that its dogmatic character serves their interests in further securing and exercising their power on Greeks' daily and life paths, and subsequently in Greece. With that power they enable only practices that reproduce Greekness unaltered and constrain alternatives, limiting significantly what Greeks know about reality, to what serves the interest of power holders of Greekness. The practical knowledge obtained by unquestioned practices from school years becomes discursive later along adult Greeks life paths without changing the tenets of Greekness, e.g. participating in religious course in school, centered exclusively around Orthodoxy, to supporting political streams with discriminatory agendas against Muslim immigrants, when adults, citing cultural incompatibilities. We can say that the media environment is a tangible reflection of that process - steered by social systems of higher in hierarchy, like the Church of Greece and the education system - but also a tool for power-holders of Greekness.

This chapter has also shown that these homeostatic loops could be disrupted with the infiltration of alternative knowledge on "how to do things in Greece". Leftist ideological approaches have been demonstrated here to serve that purpose. Greeks that participate in social systems but are informed in their actions by alternatives, like leftism – e.g. a leftist teacher, a "leftist priest", like Stratis from Lesbos (5.2), leftists' media - are "doing difference" on the micro-level of human encounters (type-2 relations Pic. 1-1). Respectively, the recipient side - students, believers and media consumers – is informed on how to do things differently and potentially will act upon that new knowledge. That doing difference is itself a sign of power (Giddens, 1984) that counters Greekness. It was therefore expected, and demonstrated in this chapter, that power holders of Greekness will suppress alternatives from emerging – from excluding differences from textbooks to restricting leftist opinions in the media. Apparently, similarly to Albanians of first-generation who accepted baptisms in order to find employment (2.3), for a leftist to participate in country's social systems he has to hide his difference.

Visible first and second-generation immigrants though can't be hidden. With modern-days increased mobility of global population and their gradual integration immigrants' participation and visibility in Greek social systems will also increase. For instance, there will be more visible immigrant kids in Greek classroom, that through daily interaction, will inevitably exchange new knowledge with their Greek classmates. A more multicultural class composition will pressure for multicultural education and potentially more religious freedoms inside and outside school environments. By further integrating to Greek culture they might start emitting from the TV screens (e.g. through

pop culture), spreading further the new knowledge that “a Greek is not born Greek, but can become Greek”. In other words, just by existing and participating – let alone succeeding - in Greek society with their different identities, immigrants will be doing difference in the frames of Greekness. The following chapter will discuss how immigrants simply by existing are doing difference. The constraints they experience in that process mirror Greekness’ defending mechanisms. As racist violence had been defined here as the main mechanism, immigrants’ responses to it mirror their “doing difference” – consequently, gaining power.

6 The effects of Greekness' racism on immigrants' daily and life paths

In contrast to the unchangeable Greekness, immigrants' identities are more prone to changes due to the immigration process. Similarly to Greeks, immigrants constitute their individual and collective identities by amassing stock of knowledge through daily and lifelong participation in practices organized by social systems of their environment. But immigration adds significantly higher diversity in socio-political and situational environments immigrants find themselves socializing in during the whole experience. Socializing among a greater diversity inevitably alters dynamically their individual identities, what in its turn facilitates them to act in new ways. This flexibility is important in immigrants' choices of adaptation strategies. A literature overview by Zissi (2006, pp. 103-104) distinguished the following three groups of factors that influence the immigrant experiences and their outcomes:

a) *Migrant's personal characteristics of the pre-immigration stage*, such as gender, age, level of education, or those emerged during the immigration, such as internal recourses, search skills, acculturation strategies. For instance, high human capital, positive attitude towards the receiving country and the choice of integration, as acculturation strategy, is linked to better adaptation outcomes. In contrast, a combination of poor education, language proficiency, disappointed expectations, "psychological attachment" to the receiving country etc. lead to negative adaptation outcomes as well as to psychological problems. Finally, the choice of an acculturation strategy is strongly dependent on personal characteristics.

b) *Social interaction characteristics of their immediate lived environment* (i.e. family) or *their wider community* (i.e. their ethnic community, neighborhood, school etc.). For example, networks of relatives that encourage the exchange of information and ensure practical support have a positive effect on the psychosocial adaptation of migrants. On the contrary, dense networks of traditional orientation have negative effect, particularly on female migrants. In general, the heterogeneity of social networks, social interaction and the multicultural composition of the sites of integration help against the mono-dimensional (mono-cultural) flow of information on how to do things in daily and life paths.

c) *Characteristics of the political and socioeconomic framework of the receiving country*. Empirical findings show that that the rejection of the migrants by the indigenous population, unemployment, high levels of bureaucracy, and lack of culturally sensitive policies constitute threatening conditions for migrants.

Drawing on ST we can suggest that intersections of those factors and their reproductions throughout immigrants' life and daily paths inform their (re)actions to racist violence. These intersections are, to a great extent, unique for each immigrant. For instance, the stock of knowledge a new Afghan refugee to Greece amassed, while experiencing the different hardships on every stop of his migration route - Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and Greece - will generate a different reaction to racist violence than that of an old Pakistani economic immigrant, who took a direct flight to Greece from Pakistan etc., something that goes in line with the response of the chief psychologist of Day Center 'Babel' over the consequences of racist violence on his patients:

I can't generalize. It depends on who is subjected to these consequences. For instance, I've heard people telling me 'Big deal! Things in my country were much worse'. I've also heard a person telling me that the torture that he was subjected to in his country were of less intensity than here, at Komotini detention center...Each person is different, hence experience his/her reality in a different way. Talking about tortures, with which I deal personally, police's sweep operations can make some revive previous experiences, which was the initial reason of their immigration, i.e. to save their lives. And I had others who laugh at them.' (Gionakis N., Head of the Day Center 'Babel' for the mental health of immigrants)

Stemming from the theoretical approach as well as the qualitative methodology chose for this thesis, in the following chapters I will also refrain from strict generalizations. Apart from that, the significantly diverse sample of participants deems difficult their categorization even when it comes to, at first glance objective, background information, i.e. a high education level in Afghanistan might not be comparable with the same level of education in India, neither in quantitative nor in qualitative terms. Therefore, in the attempt to understand the differences in how each immigrant experience his immigration, as well as how he reacts to racist violence I will pay close attention on the interplay of all three factor groups¹¹⁷ (Zissi, 2006) and their particularities in participants' life and daily paths.

Yet, for purposes of data analysis, the broader categories of high and low *human capital* will be used. The outcomes of high human capital on individuals parallel those of schooling, since it also results in 'higher paying job, more satisfying or higher-status work...the pleasure of greater understanding of the surrounding world' (Coleman, 1988, p. 116), but it's not limited to capital accumulated during the years of official education. It's definition as 'changes in person that bring about skills and capabilities that make them able to act in new ways' (Coleman, 1988, p. 100) suggests a lifelong process, which goes in line with ST's understanding of knowledge accumulation throughout an individual's life and daily paths (Giddens, 1984). In the context of this paper, as an indication of migrants' high human capital serves their ability to critically reflect on the conditions of Greek reality, as well as the ability to situate their position as migrants in that reality. Further categorization into *new* and *old* immigrants serve solely organizational purposes of the following sections.

6.1 The Geography of racist violence in Athens according to immigrants

In section 3.1.1, I have discussed the theoretical preconditions for the development of the geography of racist violence. Based on that theory and statistic data, I have also highlighted the main areas in Athens where racist violence is more likely to occur (3.1.3). In this chapter I will try to outline the geography of racist violence according to migrants themselves. In particular, I will try to unfold migrants' mental maps of racist violence, as they construct them through their daily life and experiences.

¹¹⁷ Characteristics of the political and socio-economic framework of the third group, by Zissi, have been extensively discussed in chapters 2 and 5

The effects of GD's racist violence on immigrants' daily geographies

Starting with the no-go areas, immigrants' mental maps coincide with the mental maps of the indigenous population. The main differences between the mental maps of those two groups firstly rest in the fact that for immigrants they involve places in the city where they feel at high risk of racist attacks by the locals, while for locals, residents and non-residents of no-go areas, immigrants' presence itself constitutes a no-go factor (3.1.3). Secondly, while locals' mental maps are heavily influenced by the media (3.1.3, 5.3), immigrants' mental maps are constructed on personal lived experiences of racist harassments and/or on the ripple effect (3.2) of experiences of their immediate social environment - family and friend who live in no-go areas.

As the most dangerous place for immigrants was unanimously defined the wider area of Patisia. As noted previously, the cheap housing stock of Patisia was the first choice for disadvantaged population groups in the process of their socioeconomic and cultural advancement into the Greek society. At the time of the fieldwork 6 out of 12 – predominantly new immigrants - were residing in Patisia and 4 at the adjacent neighbourhoods of Bournazi, Kypseli, Exarcheia and Kolonos. For some, Patisia was only the starting point in the process of their advancement since, as it was not providing solely affordable housing but also a dense network of co-ethnics, that would assist immigrants in their first steps in Athens. This is usually the case for immigrants with high human capital like Kh. from Afghanistan. Upon securing his financial stability, Kh. distinguished like-minded co-ethnics in the wider network of Afghans in Patisia. Together they formed their own social network that was expanding to the local population as well, and when they felt threatened by GD they decided to move out from Patisia to a safer neighbourhood.

Initially I was living with a distant cousin of my mom in Acharnon street, who was living in Greece since 2004...I started working as a tailor for an Arab in the neighborhood...Then an Afghan took me to work with him at an Italian marble company...In parallel I was learning the language...One day in 2011 the president of the Afghan community called me and asked if I wanted to work as a translator for an NGO (located in Exarcheia). My Greek was still poor but they hired me...(at the same period) I made some (Afghan) friends in Patisia. They've been chased multiple times by GD during 2010-2011. Despite that they'd just rented an apartment there, we decided to leave it and move to Exarcheia or Kypseli. (Kh. Afghanistan, Exarcheia, new)

Kh. and his friends' rapid integration allowed them to be more flexible with alternatives when their security was under threat, in contrast to Kh.'s relative who remained in Patisia and who 'still has big issues with the language' (Kh. Afghanistan, Exarcheia, new).

Those, not integrated, inevitably limit their daily and life-paths in social networks that consist predominately by co-ethnics. For them, the social, cultural and economic advantages of spatial concentration of co-ethnics (Bolt, Burgers, & Kempen , 1998) seem to surpass the fear of racist violence. This is relevant even for immigrants who live and work in other neighborhoods but prefer to spend their free time in Patisia, like in the case of P., an immigrant from Pakistan who spends many hours hanging out at my key informant's hair salon in Patisia, although living and working in the adjacent neighborhood of Bournazi:

*Do you go out in the center? For instance, in Omonoia?
Once, twice a month but I leave very quickly. (in general) I don't walk much in the center, because there are a lot of problems here. Only here, at Pakistanis shops, to buy cloths*

etc...Here in Athens I have only one real friend – H. (my key informant). He gives me advises. (P. Pakistan, Bournazi, new)

Advises over the do's and the don'ts in Greece also gives to P. his 'second mother' Ms. Giota, the manager of the nightclub where he works as a dishwasher. There he also enjoys the friendly company of the female dancers of the same nightclub, who teach him dance moves in exchange for his services as a hairdresser. A friendly neighbor, Nikos, also greets him each time they meet. Yet, despite the seemingly inclusive environment that he finds himself in during his daily activities in Bournazi, the superficiality of those relations can't replace H.'s role in P.'s life in Greece. H. in particular has gained his trust by practically assisting crucial problems P. faced during his stay, for instance when H. was rushing to gather the 'papers' for K. before the deadline, while he was in jail awaiting his deportation. H., due to the heavy workload of running two hair salons in Patisia, can be found mainly there.

Apart from the substantial support that Pakistani immigrants tend to seek, and usually find, predominantly in the networks of their co-ethnics, which has Patisia as its center, the 'feeling of home' can be easier created in Patisia. In couple of occasions, by visiting my informants at the end of their workday, I would run into an informal gathering at my key informants' hair salon, where co-ethnics would randomly pass by, join the company and socialize under Pakistani music that one of them would put on his laptop and snack on Pakistani food that someone brought from a nearby Pakistani grocery shop. That picture can be observed during the closing hours, inside or right outside, many Pakistani stores alongside main roads Llosion, Acharnon and Patision (Pic. 4.2-1).

That type of localized free and leisure time practice suggests a limited geography of daily paths in the city. This observation is further supported by my informants' claims that their main path, outside work requirements, is the route from home to work and vice versa.

(group conversation) Are there any places where you meet?

(S. Pakistan, Patisia, new): *we mainly work and go home*

Ok, how about the day offs?

(S. Pakistan, Patisia, new): *We don't have day offs*

You work even on Sundays?

(H. Pakistan, Patisia, old): *Yes, they close at 3. I close at 11 the store at Acharnon*

So, you don't even meet at each other's houses?

(S. Pakistan, Patisia, new): *No, not at houses. Here at the stores.*

When was the last time you've been in the center (Omonioia)?

(A. Pakistan, Patisia, new) *1,5 month ago*

Apart from Patisia? Do you know any other neighborhood?

(A. Pakistan, Patisia, new) *No, just Patisia*

On my insistence to elicit some more details on the geography of their daily activities, at least from S., the youngest of the group who came to Greece at the age of 16 and exhibits a significantly higher level of adaptation in Greece – at least on the level of Greek language proficiency - he replied:

You know, we came here to build something back; we didn't come here in order to stay. If someone stays here he builds a house, finds a nice girl to marry and have a nice life. We came here to work and to do something nice for our lives...here or in Pakistan...you have a different life. You don't think like us...to raise money for my (future) children so that they don't have to live the difficulties that I've lived (S. Pakistan, Patisia, new)

The life priorities in Greece S. described, provide hints about Pakistanis' norms and values, i.e. social structure, but most importantly reveal the reason of their

immigration. Due to the limited data, collected on the matter, I can't claim that these are the same norms or daily life Pakistanis lead in Pakistan, but I could observe firstly, that their understanding of leisure time practices diverges from the Western one – not oriented towards outdoor nightlife consumption. Accounts from an also new Pakistani immigrant who lives in the nearby neighborhood of Kolonos further confirms that observation:

Do you go to Patisia?

No. If I have work there I'll go.

Many Pakistani immigrants live there

Most of my friends are here or (working) at the islands. When they come here, they visit me at my house. I'm not interested in going out. When I was working at the construction site I was going in many places, but just for work not to wander around. If I want to get out of my house I'll go to Lina, Efi or Patros' house to hang out with them (M.I., Pakistan, Kolonos, new)

Pakistani's immigration pattern can be explained with the theory of Cumulative Causation, initially described for the Mexican migration to US. In short, the mechanism behind it involves 'the accumulation of social capital, by which members of a community gain migration-related knowledge and resources through family members and friends who have already traveled to the United States. Social networks lower the costs associated with migration by providing aspiring migrants with information and assistance in making the trip north and in finding work and shelter, as well as a social support network in the destination area...In turn, international migration alters community socioeconomic structures in ways that promote additional out-migration, giving international migratory streams a strong internal momentum.' (Fussell & Massey , 2004, p. 152). This is more relevant for migrants from rural areas (Fussell & Massey , 2004), what is the case for most of my Pakistani informants:

Guys from Karachi come to our village and tell us 'let's go to Greece, it's much better there and you can make a lot of money'. And I said 'Let's go!'. But when I came here (showing disappointment).

You had never heard about Greece before?

Not really. Just that people come back to Pakistan from Greece with fancy clothes and (showing how they walk and brag about having successful life in Greece) despite the fact that they might be starving in Greece. I had my business there but they convinced me (to come to Greece) (P., Pakistan, Bournazi, new)

Apart from strong ties with the origin country the mechanism also involves the option of returning back home. Disappointed on the conditions in Greece, P. used that option and returned to Pakistan a year after our interview. The rest of the informants, on the question why they don't open up to the Greek society also consider that option:

You know, our people don't open up because they think; how long we're going to stay here? 5, 10 years? Then we'll go back. (S. Pakistan, Patisia, new)

Here we can infer that Pakistanis' restricted geography of leisure activities is not a result of fear of racist violence per se, but also a combination of cultural features and reasons of immigration – earning money to support family back home. With regards to the latter, the geography of their working activities is limitless, like in the case of M.A. a 40 years old Pakistani immigrant who earns his living by distributing from door to door advertising brochures of restaurants. During 4 years of his stay in Greece, as he reveals in his interview conducted again in the H.'s hair salon, he has visited most neighborhoods of the Athenian municipality for the needs of his job. Similarly, informants from the group conversation on the question which areas they will try to

avoid, stated: *No one. If I have a work to do I will go everywhere. (S. Pakistan, Patisia, new)*

What has changed in Pakistanis' daily geographies, with the outburst of racist violence is that now they follow their daily routes under constant feeling of fear. That involves both routes that they take for the necessities of their job and the inevitable home-workplace route. 3 out of 6 Pakistani informants live in close proximity to Ag. Panteleimonas square – the epicenter of racist violence during my fieldwork– hence there is little they can do to avoid the no go areas. For instance, A. was beaten by a group of GD members right at the square on his way back home from work. Likewise, in the adjacent neighborhood of Kolonos, that GD also attempted to turn into an active stronghold, due to high votes in their favor, M.I. was beaten by members of GD who surrounded him with 10 motorcycles while he was returning from a mosque to his home which was located *'right on the other side of the street'* (M.I., Pakistan, Kolonos, new). The first bought a bike to reduce his exposure to potential violence, while the second changed nothing in his life since he contributed the incident to his bad luck – *'It was my bad luck. If they were 2-3 I could get 10 punches but I could also give at least one. If they are more than 10 and hold huge wooden sticks you can't do much'* (M.I., Pakistan, Kolonos, new). Both continued their daily routes unaltered.

The effects of Greekness' racism on immigrants' geographies: Greek police

Surprisingly, as reported by my informants, encounters with GD on the streets are less fear provoking than encounters with police patrols. One reason could be the fact that an immigrant is more likely to encounter police on the streets rather than GD's pogrom squats. Another interpretation may involve immigrants' Assumptive World and the different roles GD and the police play in their assumptions about Greece. M.I.'s use of the assumption of *luck* in interpreting his experience with GD in a way was an attempt to restore his previous assumptive world that was meant to be shattered with the attack. In his previous world he was accepted and respected by the Greeks he socializes with; he is actively involved in activities of Sunday School for immigrants in Kolonos, has made Greek friends (Lina, Efi, Petros) who's houses are open for M.I. to visits while his Greek employer has stood up for him in a number of occasions involving racism. The additional high human capital alongside with M.I.'s firm decision to establish his life in Greece, since he doesn't have family obligations back in Pakistan, allow him to refuse to accommodate this new information – of him not belonging in Greece - that such hate crimes aim to disseminate, and reassess his previous, inclusive to immigrants, assumptions in Greece.

The association of police with fear though is a structural information of immigrants' assumptive world about Greece from the moment they enter in the country. Starting from their illegal crossing of the borders, and culminating with the 'sweep' operations of the police, immigrants are aware that they have to avoid encounters with policing authorities. Particularly the 2012 sweep operation 'Xenios Dias', that coincided chronologically with the outburst of racist violence, involved massive street police operations 'targeting everyone who appears to be foreign' (Dalakoglou, 2013b, p. 517). It resulted in the arrests of approximately 5.000 immigrants, on the basis of lacking proper documents that were transferred and locked

in detention centers for unidentified period of time (Dalakoglou, 2013b). The most notorious is operating inside the territory of Amygdaleza police academy, hence with limited access to the public, - the same for which Ms. Tsoukala reported alarming rise of racist sentiments among cadets (5.1). That operations, that can result in long term confinement for immigrants simply caught walking on the streets, alongside with the knowledge of the illegality of the detention process – *they keep underage almost a year in jails. If Europe knew, Greece would have paid a huge penalty (for human rights violation) (Kh. Afghanistan, Exarcheia, new)* – intensifies their feelings of powerlessness against the police and constitute police as the main fear factor for immigrants:

Most of the guys don't go out. Now that we have organized protests they go out. A year ago they were scared of the camp because they were locking you in and you didn't know when you'll go out. I know many guys who were there for 2 years. Now few have left – 300 in Amygdaleza, less in Korinthos...Now that SYRIZA is in the government they don't do so many checks on the streets. So the guys gradually start going out. (M.I., Pakistan, Kolonos, new)

Yet, the fear remains even for those who have obtained residence permit. Numerous proofs of police officers' political affiliations and links to GD, threat to turn routine operations into opportunities for potential racial harassment. Each encounter has clear features of racial profiling, particularly of visible ethnic minorities:

It was New Years Eve and me with my 5-6 friends were about to go to Acropolis. One of us enters a Pakistani shop at Patisia to buy something. Two Polish guys enter with a girl, that had her purse stolen earlier, and accuse us...One of them punched me in the nose. I called the cops that were nearby, made the report in the police station but they kept ME inside for 5 hours. Maybe because I'm Afghan and he (attacker) is Christian' (Kh. Afghanistan, Exarcheia, new)

Another encounter was recounted to me by E. an *old* migrant of Kenyan descent about his close relative's involvement in a routine car check in one of the western peripheral suburbs of Athens – the second geographical area where GD was greatly popular (3.1.1). That search ended in demonstrative stripping off the car and severe physical injuries of migrants themselves. Their further decision not to report the incident was drawing on, the known to all in Greece, 'professional solidarity' of police officers and firm belief that they wouldn't get a fair treatment in case of a trial.

The most common incidents though involve simple ID checks. Constant ID checks on the streets usually follow unjustifiable hours of waiting for documents verification in police stations. Deliberate or not the whole process constitutes a mean of intimidation, hence adds another reason for immigrants to limit the geography of their daily activities:

- *If I go out there (center) they will take me to Allodapon (Immigration Office). Even if you have papers they will let you wait for 3 hours (S. Pakistan, Patisia, new)*
- *Even now that he has papers, he zigzags the road if he sees police while working (distributing brochures from door to door). They keep you for 2-3 hours (H. for M.A. (Pakistan, Patisia, new))*
- *They have stopped me many times. 2 times they took me to...police stations. Kept me for 3-4 hours (M.I., Pakistan, Kolonos, new)*
- *I will stay at H.'s house (in Patisia) tonight and will leave early in the morning. I don't walk much on Sundays. The buses are late (less frequent) and while you're waiting on the bus stop the police might pass by and take you (P., Pakistan, Bournazi, new)*
- *Only 2 times they've stopped me. Asked me for my papers, I showed them and they told me to follow them to the police station. They told me if my papers are ok, you go. If not, you'll go to the camp. My papers were ok, so they let me after 10-15 minutes (K. India, Patisia, new)*

Certainly these ID checks are part of police patrols' official duties on the streets. And some of the participants condone police conduct both on the streets and in police stations due to the high levels of criminality in Patisia that inevitably affects immigrants as well – *'police stations of Bournazi, Akropoli, Omonoia and others in the center are taught (aggressive police behavior). But, considering the situation there, with some carrying guns, selling drugs etc., I can't say that being nice is effective'* (M.I. Pakistan, Kolonos, new). It is the uncertainty of outcomes, encounters with the police entail, that makes immigrants to try to avoid police. They may involve some minutes of waiting, like in the case of K. from India, or longer, as the rest confirmed, but the widely acknowledged affiliation of police with GD increases the chances of immigrants being racially harassed while in hands of police custody. With that respect, when I asked Tzaved Aslam, the president of the Pakistani community, if immigrants are less fearful of going out in the streets after the legal prosecutions of GD, I received an unexpected, yet indicative reply:

Right the next day after that change (GD incarceration) the police replaced them. They didn't let immigrants breathe freely neither a day. And for immigrants there is no difference between GD and police. In fact the police treat immigrants like animals, worse than GD. GD restrict themselves in their actions, fearing legal consequences, while the police thinks they have the uniforms, the batons, so they can beat immigrants freely. (T. Aslam)

The fears of encountering police and GD and the unknown consequences, that might ensue that encounter, force immigrants to limit their daily geographies to Patisia.

The safe neighborhoods according to immigrants

In contrast, new immigrants of higher human capital are more flexible when it comes to their geographies of leisure activities. Those who live in Patisia develop a number of strategies, like K. from India whose friends are residents of Patisia from different nationalities. His good command in Greek and English helps him to blend in a group of visible and non-visible minorities, what draws away the attention from the ethnic traits that are considered negative in the Greek society. That allows him to expand his geography of leisure activities to neighborhoods of his choice like the, non-traditional for immigrants, northern upper class neighborhoods of Marousi and Kifisia since *'there are some good coffee shops there, they are always crowded'* (K. India, Patisia, new). Others, who don't live in Patisia, would stick to the center but would prefer neighborhoods that are more inclusive to immigrants like, Exarcheia, Psiri, Metaxourgeio – *I don't go there (Patisia) if I don't have work. You know, the cops can stop you and take you for 3 hours. I like more to hang out in Psiri or Metaxourgeio* (Kh. Afghanistan, Exarcheia, new). Those, inclusive to immigrants, neighborhoods are the antipodes to neighborhoods like Patisia, that engender fear of racist violence. Here immigrants feel significantly safer, but



Pic. 6.1-1 Kh. participating in the carnival of Metaxourgeio. Source: Facebook

most importantly, they have more chances for integration in numerous micro-spaces that facilitate meaningful encounters between them and local Greeks.

What differentiates those neighborhoods from the rest is their social structure that differs from Greekness. Starting from the neighborhood of Metaxourgeio, Avdikos (2015) describes it to be characterized by 'unconventional, alternative, and anti-corporatist cultural production, collective effort, multicultural elements, solidarity and spontaneity' (Avdikos, 2015, p. 120). The neighborhood was subjected to state promoted gentrification but the financial crisis after 2008 had slowed the pace of middle and upper class real estate developments, what left space for alternative gentrifiers to better establish themselves in the area (Alexandri, 2015). Those alternative gentrifiers settled in the neighborhood theater companies, art galleries, opened alternative bars and cafes. An image of the community, they try to create, can be observed at the annual carnival. During that carnival, as Avdikos narrates, 'the parade passed by all the streets...immigrants were coming out on their balconies sharing smiles; prostitutes from brothels went out on the road with their bathrobes taking pictures...the Chinese left the chopsticks on the table and went out to join the shouting crowd...' (Avdikos, 2015, p. 120), highlighting the multicultural feel of the event. Despite the fact that Alexandri (2015) questions the authenticity of those alternative gentrifiers' commitment to a multicultural community, for immigrants of high human capital Metaxourgeio is one of the safe havens in Athens. Kh. from Afghanistan discovered Metaxourgeio when he and his fellow Afghan friends started participating in one of the theater companies based in Metaxourgeio¹¹⁸. By visiting the neighborhood for the needs of plays they were enacting, they embraced and, allegedly, were embraced by the newly emergent community.

The neighborhood of Psiri shares a similar fate. Once a state-led gentrified 'heart of Athens' during the Olympic games of 2004, Psiri experienced a decline in popularity among the nightlife consumers with the start of the economic crisis. The further geographic expansion, to the south, of Omonoia's counter-economy and immigrant population brought the ghetto stigma to Psiri as well, driving entrepreneurship away from the neighborhood. From 2010-2011 Psiri started to revive again, this time, partly, under the collective efforts of alternative gentrifiers. An emblematic figure of this attempt is the occupied self-managed theater Embros¹¹⁹, that hosts theatrical plays, lectures, fund-raising cultural events etc. Kh. and his friends became familiar with the neighborhood, again, through the same social circle of alternative artists and have actively participated in different events of Embros.


Yet, the neighborhood that stands out, among the inclusive to immigrants, is Exarcheia. If Metaxourgeio and Psiri are organized around anti-corporatist artistic reproduction of space, Exarcheia is characterized by predominantly anarchist-leftist political and social organization. With regards to its link with Metaxourgeio and Psiri, in a way we can say that the knowledge regarding self-managed endeavors and the situating of immigrants is created in Exarcheia, and then via alternative gentrifiers is channeled to the aforementioned neighborhoods. That network creates urban "islands'

¹¹⁸ Facebook event for the play E-Gyga (Gr, 'I left'), with Kh.as protagonist <https://www.facebook.com/events/352088744959640/>, by the theater company Synergy-o <http://www.synergyo.gr/>

¹¹⁹ Official internet site of Embros theater <https://www.embros.gr/>


whose social structure is informed by leftist-leaning ideologies in contrast to the wider Athenian social landscape, dominated by Greekness.

The political identity of Exarcheia was conditioned by a right combination of space and time - its geographical position in the urban fabric and formed during and after the 1974 Students' Uprising against Coronels Junta. Surrounded by buildings of the University of Athens and the National Technical University of Athens (Politechnio) – protagonists and later symbols of the uprising – and, to a great extent, inhabited by university staff and students, Exarcheia's social structure was developing around the student's movement of those days. In its initial stages (1979-1980) that movement was led by extra-parliamentarian Marxist-Leninists of the leftist spectrum. But in the following decades, particularly in Exarcheia, it obtained anarchist/anti-authoritarian stances with anti-state and anti-police agenda¹²⁰.



Pic. 6.1-2 Housing Squats for Refugees in Athens, source: (Tsavdaroglou, 2018, p. 385)

With regards to immigrants, given to the fact that leftism in Greece rejects Greekness's religious, gender and racial hierarchies, the addition from the 90s of migrant's rights to movement's agenda followed logically. Its role in the latest migration wave first took its shape in 2011 when 300 immigrants, that had lost their jobs due the crisis, initiated a hunger strike in the Law School of University of Athens, to protest their deportation, associated with the loss of their legal labor status (Hadjimichalis, 2013). The massive solidarity mobilization, the movement launched, pressured the government to meet strikers' demands (Hadjimichalis, 2013). During the refugees' crisis of 2015-2016, in an unprecedented endeavor, the solidarity movement caters the needs for shelter, food and socialization of around 1000 refugees who live in numerous residential squats scattered in the neighborhood (Tsavdaroglou, 2018). The movement has caught the attention of local and international press¹²¹¹²² as an alternative example of multicultural organization and co-existence, in times when the Syrian refugee crisis has demonstrated a failure of official multicultural policies, implemented



Pic. 6.1-3 State-run refugees' camps and solidarity refugee squats in Athens, source (Tsavdaroglou, 2018, p. 382)

¹²⁰ for further reading on left-wing politics and Exarcheia indicatively (Vradis & Dalakoglou, 2011) (Vradis, 2012)

¹²¹ 'Anarchists fill services void left by faltering Greek governance'

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/22/world/europe/greece-athens-anarchy-austerity.html>

¹²² '24.06.2016: Refugee-Squats in Athens' <http://moving-europe.org/24-06-2016-refugee-squats-in-athens/>

for decades, in countries traditionally considered multicultural.

For immigrants the prior knowledge of the history of Exarcheia and its political/ideological particularities is not necessary in order to understand why Exarcheia is different from other neighborhoods. Those who have found themselves in Exarcheia have experienced its inclusive to 'difference' character through direct encounters with the residents and visitors:

Exarcheia is a neighborhood where you won't find a fascist or anyone in general to tell you 'what are you doing here, go back to your country'...There (Patisia) people stare at you even when you do nothing wrong...There isn't any place like this one¹²³ in Patisia. If I go to a bar in Agios Panteleimonas, which is full of Greeks they will stare at me, like 'What is he doing here?' I have never been in a bar or café there. When I have a job there, I just get out of the metro, go straight to the office (of Doctors Of the World) and quickly return to the metro...(in contrast) I have made some really good (Greek) friends in Exarcheia. (Kh. Afghanistan, Exarcheia, new)

A briefer and clear insights over why immigrants feel safe in Exarcheia gave me the president of the Pakistani community: *Due to the leftists. The police and fascists don't enter in Exarcheia. (Tzaved Aslam, President of Pakistani Community & member of KEERFA)*

Indeed, following social and political developments in Exarcheia after the Student's Uprising of 1974, in this 'anarchists ghetto/stronghold', as branded in the Greek press and public discourse, the police presence is significantly less 'invasive' compared to other neighborhoods and usually met with hostility by the residents and visitors of Exarcheia. In its turn, police avoid unnecessary 'visits' that could be deemed provocative and lead to clashes in a neighborhood that claims its right for self-organization and self-control. As a result, it is more likely to encounter specialized police squads targeting rioters, than a police patrol conducting ID checks on the streets of Exarcheia. With regards to GD, as its chief ideological opponent, the anarchist movement is well familiar with the Greek far-right, and the migration of its representatives to different political parties and organization (5.3), from the beginnings of its formation. From then, numerous clashes with the far-right and the emergent political structure of the neighborhood render Exarcheia a no-go area for members of GD. Hence, the two main fear factors for immigrants, discussed above, are not present, or represented weakly, in Exarcheia. The additional prevalence of the inclusive leftism versus the exclusive Greekness – as the third fear factor – makes Exarcheia highly appealing to immigrants.

At the end, it is worth mentioning that small-scale 'islands' of Exarcheia, in the form of squats, were also present in the neighborhood of Patisia. In a neighborhood, overwhelmed by racist violence during 2012-2013 anarchist squats of Patisia were functioning as a protective shield from GD for immigrants. In particular, the old (around 30 years) anarchists squat Villa Amalias and the younger squat Skaramanga¹²⁴ were part of the 'local anti-Nazi infrastructure', as their 'residents and the participants of the various activities participated actively in the anti-racist activity in the area' (Dalakoglou, 2013c, p. 285). Starting from 2012 (2013 for Skaramanga) the municipality of Athens and Ministry of Public Order with the help of heavy police forces demonstrated a great

¹²³ The interview was conducted in the social center Nosotros in Exarcheia

¹²⁴ Was occupied during the December 2008 revolt

eagerness to close down the squats, as places of ‘anomy and chaos’¹²⁵ that was terrorizing the residents of Patisia with its existence’ – according to the mainstream discourse. That came as a surprise to anyone familiar with the racial tensions in Patisia and the role of Villa Amalias in particular. Indicative is the account of one of the participants in Villa Amalias:

This is the 4th police invasion in Villa Amalias...and the 4th trial. Each time the neighbors were coming as defense witnesses...The mayor and the minister stated that they will ask the neighborhood. They haven't! It would be very

interesting if they had. There is a particularity in the neighborhood – Victorias square. From the ends of 2008, when this whole story of enforcement of GD and the police to the squares of Agios Pantelimonas and Attiki started, that suppressive ring was finding an obstacle in Victoria square...it would be also very interesting for people to look up how many stabbings, murderous attacks breakings and arsons of stores and verbal abuses have occurred in Agios Pantelimonas and Attiki squares and ask himself why this is not happening in Victoria square. (Participant of Villa Amalias, interview to a radio station¹²⁶)

This interview though was not featured in the mainstream media. It was the same period that politicians and press were actively ‘flirting’ with GD though the use of ‘Horseshoe theory’ and instead the ‘big TV channels’ gave prominence to accounts of an ‘indignant resident’ who was demonizing the squat (5.3). In the era of social and alternative media though, shortly after the interview, information about the identity of the indignant resident surfaced. Previously she happened to have given numerous interviews to the press, more or less, repeating the racist texts that GD and the so-called ‘residents’ committees’ had conducted and circulated in the neighborhood (3.1.3).

After the closure of those, monumental for the area, squats numerous attempts have been made by the anarchist movement to meet the needs in anti-racist counter spaces and action of the neighborhood – openings of smaller squats-social centers¹²⁷, calls for safeguarding squares etc. Yet, they could not reconstruct the permanent ‘no-go’ area for GD that Villa Amalias had achieved. In particular, Victoria square that unofficially was under its protective umbrella became an easy target for racist attackers¹²⁸ and police misconduct¹²⁹ during the latest escalation of the refugee crisis, as it became one of the main squares where immigrants and refugees would gather and most likely live, for days, before continuing their journey to Europe.



Pic. 6.1-4 Greek transgender activist Paola Revenioti on Villa Amalias. ‘Villa Amalias became a school. But as a squat it was a school as well. A very important school as a matter of fact. Many learned to respect difference there, to respect human being, to fight for them. One of the few schools of its kind’

¹²⁵ ‘Villa Amalias: More than 100 arrests and 40 subpoenas’ (Gr) <http://tvxs.gr/news/ellada/se-ekseliksi-prospatheia-anakatalipsis-tis-bilas-amalia>

¹²⁶ Interview about Villa Amalias at radio show ‘Ellinofreneia’ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9prAh_yU3jw

¹²⁷ Distomo (blog) <http://distomo.espivblogs.net/>

¹²⁸ ‘Fascist attacks on immigrants’ <https://athens.indymedia.org/post/1554234/>

¹²⁹ ‘Greece: Police swoop on Athens square (Victorias) in anti-immigrant operation’ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6x-0RMEg0iw>



Pic. 6.1-5 Locations of the city center mentioned in Chapter 6. 1

6.2 Consequences of racism on immigrants' daily and life paths

The geography of hate crime for immigrants, described in the previous chapter, was defined mainly by the interplay of their social interaction environment (ethnically homogenous/heterogeneous) and the political and socioeconomic characteristics of neighborhoods where they spend their daily lives. Hence, drawing on Zissi's groups of factors that influence immigrants' experiences, we can say that immigrants create their mental maps of no-go and safe areas of Athens based on, first and foremost, factors related to characteristics of their own social environment (factor group b) and the characteristics of the areas themselves (factor group c) (see introduction of this chapter). In defining the consequences though, personal characteristics of immigrants (group a) become increasingly important. Hence, this chapter will start with some general consequences of numerous hate crime incidents of 2012-2013 – the peak of GD's street 'activism' - on newly arrived immigrants. Close attention will be paid on the consequences they inflict on new immigrants of different backgrounds. Finally, I will

explore the consequences of hate crimes on second-generation immigrants. The particularities of this immigrant group lie on the fact that they demonstrate the main argument of this paper - that GD is the most violent, yet, just one of the expressions of racism a 'difference' may experience in Greece. Their experiences can give us insights about the racism of Greekness before it surprised and was acknowledged by the locals with the emergence of GD. In other words, we can see the consequences of racist violence on immigrants who haven't normalized the Greek racism in their identity structures and on immigrants for whom the Greek dimensions of racism are embedded in their individual and collective identities.

Consequences of racist violence on newly arrived immigrants

Starting from the newly arrived immigrants, fear is undoubtedly the main consequence that ensues direct or the ripple effect of hate crimes. As noted previously, the main fear factors for immigrants are the police and GD. In particular, GD had created a state of fear from 2012 with their entrance in the parliament, until 2013 when the state initiated legal prosecutions against the organization. Their entrance in the parliament followed numerous pogroms on the streets:

'In 2012 we saw a huge difference (in racist violence). 15-25 bodybuilders-look-alike men were going out on the streets...or wait for immigrants outside the factories they work or 4o'clock in the morning when they set up the street market...we had over 400 assaulted during the first 2-2,5 months following the elections...almost everyday we has at least 30-40 people in the hospital...broken hands, legs, the police doesn't help, no one wants to press charges' (Tzaved Aslam, President of Pakistani Community & member of KEERFA)

Within those circumstances the news about the newly emerged group on the streets, bringing terror in immigrants' communities, spread all around Athens. During the same period, the legitimate existence of GD in the political life of the country normalized the direct expressions of racism for a certain part of the Greek population as well, increasing the incidents of verbal (and not only) attacks in public transportation and streets by simple Greek citizens. Hence, in addition to the muscled, close-chopped thugs in black cloths, immigrants were experiencing a social climate where any Greek person was posing a potential threat:

An immigrant can't distinguish who is good and who is a bad Greek. That's why they were afraid and closed themselves in their houses. They stopped going to work to earn money for their living, stopped going to shops, and even if they were going out (for the daily groceries) they would not exit the shop if they weren't sure that the street is clean of people looking like GD. It was very bad...but what hurt me the most was that you have a bus full of passengers, and there was neither one person to say 'why you're hitting this man?'. Even if someone was anti-racist he wouldn't talk' (Tzaved Aslam, President of Pakistani Community & member of KEERFA)

In addition to GD and Greek natives, the absence of any form of authority, to protect those visible minority groups from daily physical and verbal attacks, was further aggravating the state of helplessness they were experiencing. As noted many times previously, the role of the police here is crucial. Incidents of racist violence that came into the spotlight during those years simply proved that the Greek police was not just sympathetic to GD, but was acting as racist perpetrators themselves. Aslam, as the

president of the Pakistani community and co-founder of KEERFA¹³⁰, was involved with his guidance and support in two of them:

- *(When people come to KEERFA) we always try to convince them, first and foremost, to go to the police station, no matter what happens there. We assure them that we are backing them. M.A. went 2-3 times to report a theft by GD. The fourth day they told him to come in the morning; in the morning they told him to come at midday etc. I advised him to go directly to the police commander. He started protesting - 'I'm tired, don't send me there anymore, do something else'. I insisted that that's the way we do it (legally)...The commander finally accepts him (on the 5th day) and he recounts that they (GD) entered his home and took 600 euros. The only thing commander said, while filing the report, was 'You should watch out for those guys'. Later we found out why, since after finishing with the report he went out and found in front of him the police officers that stole his money. And they started threatening him 'you know who we are? We are the GD. You'll pay for this. You came here to complain?' (Tzaved Aslam, President of Pakistani Community & member of KEERFA)*
- *I receive a call from I.¹³¹ who was in despair 'I don't know what to do. They (police) have repeatedly come to my store and took money. How long will I'll be tolerating this?' I told him that if he doesn't sue, this would continue. He pressed charges and the department of Internal Affairs arrested the commander of Rentis police station. After that, the commander was calling and threatening him to drop the lawsuit 'Do you know what will happen to you if you don't drop it?' etc. I. was terrified. It's very difficult for an immigrant to go against a police commander, but I insisted. After a week I. buys a fan to sell it in his store and underneath it they find heroine. Thank God the media were already covering the Rendi commander's story so everybody knew that it was a set up. I. got out of the holding cell after 2 days. (Tzaved Aslam, President of Pakistani Community & member of KEERFA)*

The knowledge about those incidents, alongside with others that don't meet the news, is being channeled through immigrants' social networks sending the message that the Greeks and their authorities cannot be trusted. In practice, that means that in the case of a racist attack an immigrant most likely will avoid to seek for help in the official authorities and rather rely on his close social circle of people they trust. Immigrants' mistrust of Greek authorities further complicates the job of different immigrant organizations, that make additional efforts to gain their trust under those circumstances:

They must trust us (so that we can help), and it's not easy for them to trust people. If someone has bad experiences with other Greek public services, by generalizing, he will be suspicious of us as well. We have to convince him that we are not like the other 'bad services'. Or that we will not tell police what we're talking here...So they are cooperative but after a year they can tell us 'now that I trust you I'll tell you my real name...or age...or that I'm married etc.' Or after successfully leaving Greece - all of them want to leave - they can e-mail us and ask for a certificate to be issued on their real name and not the one we knew' (Gionakis N., Head of the Day Center 'Babel' for the mental health of immigrants)

For Pakistanis this state of helplessness is getting even more intense when they realize that the embassy of Pakistan not only fails to support them, but also in times, seems to be reluctant to do so. Aslam confessed that apart from a superficial guideline,

¹³⁰ 'Movement United Against Racism and the Fascist Threat' <https://keerfablog.wordpress.com/>

¹³¹ I. a Pakistani businessman was, according to his words, repeatedly harassed and robbed by police in his store close to Omonoia. The incident, that drew the media attention, involves his employee who was arrested on the streets, while on work duties, and taken to Rentis police station. Inside the police office the chief commander illegally confiscated 4.000 euros. While the case was under investigation a client bought a fan from I.'s store and later returned it. The same moment the police entered to conduct a general control and found heroine underneath the fan. CC cameras of the store served as a prof to vindicate I.

'On trial for extortion and theft the manager of Rentis police station.' (Gr)

<http://www.newsbeast.gr/society/arthro/534681/sto-edolio-gia-ekviasi-kai-klopi-o-dioikitis-tou-at-redi>

the embassy circulated those years (advising co-patriots not to go out of their houses etc.), it was absent in all other occasions and initiatives (courts, migrant solidarity initiatives etc.) aiming to protect Pakistani migrants. For Aslam, though, this stance doesn't come as a surprise. He recounted me stories of social, political injustice, infused with feelings of helplessness against any form of Pakistani authority misconduct from his personal life that made impossible the practice of his profession as a lawyer. That type of life he aimed to escape by migrating to Europe.

Comparisons of the social and political climate of Pakistan and Greece are also made by Pakistani immigrants of lower human capital. Despite that for most of them the main reasons of immigration are financial, following the Cumulative Causation pattern of immigration (6.1), and less to enjoy social and political freedom, like in the case of Tzaved Aslam, they can't help but to draw on similarities when describing their life in Greece:

For me, they are the same (Greeks and Pakistanis)...They are friends in words but when it comes to pay you the salary...they pay you the first month and stop paying you after that...80% of women are good, while on the contrary 80% of men are not, both here and there. The police here and there is also the same. I was not going out in Pakistan either. If I go out and end up in jail, where will I find the money to go out? I don't have my mother or brother here to get me out. One Pakistani will ask for 300 euros, other 1000. That was my life in Pakistan as well' (P. Pakistan, Bournazi, new)

The interview with P. was conducted in my key informant's hair salon, while another old Pakistani immigrant (more than 20 years in Greece), who also owned a hair salon in the neighborhood, was present. Feeling P.'s discomfort, I asked my key informant to leave us alone. That was the moment when P. confessed that upon arriving in Greece, he was initially working at his hair salon. After some months he stopped paying salary, exploiting P.'s vulnerable undocumented status. Later P. found a job in a nightclub, and became friends with the female owner and dancers – hence, the very good impression about Greek women. But despite that P. had found his own small, yet trusted, circle of friend that also included Greeks, what could generally characterize P.'s accounts about his life in Greece is a great disillusion and pessimism about Greece. P. had a relatively good life in Pakistan, but was convinced by old Pakistani immigrants to migrate to Greece for a better life and more profit in his sector – P. also owned a hair salon in Pakistan. The fact that, to the same lawlessness and exploitation, he experienced in Pakistan, in Greece was added racial violence overwhelmed P. We can suggest here that this disillusion and pessimism reflects P.'s shattered assumption about the benevolence of the world, described by Janoff-Bulman (3.2). In this case though, and in the cases of almost all my participants, the benevolence is not referred to the world they left behind - whose malevolence was the impetus for migration in the first place - but to the world they came to find in Europe:

'We have seen people who believed that by coming to Greece they are coming to Europe, which is heaven on Earth. And they saw that things are not like that at all. But they discovered it in a very bad way.' (Gionakis N., Head of the Day Center 'Babel' for the mental health of immigrants)

Betrayed both by Greeks and Pakistanis – P. repeatedly stated that in Greece his only friend is my Pakistani key informant - and still having home, family and potentials for business in Pakistan, P. returned back home after 5 years in Greece.

The rest of immigrants, who still try to settle their lives in Greece, simply accept the latest wave of racist violence as part of normality. To the direct question if they are afraid of GD, most would immediately reply positively. But steering away the discussion

and returning with the vague question 'are you afraid?' will reveal different insights even from those who have been physically attacked by the pogrom squats of GD, like A, from Pakistan:

(group conversation) (A. Pakistan, Patisia, new, direct translation by H. Pakistan, Patisia, old.) *It was around 10 o'clock, when we were closing the shop. I was walking alone back home (around Ag. Panteleimonas square). They were 6, I didn't realize that they were waiting. One of them grabs me by the neck and hits me with something made of iron (probably brass knuckles). Once the one grabbed me the other 5 came to beat as well. I found an empty space between their legs and escaped.*

Did you report that to police or anyone else?

(H. Pakistan, Patisia, old.) *No, nothing. GD is in the police (laughs)*

(S. Pakistan, Patisia, new) *Police would do the same.*

(short discussion about the geography of their daily activities (see 6.1))

So, when you finish work at 10, do you want company to return home? Are you afraid?

(H. Pakistan, Patisia, old.) *Of course, he's not going home alone. I am all day on my motorcycle but at nights I try not to carry money or cell phone with me.*

Getting robbed? That's the only thing he's afraid of?

(A. Pakistan, Patisia, new, direct translation by H. Pakistan, Patisia, old.) *Yes, yes. Once in Tauros an Arab or Kurd stops with his car and tells 'dude, I have a cell phone that costs 300 euros. Need money immediately, so I sell it for 20.' The cell phone resulted to be broken'*

The whole atmosphere of the group conversation could be characterized as joyful. I would dare to say that A. and H. were describing the two incidents as a funny memory from the past despite the fact that GD attacked A. some months before the interview. Given the limitations of having H. mediating as a translator, what could reduce the authenticity of A.'s accounts over his emotional responses, I could not claim with certainty that A. didn't had any emotional consequence following the attack. Yet, the decision to narrate – so vividly - the cell phone story might reflect the fact that it had similar, if not greater, effect on A. This downgrading of experiences with racist violence at first glance seems to paralleling the African American attitudes. They also tend to underreport hate crimes since, as Blee found, racism constitutes part 'of the normal vicissitudes of daily life' (Blee, 2007, p. 265), and hence, it can be indistinguishable from parallel crimes. This could be also the case of A. who, as a recent immigrant (only 3 years in Greece), most likely still has vivid memories of abuse and exploitation throughout the journey from Pakistan to Greece. An idea about the experiences accompanying immigrants in that journey provides me another immigrant:

It bothers me (racist violence) but I don't think about it afterwards. Look, it's not that I come from a good life to be sensitive about people insulting me on the streets. In Iran it was much worse. Ok, now with the fascist (GD) I don't know (the experience could be comparable to Iran), but around 2 million Afghanis live in Iran. One does the bullshit and they punish us all. But there we say that it's a dictatorship and here you claim that it's the birthplace of democracy. Is it? (Kh. Afghanistan, Exarcheia, new)

Therefore, for most newly arrived immigrants (less than 10 years in Greece), who most likely passed by the Iran-Turkey route, racist violence in Greece is simply a continuation of the vicissitudes of the migration journey.

In contrast to African Americans though, racist violence is still easily distinguishable for all the new immigrants. The ethnic status in their identities shifted rapidly from a member of the majority to a minority group within the last 10-15 years, what could be considered a short time in order to assimilate racism as normality in

their social structure or fundamental assumptions about the world. Therefore, they clearly understand and still have a sharp reaction to racist stimulus:


You know what I hate? The way they talk to us. As if we're thieves...I pay my taxes like the Greeks, but when he (a Greek) passes by (hair saloon), sees us from outside and laughs, it bothers me a lot...what can I say, if he wants to laugh, let him laugh. I don't think about it much. I don't have time for that' (S. Pakistan, Patisia, new)

This sadness is expressed by the youngest of my participants - 19 at the time of the interview - contradicts his previous repeated, and at first glance firm, claims that he came to Greece just to work and remains emotionally unaffected by the social dynamics of his immediate environment. Despite the arguments over differences in culture and life proprieties he employed in order to justify his, allegedly, voluntary limitations in his social relations and spatial mobility - 'you have a different life. You don't think like us...to raise money for my (future) children...' (6.1) – S. is still a young man who apparently was not able to practice his identity as a teenager in Greece. By arriving to Greece at the age of 12, S. started living with his uncle who belongs to the generation of old Pakistani immigrants that with hard and continuous work have succeeded a certain level of economic integration – has a secure job, bought an apartment, plans to bring his family from Pakistan - at the expense of the social – S.'s uncle also struggles with the Greek language. By growing up next to his uncle and surrounded all day, every day, by co-ethnics S. has limited access to information outside the homogeneous network of his lived environment, what made him develop the identity and adapt to the norms and values of old Pakistani immigrants. Despite the fact that his good command in Greek – S. was the only one in the group conversation who didn't need translation - could help him to open up to other heterogeneous social networks and familiarize himself with more inclusive social structures (i.e. Greek leftists) that could reduce the negative emotional consequences of racist violence and finally achieve a better social integration, S.'s seems reluctant to stray from his co-ethnics in Patisia. I assume the increasingly hostile Greek society would deter him even from desires for exploration outside his 'comfort zone', common for young people of his age.

Drawing on a stock of knowledge informed predominantly by older and more experienced co-ethnics new immigrants will, in all likelihood, eventually accommodate racist violence as part of the norm in their life in Greece, as the previous generations did. My key informant – acknowledged by the community as respected and successful old Pakistani immigrant - in his own interview was describing the hardships of dealing with everyday "casual" racism in his daily life particularly when facing the Greek authorities:

When I wanted to rent one of my apartments to a friend the lady at the office told me to bring the owner of the apartment. When I told her that I'm the owner she turned to her co-worker and commented (ironically) 'look at that ksenos (foreigner), he came here and even bought a house'. Well you know what, that ksenos works day and night (H. Pakistan, Patisia, old.)

But even if immigrants overcome – most of the times by simply ignoring - the verbal racist abuse in order to get the necessary signature or stamp from the respectful public clerk, racism in Greek society poses its own challenges when immigrants manage to set their small businesses. Here Greekness' racism is manifested through consumers' behavior.



Pic. 6.2-1 Comment on social media: 'Only in Athens, one could do a feature on falafel shops, and not include those owned by immigrants, which at the end are the original ones (Vathis sq., Acharnon etc.)...Athens, a comedown city

In the same way that Greeks are queuing for falafel made by Giorgos and Aris¹³² instead of visiting the numerous fast food shops operated by immigrants in Patisia¹³³, H. admits that 'No matter what you do, how much you lower the price, you can't bring Greek clients' (H. Pakistan, Patisia, old). Not able to attract clients even with the lowest prices in the market (5 euros for male/8 for female haircut) H. had the idea of hiring a Greek, in an attempt to anticipate potential clients' reluctance to enter the salon in the sight of all male Pakistani staff. Searching in immigrants' networks of Patisia he found a Pontic Greek who migrated from Georgia in the 90s - 'Afroditi who has a Greek passport'. Some of his Greek friends questioned that decision, as immigrants from Georgia, regardless the ethnicity, are burdened with their own set of racist stereotypes, related to activities of organized crime - *I had Greeks telling me 'how you let a Georgian girl working in your saloon, they are all thieves' (H. Pakistan, Patisia, old.)*. For the rest of the locals the appearance of a whiter, female employee with a Greek name made no significant difference, as Afroditi added while present at one of our meetings with H.:

'A (Greek) client told me that once, when our saloon was closed, she entered the grocery shop right next to us, to ask why we were closed. The owners asked her 'why you cut your hair there and don't go to our (Greek) salons'. (Afroditi, employee of H. Pakistan, Patisia, old.)

Even though it becomes obvious that H.'s problems are rooted in racism among Greeks, he seldom discusses about it, if not asked directly. I had the unfortunate opportunity to be present in a racist incident inside his hair saloon where a Greek client demonstrated his dissatisfaction with his haircut by throwing a 5-euro banknote on the floor and leaving the saloon. H. picked the money up and continued with the rest of his duties without showing the slightest irritation. In other, random and of-the-record, visits that I made, to the question 'How are you?' H. would most often complain about the constantly increasing taxation, prices on goods, reduced income due to fewer clients, a robbery in the neighborhood etc. In other words, we would discuss daily problems related to economic crisis, experienced by anyone who lives and works in Greece. Racism for him is simply one of the obstacles that he has to cope passively, in times by simply ignoring it, in order to get his job done and move on.

It was hard to dig deeper in the emotional consequences new and old Pakistani immigrants experience following racist violence. From one side, the language barrier could impede the elaboration on the diversity of potentially experienced emotions. On the other, the identity of a man in Pakistani community seems to have quite traditional masculinity features, corresponding to Islamic and/or Pakistani patriarchic culture. I assume talking in details about emotions is excluded for men who practice their

¹³²<https://www.facebook.com/128465184022290/photos/a.176480512554090.1073741831.128465184022290/176480192554122/?type=3&theater>

¹³³ 'Falafel at Vathis sq.: Luben found cheap and good food at the beginning of Archarnon street.' (Gr) <http://lubn.tv/guide/food/9184>

identity in accordance to its traditional understanding. This was the case of all Pakistani participants who were fostered in their tradition back in Pakistan and continued to rely on those values in Greece as well. This attachment to tradition may explain the passive coping strategy among Pakistani immigrants. After all, in a study on Southeastern Asian refugees in Canada, Noh et al. (1999) have found that forbearance is an effective strategy in reducing the stress that follows a racist attack, when it is 'consistent with cultural values which assign primacy to the promotion of interpersonal cooperation and the avoidance of conflict' (p. 202). Moreover, 'the stress-buffering effect of forbearance was augmented among those refugees with the strongest attachment to traditional ethnic values and ethnic community' (p. 202). This could be the reason behind the fact that, despite the hardships, all the remaining in Greece Pakistanis I've interviewed overall assess their life in Greece positively. After all, the culturally and socially isolated, yet solidary, networks of co-ethnics in Patisia provide moral and practical support when one is in need.

Consequences of Greekness' racism on second-generation immigrants' daily life paths

In contrast, the consequences of racist violence on the second-generation of immigrants in Greece are far more eroding. The pattern of their accommodation in the Greek society shares striking similarities with the French on a macro level; if the French social structure is still informed by remnants of Colonial racism (Loch, 2009), the Greek is informed by the utterly exclusive to difference concept of Greekness (2). Therefore, immigrants in both societies are pressured to assimilate to the values of the receiving country, and at the same time experience institutional racism and social exclusion that doesn't allow them to participate in those societies on equal terms with the native population. Probably the main difference between the two countries lies on the absence of high ethnic segregation in Greece, versus the infamous French banlieue. Spatial concentration conditions French second-generation migrants not only to experience collectively the negative and positive aspects of spatial concentration (see more Bolt et al. (1998)), but also collectively respond to racist discrimination, even if it's in the form of urban riots (Loch, 2009). Regardless the lack of concrete political motivation and aims, riots are a form of political mobilization incited by anger – the only emotional consequence of racial violence with both negative and positive outcomes – as they usually follow incidents of police brutality, and are facilitated by spatial concentration of people that share a common reality. The Greek second-generation immigrants share a similar reality, but experience it individually, having been dispersed in the Athenian sprawl, as the pattern of their settlement suggests (2.3, 3.1.3) – All, but one incidents experienced by second-generation immigrants discussed here didn't take place in traditionally immigrants neighborhoods.

It should not come as a surprise then that the second-generation of immigrants in Greece were affected even less by the rise of GD. On one side GD, with its pogrom battalions, was targeting predominantly the vulnerable new immigrants in areas of their high concentration, like Patisia, hence they have less opportunities to encounter GD on the streets. On the other side their documented status alongside with a high degree of assimilation was somehow protecting them at least from one fear factor – the Greek police. But above all, GD is just one of the expressions of racism that they

grew up with. Therefore, when it comes to GD, during the interviews they would rather discuss incidents they've heard about from other people:

- *I can tell you what people feel, based on the things I hear in my job (translator in courts). From the moment it starts getting dark, those who have been verbally or physically abused lock themselves inside their houses. I know a girl living in Ag. Meletiou street and she doesn't get out...Sure, fear of criminality is also there but it's predominantly the fear of GD...Things are better now, but the fear remains. I see it in the eyes of people during racially motivated trials...Criminality is just an excuse for the racists to say what they want to say. (K. Pakistan, Marousi, s-g)*
- *I don't know how that experience would be, the fear they might have felt...I've heard about it from people that have encountered them. I know an (Indian) association in Marathonas whose windows have been shot with bullets. They don't know who was it but of course they assume (GD).(M. India, Northern Suburbs, s-g).*

On the other hand, E. when asked about GD mentions the positive side of their emergence in the public discourse:

I've seen the opposite (with the emergence of GD). The side of the Greek society that doesn't vote for GD, feels guilty. So, all those 'hey, arapi (equivalent to 'N word' in Greek vernacular)' have been reduced. On the other side, the good thing that happened, and I've lived with it all my life, is that I would always start conversations with my Greek friends with the phrase 'Greeks are not racists'. It was an insult back then...They could be telling you the most racist things 'There are no good Albanians. We should burn all of them (figuratively speaking)'...but to end up with 'But I'm not racist. I like you guys, the blacks'. Now anyone is free to say what he wants and be proud of it. Now it's a swagger to say 'Get out of my country, to clean up the place from all the garbage that has gathered here'. And I like it, because they are not hiding any more and you are not the 'sensitive' paranoid. Now it's clear. (E. Kenya, Kypseli, old)

For all three of them the discussion would quickly steer away from GD and turn towards their own life paths, infused with racism and discrimination. All three second-generation interviewees were among the first visible minorities in Greece – '40 years ago my parents were from the first Pakistani immigrants. My father receives pension from Greece' (K. Pakistan, Marousi, s-g), 'There were not many foreigners back then, so Greeks were looking to us like 'who are these people?' (M. India, Northern Suburbs, s-g). The fact that both K. and M. grew up in the affluent Northern suburbs of Athens indicates that their parents were most likely employed as domestic servants. Due to their limited numbers, their accommodation in the Greek society was not accompanied by the radical racist discourse observed today. Their parents' victimization could be predicted with the *power differential* hypothesis, as M. who grew up in an Indian Sikh family with strong attachment to their culture, suggests: 'When you see 100 people and 1 man with long beards and a turban, it's logical to feel weird about it. My father was mistaken for Taliban...It's ignorance.' (M. India, Northern Suburbs, s-g).

But for second-generation kids, victimization is occurring through bullying in schools. As another aspect of Greekness, bullying of any sort of difference in Greek schools is part of the normality, as one of my interviewees informed me: *There were bullies in Lukeio...and a tolerance to them. No one would become the 'snitch' to report to teachers/headmaster, so the whole school was silent. Rather, when someone was getting an egg on his head we were saying 'Thank God it wasn't me' (E. Kenya, Kypseli, old).* Within such circumstances, where violence against difference was normalized and young kids were left to sort those issues on their own, immigrant kids were inevitably a target, while their reaction to racist bullying was depending strongly on personal characteristics:

It (racist violence) creates you psychological problems. When I was younger I had experienced that...When you are a child and everyone is pointing at you...you start losing it...but I was always a reactionary personality. I would always answer back. So in school I was constantly fighting (K. Pakistan, Marousi, s-g)

But others would not dare to go against the majority but rather internalize the negative emotions victimization inflicts – *'It bothered me a lot but not so much to resort to extreme behavior. I'm a low profile person. I was keeping it inside of me'* (M. India, Northern Suburbs, s-g).

E., on the other side, grew up in the neighborhood of Kypseli – adjacent to Patisia – with a sizable cluster of immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast to the other two interviewees he has positive memories from his school years. Partly due to teachers' experience in dealing with ethnically diverse classrooms – given the area - and partly due to having an older brother who *'first experienced the hardships and paved the way for me'*, E. describes the atmosphere in his school as loving:

I believe that my teachers protected my brother and me. There was a feeling that someone 'had your back' without you even knowing it. Maybe they had spoken to the other kids. I don't know. But they never made me feel different. (E. Kenya, Kypseli, old)

What all three guys have in common is a certainty that *'one person is enough to change your life'*. All of them had at least one Greek friend from school that, in contrast to the majority, were treating them equally and at the same time were protecting them from racist bullying:

- *I tell this story over and over although I don't remember this kid's name. At the first grade we were sitting together and he was also hanging out with me during the breaks. Therefore, I never got to the point to cocoon and ghettoize myself behind my Kenyan identity. One person is enough! (E. Kenya, Kypseli, s-g)*
- *I know my best friend 20 years now. He's Greek. Basically he stopped the bullying against me when we became friends at the 9th-10th grade. He taught me how to defend myself. Before that, the bullying was out of control. I've experienced very bad things. (K. Pakistan, Marousi, s-g)*
- *My best friend Nikos, I know him since I was 9. He helped me to get over it (bullying). We were spending a lot of time after the school. (M. India, Northern Suburbs, s-g)*

Random chance encounters with friends open to diversity appeared to be crucial in reducing negative outcomes a racist society inflicts on those young ages. Given the lack of provision by the official authorities to integrate immigrants, the randomness of encounters, either with teachers or classmates, also seems to be the main way for immigrant kids of color to develop feelings of belonging to the wider society. After all, visible ethnic minorities were still an infrequent phenomenon in the Greek society, and were excluded from the public racist discourses of the time, that involved predominantly Albanians and Pontic Greeks. So, Greeks' attitudes were inevitably informed by Greekness, but had a vague guideline on how to react to visible minorities. On the other hand, considering that second-generation immigrants were also fostered by Greekness, their daily reality would inevitably become similar with the daily realities of their Greek classmates. That would allow them to participate in common ventures with their classmates, what in its turn would reduce stereotyping and eventually lead to their acceptance by the wider society.

In contrast, Greeks' attitude towards Albanian immigrants was not only informed by Greekness but also guided by a detailed exclusive narrative of the time. In particular, the widespread *'police logic'* that was equalizing Albanians with criminals (2.3) had rendered the word *'Albanian'* an insult. The negative stereotyping had reached the point where, just referring to Albanians by using the word *'Albanian'*, would

presuppose a prejudice towards that ethnic group. Within those circumstances, while the older generations would 'voluntarily' baptize in Orthodox Christianity and acquire Greek names in order to distract the native population from their discredited ethnic traits (2.3), the younger Albanians were, also 'voluntarily', adapting more drastic measures.

Experiences of Antigoni:

We have kids (admission) papers here, with their actual names, but they deliver me written exams with a Hellenized version of their name. In particular, I had a student whose name was Tzamo but she was delivering me writings signed as Tzamou. The kid was deliberately not using its name...The other thing that impressed me is that they don't speak their language. They refuse to learn it. I have a kid of Albanian origin whom I asked in the class if he speaks Albanian. OF COURSE NOT! Do your parents speak Albanian? Yes, but I don't. Go tell (convince) them that a language is culture and they should know their own. I used to say a lot of those 'should' back in your days. It didn't work. I stopped saying 'should' and it's still not working (Antigoni, Vice principal of Lyceum of Kareas, 2015)

In other words, rejecting completely their individual and collective ethnic identity is the main outcome Albanian kids resort to in order to be accepted in the Greek society.

Consequences of Greekness' racism on second-generation immigrants' individual and collective identities

Remembering my school days, we also would accidentally learn about the Albanian origins of our classmates, usually after graduation or when stumble on 'official papers', i.e. when detecting non-Greek parents' names of classmates in the lists of successful examinees for the entrance to tertiary education institutions, hanged outside our school at the end of the last year in school. We were growing up alongside with those kids, without knowing that they were coming from Albania. The most disturbing though is that despite the generally anti-racist discourse dominated in school 'back in my days' I recall us also avoid referring to the word Albanian. The underlying rationale was that, since that word is so heavily burdened with negative stereotyping, if we considered ourselves anti-racists, we should not mention it at all. Namely we would remove from our vocabulary a word that simply refers to the country of origin of our fellow classmates – citizens, if extended on societal level - without engaging them in the debate over the expediency of the chosen anti-racist measure and without doing it for any other country. In other words, having no guidance either from the educational curriculum, or from teachers, and Greekness informing kids' action, the inevitable outcome of relations between students of different ethnic backgrounds for the natives was the intentional or unintentional reproduction of racism. And on the other side, for Albanians, the hiding or complete stripping off of Albanian ethnic traits, in a self-hate fashion that strongly resembles the internalized homophobia prevalent between LGBT hate crime victims and non-victims (Noelle, 2002, 0, 3.2.1):


Albanians refuse to socialize with other Albanians. They prefer Greeks...I'll describe you an incident five years ago. We had an Albanian student who was graduating with honors. We call him (in a school ceremony) to give the excellence award. Another Albanian student got too much excited, stands up and claps louder than his Greek classmates. I also got emotionally touched that the latter felt close to him and asked 'Did you see Ledi – who was keeping his Albanian name unaltered – that was applauding you so enthusiastically?' He turns to me and replies with a mean way 'He shouldn't have. I'm not like him.' 'Excuse me, aren't you both from Albania?', 'Yes, but I'm not like him'. I insisted to the point he got mad with my questions 'He's not a good student. He doesn't want to escape his fate'... therefore he shouldn't have applauded (Antigoni, Vice principal of Lyceum of Kareas, 2015)

In a school environment where even the teachers understand immigrants' successful adaptation predominantly in terms of assimilation (Pavlopoulos et al. (2008)) renouncing ties with your own identity seems less as a strategy of choice, but rather as the only choice Albanian students feel they have in order to be accepted in the Greek society on equal terms. The angry attitude towards Ledi – who, given the unaltered name, apparently is using integration as adaptation strategy - indicates that Ledi with his behavior disclosed publicly the ethnic identity of the top student, something that the latter desired to hide, partly through his high achievements in school. Educational progress undoubtedly is a mean to get access to the Greek society and reduce the likelihoods of hate crime, particularly in a neighborhood where the borders between education levels coincide socially and geographically with the ethnic ones (see Pic. 6.2-2).

What came as a surprise in this case though are the dimensions of the conflicting relations between the integrated and (forcedly) assimilated Albanians. The attitudes of the latter can be described with negative emotions that could range from anger towards co-ethnics who, according to them, do not desire to escape the 'Albanian fate', hence allow the reproduction of racist stereotypes that inevitably affects the assimilated as well, to embarrassment – as noted before, in a self-hate manner - when their belonging to the discredited Albanian identity is revealed. To some extent, we can say that second-generation Albanians's assimilation strategy is an outcome of internalized racism against their co-ethnics and themselves.

Despite the fact that it still requires further research, we can argue that that type of internalized racism is also affecting relations inside the family. Not desiring to learn the language of their parents – as noted in a previous quote - reflects also a tendency to renounce the cultural structure their parents were foster in, subsequently - as bold as it sounds - renounce their parents. A glimpse of the potential negative domestic relations that could develop in these situations provided the second-generation immigrants that I've interviewed, although in their case the disarray of identities between members of the same family seems to be resulting reversely – parents renouncing or are unable to keep pace with the new identities of their kids:

*My father is in Kenya now because he belongs there.
When we were fighting I was supporting Greece (father had negative view of Greece)*



Pic. 6.2-2 Kareas – University degree or equivalent, %. Yellow 0-10% (neighbouring municipality), Orange 10-16% (Social Housing area), Red 16-23%, Brown 23-39% Source: <http://panoramaps.statistics.gr>

because we belong here...he left when I was 15, supposedly for a while but never returned. I was mad but later forgot him. Ok, he did his 'thing', but at least he could keep a contact...With my mom they were separated but he made it look as if it was our fault (of children). Ok, I was upsetting him with my strong reaction to the identity issue. I kept saying 'I'm Greek! I'm not Kenyan'. So he got pissed off...Many second-generation kids grow up without their fathers. That empowers us even more. (E. Kenya, Kypseli, s-g)

Of course E.'s father did not leave Greece solely due to cultural incompatibilities. Economic migrants, of 80s-90s wave, were initially aiming to return back home at some point. The same did K.'s father after 40 years working in Greece:

He has returned permanently to Pakistan. He has land and is occupied with farming. He has amassed a certain fortune. Not here. Here he would be paying a lot. Life is much cheaper there...If I would return as well, I wouldn't have to work at all. It's just that you don't go, cause you're used to life here. After all those years you're Greek. But they (institutions, society) don't consider you as such. (K. Pakistan, Marousi, s-g)

Regardless of the reasons, cultural disarrays can break down communication and further widen the generation gap between family members – unbridgeable in the case of E. Having spent most of their lives, i.e. are informed predominantly by the social structure of their country of origin, parents of second-generation immigrants have less chances of successfully integrating elements of Greekness in their individual identity. Their children's' life and daily paths though tread in Greece, therefore they amass predominantly – arbitrary defined – 'Greek knowledge' on how to act in their social structure. While the younger the age, the better the chances of adaptation – *'Of course it's better that I was only 9 when I came to Greece. If I was 18, It would be harder to adapt...My younger brother is more Greek than I am (M. India, Northern Suburbs, s-g)*. Given the persistence of Greekness, parents would most likely spend the rest of their lives among co-ethnics and socially isolated from the Greek society, like in the case of old Pakistani immigrants discussed above, or even return to their homelands leaving behind their already 'Greek' kids.

The developments of second-generation kids though would resemble their - until recently - official citizenship status as aliens or stateless. Being born but not granted Greek citizenship meant that second-generation immigrants can participate in the society but with limitations in rights on institutional level¹³⁴ – can (must) work/study but not in the public sector or professions requiring license (i.e. lawyers), can study in EU but will be burdened economically as non-EU citizens etc. – while the living limitations are even more severe for the stateless, who, by not having any form of ID, are excluded from all states' institutions¹³⁵. Something similar can be observed in their social life.

The Greek society raises invisible barriers for their full and equal participation, first and foremost when it comes to personal relations. Firstly, in the case of Albanians, who by fearing potential discrimination from the wider society and hiding their identity, social relations can be eroded, since they project only a part of themselves to potential friends, partners etc.:

Three years ago two of my Greek students, who were friends with an Albanian, came to me to 'discuss a problem'; 'She (the Albanian) is our best friend but she was hiding her origin from us. Of course we don't have any problem with that because we love and enjoy her company but we do with the fact that she lied to us. We confronted her and now she's

¹³⁴ 'What does it mean for a child, born and raised in Greece, not to have the Greek citizenship' (Gr) <http://secondgenerationgreece.blogspot.gr/2013/12/blog-post.html>

¹³⁵ Those institutional limitations have been removed for a certain part of second-generation immigrants in 2015 after modifications in Greek naturalization law.

mad at us because she doesn't understand that we have problem with her lie, not with her origin.' She was also hiding from her friends that her mother was a cleaner. They learned all that at once so one of them told me 'That way she derogates me, because it looks like I would hang out with her due to the educational or economic level of her parents and I'm not into her thinking that I'm that kind of person'. You see how that complex effects social relations (Antigoni, Vice principal of Lyceum of Kareas, 2015)

Probably drawing on prior experience, or on the ripple effect, of being rejected, the Albanian friend created and introduced a fictional image of herself, projecting only parts of her identity. Apart from that, her identity seems to be the first – if not the only – reason she deployed in order to understand why her Greek friends were dissatisfied with her, since as E. commented *'the worse thing about those who experience racism is that it (the feeling of being discriminated) ingrains in you and continues to function even when no one is around and when it's non-stop, it gets under your skin'*. For Albanians, the deeply nested in the society, negative stereotyping of the 'Albanian fate' – that here we learn that also involves low social class – still remains a burden that doesn't allow them to fully enjoy or create social relations, as its stigma constitutes a default knowledge during the conscious or unconscious decision making.

For second-generation visible minorities the perceived or actual restrictions in social life are greater. Not being able to hide discredited ethnic traits, they would result in limiting their exposure in each social setting they find themselves in. For instance, E. in his interview expressed his bitterness and frustration over the superficiality of his personal relations:

Let's say that we, as friends, have gathered to paint a house. After the painting I'm interested in having fun, create relationships, not to be dissolved right after. That for me is a waste of time. (E. Kenya, Kypseli, s-g)

He further elaborates on how he feels during occasions when he finds himself among Greeks:

I know Greek very well, and since I'm in the Philosophical faculty I'm also familiar with ancient Greek. With the theater I have overcome the fear of audience. I'll raise my hand, and, maybe with a shaky voice but, I'll talk and I actually love it. But when I'm in a company, i.e. with the guys from the theater group, I say nothing. I have the feeling that they speak with a code that I don't understand. Despite the fact that the climate in the group is great, I still don't talk much. I had the feeling that when I say something, that doesn't resonates to anyone. No one will listen to me...When I feel that, I stop talking...And it makes me sad because I want to talk. Thank God at times I speak in places where educated people gather and I receive a 'bravo E., we liked what you said' otherwise I would consider myself retarded. This must be a remnant (of racist discrimination), because I'm doing it from school years. I cannot talk to a person who doesn't hear me, or hear what I say, has nothing to say back and changes the subject or turns his look away from me. I really hate that. (E. Kenya, Kypseli, s-g)

Groundless or not, E. discusses his perception that he's constantly ignored or made feel invisible even in social settings openly inclusive to difference like him. If we draw on Assumptive World Theory we can say that the negative feedback towards his identity, he was constantly receiving from very early ages, affected his sense of self-worth. A person nurtured in the Greek social structure can result into the conclusion that the racist attacks are addressed to all the sub-traits of his identity – character, personality, capabilities etc. – since for Greekness' understanding of identities as organic entities, those constitute an inseparable whole of predefined wider categories of identity –race, ethnicity, religion etc. (2.3). In addition, his skin color as a negatively stereotyped, unchangeable identity trait, that in the Greek context dominates the other identity traits, leaves little space for him to believe that he can control the outcomes of his

social relations – ‘*me as a black guy will never become an equal member of the Greek society*’. Having the two main self-relevant assumptions shattered – self-worth and self-controllability will most likely lead to redefinition of the whole assumptive scheme, E. has been contouring about himself from early ages, to the negative direction.

As E. admitted, one of the reasons he decided to study Philosophy and Psychology is to understand ‘*what’s wrong with me*’. A more ‘professional’ self-reflection allowed him to detect his share of the blame regarding the superficiality of his relations:

Once I was with the guys from the theater group, said something, and they told me ‘Bravo E., very nice’. I was like, ‘wait a minute, don’t they know that I can speak Greek that good?’ Then I realized that they rarely hear me speak. (E. Kenya, Kypseli, s-g)

It would be logical to expect that after having ‘diagnosed’ the problem E. would like to lift those barriers that he himself erected towards Greeks and as he acknowledges impedes his social life. Yet, E. is reluctant in removing those self-imposed barriers:

Complexes are not necessarily bad things. You know the age of Chivalry with the armors they used to wear? They were heavy, cumbersome. You could see only through a thin opening. No matter where they hit, you were protected. You couldn’t move easily but your life was safe...After many years you get used to its weight and its protection. And suddenly the King tells you that the war is over and that you can take off your armor. How easily do you take it off? You were surviving thanks to it. If you didn’t had it, and would wander around, carefree, with your broken Greek language, you’d get a lot of slaps...You can’t take it off from one day to another...Everyone should be sure that the battles and the war are over. Above all, you should be convinced, because the messages could be misleading. Even if you are convinced, you won’t take it out all at once. You first take off the shoulder parts, then the legs etc. And once you feel attacked you put it on again. (E. Kenya, Kypseli, s-g)

If for Albanians that armor represents their ‘voluntarily’ adapted strategy of hiding the non-visible traits of their ethnic identities, for E. the same strategy would mean reducing his exposure to the outside world though remaining silent. The ‘messages’ of him being accepted, therefore allowed to reveille the whole array of his identity and engage in more close relations, in the Greek society are most of the times misleading. This is relevant both in impersonal relations – ‘*I was returning to Athens from Youth Against Racism camp¹³⁶ without the armor. The moment you encounter the first public clerk, it puts on automatically*’ – and personal:

- *A friend of mine was spreading the news about a job opening in a video club. Everybody knew, except me, despite the fact that he knew I was searching for a job. I asked him ‘Dude why you didn’t tell me?’. ‘They told me that you knew’, ‘I didn’t thought about it’ etc. He doesn’t tell that, ‘they won’t hire you because you’re black’. And we are supposed to be friends’. (E. Kenya, Kypseli, old)*
- *A (female) friend of mine asked if I knew any ‘good guys’ to introduce to a friend of her who was searching for a boyfriend. And I was like (stunned), ‘Wait a moment, what about me? Am I not a good guy?’. ‘Yes, but you know...’. ‘Has she told you that she doesn’t want black guys?’ ‘No, I just presupposed’. That constant, underlying racism is the worse! . (E. Kenya, Kypseli, old)*

In what looks like a vicious circle, the Greek friends try to protect E. from negative emotions by not revealing that the actual reason of his rejection is his skin color. The chosen action reflects E.’s friends’ attempts to negotiate Greekness’s exclusiveness that they stumble upon, with their warm feelings towards E. Even if the intentions were genuinely non-racist, the result is again racist, since the contested issue – his skin color - remains unsolved and present as a barrier between the friends. On the other

¹³⁶ Official internet site of Youth Against Racism in Europe <http://www.yre.org.uk/index.html>

hand, E. for whom racism is very likely to have gotten 'under the skin', reacts very emotionally to the slightest hints of racism and automatically raises his own barriers to protect himself. The resulted miscommunication, still strongly dictated by Greekness, impedes the development of more meaningful personal relations since it works in the alienating and not conciliating direction.

The aspect of personal life though where the Greekness's barriers are manifested in their entire splendor is the love life.

...Later, the problem with us, the black kids, was love. Girls liked us, and some liked us a lot, but we couldn't live it (to the full extend).

They couldn't transcend?

Yes, there were parents behind, and they had the feeling that they will be bullied from their surrounding, friends etc. I'm not sure 100% if that was the case, but that was the prevalent feeling. (E. Kenya, Kypseli, old)

In this case, it is almost certain that the feeling E. had is not a product of his misinterpretation of his environment. In collectivistic societies like the Greek, where even the political affiliations are a matter of a family tradition (2.2), a Greek individual is still strongly dependent from his actual or/and social families (family, friends, co-workers etc.). Given that Greek families are informed by the utterly exclusive macro-concept of Greekness where the interplay of patriarchy, sexism and racism prioritizes the white Greek male, the possibilities of acceptance of interracial couples are still faint. For the actual or/and social (friends, co-workers etc.) family interracial couples would signify a violation of the expected homogamy, while their children, the disruption of the racial homogeneity – one of the defining features of Greekness. If such racist concepts are still relevant in societies with constant presence of people of color, like the USA's¹³⁷ one can only imagine their dimensions in Greece where second-generation immigrants of color became visible in the society for the last 10-20 years. Even in the case where individuals have overcome the racial boundaries, with limited precedents in the society, it would require a certain courage from a Greek, woman in particular, to bear the consequences of the resistance from the wider society.

For immigrants of color, such societal order bears the risk of not being able to find a life partner and spend their lives in loneliness. This was one of the main 'complaints' of my key informant about his life in Greece. Initially he tried, in vain, to bring his wife and kids from Pakistan. The long lasting separation though, of currently more than 20 years, inevitably distanced him from his family in Pakistan. By realizing that, he started to establish his life exclusively in Greece. He followed what he considered as a pattern for a successful life, both in Greece and Pakistan – owns two apartments, hairs saloons, and through that economic achievements holds a respected place among old and new co-ethnics, while waiting for the rest to follow naturally. Today in his late 40s, he realizes that his chances to start a family, again, in Greece are very limited.

6.3 Strategies immigrants implement against racism

¹³⁷ For further reading (Killian, 2001), (Perry, 2002)

Some strategies that immigrants adapt in order to overcome or reduce the negative consequences of racist violence have already been mentioned in the previous chapter. The decision to include them there was based on the assessment that they can be considered both strategies, as they constitute conscious or unconscious actions of immigrants dictated by the surrounding Greekness, and consequences as their implementation brings about new negative consequences. That way, immigrants maybe not be reproducing the Greek racist social structure per se, but with their 'voluntarily chosen' strategy, of invisibility and isolation, don't add new elements that could change it. This chapter will be focused on actions and strategies immigrants employ consciously in order to reduce the negative effects of racist violence and, as reported, have been deemed successful.

Strategies newly arrived immigrants adapt to avoid racist victimization

Starting from the new immigrants, it is useful to note that the character of strategies they employed was answering the needs of what could be considered "overnight" escalation of racist violence. Racist violence was undoubtedly a common phenomenon in the Greek society but the next day of 2012 elections, where GD entered the parliament for the first time, can be marked as the beginning of an unprecedented "manhunt" against immigrants. In a way, the tensions that GD's hate campaign was mounting in the media, was allowed to turn into action, as the outcome of elections legitimized hate crimes for those Greeks for whom the hate narrative echoed back. For immigrants, that entailed a sharp increase in frequency of verbal and physical hate crimes. For illustration purposes, while the *'The city at a time of crisis'* project¹³⁸ recorded 40 incidents of hate crimes from its start (2009) until the election day (6 May 2012), it counted 146 until GD's legal prosecution and incarceration (28 September 2013). Therefore, the strategies undertaken by immigrants and anti-racist organizations, at least during that year correspond to a state of emergency.

The very existence of the project *'The city at a time of crisis'* itself can be considered a strategy, since, as the creators state, it aims to act *'as a tool for organizing and communicating amongst the anti-fascist and anti-racist initiatives'*¹³⁹. In contrast to UK's and USA's examples, in Greece the first hate crime law was passed in the parliament only in 2014. With no official definition, nor guidelines, authorities had no provision for the record of hate crimes in particular. In addition to that, governments', deliberate or not, inaction as well as the reluctance of the police to file or accept racially motivated reports by immigrants, as in numerous cases they were acting as perpetrators themselves (6.2), deems any governmental attempts to at least monitor racist violence, unreliable. Lacking provision from official state figures, it was up to various individual and collective initiatives, such as *'The city at a time of crisis'* to organize action against GD and stand by immigrants.

¹³⁸ The map of the project *The city at a time of crisis'* is based on crowdsourcing and, as the creators acknowledge, the verification of (all) incidents is not always possible. Yet, in the absence of official data, it represents - a unique for Athens - monitoring of racist incidents and illustration of their spatial features

¹³⁹ <http://map.crisis-scape.net/page/index/2>

Among the different anti-racist initiatives that were formed precisely with the aim to curb the racist threat to immigrants was KEERFA¹⁴⁰. When immigrants were turning to KEERFA for help, its members were first and foremost advising them to pursue legal action, by reporting the hate crime to police. Given immigrants' fear to confront the Greek police, due to widely spread information about its affiliation with GD (6.2), KEERFA had created a network of solidarity activists who would assist immigrants in their attempts to report hate crimes and prevent police misconduct:

- *We founded KEERFA in 2011. Our first job was to create local (ad hoc) committees of 2-3 (Greek) people. Their first role was to be present when immigrants call the police. When they come without the presence of a Greek person, even if he has a broken hand, leg, head, they arrest him immediately. With members of committees acting as witnesses, the police have fewer chances to conduct and cover up things. That was our main goal and it had very good results (Tzaved Aslam, President of Pakistani Community & member of KEERFA)*

To the certain – limited - extend simple citizens can intervene as legal actors:

- *One day in 2012 they called me from Acharnes (Western suburbs, see 3.1.1) and told me that they beat them every day. I asked him if they pressed charges. He replied, 'what charges? We go there (police station) and no one listens'. The day after my (first) visit of the area they hit 4 people. I was far and couldn't go but urged them to go to the police, because that's what they (police) want – not to have proofs of the hate crime...(They were discouraged, so) I searched for a Greek girl (from the committee) in the area to go with them...She couldn't represent them, but only be present and talk (translate) to the police. They intimidated her as well with the (angry) way they were talking to them. 3 times they told them that they had no time, while when immigrants insisted they locked them up. The next days, when me and another lawyer went, they accepted to fill the charges, from the 4 beaten, but for a simple attack. Namely we forced the commander of the police station to accept to fill the charges but he still refused to write down that it was a racist attack (Tzaved Aslam, President of Pakistani Community & member of KEERFA, summary)*

Given the unprecedented dimensions of the outburst of racist violence, immigrant organizations could do little to prevent or to protect immigrants from daily attacks and harassment. At least during the first year, their role was predominantly advisory. Again, the advises and measures undertaken were indicative of the emergency immigrants were facing those days and could definitely not be considered long term strategies:

- *We were advising them not to go out without a reason. Each immigrant had 2-3 telephone numbers of an anti-racist or someone who could help. If someone gets attacked, to go straight to the police, regardless of their behavior. We strictly prohibited them to fight back, because that would allow the police to record the incident as a simple fight. Most importantly, when we were accompanying them they were gaining a bit of courage. (Tzaved Aslam, President of Pakistani Community & member of KEERFA)*
- *Our embassy told us (issued a guideline) not to walk during the nights. For the needs of work, if we had to travel long distances, i.e. from Metaxourgeio to Piraeus, better ask a friend who lives there nearby to do the work. If we hadn't had any friends there, to ask 2-3 friends to accompany us...The School¹⁴¹ frightened us a lot; don't go there, don't do that. They were not allowing guys to return back home alone – 'Wait for Elena to take you home with her car' etc. (M.I., Pakistan, Kolonos, new)*

The vast majority of immigrants though, particularly those living and socializing within the micro-space of Patisia are either unaware of the existence of such organizations, or/and preferred to resort to the security and support of co-ethnics.

¹⁴⁰ Movement United Against Racism and the Fascist Threat' <https://keerfablog.wordpress.com/>

¹⁴¹ Sunday School of Immigrants <https://www.ksm.gr/>

Even without the knowledge of the guidelines though, the increasingly hostile social environment – the Greek neighbor who now openly expresses his racist sentiments, the Greek grocery shop owner who now shows with his body language and rude behavior that immigrants are not welcome, the random encounter with a Greek on the streets of Patisia that could lead to violent confrontation etc. - was encircling them and leading on immigrants to lock themselves in their houses, in their shops, and to socialize mainly among co-ethnics:

He (immigrant) is terrified, in a corner of his house, and basically neither the state nor laws exist to protect him. You have a bus of 40 people, and 2 GD members or simply racists beating up an immigrant, and the rest 38 not reacting at all. (Tzaved Aslam, President of Pakistani Community & member of KEERFA)

With little recourses (solidarity networks, protections from the authorities etc.) available, particular measures that could be considered strategies targeted precisely to reduce the effects of racist violence are the change of transportation mode - like in the case of A. (Pakistan, Patisia, new) who bought a bicycle after being attacked by GD on his way home - and less frequent, relocate to safer neighborhoods – like in the case of Kh. (Afghanistan, Exarcheia, new) who moved to Exarcheia.

After GD's incarceration racist violence decreased rapidly, therefore we can say that immigrants returned back to pre-GD normality:

Things have changed a lot (after the incarceration). The good and the bad thing is that media play a huge role in this (GD's portrayal). I was greatly surprised that right the next day, people in the metro, bus, on the streets were talking 'oh my God, they (GD) were so bad'. I mean, couldn't they understand that before the incarceration; when they were killing and stabbing immigrants on the streets and squares? They believe only the things they hear in the media? . (Tzaved Aslam, President of Pakistani Community & member of KEERFA)

Indeed, the incarceration of GD was accompanied by a rapid change in the media discourse. If before it was developing around the premise of GD as a social phenomenon, that should be examined and understood (5.3), now GD was portrait in the media, in line with the indictment, as a criminal organization. This re-branding of GD seems to have had a reverse result from that of their entrance in the parliament – it de-legitimized the expression of racist sentiments. With fewer Greeks willing to be associated with a - now widely acknowledged - criminal organization, hence fewer attacks on the streets, immigrants' fear of racist violence from simple Greek citizens gradually subsided. In addition, with almost all GD's parliamentarians in jail, hence not able to motivate its members for 'activism', the frequency of GD attacks on immigrants was also reduced. Indicatively, the project *'The city at a time of crisis'* recorded only 25 incidents of racist violence, counting from the day after the incarceration (29 September 2013) until May 2015 (last report). Still, the post-GD 'normality' for immigrants is not deprived from racism in Greece.

Strategies newly arrived immigrants adapt to avoid Greekness' racism

Even if the violent hate crimes were reduced, Greekness' racism was/is still informing both society and institutions – *'right the next day, the police replaced GD'* (Tzaved Aslam, President of Pakistani Community & member of KEERFA). The very reasons behind the sudden shift in discourse indicate that the hardships of immigrants were not the focal point. Firstly, it was the murder of a Greek anti-racist rapper P.

Fyssas that resulted to be the red line for the apolitical Greeks who were sympathetic to GD for their 'courage' and anti-establishment stances, and not the attacks on immigrants. Secondly, racist violence in Greece had started to attract attention and criticism from abroad. That could be considered a 'stain' for the conservative New Democracy government that was about to assume presidency of the Council of European Union (January-June 2014) three months after the incarceration of GD. The ease and determination with which the government finally tackled the problem of GD, showed to many that tolerance of GD, in the political scene of the country, was to a certain degree a matter of political decision:

After September 28 the prosecutor calls me every other day to testify...We (KEERFA) have investigated and have a lot of data, proofs, victims...How is it possible that before that date hundreds of immigrants were attacked but nothing was done. The same laws existed back then...It was a political decision, namely 'it's ok, if the attacked are immigrants'. Maybe we own the shift to the upcoming presidency, but from our experience, GD could not do all that if laws were implemented, immigrants were not afraid to report hate crimes and arrests were done. (Tzaved Aslam, President of Pakistani Community & member of KEERFA)

So, with government's inaction and in times implicit support of GD's stances (5.3) there was very little immigrants could do to protect themselves from the direct racist violence, except from reducing to minimum their exposure to the Greek public. The remaining racism of Greekness and its expressions faced in different social settings requires different – long-term - strategies. Integration appears to be the main strategy of choice for immigrants that desire to settle their lives in Greece. From the interviewees of this paper, that inevitably includes second-generation immigrants and from the new, those who do not intend or can't return back to the countries of their origin.

Starting from the new immigrants, learning the language is considered a crucial step towards integration – *When you are in a country whose language you don't know, it feels as if you have eyes but can't see' (Kh. Afghanistan, Exarcheia, new)*. With no provision by the state for foreigners to learn Greek, Kh. searched for language courses offered in different cultural centers and immigrant organizations.

Basically I was searching for organizations that offer free language courses. From early on I had realized that only organizations for immigrants and refugees could help. If I was in Sweden, I'd had those classes provided for me for free (by the state), and when I would start working, through taxes I would return the money Swedish government had spent on me. My older brother was studying for 10 years, Fine Arts and Philosophy. He has started to pay back only recently through his job. Me? I've only finished high school and have no chances to continue with a university (Kh. Afghanistan, Exarcheia, new)

Well familiar with the successful integration experiences of his older brother in Sweden and younger in France Kh. can't help but to compare the structural assistance his brothers received with the absence of integration policies in Greece. With that regard, Kh. also expresses his bitterness over the unfortunate combination of circumstances that resulted in his 'entrapment', versus his brothers' 'escape' from Greece, and the differences in personal growth it entailed for each brother. Despite the fact that all brothers entered EU through Greece, each in different periods of time, the two brothers passed through Greece earlier, when the border controls were not as strict as they were when Kh. arrived to Greece in 2007. The initial aim was to continue his journey to Sweden, but the timing coincided with a sharp increase in immigrant flows and the subsequent increased alertness in the EU and strict implementation of Dublin 2 agreement – *'I knew from the beginning that by 90% they would return me*

back to Greece' (Kh. Afghanistan, Exarcheia, new). Alongside with the EU border policies though, Kh.'s poor motivation can also be related to his good adaptation in the Greek society – sometimes I think that if go now (to another EU country), I'll definitely have a problem (adapting), cause I'm used to life in Athens so much (Kh. Afghanistan, Exarcheia, new) - that started with the language courses.

The language courses helped Kh. not only in his economic but also social and cultural integration to the Greek society. The search for free courses inevitably led him to Exarcheia and in particular, the cultural center Nosotros. Through Nosotros Kh. got familiar with different immigrant organizations located in the area and got access to the immigrant solidarity network formed in Exarcheia. From there Kh.'s life changed dramatically. Firstly, he was provided with the opportunity to upgrade his professional status, from construction worker to a Farsi translator for a well-known NGO – *One day the president of the Afghani community called me and told me that an NGO is searching for translators. My Greek was still broken but I went for the interview and got hired, in 2011 (Kh. Afghanistan, Exarcheia, new).* Then, the different micro-spaces of Exarcheia facilitated his engagement in meaningful contacts (for 'meaningful contacts' and Leftism/Exarcheia see 3.2.2, 5.1, 6.1), that resulted, in him developing a sense of belonging and attachment to Greece – *'see this guy over there, his son is a big (beloved) brother to me. He was our teacher here' (Kh. Afghanistan, Exarcheia, new).* Allegedly today, Greeks comprise the 50% of his friends in Greece. In parallel to all that, he was pursuing his dream of acting by attending theater classes, also provided in Nosotros. With that regard, by the time I conducted the interview with Kh., he was participating in one of the theater companies of Metaxourgeio, that was enacting plays in small theaters of Metaxourgeio and Psiri. Following his acting career after the interview, I could observe his impressive upward career progression: participation with a theatrical play in the frames of Festival of Athens¹⁴² - the highest cultural event of Greece, participation in theatrical play among famous Greek actors¹⁴³, an upcoming participation in a tv series¹⁴⁴.

The most important though is that by integrating in the Greek society, Kh. could effectively respond and protect himself from racist violence.

Now that I understand Greek I can stand for myself. Once a man and a woman were shouting at a Pakistani guy in the bus 'you destroyed our country' etc.. I stand up and confront them 'We fucked up your country? You stole your country. I send 500 euros as a gift to my parents every now and then while a Pakistani usually works for 20 euros per day and lives with other 10 in one apartment. It is you who buy 200.000 euros German cars. And by the way, the only reason why I'm demanding my rights here, as a refugee, is because you have send army to fight my country'. After that some ladies stood up to confront them as well. At the end the majority in the bus supported me. (Kh. Afghanistan, Exarcheia, new)

Knowing the language and socializing with Greeks allow K. to reflect more accurately on the Greek reality and situate his position in that reality. In its turn, that empowers Kh. to retaliate when faced with racist violence, at least with its non-physical expressions. Incidents in busses like the one Kh. recounted, were very common during

¹⁴² 'We are the Persians' <http://greekfestival.gr/en/events/view/the-station-athens-group-2015>

Trailer: <https://vimeo.com/132524790>

¹⁴³ A theatrical remake of the movie *Qu'est-ce qu'on a fait au Bon Dieu?* By Philippe de Chaveron <https://www.athinorama.gr/theatre/article/thee-mou-ti-sou-kaname-2511385.html>

¹⁴⁴ Tv series 'Farewell, my dear in-law' <https://www.imdb.com/title/tt6456030/>

2012-2013 and were usually met with numbness or simply indifference of the rest of the passengers, as T. Aslam previously admitted. Informed by the media 'bombardment' with reports of racist violence, it is very likely that racist offenders felt encouraged to emulate what they see in TV, particularly when in the same reports counteraction to racist offending was absent. Kh.'s answering back, let alone with persuasive arguments, disrupted offenders' planned course of events that aimed to end with 'putting the immigrants in their places'. Secondly, his initiative triggered reactions from other passengers, sending the message to racist offenders that their views are still considered unacceptable by the majority, at least in the micro-space of the bus. In other words, while offenders, encouraged and informed by the media on how to act, believed that they serve the collective views in restoring Greekness' boundaries, they met the opposition of Kh. and the other passengers. If individually Kh. managed to protect himself by reversing the outcomes of an incident that aimed to harm him emotionally, together with the other passengers they engaged in an act of resistance against the racist order GD and its supporters aimed to impose. We can hypothesize that these offenders in particular could balk at the thought of attacking again immigrants in similar settings.

What prompted Kh. to counteract against the racist offenders, thought, was not the integration per se, but the fact that it allowed him to externalize his anger. As noted previously (3.2.1), anger is the only consequence of hate crimes with potentially dual outcomes. If internalized, it's just added to the list of negative emotional outcomes of hate crimes with destructive consequences for the individual psychological health. If externalized, anger can provoke a fightback with the subsequent mobilization for activism. Kh.'s different outcomes of anger strongly correlate with the different stages of his integration in Greece. At the beginning:

'When I was living in Patisia, people were constantly calling me thief that has destroyed their country in public places, dragging me here and there. I could sense it (the negativity) but since I wasn't speaking Greek, I could not answer them back. So, I was letting it all pass me by' (Kh. Afghanistan, Exarcheia, new).

As he was moving towards integration though his tolerance of racial violence was decreasing:

It bothers me a lot when cops stop me and drag you for 3-4 hours for nothing. Once in 2010, I was going to Greek classes, they stopped me at Patision str., forcibly throw me on the ground, opened my bag and only when they saw books in I heard 'it's the wrong guy'. I was very close to get beaten for no reason. (Kh. Afghanistan, Exarcheia, new).

Today, similar incidents are less likely to occur with Kh. without him answering back. Apart from the proficiency in language, through his working experience in an NGO he became well familiar with the asylum process and asylum-seekers' rights. Hence, not only can he protect himself from racist violence but also others when needed. It's doubtful if Kh. would have been able to externalize his anger in a productive way without feeling empowered by integration and the security of the multiethnic network of friends and co-workers he found himself in.

In times though, a simple supportive Greek environment is enough to empower immigrants. This was the case of M.I., a 33 years old male from Pakistan from whom I struggled to elicit negative outcomes from his recent attack by GD throughout the whole interview:

Did the outbreak of racist violence affect you?

No.

Neither after you were being beaten?

No. They kept me in the hospital for 2-3 days. The first Sunday after the beating I went to School...When I arrived everybody was shocked; why did you come? I told them that I'm not afraid and I didn't want to stay home anymore. (M.I., Pakistan, Kolonos, new)

M.I. started attending language courses at Sunday School of Immigrants - the main immigrant supporting organization in the neighborhood of Kolonos – realizing its need, as his then employer, at the construction site, was charging him with duties requiring language skills. In contrast to Kh., after 6 years attending the School M.I. speaks poorly Greek – admittedly, because he has neglected the courses – and his mobility of labor is insignificant – at the time of the interview he was working at a machine shop. But similarly to Kh. through the language courses he became member of School's community that apart from language courses and legal support¹⁴⁵, provides access to the wider immigrant support network of Athens. Having locals to rely on when in need, empowers M.I. immensely and in times allows him to engage in risky behavior that otherwise would probably refrain from:

You know that in Kolonos was the shop of Panagiotaros¹⁴⁶? I pass by that shop every day to go to work. Once my boss send me to buy wine and on my way back, around 10 people that were sitting outside the shop started insulting me. I didn't stop...I told my boss what happened and he said that from now on he won't send me anywhere. I was like 'no, I'm just warning you so that if I grab a tool from your store and attack them, you (better) act as if you don't know me'. He got scared and said 'No, no, we'll go to talk to them after the closing hour'. We went there. I didn't talk. My boss started telling them that I'm a good guy, working for him, and asked them to stop harassing me. Some of them were looking at me angrily and I started looking at them angrily as well, until one told me 'What are you looking at?'. 'Why are you looking at me?' I answered. My boss tried to calm me down but I replied 'no, you stay calm. I'm leaving. Whoever wants, I'm waiting for you outside (for a fight)'. 2-3 of them followed me. I thought 'ok, they might beat me a lot but at least I'll beat as well.' My boss once again stopped the fight and stayed inside to talk to them. I left and called the guys from the School. They told me to leave the area and that we will gather at School on Sunday to decide on how to counter-act. I was still furious so told them that if they don't come, I will call my Pakistani friends. They came, put me in their car, calmed me down and forbid me to go confront them.

Did you passed by Panagiotaros' shop after that?

They locked them up soon after the incident, and he had to close the shop (M.I., Pakistan, Kolonos, new)

It is dubious if M.I. would be able to act without having people to 'call' when in need. In this case he knew that he could rely on his employer and the members of Sunday school. They, in their turn, managed to control his anger and avoid a violent clash with GD members. In general, such organizations' aim is usually to channel immigrants' anger to a more productive and less violent forms of mobilization; organizations of anti-racist festivals, protests etc., as in the case of M.I. who is most of the times actively occupied with the practical matters of such events – *I participate in School 6 years now, but I don't go to classes. I do different chores here and there (M.I., Pakistan, Kolonos, new).*

But GD's violence of those days was fueling anger in the immigrant communities, allowing ideas of violent confrontation to emerge, at least among the socially

¹⁴⁵ Sunday School of Immigrants <https://www.ksm.gr/about/>

¹⁴⁶ GD parliamentarian, owner of the shop ΦΑΛΛΑΓΑ (Convoy) in Kolonos that was selling military gear and clothing. It was the main provider of GD members' garments. After the entrance of GD in the parliament, the shop became the main venue for GD members to gather in an attempt to establish their positions in the neighborhood of Kolonos. The shop was located a block away from Sunday School.

integrated and 'hot-tempered' immigrants. So, during the interview M.I. admitted that in a demonstration for the International Migrants Day, we both attended some weeks ago, he was one of the determined ones to try to break the police block and confront GD's counter-gathering outside their headquarters¹⁴⁷ – *Yes, we had decided beforehand with the guys (other immigrants from the School) that we will go there but they (police) stopped us (M.I., Pakistan, Kolonos, new)*. Without the dispassionate voices of people who organize such events, and undoubtedly the legal prosecution of GD that followed, it was very likely that Greece would also experience violent ethnic riots, similar to those observed in UK, as immigrants continue to integrate and organize.

In cases where the supportive environment, whether in the sense of a sizable spatially concentrated ethnic community, like the Pakistani, or immigrant supporting organization, is absent new immigrants resort to non-violent strategies. This was the case of an Indian interviewee that at first glance seemed of no use, for the topic of the current thesis, as he was describing his life in Greece with an unusual excitement – *I want to see other countries as well but I want to live only here*, had no complains for the police – *I don't have any problem with them because I have residents permit*, while repeatedly downplaying his personal experiences with Greek racism – *Nooo, Greeks are not racists. Only girls are (laughs)*¹⁴⁸ (*K. India, Patisia, new*). It was also impossible to elicit remarks over the expected ripple effect of hate crimes occurring in the vicinity of his living and working environment¹⁴⁹ – *Yes, many times (visits Ag. Panteleimonas square). At nights, and 2-3 o'clock in the morning. Why, GD has offices there? (laughs) (K. India, Patisia, new)*. But with one statement K. clarified his unusual, for the time and place, attitude:

So, you're not afraid walking in the city?

No. I'm a good guy. But my (Pakistani) friend had a problem with GD.

You were not afraid even after hearing that your Pakistani friend was attacked?

I'm not afraid that much because I'm not hanging with Pakistanis, like my friend. I have mostly Albanian and Romanian friends that I hang out with outside...Greeks as well. That's why I don't have problems with GD. I've seen them 2-3 times (on the streets) but they didn't say to me anything. (K. India, Patisia, new)

Drawing on Assumptive World Theory we can say that K. strongly relies on the principle of controllability; a persons' 'proper' behavior defines his vulnerability against negative events and outcomes (3.2). K. feels at ease because he believes that by being a 'good guy', namely having solved the main practical problems immigrants face - legal stay and job – *Look, I came here to work. And I work straight. Not doing bullshit (illegal activities). If I do bullshit people will also do me bullshit. If I'm straight, everybody will be straight with me'* (*K. India, Patisia, new*), he is secured from negative experiences. Having succeeded in issues that, particularly in Greece of economic crisis are not necessarily depending on one's conduct, further strengthened his belief that he can control the outcomes of other life aspects as well (self-controllability). Hence, the certainty that he managed to protect himself from GD by diversifying the ethnic composition of his social circle.

¹⁴⁷ The demonstration was initially aiming to approach GD's headquarters, but as GD announced a counter-gathering on the same day, the police forbid protestors' access by blocking the road leading to headquarters. Despite that a group of protestors attempted to break the police block.

¹⁴⁸ A conclusion he reached after being rejected by Greek girls couple of times on racist basis

¹⁴⁹ K. works in an internet-cafe located right on one of the three main roads of Patisia

The main way K. chose to control the negative outcomes of racist violence is by adapting Goffman's passing and covering strategies (3.2.2). As admitted, K. deliberately socializes with Albanian and Romanian immigrants who are physiologically undistinguishable from locals. His physical appearance – tall, with a skin color close to dark skinned South Europeans - allow his discredited ethnic traits to dissolve in a group of people, that all together could be easily passed for 'normal' Greeks. On the contrary, a group of co-ethnics would further highlight those traits and increase his likelihood of racist victimization – a reason K. suggested over GD's attack on his Pakistani friend.

It would be logical to conclude that K.'s choice of the passing strategy was a result of his friendship particularly with Albanian immigrants. As it has been noted previously, in an attempt to reduce their likelihood of racist discrimination and be accepted by the Greek society Albanians were led to hide, or even forgo ethnic traits, such as religion or language (2.3, 6.2). This at first glance voluntaristic strategy dictated to them on macro level, on the micro level of day-to-day interaction can be translated as the passing strategy. Even though on daily basis Albanians can maneuver between numerous strategies, given the diversity of situational and relational frames daily life provides, i.e. work, shopping for groceries, leisure time etc., passing strategy results to be successful in reducing the likelihoods of racist violence and its negative consequences, particularly during interactions with people that they don't expect to develop further relations. It is very likely that K., decided to follow the passing strategy after witnessing the affirmative feedback his Albanian neighbors in Patisia were receiving, when using it. By joining them K., manages to enjoy more his life in Greece, since a group of friends passing for Greeks has more chances to visit more neighborhoods, engage in a greater variety of leisure activities, social contacts etc. That probably could explain why K.'s favorite places in Athens are the nightlife areas of the affluent and exclusive, to economic immigrants, neighborhoods of Marousi and Kifisia.

K.'s case in particular shows that he also engages in a self-controlling behavior of covering. Apart from the unusual enthusiasms and refusal to acknowledge the severity of racism in Patisia, during our interview, K. numerous times was attempting to avert from the banal topics that surrounds immigrants in Athens and turning the discussion to impressions from different countries that he and I have visited or would like to visit – *I like Holland!!! I have family there, in Bredevoort, and a cousin in Glasgow...My family is there as well, but I don't like UK. I don't know why...My dream is to see Sydney, I think it's beautiful. Have you ever visited Sydney?* (K. India, Patisia, new). In a way it felt that I should leave with the impression of him as a traveler, who 'felt in love' with Greece and decided to stay despite the hardships – *Because I was seeing those beautiful pictures of Europe and wanted to come and see* (K. India, Patisia, new) and not to associate him with the stereotypical socio-cultural setting of Patisia.

Factors that contribute to newly arrived immigrants' adaptation choices

What differentiates the last three new immigrants who deviated from their co-ethnics' life path in Greece by choosing active strategies and integration is their relatively high human capital. Defined as 'changes in person that bring about skills and capabilities that make them able to act in new ways (Coleman, 1988, p. 100), high

human capital is essential in finding, embodying and using new, useful sources of knowledge when they intercept one's life path. In the absence of official integration policies in Greece, that type of new knowledge is up to random chance encounters. For instance, Kh.'s initial high human capital led him to the understanding that Greek language would improve his quality of life. The search for courses channeled him to Exarcheia, where apart from the language, he embodied elements of the Greek leftist social structure, that also started informing his actions (starting theater, activism etc.). In contrast, K.'s life path intercepted with his Albanian neighbors, and by witnessing the success of their adaptation strategies, he chose to be informed in his actions by them. In what follows, I'll try to describe the outcomes of interplay between different (high) human capitals and random chance encounters on the example of three new immigrants.

Starting with Kh., he comes from a relatively affluent Hazara family – *when we were gathering the almond crops that we had, we could live 2 years with that money (Kh. Afghanistan, Exarcheia, new)* - of a high school teacher (teaching mathematics, chemistry and biology), who was also a member of the Hezbe Wahdat¹⁵⁰ party. After being arrested and tortured by the Taliban due to his active involvement in politics, and under the fear of his young sons being forcefully taken as soldiers – *all young boys over 12 years old were taken to war (Kh. Afghanistan, Exarcheia, new)* - Kh.'s father sent Kh., (14 y.o. at the time) and his older brother (16) to Iran. In 2004 (after US invasion), K. returned to Afghanistan only to learn that everyone from his relatives had left Afghanistan. From then, Kh. decided to follow his older brother's footsteps to Sweden, spending 3 years in the Iran-Turkey route, until 2007 when he entered Greece. Reflecting on how his life could be different:

The only reason why we (family) left is war. There is no other reason!...Our village was a heaven...If we didn't had war I would most likely go to Kabul's University after high school, and then to continue with my studies somewhere else. (Kh. Afghanistan, Exarcheia, new)

Until today Kh., is saddened for not being offered an opportunity for higher education. Yet, his life path, particularly the years on-the-road, led to his first-hand familiarization with situations and concepts such as war, (geo)politics, racism, exploitation etc. The knowledge amassed throughout that life path has provided him with flexible (survival) skills to be used during decision-making processes in different social contexts of Greece. Still, as he admits, a basic education, even if it's on the reading/writing level, is a precondition:

I was hanging out with some Arabs who are here 15-20 years and they talk worse than me. While my Afghan friends, who are also from my hometown, after 6-7 years have no problem with the language. Only Afghans who haven't been to school at all have problems because they don't know what grammar is in the first place. Like my mom's cousin, with whom I was initially living in Patisia. He still doesn't speak Greek' (Kh. Afghanistan, Exarcheia, new)

A second precondition is the desire to settle their life in Greece:

Basically if you want to change your life qualitatively, no matter where you ended up, you can do it...I've observed that Pakistanis and Arabs don't want to learn the language. Maybe they think that having a job, making some money and support their families back home, where there is a lot of poverty. We (family) in Afghanistan, we never lived with the fear of starving, but a Pakistani might be thinking 'I have a job, know some words to communicate, I'm fine'. They don't even search (for opportunities), with exception this

¹⁵⁰ A pro-Hazara (third largest ethnic group of Afghanistan) party of Afghanistan
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hezbe_Wahdat

(Pakistani) guy over there. And again, he asked ME where he could attend courses. If he would have asked a Pakistani, he probably wouldn't advise him to learn the language...The job positions for Farsi language are all covered with first-generation immigrants like my friends and me. On other languages, only second-generation immigrants work. (Kh. Afghanistan, Exarcheia, new)

The Pakistani guy, Kh. was referring to in this quote, resulted to be the only Pakistani who participated in the theatrical play they enacted for the festival of Athens¹⁵¹. Since the play was narrating actors' actual stories, from the Pakistani actor's story we can infer that he had one extra motive to diverge from Pakistani immigrants' typical life path in Greece - he wanted to act. According to the story he narrated, acting was considered incompatible with understandings of masculinity in the conservative society he came from. Hence, his social environment discouraged him from pursuing a career in the field early on. It is very likely that a random chance encounter with Kh. – probably somewhere in Patisia - and the knowledge Kh. shared, prompted him to try acting in Greece. That requires a certain command in Greek, which inevitably will lead him to diverge from Pakistanis' work-home lifestyle and follow Kh.'s footsteps (6.2).

A similar random chance encounter defined the particularities of M.I.'s integration. In contrast to the majority of Pakistanis immigrants who follow Cumulative Causation pattern of immigration, M.I. didn't come to Greece for economic reasons. According to his words, his parents were pressuring him to leave university, which he was struggling to finish, as he failed some of exams. A series of arguments on the matter, or simply different visions over M.I.'s future, provoked his reactionary character to take the radical decision to immigrate, following the immigration paths, already steered by his fellow countrymen.

I had good relations with my parents. They didn't want me to go...because I'm their only son. They were telling me 'You need money? I'll give you money. Open a business, or something, here.' I told them 'No matter how much money you'd give me I won't stay here'...The first day in Athens, my cousin's friends had gathered in his house and were telling me 'You'll come to work with me', 'No, he'll come to work with me'. But my cousin told them 'No, let him wander around (to see/familiarize with the city). He has a whole life ahead of him to work'...(meanwhile) my father was telling him to convince me to go back (M.I., Pakistan, Kolonos, new)

Even if from the above we can suggest that M.I. comes from a relatively affluent family with high cultural capital, their social structure is infused with strict patriarchal features. As he continues to live in Greece with his older cousin, who similarly to Kh.'s relative still struggles with the language – *He's here more than 18 years, but he doesn't speak Greek. He takes me with him, every time he goes to public services (M.I., Pakistan, Kolonos, new)* - and is attached to traditional lifestyle, M.I. is tied and obliged to comply with Pakistani norms. On the other hand, his encounter with the School further enriches his already high human capital with new knowledge, inevitably exchanged during interactions with School's stuff¹⁵². As a result, when M.I. is asked to act, he manages to balance between the two social structures, whether when it comes to activism discussed earlier or everyday life:

I'm 33 and my cousin is 42. He doesn't do any of the household chores. I clean, cook. Yesterday I returned home at 10. He was like 'How come you returned home? Didn't they

¹⁵¹ Trailer: <https://vimeo.com/132524790>. In the play participated 4 actors from Afghanistan, 1 from Pakistan and 1 from Bangladesh

¹⁵² Even if Sunday School of Immigrants doesn't claim a clear political identity, its participants and activities beyond language courses are organized around leftist principles. For a certain period of time was actively supported by the leftist party of SYRIZA

have a bed to offer you sleep there? (sarcastically).’ I replied, ‘No, I just came to cook for you’. ‘Leave it and go, if you have a job to do’. I replied, No, a friend of mine throws a birthday party. I’m going there. But if you get angry, I’ll cook first and then leave’

Why only you cook in the house?

Well, he’s older. So, I don’t want to put him do all that stuff. (M.I., Pakistan, Kolonos, new)

Lastly, K.’s random chance encounter with Albanian second-generation immigrants defined his integration particularities. K., refrained from elaborating about his background, apart from the fact that he decided to immigrate to Greece, a month after graduating college. Yet, his benevolent outlook on life in Greece (expressed throughout the whole interview) and most importantly, his repeated claims that racism is not a matter of concern to him, according to Blee (2007) could indicate a high human capital. As Blee notes, those who see themselves as having high status are more likely to dismiss interpretations of hate crimes as such, in contrast to the less integrated, like recent immigrants, students and housewives (2007). Hence, in the micro space of Patsia K.’s human capital helped him to detect an easily adaptable and successful strategy, tailored to his needs. In the absence of micro spaces like the School or Nosotros and the fact that in Patsia immigrants’ (meaningful) interactions with locals are limited, K. found the needed knowledge through encounters with Albanian second-generation immigrants in his immediate environment.

Strategies second-generation immigrants adapt to avoid Greekness’ racism

Strategies that allow the negotiation of relational and situational identities are extensively used by visible second-generation immigrants as well. In their case though, it is their professional status that is being highlighted during interactions with locals. In the case of K., who works as Urdu translator in courts - a high status workplace in the Greek occupational hierarchy - also protects him from casual every-day racism:

I have and still face racism. But now they can’t afford it. I tell them where I work and they shut up. Probably thinking ‘we can get in trouble with this guy working in courts’ (K. Pakistan, Marousi, s-g)

Or even from GD’s squads:

Look, I will definitely experience fear if I see 10-15 GD members on the streets. I’ll tell you an example from GD’s trial. I was there at courts. While entering (the courts) I passed in front of them and they said nothing. While going to meet some colleagues for the lunch break one of them was eyeballing me. I look back and say ‘What’s you’re looking at? What do you want’. On my next turn to look at him, there were already 6, staring at me. At that that moment I got scared and started scanning the space for chairs from cafes,...anything that could be thrown at them, and preparing myself (mentally) for fight. But no one approached me.

Aren’t you afraid that they can stalk and check who you are?

That’s what they were doing. Of course now I’m part of their system. Therefore, they should watch their moves. If they stalk me, they will see me among lawyers, cops, in police stations etc. (K. Pakistan, Marousi, s-g)

Particularly in those cases where his high position in occupational hierarchy is used, K. communicate his professional status though symbols such as professional clothing, business cards etc. For instance, K. arrived for our interview ‘straight from work’ wearing a formal suite and coat, an attire - symbol of high status occupation. It is very likely that it was that appearance that made GD members to hesitate over whether attacking a man who from one side is clearly of immigrant origin, on the other, with his

appearance could be easily passed for a lawyer. After all, as Tzaved Aslam notices, GD had instructed its members from the beginning not to leave evidences that could lead to GD – *what their lawyers advised them is not to talk, not to insult, just hit and leave, so that there are no proofs of a hate crime (Tzaved Aslam, President of Pakistani Community & member of KEERFA)*. Therefore, it would be quite reckless to attack an immigrant outside the court where GD is being tried, who, given the ambiguity of his whole appearance, could get them into more troubles.

K.'s new situational identity is used not only to protect him from racist violence but it also redefines his social status in different relational frameworks as well. For the first time, K., found himself in a power position that could demand the respect and/or recognition from a society of 'Motherland, Religion, Family' that according to his feelings would never recognize a Muslim as a Greek:

I was always reacting, talking back etc. But when you gain power it's different. You are more self-confident, less stressed. Now, you have the respect of the police, judges. Now I personally know (listing names of famous Greek lawyers) ...Let me give you my business card. It has helped me a lot! Before they (employers) were treating me in a diminishing way, i.e. I was a dishwasher in a restaurant and the owner - who was a bit right-winger - was calling me a wretch. Recently I saw one of the waitresses at the courts. I told her, take my business card and show it to him, because none of you believed in me. (K. Pakistan, Marousi, s-g)

The gained self-confidence combined with his reactive character made him also less hesitant in getting involved when witnessing other immigrants' racist harassment:

- *There were moments where I have stood up for unknown people. For instance, I was at the queue of Lidl's checkout. There were some African women. A man passes by and starts the 'go back to your country' etc. For some time, I was thinking 'shall I or shall I not intervene'. So, I take the decision and say 'grab your stuff and get out of here'. He looks at me 'Who are you?' I'm like 'Wait for me outside'. He didn't. I demean that kind of people because they deserve it. (K. Pakistan, Marousi, s-g)*
- *You know those people in busses, 'immigrants do this, do that' etc. Once in front of me one was insulting some Pakistanis. I said 'dude, I'm also from Pakistan. Do you have something to say now?' (K. Pakistan, Marousi, s-g)*

Despite the fact that K.'s life has improved, he still wants to immigrate to UK. Undoubtedly, the demand for translators in courts has risen sharply during the immigration crisis, particularly after GD's entrance in the parliament. Yet, it is not convincing that that type of occasional employment can offer a sustainable alternative for his economic stability. Neither the high status that it ensues can last for long, in order to protect him from racist harassment, as its demand fluctuates. His experiences of living in UK, though sound far more promising. In contrast to K., who at the time of the interview still hadn't obtained Greek citizenship, his siblings had successfully obtained the British long ago. Thanks to that K. has lived for 5 years in UK and can compare the differences in quality of life.

Your life looks fine here. Why do you want to leave?

I'm fed up. I don't have any particular plans about what I'm gonna do in Manchester. But I'm sure that I'll find something. My friends have companies. My sister has opened a big spa salon and it's going very well.

Pakistanis are better there than here, right?

No, doubt! You don't see there the things you see here. It (racism) exists there as well. You constantly hear that 'Paki', 'Paki'. For me it is just envy, when you see successful people...My friends are living very well there. That strikes the eye of the Brits. Namely, for a 20 years old guy driving an expensive car, he must be doing illegal stuff. (But) You have your rights. You have places to pray. You have it all. Here they attempted to build a mosque, for only 300 persons, and you heard about the reactions...The Chinese are

celebrating their New Year's Eve in the streets of their Chinatown. And us? Is this the image a Chinatown should have¹⁵³? (K. Pakistan, Marousi, s-g)

Throughout the whole interviews K., was referring and linking the topics we discussed to the institutional racism he experiences in Greece. As discussed in the previous chapters, for second-generation immigrants GD is an exceptional phenomenon of crisis times. Their life-long and acute problems though derive from Greekness. For instance, despite having grown up in Greece, K.'s siblings managed to eventually obtain citizenship in UK, since Greekness, that governs states institution, doesn't provide such rights to those not of the Ethnos. Having experiences from other European countries, a second immigration, to a more open to immigrants, country seems a reasonable opportunity they have in order to improve their lives qualitatively.

For second-generation immigrants that have spent all their lives in Greece a simple trip abroad can have the reverse effects of a shattered Assumptive World. In a way, it can restore the assumption of the benevolence of the world. In particular, when visible immigrants find themselves in places - countries or societies (social structures) - more open to diversity, they experience strikingly different embodied emotions, to those their bodies generate in a societies infused with racism:

*When I travel, the moment I step my foot off the plane, i.e. I've been to Australia, I can't describe you my feelings. The air is different, the reality is different, I am different and everything is adventure. It felt like I was high on drugs. **It felt like home.** I was meeting people from all around the world, to the point that I (had the opportunity to) choose with whom I want to hang out. I had that feeling when I returned in Greece as well. I remember we went (camping) to Evia. I took a guitar and started playing, people started gathering around us. I liked a girl, I asked her to go out with me. Namely, I was doing things, that I could never imagine doing. It was still doped from (the experience from) abroad. It faded away after some time. (E. Kenya, Kypseli, old)*

Finding himself in a place where Greekness is absent was a revelation to E. Firstly, he experienced an array of positive emotions never felt before. The most important of them was the unprecedented freedom to act and shape his reality as he desires. Secondly, as oxymoron as it sounds, in a completely foreign country, E. felt like home. On macro level, the main reason, for E. not referring to Greece as his home, is his understanding that *'me as a black guy will never become an equal member of the Greek society'*. On the micro level of everyday life, Greekness' boundaries force E. to limit the expressions of his individual identity and restrict his social actions - *When I liked a girl, I would always retract. You know, I would always find an excuse to put on the breaks. That's what I was used to do in Athens. (E. Kenya, Kypseli, old)*. It becomes understandable then that a social structure that doesn't allow E. to practice his full identity, and to fully enjoy all aspects of life cannot be felt 'a home'. As for Kenya, even if his father insisted in emphasizing its centrality in family's identity, as E. noted, it was practically absent during the formation of E.'s identity. Yet, in its own way, it was also imposing its restrictions – *I have internalized the thought that I represent the Kenyans or Africans in general. So I would modify my behavior and actions in order to reflect a good image. I realized that abroad (E. Kenya, Kypseli, old)*. Therefore, if neither Greece

¹⁵³ The interview was conducted in Metaxourgeio, a neighborhood with a significant concentration of Chinese immigrants and their entrepreneurship. Despite the fact that in the mental maps of Athenians certain blocks of the neighborhood are already known as Chinatown, it resembles little the, open to the wider society, ethnic enclaves observed elsewhere

<https://www.flickr.com/photos/127226743@N02/18937969616/in/album-72157653792470698/>

View from the inner courtyard <https://www.flickr.com/photos/127226743@N02/18777984679>

nor Kenya, a third country/social structure managed successfully to substitute the need for a home where no one expects from him to act in accordance to pre-defined norms of Greece or Kenya.

Thirdly, without the cuffs of Greekness, at 'home', E. had the opportunity to practice social skills, he would hesitate to exercise in Greece. Despite the fact that '*we all wear masks, not because we are hypocrites, but in a sense that we show a different self in a formal environment and other in a familiar environment*' (Antigoni, Vice principal of Lyceum of Kareas, 2015), we can infer from E.'s stories that he constantly wears a mask – or an armor, as E. metaphorically refers to his self-seclusion - in most social occasions in Greece because he fears that his actual self will be rejected (6.2). The first time he had the opportunity to reveal his actual self was in Greece, but in a place where Greekness was absent. The feedback he received was surprisingly positive:

A lot of my problems were solved during YRE's camping. I was at an anti-racist festival and some guys gave me a flyer of the camping. I was like, 'why not?' I experienced a culture shock. I had friends from every table people were gathered around...I felt a lot of love and protection. Nobody was insulting me, calling me 'arapi'¹⁵⁴. If my life was like that in Greece, it would be heaven. I went again the next year, and 'yeap, heaven again' (not only first impression). The girls were sophisticated. They were seeing me as the guy Martin Luther King was talking about, the quality of my character and not the color of my skin...So at some point I realized that not only I can be myself, but I'm also not bad at it (socializing while being himself). I could choose to talk to any girl, even if she was the most popular in the camp...I couldn't believe what I was living...But you have to be in a safety environment, like YRE's camp, if you want to abandon your amour (E. Kenya, Kypseli, old)

The summer camps E., is referring to are organized by the organizations Youth Against Racism in Europe¹⁵⁵ and AntiNazi Zone¹⁵⁶. Despite that E., learned about the camp in a similar anti-racist event in Athens, it was the environment of the camp that resulted life changing. The difference may lie on the fact that during the 10 days of the camp people are not just invited, like visitors, to participate in activities and socialize among like-minded, but also live and create a daily reality together. Even if this involves banal activities like parties, cooking, excursions etc., or less banal like talks, workshops, movie screenings, the process resembles more the formation of a community from scratch. The rules and topics – usually involve current social affairs discussed through a leftist approach - around which that community is organized, took E. from the margins, from where he was used to observe life in Greece, and not only put him at the epicenter of the common interest, but also encouraged him to actively participate in its formation. For E. that was an '*utopian*' and a '*healing*' experience and he recommends it to anyone he believes suffers from the same consequences of racism:

I was talking with my friend that was repetitively rejected by a girl he liked and he was hurt about it. I said, YER my man! He met a girl there and up until now I can say that she healed him. ONE PERSON IS ENOUGH!...She accepted him as he is. Hugs and kisses at the central square of the island. Nothing of the usual 'let's keep it between us' or 'hey Thanasi come with us so that we don't look like a couple' (E. Kenya, Kypseli, old)

E.'s friend's experience with this girl resulted in a more extraordinary act that broke down one important barrier of Greekness for second-generation immigrants:

And at some point she throws the crazy idea 'Why don't you come to my village this summer?' He was like 'Man, I'm not going there alone. You will also come with me. If they

¹⁵⁴ The equivalent of the 'n*word' in Greek vernacular

¹⁵⁵ <http://www.yre.org.uk/about.html>

¹⁵⁶ <http://www.antinazizone.gr/>

kill me, I want you there, at least as a witness'. So we go there, and her parents had prepared the richest breakfast table we've ever eaten.

Did you also meet the Grandfather?

He did. When I was there only the Father was present. I was (acting) the diplomat there; 'Hello! How do you do? It's really nice to meet you' etc. The moment the Father enters he's like 'How are you doing my boys?' We hugged, kissed, talked, they wanted us to stay overnight. They were wandering all over the village, kissing at the central square. I was on alert, as a lookout, so that the Grandfather doesn't emerge with a shotgun from somewhere. Long story short, he went back again, with his sister, they hosted them. From then, he became a different person. That girl took him out of his darkness. One person is sufficient (E. Kenya, Kypseli, old)

If the family is the basic social unit upon which Greekness is build, the Greek village is the basic spatial unit where - compared with urban areas - the Greek concept of family is being reproduced with slower pace of alterations. Namely, the Greek nuclear, patriarchal family still persists more or less in its traditional understanding. For that understanding, homogamy, that would secure Greekness racial/ethnic homogeneity, is central (2.2). Therefore, for a black guy being invited to a Greek village - as the partner of the daughter of the family - signifies a breakthrough in previous social arrangements as it disrupts the very kernel of Greekness (2.2). By welcoming E. and his friend the family introduced a new element to the social structure of the village, that from now on will be reproduced with embedded the potentials of acceptance of interracial couples. The fact that the father and the grandfather –the highest positions in the hierarchy and guardians of the family - accepted the interracial couple, while the latter were also free to walk around the village in plain view, adds to the new knowledge a more official status.

The whole occurrence let the two black friends to change their social structure, or assumptive schema, as well. Drawing on the previous, mainstream, knowledge that posits the structure of the Greek village as an exaggerated model of Greekness, hence highly exclusive to visible migrants, the two friends initially reacted to the invitation with surprise and disbelief. The use of humor in describing the event – with the relatives that will 'kill him', the grandfather who will come after them with a shotgun - in a way is a stereotype-disconfirming strategy (Valenta, 2009), as it ridicules their role in Greekness. On the other hand, the excitement with which E., narrated me the story, also reflects the emphasis E., puts on the unprecedented and life-changing significance the visit had on them. Until that day E.'s life was spent in a multicultural environment, where natives were also present. But as he confessed during interaction with them Greekness' barriers were frequently emerging (6.2), impelling him to raise his own as well. It was this village experience, in particular the in-practice demonstration of his acceptance in the core of Greekness, that fits Valentine's understanding of meaningful contact – the one that 'actually changes values and translates beyond the specifics of the individual moment into a more general positive respect...for others' (Valentine, 2008, p. 325). For E. and his friend, that meaningful encounter resulted, first and foremost, in them restoring the so essential assumption of the benevolence of the world.

Having one of the categories of AW restored, led E. to improve the other as well. After first-hand experiencing benevolence in those occasions, E. gained confidence as he was receiving positive feedback by simply being himself (worthiness of self). This further led him to believe that his conduct or behavior can influence the outcomes in his life (meaningfulness). Therefore, instead of the invisibility that he usually resorted

to, in order to avoid negative outcomes from the native surrounding, this time he pushes himself out of his comfort zone. In a self-healing fashion, he deliberately engages himself in endeavors that, according to him, even if not very pleasant, will improve traits of his personality that don't allow him to abandon the armor. Theater resulted to be the best-suited activity in that direction:

Then, I got involved with theater there (at YRE camp), in the frames of cultural events in the center of the island. I decided to try. I was so reserved, but the moment I started playing I felt like I was elevating a step. I was not bothered by anything people down (in the audience) were saying. I was from above and was listening what they were saying. I was not an inferiority to be stepped on. I was a bit higher. Why higher? Because I dared and came out in front of an audience, something that not many (immigrants) would do...All the rest are shy, intimidated and don't want to do it. I felt that I've transcended myself, so, the 'other' can't look at me from above. (E. Kenya, Kypseli, old)

Theater was a recurrent topic in this fieldwork. It is usually the immigrants of high human capital that want to settle in Greece, like E. or the newly arrived Kh. and his friends, who choose theater. For them it's a form of not only getting out of invisibility and take a more active role in the Greek society, but also as a form of communicating their side of the immigrant narrative. The plays they participate usually deal with social issues relevant to immigration, and enacted in an experimental form, that allows actors the freedom to actively participate with their personal contributions during the whole process. For instance, actors of 'We are the Persians' used that chance to share with the audience their personal life stories. Turning impersonal stories into a personal is one of the strategies Valenta's immigrant participants used in order to show that 'the identity imposed on them by indigenous locals did not match the full complexity of their personal history' (2009, p. 364). This strategy is considered more successful during interactions with friends, as that relational frame provides more opportunities for immigrants to present their life stories - additional biographical information, photos etc. Theater though offers the same opportunity but to a wider audience of strangers. So, although it requires a separate attention – not given in the frames of this fieldwork - it seems that theater has positive effects for migrants on both macro and micro levels. On micro, immigrants are using it for their personal benefit. Some, like E., are benefiting from its therapeutic potential, some found their vocation, like Kh. and his Afghani friends, some find in it the opportunity for self-fulfillment, like in the case of the Pakistani actor in 'We are the Persians' who could not actualize his ambitions back home, as theater was inconsistent with the Pakistani understanding of masculinity. On macro level, by communicating their stories, in this artistic form, to a socially and culturally diverse audience, they have the opportunity to influence the exclusive narrative towards immigrants. We can say that through the platform of theater they are 'doing difference' for both the host society and themselves.



Pic. 6.3-1 E. participating in a performance presented in Berlin. Source: https://www.facebook.com/pg/CIVIL-2-847406728666456/photos/?tab=album&album_id=885357521538043

7 Conclusion

The present work has embarked an attempt to understand the impetus behind racist violence on the streets of Athens, sparked with the entrance of Golden Dawn in the Greek parliament in 2012. It was expected that the economic crisis, and the political instability it ensued, would have played the major role in informing racist offenders' actions. But the crisis resulted to be a mere catalyst that facilitated the expression of the already existing racist sentiments in Greek society. This thesis therefore firstly investigated the sources of racism in Greece and their manifestations on different migration groups (Research Question 1). Secondly it focused on how different migrant waves and groups dealt with different narrative frames they were enclosed in by Greekness' racism (Research question 2). Based on the findings of this thesis I propose an approach for policy intervention that could potential help to solve conflicts studied in this thesis. Lastly I provide a reflection over the trajectory of social change Greece follows today.

How Greekness leads to racist offending?

This thesis has demonstrated that racism is an element embedded in the structuring principles of the Greek ethnic identity. Structural principles are being transformed into action through daily and lifelong participation Greece's social systems organize. The consequences of practices informed by Greekness, feed back to the abstract macro-level to continue informing further (racist) action. In what follows, I will describe the emergent homeostatic loop (Pic. 1-1) of Greekness' reproduction and the reproduction of racism embedded in its principles.

Greekness itself is a product of positivist dominance in social and political theory in Europe, at the time it was conceived. It emerged as a necessity of transforming a former part of multicultural Ottoman Empire into a nation-state after Greece's Independence (1821). We can say, that the social paradigm of the time pressured for a link between the ancient Greek relics scattered all around the Greek physical space with the Christian Orthodox social reality of the 19th century. The link was established with the help of positivisms' organic understanding of social objects that served to unite the two conceptually conflicting social structures into one historic synthesis, better described as Helleno-Christianity.

Greekness implies that a Greek is being born Greek, and does not become Greek (organic concept). That theoretically means that by birth a Greek inherits from his ancestors a set of *structural principles* attributed solely to Greeks. The literature review revealed that those principles are three: common genealogical ancestry with a genetic succession that goes back to Ancient Greeks, (as tangible proof is regarded the linguistic socio-spatial continuum), common cultural traditions arbitrary defined as Greek, and common religion – Orthodox Christianity. This approach intertwines the physical and social worlds implying that Greekness exists in "Greek genes". Therefore, as it exists beyond human conduct, it can't change and cannot be influenced, through historic time (dating from Ancient Greece) and space (defined by the Greek irredentist "Great Idea").

As the triad defines the distinctiveness of Greece from the rest ex-Ottoman states, “others” are defined in opposition to Greekness. Namely, others are anyone else whose identities are not structured by the triad of its principles – does not bear the “Greek genes”, doesn’t share the Greek culture and is not an Orthodox Christian. External others are considered neighboring ex-Ottoman states that could raise territorial (Turkey, Albania) or cultural (Macedonia) claims. Internal others are considered ethnic minorities residing in enclaves (e.g. Muslim minorities of Thrace) and within Greece’s social fabric (immigrants). The latter, by participating in the Greek society through daily interaction and potentially act differently from what Greekness provides, will “contaminate” and “decompose” its national “body”¹⁵⁷, as the organicness of Greekness implies. Subsequently, when Greekness is threatened by others a Greeks’ duty is to defend it, by defending its uniqueness. This thesis found that defending Greekness is most commonly achieved by excluding and isolating the other from participation in Greek society (social systems). The first massive migration wave forced Greeks to accommodate and place immigrants in society, yet they constrained it with limited social mobility. The way to overcome this ‘immigrant fate’ is assimilation.

The aforementioned principles are informing action through practices Greek *social systems* organize – the education system, the Church of Greece and political and media environment (type-1 relations). Informed by Greekness, they will enable practices that regulate action to secure Greekness’ principles and conditions of reproduction (reflexive monitoring). Racist violence – a defensive mechanism - is a tangible consequence systems’ reflexive monitoring. A reflection of this process are the texts that circulated among Greek residents of Patisia - the most ethnically diverse neighborhood of Athens - to motivate racist attacks on immigrants (type-2 relations).

The analysis of those revealed that the historic narrative over Greekness and “others” that prevails in *the education system*, has been narrowed down to the micro-level of urban neighborhoods, where encounters with others most commonly occur. Similarly, to Greekness it draws on selective historical memory of a glorious past and social cohesion due to homogeneity of Patisia’s residents that have been disrupted due to presence of visible minorities, ignoring the urban planning decisions, preceding migration, which led to the devaluation of Patisia’s material space (system of antiparoxi, see 3.1.3). Those texts recognize the ability of the old non-visible immigrants to integrate in the ‘normal way of life’, suggesting their partial compatibility with Greekness’ properties – religion for Pontic Greeks and wider Balkan culture for Albanians. They refuse to recognize the same ability for visible immigrants, whose manifestations of economic inequalities and social exclusion are attributed to ‘inferior’ ethno-racial features. Residents’ complaints about ‘the deteriorating moral profile of the area’ and ‘the aesthetic devaluation of public space where immigrants are concentrated’ (Kandyliis & Kavoulakos, 2011, p. 171) reflect an organic understanding of the visible “other” where immigrants’ physical identity traits (skin color(s)) and social structures are intertwined and perceived as an inferior solid body that decomposes, socially and physically, the formerly homogenous Greek body of Patisia. Social systems, discussed in this thesis, resulted to reproduce that narrative, turning the localized ‘threat’ to national. At least 6% of the electorate from 2012 to 2015 responded to the call to defend Greece from the threat of immigrants by voting GD.

¹⁵⁷ Words extracted from archbishop Anthimos’s Sunday sermons, 5.2

The first to embrace that narrative was the caretakers of Greekness – *the Church of Greece*. With its central role in Greekness and the relations of symbolic and material interdependency with the state, the Church has personal interests in supporting political streams that base their agenda on the protection of Greekness - that is, the nationalist right-wing political spectrum (5.2). With regards to migration, the case of Greece eventually complying with its international obligations, regarding Human Rights, and granting rights to religious minorities, threats to dethrone the ‘prevailing religion’ from its dominance both in institutions and society. Hence, most prominent figures of Church will assume their role to ‘feed the poor’¹⁵⁸ but would refrain from discussions of their further accommodation in Greece¹⁵⁹. Yet, some are explicitly vocal against immigrants. Its most popular figure - archbishop of Thessaloniki Anthimos - enriches his Sunday sermons with Greekness’ narrative about the Greek self, the modern threats to Greece and the solutions against the threats, strikingly aligning on all points with GD (5.2). Other leaders of big religious congregates were less hesitant to directly ally with GD against their common threats – racial and religious minorities and the leftists that aim to “legalize them” (with the introduction of *jus solis*). Sunday sermons’ outreach of those priests could be limited to its attendants, if the media didn’t choose to promote the views of particularly the most bigoted bishops.

The most bigoted views of the Church reached to become the ‘loudest’ in the public discourse with the help of a clientelism – structural property of Greekness that informs intersystem practices of public and non-public actors of Greece, but also *diaploki* - a vernacular variation of clientelism between public actors – political establishment, media and their industrialist owners. The reproduction of *diaploki* starts with the Christian Orthodox family as society’s basic social unit where ‘rights and obligations...are not attributes of individuals possessed by all’ (Pollis, 1992, p. 173). Any ideological affiliation of the family is a matter of choice of the patron, usually patriarch, of the family. Later, the patriarch negotiates his entrance to the respective political family, via the votes of the whole family, in exchange for direct privileges - usually tenure in the public sector. The additional follow-the-family tradition of spatial reproduction further results into socially and politically homogenous spatial units ranging in scale from neighborhoods to entire areas, thus perceived as “collective clients” traditionally affiliated with certain political parties¹⁶⁰. The electoral alternations of two major parties, after the fall of Junta (1974), meant that the electorate was divided in two groups of ‘voters-clients’, and each was enjoying privileges from the public sector when the patron of their political family – parties PASOK or New Democracy - was in power (see teachers’ appointment system 5.1 and management of public broadcasters 5.3). The electoral growth of the leftist party SYRIZA threatened to break with that hierarchical socio-political tradition and shift and sort its voters-clients. Public and non-public actors loyal to Greekness – the

¹⁵⁸ ‘Church of Greece – State cooperation on the refugee issue’ <http://www.kspm-erp.com/church-of-greece-state-cooperation-on-the-refugee-issue/?lang=en>

¹⁵⁹ <https://www.hlhr.gr/%CF%80%CE%BF%CE%B9%CE%B1-%CE%B9%CE%B8%CE%B1%CE%B3%CE%AD%CE%BD%CE%B5%CE%B9%CE%B1-%CE%B3%CE%B9%CE%B1-%CF%84%CE%B1-%CF%80%CE%B1%CE%B9%CE%B4%CE%B9%CE%AC-%CF%84%CF%89%CE%BD-%CE%BC%CE%B5%CF%84%CE%B1%CE%BD/>

¹⁶⁰ “80 y.o. points at Mitsotakis over his appointment (as manager) at Karditsa’s hospital.” (2019) https://www.efsyn.gr/politiki/kybernisi/220658_o-80hronos-k-pateras-karfonei-mitsotaki-gia-diorismo-sto-nosokomeio

conservative, right wing spectrum – drawing on its principles, responded to that threat, that at the same time threatens to sideline them within Greekness’ hierarchies of dominance. The excessive media coverage of particular priests was just one of strategies, actors of diaploki employed, in order to regulate the conditions of Greekness’ reproduction.

Horseshoe theory resulted more useful of a strategy for ND’s political family to achieve two goals at the same time – canvass indecisive voters of GD and cut the electoral rise of SYRIZA. Firstly, by appropriating GD’s stances, mannerisms and supposed decisiveness on immigration, which was expected to echo aback to GD voters’ (working class) demographics, it aimed to make GD politically redundant. Horseshoe theory would additionally marginalize GD as the dangerous far-right extreme. With that ND presented itself as a more traditional and mainstream alternative to GD. Three high ranking parliamentarians that migrated to ND from various far-right political formations and hold key positions in government - without having changed significantly their ideological stances (5.2, 5.3) - are bridging the gap between the right and the far-right for voters loyal to Greekness.

The second goal was to be achieved by framing SYRIZA as the far-left, and juxtaposing it to GD as similarly dangerous extreme for country’s political stability. If we summarize, the overall strategy used, we can say that ND’s family, through its affiliated media environment, aimed to artificially inflate public attention on GD, in an attempt to balance the inevitably increased political interest to SYRIZA, as the major opposition party. Some of the direct actions media undertook to serve that purpose are the following (5.3). News bulletins before the elections were overwhelmed with reports about criminality in immigrant-populated neighborhoods. In parallel, reports about GD’s charity events in the same area receive disproportional airtime, omitting to mention their racist component. Lastly, but most importantly, counterarguments to the discourse ND’s political family desired to enforce were restricted. Tabloid media further introduced GD to the public in a lifestyle manner that would allow non-political parts of society to identify with the “honest lads of GD”. At the electoral rallies of ND though, within the frames of Horseshoe Theory voters were encouraged to reject both extremes as dangerous, in favor of the moderate right-wing ND.

As evidenced from political developments that followed, the strategy resulted successful, with ND winning the elections of 2012. As a side effect, around half a million voters gave the political mandate to GD. In the elections of 2019 ND eventually managed to deem GD politically redundant, by pre-electorally adapting GD’s taught stances on Macedonia issues, immigration, Exarcheia, and therefore absorb significant part of its voters^{161 162}. In other words, even when GD seized to exist, its stances simply shifted to the center of the Horseshoe of country’s socio-political life. We could summarize with the conclusion that this normalization of far-right stances is a consequence of Greekness defending itself from totally alien others (type-3 relations). Hence, racism will feed back to the initiating conditions (type-4 relations), to secure the continuation of Greekness’ homeostatic reproduction (Pic. 1-1).

¹⁶¹ What brought down Golden Dawn? <http://www.macropolis.gr/?i=portal.en.society.8643>

¹⁶² The electoral analysis of a Neo-Nazi defeat <https://omniatv.com/853445788>

The geography of encounters with difference in Athens - the no-go and islands of safety

Urban space in this thesis was regarded as the medium between the background social structure, of the material space in question, and the foreground of racist offending. As actions informed by Greekness, have been shown here that can lead to racist offending, when encountering difference, Greekness' omnipresence within the Athenian, theoretically homogenous, social space, would presupposes high odds of racist victimization for immigrants throughout city's agglomeration. Yet, the difference between the background of just being racist, on macro-structural level, with the foreground of actually act racist on micro-level, resulted to be conditioned by a right combination of time and space – Greece of the economic crisis and areas of the city affected by crisis the most. In line with the literature on racist offenders' motivations (Ray's et al., 2004), the catalyst for Greeks to engage in racist violence were the negative emotions (shame, resentment, envy etc.) experienced by individuals living in communities under economic decline. Kandyli's highlighted areas of high risk of social exclusion for the natives in Athens (2015), that geographically correlate with the spatial expression of racist violence¹⁶³, helped to distinguish Patisia as the main *no-go area* where the risk for immigrants' victimization is higher than the rest of Athens.

This main no-go area is at the same time the main neighborhood in the city sprawl within which immigrants organize their life. Patisia's dense network of co-ethnics that offers immigrants practical assistance (housing, work, bureaucratic assistance etc.), as well as social and cultural recourses, outweighs their fears of racial victimization. Most importantly thought, Patisia's high concentration of immigrant population facilitates immigrants' entrepreneurship through which structural properties of immigrants' identities can be maintained and reproduced (ethnic grocery shops, restaurants etc.). Both factors make Patisia a place that can engender a feeling of home to immigrants. According to Greekness' tenets, immigrants' transforming a part of the previously homogeneous Athenian urban space, by organizing it differently, is (rightfully) a sign of immigrants' gaining power. Therefore, GD's physical attacks and heavy policing, that were aiming at immigrants' feelings of safety in Patisia, could be interpreted as (societal and institutional) Greekness' attempt to uproot the feeling and deny a place-to-call home to immigrants.

In contrast, amidst the omnipresence of Greekness in the Athenian urban fabric, there are "*islands*" in the form of neighborhoods, whose social structure is not informed by Greekness, but by an array of leftist ideologies and approaches – Exarcheia, Metaxourgeio and Psiri. Their particularities lie on the fact, that leftist ideologies reject pillar hierarchies of Greekness; religious (prevailing religion), gender (family vs. individual based social structure) and race/ethnicity (relevance of blood lineage) hierarchies (5.1). Therefore, the emergent socio-spatial communities (in)formed by these norms, are more likely to be inclusive and egalitarian to "differences", that differ from the collective prototype of a Greek – an Orthodox Christian, (heterosexual) male, offspring of a Greek father/mother (0) - those hierarchies create and prioritize. The community of Exarcheia, in particular, has been

¹⁶³ monitored by *City in times of Crisis* (3.1.3)

forging this inclusive to all the differences, marginalized by Greekness, socio-spatial “island” for the last 50-60 years (6.1).

Even, though, it is immigrants of high human capital that usually discover Exarcheia, it’s not necessary for an immigrant to have a prior knowledge of Exarcheia’s socio-political particularities to understand its difference from the rest of Athenian social fabric. From a simple friendly attitude of a waiter in a coffee shop, to numerous grassroots solidarity and cultural collectives, scattered all around Exarcheia, the neighborhood offers immigrants not only opportunities that can engender feelings of belonging, but also potentials for integration.

Exarcheia is indeed the safest neighborhood for immigrants, because “*police and fascists don’t enter in Exarcheia.*”¹⁶⁴. Due to socio-political particularities of Exarcheia, the relationship of the community with policing authorities, throughout the decades, has resulted into a less invasive day-to-day presence of police in the neighborhood. It is therefore more likely to encounter specialized police squads targeting rioters, than a police patrol conducting ID checks on the streets. The same particularities have rendered Exarcheia a no go area for the Greek far-right as well¹⁶⁵. With two institutional fear factors for immigrants represented weakly in Exarcheia, the additional inclusive leftist political affiliations of the community, versus the exclusive Greekness, renders Exarcheia the safest place for immigrants in Athens.

How do immigrants in Greece deal with racism and what consequences does it have on their life and identities?

This thesis had embarked by an attempt to understand the impetus behind GD’s racist violence on the streets of Athens, and the effects it has on immigrants. Indeed, its escalation with physical attacks in 2012-2013 was perceived as exceptional, in terms of frequency, massiveness and community terrorizing effect. But informants in this thesis reported that it didn’t have a significantly greater overall effect than Greekness’ racism, immigrants deal with along their daily and life paths in Greece. It was particularly the racism, that stems from intended or/and unintended consequence of Greekness practices, that was cited as far more eroding, both on immigrants’ daily life and identities. At the same time the strategies immigrants employ in order to avoid racism and its effects have two potential consequences themselves. First, the reproduction of Greekness in cases of complying with the immigrant’s place in the society (limited social mobility, isolation) constrained by Greekness. And the second is the radical, doing difference, in cases when immigrants undertake actions that resist Greekness’ constraints and immigrants “fate”. The following findings highlight the consequences of various constraining and facilitating factors of immigrants daily and life paths in Greece that result in immigrants’ different life-paths.

¹⁶⁴ Quote from interview with Tzaved Aslam (President of Pakistani Community & member of KEERFA)

¹⁶⁵ ““Brave” Thanos Plevris in Exarcheia, at dawn” (Gr) https://www.efsyn.gr/politiki/paraskinia/202134_o-gennaioi-thanos-plevris-sta-exarheia-ximeromata

Consequences of Greekness' racism and of strategies to avoid racism: first-generation

Despite the fact that most newly arrived immigrants downgrade racism as a simple continuation of the vicissitudes of the migration journey, it affects them on many levels. Firstly, the changeover in immigrants' identities, from majority to minority group in a society, occurred during their lifetime. Racism hasn't been normalized to the extent for it to be indistinguishable, and therefore new immigrants clearly have a sharp emotional reaction to racist stimulus. Secondly, racism forces members of immigrants' communities to turn inwards to itself in search for guidance, including on how to cope with situations they encounter in Greece. My newly arrived Pakistani informants, were dependent on knowledge accumulated by familiar co-patriots (uncles, neighbors), that had arrived earlier. The knowledgeability on how to do things in Greece have secured them a relatively successful economic integration, though at the expense of the social.

Thirdly, economic integration is, first and foremost, represented through entrepreneurship oriented towards migrant clientele, and, in rare cases, house ownership (6.2). Greekness' racism, reflected in consumers' behavior in this case, prompts immigrants' economies, as well, to turn inwards to itself, as '*No matter what you do...you can't bring Greek clients*' (H. Pakistan, Patisia, old). With that, cultural practices, that accompany consumers' behaviors, are reproduced in isolation from the wider Greek socio-cultural environment. As a result, native and immigrant communities grow increasingly apart, both on macro level of identities and the micro of everyday interaction – upon which new identities could develop. For younger immigrants, socio-cultural self-isolation means that knowledge on "how to do things in Greece" is limited to that, accumulated and circulated by primarily co-ethnics. The relative success of prominent older members of the community - as a role-model to follow - versus Greekness' racism they encounter outside their community, would deter younger immigrants with potentials (i.e. good command in Greek), to diverge from the relatively secure life-path already steered by older co-ethnics. That inevitably limits their potentials for social integration and individual advancements in Greece.

The bold ones who dared to escape co-ethnics' life-path, have a better adaptation in Greek society. By enjoying more situational settings, alongside Greeks, they familiarize themselves with new discourses, new norms and get access to more recourse to actualize their life projects. In terms of racist violence, they are more flexible in finding solutions to protect themselves from racial harassment (i.e. move to better neighborhood, rely on Greek friends for support etc.). At the same time, embolden by their level of integration, they would most likely externalize the post-victimization anger with pro-active coping - from answering back in a racist incident in a bus, to organized activism (6.3). Of particular interest though, are changes in life-projects, which reflect radical negotiations of previous socio-cultural identity norms e.g. immigrants from Central and South East Asia that pursue acting career (Cover Page, 6.3) – incompatible with masculinity norms of their countries of origin. That demonstrates that meaningful contacts with ethnic/racial other, at least for immigrants, result into multicultural negotiations and reproduction of identities, tailored for the better actualization of their own life-projects.

Meaningful contacts are more likely to occur in the safe neighborhoods described earlier. Patisia's urban space though, could also facilitate similar contacts. In contrast to patterns of European spatial segregation, examined here (3.1.2), Patisia's build

environment conditioned the development of a vertical segregation. The same apartment building can be occupied by households that differ in terms of social class, professional statuses, apartment sizes, tenure and household types (Maloutas & Karadimitriou, 2001). On that grounds, I have argued (3.1.3) that, as opposed to racist narratives, Patisia could not be characterized as a ghetto. Let alone a ghetto of one social group. Immigrants added to that vertical segregation the ethnic factor, whereby the upper floors are occupied by (relatively) advantaged native population, the lower floors by disadvantaged visible migrants and Albanians - the socio-cultural “buffer-zone” - in-between. But the deepening of financial crisis, and the further impoverishment of the society will affect adversely the whole apartment building. With the further removal of material security from a population - already at high risk of social exclusion (3.1.3) - in the future, Patisia, instead of cohesion, might experience more racial tensions, similar to those observed in UK’s former mill towns (3.1.2). Only in the Athenian case, tensions will be palpable between Patisia’s upper and lower floors.

Consequences of Greekness’ racism and of strategies to avoid racism: second-generation visible minorities

In contrast to newly arrived immigrants, second-generation immigrants have normalized Greekness racism in their identities and have grown up shaped by it. Therefore, when asked about GD, informants here, expressed rather a relief over the public acknowledgment of racism in Greece, since now *‘they are not hiding it anymore and you are not the ‘sensitive’ paranoid.* (E. Kenya, Kypseli).

For most, their first encounters with Greek racism occur though bullying in school. In a school environment where the education system, schools’ staff and parents are informed exclusively by Greekness (5.1), a bullying behavior of students is unlikely to be recognized and corrected. Greek kids, with no other guidance than Greekness, on how to deal with difference, result in reproducing its main “brought from home” concepts, unaltered (5.1). In this environment, if Albanian kids could choose to pass for Greek, in order to avoid at least the racist bullying, visible immigrants of this thesis admitted that they had to simply endure it (6.2). Building perceptions of own identity within these conditions results into racism becoming an identity-building element that is later reflected in the identity structure of adult immigrants.

Shyness and/or reserved behavior, observed among immigrants, could serve as an example of personal identity traits conditioned by Greekness’ racism. Not able to hide discredited traits, visible migrants resort to reducing their visibility, by making their presence in unfamiliar social setting subtle. In this thesis, second-generation immigrants reported that they occupy non-active positions, i.e. by being silent, even in open and inclusive social settings of their own choice (6.2). This armor – a metaphor E. (Kenya, Kypseli, old) used, to describe his “passing for invisible” strategy – parallels the passing for Greek strategy, Albanian kids’ use to avoid racist bullying in school. Namely, the less attention you attract in settings with natives (i.e. classroom), the less are the odds of your (opportunistic) racist abuse. As opposed to shyness, reactive character is observed among immigrants who used to externalize their anger by confronting their abusers when kids. Like K. (Pakistan, Marousi, s-g), who used to fight his bullies in

school (6.2), and later as an adult didn't hesitate to confront GD members at his workplace (6.3). Within the frames of ST we can suggest that both behaviors seem to be strategies followed with awareness over their expediency, during school years that, by repetitive practice throughout the years, became sub-traits of identity structures, now practiced unconsciously by adult immigrants – *'The moment you encounter the first public clerk, it (armor) puts on automatically'* (E. Kenya, Kypseli, old).

Informants also reported, though, that those dominant personality traits subside when immigrants find themselves at "home". Even though their actual home in Greece, was expected to be regarded safe (3.2.2), it was not cited as a place they could be themselves. Given that older generations will most likely spend their live-paths in Greece predominantly among co-ethnics (6.1) - maintaining strong cultural attachment with their countries of origin - cultural gaps are added inside immigrants' houses. Particularly for kids who have internalized Greekness' racism towards themselves, and want to escape the "immigrant fate" cultural disarrays can break down communication, up to lead to confrontations between the unwilling or/and incapable to keep pace with the integrated, already "Greek", family members.

As oxymoron as it sounds, feelings of being at home my informants first experienced when found themselves abroad. There, E. admitted that he had the opportunity to display sub-traits of his individual identity that he can control – character, personality, capabilities etc., and disprove in practice Greekness' version of himself, when receiving positive feedback. While K. admitted that he prefers Pakistanis place in UK's society, as at least UK's racism could be compensated with British Pakistanis' relatively more privileged socio-economic position - he observed when visiting siblings in Manchester. Both felt free from obligations to comply and act upon the norms of the unachievable Greekness and, of the already, distant origin culture. Hence, collective identities like ethnicity, race etc. - as social structures with predefined norms and frames are experienced as burdens, that when lifted, allowed the development and expression of individual (multicultural) identities of immigrants.

Places where Greekness' norms about immigrants' identities are not present also could be found in Greece. First and foremost, it's the safe neighborhoods for immigrants highlighted above – Exarcheia, Metaxourgeio, Psiri. Immigrants' collective identities are not discredited in those neighborhoods, as their understandings are framed by more inclusive leftist theoretical approaches. Similarly, to experiences abroad, without the burdens of ethnic identities, immigrants are empowered to try themselves in various endeavors that would help them determine their own understanding of self. Better understanding of self for immigrants' entails identifying and "removing" internalized biases - tied to their collective identities by Greekness - and better understanding of their own skills and capabilities (6, 6.3). Those who underwent this process, took control of the outcomes of life (restored/redefined their assumptive world) and improved it by acting in new ways, like the actors of the theatrical play "We are the Persians" did (6.3). Namely, in places when Greekness is absent, immigrants increase their human capital.

Outside the safe neighborhoods, workplace can be turned into a 'home' and have similar effects. The European example highlighted the necessity of material security as the base of any attempt for immigrants' integration to be achieved. The experiences of UK's city-building mills, particularly, demonstrate that a workplace can also be a (first) site of integration, when it secures economic stability and equality, for both native and

immigrant employees. Namely, when it removes inter-group competition for material security. In modern day economies though, it rather depends on the employer. In Greece's case, a "boss" can turn workplace into a site of integration, even if he's acting slightly differently from the typical exploitative labor practices of observed among Greeks and low-qualified immigrants¹⁶⁶.

Workplaces of higher status in Greece's labor hierarchy, though - as occupations demanding extensive expertise (language skills, familiarization with new knowledge, i.e. legal system, etc.) are themselves reflections of immigrants' high levels of integration and personal skills and capabilities. In line with the literature (3.2.2), immigrants use that high human capital when protecting themselves from racist violence but also feel empowered enough to protect others. For instance, Kh.'s transitioning from passive to active coping with everyday racism parallels his rapid integration process, partly, as a result of him changing jobs from construction worker to an NGO employee (6.3). That ability to stand for themselves and others, i.e. in a racist incident in a bus, restores immigrants' assumptions about themselves (Janoff-Bulman, 1989) since now they, themselves, can control the outcomes of events (controllability), by being and expressing themselves (self-worth). On community level, an immigrant that eloquently "answers back" disrupts socio-cultural understandings of Greekness, that relegates immigrants at the lowest echelons of Greekness' hierarchies (classic racism). In other works, he acts differently from what his immigrants place provides. An effects that amplifies, if natives, i.e. the rest of passengers of that bus, actively support immigrants' doing difference. Therefore, if the pre-migration high human capital is further enriched, in more institutionalized form (education, labor etc.), immigrants can do difference for themselves and the wider society.

Finally, home was regarded any locale where there was at least that '*one person*' who is '*enough...to take (immigrants) out of their darkness*' (*E. Kenya, Kypseli, s-g*). That one person should, similarly to employers, act differently from what provides societal Greekness for immigrants. It's that one classmate or teacher, who turned school from bullying site into a 'home' for immigrant kids, when he/she embraced them. This thesis has shown that immigrants encounters with those ones are random, against the wider social and institutional settings, yet are so powerful that immigrants described them as life-changing, towards accepting themselves and feel accepted. Their significance lay on the fact that that type of encounters, take immigrants from the immigrant place and integrate them in Greekness' social systems, with potentials to infiltrate different knowledge on how to do things in Greece. For instance, the Greek girls' family that welcomed to their village my informant from Kenya turned the utterly exclusive to immigrants' Greek village into a home. At the same time, the social structure of the village will be reproduced with awareness about multiculturalism. In sum, immigrants' doing difference has consequences that indeed 'destroy Greece' – as racist narratives claim - but on the other help Greeks integrate to the new global paradigm of increased mobility of populations.

¹⁶⁶ Manolada Watch <https://g2red.org/manolada-watch/0>

8 Discussion

Relevance of findings

The findings on this thesis indicate that immigrants zone their social life along two main 'regions' (Giddens, 1984). Each region is comprised by locales (material and social settings), immigrants encounter along their daily and life paths, whose properties of interaction are defined by two different social structures. In our case, the first region is comprised by locales whose properties of interaction are defined by Greekness, and a second that I have earlier named as "home". For immigrants, what differentiates those two regions is the level of enclosure and disclosure of self they undergo and act upon in each. In particular, in which they, consciously or subconsciously, modify their behavior ('passing for invisible' strategy), and in which they are allowing to express themselves. This thesis has established that high levels of disclosure immigrants undergo in locales where Greekness' properties of interaction are weakened or allowed to lapse, like abroad, islands of Exarcheia, cultural centers, inclusive workplace etc. On the contrary, high levels of enclosure of self, immigrants undergo in the region where Greekness' properties are the main to inform action. Starting from the Greek school - with its assimilationists tendencies - to a public bus, and anywhere else where Greekness prevails in informing Greeks' actions, in locales of this region immigrants 'feel they are playing roles in which the self is only marginally involved' (Giddens, 1984, p. 126). Using the metaphor of the armor, one of my informants uses to describe his passing for invisible, we can say that second-generation immigrants spend their social life along the region of Greekness where they wear their armor, and the region of "home" where they abandon it.

This thesis also revealed that immigrants of high human capital gain their understanding of their own needs, regarding their integration, by drawing on experiences on their daily and life paths, e. g. the understanding that good command in Greek will result in better job opportunities. Their understandings of their needs and the socio-cultural characteristics of the home region, where that understanding is facilitated, could be used when designing integration policies. That non-paternalistic approach would respect and promote immigrants' agency in defining their own capabilities and possible contribution to wider society. This approach could be also seen as an answer to immigrants' difficulties in adapting to modern day economies, and potential welfare dependency (Ward, 2020), that has been shown here to fuel exclusive discourses and racist violence.

Conceptual framework of policy interventions

Presuming that the objective is the successful integration of immigrants in the Greek society, immigrants abandoning their armors is a positive development in that direction. This thesis has revealed that in locales where armor is not needed, immigrants not only freely express themselves, but also 'engage in new practices, enter new relationships and embrace new concepts and discourses' (Kymlicka, 2010, p. 103),

namely practice multiculturalism. The increased knowledgeability on 'how to do things' in Greece or in general - as now they are informed by more than one social structure in their actions - alongside with the increased recourses to actualize their new selves, they usually find in those locales, 'bring about skills and capabilities that make them able to act in new ways' (Coleman, 1988, p. 100). In sum, in the region where immigrants feel at "home", they practice multiculturalism, what further increases their human capital. High human capital, in its turn, helps them (re)define themselves and better (re)negotiate their life projects in order to better fit in to the social environment they've found themselves in (adaptation) – from simply moving to Exarcheia to avoid racist violence, to participating in theater in order to improve personal social skills.

Presumably Greece desires that development and commits to tackle the problems immigrants face during their integration, the findings of this thesis suggest that the solutions should draw along the principles of equity and equality. The problem of categorization of my informants and the relevance of using the concept of human capital instead (4.2, 6), highlighted a great socio-cultural diversity in the backgrounds of immigrants arriving to Greece today. Applying standardized integration policies that measure immigrants' 'excellence' (i.e. in Greekness, as it is the case today) on such a diverse group, 'unavoidably will perpetuate inequality making it impossible to obtain both excellence and equality at the same time' (Espinoza, 2007, p. 348). Spike also notes that 'if we wish to produce equal results...we will need to generate an unequal distribution of recourses...based not on a criterion of the ability but on a criterion of a need' (Espinoza, 2007, p. 348). Distribution of recourses according to one's needs would, in its turn, require identifying and addressing the causes of inequality (Espinoza, 2007). In immigrants' case, Berman and Paradies (2010) propose that effort to be focused firstly, on immigrants' disadvantages - resulting from migration experience or from colonization - and the recognition of their ethnoracial identity. And secondly on addressing societal racism on individual and institutional/structural level.

Policy interventions targeting immigrant communities

In Greece's case, racism is embedded in structural properties, and shown here to condition the disadvantages and assimilationist practices on the micro level of day-to-day action. Given the socio-spatial isolation of Patisia's immigrants, problems resulting from disadvantages are more perceptible among the newly arrived immigrants that are concentrated predominantly there. When developing policies, it would be therefore useful to draw on insights from immigrants of high human capital, who have experiences of many facets of the migration experience. Three of the newly arrived informants fit that description, but also outlined the definition of an immigrant of high human capital used in this thesis. As indications of high capital serves firstly, immigrants' ability to critically reflect on, and to situate themselves in Greekness. Secondly, the use of their own agency in acting differently (participating in locales of home region etc.) than what provides Greekness and the life-paths steered by co-ethnics in Greece.

As prime consideration undoubtedly should be the addressing of immigrants' basic-material needs – access to affordable housing, appropriate health care and welfare support (Berman & Paradies, 2010). In terms of socio-cultural integration

though, of prime considerations should be the disadvantages that originate from immigrants' pre-migration individual characteristics (Zissi, 2006). Of particular importance is the level of literacy, as *'only (those) who haven't been to school at all have problems (learning Greek) because they don't know what grammar is in the first place (Kh. Afghanistan, Exarcheia, new)*. Low human capital seems like a barrier that precedes the more tangible language barrier, and discourages immigrants to further pursue economic and social integration. Assistance with the language barriers should be therefore offered, in conjunction with a broader assistance that would include educational, training and employment support, appropriate to the needs and potentials of immigrants (Berman & Paradies, 2010). If pre-migration disadvantages are not addressed, immigrants of low human capital, fail to participate independently in state and society. That limits their individual advancement and confines their life-paths among co-ethnics, reproducing that way the 'immigrant fate'.

When it comes to immigrants' motivation for integration, human capital is interrelated with the social interaction characteristics of immigrants' immediate lived environment (Zissi, 2006). Afghan immigrants have been observed particularly determined to adapt, because - as admitted - they have nowhere to return to. Given the turbulent political developments in Afghanistan for the last decades, Afghan immigrants have most likely spent a significant span of their life-paths on migration routes. Therefore, Afghans of high human capital, like Kh., will grasp any opportunity intersecting their life-paths in order to establish themselves in a place that can finally become a home. Similarly determined to integrate appeared the other two informants of high human capital whose reasons of immigration were any other than exclusively economic. In contrast, their co-patriots of low human capital will most likely settle with the immigrant fate, framed for them by Greekness (limited social mobility etc.). The same pattern of adaptation seems to exhibit economic migrants, whose poor motivation to integrate is usually justified with ties and obligations 'back home' and/or an initial intent to return. Yet, as practice shows (i.e. on the example of my key informant's life-path), many will result spending a great span of their lives in Greece. This thesis also established that their hesitations to explore alternatives to co-ethnics' life-paths is not voluntarily. It's rather constrained by their unwillingness, or even fear, to be targeted by racist abuse outside Patisia, and the absence of locales of the home region in the neighborhood.

Therefore, if the presence of locales of home was stronger in Patisia, in a way that it would intersect immigrants work-home daily paths, maybe my youngest informant from Pakistan who grew up, and works all day in a hair salon, among co-ethnics - would be less hesitant to step out of the safety of co-ethnic community in his limited free-time, and be more encouraged to seek integration. Sports facilities, could facilitate spontaneous initial (meaningful) contact¹⁶⁷, as sports have universal rules, and therefore lesser cultural barriers to negotiate, in ones' willingness to participate. Cultural centers and anti-racist festivals, with activities 'focused on encouraging social participation by ethnocultural minorities' (Berman & Paradies, 2010, p. 223) - like those immigrants of high human capital found in locales of home (6.3) - could become a welcoming introduction of immigrants to the wider local society. Among those activities, theater, in line with the literature (Rousseau, et al., 2007; Dorker, 2000),

¹⁶⁷ <https://www.eurohoops.net/en/backstage/402959/giannis-figure-graces-court-grew-playing/> 'Giannis' figure graces the court he grew up playing'

resulted catalytic to immigrants (re)defining their identities and increasing their human capital.

Regardless of human capital though, immigrants' pre-immigration capital itself could be used to facilitate immigrants' socio-economic integration. The very basic, everyday cultural practices that immigrants carry with them from home (cuisine, clothing, festivities etc.), as elsewhere, have boosted an economic activity to meet those cultural needs (restaurants, groceries shops, hair salons, internet cafes etc.) - around which immigrants' social life is developing. Today similar activity in Patisia maintains a closed character and is oriented predominately towards co-ethnics. As gentrification attempts to include immigrants in Athenian social fabric 'from above', (i.e. Metaxourgeio,) have produced dubious results (Alexandri, 2015), maybe urban planning interventions that aim to 'open' the material space of Patisia, and parallel assistance to immigrants' agency (material, bureaucratic etc.) would have better results. For the receiving society, this radical transformation could revitalize socially and economically Patisia, that was exhibiting decay before the arrival of immigrants.

Devising solutions based exclusively on immigrants' pre-immigration cultures though, bears the risk of developing boutique multiculturalism – the one that maintains superficial relations and doesn't recognize core values of difference (Fish, 1997). To avoid that development, it's important to guarantee immigrants the capacity of choice (Fish, 1997). For instance, occupation in an ethnic restaurant to be a career choice, and not an easy adaptable solution conditioned by the aforementioned disadvantages - as observed today in Patisia. In the opposite case, easy adaptable solutions will limit immigrants' agency to certain spheres of activity, what in its turn will reproduce the (racist) concept of immigrants' place in society – albeit in a more privileged position¹⁶⁸ ¹⁶⁹, - but would not eliminate the concept itself. A middle solution is suggested in this thesis by immigrants of high human capital that choose cross cultural occupations (translators, NGO employees, community organizers), where they can use their pre-immigration experience, as well as their high involvement with native society. Immigrants of high human capital can therefore become a sort of cultural mediators - that would bridge differences in communication between people of different ethnocultural origin (Gionakis & Stylianidis, 2016) . Apart from financial stability, a greater involvement of immigrants in 'translating' cross cultural communication will help them learn in practice about life in Greece, hence better integrate in the structure of society itself. But it can also 'teach' the Greek society and institutions on how to deal with difference. In other words, immigrants of high human capital can be a crucial communication channel between immigrants and policy makers.

Policy interventions targeting societal racism

The above interventions targeting immigrants' communities could succeed if addressing structural racism of the receiving society take place simultaneously. In our

¹⁶⁸ <https://www.essentiallysports.com/nba-news-milwaukee-bucks-basketball-from-hating-basketball-to-being-nba-mvp-all-that-we-know-about-giannis-antetokounmpo-his-family-past-life-more/> 'From hating basketball to being NBA MVP'

¹⁶⁹ <https://www.huckmag.com/playlist-archive/hip-hop-athens-greece-thriving-in-the-face-of-hostility/?fbclid=IwAR3PEdZ3fp1UVFuUIb5CxxwvU12LWIS88sOwa0wKi7NF-l8RuZVnFkTTs5g> 'How hip hop is thriving in the face of hostility'

case, features of immigrants' home region could be used as guideline. In particular, the socio-political theory and practice, without the principal religious, ethnic and gender hierarchies of Greekness, that has been shown here to result in racism. Berman and Paradies (2010) suggest concrete examples of interventions to combat racism that could be implemented directly, such as media campaigns, reviews, monitoring and reporting racism, regulation of media etc. But they are interventions on the micro level that don't target the principles of the racist structure itself. Since 'there is nothing irrational and pathological about...(racism)...in decidedly racist societies' (Iganski, 2008, p. 19), social change dictated 'from above' would likely result in yet another conceptual contradiction for Greekness, with dubious results for immigrants integration. Starting from education Antigoni, who had turned school into a home for many generations of differences in my school, has little faith in solely additional anti-racist curricular and training (Berman & Paradies, 2010):

I also take full advantage of those research projects (newly introduced in school curriculum). We've worked on racism, how it's being reproduced through verbal utterances etc. But you know, I'm just an individual, who functions on its own, and wishes it works.

Indeed, you were the only 'different' teacher I remember from school.

Yes, but those who are not like the rest are considered quaint. You can't escape that. Namely, they can say 'Antigoni is a cool person, but the whole world says one thing, and she says her own stuff'. (Therefore) I'm not sure how many things they can actually process and embody. (Antigoni, Vice principal of Lyceum of Kareas, 2015)

By taking advantage of new recourses to *integrate new anti-racist content* Antigoni engages in the first component of Banks' five-part classification of multicultural education (as cited in Spiteri, 2017). In order to overcome its weaknesses Antigoni also attempts to stimulate the *process of knowledge construction* (Spiteri, 2017) of the other, as shown in an example she provided:

The last 3-4 years I do the following; I ask the kids where they come from, because 'I like to organize soirees with food and drinks from different places, so I want you to bring me different nice recipes from your place of origin. Like, I don't know, a soiree dedicated to Karpenisi or Tirana etc' - which I don't because you know that I don't cook. There, we enter in a process where they bring recipes, and we start a discussion over how to cook, how to eat it etc. That way, at least, they want to discuss about their origin. (Antigoni, Vice principal of Lyceum of Kareas, 2015)

Similarly, to societal boutique multiculturalism (Fish, 1997), Spiteri (2017) notes that focus on food and festivities, will unlikely increase students' knowledgeability about the other. Multicultural knowledge construction rather requires stimulation of a dialogue and questioning of the presented knowledge itself. Dialogical exchange in its turn can make visible the operation of power and oppression, namely whose interests that knowledge promotes (colonial narratives, state, Church etc.). Understanding how and by whom that knowledge is constructed would enable students to develop a 'sense of social and political agency and a critical subversion of dominant power itself' (Giroux, as cited in Spiteri, 2017, p. 28). In the didactic and monocultural environment of the Greek school, where the historic research during construction and reproduction of knowledge regarding self and others is greatly omitted (Avdela, 2000), even discussions about food that Antigoni attempts to open, are increasing immigrants' visibility. Acknowledgment, instead of hiding, immigrants' differences in unavoidable locales of Greekness, like the classroom, could foster immigrants' self-acceptance, as it does in locales of the home region. In the rest locales of Greekness (Greek society) dialogue and questioning of previous knowledge could be instigated by immigrants' visibility in popular culture. Popular artists of immigrant descend whose music and life

stories¹⁷⁰ intercept more often Greeks' life paths (through radio, TV, social media) could instigate a reevaluation of previous knowledge. For a start, it could be the questioning of whether 'one is being born Greek or becomes Greek', while facing the fact that a second-generation immigrant raps about Greece, in fluent Greek¹⁷¹ - a question with previously unequivocal answer for most Greeks.

Interrelated with knowledge production are concerns over *equity in multicultural pedagogy* that refers to addressing disadvantages in immigrants' equal participation in knowledge construction. The latter would require challenging the divide between Western viewpoint and the rest, 'folk thought' that marginalizes the knowledge of ethnic/racial other. Recognizing biases in Western thought and changing attitudes towards others' knowledge, could help debunk myths (e.g. of Greeks' superiority over others) that obscure oppressive structural forces operating the wider society and perpetuate prejudice.

Subsequently, *reduction of prejudice* should involve the disclosure of factors causing or supporting oppression and purposeful action based on this new awareness (Freire, as cited in Spiteri, 2017, p.36). In our case, this thesis has described thoroughly how the production and reproduction (teaching) of two pillar courses - Greek history and religious education - nurtures racist attitudes in future Greek adults (2.2, 5.1). Both could be generally described as dogmatic and lacking 'historicity' – the identification of history as progressive social change and using historic knowledge to further change it (Giddens, 1984). Findings of this thesis, suggest that the first consideration to address is the separation of education system from ideological influences and political interests of the state and Church of Greece. Secondly, the rejection of the positivist approach that rationalizes the concept of 'Greek genes'. Thirdly, the addition of sociology in production and reproduction of history textbooks in order to achieve historicity (Giddens, 1984).

Banks' fifth and last component towards multicultural education involves actions to create an *empowering school structure and culture* (Spiteri, 2017). That can be achieved by guaranteeing the capacity and encouraging students to engage in active and purposeful action. That is, 'the involvement of all students in activities that concern them, the possibility of giving feedback to (the power holders of school environment i.e. teachers, principals, pedagogic evaluators etc.) and the ability to engage in decision making in areas of the curriculum' (Spiteri, 2017, pp. 36-37). Purposeful action would provide all participants of the school system power to transform, not only the daily environment of schools, but also the content of education system itself. In Greece's case, providing such agency, for instance, to Albanian kids could subvert the stereotypical societal view about Albanians. It is doubtful though if that agency would have transformative capacity on the macro-level of principles. For instance, if at least the education system would recognize Greeks' cultural similarities with Albanians and dissimilarities with their Homogenis brothers from Soviet Union, that was revealed during their encounters with Greeks. As multiculturalism must be not only preached but also practiced (Spiteri, 2017; Berman & Paradies, 2010) acting upon that new awareness would signify radical reconceptualization of country's organic, monocultural identity narrative, with the subsequent changes in history textbooks production and

¹⁷⁰ 'Popular singer Eleni Foureira explains why she lied about her Albanian roots' <http://en.protothema.gr/popular-singer-eleni-foureira-explains-why-she-lied-about-her-albanian-roots/>

¹⁷¹ Documenta 2014, Negros tou Moria <https://www.documenta14.de/en/artists/13697/negros-tou-moria>

overall philosophical approach to educational curriculum. Otherwise, similarly to Antigoni's remark, Spiteri (2017) notes, that it's practically pointless if some sectors of the education system are employing multicultural pedagogy while others harbor prejudices – 'This will only serve to generate confusion in students' minds' (p. 37).

Lastly, increasing immigrants' visibility through adaptation of multicultural approaches should also be extended to other institutions as well. This thesis has discussed how *jus sanguinis* principle of citizens' naturalization and lack of legal framework for hate crimes have contributed to immigrants' vulnerability and perpetuated their disadvantages. Therefore, the introduction of *jus solis* to Greek naturalization law in 2010 and the enactment of Anti-racist law in 2014 are crucial first steps for the institutional recognition of differences in Greece. The additional legal prosecution of Golden Dawn (2013-2020) has contributed to society's rejection of, at least, this extreme expression of Greekness. But the effectiveness of this new knowledge introduced on macro level, yet again stumbles on Greekness that informs Greeks, called to implement those new laws. Hence, surveilling methods like anti-racist training and monitoring/sanctioning racist practices (i.e. in Greek police, public sector) (Berman & Paradies, 2010), at least on generations nurtured exclusively on Greekness, could be helpful. Nevertheless, Greece's history has shown that social changes, dictated from above upon the unchangeable Greekness have resulted in inconsistencies, e.g. practice of Human Rights, undermined by traditional claims of loyalty to Greekness (2.2).

The policy approach proposed above targets immigrant and native communities not only on micro and macro, but also takes into consideration the causal micro-micro, macro-macro links, neither having priority over the other. Policy makers are therefore asked to identify the causal links between different elements of the society that result in day-to-day expressions of racism. As examples could serve some of the links illustrated in this thesis. For instance, racism in schools could be untangled from micro level of daily action to macro of structure as follows: racist bullying in schools – staff's incapability to recognize racist expressions – inadequate teachers' appointment/evaluation – political clientelism – the Greek (nuclear and political) family. Racism in the media could be also traced back to Greek family but follows different causality: TV features of GD and their stances – strategies for manipulation of public opinion - advocacy journalism – political clientelism – the Greek family. If we integrate the economic factor that contributed to the rise of GD the following casual sequence emerges: voting for GD – negative emotions (shame, frustration, anger) – socioeconomic marginalization during economic crisis – low human capital/social class - strong identification with Greekness (family). Therefore, in order to avoid inconsistent results, solving problems of day-to-day racism require interventions on links that would affect the whole structural chain(s) Greekness creates, up to Greekness itself. It is logical to conclude then that those interventions would signify radical negotiations of Greekness' pillars. Hence, they can't be conceptualized within the frames of modernization of Greek society but rather within those of radical social change.

Reflections on the findings - Will immigrants destroy Greece?

In the previous section, I have used the word 'presumably' when referring to the goals migration policies should pursue, as those can be achieved only if powers that hold the knowledge, whereby Greekness is perpetuated, are committed to radical social change. Those examined here - education system, Church, media/political establishment – have been shown to have successfully resisted pressures for change of the first migration wave. Yet, even though their differences could be hidden, they were the first to highlight Greekness contradictions.

Probably the reason contradictions on the first wave did not lead to conflicts (Giddens, 1984) is that actors of Greekness managed to successfully surveil and resist societal changes they pressured, by partially incorporating their differences into Greekness. In ex-Soviets' case, their effortlessly naturalized status, was providing them with a base to resist changes in their Assumptive World. The almost overnight fall of the Soviet Union, and the ideological vacuum it ensued, was a traumatic event for all ex-Soviet populations. The Greek government filled ex-Soviet Greeks' ideological vacuum with Greekness. Over the time though, their unassailable belief over their Greekness, in a way, could be seen as denial - a coping mechanism according to Janoff-Bulman (1989) – that soothes experiential inconsistencies between the old assumptions of their belonging to Greece, with the daily reality of their gradual isolation and marginalization along the ethnic line (Hess, 2011). Albanians of Greece underwent similar traumatic socio-cultural changes with the fall of communism. But even if their ideological vacuum was filled with the assumption of them as second-class citizens, their invisible identity traits, the wider Balkan culture and weak affiliation with Islam, were allowing them the potentials to be incorporated to Greekness, albeit in an "immigrant place" or by passing for Greek. Conflicts derived from contradictions exposed by the latest visible migration wave though - that neither can nor desires to be hidden - might eventually lead to a momentum of social change

According to Giddens (1984) though, structural contradictions would most likely lead to conflict in the following situations. Firstly, when contradictions are ensued by perverse consequences on actors that highlight those contradictions. Hence, perverse consequences on immigrants are expected to generate resentment and lead to potential mobilization for struggle. Secondly, in the absence of perverse consequences, contradictions can lead to conflict when there is a great convergence of contradictions of macro level with those they create on micro level (Pic. 1-1). In this case, a conflict of collective interests is expected, which would 'more likely develop along the 'fault line' of those contradictions' (p. 318). Therefore, it is likely that the collective interest of an increasing migrant population to tackle the perverse consequences, detailed in this thesis, will come into conflict with the interest of Greek Christian men that would, most likely, refuse to renounce their dominant positions Greekness provides.

Probably what could be catalyst for conflict are the different conditions (time) under which it takes place. Today storages of Greekness' recourses – 'medium of retention and control of information or knowledge whereby social relations are perpetuated across time-space' (Giddens, 1984, p. 261) – are not exclusively in the hands of institutions of power. The increase of the second wave coincided chronologically with the widespread access and use of new technological, tools like smartphones. The knowledge and information, previously disseminated by the highly surveilled education curricula, the Church and traditional media, today is being challenged by discourses emerging on social media. Despite criticism over their effects

on macro level (Sajir & Aouragh, 2019), new technological tools have already shown their agency in shifting narratives, but also in organizing global and local action informed by narratives developed outside the borders of nation-states(citations). The fact that those storages of resources are partly controlled by non-institutional actors of Greece allows immigrants' visibility in the society, thus highlighting Greekness' contradictions more apparent as irreconcilable.

Against this novelty Greekness still resist changes. The brief governance the political otherness, leftist SYRIZA (2015-1019) was succeeded with yet another victory of ND (2019) that promised the return to "normality". Reflecting on government's first actions we can say that that means the return of traditional understandings and practices of Greekness in political and social life. Starting from its leader – an heir of a renown political family himself¹⁷² - the party re-established the relevance of blood lineage in political life¹⁷³ with the subsequent political clientelism it entails in social life¹⁷⁴ and media environment ¹⁷⁵. Regarding religion, through the Ministry of Education and Religion, ND reasserts state-Church relations¹⁷⁶ and its centrality in education of Greeks¹⁷⁷ ¹⁷⁸. For the - similarly deemed as problematic in this thesis - history course, the Minister stated that *'History shouldn't have sociological character, but to develop national consciousness'* ¹⁷⁹, further marginalizing Sociology in schools' curricula¹⁸⁰. Lastly, the semiotics of recent celebrations of bicentenary of War of Independence (1821-2021) reflect party's unwillingness to address contradictions of the official narrative regarding



Pic. 8-1 'Αγιος Παντελεήμονας' M. Chrisochoidis, Minister of Citizen Protection

¹⁷² 'In Greece, politics is a family affair' <https://www.politico.eu/article/greece-politics-family-affair-election/>

¹⁷³ 'The phenomenon of nepotism in parliament from Metapolitevsi (regime change after Junta) until now' (Gr) <https://vouliwatch.gr/infographics/article/to-fainomeno-tis-oikogeneiokratias-voyli>

¹⁷⁴ 80 y. o. K. Pateras points at Mitsotakis over his assignation at Karditsas hospital (Gr).

https://www.efsyn.gr/politiki/kybernisi/220658_o-80hronos-k-pateras-karfonei-mitsotaki-gia-diorismo-sto-nosokomeio

¹⁷⁵ 'Greece: New Democracy – New Press Freedom?' <https://www.ecpmf.eu/greece-new-democracy-new-press-freedom/>

¹⁷⁶ 'N. Kerameus to Ieronimos (Archbishop of Athens and all Greece): we will secure salary and pension rights of the clergy' (Gr) <https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/1034358/n-kerameos-se-ieronimo-tha-diasfalisoyme-ta-misthologika-kai-syntaxiodotika-dikaiomata-ton-klirikon/>

¹⁷⁷ 'Obscurantism that became a course' (Gr) https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/ekpaideysi/233703_o-skotadismos-egine-sholiko-mathima

¹⁷⁸ 'The decision of the Court of State on the course of Religious Education' <https://www.lawspot.gr/nomika-nea/olokliri-i-apofasi-toy-ste-gia-mathima-ton-thriskytikon>

¹⁷⁹ 'Return to anachronism: "In flames" the History curriculum of 2019, they reinstate that of 2002' (Gr) https://www.alfavita.gr/ekpaideysi/333113_epistofi-ston-anahronismo-stin-pyra-ta-programmata-spydon-tis-istorias-toy-2019

¹⁸⁰ 'Niki Kerameus eliminates social sciences from Secondary Education?' https://www.alfavita.gr/ekpaideysi/324447_i-niki-kerameos-katargei-tis-koinonikes-epistimes-apo-ti-mesi-ekpaideysi

Greek identity; neither the positivistic approach that implies Greekness' genealogical and cultural continuum from ancient Greece, nor its selective historic and social memory, nor its defensive character¹⁸¹.

Particularly the defensive character of Greeks is being overemphasized, as from the first months of governance ND sought to defend Greece from its significant 'others'. Regarding external others, pre-electorally the party proclaimed tough stances towards the Macedonian issue¹⁸² and Turkey¹⁸³, securing that way votes of the right-wing electorate. The link between the external and internal others in their new discourse was achieved by using the refugees crisis at the Greek-Turkey border^{184 185}. Domestically, ND launched an attack on the region of home, demonstrated here as a developing alternative to Greekness. Starting from its safe spaces for immigrants, the party initiated the 'cleaning of Exarcheia'¹⁸⁶ and its "islands" with the use of heavy specialized police force^{187 188}. Police presence - a fear factor for immigrants, previously absent in Exarcheia - was instated with increased police units patrolling and stationed inside the neighborhood^{189 190 191}. Similar treatment received Patisia (Pic. 8-1). Immigrants and refugees evicted from squats¹⁹² and official housing inside the urban fabric¹⁹³ are being placed in camps outside of it, where their integration is designed to take place¹⁹⁴. In other words, ND practices the exact opposite to the recommendations regarding goals and actions of migration policies proposed in this thesis - safeguard of

¹⁸¹ 'In pictures: 200th anniversary of the Greek War of Independence'

<https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2021/3/25/in-pictures-200th-anniversary-of-the-greek-war-of-independence>

¹⁸² 'K. Mitsotakis: ND will do anything possible to cancel Prespa Agreement' (2018 Agreement on the name "North Macedonia") <https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/1006099/kyr-mitsotakis-i-nd-tha-kanei-o-ti-mporei-gia-na-akyrosei-ti-symfonia-ton-prespon-sti-voyli/>

¹⁸³ 'Greece irked by Germany in standoff with Turkey' <https://www.politico.eu/article/greece-irked-by-germany-in-standoff-with-turkey/>

¹⁸⁴ 'Evros Zero Hour: Turkey is renewing pressure with immigrants as weapons' [Mainstream media]

<https://www.tanea.gr/2020/06/04/greece/evros-ora-miden-oi-tourkoi-etoimazontai-gia-nees-pieseis-me-oplo-tous-metanastes/>

¹⁸⁵ 'Shootings at Evros! Turkish soldiers are pushing illegal immigrants to break the Greek block at Kastanies and enter Greece. 120.000 Muslims at the gates of Greece. Mitsotakis cancelled trip to Samos and calls for emergency meeting' (Gr)[Far-right media]

<https://www.makeleio.gr/%CE%B5%CE%BE%CF%89%CF%86%CF%85%CE%BB%CE%BB%CE%BF/%CE%A0%CE%A5%CE%A1%CE%9F%CE%92%CE%9F%CE%9B%CE%99%CE%A3%CE%9C%CE%9F%CE%99-%CE%A3%CE%A4%CE%9F%CE%9D-%CE%95%CE%92%CE%A1%CE%9F-%CE%A4%CE%9F%CE%A5%CE%A1%CE%9A%CE%9F%CE%99-%CE%A3%CE%A4%CE%A1%CE%91%CE%A4/>

¹⁸⁶ 'Kiriakos Mitsotakis: I will clean Exarcheia' (Gr) <https://www.iefimerida.gr/news/312224/kyriakos-mitsotakis-tha-kathariso-ta-exarheia-ti-tha-kano-me-paranomoyis-metaklitoys>

¹⁸⁷ 'Greek police raid Athens squats and arrest immigrants'

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/26/greece-police-raid-athens-squats-exarcheia-arrest-migrants-agency-reports>

¹⁸⁸ 'Greek govt moves against 'Anarchist' Exarcheia, refugees first' <https://balkaninsight.com/2019/10/08/greek-govt-moves-against-anarchist-exarcheia-refugees-first/>

¹⁸⁹ 'Men of ELAS (police) beat an immigrant at Exarcheia and drag him unconscious' (Gr)

<https://tvxs.gr/news/ellada/andres-tis-elas-xytopyn-metanasti-sta-eksarheia-kai-ton-sernoyn-anaisthito>

¹⁹⁰ 'Residents of Exarcheia report the torture of a man during his arrest from MAT (riot squat)' (Gr)

<https://www.lifo.gr/now/greece/katoikoi-ton-exarheion-kataggelloyn-basanismo-andra-kata-ti-syllipsi-toy-apo-mat>

¹⁹¹ 'Exarcheia: LGBT activist Ilias Gkionis reports his unjustified arrest from homophobic police men that mocked him' (Gr) <https://www.lifo.gr/now/greece/exarheia-o-loatki-aktivistis-ili-as-gkionis-kataggelei-anaitia-syllipsi-toy-apo>

¹⁹² 'Asylum seekers taken from Athens squats to be moved to migrant camps'

<https://greekreporter.com/2019/08/28/asylum-seekers-taken-from-athens-squats-to-be-moved-to-migrant-camps/>

¹⁹³ 'UNHCR criticizes Greece over evictions of 9000 recognized refugees'

<https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2020/06/02/unhcr-greece-refugees-eviction/>

¹⁹⁴ "'Integration Camps' of refugees with Greek and PC courses'

<https://www.kathimerini.gr/society/561317578/camp-entaxis-prosfygon-me-mathimata-ellinikon-kai-chrisis-i-y/>

Greekness on societal level and force into invisibility the differences along home region.

By finalizing this thesis it is worth mentioning that Greeks don't defend solely the Greek borders at the Greece-Turkey border, but also the European¹⁹⁵. Greece's shift from welcoming to repressive handling of the immigration issue¹⁹⁶ aligns with the shift in views and policies of most countries of EU's periphery (South and Eastern Europe) (Rea, Martiniello, Mazzola, & Meuleman, 2019). While EU's responses to the issue could be characterized in general as attempts to halt – physically¹⁹⁷ ¹⁹⁸ - the migration routes steered by the “refugee crisis” of 2015. As mentioned in the beginnings of this thesis, Greekness – the content of the Greek nation-state - is a product of European thought, dominant in Europe at the time it was conceived. It is likely that the latest wave of immigrants highlights the structural contradictions of EU's nation-states and EU as a whole, as well¹⁹⁹. Regardless the particularities of each state, the latest immigration wave causes polarization of pro and anti-immigration views, between and within EU's member states (Rea, Martiniello, Mazzola, & Meuleman, 2019). Namely, similarly to Greece, migration causes conflicts - between adherents of open and closed-door migration policies - that pressures EU for changes. Until now, the aforementioned (re)actions of both Greece and EU reflect their resistance to change, against the dominant paradigm of increased mobility of our times.

¹⁹⁵ 'Migration: EU praises Greece as 'shield' after Turkey opens border'

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/03/migration-eu-praises-greece-as-shield-after-turkey-opens-border>

¹⁹⁶ 'Greece: Deaths and Push-backs continue, Racist attacks on hosting Centre for unaccompanied children, camp conditions deteriorating' <https://www.ecre.org/greece-deaths-and-push-backs-continue-racist-attack-on-hosting-centre-for-unaccompanied-children-camp-conditions-deteriorating/>

¹⁹⁷ Implementing the EU-Turkey agreement – Questions and Answers

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/el/MEMO_16_1494

¹⁹⁸ 'Sakellariopoulou (President of Democracy) in front of Evros fence: a picture that reminds of Trump' (Gr) <https://www.news247.gr/politiki/i-sakellariopoyloy-mprosta-sto-teichos-ston-evro-mia-eikona-poy-thymizei-tramp.9232731.html>

¹⁹⁹ 'Europe and the refugee crisis: A challenge to our civilization' <https://www.un.org/en/academic-impact/europe-and-refugee-crisis-challenge-our-civilization>

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