

Acknowledgements

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Table of Contents

Overture		4
Part I		
First Movement:	Wilsonian Internationalism & Republican Opposition	10
	1.1 <i>Dominant Strains of Political Thought</i>	10
	1.2 <i>The Struggle between Republican Isolationism and Nationalism</i>	14
Second Movement:	The 1920s, 1930s & 1940s	16
	2.1 <i>The Roaring Twenties and the Thirties</i>	16
	2.2 <i>Evolution in Republican Foreign Policy</i>	18
	2.3 <i>The Implications of yet another World War</i>	21
Part II		
Third Movement:	Republican Opposition between 1948 and 1950	26
	3.1 <i>An Upset Victory</i>	26
	3.2 <i>Internalities: Republicans in Search of Answers</i>	29
	3.3 <i>Externalities: Atomic Weapons & Revisionism</i>	33
	3.4 <i>McCarthyism, NSC-68 and the 1950's Campaign</i>	35
	3.5 <i>The Elections and the Politicizing of Korea</i>	39
Fourth Movement:	The Republican Groundswell: 1950-1952	44
	4.1 <i>Republican Ammunition: China Intervenes and MacArthur Is Dismissed</i>	44
	4.2 <i>Vandenberg Dies, Taft on the Rise</i>	45
	4.3 <i>Eisenhower versus Taft</i>	47
Finale / Reprise:	Concluding Remarks	51
Appendix		
A.	GOP Strategies and Objectives for elections 1950 and 1952	53
B.	Truman's Approval Ratings, 1949-1950	54
C.	Bibliography	55

Overture

Even before the smoke of the destruction of World War II fully cleared, the Cold War emerged from the rubble to take its place. For the next forty years or so, virtually all foreign affairs were framed by the continuous but indirect confrontation between capitalism and communism. Naturally, many scholars of American history have devoted their time and attention to the study of this fascinating era, roughly using one of two approaches to make sense of the contours of American foreign policy during the Cold War: the international and the domestic approach. Especially the former approach has proved to be very important during the last twenty years. It essentially involves consulting foreign archives and, consequently, attempts to reconstruct the events of the Cold War from the perspective of dealings between nations. This movement is of course greatly stimulated by the 'globalization' of American scholars and the opening of former Soviet archives. But Jussi M. Hanhimäki warns that "[t]here is a tendency as we search for new perspectives to ignore the old ones."¹ Consequently, he arrives at the paradigm's major downside: it largely neglects the influence and consequences of domestic political considerations. In response to the limitations of this so-called international perspective, scholars like Hanhimäki and Frederik Logevall have argued that it has received too much attention and have increasingly turned to the study of the influence of domestic politics on foreign affairs in the last decade.² The domestic approach utilizes domestic sources such as Congressional records, private papers of politicians, newspapers and other periodicals, documentation of the changes in public opinion and so forth, in addition to the sources traditionally used by diplomatic historians.

Of course, as Logevall clearly states, both approaches are not and should not be mutually exclusive.³ However, because of the extensive consideration of international perspectives, it seems as if the domestic side has received the short end of the historical stick – especially with regards to the era of the Cold War. Moreover, Logevall argues a too powerful international framework could potentially result in "ahistorical [scholarship] by assigning greater influence to some actors [i.e. foreign countries] than they may in fact deserve." Consequently, "for some topics and periods at least" (case in point: the Cold War), an "America-centric" approach is warranted.⁴ Several years before Logevall made his observation, Hanhimäki already perceived a tendency to give "the influence

¹ The Cold War is merely a case in point; the predominance of the international perspective also applies to other topics of historical writing. Hanhimäki, J.M, "Global Visions and Parochial Politics: The Persistent Dilemma of the 'American Century' " in *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (September 2003), pp. 424

² Examples of such works follow below. Idem, pp.423-47; Logevall, F., "Politics and Foreign Relations" in *The Journal of American History* Vol.95, No. 4 (March 2009), pp. 1074-8.

³ Logevall, 1074-5

⁴ Logevall, 1076

and role of domestic politics”, at the most, “short thrift”. He goes on to state that “in order for assessments of American foreign policy to be truly comprehensive”, it needs to include “the multifaceted interaction between what is foreign and what is domestic.”⁵

This thesis sets out to do exactly that: to contribute to this debate between the international state of mind and the more domestic bearing. As the attention for the latter orientation has only recently surfaced, there remain ample gaps that require research still. More specifically, the early, formative years of the Cold War as experienced in the U.S. raise many interesting questions that remain unanswered. With regards to that era, Steven Casey has made a terrific start with his recent book “Selling the Korean War” which gives a fascinating account of the domestic considerations during the Korean War (1950-1953), which was the first ‘hot’ conflict of the Cold War. However, his book emphasizes the role of incumbent politicians (the Democratic Truman administration and, for the last year of the war, the Republican Eisenhower administration) which, as a result, omits changes that occurred elsewhere in the political arena.⁶ Robert Johnson’s “Congress and the Cold War” offers a broad overview of Congress’ role in the formulation and execution of American foreign policy since WWII. It considers both domestic and international factors and embeds the entire Cold War in an overarching domestic perspective – proving Congress was anything but passive in the formulation of American foreign policy. By definition, however, such a broad view cannot pay sufficient attention to specific events that had major implications.⁷ Other scholars have also opted for a grander approach: Logevall and Campbell Craig (“America’s Cold War”) as well as Julian Zelizer (“Arsenal of Democracy”). Logevall and Craig argue that domestic factors are fundamental in explaining why the Cold War lasted as long as it did: communist threats were structurally overstated as a result of electoral concerns and the firmly established military interests also benefited from a longer Cold War. Their book blends international with domestic factors and delivers a comprehensive narrative true to Hanhimäki’s suggestion.⁸ Zelizer even works through a full century of American engagement with the world, starting in 1898. As his book’s scope is even larger than that of the aforementioned titles, it should come as no surprise that it is largely phrased in generalities. However, it is a worthwhile addition to the writing on American foreign policy as it still manages to include the pull domestic considerations have over foreign policy and includes contemporary issues as well.⁹

⁵ Hanhimäki, p423-8.

⁶ Casey, S., *Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion 1950-1953* (Oxford : Oxford U.P. 2008)

⁷ Johnson, R., *Congress and the Cold War* (Cambridge, MA : Cambridge U.P. 2006). For example, Johnson dedicates no more than a full page to each election (Congressional or Presidential) between 1946 and 1984.

⁸ Logevall, F., C. Craig, *America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity* (Cambridge, MA : Belknap Press of Harvard U.P. 2009)

⁹ Zelizer, J., *Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security, from World War II to the War on Terrorism* (New York, NY : Basic Books 2009)

If anything, these books prove there is a whole new world to (re-)discover after academia became sidetracked by its attempt to ensure other nations were not forgotten. Unfortunately, an America-centric approach is still too often unjustly associated with American arrogance. In light of this connotation, it is imperative to remember that “[t]he United States is not merely one power among many and has not been for a very long time.”¹⁰ Moreover, America’s obsession with her past ensures source material is abundant and readily available for scholars.

In light of said debate and because the aforementioned works, save for that of Casey, are concerned with a broad timeline, this dissertation will focus on one specific development in a very specific timeframe: that of Republican ideas about foreign policy between 1949 and 1952, when the domestic discussions on the resolution of WWII (the Marshall Plan, the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)) and the events leading up to the Korean War dominated American politics. However, these discussions had a significant effect on other sections of American politics than, for instance, Casey has considered so far. Essentially, it would mark the beginning of a decidedly more partisan Republican foreign policy. Before that, the so-called Cold War Consensus dominated Washington. Insofar this development is acknowledged at all, scholars argue it is mainly informed by factors other than domestic considerations. This thesis therefore sets out to rectify two basic misconceptions: first, it argues that such a development actually took place within the Republican Party and, accordingly, deserves recognition and, second, that the role of domestic issues in this process is larger than it has long been thought to be. The dissertation’s structure and content is guided by the following question: *Why did a decidedly more partisan Republican foreign policy resurface and how did it evolve in the years 1949-1952?*

It is necessary to first define domestic politics as it relates to this thesis. Within the American political system, the influence of domestic politics consists of two sources and the mutual interaction between the two. On the one hand, domestic politics is incited by Congress’ actions as informed by ideology, personal relations, political considerations (i.e. taking a politician’s constituency into account), and world affairs. On the other hand, domestic politics is also the product of presidential actions and policies as informed by elections, popular opinion and so on. The second element to define is the Cold War Consensus. It appeared shortly after World War II when President Harry S. Truman (Democrat) presented the outline of what was later named the Truman Doctrine (or: Containment) to Congress during his request for financial assistance for Greece and Turkey – both

¹⁰ Logevall, 1076

countries were struggling with internal (Greece) and external (Turkey) communist threats.¹¹ The doctrine, heavily influenced by the writings of George Frost Kennan (American diplomat), rested on three presuppositions: one, communism is unwanted and in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations, two, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) ultimately aimed for world domination, and three, the U.S. was the only nation capable to withstand this threat and was obliged by its founding principles to do so. In essence, the doctrine dictated that the U.S. was to support, by financial and other means, any nation under attack by communism in order to contain the expansionist USSR.¹² The doctrine, although altered over time, outlived Truman's presidency and was able to garner broad bipartisan support (the Cold War Consensus) because essentially the doctrine's language merely pledged local assistance to countries that faced a domestic uprising of communism. Hence, even if such an uprising was fully funded and directed by the Soviet Union, it would still commit the U.S. to nothing more than local assistance. This low level of commitment and little specification gave the U.S. the leeway to act against communism when and how it wanted without risking a total war. Moreover, all of Congress may have agreed on the fact that communism was a common threat that required a unified response, but that was as far as the consensus extended. On the left and right, dissenting factions arose that argued for either a more conciliatory approach or in favor of political isolationism. The Truman doctrine circumvented these partisan pitfalls by adopting a centrist approach and this is what made the doctrine appealing to both parties.¹³

The Cold War Consensus was a convenient term that effectively grouped American popular and political opposition to and fear of communism together. However, its actual longevity and influence must not be exaggerated. In fact, this thesis argues that the consensus as defined above lost much of its support a mere two years after Truman's speech because the Republican Party began to form a more partisan view on foreign policy between 1949 and 1952. The majority of Representatives and Senators may have agreed on the faults of communism in general and the USSR in specific, but the proposed policies of both parties would diverge greatly throughout the Cold War.

This thesis uses a thematic approach to answer the how and the why of Republican ideas about foreign policy; an individual analysis of foreign policy cases would have significant drawbacks. Firstly, the aim and size of this research do not permit a summary and analysis of all foreign policy issues that emerged within the set timeframe. Consequently, it would have to settle for an arbitrary

¹¹ A digital copy of the President's address before Congress is available at:

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/documents/index.php?document_date=1947-03-12&documentid=5-9&pagenumber=1

¹² Morgan, I.W., *Beyond the Liberal Consensus: A Political History of the United States since 1965* (New York, NY : Palgrave MacMillan 1994), p1, 2, 20-6; McCormick, J.M., *American Foreign Policy and Process* [Fifth Edition] (Boston, MA : Wadsworth 2010) p69-71, 73-4.

¹³ Morgan, p23-7

selection of conflicts to review. Secondly, a mere sum of individual conflicts would not reveal general tendencies in the evolution of Republican foreign policy – which is exactly the purpose of this research. Part I of the thesis, which in itself consists of Chapters 1 and 2, analyzes Republican ideas about foreign policy between the First World War and approximately 1948 based on several recurring themes. It emphasizes how certain topics continued to return in Republican policy-making and how it set the stage for the period this paper is primarily concerned with. It shows how, up to 1949, several distinct but often overlapping strains of thought on foreign policy existed within the Republican Party and how they were influenced by numerous domestic political considerations (popular opinion, partisan politics and ideology), external influences and the mutual interaction. Part II (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) forms the core of the thesis and adopts a similar chronological approach to that of Part I while looking at the years 1949-1952 from the Republican point of view. Among others topics, these chapters include the USSR's development of nuclear weapons, the effects of National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68), involvement in the Korean War, and pressing domestic issues. This part is central to the thesis because it embodies a complex set of interactions between incumbent and oppositional politicians, popular opinion and political pragmatism, idealism and reality, non-interventionism and interventionism, and, finally, unilateralism and multilateralism. Moreover, it argues why and how these different events informed Republican ideas on foreign policy the way that they did. The final chapter, Chapter 5, concludes this thesis. It positions this thesis in the academic discussion, summarizes the findings of the research, answers the main question as posed above and sheds some light on how the changes in Republican foreign policy have continued to exist throughout the Cold War and beyond.

PART I

“MOVEMENTS I & II”

1. Wilsonian Internationalism & Republican Opposition

This chapter gives an introductory and brief overview of Republican foreign policy between the First World War (1914-1918) and 1948 as the factors that pushed the Republican Party towards a more coherent and partisan foreign policy after 1948, were established during this time. Three distinct strands of thought that covered virtually every aspect of the domestic debate on American foreign policy emerged between 1914 and 1948: *Nationalism*, *Isolationism* (mainly on the Republican side) and *Wilsonian internationalism*. Although the former two currents existed before Wilsonian internationalism emerged, the triangular interaction intensified the political differences. The fierce debates that followed the War centered on the conclusion of the War and the formation of the League of Nations and, more specifically, the American role in it.

1.1 Dominant Strains of Political Thought

American intervention in the WWI was affected by the experiences of the Spanish-American War of 1898. Three important implications arose out of the American victory in that war. Firstly, America became more self-aware of its power and status in the world. The war was well-publicized in national media – which was becoming more important at the end of the 19th century – and general American views on foreign policy slowly embraced a more active part in the world. Consequently, those who decided on American foreign policy had to take popular opinion into consideration more than before.¹⁴ Secondly, Spain's defeat strengthened the perception that the New World was on the rise. Finally, the U.S. became an imperial power as it expanded its territory outside of continental America for the first time.

These three developments profoundly shaped American thoughts on foreign affairs – as illustrated by WWI and its resolution. Although WWI lasted for four years, the U.S. did not get militarily involved until 1917, largely because popular opinion dictated the U.S. stay out of European affairs. Wilson preached neutrality to satisfy anti-war sentiments, but the U.S. heavily favored the

¹⁴ Leary, J.P., "America's Other Half: Slum Journalism and the War of 1898" in *Journal of Transnational American Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2009), 11th article (no page numbers); Miller, B.M., "The Image-Makers' Arsenal in an Age of War and Empire, 1898-1899: A Cartoon Essay, Featuring the Work of Charles Bartholomew (of the Minneapolis Journal) and Albert Wilbur Steele (of the Denver Post)" in *Journal of American Studies*, Vol.45, No.1, pp. 53-75; MacDougall, 40, 101-5; 110-12

Allies by means of trade before joining in.¹⁵ Wilson's neutrality *and* eventual interventionism generated conflict with two distinct currents of Republican opposition. On the one hand, there was the internationalist flank, primarily represented by Senators Henry Cabot Lodge (Republican, Massachusetts), Elihu Root (Republican, New York) and former President Theodore Roosevelt. They vehemently opposed Wilson's neutrality, criticized his passivity and pressured him to enter the war on the side of the Allies. On the other hand, there was the isolationist flank, led by Senators William Edgar Borah of Idaho, Robert Marion La Follette Sr. of Wisconsin and George William Norris of Nevada (all Republicans), who desired to stay out of troublesome Europe. They argued European problems should not become American problems, and maintained conspiracy theories that argued involvement in the war would solely benefit bankers and corporations. Naturally, this group supported Wilson's initial policy of neutrality but voted against the U.S. Declaration of War on Germany of 1917 brought before Congress.¹⁶ In light of these competing views, the war posed fundamental questions about American identity, American responsibilities in the world and its willingness to assume a leading role.¹⁷

Each answer to these questions constructed America's core responsibilities vis-à-vis the world differently but all three currents rested strongly on American Exceptionalism. Wilsonian internationalism argued for a worldwide organization (The League of Nations) that relied on the premises of morality, extensive international cooperation and the supremacy of the rule of law; only then could the world move beyond traditional power equilibriums, prevent an arms-race and collectively make decisions.¹⁸ Wilson perceived intervention in world affairs to be a moral obligation rooted in American Exceptionalism, which simultaneously provided the U.S. with the *moral* leadership this new world order required.¹⁹ Although Wilson's ideas for the League were by no means new, they did constitute a dramatic change in American perceptions of foreign policy.²⁰ Critics felt it defied Washington's Farewell Address of 1796, in which the retiring President had warned against permanent alliances, whereas supporters argued it finally brought the U.S. into the twentieth

¹⁵ Cooper, J.M., *The Warrior and the Priest* (Cambridge, MA [etc.] : Belknap Press of Harvard U.P. 1983) p303-5, 307-23

¹⁶ McDougall, p134; Unger, N.C., *Fighting Bob La Follette: The Righteous Reformer* (Chapel Hill, NC : University of North Carolina Press 2000) p239-262.

¹⁷ Stone, R.A., *The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations* (Lexington, KY : University Press of Kentucky 1970) p4-23

¹⁸ This missionary sentiment was already present in pre-WWI interventions in South America where Wilson would "teach the South American Republics to elect good men" in: Schulte-Nordholt, J.W., [translated by H.H. Rowen], *Woodrow Wilson: A Life for World Peace* (Berkeley, CA : University of California Press 1991) p123, 134-6, 143-5, 223

¹⁹ Cooper (1983), p324-45

²⁰ Cooper, J.M. [ed], *Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson: Progressivism, Internationalism, War, and Peace* (Baltimore, MD : John Hopkins U.P. 2008) p225-244

century.²¹ Despite the League's eventual failure, it is impossible to dismiss the impact of Wilson's interpretation of the American mission, its moral obligation to intervene on behalf of freedom, democracy and capitalism, on the development of American foreign policy.²²

Isolationism was related to the Monroe Doctrine and dictated that European nations refrain from interference in the Americas and vice versa.²³ Isolationists argued that Europe and the U.S. fundamentally differed in terms of political interests, aims and cultural heritage and should therefore not engage in mutual alliances.²⁴ Isolationism argued American Exceptionalism dictated *against* interventionism as it would jeopardize America's special position in the world.²⁵ After WWI, isolationists fervently opposed the League of Nations as it would structurally compromise U.S. sovereignty, ideals and require involvement in conflicts that were of no concern to the U.S.²⁶ While isolationism was indeed conservative, its history shows it was not simply a reaction to Wilsonian internationalism but did attract much attention because the Isolationists' role in the debates on the League was well-publicized.²⁷ Generally, isolationism opposed more than it favored and was unable to present actionable proposals because those would likely contradict the movement's conservative, strict-constructionist views on the role of the federal government. Finally, isolationists favored worldwide disarmament; when nations ignored other countries' affairs, all defense spending was unnecessary.²⁸

Nationalism, the final ideology that informed Republican foreign policy, found a middle ground between Wilsonianism and Isolationism. This flank pleaded with Wilson, unsuccessfully, to intervene in WWI before 1917 on the side of the Allied Powers. When Wilson *did* go to war Nationalists remained unsatisfied. Wilson's previous indecisiveness led the nationalist flank to believe the American involvement would lead to undesirable compromises. Moreover, they were

²¹ Washington's Farewell Address can be found here: <http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/farewell/sd106-21.pdf>. The warning against enduring alliances is present between p25-30.

²² Wilson's League of Nations forms a direct precedent for the role of the U.S. in the UN and NATO.

²³ The Doctrine was formulated by John Quincy Adams and expressed by President James Monroe in 1823 (which was in turn inspired by Washington's farewell address)

²⁴ The Monroe Doctrine was first expressed in the President's State of the Union Address of December 2, 1823. A transcript of his speech can be found here: <http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=23&page=transcript>.

²⁵ Toth, C.W., "Isolationism and the Emergence of Borah: An Appeal to American Tradition" in *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Jun., 1961), pp. 555-568

²⁶ As Isolationism had a distinct Western/frontier mentality and its rank-and-file inhabited largely rural and sparsely populated areas, internationalists (Wilsonian and otherwise) thought of isolationists as naïve anti-modernists who underappreciated the complexities of an increasingly interdependent world.

²⁷ Unger, p241-2

²⁸ Johnson, R.D., *The Peace Progressives and American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, MA : Harvard U.P. 1995) p70-104; Powaski, R. E., *Toward an Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism, Internationalism, and Europe: 1901-1950* (Westport, CT : Greenwood Press 1991) p5-6, 11-5, 19-26; Cooper Jr., J.M., *Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations* (New York, NY : Cambridge U.P. 2001) p19-20; 55-233; Steigerwald, D., *Wilsonian Idealism in America* (Ithaca, NY : Cornell U.P. 1994) p98-113

concerned about Wilson's attempts to mobilize a country that had rejected war for years and opposed tax increases to fund the war. After the war, conflicts with the Wilson administration continued even though there were several similarities between both views as both envisioned an active role for the U.S. in the world and emphasized American Exceptionalism and superiority. Unlike Wilsonians, however, Nationalists rejected the concession of sovereignty in exchange for a possibility of peace – as the League's charter implied. Moreover, nationalists were realists – looking at the world in terms of power relations, practical and material factors as opposed to ideology – and, as such, characterized Wilson's morality as naïve and advocated a strong Army and Navy instead. To some extent, nationalists shared the isolationists' skepticism towards international alliances but considered the latter's wish to fully retreat from world affairs insensible.²⁹

Wilson's vision emphasized the irreversible extent to which the U.S. was already intertwined with the world, explicitly sought to serve more than just American interests, and allowed for other nations to be regarded as equals. To compensate for these changes, Wilson formulated his policy in terms of American Exceptionalism and religion but could not prevent American politics from becoming divided over Wilson's plans. Moreover, the Republican opposition grew more powerful after the Republicans had won both Houses in 1918 even though Wilson refused to consider the Senate's reservations. Personal animosities between Wilson and Republican Nationalists increased the latter's opposition to the treaty and the isolationists were, by definition, against it. As both the President and his opponents severely politicized the aftermath of WWI, the Treaty was bound to fail.³⁰ Popular opinion also turned against Wilson in general, as illustrated by the landslide victory of the Republican Harding-Coolidge ticket that, with a promised "Return to Normalcy", was able to capture voters that grew increasingly tired of domestic change and reform.³¹

However, there was more to these events than just the League's defeat, as this debate contributed to the future development of American foreign policy. Arguments of equal partnerships as opposed to those asserting American superiority or isolation from all that is not American, kept recurring over time.

²⁹ Chambers, J.W. [ed.], *The Eagle and the Dove: The American Peace Movement and United States Foreign Policy 1900-1922* (Syracuse, NY : Syracuse U.P. 1991) xxxi-lxxxvii; 59-61, 96-99,102-3, 147-148; 162-4;171-147; Miller, K.A.J., *Populist Nationalism: Republican Insurgency and American Foreign Policy* (Westport, CT : Greenwood Press 1999) p 55-72

³⁰ *New York Times*, "SENATE DEFEATS TREATY, VOTE 49 TO 35", March 20, 1920, p1.

³¹ Both Harding and Coolidge did support a world organization in principle, just not Wilson's League of Nations. In addition to McDougall p137-146, also see: Bagby, W.M., *The Road to Normalcy: The Presidential Campaign and Election of 1920* (Baltimore, MD : John Hopkins Press 1962)

1.2 The Struggle between Republican Isolationism and Nationalism

The isolationist flank (or: the Irreconcilables) consisted of sixteen Senators; fourteen of which were Republican, and was led by Senators Borah, Norris and La Follette Sr. – who was succeeded by his son, Robert M. La Follette Jr. after senior's death in 1925.³² Norris and both La Follettes were not very influential when it came to the Senate's foreign policy whereas Borah became Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations after his predecessor, Sen. Lodge, died in 1924.³³ Borah controversially advocated recognition of the USSR and, as organizer of the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-1922, he gave tangible expression to the isolationists' wish for disarmament.³⁴ Domestically, the Irreconcilables supported most of Wilson's progressive reforms but feared foreign affairs would undermine them.³⁵

The foremost nationalist politicians (Lodge, Root and former President Theodore Roosevelt) were conservative in light of domestic affairs and their outlook on foreign policy implied a strong military and no U.S. membership in alliances that threatened American sovereignty.³⁶ Nationalists equated Wilson's initial neutrality during WWI with weakness, un-patriotic behavior, and considered his alignment with public opinion political opportunism.³⁷ Senator Lodge was especially influential as he chaired the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations during 1919-1924 and, in that capacity, led the Republican opposition to Wilson's League of Nations. However, Root was instrumental to Lodge's opposition as he formulated the nationalists' position – both before and after the League was debated – that maintained American superiority over the world and the elements of the Monroe Doctrine that pertained to foreign intervention in the Americas.³⁸ Roosevelt held no office after his failed 1912 presidential run, but remained influential as he spread his opinions through columns in

³² This amount and division over parties is based on: Stone, p 1, 2. Other literature on the subject may very well define the group of Irreconcilables differently; Stone, p183-8

³³ Norris presided over the Senate Judiciary Committee and La Follette Sr. participated in Committees that focused on consumer rights while his son's work concerned organized labor. Norris and La Follette, together with four others, even voted against the Declaration of War on Germany in 1917 which led to great consternation in- and outside of Congress; Buhle, M.J., P. Buhle, H.J. Kaye [eds.], *The American Radical* (New York, NY : Routledge 1994) p159-66; Unger, p239-262.

³⁴ Johnson (1995), p 81-85; Stone, p97-99

³⁵ Unger, p242-80

³⁶ Even Roosevelt's famed anti-trust attitude (which is deemed progressive) has often been exaggerated. Cooper (1983), p 41-2, 82-4, 114-5, 212, 216-7

³⁷ Widenor, W.C., *Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy* (Berkeley CA [etc.] : University of California Press 1980) p178-99; Cooper (1983), p30-1, 36-8, 41-2, 74-5, 86-7,152-5, 158-9,249, 271-2, 283, 317-8.

³⁸ The element of the doctrine that stated the U.S. would accordingly stay out of European affairs had lost most of its meaning – a development that originates from the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, devised by Roosevelt and first announced by his Secretary of War Root in May of 1904. Rossini, D. [ed.], *From Theodore Roosevelt to FDR: Internationalism and Isolationism in American Foreign Policy* (Staffordshire : Keele U.P. 1995) p69-92; Cooper (1983), p71-3, 79, 266, 277, 288.

the *Kansas City Star* (which was republished by another 50 papers); many of which focused on the government's failings surrounding WWI, but criticized isolationists as well.³⁹

When America's neutrality was about to be forsaken, isolationist opposition to Wilsonianism was rooted, primarily, in differences of ideology and the fear of conspiracies. Nationalist opposition was somewhat different ideologically but was far more informed by procedural opposition. After the war, the antagonism between isolationists and nationalists diminished as Wilson and the League of Nations emerged as common adversaries.⁴⁰ Moreover, as Ole Rudolf Holsti argues, the "Republican platform [for the elections of 1920] was sufficiently ambiguous such that both the league's supporters and its opponents could believe that the party followed their preferences."⁴¹ If the Republicans allowed the League of Nations to succeed, they would forsake the ambiguous position that kept their supporters together and result in an easy Democratic victory in 1920.⁴²

³⁹ Roosevelt, Th., *Publications of the Roosevelt Memorial Association: II. Roosevelt in the Kansas City Star* (Boston, MA : Houghton Mifflin Company 1921) xv, xxi, xxxiii, xxxv-xliii, 3-8. Roosevelt wrote approximately 115 columns for the *Kansas City Star*, only small number of them did *not* concern WWI.

⁴⁰ Cooper (1983), p263, 333-4, 338-40

⁴¹ Holsti, O.E., *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* [Revised Edition] (Ann Arbor, MI : Michigan U.P. 2004) p11

⁴² Hanhimäki, 431-2; Holsti, p10-2

2. The 1920s, 1930s & 1940s

During the 1920s America's economy expanded greatly and urbanization rates increased. Due to its geography, the U.S. was spared the War's physical destruction and became the world's banker as it held virtually all of Europe's debt. However, America was disillusioned by WWI's horrors, domestic anti-immigration sentiments were on the rise, and several totalitarian regimes, fascist and communist, emerged in other parts of the world.⁴³ The affluent decade finally ended with the Wall Street Crash of 1929, which started the Great Depression. In light of these events, how did American foreign policy change after WWI had ended and the League of Nations had been defeated?

2.1 The Roaring Twenties and the Thirties

When much of Europe lay in ruins and totalitarian regimes arose in the USSR and Italy, the U.S. was disgusted and retreated beyond its shores as a majority of people and politicians alike thought involvement in WWI was a grave mistake.⁴⁴ To some extent however, the U.S. continued to assert itself and its plans for the world after the League was rejected through, for instance, the Washington Naval Conference (initiated by Borah, held under the Harding administration) which led to several international agreements and, domestically, by means of the peace movements that were shattered by WWI (affiliation or membership of such movements was deemed unpatriotic) but which returned after the war with even more determination. Between 1936 and 1938, a majority of Americans was in favor of U.S. led disarmament conferences.⁴⁵

Not until the 1930s did the mixture of pacifism, isolationism and regret – pushed even further by the devastating Great Depression – force Americans to reconsider their past decisions. Firstly, Congress was pressured by public opinion and its members to adopt protectionist measures such as the Smoot-Hawley tariffs of 1930.⁴⁶ Secondly, there was the Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry (1934-1936), chaired by isolationist Republican Senator Gerald R. Nye of North-Dakota, which investigated the munitions industry and American motives for

⁴³ Anti-immigration sentiments: Rossini, p 93-107

⁴⁴ In the spring of 1937, this opinion applied to 70% of Americans, and 73% thought there would be another World War. American neutrality should be upheld (November 1935: 71%, in 1939: between 83 and 96%), a declaration of war should require a national vote (more than 70% between 1935 and 1937) and American military appropriations should be larger (December 1935: 59%, in 1938: between 68 and 74%). Gallup, G.H., *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971 [Vol. I: 1935-1948]* (New York, NY : Random House 1972) p 3, 6-7, 54, 61, 65-6, 71, 84, 92, 111-2, 121-2, 137, 145, 149-50, 175, 181, 184, 186, 193; Holsti, p 8, 9-18, 129

⁴⁵ Gallup I, p39, 61-2.

⁴⁶ This is a great example of the influence of domestic considerations over trade-related, thus international, policies. See: Manhimäki, p429-30

participation in WWI.⁴⁷ Its report suggested a conspiracy of bankers and arms manufacturers and strongly enhanced pre-existing sentiments of disappointment. Even though the Committee's work was cut short in 1936, it was directly responsible for the Neutrality Acts of the 1930s – the third change.⁴⁸ These acts – first passed in 1935, extended and altered in 1936, 1937 and 1939 – were brought about by Senators Borah, Nye, La Follette Jr. and the hereafter mentioned Senator Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg (Republican, Michigan), who led Congress' majority faction of isolationists.⁴⁹ The Neutrality Act (essentially a full embargo on war related trade) was largely supported as the country desired peace and feared another war. The bill also addressed the extent of executive privilege, stemming from the League of Nations debates, and strongly limited executive powers. In 1939, Roosevelt was able to soften the bill's regulations and in 1941, the Lend-Lease Act overruled almost all of it.⁵⁰

The decline of neutralist legislation had set in and became final when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941, but the 1930s were mainly characterized by a bipartisan isolationism; a natural process with clear origins: postwar disappointment and disillusion, anger about American involvement in WWI, the illusion of geographical safety, and the priority and urgency of domestic issues. Symbolic of a larger tendency to form pacifist, isolationist movements, was the founding of the America First Committee in 1940, which held nationwide appeal because of its prominent members (Senators Wheeler, Walsh and Nye but also national hero Charles Lindbergh) but no level of popularity could have saved the Committee after the attack on Pearl Harbor. All isolationist sentiments abruptly vanished in the wake of the attack and, within days, the committee was formally disbanded.⁵¹

⁴⁷ One of the Committee's other members was Republican Senator Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg of Michigan, who will be considered at length later in this dissertation.

⁴⁸ The fear of this so-called military-industrial complex would often recur, most notably in Eisenhower's farewell address of 1961, which can be found here: <http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=90>. McDougall, p137, 149; Holsti, p17; Weiss, S.L., *American Foreign Policy and Presidential Power: The Neutrality Act of 1935* in *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Aug., 1968), pp. 682-3

⁴⁹ President Roosevelt was forced to adopt the Neutrality Act of 1935 as his domestic reforms (the New Deal) required support from the isolationists and consequently kept Roosevelt from exercising his Presidential veto. Weiss pp. 672-681; Rossini, p113-130

⁵⁰ Idem, pp. 683-5; 690-1; Jessup, P.C., "The Neutrality Act of 1939" in *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Jan., 1940), pp. 95-99; Garner, J.W., "The United States Neutrality Act of 1937" in *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Jul., 1937), pp. 385-397. The transcript of the Lend-Lease Act of 1941 can be found here: <http://ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=71&page=transcript>.

⁵¹ MacDougall, p147; Cole, W.S., "America First and the South", 1940-1941 in *The Journal of Southern History*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Feb., 1956), pp. 36-8, 43, 47; Doenecke, J.D. [ed.], *In Danger Undaunted: The Anti-Interventionist Movement of 1940-1941 as Revealed in the Papers of the America First Committee* (Palo Alto, CA : Stanford U.P. 1990) p2-22

2.2. Evolution in Republican Foreign Policy

Sen. Vandenberg served in the U.S. Senate between 1928 and 1951 and was one of Roosevelt's foremost political adversaries prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor both with regards to domestic as well as foreign affairs. Already at the onset of his senatorial career, Vandenberg was a convinced political isolationist, or, in his own terms, an *insulationist*.⁵² His arguments were illustrative: he feared foreign entanglement, deemed the U.S. secure because of both oceans and disapproved of the Administration's tendency to compromise American sovereignty. Even though Vandenberg hated "Hitlerism and Nazism and Communism as completely as any person living", they were not American problems.⁵³ Unsurprisingly, Vandenberg strongly supported the initial Neutrality Act as he thought the President's behavior and "treacherous" ideas destroyed "150 years of traditional American foreign policy", made America's future dependent on that of Europe, Asia and Africa, and, in "totalitarian fashion", gave no "real and serious consideration" to the Republican opposition and its ideas. The final straw for Vandenberg was the Senate's approval of the Lend-Lease act in 1941, which provided the Allied nations with large amounts of war supplies – he qualified it as "the suicide of the Republic". Meanwhile, the people's opinion had already changed somewhat in comparison with the 1930s as it started to favor active engagement with the world and approved of the Lend-Lease Act.⁵⁴

Moreover, the majority of Americans, with some fluctuations of course, supported Roosevelt during his three-term presidency despite the discrepancy between his internationalist policies and the public's preference for strict neutrality.⁵⁵ So, notwithstanding Vandenberg's adamant and emotional opposition to Roosevelt, he accepted the latter's strategy as it had become official U.S. policy early and was determined to make the most of it. However professional this pragmatism, within a matter of months it became superfluous: the attack on Pearl Harbor instantly discarded all forms of isolationism. Vandenberg was no exception but took his shift in views even further: within years he would come to represent full-fledged internationalism, headed the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations between 1947 and 1949, and was instrumental in founding, among others, the United Nations.⁵⁶ However, structural cooperation between the Administration and Congress would not occur until 1943, when questions about the arrangement of the postwar world emerged. As the other allies would primarily look out for their own interests, Vandenberg realized it would crucial for

⁵² Defined as: "one who wants to preserve all of the isolation which modern circumstances will permit." in: Vandenberg Jr., A.H., J.A. Morris [eds.] *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (London : Gollancz 1953) p4.

⁵³ Vandenberg, p2,3, 10, 11; Gazell, J. A., "Arthur H. Vandenberg: Internationalism, and the United Nations" in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 88, No. 3 (Sep., 1973), pp. 375-394

⁵⁴ Vandenberg, p2-4, 9-13, 15; Wunderlin, C.E., *Robert A. Taft: Ideas, Tradition, and Party in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Lanham, MD : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2005) p60; Gallup I, p267-8

⁵⁵ See Gallup I, p1-484 for all of Gallup's approval ratings between 1935 and 1945.

⁵⁶ For the moment however, he wondered whether or not Roosevelt's policies had in fact facilitated the Japanese attack. Vandenberg, p 3, 15-20, 22-3

the U.S. to enter those negotiations with a unified voice.⁵⁷

Some ten years after Vandenberg's debut in the Senate, Robert Alphonso Taft of Ohio made his. Both senators adhered to the same general conservative ideas and, like Vandenberg, Taft would become increasingly important in the Senate. Taft believed adamantly in fiscal responsibility and a small government; he loathed the New Deal deficits and saw his libertarian views proven by the Recession of 1937-1938 (the 'Roosevelt Recession') – although public opinion strongly disagreed.⁵⁸ After the war, Taft, also known as 'Mr. Republican', became the Party's leader on domestic issues but also influenced other policy areas as he became chairman of the Republican Policy Committee in 1947.⁵⁹

Taft's isolationism led him to disapprove of Roosevelt's foreign policy and to curb Roosevelt's power, Taft and others called for a decrease in executive power and an increase in that of Congress. In August of 1936, 45% of Americans (83% of Republicans) believed that the "acts and policies of the Roosevelt Administration may lead to a dictatorship" and in October of 1937, a substantial minority of 35% (71% of Republicans) thought the President ought to have less power than he has now.⁶⁰ In addition to procedural critiques, Taft also argued that European and Asian conflicts were of little to no concern to the U.S. and even if the Nazis were to rule all of Europe, the U.S. would still be protected by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. In line with Washington's Farewell Address, he believed American foreign policy should be impartial as not to invite foreign conflicts in but when Japan attacked the U.S., Taft voted for the declarations of war issued against Japan, Germany and Italy but felt Roosevelt had provoked the Japanese attack.⁶¹ Throughout the war, he remained extremely critical of the Roosevelt administration, its handling of the conflict and the extent of executive power but stood, for the most part, alone: the rest of Congress was far more willing to expand executive powers during WWII.⁶²

While Vandenberg embraced interventionism after the war, Taft remained isolationist –

⁵⁷ Idem, p31-6

⁵⁸ Smith, T.V., R.A. Taft, *Foundations of Democracy: A Series of Debates* [from the series *Politics and People: The Ordeal of Self-Government in America*] (New York, NY : Columbia U.P. 1939) p224-234; Gallup, 99, 108.

⁵⁹ In that same year, he co-sponsored the Taft-Hartley Act, a conservative piece of legislation that severely limits union power which is still in place.

⁶⁰ Wunderlin, p33; Smith, p184-93; Gallup, p30, 74

⁶¹ Wunderlin, p33-5. 54-65. Interestingly enough, in Smith pp.184-193, Taft also mentions President Wilson's policy before 1917 in reference to the benefits of neutrality and loosely indicates American intervention in WWI was forced upon the U.S. – as opposed to the opinion of many Republican contemporaries of Wilson, who depicted the latter as warmonger. Support for the declarations of war was unanimous save for the dissenting Rep. J. Rankin (R, Montana), who voted against war with Japan and simply signed in as 'present' for the declarations of war on Germany and Italy.

⁶² Wunderlin, 64-6; Kirk, R., J. McClellan, *The Political Principles of Robert A. Taft* (New Brunswick, NJ : Transaction Publishers 2010 [reprint of 1967 version]) p90-6; Taft, R.A., C.E. Wunderlin, Jr. [ed.], *The Papers of Robert A. Taft: Volume 4 – 1949-1953* (Kent, OH : Kent State U.P. 2006) x-xi; Matthews, G., "Robert A. Taft, the Constitution and American Foreign Policy, 1939-1953" in *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 17, No.3 (July, 1982), p 508-9

albeit less severe than before. His emphasis on the American economy informed his unsuccessful attempt to downsize the Marshall Plan, he advocated structural demobilization, approved only selectively of the Truman Doctrine, ultimately voted against the U.N. Charter, opposed the formation of NATO and did not consider the USSR to be America's foremost threat.⁶³ Only a minority of fellow politicians and the public agreed with Taft's assessments; the impulse of neutrality that reigned in the 1930s lost virtually all of its appeal after the Axis powers were defeated.⁶⁴ Consequently, Taft's 1948 and 1952 bids for the Republican presidential nomination failed primarily because of the discrepancy between his conservative world view and public opinion. In both instances, the Party went with more interventionist and liberal candidates (Thomas Edmund Dewey in 1948; Dwight David Eisenhower in 1952).⁶⁵

Although Taft and Vandenberg's main areas of interest lay in rather separate spheres, there was some contact between the two senators, and, despite a similar conservative view of domestic issues, their opinions and methods diverged especially on the topic of foreign policy.⁶⁶ Tensions were sometimes heightened because Taft's chairmanship of the Republican Policy Committee implied his say in matters of world affairs was larger than his role as primary spokesman for domestic policies would normally entail. Vandenberg, aside from voting like any other senator, had no corresponding influence in his colleague's domain and, above all, generally agreed with his counterpart in domestic discussions.⁶⁷ As for methods, Taft and Vandenberg's conservative dispositions towards national concerns were part of a larger partisan battle between the Democrats and the Republicans. The former supported the New Deal (and thus, a growth in government) and the latter, true to more libertarian principles, argued against a large government and for fiscal responsibility. Consequently, national issues brought before Congress almost immediately bore agreement and disagreement along party lines.

Foreign policy however, required a different concept according to Vandenberg: bipartisanship. Vandenberg's shift to internationalism made such an approach possible in the first place, but his conviction that during conversations with the rest of the world the U.S. must speak

⁶³ Eventually, Taft's views on the limited applicability of the Truman Doctrine forged his opposition to involvement in Korea. MacDougall, p146-7; Taft (2006), p xii-xiii, 4, 230; Wunderlin, p107-111, 123-31, 210; Kirkendall, R.S., *A Global Power: America since the Age of Roosevelt* [Second Ed.] (New York, NY : Alfred A. Knopf 1980) p26, 50-4, 77, 94; Kirk, p85-108

⁶⁴ Already in April of 1945, 81% of Americans approved membership in "a world organization with police power to maintain world peace", in July of 1945 66% agreed with the United Nations Charter as established at the San Francisco Conference, and 71% thought that the U.S. should "take an active part in world affairs" in October of 1945. Gallup I, p497, 516, 534

⁶⁵ Taft also ran in 1940 but lost to Willkie because Taft was too conservative (both on domestic as well as foreign issues) to appeal to more liberal voters; Matthews, 507-22

⁶⁶ Wunderlin, p111, 120-3, 131; Taft, p58-63; Kirk et.al, p116, 160-165; Vandenberg, p353-8, 498.

⁶⁷ Wunderlin, p125, Vandenberg, p319.

with a single voice, made it plausible. Ultimately, to prevent a schism in the Republican Party, Taft and Vandenberg made sure that it never came to an all-out confrontation.⁶⁸

2.3 The Implications of yet another World War

In his book “Promised Land, Crusader State”, Walter MacDougall argues that isolationism during the inter-bellum was “moral, sensible, and American” which would explain why isolationism was so popular during the 1920s and 1930s and simultaneously account for the severity of the shock the American people felt in December of 1941: the attack “had stolen the most basic of freedoms: the freedom to choose war and peace”. But whereas Wilson’s plans for the world after the WWI were supported by only a handful, WWII convinced people and politicians alike that the U.S. could ill afford to disregard world affairs and demanded a permanent American presence on the world stage.⁶⁹ Two themes emerge between 1941 and 1948: Republican internationalism and Republican frustration; both which gave rise to the final, cardinal theme of this dissertation: partisan foreign policy.

Republican Internationalism embodied the Republican embrace of international cooperation, as illustrated by the founding of the United Nations (UN), the execution of Marshall Plan, and the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, these examples did not imply that Republicans by definition spoke with a united voice when it came to these postwar policies.⁷⁰

The UN originates from the secretive Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy, established in 1942. The Committee, chaired by Secretary of State Hull, formulated the first recommendations for world peace. Hull, eager to revive Wilsonian internationalism but not repeat its mistakes, then formed the Committee of Eight (four Democratic, one Progressive and three Republican Senators – including Vandenberg) so that the process was rooted in bipartisanship from the outset. The organizational layout of the U.N. yielded it the ability to act, as opposed to its powerless predecessor The League of Nations.⁷¹ Meanwhile, largely unaware of these activities, the American people approved of drawing up postwar plans before the war was even over, recommended bipartisanship, and civilian initiatives, such as the Council for the United Nations, emerged to promote the UN.⁷²

Vandenberg deemed the preliminary Charter “excellent” because it was “so conservative”

⁶⁸ Vandenberg, p93-94, p318-9, 332.

⁶⁹ See footnote 29 and 51; MacDougall, p 150-1,

⁷⁰ Vandenberg, p128-9

⁷¹ Idem, p90-5; Johnson, 1-3

⁷² Gallup I, p361, 377, 425, 444. One man in particular advanced the cause outside of Congress: Wendell Willkie, a Republican that became Roosevelt’s personal representative in- and outside of the U.S., wrote the best-selling book *One World* and, in doing so, helped generate broad popular support for the U.N. MacDougall, 151-3; Kirk et.al., p51; Barnard, E., *Wendell Willkie: Fighter for Freedom* (Marquette, MI : Northern Michigan U.P. 1966), p296-336.

and it “so surprisingly protects the independent authority of the United States” but as Vandenberg and his Republican colleagues worried about the terms and conditions Churchill and Stalin would attach to the eventual peace that the U.N. was supposed to protect, they needed more assurances. Interestingly, the Committee’s secrecy ensured obstacles such as these could be overcome as their opinions were not polarized by the interference of public opinion – as opposed to Wilson’s ideal that diplomacy be open, democratic and non-secretive.⁷³ During the campaign of 1944, there was a consensus among key Republicans and Democrats to not invoke foreign policy and the U.N. as politicization of the issue could prove fatal to the project. Moreover, as public opinion approved of interventionism independent of the developments in Congress, neither party would benefit from politicizing the issue.⁷⁴

In January of 1945, Vandenberg held a speech before the Senate that made public fully his changed opinions as he argued in favor of the U.N. The speech was warmly received and added to America’s willingness to cooperate internationally but even before WWII was over, the American people supported unspecified international cooperation and trusted the USSR and its intentions, in addition to their traditional favorite nation, Great Britain.⁷⁵ The definitive organizational structure of the U.N. – the Security Council in addition to the General Assembly – could also count on popular support.⁷⁶ Supported by the people, the Senate ratified the U.N. charter in 1945 by a vote of 89 to 2 – a vote that attested to Vandenberg’s influence in particular, but to Republican supported bipartisanship in general.⁷⁷ Even Taft, who opposed plans for a postwar international organization during the war because it would disenfranchise Congress, voted for ratification.⁷⁸

A few years after the U.N.’s founding, the American people still supported active involvement in the world, but felt the U.N. lacked effectiveness and were dissatisfied with its progress. Moreover, already in 1946 Americans no longer trusted the USSR – crucial to the U.N.’s success because it had a permanent seat on the Security Council.⁷⁹ Finally, after the U.S. was no longer in a state of war the approval ratings for the Democrat-controlled Congress and Administration dropped as people worried more about unemployment, labor unions and inflation.⁸⁰

⁷³ Vandenberg, p95-6, 98, 110-1; Gazell, 375-6, 382-6.

⁷⁴ Idem, p112-3

⁷⁵ Idem, 126-45

⁷⁶ Gallup I, 382, 406, 453-4, 471, 492, 497

⁷⁷ The Senate may have showed overwhelming support for the Charter, the public was, to say the least, skeptical about the U.N.’s ability to keep the peace. Consequently, they did not want, for example, to put the atomic bomb under the U.N. authority (Gallup I, p 500, 517, 525).

⁷⁸ Taft’s support was short-lived however, when he voted against sending U.S. delegates to the U.N. later that same year (1945). See: Matthews, 513-4; Gazell, 392-4

⁷⁹ Gallup I, 566, 566, 576, 589, 736. This vision was underlined by, among others, Sen. Taft. See: Hayes, M.T., “The Republican Road not Taken: The Foreign Policy Vision of Robert A. Taft” in *The Independent Review*, Vol. 8, No. 4, (April 2004) p514-7

⁸⁰ Gallup I, 587, 592, 604-5.

These considerations allowed the Republicans to take control of Congress in 1946 and would soon affect decisions on foreign policy.⁸¹

After WWII, the Marshall Plan (1948-1952) aimed to rebuild Europe, help it withstand the USSR's expanding communism and establish structural trade relations between the U.S. and Europe.⁸² Although an affluent Europe would offer the U.S. good trade prospects, domestic concerns constituted arguments against the Plan when economic worries arose and the GOP took possession of Congress: opponents argued the U.S. could not afford it and the Plan's proposed reduction in trade restrictions would harm American business interests according to conservative Republicans – as European communism was merely political, they prioritized domestic economic issues over halting it; others still opposed the plan because Europe was governed by socialists.⁸³ Vandenberg however was convinced of the plan's necessity and led the movement to alter the Marshall Plan in order to overcome Republican opposition and succeeded – despite a challenge by Taft, who wanted to cut the amount by more than 20%.⁸⁴

As the U.N. proved to be rather ineffective and European communism remained a real threat, the Administration worked towards the establishment of NATO in 1949 to complement the U.N.'s Security Council.⁸⁵ Negotiations on the treaty continued throughout 1948 and were somewhat complicated by that year's presidential elections but a more important obstacle was the European demand for unconditional American military support if a Soviet attack were to occur – whereas Congress was unlikely to pass any treaty that conceded its constitutional right to declare war. In response, the Truman administration reached out to Vandenberg, who would once again play a vital role in selling foreign policy to Congress.⁸⁶ In June of 1948, Vandenberg introduced a resolution that urged the President to further world peace and security through alliances that circumvented the ineffective U.N. but would still be in compliance with the U.N. Charter. The resolution allowed Undersecretary of State Robert Abercrombie Lovett to continue negotiations while the submission of

⁸¹ For an interesting statistical analysis of the American tendency to vote Republican in times of heightened societal threat, including the elections of 1946, see: McCann, S.J.H., "Political Conservatism, Authoritarianism, and Societal Threat: Voting for Republican Representatives in U.S. Congressional Elections from 1946 to 1992" in *The Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 143, No. 4 (April 2009), p341-58.

⁸² The actual causal relation between the Plan and Europe's economic recovery is still subject of debate, however. Leffler, M., *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA : Stanford U.P. 1992), p 157-65; Gallup I, p 660-1, 677-8, 683-4, 691-2, 708-9, 715-6, 722, 770-1; Clayton, W., "Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs" in *FRUS*, 1947, Vol. 3 p230-2; "Policy with Respect to American Aid to Western Europe Views of the Policy Planning Staff" in *FRUS*, 1947, Vol.3 p224-6; Hanhimäki, p428-9.

⁸³ Leffler, 161-4; Johnson, p22-5

⁸⁴ Vandenberg, 373-398

⁸⁵ Already in 1948, the USSR had used its right to veto more than 20 times. The text of the North Atlantic Treaty can be found at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm; Vandenberg, 399-401

⁸⁶ Leffler, p208-18; "Washington Exploratory Conversations on Security, September 9th, 1948" in *FRUS*, 1948, *Western Europe*, p237-248.

a formal treaty to the Senate was delayed until after the presidential elections; the political debates of 1948 were of a partisan nature and a treaty that required a two-third majority would not likely pass in such a climate and would simultaneously erode public support for such an alliance.⁸⁷

⁸⁷ Vandenberg, 404-12, 416-20, 425-6, 446-52; Leffler, 215-6, 220-1; Johnson, p24-6; Truman, H.S., *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, NY : Doubleday & Company 1956), p28-9, 167-8, 211-2; Gallup, p750

PART II

“MOVEMENTS III, IV & FINALE/REPRISE”

3. Republican Opposition between 1948 and 1950

When the Republican National Committee (RNC) convened in Kansas City, Missouri in April of 1947, former Governor and Republican presidential candidate Alfred Landon, told his audience that the current “Republican Congress is supporting [Truman’s] foreign policy in the interest of national unity and bipartisan cooperation for the nation’s welfare.”⁸⁸ In the fall of 1950 however, the *New York Times* spoke of a “violent campaign” that “has seen the triumph of “McCarthy-ism””, in which Republicans, among other things, suggested that the “setbacks abroad were due to stupidity and treason in the government”.⁸⁹ This remarkable turnaround occurred in roughly two-and-a-half years and would continue right up to the presidential elections of 1952, after which the Republicans took possession of the White House for the first time in twenty years. But exactly which factors were responsible for this reversal of Republican opinion?

3.1 An Upset Victory

The struggle against communism that would come to dominate American foreign policy for decades to come, materialized further in 1948 when Congress approved the Marshall Plan and the Truman Administration organized the Berlin Airlift when the Soviets prevented essential supplies from entering parts of Berlin.⁹⁰ On the domestic political front, this antagonism increased as well through the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC). In 1948, the Committee’s case against Alger Hiss, a former employee of the Department of State and the U.N. who was accused of being a Russian spy, was highly publicized and almost instantly, the domestic threat of communism became a major issue in the presidential elections later that year.⁹¹ Consequently, the economic worries that were predominant in the Congressional elections of 1946 were of lesser importance during the presidential elections of 1948.⁹²

The Republicans entered the elections of 1948 with confidence, as illustrated by the tone and

⁸⁸ “Remarks by Alfred M. Landon, former governor of Kansas, on the Republican Congress and the Truman administration’s foreign and domestic policies” in Kesaris, P.L. [ed.], *Papers of the Republican Party, Part I: Meetings of the Republican National Committee, 1911-1980; Series A: 1911-1960*, part of *RESEARCH COLLECTIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICS: Microforms from Major Archival and Manuscript Collections* (Frederick, MD : University Publications of America 1986), 8.0335

⁸⁹ *New York Times*, “DEFAMATION MARKS VIOLENT CAMPAIGN”, Oct. 31, 1950, p22 by J. Reston.

⁹⁰ The struggle started after the U.S. pledged funds to help strike down communist uprisings in Turkey and Greece in 1947.

⁹¹ While the 1948 campaign largely refrained from talking about foreign policy, the domestic threat of communism however, was a general topic. Moreover, the Hiss-case set a precedent for the rise of McCarthyism in 1950. The committee also allowed its member, then Congressman, Richard M. Nixon (Republican, California) to enjoy national media exposure, but he will be discussed in Chapter 4. See: Johnson, p10-1, 48; MacDougall, p166-7.

⁹² Gallup I, p709-10, 744, 767.

content of the many speeches, statements and discussions of the RNC meetings in 1947 and 1948. Landon, in the previously cited address, noted how the Republican Congress conducted public affairs “as they must be if those affairs are to be handled in accord with the liberal principles of genuine representative government” and how “the American public will be quick to salute this Republican Congress”. Interestingly, Landon allowed Truman and the Democrats to take the lead on foreign policy and pledged Republican support for it but asserted Republican superiority on the domestic front. After all, the Republican Congress, “by building a strong America, is laying the foundation for the success of President Truman’s new foreign policy.” For two reasons, Landon seemingly granted the Democrats a monopoly on the formulation of foreign policy. Firstly, the executive branch set out a foreign policy that relied heavily on bipartisan support. As long as both parties were consulted, remained in agreement and the Republican role in the process was acknowledged, it would not serve the Republicans’ best interest to sabotage it. Secondly, the Democrats could count on the people’s goodwill as Democratic leadership had secured victory in WWII – partisan attacks on foreign policy would, to say the least, be risky. So, after Landon essentially conceded the issue of foreign policy, he emphasized that the Republicans were more capable than Truman and the Democrats when it came to domestic policy, as he believed that was what the coming elections would be about.⁹³ During the RNC meeting in January of 1948, Republican Senator John W. Bricker of Ohio (Dewey’s running mate in 1944) argued differently: in a direct reference to Sen. Vandenberg, who said that unity with regards to foreign affairs must start at the water’s edge, Bricker took a stand: “I have heard it said time and time again in the last few months (...) that we have or ought to have a bi-partisan foreign policy. That may be true (...) but let us as Republicans battle out what that policy is going to be before it gets to the water’s edge.”⁹⁴

The RNC’s chairman, Brazilla Carroll Reece, discussed the State of the Union Address held by Truman just two weeks prior as he accused the Democrats of “fifteen years of mis-management, waste and confusion and playing politics with human misery”, which could only result in a Republican electoral victory.⁹⁵ Republican Senator Kenneth Spicer Wherry of Nebraska joined the chairman by saying: “The signs are plain. The groundswell for the Republican Party and good government is unmistakable. There just is no doubt about it” – even though he acknowledged that “[o]verconfidence has lost many worthwhile contests.” Truman’s foreign policy is silently approved of by Wherry, but can only be executed with responsible Republican financial policy: “only a sound, solvent

⁹³ “Remarks by Alfred M. Landon...” in Kesaris, P.L. [ed.], *Papers of the Republican Party, Part I...*, 8.0335

⁹⁴ However, the majority of his speech focused on economic issues: no price controls and rationing of goods, less bureaucracy and lower taxes. “Remarks by Senator John Bricker, Republican candidate for Vice President, on the 1948 presidential campaign” in *idem*, 8.0375

⁹⁵ “Remarks by RNC Chairman B. Carroll Reece criticizing President Truman’s State of the Union Address” in *idem*, 8.0388

America can lead and help the nations of the world” and voters should know “that foreign commitments, no matter how alluring they may be, affect them in their business and home life.”⁹⁶ Republican Governor Ralph Gates of Indiana noted that whereas the Democratic Party went sixteen years with only one presidential candidate, the Republican nomination has attracted several candidates each election. He argued that “minds perhaps will be diverted and there will be discussion as to the merits of candidates”. He proposed that “[w]e (...) make [the electorate] conscious of what our Party stands for rather than this candidate or that candidate in building up this coming election”; he was “fearful that the common individual does not understand what the Republican Party stands for”.⁹⁷

A *New York Times* editorial agreed with the previously mentioned speakers that the unity and the efforts of the Republican Congress, such as the Taft-Hartley act and the support for the Truman doctrine, would prove vital in the persuasion of voters. However, Congress’ second term preceded the election and the paper argued that the Party’s ability to retain its unity would decide whether or not the next president would be Republican.⁹⁸ Moreover, the paper was convinced that a constructive, bipartisan attitude towards Truman’s foreign policy was essential: “The test, we believe, will come – indeed, has already come – in the field of foreign policy [and that] the Republicans will meet, and will earn, sure defeat this fall if their leadership remains weak, confused and narrowly partisan.”⁹⁹

Gov. Gates’ prediction was correct: several contenders vied for the Republican nomination, among which Sen. Taft, who initially attacked not the aims of Truman’s foreign policy but rather its economic consequences: “We want peace and prosperity throughout the world to eliminate a threat to our own freedom, but it is certainly not worthwhile to adopt a foreign policy so burdensome on our people that it will destroy at home the very freedom we are trying to protect.”¹⁰⁰ Some days later however, he went beyond the line held by his colleagues: Roosevelt and Truman’s failures which arose “largely from an inept and futile policy toward communism [had resulted in] losing the peace”. Moreover, “the term ‘bipartisan foreign policy’ was incorrect” as Republicans played no part in “the appeasement of Stalin, the abandonment of constitutional Yugoslavia, the betrayal of the Polish patriots”.¹⁰¹ Taft’s offensive was more extreme than that of his competition, which may explain why he was not nominated in June: Republicans held him in high regard, but his foreign

⁹⁶ The rest of Wherry’s speech focused mainly on economic issues “Address by Senator Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska on the Republican Congress, communism, the Taft-Hartley Act, government spending, the economy, and Republican Party organization” in *idem*, 8.0440

⁹⁷ “Discussion of how the Republicans can reach the ‘common man’.” in *idem*, 8.0504

⁹⁸ *New York Times*, “LETTER TO REPUBLICANS”, Jan. 3, 1948, p12

⁹⁹ *New York Times*, “THE REPUBLICAN OPPORTUNITY”, Jan. 11, 1948, pE8

¹⁰⁰ *New York Times*, “SENATOR TAFT PUTS U.S. FREEDOM FIRST”, Feb. 11, 1948, p1 by G. Eckel

¹⁰¹ *New York Times*, “LOSING OF PEACE’ CHARGED BY TAFT”, Feb. 13, 1948, p4 by G. Eckel

policy would insufficiently appeal to moderate voters who had voted Democrat in previous elections. Moreover, the rather strict 1947 Taft-Hartley Labor Act, curbing organized labor, was unpopular – especially after Truman vetoed it.¹⁰²

When the electability of Taft and Stassen fell short, the Republicans, during their meetings in June of 1948, nominated Governors Dewey and Earl Warren as the Republican candidates. Their respective addresses illustrated clearly the Party's dominant mood and confidence, as Dewey was sure "that following the victory in November we shall be able to bring to the people of our country (...) a new hope, a new unity, and a new sense of faith in the institutions of human freedom."¹⁰³ His running mate Warren added that "we are here today on the threshold of complete victory" and the Republican ticket would provide the people with "one of the finest administrations they have ever had."¹⁰⁴ This sense of certain victory was not limited to the usual suspects such as the candidates themselves; even the sensible Vandenberg, who largely stayed out of the campaign, was certain of a Republican victory.¹⁰⁵

3.2 Internalities: Republicans In Search of Answers

But in spite of all the favorable signs, the Republicans surprisingly lost the elections to the Democrats and started 1949 with some much needed soul searching.¹⁰⁶ The *New York Times*, which had endorsed Dewey, said that "[Truman's] victory is a personal triumph, accomplished in the face of apparently heavy odds". More importantly, "the Democratic-Republican bipartisan foreign policy has emerged triumphantly (...) and in that solid fact democratic forces in every part of the world are entitled to find satisfaction."¹⁰⁷ In another editorial, the *Times* expected "that President Truman will be able to find both the men and the means to develop a clearer and a broader foreign policy than

¹⁰² Historical Gallup polls confirm this view: in January of 1948, in a hypothetical contest between Truman and Taft, the former would win by a landslide. In February, Taft ranked third behind Dewey and the unconfirmed candidate Eisenhower. In March, Eisenhower was no longer a candidate but Taft still ranked third, after Dewey and Harold Stassen. Later that month, Taft dropped to fifth position behind Dewey, General Douglas MacArthur (who had no campaign in place), Stassen, and Vandenberg (who did not want to run in order to maintain bipartisan foreign policy). The same ranking was valid throughout April, May and June. Gallup I, p697, 706, 718, 721, 728, 730, 739-40; Vandenberg, p421-3; Johnson, p24; Donaldson, G.A., *Truman Defeats Dewey* (Lexington, KY : The University Press of Kentucky 1999), p123-38; Taft, R.A., Wunderlin, C.E. [ed.], *The Papers of Robert A. Taft: 1949-1953* (Kent, OH : Kent State U.P. 2006) p346

¹⁰³ "Remarks by Governor Thomas Dewey of New York, Republican candidate for President, on the success of the convention and the coming election." in Kesaris, P.L. [ed.], *Papers of the Republican Party, Part I...*, 8.0908

¹⁰⁴ "Remarks by Governor Earl Warren of California, Republican candidate for Vice President, on the success of the convention and the coming election" in idem, 8.0911

¹⁰⁵ Vandenberg, p446-8

¹⁰⁶ Gallup predicted in its final elections poll, published the day before the election, that Dewey would receive 49.5% of the votes and that Truman would only definitively carry nine states. Gallup I, 767-70; Johnson, 24-5; Truman, p167-8, 220-2, 311

¹⁰⁷ *New York Times*, "MR. TRUMAN'S VICTORY", Nov. 4, 1948, p28

has been pursued thus far”.¹⁰⁸

However, the satisfaction that the paper spoke of was clearly not enough for the Republicans, who vowed to discover the reasons for their loss and correct their mistakes before the elections of 1950 and 1952. Landon argued “that Republican acquiescence in the bi-partisan foreign policy had let both the party and the country into a “booby trap” [and had] resulted in a blackout of intelligent debate”.¹⁰⁹ In the Senate meanwhile, a coup was underway against Taft as chairman of the Republican Policy Committee. This fight, which its initiators (the “liberal Republican Senators”) did not even expect to win, served “to draw public attention to the fact that a Republican renaissance is under way after five successive defeats for the Presidency and the loss of Congressional majorities gained only two years ago.”¹¹⁰ The Research Division of the Headquarters of the Republican National Committee made a “factual analysis” that concluded Truman won because of the farmers’ vote and that “the character of Truman’s promises appealed to low income groups” and voters of “foreign ancestry”.¹¹¹

The RNC convened for the first time since the elections in January of 1949 to analyze the loss. The RNC’s chairman, Hugh D. Scott Jr., argued the defeat was unexpected and unnecessary, and promised that Dewey would not be allowed to run again in 1952. Moreover, to win in 1950 and 1952, the Party needed to “fight and fight and more fight”, learn to sell their positions and accomplishments to the people and stop being modest.¹¹² The Senate’s minority leader, Sen. Wherry, agreed wholeheartedly and opened “the counterattack” against those responsible for “the socialization of this country”. Republicans would not concede the traditional American principles they represented by following Truman; such a “me-too policy is the road to ruin for our party and for our nation” as the Fair Deal is “national socialism in disguise”.¹¹³ Republican Governor Frederick V. E. Peterson of Nebraska said that five consecutive inaugurations “of a President [that is] not of our political faith (...) gives cause for sober reflection.” Consequently, “if we are to win we must offer a positive program, rather than a negative one”; Republicans could not continue to condemn “every policy of the federal government in recent years”, rely on “specter of communism”, or sneer “at the

¹⁰⁸ *New York Times*, “THE BIPARTISAN POLICY”, Nov. 5, 1948, p24

¹⁰⁹ *New York Times*, “BIPARTISAN POLICY CRITICIZED BY LANDON”, Dec. 9, 1948, p40

¹¹⁰ *New York Times*, “‘MODERN’ REPUBLICANS SEEK NEW PARTY LINE”, Jan. 2, 1949, pE3

¹¹¹ “Why the Election was Lost” in Kesaris, P.L. [ed.], *Papers of the Republican Party, Part II: Reports and Memoranda of the Research Division of the Headquarters of the Republican National Committee, 1938-1980*, part of *RESEARCH COLLECTIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICS: Microforms from Major Archival and Manuscript Collections* (Frederick, MD : University Publications of America 1986), 1.0789

¹¹² As pointed out below, Scott made his remarks on Dewey because he himself was a supporter of Dewey and received some criticism for it. “Remarks by RNC Chairman Hugh D. Scott, Jr., on the failure of the 1948 campaign and the need for the Republican Party to regroup and go forward.” in Kesaris, P.L. [ed.], *Papers of the Republican Party, Part I...*, 8.0929

¹¹³ “Remarks by Senator Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska on the closeness of the 1948 election and the organization of the Republican Party for future elections.” in idem, 8.0936

New Deal". The majority of Peterson's speech concerned economic measures, but his remarks on foreign policy were clear signs of what was to come: the breakdown of bipartisan foreign policy. While he felt "that as Americans we must stand united at the water's edge", it was "desirable only so long as it is sound". This was, as he referred to the Administration's "muddled, confused, inept, fumbling of the China problem and of our relationships in the Orient generally", no longer the case. Truman's "apathy (...) spells disaster for China and jeopardizes democratic people everywhere."¹¹⁴ This was a distinctly different opinion than that voiced by John Foster Dulles (Republican and Dewey's main foreign policy adviser and part of the bipartisan U.S. Delegation to the U.N.), who, after Dewey's defeat, declared that bipartisan foreign policies would undoubtedly continue as they "have proved their worth". Dulles' statement was supported by another Republican in the Delegation to the U.N., former Senator Warren R. Austin of Vermont.¹¹⁵

Republican Senator Homer E. Capehart of Indiana held by far the most confrontational address at the RNC's meeting. "The 80th Congress gave the President (...) everything he asked for in respect to foreign affairs and we failed to sell it. (...) We permitted for sixteen years (...) [Democrats] to beat the brains out of our leaders and then they fall to the ground and we wonder why." Republicans "fall down miserably (...) and we will fall down again in 1950 and in 1952 unless we learn the art of salesmanship, (...) the art to fight and (...) the art of sticking together and one being for the other."¹¹⁶ Sen. Taft, in a January letter to a New York businessman/philanthropist, paid no mind to Capehart's call for unity and simply argued "the election was lost by Mr. Dewey's campaign policies. (...) Every affirmative feature of [the Congressional] record could have been made an asset, but Mr. Dewey threw them all in the ash can and substituted a vague liberalism at a high level." Taft also confirmed that issues "as always, will be made by the candidates themselves."¹¹⁷

Although Scott stressed the fact that the GOP was the only "party of the people", Republicans had poor image as, even in November of 1949, most people thought the GOP was a "big business party", "all for the rich [and] nothing for the poor".¹¹⁸ To regain the people's trust, Scott proposed the GOP stop with 'me-too-ing' the New Deal and instead offer a "good program" that was

¹¹⁴ "Remarks by Governor Val Peterson of Nebraska on the reasons for the decline of, and the future of, the Republican Party" in idem, 8.0949

¹¹⁵ Even later, in 1950, Dulles published a book in which he criticized the Truman Doctrine. *New York Times*, "DULLES WOULD KEEP BIPARTISAN POLICY", Nov. 4, 1948, by T.J. Hamilton.

¹¹⁶ "Remarks by Senator Homer E. Capehart of Indiana on the need for unification in, and the need to 'sell', the Republican Party." in Kesaris, P.L. [ed.], *Papers of the Republican Party, Part I...*, 8.0970; Another plea favoring salesmanship and party unity came from Congresswoman Cecil Murray Harden of Indiana, who wanted the GOP to dramatize its opposition to the Democrats, come up with an aggressive program and stop internal quarreling; "Remarks by Congresswoman Cecil Murray Harden of Indiana on the failure of the Republican Party to "sell" its policies." in idem, 9.0034

¹¹⁷ Taft, R.A., Wunderlin, C.E. [ed.], p12, 122

¹¹⁸ Gallup II, p865-6

“progressive, (...) truly human and truly in the interests of the people”.¹¹⁹ Republican Senator Hugh A. Butler of Nebraska used anti-communism as the Republican platform. “The Republican Party is the only party which can absolutely [be] relied upon to make no compromise with Communism, to oppose it fearlessly and without equivalence, both at home and abroad. We have never harbored the Communists within our ranks. We did not accept their support and their votes, as did another major party. We denounced them from the beginning, and they have hated us from the beginning and we are proud of it.”¹²⁰ Republican Governor J. Bracken Lee of Utah argued that “bi-partisan foreign policy was popular, but hardly an issue in the campaign. (...) We took an aggressive stand with respect to communist infiltrations (...) but this matter was too far removed from the minds of the average citizen to alarm him unduly.”¹²¹

The National Committeeman from Maryland, Jacob France, told his audience that the factionalism within the Party must stop and that “[i]n this party after a convention there should be no Dewey Republicans, (...) no Taft Republicans, (...) no Stassen Republicans. We should all be good Americans and all good Republicans fighting for our ticket.”¹²² France even entered a motion that called for the resignation of the RNC’s chairman (Scott) as he was a Dewey man and, in France’s perception, had only consulted with other Dewey-men.¹²³

On a practical level, the discussions led to the installation of several committees that aimed to foster cooperation between National Headquarters and state and local Republican officials, between the RNC and the Senate and the House of Representatives and the *Organization Policy Committee* aimed to ensure consultation and cooperation between the RNC, Senate, House of

¹¹⁹ “Remarks by RNC Chairman Hugh D. Scott, Jr., on President Harry Truman and the 80th Congress.” in Kesaris, P.L. [ed.], *Papers of the Republican Party, Part I...*, 9.0003

¹²⁰ “Remarks by Senator Hugh A. Butler of Nebraska on the differences between the Republican and Democratic Parties” in idem, 9.0014

¹²¹ This is not entirely true. Of course, the election focused mainly on domestic issues but not because foreign affairs and the USSR in particular were not in the mind of the voter. Rather, most Republicans (and Democrats) refrained from attacks along party lines as it would jeopardize the bipartisan process – which made it *seem* as if voters were not interested in the subject. Of all the prominent Republicans, only Taft turned it into a partisan issue *during* the campaign and, as mentioned before, this approach would lead the way for his fellow Republicans *after* the election. “Remarks by Governor J. Bracken Lee of Utah on the need for the Republican Party to become more of a “people’s party.” in idem, 9.0046

¹²² Moreover, Taft and Stassen themselves “were forgotten in the campaign. I do not think they were called on to make more than one or two speeches, with the result we lost Ohio and we lost Minnesota, their respective states.” - “Remarks by Jacob France, national committeeman for Maryland, on factionalism in the Republican Party.” in idem, 9.0100

¹²³ The motion eventually failed, after which a motion was adopted that expressed a vote of confidence in Mr. Scott. In July of 1949, Scott would voluntarily step down. “Remarks by Jacob France, national committeeman for Maryland, on factionalism in the Republican Party.” in idem, 9.0100; “Resolution introduced by Jacob France, national committeeman for Maryland, calling for the resignation of RNC chairman Hugh D. Scott, Jr.” in idem, 9.0108; “Discussion and debate of the resolution calling for the resignation of RNC Chairman Hugh D. Scott, Jr.” in idem, 9.0109; “Motion calling for the resignation of RNC Chairman Hugh D. Scott, Jr., is voted down.” in idem, 9.0227; “Motion passed giving vote of confidence to RNC Chairman Hugh D. Scott, Jr.” in idem, 9.0236.

Representatives, state central committees, and the state finance chairmen.¹²⁴ Furthermore, the discussions that took place in the Republican Party were *far* more elaborate than this selection of addresses might suggest. However, they do illustrate a threefold consensus that was widely supported among the Republican rank and file. First, Republicans agreed the 1948 loss was due to the combination of poor salesmanship, too little party unity and too little aggression and willingness to fight the Democrats. Secondly, important Republicans call for the consolidation of the Party as a result: only a cohesive, unified Republican alliance with a positive program based on its Congressional record could effectively combat its collective enemy on all fronts – including foreign policy. The absolute Republican denouncement of domestic policies – such as the New Deal – in harsh terms such as ‘state socialism’ should be applied to foreign policy as well in order to make the GOP successful again. Finally, Republicans were deceived by their hubris and had relied too much on ‘me-too-ism’. The Republicans should take pride in the fact it was anti-communism from the beginning and point out the Democrats, to a certain extent, were not. The Republican response to this analysis would lead to far-reaching polarization, enhanced by foreign events. In any case, criticism had always been part of the bipartisan process, but the deciding factor was that most meetings occurred behind closed doors. Bricker’s call in 1948 to ‘battle it out’ in the open was what would make the difference in the end. When the RNC reconvened in April of 1949, it issued a list of objectives and strategies for 1950 and 1952, which clearly rested on party unity and explicit antagonism with the Democrats and the Administration (see Appendix A).

3.3 Externalities: Atomic Weapons & Revisionism

Bipartisan foreign policy continued in 1949, as witnessed by the founding of NATO (the third historic vote in which Vandenberg held a key position), but in a different form as Dean Acheson replaced Secretary Marshall, and as the Democrats changed the division of seats in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. This last move infuriated Vandenberg and the Republicans, who regarded it “as the rawest deal in the short history of bipartisan foreign policy.” Moreover, the change “reduces [Vandenberg’s] influence within his own party just at a time when the Administration is planning to bring in some very controversial foreign policy legislation.” The ‘isolationist’ faction was pleased, as “the action of the Democrats had relieved them of any responsibility to support the bi-partisan

¹²⁴ “Appointment of committee on cooperation between National Headquarters and state and local Republican officials.” in idem, 9.0098; “Appointment of committee on cooperation between the RNC and the Senate and House of Representatives” in idem, 9.0099; and “Resolution calling for the development of an Organization Policy Committee to assure consultation and cooperation between the RNC, Senate, House of Representatives, state central committees, and the state finance chairmen.” in idem, 9.0269.

foreign policy.”¹²⁵ Despite this setback, *the New York Times* joined Vandenberg in his view that bipartisanship was not deceased (yet). Bipartisanship was simply “an understanding among a few leaders of both major parties to refrain from doing certain things rather than a binding commitment”. The paper warned against attaching too many commitments to bipartisanship and, in doing so, exaggerating the crisis it appeared to be in and predicted, therefore, that the “approach (...) will be continued”.¹²⁶ The bipartisan dynamic may have changed, but as it still rested on input from both sides, it did not, as Republicans feared, occur on a ‘me-too’ basis.¹²⁷

Because the USSR had acquired atomic weapons in the summer of 1949, America’s fear of communism deepened as its military superiority was gone and American distrust of the USSR reached new heights.¹²⁸ The same year also saw the definite rise of revisionism, a loosely knitted bipartisan movement that called for more attention to events in East-Asia (China in particular). Their plea garnered more influence in American politics as it became increasingly loud and well-publicized, but those in a position of influence, chiefly Acheson and Vandenberg, remained preoccupied with Europe. Outside the State Department and the Foreign Relations Committee, an open letter to Truman became public, in which a total of 21 Senators called for military support for the Kuomintang (KMT) nationalists in China in their battle against Mao Tse-tung’s People’s Liberation Army.¹²⁹ The revisionist trend grew infinitely stronger when the Nationalist KMT was driven off of the mainland and took refuge on Formosa (Taiwan) later that year and continental China, led by Mao, had turned irreversibly communist.¹³⁰

As soon as 1949, Vandenberg noted that the “American Government already is charged with a large share of responsibility for Chiang’s [Nationalist] Government’s fate because of our previous policies and our failure to give it adequate military supplies”, a charge Vandenberg classified as only

¹²⁵ *New York Times*, “Republicans Say ‘Raw Deal’ Cuts Vandenberg Prestige”, Jan. 6 1949, p7 by J. Reston. See also: “GOP CHARGES BLOW AT BIPARTISAN PLAN”, Jan. 6, 1949, p1 by W.S. White in idem.

¹²⁶ *New York Times*, “NON-PARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY WILL CONTINUE”, Jan. 16, 1949 pE3 by J. Reston; *New York Times*, “VANDENBERG CALLS ON GOP TO FOLLOW ‘HIGH CENTER ROAD’”, Feb. 11, 1949, p1, by W. W. Ruchs

¹²⁷ Johnson, p25-32; Vandenberg, p508-9

¹²⁸ This occurred some three years earlier than American intelligence had predicted. A copy of Director of Central Intelligence R. Hillenkoetter’s memo to President Truman which contains the overoptimistic estimations on Soviet nuclear capabilities can be found at: <http://www.paperlessarchives.com/FreeTitles/SovietNuclearDetection.pdf>; Gallup II, p788, 790, 792-3, 800, 814-5, 820-1, 826-7, 830; Vandenberg, 461-9, 546; Johnson, 25; Leffler, 265-8; Casey, S., *Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion 1950-1953* (Oxford : Oxford U.P. 2008), p10-11. All the meetings between Vandenberg and Acheson that occurred between 1949 and 1953 can be found in: Kesaris, P.L. [ed], *Official Conversations and Meetings of Dean Acheson (1949-1953)*, part of *THE PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS SERIES* (Frederick, MD : University Publications of America 1980)

¹²⁹ Already in 1948, right after the elections, the *New York Times* warned of the grave consequences the civil war in China might have for the U.S. – and the world. See: *New York Times*, “WHAT TO DO ABOUT CHINA IS A MAJOR U.S. PROBLEM”, Nov. 14, 1948, pE5, by B.D. Hulen; Johnson, 32-5; Truman, p61-75.

¹³⁰ *New York Times*, “KNOWLAND ASSAILS ACHESON ON CHINA”, Apr. 22, 1949, p3; Johnson, p32-5; MacDougall, p165; Vandenberg, 519-22

“partially justified”.¹³¹ After China had fallen to the communists, it became an important basis for Republican attacks on the Administration. For instance when R. Walton Butterworth, a China expert attached to the State Department, was up for the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Republican senators used this occasion to emphasize the Administration’s failure. Vandenberg himself opposed the nomination because Butterworth was connected to the failed Far East policies. Consequently, for the first time in over two years, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations did not vote unanimously on an issue.¹³² In August of 1949, the Administration released the White Papers, in which the Administration’s full policy towards China over the years was presented to counter allegations that it had ‘lost’ China but it did not convince critics and gave them even more ammunition for their attacks.¹³³ Vandenberg wrote that “the White Paper (...) ‘adds up’ to a defense of Administration policy in China. I do not agree (...) I think we virtually ‘sold China down the river’ at Yalta and Potsdam.”¹³⁴ The *New York Times* said that members of Congress had attacked the policies “with a sharpness that has not been known in the Capitol since the period before Pearl Harbor” and bipartisan foreign policy was not helping: containment was broadly supported, but on “the practical ways to put it through (...) there is anything (...) but complete agreement.”¹³⁵

In May of 1949, public opinion wanted the U.S. to stay out of the Chinese civil war. In July, after communist China was formally established, the majority opposed diplomatic recognition by the U.S. and this attitude persisted well into 1950. In September, when the White Paper was fully dissected and the debate on China was still raging, 53% of Americans disapproved of the Administration’s China policy and would continue to do so in large numbers.¹³⁶

3.4 McCarthyism, NSC-68 & the 1950’s Campaign

Revisionism did not simply call for an adjustment of priorities (to focus more on Asia than on Europe), but also focused on the domestic dangers of communism. The foremost example is Sen. McCarthy, who was first elected in 1946 but did not become a household name until early 1950 when he claimed to have a list with names of people that had infiltrated the entire Truman Administration on behalf of the communists. Consequently, the Subcommittee on the Investigation

¹³¹ Vandenberg, p530-1

¹³² Vandenberg, 532-4

¹³³ Rintz, W. A. (2010) "The Failure of the China White Paper" in *Constructing the Past: Vol. 11: Iss. 1, Article 8, 76-84*; Tucker, N. Bernkopf [ed.], *China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations: 1945-1996* (New York, NY : Columbia U.P. 2001) p 61-7; Fordham, B.O., *Building the Cold War Consensus: The Political Economy of U.S. National Security Policy, 1949-1951* (Ann Arbor, MI : University of Michigan Press 1998) p103-30; Cohen, W.I., *America's response to China: a history of Sino-American relations* [Fifth Edition] (New York, NY : Columbia U.P. 2010), p148-94.

¹³⁴ Vandenberg, p536-40

¹³⁵ *New York Times*, “BIPARTISAN’ FOREIGN POLICY RUNS INTO TROUBLE”, Aug. 21, 1949, pE3, by W.S White

¹³⁶ Gallup II, 818, 831, 852, 880-1.

of Loyalty of State Department Employees (the Tydings Committee; named after its chairman Democratic Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland) was founded to look into McCarthy's charges but could not substantiate his claims. Regardless, McCarthy continued his crusade and he took on people outside of the political arena as well (most notably Hollywood). Based on senatorial tasks such as passing legislation, McCarthy was not a very successful senator.¹³⁷ However, he proved valuable to the Republican Party as he attracted media attention with his intriguing rhetoric and fantastic accusations. The Administration and Congress had a hard time dealing with McCarthy, but his popularity was undisputed. Opinion polls showed that Americans agreed to a great extent with McCarthy's actions.¹³⁸ Moreover, his popularity kept other Republicans such as Taft from criticizing him. Those that did criticize him, such as Sen. Margaret Chase Smith of Maine, held too little sway to make a difference.¹³⁹ Anti-communism was best represented on the legislative side by Democratic Senator Patrick Anthony McCarran, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, author of the McCarran Internal Security Act of 1950 (passed but never enforced), the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 and firmly supported Spain's dictator Francisco Franco and the KMT's leader Chiang Kai-Shek.¹⁴⁰

In conjunction with the fear of domestic communism, the related call for Asia-centered foreign policy gained momentum. In 1950, the *New York Times* reported on the "difference of opinion between the Administration and a highly vocal and sincere minority in Congress on how to deal with the expansion of communism in Asia." Acheson contended that the U.S., "powerful as it is, can exert only a limited influence on the course of events in Asia". Sen. Taft, "[t]he principal attacker", blamed "the bitter resentment of the State Department and its pro-Communist allies against any interference with its policy of liquidating the Nationalist Government [the KMT]." The issue was becoming increasingly important, but Democrats and Republicans were increasingly unable to agree – even within their own party: "in part, at least, the Republican criticism seemed to be an election-year effort to make political capital of the failure to halt communism in a vital theatre of the cold war." For the moment however, the *Times* did not think that the Administration's China policy

¹³⁷ Leffler, p312-3, 341-4; MacDougall, 166-7; Johnson 41-2

¹³⁸ Americans supported HUAC, called for a ban on the communist party, required communists to register with the government and demanded unionists and teachers take an oath to vow they were not communist; Gallup II, 1949: 787-8, 791, 809, 826-7, 853, 863, 873-4, 1950: 881, 910-2, 924-5.

¹³⁹ Johnson, 46-7

¹⁴⁰ The Internal Security Act of 1950 aimed to "protect the United States against certain un-American and subversive activities by requiring registration of Communist organizations, and for other purposes." Johnson, p35-8; Transcript of the Internal Security Act of 1950, available at <http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/dept/polsciwb/brian/docs/1950InternalSecurityAct.pdf>; United States Department of State, "Impact of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (the McCarran Act) upon the Conduct of United States Foreign Relations" in *Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1950: "National Security Affairs; foreign economic policy"*, Vol. I, p896-904.

cost “Mr. Truman appreciable political support”.¹⁴¹

Unsurprisingly, Asia-centrism and attacks on bipartisanship heightened in 1950 as Senator Vandenberg’s health slowly but surely deteriorated. In January of 1950, Taft attacked Acheson in a debate with Democratic Senator Paul Howard Douglas of Illinois by saying that “this country’s bipartisan foreign policy died when Dean Acheson became Secretary of State.” Certainly, Taft’s assault did not help the bipartisan cause either, and it illustrated the Republican’s course during a time when Vandenberg was only minimally present in Washington because of extensive medical treatment.¹⁴² Accordingly, Taft argued Republicans “are not responsible for the present mess in China”.¹⁴³ However, it would be wrong to assume that unity within the Republican Party was present by early 1950. Far from it, “[d]eeply divided along sectional lines, the Republicans today are searching almost feverishly for a common policy, or a leader, or both, that can unite them – even temporarily – for victory in 1952.” If a common policy could be found, “the belief is a leader will emerge who can join all elements of the party, albeit in an uneasy union, for the supreme effort to return to the White House for the first time in twenty years.” Meanwhile, Sen. Taft “hopes to emerge as the party’s strong man and candidate in 1952” and had started acting like it already by adopting a more partisan approach towards foreign policy in Vandenberg’s absence. Taft was determined to win decisively the 1950 election for his Senate seat to prove he did not lack electability and consequently improve his chances for 1952.¹⁴⁴ However, because of Taft’s influence, any position adopted by *Mister Republican* was bound to affect other senators as well. Meanwhile, the *Times* theorized the Party has little alternative to Taft, unless of course the moderate Eisenhower would join the contest.¹⁴⁵

When the Republicans reconvened in February, Taft, as head of the Senate Republican Policy Committee, promised “the program would be a fighting challenge to President Truman on spending, taxes, labor legislation and the Brannan farm plan.”¹⁴⁶ As it turned out, the main premise for the 1950 midterm elections was to be “Liberty Against Socialism”, but the Party’s platform “failed to achieve complete unity, either in its denunciation of the Truman Administration (...) or on the alternatives which it promised”. On the other hand, an “effort made by Werner Schroeder [Republican National Committeeman for Illinois] (...) to put the party on record as opposed to

¹⁴¹ *New York Times*, “CHINA QUESTION BECOMES A CENTRAL ISSUE FOR US”, Jan. 1, 1950, p77, by J. Reston; and “Growing Issue” in idem, Jan. 15, 1950, pE1.

¹⁴² Vandenberg, 546-50

¹⁴³ Douglas replied with the observation that “when [bipartisanship] works, (...) then the Republicans have had a share in it, and when it doesn’t then they have not.” *New York Times*, “TAFT SAYS ACHESON IGNORES G.O.P.”, Jan. 9, 1950, p12

¹⁴⁴ Taft, Wunderlin [ed], p121-72; Leffler, 341-3

¹⁴⁵ *New York Times*, “G.O.P. SEEKING A POLICY AND A LEADER”, Jan. 15, 1950, pE9, by C. Knowles

¹⁴⁶ *New York Times*, “REPUBLICANS FRAME POLICY FOR ELECTION”, Feb. 6, 1950.

continuance of the bipartisan foreign policy, was overwhelmingly defeated in the national committee.”¹⁴⁷

Partisan attacks on foreign policy continued throughout the spring of 1950. RNC Chairman Guy G. Gabrielson declared Truman “had drawn the nation to ‘disaster’ in foreign policy” as it had “deliberately sabotaged the bi-partisan policy”, warned of “a catastrophe of unparalleled magnitude”, “called for ‘a unified, harmonious party effort’” and said “that Senator Joseph McCarthy’s charges against the State Department were ‘justified by the facts’”.¹⁴⁸ The *New York Times* observed that “[t]he outlines of the Congressional campaign of 1950 began to form more clearly this week when the President charged three Republican Senators with sabotage of foreign policy at grave peril to world peace” and noted that Democratic candidates did not know how to deal with McCarthy’s allegations.¹⁴⁹ Gabrielson continued his spree by declaring “Mr. Truman had lost the ‘cold war’ in Asia” and “has failed miserably”.¹⁵⁰ Regardless, disagreement over the Party’s platform hindered its comeback and revitalization and “has caused a certain apathy and resignation to become evident up and down” the ranks. Progressives were still pitted against conservatives and “a majority of Senate Republicans are clearly, if silently, exasperated and alarmed” by the rise of McCarthy(ism).¹⁵¹ But even though the GOP struggled to find its way, factionalism was abundant and some Republicans had adjusted their attitude to correspond with their future plans, Truman’s popularity had been declining steadily ever since 1949 (see Appendix B) and dropped below 50% in February of 1950 and his efforts to reverse this trend failed.¹⁵²

While the political back-and-forth continued throughout the spring of 1950, the Truman Administration received the final version of the National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68), which was composed “in the light of the probable fission bomb (...) and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union”¹⁵³ What followed was a report that would establish the foundations of American foreign policy for decades to come (it was not declassified until 1975) but its significance was immediately confirmed as it informed the decision to intervene in Korea.¹⁵⁴ Surely, the conviction that communism was America’s nemesis had been a potent force in American society for quite some time already but was primarily reserved for certain members of Congress, columnists and

¹⁴⁷ As of April 1950, only 25% of Americans had heard of the Republican slogan and the majority of that percentage did not think the slogan expressed ‘the real issue’; Gallup II, 902. *New York Times*, “G.O.P. POSES ISSUE FOR ‘50 AS LIBERTY VERSUS SOCIALISM”, Feb. 7, 1950, p1, by W.H. Lawrence

¹⁴⁸ *New York Times*, “TRUMAN RUINS U.S., GABRIELSON AVERS”, Apr. 1, 1950 p8, by G. Hill

¹⁴⁹ *New York Times*, “FOREIGN POLICY BECOMES A MAJOR POLITICAL ISSUE”, Apr. 2, 1950, p143, by A. Krock

¹⁵⁰ *New York Times*, “TRUMAN A FAILURE, G.O.P. LEADER SAYS”, Apr. 15, 1950, p10, by A. Leviero

¹⁵¹ *New York Times*, “REPUBLICANS CAN’T AGREE ON WHAT PARTY WANTS”, Apr. 9, 1950, pE7, by C. Phillips

¹⁵² *New York Times*, “TRUMAN DECLARES G.O.P. TRIES ‘SCARE’ FOR LACK OF A PLAN”, Feb. 17, 1950, p1, by W.H. Lawrence

¹⁵³ “Terms of Reference” in *NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security*, April 14, 1950

¹⁵⁴ Leffler, p313-4; MacDougall, 165

parts of the electorate. The significance of NSC-68 lay in its apocalyptic wording, because the idea of an arch-rivalry between communism and capitalism became official American policy and because it called for enormous increases in defense spending (from almost \$13 billion to \$50).¹⁵⁵ What exactly did NSC-68 state?¹⁵⁶ It held that the USSR “seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world.” If it were to expand unchecked, it “would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled”. In other words, the time to act is now, as “this Republic and its citizens (...) stand in their deepest peril”; and it might end with the “destruction of (...) civilization itself”. Actual war between the USSR and the U.S. had yet to emerge and already the Cold War was considered to be more dangerous than WWII. The only power able to stop the USSR was the U.S. and it was morally obliged to do so.¹⁵⁷ Containment of communism required “a strong military posture” as the report concluded the Soviet threat was “more immediate than had previously been estimated.”¹⁵⁸

Although only Soviet nuclear capabilities are acknowledged as the leading motive for NSC-68 and its potentially catastrophic forecast, it seems unlikely societal and political attitudes had no influence. After all, while the report remained top secret, Truman’s eventual adoption of it – his initial opposition to the report’s budgetary effects was overcome by the Korean War – and subsequent funding requests to Congress brought parts of the new policy out in the open and corresponded with domestic aggressive anti-communist sentiments that were already there.¹⁵⁹

3.5 The Elections and the Politicizing of Korea

The Korean War, which started on June 25, 1950 as communist North Korea attacked its Southern, non-communist counterpart, would profoundly affect American domestic politics.¹⁶⁰ The rising confrontation between communism and capitalism led the Truman Administration to decide the attack required a response; support for South Korea would eliminate doubts about America’s

¹⁵⁵ Idem, 355-60; Casey, 67-72; Johnson, 55; MacDougall, 165-70

¹⁵⁶ For the Administration’s discussions on the report, see: United States National Security Policy: estimates of threats to the national security; the extension of military assistance to foreign nations; the preparation of NSC 68, “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security” in *FRUS, 1950. National Security Affairs; foreign economic policy*, Vol. 1, 293-492.

¹⁵⁷ “I. Background of the Present Crisis” and “III. Fundamental Design of the Kremlin” in *NSC-68*; via <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm>.

¹⁵⁸ The report’s bottom line was that America’s “military strength is becoming dangerously inadequate”. See: “IV. U.S. Intentions and Capabilities – Actual and Potential”, “IX. Possible Courses of Action” and “Conclusions and Recommendations” in idem.

¹⁵⁹ Casey, 3-9; Johnson, 55; Leffler, 14-5, 323.

¹⁶⁰ Even though numerous skirmishes had occurred before the all-out attack (see: “Korea” in *FRUS, 1950*, Vol. 7, 1-124), it still came as a surprise; Leffler, 361-6

commitment to keeping world communism 'contained'.¹⁶¹ Within a week, naval and air support were provided – during what was the first U.N. intervention ever – under leadership of the U.S.¹⁶² The urge for the Administration to prove itself against communism was illustrated by Truman's address on July 19th: "This attack has made it clear beyond all doubt that the international communist movement is willing to use armed invasion to conquer independent nations. (...) The free nations have learned the fateful lesson of the 1930s. That lesson is that aggression must be met firmly. Appeasement leads only to further aggression and ultimate war."¹⁶³ Internally, the Administration decided to term the intervention a 'police action', which did not require a Declaration of War by Congress.¹⁶⁴ However, the situation in South Korea deteriorated quickly and required ground troops already in early July. Because the intervention started out limited and had broad public and political support, it made sense to initially categorize it as a police action but as the conflict gradually turned into seemingly endless war, this decision and terminology was used by the Republican opposition.¹⁶⁵ To prevent 'war hysteria', Truman left the public, the press and Congress with little information on the situation which allowed the Republicans to create their own version of events.¹⁶⁶

In August of 1950, the Republican Party said it "will support the Government's Korean effort" but criticize the Administration's "fumbling, stumbling ineptness" as the war illustrated its incompetence. Moreover, the Republicans promised to make the Korean War into a campaign issue, along with the threat of domestic communism.¹⁶⁷ As a RNC sponsored group toured Illinois, it became clear that Korea would present the foremost election issue as "[i]nterest in all issues aside

¹⁶¹ Especially given the fact that the U.S. (Administration *and* Congress) was initially convinced that North Korea stood under direct control of the USSR; Casey, 19-23; Leffler, 366-9

¹⁶² A number of great books have been written on the Korean War and its development, such as Halberstam, D., *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War* (New York, NY : Hyperion 2007); Hastings, M., *The Korean War* (New York, NY etc : Simon & Schuster 1987); MacDonald, C.A., *Korea: The War Before Vietnam* (London, UK : The Macmillan Press Ltd. 1986); Millett, A.R., *The War for Korea 1945-1950: A House Burning* (Lawrence, KA : U.P. of Kansas 2005) and Paige, G.D., *The Korean Decision: June 24-30, 1950* (The Free Press : New York (NY) 1968). This thesis will however concern itself with the domestic implications of the war, not its development. The first UNSC Resolution of June 25, 1950 is available at:

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-17-4.pdf#zoom=100; the press release concerning the meeting between President, Congressional leaders, Secretaries of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff can be found at:

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-4-23.pdf#zoom=100.

¹⁶³ Truman, H.S., *Address on the situation in Korea, July 19, 1950*; audio file accessed via <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/audio/tunesCast.rss>

¹⁶⁴ For the full documentation of the White House decision making process, see: "Korea", in *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. 7, 125-270

¹⁶⁵ Casey, 28-36; Leffler, 366-7

¹⁶⁶ "Pres. Truman, L. Johnson, Cabinet, F. Pace, Amb. Jooste of South Africa: re Soviet Black Sea fleet, meeting at Blair House, MDAP funds, Korean crisis" in Kesaris, P.L. [ed], *Official Conversations and Meetings of Dean Acheson (1949-1953)*, part of *THE PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS SERIES* (Frederick, MD : University Publications of America 1980) 3.0002; Casey, 33-37

¹⁶⁷ *New York Times*, "G.O.P. TO SUPPORT OUR KOREAN POLICY", Aug. 1, 1950, p17, by G. Hill.

from the Korean War is greatly reduced”.¹⁶⁸ Despite extensive media coverage similar to the above excerpts, the definitive “go-ahead signal” to “attack the Administration and its spokesmen on the Government’s Far Eastern Policy” did not come until the end of August as the Far Eastern region did not fall under the umbrella of bipartisanship.¹⁶⁹ The sanctioned attack would come to comprise the ‘loss’ of China, Administration responsibility for the entire Korea conflict and mismanagement in defense expenditures.¹⁷⁰ When the campaign was in full effect, both “parties open[ed] fire over foreign policy” as the Democrats accused the Republicans of a “cynical attempt to gain partisan advantage out of the ordeal of our heroic troops in Korea” and the Republicans contended they “will not be silent about five years of blundering in Administration foreign policy which brought the Korean situation rendounding [sic] against it”.¹⁷¹ During the pre-election RNC convention of September, Congressional Committee Chairman Leonard Hall of Maine said “the Korean War is unpopular” and “[w]hen people are in a war that they don’t like (...) we will get something from it”.¹⁷² All in all, the campaign had turned ugly as it was characterized by “the use of lies or partial truth to score a political point (...), public charges before proof, guilt by association and the elevation of means above ends”.¹⁷³

The strife between Europe-minded and Asia-minded politicians was illustrated further by the question of German rearmament. The Administration favored rearmament as Germany formed a vital component in Europe’s defense against a possible Russian attack because of its large population and industrial capabilities. Europe’s defense, led by NATO, needed all the help it could get as the U.S. was preoccupied with the Korean War and the USSR might consider a weaker American presence in Europe as an opportunity to attack it.¹⁷⁴ West-Germany would however not simply consent to this plan without reciprocal concessions such as the restoration of Germany’s sovereignty, loosening of postwar economic restrictions with regards to, among others, military production and guarantees with regards to the protection of its borders.¹⁷⁵ While Germany’s demands could be met, France, in light of its experiences with German aggression in both World Wars, remained unconvinced of the

¹⁶⁸ *New York Times*, “G.O.P. ‘SCHOOL’ SEES KOREA MAIN ISSUE”, Aug. 11, 1950, p38

¹⁶⁹ In addition, the people had no obvious preference for a focus on either one area: almost half of the people thought Asia and Europe were equally important in September of 1950, Gallup II, 938. Vandenberg, 532-3

¹⁷⁰ *New York Times*, “G.O.P. GEARS DRIVE TO FOREIGN POLICY”, Aug. 29, 1950, p14

¹⁷¹ *New York Times*, “PARTIES OPEN FIRE OVER FOREIGN POLICY”, Sep. 9, 1950, p8

¹⁷² “Remarks by Republican Congressional Committee Chairman Leonard Hall on the Maine elections and the Korean War as a campaign issue.” in Kesaris, P.L. [ed.], *Papers of the Republican Party, Part I...*, 10.0375

¹⁷³ Neither party was innocent: the Republicans contended America’s “international troubles resulted from a dark conspiracy” and the Democrats misrepresented Taft “as having said that if the people wanted to reduce the cost of living, they should ‘eat less’”. Moreover, even “newspapers have themselves been guilty of the same tactics employed by the candidates”. *New York Times*, “DEFAMATION MARKS VIOLENT CAMPAIGN”, Oct. 31, 1950, p22 by J. Reston

¹⁷⁴ In addition to German rearmament, the U.S. would also contribute to a fortification of Europe’s defense by providing Europe with extra economic assistance and extra American troops.

¹⁷⁵ Leffler, 384-90; 416, 453-63

plan.¹⁷⁶ As the question of German rearmament emerged before a round of elections that was already preoccupied with foreign policy, it was also noted in American politics. To mute allegations, firstly, that the Administration could in fact successfully carry out its foreign policy and, secondly, to boost public support for the Administration's policy (the public supported German rearmament), it had hoped to successfully conclude negotiations before the elections and appoint WWII hero General Dwight Eisenhower as NATO's supreme commander in Europe.¹⁷⁷ Although the Administration failed, Republicans could not turn it into a campaign issue as Europe fell under the umbrella of bipartisanship. The electorate however had no such limitation and could approve or disapprove of the Administration's actions regardless.

Meanwhile, the Administration was weighing its options in Korea: it could stop their advance at the pre-war border at the 38th parallel or push through, conquer all of Korea and unify it fully. The latter option held the most appeal as nobody believed that the USSR or China would join the war – Korean unification would be relatively easy and reflect positively on America. As the Administration's domestic standing was precarious to say the least, Korean unification would discredit Republican allegations that the Administration was soft on communism and please public opinion as it favored progressing beyond the 38th parallel.¹⁷⁸

Initially, the northern advance met with little resistance and produced favorable attention for the Democrats right before the elections, but it did not prevent the GOP from winning – although the Democratic majority remained intact, albeit slimmer.¹⁷⁹ Taft – who won decidedly in Ohio himself – said the Democrats were “demoralized”, and that the GOP was in great shape (it could even “beat Santa Claus” in the 1952). Three races during the elections of 1950 in particular highlighted the significance of anti-communism. The first was the defeat of Sen. Tydings by Republican John Marshall Butler of Maryland, who enjoyed extensive financial and political support of his popular colleague, Sen. McCarthy. The second was the victory of Republican Congressman George Smathers over Democratic officeholder Claude Pepper for a Senate seat representing Florida based on the premise of ousting ‘Red Pepper’. Finally, there was Democratic Congresswoman Helen Gahagan Douglas' defeat at the hands of Nixon for a senatorial seat representing California. This race was the harshest of all as Nixon left no opportunity unused to accuse his opponent of extremism and communist sympathies.¹⁸⁰ Almost immediately the Party turned to 1952, as it started building party

¹⁷⁶ The issue was finally resolved in October of 1954 as West-Germany was added to the Treaty of Brussels. However, the Korean War had already ended by then. Leffler, 385-7

¹⁷⁷ Casey, 106-8; 178-9; Gallup II, on German rearmament: p914, 932, 951, 962; on preference for Eisenhower: 834, 856, 863, 875, 901, 927, 953

¹⁷⁸ Casey, 95-101; Leffler, 374-80; Gallup 942-3

¹⁷⁹ Johnson, 47-9; Casey 109-19

¹⁸⁰ Johnson, 47-9; Casey, 119-20; Scobie, I., “Douglas v Nixon” in *History Today*, Vol. 42, 11 (Nov., 1992), p16-24

infrastructure in the South and as Taft “challenged [his fellow Republicans] to win back the Negro and nationality vote”.¹⁸¹

¹⁸¹ A post-election survey among GOP party leaders attributed the election’s results to the “lack of defense preparedness and “failures” of American foreign policy”. *New York Times*, “TAFT SEES VICTORY FOR G.O.P. IN 1952”, Dec. 9, 1950, p8, by W.H. Lawrence

4. The Republican Groundswell: 1950-1952

The Chinese proved American assumptions wrong when it entered the Korean War at the end of November on the side of communist North Korea after the Americans had advanced beyond the 38th parallel.¹⁸² Chinese participation had grave consequences: it prolonged the war, increased costs and casualties, it prevented the U.S. from achieving its goal of full Korean unification and the Truman Administration's domestic standing deteriorated rapidly because of it. In the words of Johnson, "Truman's inability to end the war doomed Democratic chances in the 1952 elections."¹⁸³ But before those elections can be considered, this chapter maps out the events of 1951 and 1952 that affected their outcome.

4.1 Republican Ammunition: China Intervenes and MacArthur Is Dismissed

Although the Democrats had contended in 1950 that the Democratic "bold and far-seeing policies" were responsible for defending "free men and free nations (...) and their independence and their liberties against the threat of international communist aggression", that opinion held less sway when the Chinese intervention in Korea shed all pretense of Korean intervention being simply a police action and Truman had to ask Congress for an additional \$16.8 billion dollar in funding.¹⁸⁴ Moreover, the escalation of the War prompted the Republican assertion "that Mr. Truman (...) alone is to blame for any misfortune that befalls us." The perpetual discussion over the division of powers was reignited once again not just in the light of Korea, but also with regards to sending troops to Europe (of which Truman said "he did not need Congressional authority to send troops overseas (...) as Commander in Chief") and the dismissal of Gen. MacArthur later in April.¹⁸⁵ The war had also turned very unpopular as 50% of Americans thought even entering the war had been a mistake in March of 1951. Moreover, most Americans now favored a conciliatory approach toward China and a return to the prewar status quo.¹⁸⁶

While MacArthur's dismissal was not unexpected – he had disregarded several and publicly

¹⁸² There was however already an attack on South Korean and UN forces at the end of October, but Chinese troops suddenly disappeared. This led the UN to believe the Chinese were not really getting involved in the war.

¹⁸³ Johnson, 55; also supported by Casey, 327. In addition, see: Leffler, 374-80. For an elaborate account on the Chinese intervention, see Halberstam, D., *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War* (New York, NY : Hyperion 2007), 395-502

¹⁸⁴ "Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee pamphlet on lack of Senate Republican Support for Truman's foreign policies" in Leuchtenburg, W.E., *President Harry Truman's Office Files, 1945-1953; Part I: Political File*, part of *RESEARCH COLLECTIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICS: Microforms from Major Archival and Manuscript Collections* (Bethesda, MD : University Publications of America 1989), 3.0813; Casey, 131

¹⁸⁵ *New York Times*, "TRUMAN'S POPULARITY IS IN ANOTHER DECLINE", Apr. 8, 1951, p151, by W.H. Lawrence; Johnson, 50-1

¹⁸⁶ Gallup II, 968-9, 972-3, 983

disagreed with the President – it benefitted Republicans greatly: MacArthur was an American war hero, largely credited with the victory in the Pacific theater of WWII, a Republican and was hard on communism.¹⁸⁷ Republicans were quick to demand a hearing on his dismissal – they considered it, in the words of Styles Bridges (Republican, New Hampshire) “the biggest windfall that has ever come to the Republican Party”.¹⁸⁸ MacArthur’s popularity was not only the reason a hearing was demanded, it was also the reason the Democrats could not refuse it. The odds were against the Administration: as the American people had disapproved by and large of Truman and questioned his leadership, MacArthur’s aggressive solutions for the Korean War resonated with a large part of the public.¹⁸⁹ The hearings were held before a joint panel composed of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees and presided over by Senator Richard Russell (Democrat, Georgia). Although scholars still disagree on the extent of the damage or advantage the hearings had brought the Administration, MacArthur could not fully meet expectations and by September Truman’s approval ratings had risen somewhat – but the war remained incredibly unpopular and a majority foresaw no quick end to it.¹⁹⁰

4.2 Vandenberg Dies, Taft on the Rise

After the elections of 1948, partisan strife had slowly gained on the bipartisan attitude, but it definitively became a thing of the past when Sen. Vandenberg succumbed to his cancer in April of 1951. His long absence had already granted Sen. Taft, among others, to take the lead on Republican foreign policy and Vandenberg’s heir apparent, the moderate, internationalist Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. of Massachusetts, did not have the influence to effectively counter Taft in the Senate and lost his Senate seat in 1952 to Democrat and future President John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts.¹⁹¹ Despite recognition for Vandenberg and his ideals the *New York Times* noted in May that during the RNC’s meeting in Tulsa, Oklahoma, it became clear “the Presidential campaign of 1952 is beginning early” as “the dismissal of General MacArthur and the subsequent overhauling of our whole foreign policy have speeded up the process.”¹⁹² At the same time however, the Republicans still had no idea who would be the “winning man”. The GOP hoped Eisenhower would clarify his political allegiance because while Taft was presented as a potential candidate, only “[f]ew except his closest adherents would say (...) he could win” and “if the Republican Convention nominated an isolationist” such as Taft, Eisenhower “might feel it is his duty to take a nomination of the Democrats on the foreign policy issues.” Aside from uncertainty with regards to potential

¹⁸⁷ Lowe, 175, 180-1, 207-8;

¹⁸⁸ *The Washington Post*, “GOP-MACARTHUR FRICTION NOTED”, Apr. 18, 1951, by D. Pearson

¹⁸⁹ Gallup II, 981, 983, 987-9, 994, 998

¹⁹⁰ Gallup II, 1007, 1017, 1019

¹⁹¹ Casey, 233-63, Johnson, 17, 42-3, 49, 56; *New York Times*, “VANDENBERG DEAD; BIPARTISAN LEADER ON FOREIGN POLICY”, Apr. 19, 1951, p1

¹⁹² *New York Times*, “LOOKING TOWARD 1952”, May 13, 1951, pB8

nominees and which position to take on foreign affairs, the GOP was also unable to identify the key issues for the 1952 elections: most speakers addressed domestic issues “in general terms” and attacked “familiar targets in the Fair Deal program”; signaling the Republicans were in need of new material.¹⁹³ Although the *Times* was rather pessimistic about Taft’s chances for the Republican nomination, the Senator went ahead with his pre-campaign schedule, during which he called the Korean War “a Truman war”, said “immoral, if not illegal practices are condoned by the highest authority in the Administration”, argued Truman “has adopted the theories of British socialism”, blamed the Russian threat on the “weak and wrong-headed policies of this and [Roosevelt’s] Administration” before he argued that there existed a “strong pro-Communist influence in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department.” Finally, he voiced his support for McCarthy and his methods – stating his calls for investigation were “a public service”.¹⁹⁴ During a different campaign event, Taft said the Administration has “no plan to deal with which it “practically invited” in the first place. According to Taft, there would be three major issues in the 1952 campaign: “liberty versus socialism, corruption in the Administration and the foreign policy.”¹⁹⁵ As Taft aspired to be the next Republican nominee for the Presidential elections, a comprehensive view on foreign policy was indispensable. To that end, he published a book in the fall of 1951, “A Foreign Policy for Americans”, which served to elucidate his world view. The book and Taft’s June pre-campaign trail had served a specific event: his October 17 announcement to run for the Republican presidential nomination – the first Republican to do so.¹⁹⁶ A *New York Times* editorial on his candidacy noted Taft’s image as “an antiquarian” on domestic issues and, on the foreign policy front, found his “record on Korea to be enigmatic and frequently inconsistent; his efforts in the matter of adequate aid for Europe to be far from helpful.” Consequently, the paper argued Mr. Taft should prove to his voters “that he is not leading what remains of the isolationist wing” of the GOP, but a later review of Taft’s book in the same paper confirms there remain some isolationist tendencies within his foreign policy.¹⁹⁷ While Taft and his supporters had a clear view of their campaign, the rest of the GOP remained in a state of doubt as Gen. Eisenhower’s position was still unclear – even though his supporters had started organizing on a national scale already and were planning to enter his name in the Wisconsin and New Hampshire primaries – and Taft’s partisan foreign policy divided the party over the conservative flank (his supporters) and the moderate internationalist flank, represented by Republicans such as

¹⁹³ *New York Times*, “WANTED BY THE G.O.P. – THE MAN AND THE ISSUE”, May 13, 1951, pB6, by A. Leviero

¹⁹⁴ *New York Times*, “TRUMAN’S POLICIES ARE RAKED BY TAFT”, June 10, 1951, p67.

¹⁹⁵ *New York Times*, “TAFT SAYS TRUMAN FAILS IN ALL FIELDS”, June 24, 1951, p16

¹⁹⁶ Taft’s Senate votes, such as his vote against extended American commitments to NATO were informed by the 1952 elections as well. Matthews, 507-22;

¹⁹⁷ *New York Times*, “TAFT LISTS ISSUES FOR ’52 CAMPAIGN”, Oct. 16, 1951, p27, by E. Abel and “MR. TAFT IS WILLING”, Oct. 17, 1951, p30, and “What ‘Mr. Republican’ Wants Our Foreign Policy to Be: review of ‘A Foreign Policy for Americans’”, Nov. 18, 1951, pBR2, by L. Rogers

Dulles.¹⁹⁸ Later that fall, Gov. Earl Warren of California announced he would run for the Republican nomination as well, after “two petitions from the state’s [California] Republican leaders”, among them internationalist minded Senators Knowland and Nixon, who urged him to run in a move against non-internationalist Taft.¹⁹⁹ Democrats suffered from Republican uncertainty as well (they did not yet know who their opponent would be), and lacked intra-party clarity as well: Truman had not announced whether he would run again or not; nor were there any clear alternatives. The President did offer some political attacks by saying a “bitter, partisan, backward-looking Republican Old Guard [is] trying to destroy our faith in ourselves and in our present course of action as a nation.” Moreover, Truman believed “in a bipartisan approach to foreign policy” but some Republicans were trying to “discredit the effort we are making to bring about peace.”²⁰⁰

4.3 Eisenhower versus Taft

The elections of 1952 formed the climax of the process that led the Republicans to a coherent, decidedly more partisan foreign policy as the American people elected Eisenhower to be President. Initially however, it remained uncertain whether Eisenhower would even receive the Republican nomination, as the contest between Taft and Eisenhower was very close. The latter had won the primaries in New Hampshire, Minnesota and Oregon, but Taft had a loyal following and had started building his campaign much earlier than Eisenhower. At the end of March, meanwhile, Truman announced he would not run again.²⁰¹ This opened up the race for the Democratic ticket and was ultimately won by Governor Adlai Ewing Stevenson II of Illinois, who believed that the campaign issues as posed by Taft (socialism, corruption and Korea) really were non-issues as the sensible opinion on all three would be self-evident (socialism and corruption are bad, and nobody favored more casualties of war) and instead wanted a debate on the ideologies of himself and his opponent.²⁰²

The Republican nomination of Eisenhower reflected the struggle between progressive internationalism and conservative nationalism, as Eisenhower represented the former and Taft the latter. This antagonism was particularly illustrated by the issue of foreign policy and the Korean War in particular; Taft believed his success depended on repeated, aggressive and harsh criticism of the

¹⁹⁸ *New York Times*, “KEY TO THE CAMPAIGN IS HELD BY EISENHOWER”, Oct. 28, 1951, p129, by A. Krock and “Bipartisanship Held Essential by Dulles”, Oct. 29, 1951, p1; “U.S. MUST PROTECT SUEZ, TAFT ASSERTS”, Nov. 15, 1951, p22, by W.S. White

¹⁹⁹ *New York Times*, “Warren to Seek Nomination; Taft Outlines Foreign Policy”, Nov. 15, 1951, p1.

²⁰⁰ *New York Times*, “THE NATION: TRUMAN ON ’52”, Nov. 25, 1951, p182.

²⁰¹ Truman had already decided in April, 1950 however. See: Truman, p491

²⁰² While Truman had an aggressive campaign style, Stevenson could afford to take a moderate approach as he was not obliged to defend Truman’s policies like the President himself had to. Casey, 325-8; Leffler, 492-3

Administration and its failings in three key areas.²⁰³ Eisenhower-Republicans, which included well-known internationalists such as Dulles and Lodge, on the other hand, viewed Taft's polarizing opinions as counterproductive (the discussions in previous years oftentimes referred to the GOP needing a positive, constructive program) and unrealistic. Most of all, they disagreed with Taft's assertion that entry of the Korean War was a mistake, instead they argued that the Administration's *handling* of the conflict failed.²⁰⁴ Taft's controversial nature was echoed by several Gallup polls that presented several hypothetical possibilities with regards to both parties' candidates. Support for either Eisenhower or Taft among *registered* Republicans was split evenly (33% for either in February, 34% for Taft and 33% for Eisenhower in March, 37% for Eisenhower and 34% for Taft in April), but their respective appeal to independents would be the decisive factor in winning the *general* elections: "on the basis of a turnout of 55 million voters, 21.5 million classify themselves as Democrats, 18.5 million as Republicans and 15 million as Independents. The Independents, in short, hold the balance of power."²⁰⁵ In this field, Eisenhower clearly performed better: 42% of independents preferred him (Taft: 16%) in February, 37% in March (Taft: 17%), 50% in April (Taft: 15%), 52% in May (Taft: 14%) and 46% in June (Taft: 19%). In addition, when Gallup asked which potential GOP nominee would handle foreign policy best, a majority of both Republicans and Independents favored Eisenhower in this respect (60% of Republicans; 71% of Independents).²⁰⁶

In retrospect, the real contest was between Taft and Eisenhower as Stevenson in the general election held little appeal representing a Party that had occupied the White House for 20 years already and was home to the extremely unpopular President. The Republican campaign for nomination however was undecided until the end. The fact that a political amateur such as Eisenhower – who "lacked information on plenty [subjects]" and "had to ad lib a strategy as he went along" – could compete with weathered political veteran like Taft – who had "a warehouse full of arguments on domestic issues" – was the most significant testament to the importance of foreign policy during these elections. Eisenhower implicitly singled out Taft by attacking "those who assert that America can live within its own borders; those who think we have little or no stake in the rest of the world" while Taft underscored Eisenhower's lack of information on important topics. Ultimately, "the insistent question was: Which man would give the party a better chance of winning the

²⁰³ The Korean War formed an important topic in the Republican Party as of 1951; see "Remarks by Congressman O.K. Armstrong of Missouri on the formation of a Republican policy in connection with the Far East", 11.0194; "Remarks by Bonner Fellers, director of the RNC Veterans Division, on enlisting veterans in the Republican campaign", 11.0496 and "Remarks by Senator Harry Cain of Washington on Douglas MacArthur and the Korean War", 11.0917; all three in Kesaris, P.L. [ed.], *Papers of the Republican Party, Part I...*

²⁰⁴ Casey, 328-9

²⁰⁵ Gallup II, p1057

²⁰⁶ Gallup II, 1041, 1043-4, 1054-5, 1060, 1067

Presidency for the first time in twenty-four years?”²⁰⁷ While Republican voters and party bosses were evenly divided between both sides, Eisenhower’s appeal to Independents would prove to be decisive during the actual nomination in July, as foreign policy was both the most pressing issue this campaign and Eisenhower’s forte. The Convention did not go over smoothly – Eisenhower’s supporters accused Taft loyalists of ‘stealing’ delegates – so in the interest of party unity (which had been lacking in 1948) Taft and Eisenhower came to a post-convention agreement that resolved their issues: Eisenhower would still consider Taft supporters for party and government positions if he won the general election and he would emphasize fiscal responsibility in government as Taft, on his part, promised he would leave foreign affairs to Eisenhower.²⁰⁸

Already during the contest between Eisenhower and Taft, the former showed he could display a partisan attitude as well when he said that “[w]e have been too ready for too long to trust a godless dictatorship. (...) Our loss of China, a divided and almost naked Germany, the enslaved countries of the Baltic and the Balkans, the long and bloody struggle in Greece – they, the consequences of that mistrust, come home to every one of us in the war in Korea”, which was labeled by the *Times* as his “strongest attack yet at the Administration’s foreign policy”.²⁰⁹ This attitude evolved further after Eisenhower secured the nomination and had chosen Nixon as his running mate; a McCarthy-like Republican when it came to the infiltration of communists in the Administration, as he was responsible for “breaking the Alger Hiss case and paving the way for the indictment and conviction of the former State Department official”, an “internationalist that had “been a critic of the Administration’s policy in the Far East”.²¹⁰ To further shed the Republican image of being a ‘me-too’ party (not helped by the fact that Eisenhower, as a General, had served under the Truman Administration), Eisenhower appeared with McCarthy in the latter’s home state. Moreover, to reach both loyal Republicans as well as the crucial Independents, Eisenhower’s campaign embraced Taft’s favorite issues: socialism, corruption and Korea. After all, those issues resonated strongly with undecided voters and, according to Steven Casey, “the Republican Party’s desperation to win” and the fact that “senior Republicans [were still] obsessed by Dewey’s 1948 defeat” convinced the Eisenhower campaign to “stiffen its message”.²¹¹

Meanwhile, the Korean War raged on during the campaign and negotiations with the Chinese and North-Koreans throughout the year remained unsuccessful. As Americans were growing impatient, casualty rates remained high and elections were approaching fast, Democrats and

²⁰⁷ *New York Times*, “Winner Wanted”, June 29, 1952, pE1

²⁰⁸ Casey, 330; Edwards, L., “The Spirit of ‘52”, in *National Review*, 4/19/1999, Vol. 51 Issue 7, p49-50; Hayes, p517-20

²⁰⁹ *New York Times*, “Winner Wanted”, June 29, 1952, pE1

²¹⁰ *New York Times*, “NIXON IS YOUNGEST OF G.O.P. IN SENATE”, Jul. 12, 1952, p6

²¹¹ Gallup, 1050-2; Casey 330-2

Republicans alike pressed for escalation of the war by bombing China or cutting it off by instituting a naval blockade. The Administration did not succumb to that pressure, but had no alternative to offer either: the war was in a deadlock that seemed unbreakable.²¹² Eisenhower on the other hand never claimed to have an exact solution to end the war but this ambiguity was more than offset by his credentials as a General and the fact he did not belong to the party responsible for the war. The final push however, was his promise to go to Korea after he was elected. While in Detroit, Eisenhower said that “one fact looms above all others in our people’s mind. (...) This fact, this tragedy, this word is: Korea” which was fought for the “simplest of reasons: because free leadership failed to check and to turn back Communist ambition before it savagely attacked us.” The U.S. may have intervened for the right reasons, but as appeasement informed Truman’s policy, the war was “a record of appalling failure.” Eisenhower continued to highlight the Administration’s failures (the Administration “cannot escape that responsibility now or ever”) but emphasized even he cannot pledge “an end to war in Korea by any imminent, exact date”. However, he promised he would continue the effort to spread “a secure peace”, to end the Korean War “honorably” and pledged to the American people: “I shall go to Korea”. Only then could his Administration, “unfettered by past decisions and inherited mistakes (...), review every factor (...) to be mobilized in speeding a just peace.” But, the people could rest assured: “I will always reject appeasement.”²¹³

After this move Stevenson – however eloquent and hard-working – could not stave off Eisenhower’s victory. After a complex process towards a coherent and more partisan Republican foreign policy – which started in 1948 but was rooted in the debates on the American role in the world that followed the First World War – the Republicans had won the elections decisively and, for the first time in 20 years, could take possession of the White House again. The GOP was already in good shape after winning the 1950 elections, but their advantage over the Democrats increased even further after the Korean War entered a stalemate, MacArthur was dismissed and Vandenberg died without a political heir. With the inauguration of Eisenhower in early 1953, the Republican move towards partisan ideas about foreign policy had finally reached its climax.²¹⁴

²¹² Leffler, 446-8; Halberstam, 624-6; Casey, 333-4

²¹³ Casey, 334-5; Eisenhower, D.D., “Address by Dwight D. Eisenhower, Republican Nominee for President, Delivered at Detroit, Michigan, October 24, 1952” via http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/All_About_Ike/Presidential/Korea/documents/ishallgotokorea1.html and beyond; Halberstam, 626-8

²¹⁴ Truman retired from the stage with his popularity at an all-time low but could take solace in the fact that Eisenhower continued many of his foreign policies – albeit under a different name.

5. Finale/Reprise: Concluding Remarks

This dissertation – following the high standards set by Johnson and Casey – emphasizes the role of domestic considerations as determinants of American foreign policy in the early Cold War.

Consequently, it adds to Logevall and Hanhimäki's assertion that the Cold War should not be approached solely in terms of international events and foreign relations as America's role in it was undoubtedly more significant than that of other countries and that a disregard for this observation might lead to a-historical scholarship.

Why did a decidedly more partisan Republican foreign policy resurface and how did it evolve in the years 1949-1952? The answer to that question finds its roots between World War I and World War II, when a competition between Wilsonian Internationalism, Nationalism and Isolationism unfolded. The 1930s took an isolationist turn but the attack on Pearl Harbor quickly dissolved that attitude. Instead there appeared a process that institutionalized American interventionism through, among others, a leading role in the UN and NATO; a modified and more successful Wilsonian Internationalism characterized postwar America. Despite across-the-isle cooperation – which constituted the Cold War Consensus – there remained opposition composed of nationalist and isolationist elements from Taft and like-minded politicians.

Republicans thought the 1948 reelection of Truman was due to the fact that Republican contributions to American foreign policy were underappreciated. Consequently, the Cold War Consensus was short-lived as the constant fear of domestic communism riled up by HUAC, McCarthy and McCarran eventually facilitated a partisan foreign policy that complemented partisan opposition to progressive domestic policies (Roosevelt's New Deal and Truman's Fair Deal) already present as those programs were portrayed to be the first steps on the road down to a socialist government. Other factors that informed this evolution were the Russian acquisition of atomic weaponry, the failed China policy combined with the rise of revisionism, the Administration's decision to intervene in Korea in light of the cataclysmically phrased NSC-68 report, the Korean stalemate of 1951 and 1952, the dismissal of American hero MacArthur and popular allegations of corruption and communist sympathies within the Administration. The GOP capitalized on each of these issues, but especially the administration's failings in Korea provided it with ample opportunity to present itself as the party better suited for the responsibility of government. The partisan stance resonated with the people and climaxed with the Republican victories in both the 1950 midterm elections and the 1952 Presidential elections.

If this was insufficient justification for the emergence of a partisan Republican foreign policy, there was no longer an adequate alternative as Vandenberg passed away in 1951 without an equally influential and capable successor. Thus, the approach remained in play and would come to have far-

reaching consequences for America's foreign policy during the rest of the Cold War: domestic fears of communism and communist subversions would continue to affect much of American society – even after Sen. McCarthy was censured by the Senate in 1954. Republican oppositional rhetoric further fostered a black-and-white vision of communism that had started with the Truman Doctrine: shades of gray no longer existed as all forms of communism came to be wrong by definition. This applied vice versa as well: everything that was not communist deserved American support, such as the corrupt but nationalist KMT in China, Franco's dictatorial regime in Spain and the despotic regime of Fulgencio Batista in Cuba. Interestingly, the same line of reasoning formed at least part of the reason why Republicans felt they deserved the support of the American people in 1950 and 1952: as Democrats were harassed by allegations of communist or socialist sympathies, the Republicans stressed – and took pride in – the fact that they opposed communism more fervently and would continue to do so throughout the rest of the Cold War.

APPENDIX

A.

“List of objectives of the Republican Party and strategies for winning the national elections in 1950 and 1952” in Kesaris, P.L. [ed.], *Papers of the Republican Party, Part I: Meetings of the Republican National Committee, 1911-1980; Series A: 1911-1960*, part of *RESEARCH COLLECTIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICS: Microforms from Major Archival and Manuscript Collections* (Frederick, MD : University Publications of America 1986), 9.0397

I. Objectives of the Republican Party are:

1. To keep men free – in a free land
2. To oppose communism, fascism, socialism, all forms of absolutism and totalitarianism
3. To deny further extension of the Chief Executive’s power
4. To secure to the individual, the local community, and the State any functions not properly necessary to the operation of the Federal Government
5. To demand honesty and efficiency in government
6. To prevent tax increases and to provide tax relief wherever possible
7. To maintain a sound national economy and the wage-profit system
8. To strive for the highest possible standard of living for all; and to remove the specter of poverty and insecurity from the land
9. To demand an open realistic Foreign Policy
10. To support adequate, modern National Defense
11. To fight for peace and to resort to war only as the last means of preserving our freedom.
12. To develop programs in furtherance of our Platform

II. To win the National Elections in 1950 and 1952 by:

1. Acquainting the American people via radio, press, and forum, with meaning of these aims and what we are doing to achieve them
2. Assisting Senators and Representatives with research material and radio recordings, and personal services such as assistance in campaign problems and techniques
3. Coordinating all Republican activities, throughout the nation
4. Providing speakers of national reputation to further our program
5. Exposing Democrat Administration failures, mistakes, and inefficiency

6. Opposing the Administration's trend toward the omnipotent State, and publicizing constructive alternatives to the Administration's program
7. Assisting in the election to public office of qualified Republican candidates in State and Nation

B.

Truman's approval ratings, 1949-1950, based on Gallup, G.H., The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971 [Vol. I: 1935-1948], [Vol. II: 1949-1958] and [Vol. III: 1959-1971] (New York, NY : Random House 1972)

YEAR	MONTH	APPROVAL RATING IN %
1949		
	January	69
	March	57
	July	57
	October	51
1950		
	February	45
	September	43
1951	January	36
	March	26
	April	28
	June	24
	July	25
	July	29
	September	31

	October	32
	November	29
	December	23
1952	February	25
	March	25

C.

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