

The Franco-German 'special relationship'

Adenauer between Washington and Paris?



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Scriptiebegeleider: Dr. M.L.L. Segers
23-06-2011

A wise word from Adenauer:

'Wenn ein junger Politiker, der gerade beginnt, Sie fragen würde, was sind die Regeln, die man befolgen muß, um Erfolg zu haben, was würden Sie ihm da antworten?

Adenauer: *'Geschichte studieren...'*¹

¹ K. Adenauer, *Teegespräche 1961-1963* (Berlin 1992), 329.
(Adenauers *'Teegespräche'* are a collection of his recorded briefings)

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Introduction

On January, 22nd 1963, West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer and French president Charles de Gaulle signed the Elysée friendship treaty, marking the alliance of historic significance between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and France. This treaty followed only a few days after de Gaulle had vetoed the British application to the European Economic Community. Effectively, the friendship treaty implied West-German consent to the French policy towards Great-Britain.² This was confirmed by the then West-German minister of foreign affairs, von Brentano, who commented: "*De Gaulle would never have ventured as far if he was not sure of Adenauer.*"³ With the signing of this treaty, Adenauer did not only distance himself from Great-Britain, but also from the United States, until then assumed the most important ally of West Germany. With the British rejection, the European integration process was plunged into a crisis, which was contrary to Adenauer's recognized foreign policy objectives. Furthermore, the alliance with France went against the wishes of Adenauer's own Cabinet. How then is this alliance, and implicit shift in Adenauer's foreign policy to be explained?

Historical background

In the years preceding the French veto, Adenauer had struggled to gain legitimate governing power, in a 'state' which was divided and which in fact was occupied territory. The Allied powers had assumed joint authority over Germany according to the common occupation policy which was developed in conferences at Yalta and Potsdam in 1945. After the capitulation of Germany in 1945, the conflicting interests of the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other, had prohibited the signing of a peace treaty. The eventual result, first taking shape in September 1949, was a divided Germany: the Federal Republic of Germany in the American, British, and French zones, plus West Berlin and a communist government in the Soviet zone of East Germany and East Berlin.⁴

As cold war tensions increased during the 1950s, the Federal Republic found itself in a particularly vulnerable position within the bilateral international system, between the 'great powers'. The FRG was entirely dependent on the Allied 'good will' both in the economic reconstruction as well as for recognition as a Western democratic partner. From 1948 onwards the FRG's foreign policy was geared to achieving the integration of

² T. Rhenisch en H. Zimmermann, 'Adenauer Chooses de Gaulle: The West German Government and the Exclusion of Britain from Europe' in R.T. Griffiths en S. Ward (ed) *Courting the Common Market: The First Attempt to enlarge the European Community 1961-1963* (Londen 1996) 83.

³ O. Bange, *The EEC crisis of 1963, Kennedy, MacMillan, de Gaulle and Adenauer in Conflict* (Londen 2000) 52.

⁴ W.I. Hitchcock, *The struggle for Europe: the turbulent history of a divided continent, 1945 to the present* (New York, 2004), 1-13.

the German state into the Western world. The unification of Germany on Western terms was Adenauer's ultimate objective. The Chancellor wanted to achieve this through close cooperation with the West. Cooperation had to prove that the era of expansionist German nationalism, which twice in half a century had led to the devastation of Europe, belonged to the past. The outbreak of the Korean War, the seizure of power by Mao Zedong in China and the Communist coup in Prague reinforced the desire for Western cooperation during the 1950's. A Western alliance should protect the Federal Republic against the expansionist Soviet Union and its military threat and would ensure the desired unification. According to Adenauer, the American friendship was crucial for the safeguarding of these West German interests. Therefore, Adenauer's foreign policy was geared to '*..creating a close relationship with neighboring countries in the Western world, particularly the United States.*'⁵ The policy pursued by the West German leader, which came to be known as *Westbindung*, quickly bore its fruits. Economic recovery came surprisingly swift as well as political recognition in the West. Together with France, the first steps towards European integration were set with the creation of the Economic Community for Steel and Coals (ECSC) in 1952, followed in 1955 with West Germany's admittance to NATO. A decennium after the end of World War Two the FRG was in fact recognized as an equal Western partner.⁶

Germany's age old enemy, France, who had emerged from World War Two as one of the victors, initially wanted to prevent the unification of Germany since a unified German state might acquire a dominant position in Europe. Weakening Germany politically and economically was supposed to safeguard France. However, the post-war economic development of West Germany, often referred to as the *Wirtschaftswunder*, along with the demise of the Union Française, forced France to change this policy. Cooperation with the FRG and European integration were seen as a way to keep nationalist aspirations in Germany in check. Simultaneously, European integration was a means for France to achieve its own aspirations as a leading world power. With the coming to power of Charles de Gaulle in 1958, and especially from 1960 onwards, France took a clear distance from the U.S. and took an open stance against American hegemony and mass Americanization. The French trust in America after the Suez crisis came to an all-time low and led France to challenge the post-war dependence on the U.S. and focus entirely on the European continent. A strong Europe, so the French believed, would break the international bipolar power structure and would guarantee a place for France as a superpower in the world, equal to the U.S. rather than subservient. A 'strong Europe' as de Gaulle envisioned would not be a venture under a supranational organization, but a

⁵ M. Görtemaker, 'Germany between the superpowers, 1948-1968' in D. Junker (ed) *The united states and Germany in the era of the cold war, 1945-1990* (I: 1945-1968), 113.

⁶ Hitchcock, *The struggle for Europe*, 150-153.

partnership under the authority of France, and if necessary under a bilateral Franco-German alliance.⁷

This French policy conflicted with the American vision of the future shape of Europe and its relations with the United States. After World War II, the U.S. had taken up a political, economic and military 'partnership' with the continent. The threat of communism, and particularly the threat of Soviet military power during the Cold War, had enforced the need for a strong alliance with Western European partners. The U.S. supported West European integration during the 1950s and had initially supported the entente between France and the FRG, which gradually was taking shape during the 1950s. A good relationship between the two states was seen as a prerequisite for a strong united Europe which could stand fast against the communist threat. Washington was convinced of its own fertile relationship with Bonn, and at first did not see the rapprochement between the FRG and France as a threat. However, Washington did not want the continent to become an independent 'third force' under French leadership since this in fact would lead to the reduction of American influence on the continent. The U.S. favored an Atlantic alliance with supranational institutions under American leadership, which would enable the U.S. to intervene more effectively in European and global affairs.⁸

During the 1960s the debate on Atlantic cooperation, and the differing designs for the future led to an open conflict between France and the U.S.⁹ The American leadership of the transatlantic alliance, especially in NATO but also visible in the OECD and in the multilateral nuclear force (MLF), would not be accommodated by de Gaulle.¹⁰ From 1958 onwards the General sought to limit, and potentially undermine, the American role on the continent through various initiatives, including the development of an independent French nuclear capability (*force de frappe*), the strengthening of bonds with Bonn, by blocking Great-Britain from the European community and eventually by withdrawing from NATO's military structure in 1966.

The French repositioning from 1958 onward and especially de Gaulle's challenge to the U.S. hegemony and the blocking of Britain's entrance to the EEC put Adenauer in an awkward position. In contrast to the French plans for Europe, the West German foreign policy was focused on European integration and cooperation through supranational agencies, which would prove that West Germany was not pursuing expansionist's goals. Furthermore, the FRG was dependent on the NATO alliance and the U.S. to ensure safety

⁷ *Ibidem*, 179-183.

⁸ H. Haftendorn, 'The NATO crisis of 1966-1967: confronting Germany with a conflict of priorities', in H. Haftendorn, et al (ed) , *The Strategic Triangle: France, Germany, and the United States in the Shaping of the New Europe* (Washington 2006)89-102.

⁹ J.G. Giauque, *Grand designs & visions of unity: the Atlantic powers and the reorganization of Western Europe 1955-1963* (North Carolina, 2002)94-98 .

¹⁰ N.P. Ludlow, *European integration and the cold war: Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965-1973* (Abington 2007), 152.

with respect to the Soviet Union. Because of the tension between Paris and Washington the FRG was faced with a conflict of interests, between the U.S. as the guardian of Germany's security and freedom, and France, the FRG's most important partner in Europe as the basis for further European integration.¹¹ Adenauer had tried to balance between Paris and Washington, needing them both as allies to ensure the West German foreign policy objectives. However, de Gaulle's veto of the British application to the EEC and his public distancing from the U.S. forced Adenauer with a choice. Closer ties with Paris would imply a distancing from the US and from the Atlantic community. The consequences of such ties with France were great since the entire post-war politics of Adenauer, aimed at the inclusion of Germany in the Western alliance and unification of Germany was dependent on the support of the U.S.¹²

Research problem and question

The rapprochement between Bonn and Paris, as enshrined in the Elysée friendship treaty, therefore meant a break in Adenauer's foreign policy since this in fact meant a support of French policy, a policy which was geared to minimalizing the U.S. position on the continent.¹³ Dean Acheson, at that time U.S. Secretary of State, remarked that the signing of the Elysée Treaty was '*one of the darkest days of the postwar era*'.¹⁴ Paul H. Nitze saw the Franco-German friendship treaty as a betrayal to the Atlantic alliance: '*the first step in a policy that would lead to the exclusion of the U.S. from Europe*'.¹⁵ To this day, the shift in Adenauer's foreign policy calls for many questions. These questions are even greater given the fact that de Gaulle had only days before vetoed the British application for membership of the EEC. Washington had exerted enormous pressure on Adenauer not to sign the friendship treaty and not to agree with the blocking of Britain from entrance into the EEC.¹⁶ The U.S. strongly supported British membership to the EEC, since this would ensure the transatlantic character of the Economic Community.¹⁷

The crisis of the European integration which followed the British rejection has been studied in depth. The position of de Gaulle has been explained from a geopolitical as well

¹¹ H. Haftendorn, 'Introduction: relations in a strategic triangle – Bonn/Berlin, Paris, and Washington' in H. Haftendorn (ed) *The Strategic Triangle: France, Germany, and the United States* (Washington 2006), 8-9.

¹² D. Dinan, 'Building Europe: the European Community and the Bonn-Paris-Washington relationship, 1958-1963' in H. Haftendorn, et al (ed), *The Strategic Triangle: France, Germany, and the United States in the Shaping of the New Europe* (Washington 2006), 45.

¹³ Giaque, *Grand designs & visions of unity*, 204.

¹⁴ M. Görtemaker, 'Germany between the superpowers, 1948-1968', in D. Junker (ed), *The united states and Germany in the era of the cold war, 1945-1990 I* (Cambridge 2004), 116.

¹⁵ F.A. Mayer, 'Adenauer and Kennedy: An Era of Distrust in German-American Relations?', *German Studies Review* 17 (1994), 96.

¹⁶ Giaque, *Grand designs & visions of unity*, 204.

¹⁷ M. Knapp, 'Divided loyalties in transatlantic policy toward Europe', in D. Junker (ed), *The united states and Germany in the era of the cold war, 1945-1990 I* (Cambridge 2004) 129.

as from an economic perspective. Britain was a threat to French dominance on the continent and endangered the for France advantageous Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Furthermore, Britain with its *special relationship* with the US was not sufficiently "European".¹⁸ De Gaulle feared U.S. influence in European affairs and referred to the British entry as: *'En définitive, il apparaîtrait une Communauté atlantique colossale sous dépendance et direction américaines, et qui aurait tôt fait d'absorber la Communauté de l'Europe.'*¹⁹ In short, the national interests of France were not in line with British admission which explains the French refusal. The position of the German Chancellor in this process is unclear. What had brought Adenauer to support the French and to turn away from the transatlantic alliance? Were the West German national interests in line with this decision? Was there some economic advantage?

The dominant explanation for the German policy is geopolitical. Between 1958-1961 Adenauer was faced with a very serious threat, namely by Khrushchev's ultimatum on Berlin. The response of the U.S. on the construction of the Berlin Wall was in Adenauer's view utterly inadequate. America took no action and accepted the status quo which in fact meant a divided Germany. It seemed that the unification of Germany under Western conditions was further away than ever. The stance taken by the US government increased doubts concerning the American president's willingness to support Bonn's attempts to safeguard German political priorities. This would have lead him away from his Atlantic ally. This explanation for Adenauer's foreign policy at the time of the British rejection draws attention mainly on West German security interests.²⁰ However, Adenauer's disappointment in U.S. policy during the Berlin crisis does not seem to be a sufficient explanation for the shift in the FRG's foreign policy, since France could not possibly substitute the geopolitical role of the U.S. De Gaulle's military and political power could not protect West-Germany from the Soviet Union nor could it provide any guarantees with regard to German unification.²¹ Furthermore, Adenauer had equal reasons to distrust de Gaulle, who had gone behind his back proposing a Franco-British-American directorate in NATO (which was turned down by the U.S.) in 1958.²² In addition, Adenauer was not only alienating Washington by embracing de Gaulle but was also going against his own government. The FRG's government was largely in favor of British entry into the EEC and both the West German Minister of Economic Affairs, Ludwig Erhard as well as Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder, had strongly condemned the

¹⁸ R. Davis, 'The 'Problem of de Gaulle': British Reactions to General de Gaulle's Veto of the UK Application to Join the Common Market', *Journal of Contemporary History* 32 (1997), 459.

¹⁹ A. Grosser, 'General de Gaulle and the Foreign Policy of the Fifth Republic', *International Affairs* 39 (1963) 209.

²⁰ Bange, *The EEC crisis of 1963*, 151-165. Mayer, 'Adenauer and Kennedy: An Era of Distrust in German-American Relations?', 1.

²¹ Zimmermann, 'Adenauer Chooses de Gaulle', 89.

²² Dinan, 'Building Europe', 45.

French position in relation to Great-Britain. The discontent with Adenauer's foreign policy is demonstrated clearly by Erhard's opinion on de Gaulle: '*Thirty years ago Hitler subjugated the Germans. De Gaulle is now doing the same with Europe.*'²³ In light of this domestic pressure, the Franco-German friendship treaty is even more remarkable.

Andrew Moravcsik, a professor of Politics at Princeton university, has challenged the primacy of geopolitical motivation relating to the French veto, blocking Britain's entry to the EEC. He has developed a theory explaining European integration and has intensively studied this turbulent time period in European integration. His theory, *liberal intergovernmentalism*, explains European integration as a process in which especially domestic economic preferences are decisive. Relating to the European integration during the 1950s and 1960s he states that '*the true underlying continuity of postwar European integration*' is the '*conflict among Anglo-American, French, and German commercial interests.*'²⁴ And he writes: '*Each government sought above all to realize commercial advantages for agriculture and industry.*'²⁵ These statements however do not seem to explain why Adenauer consented to block the British entry to the EEC. The West German political elite largely rallied behind Erhard's criticism of Adenauer since the British entry would be economically beneficial for Germany. Economically, the Federal Republic was much more geared to the Anglo-Saxon model of free trade than to the French, more protectionist economic model.²⁶ The German delegation at Brussels stated that '*For political and economic reasons...we regard it as necessary that Great Britain should be a full member of the European Community.*'²⁷ Moravcsik's theory thus does not seem to explain the West-German stance in the matter.

Research approach and methodology

Considering that there are multiple theories explaining the Federal Republic's foreign policy during the early 1960s, each with their limitations, further research on this topic is necessary. The purpose of this study is to come to a better understanding of this turbulent period in European integration. The primary focus of this research will be on Chancellor Adenauer since he had a decisive influence on the course of the political events of the early 1960s. The course taken by Adenauer was in many ways in direct opposition to the public opinion in West Germany. Furthermore, as already stated, the FRG's Bundestag and Adenauer's own Cabinet were very much against the policy pursued by the chancellor, relating to his relationship with de Gaulle and the shift in policy, away

²³ Zimmermann, 'Adenauer Chooses de Gaulle', 85.

²⁴ O. Bange, 'The EEC Crisis of 1963: Kennedy, Macmillan, De Gaulle, and Adenauer in Conflict' reviewed by A. Moravcsik in *The American Historical Review* 106, 5 (2001), 1770.

²⁵ A. Moravcsik, *The choice for Europe: social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht* (New York 1998) 160.

²⁶ Zimmermann, 'Adenauer Chooses de Gaulle', 85-87.

²⁷ R.G. Hughes, *Britain, Germany and the Cold War: the search for a European Détente* (New York 2007) 119.

from the U.S. and the Atlantic alliance. Based on this information, and considering that the consent of the Bundestag was not required in foreign policy issues, it stands to reason that in trying to find an explanation for this policy, Adenauer's prime considerations and his decision making process must be examined. To gain insight into Adenauer's motives his *Erinnerungen* will be studied as well as his correspondence with other political leaders, especially Charles de Gaulle.²⁸

The central research question is: *How can Adenauer's prioritizing of the French alliance over the Atlantic alliance, reflected in the Franco-German friendship treaty and the implicit support of the French veto blocking Great-Britain from the EEC, be explained?*

The focus of this research will be on the rapprochement between France and the FRG between 1961 and 1963. Before 1961 the relationship between the two states had developed in a positive manner and was not contested by the US. Therefore the period prior to 1961 will not be studied in detail since it did not reflect a clear shift in alliance. After 1963 Adenauer was succeeded by Erhard as chancellor, who pursued other foreign policy objectives. Therefore this research does not cover the period after 1963.

In order to answer the central research question and understand the development of the bilateral relationship between France and West Germany it is necessary to have a clear picture of the Federal Republic's foreign policy objectives. Historical developments cannot be understood by only focusing on '*Großer Männer*'. Adenauer had a dominant influence on the FRG's foreign policy during this time period, but his decisions were very much connected to international circumstances and to the domestic situation. To identify multiple structures and causal connections, and to gain an understanding of the choices made between 1961-1963, both the personal element (the role played by Adenauer) and the structural development (the position of the FRG in the international system and domestic situation) will be discussed. The first chapter of this research will be geared to unraveling which principles lay behind Adenauer's foreign policy. What was Adenauer's vision of Europe? And which position should West-Germany have in the world according to the Chancellor? This will be described in the context of how the government and its bureaucracy were organized under Adenauer. Particular attention will be given to the international circumstances during the late 1950s, when European integration was advancing and when American strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union was lost.

In the following chapter, the development of the Franco-German relationship between 1958-1962 will be studied. During these years France unsuccessfully tried to build a European political union. These 'Fouchet plans' were geared to overcome American

²⁸ Adenauer's 'Erinnerungen' are an autobiographic bundle which encompass the years 1945 to 1963

hegemony on the continent by building separate institutions in which the U.S. would not be a partner. What position did Adenauer take in these Fouchet negotiations? Special attention will be given to the personal rapport between Adenauer and de Gaulle and the opposition Adenauer encountered within his own cabinet.

In the third chapter the British application to the EEC will be studied. The British application for membership became the main battleground for the competing French and American concepts of European integration.²⁹ Which stance did Adenauer take during the Brussels negotiations? In chapter four the French veto and the signing of the Élysée treaty will be examined. What was agreed on? Finally, a brief reflection with a general conclusion will be given.

This research is important because it reveals the roots of the relationship between France and Germany. Reconciliation between the arch rivals France and Germany was a key element in building the European Community. To this day, these two states are the driving forces for European integration, often referred to as 'the Franco-German engine of Europe'.³⁰ Furthermore, this research will provide insight in the broader debate of national motivation in European integration. Finally, this research fits into the current discussion on America's global power. In recent years the global role of 'the West' and particular the European-American relations have been under scrutiny. The American military intervention in Iraq has provoked strong criticism, and has brought into question which position 'Europe' should take in such issues. Should Europe's foreign policy follow in step with American lead, or should the European Union take a more independent role in foreign affairs? This question, which confronted the European leaders, Adenauer and de Gaulle almost fifty years ago, is thus still very current today. Germany has taken a surprisingly strong stance in opposition to the U.S. policy and invasion of Iraq. According to H. Haftendorn '*..before the fall of 2002, the German leadership always preferred being between Washington and Paris, and it made every effort to avoid a choice between the two.*'³¹ Haftendorn claims that Germany, during the Iraq crisis, for the first time went against American policy. However, it seems that Germany has done this before, namely in 1963 with the signing of the Elysée Friendship Treaty.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, 22.

³⁰ Giaouque, *Grand designs & visions of unity*, 221.

³¹ S.F. Szabo and S.F. Wells, 'Epilogue: a new geometry?' in H. Haftendorn, et al (ed), *The Strategic Triangle: France, Germany, and the United States in the Shaping of the New Europe* (Washington 2006) 371.

The Federal Republic under Konrad Adenauer's leadership

*'Im Anfang war Adenauer.'*³²

In 1949 Konrad Adenauer was elected as the first Chancellor of the Western part of the divided Germany. Under his leadership, sometimes referred to as 'the Adenauer era' (1949-1963) the Federal Republic was transformed from the ruins of World War II to a prosperous European nation, the driving force of European integration, an economic power house and a Western partner in the cold war. In this chapter, Adenauer's foreign policy will be examined from a broad perspective. The background, relating to the post-war settlement and the new cold-war order, will be discussed in relation to Adenauer's foreign policy objectives. The bureaucratic structure in which the Chancellor operated will be considered as well as Adenauer's own vision for the future of Germany and Europe.

The person and the statesman Adenauer

Konrad Adenauer acquired historic stature as a statesman, both in the eyes of his contemporaries as well as by people decades after his death. Germany's post war political recovery and reentry into the Western community have been attributed to his leadership and he has been viewed as one of the key persons to foster European integration.³³ Even though these perceptions do not per se reflect historical reality it is clear that Adenauer surely put his mark on a period in which the future of Germany was very unsure.

When Konrad Adenauer became the political leader of the *Bundesrepublik Deutschland* he was 72 years old. Earlier, Adenauer had had a notable place in local politics, as the mayor of Cologne from 1919 to 1933. During the Hitler regime he withdrew from politics. Already early in his political career, during the interbellum, Adenauer had a fairly detailed vision of the future of Europe. In 1919 he stated: *'Wenn ihre Versöhnung nicht gelingt, wenn die europäischen Völker nicht lernen, über der berechtigten Wahrung ihrer Eigenart das aller europäischen Kultur Gemeinsame zu erkennen und zu pflegen, wenn es nicht gelingt, durch kulturelle Annäherung die Völker wieder zu einigen, wenn auf diesem Wege nicht einem neuen Kriege unter den europäischen Völkern vorgebeugt wird, dann ist Europas Vormacht in der Welt dauernd verloren.'*³⁴ Even at that time Adenauer recognized that reconciliation with France would be necessary if the long term security of Europe was to be guaranteed. After 1945 Adenauer grew even more convinced that

³² As Arnulf Baring expressed in A. Baring, *Aussenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie* (München 1969) 1.

³³ G. R. Boynton and Gerhard Loewenberg, 'The Evolution of Public Perceptions of Adenauer as a Historic Leader: Test of a Mathematical Model of Attitude Change', *Social science history* 1 (1976) 80-81.

³⁴ K. Adenauer, *Reden 1917-1967: Eine Auswahl* (Stuttgart 1975), 39.

lasting European unity could only be built on the basis of Franco-German friendship.³⁵ As he stated in 1959: *'Deutschland und Frankreich sind Nachbarn, die seit Jahrhunderten immer wieder Krieg geführt haben. Völliger Blödsinn! Einmal mußte das in Europa aufhören.'*³⁶ The West German Chancellor believed that European unity, with at its base Franco-German cooperation, was the only guarantee for peace on the continent.

Adenauer was, as a devout Catholic Rheinlander, very much orientated to the West. As Mantzke states: *'Paris und Brüssel lagen ihm ungleich näher als etwa Königsberg und Berlin.'*³⁷ Adenauer's memoirs and speeches show that the Chancellor's vision of Europe was to a large extent determined by his religious beliefs. European integration represented an opportunity of uniting 'Christian Europe' against what Adenauer believed to be *'der tödlichste und furchtbarste Feind des Christentums'*³⁸: the Soviet Union. *'Das christliche Abendland'*, was to be a stronghold against the socialist East. In January 1960 Adenauer stated: *'Ich glaube, das Gott dem deutschen Volk in den jetzigen stürmischen Zeitläufen eine besondere Aufgabe gegeben hat, Hüter zu sein für den Westen gegen jene mächtigen Einflüsse, die vom Osten her auf uns einwirken.'*³⁹ Thus, for the West German Chancellor, developing a strong Europe, free of Soviet domination was nothing less than a defense of Christianity.

Adenauer was a staunch antisocialist. According to the Chancellor all versions of socialism were totalitarian and in this respect no different than Fascism. The government control which accompanies socialism would always lead to an authoritarian type of state.⁴⁰ During his years as Chancellor, Adenauer never doubted the aggressive, expansionistic character of the Soviet Union.⁴¹ Washington thus found in Adenauer a strong ally against the threat of Communism.

The foreign policy objectives of a divided state on a divided continent

The Federal Republic of Germany came into existence in 1949 when the Allied forces, which had controlled the Western part of Germany, merged their occupational zones. A democratic party system was to be established. A mere four years after the defeat of Hitler the circumstances under which this democracy was to take shape were hardly promising. In the light of the disastrous experience of the Weimar democracy and the experiences after 1945 of total defeat and continued occupation it was hard to imagine how a democratic system could take root.

³⁵ R. Irving, *Adenauer: profiles in power* (London 2002) 108.

³⁶ K. Adenauer, *Teegespräche 1959-1961* (Berlin 1988), 90.

³⁷ M.A. Mantzke, *Grundzüge der Frankreichpolitik Konrad Adenauers 1958-1963* (Bonn 1975) 37.

³⁸ Adenauer, *Reden 1917-1967: Eine Auswahl*, 226.

³⁹ Mantzke, *Grundzüge der Frankreichpolitik Konrad Adenauers*, 39.

⁴⁰ K. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1955-1959* (Stuttgart 1967), 205-209.

⁴¹ Mantzke, *Grundzüge der Frankreichpolitik Konrad Adenauers*, 4-15.

The first elections for the Bundestag, the West-German parliament, were held in 1949. The *Christlich Demokratische Union* (CDU) obtained a dominant position which it would hold until 1966. The CDU had been established in 1946 and was essentially a non-socialist confessional party, in which Catholics and Protestants were represented. Under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer this party was committed to values of Western democracy, social welfare and free market economy. With the support of the CDU and of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) Adenauer was elected the first *Bundeskanzler* (Chancellor), the chief executer of the Federal Republic of Germany.⁴²

The democratic character of this new government has been doubted by some historians who believe many of the autocratic features of the old German regime survived. The early West German state has been labeled a *Demokratatur*, a state in which democracy and dictatorship were combined. According to A. Baring the position of the Chancellor was virtually unchallenged: Adenauer monopolized the foreign policy making process and accepted no independent criticism. Baring states that Adenauer operated from the Chancellor's office in a '*innenpolitischen Vakuum*'.⁴³ And that: '*Die Startchance des ersten Regierungschefs der Bundesrepublik – und der Ursprung der Kanzlerdemokratie – lag in der Monopolisierung aller außenpolitischen Aktivität im bürokratisch hochqualifizierten, von partei- und verbandspolitischen Einflüssen abgeschirmten, allein vom Regierungschef kontrollierten Bundeskanzleramt*'.⁴⁴ This statement seems justified in the light of the developments of the foreign policy under Adenauer, even against opposition within his own government. Until 1955 there was no foreign policy office, but even after it was restored Adenauer remained dominant in the decision making process.⁴⁵ The *Auswärtiges Amt* in fact consisted of a small group of trusted figures around Adenauer.⁴⁶

The East-West conflict largely determined the direction of the Federal Republic in international politics during the 1950s. The German Democratic Republic (GDR), the socialist state in the Soviet occupational zone, was not recognized by the Federal Republic. According to the West German constitution the FRG was the only democratic, and therefore legitimate representative of the German nation.⁴⁷ Until 1955 the Chancellor's main goal was the realization of a sovereign West German state, firmly anchored within the Western alliance. Reunification came second to this. Adenauer believed the FRG should only negotiate with the Soviet Union from a position of strength

⁴² Irving, *Adenauer: profiles in power*, 57-84.

⁴³ Baring, *Aussenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie*, 339.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*

⁴⁵ Mantzke, *Grundzüge der Frankreichpolitik Konrad Adenauers*, 12-14.

⁴⁶ Bange, *The EEC crisis of 1963*, 56.

⁴⁷ W. Loth, 'Adenauer's final Western choice, 1955-1958' in W. Loth (ed), *Europe, cold war and coexistence 1953-1965* (London 2004), 24.

to ensure German reunification on Western terms.⁴⁸ During the 1950s these foreign policy objectives were mostly accomplished. External political constraints were to a large degree lifted and the Federal Republic became a (semi) sovereign state in 1955. At this occasion Adenauer proclaimed '*Wir stehen als Freie unter Freien, den bisherigen Besatzungsmächten in echter Partnerschaft verbunden...Es gibt für uns in der Welt nur einen Platz: an der Seite der freien Völker.*'⁴⁹

However, the division of the country and its position between the two superpowers remained a major security issue after 1955. West Germany's security was perceived as constantly under threat by the hostile, expansionist Soviet Union. According to Bonn, *Westbindung* remained essential under these circumstances. The 'sovereignty' which was obtained in 1955 was limited, since Bonn was not allowed to acquire chemical or nuclear weapons.⁵⁰ The FRG thus remained totally dependent on the U.S, with its nuclear capability as the guardian of West-Germany's security. During the late 1950s awareness grew of the potential dangers connected to this dependence on the U.S. The Soviet technological developments in the field of missiles, demonstrated by the successful launch of the first Sputnik in October 1957, brought Europe within striking distance of Soviet missiles. Doubts therefore arose on the U.S. capability to ensure safety in the long run.⁵¹ Besides these doubts on U.S. capability, Adenauer doubted the American willingness to defend the FRG's interests. The Chancellor feared that America might strike a deal with the Soviet Union, at the expense of Germany. The result would be a unified and neutralized Germany in which the Soviet Union could exert considerable influence. The Chancellor opposed *détente* between the superpowers since the U.S. would in such a situation become less eager to prioritize the FRG's interests over a process of de-escalation. The U.S. noninterference in Hungary and during the Suez crisis seemed to be a sign that Washington was withdrawing from the European continent and had to some extent accepted the status quo.⁵²

Whether these suspicions were actually justified or not, it is clear that the possibility of becoming a puppet of political actors which the FRG could not influence, had a decisive effect on the policy pursued by the Chancellor. From 1958 onwards, when the Berlin crisis cast even greater doubts on the extent of Washington's willingness to defend West German interests, Bonn's policy shifted even more to a stronger integrated Europe. The formation of the ECSC in 1951 and the Common Market (EEC) in 1958 had established

⁴⁸ Irving, *Adenauer: profiles in power*, 90.

⁴⁹ Schwarz, *Adenauer der Staatsmann*, 176.

⁵⁰ K. Schwabe, 'Adenauer and nuclear deterrence', in W. Loth (ed), *Europe, cold war and coexistence 1953-1965* (London 2004), 38.

⁵¹ J. Bariéty, 'Die Rolle der persönlichen Beziehungen zwischen Bundeskanzler Adenauer und General de Gaulle für die deutsch-französische Politik zwischen 1958 und 1963' in H.P. Schwarz (ed), *Adenauer und Frankreich: die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen 1958 bis 1969* (Bonn 1985), 14.

⁵² Loth, 'Adenauer's final Western choice, 1955-1958', 25-28.

economic cooperation between the six Western European countries. The FRG had been a great promoter of this cooperation via supranational institutions since it provided a way out of its predicament as a defeated nation and secured a somewhat equal international position for West Germany. European integration became even more important for Bonn in the light of increased doubt over the American commitment to Europe. According to the Chancellor, European economic integration would have to be extended to political cooperation. In October 1962 Adenauer wrote: *'The economic integration of Europe, in spite of its great value is not by itself sufficient. It is necessary for Europe to create a strongly coordinated policy with regard to vital problems, and especially in foreign policy.'*⁵³ A unified Europe would restore Europe's position in the world so Europe would not be left as a pawn in the hands of the two superpowers. If confronted with a strong, united Europe the U.S. would be forced to acknowledge European concerns.⁵⁴

Even though Adenauer had, to some degree, lost trust in the U.S. policy he did not wish to weaken the ties between Germany and America. The Chancellor believed European unity could only be obtained by close cooperation within NATO. In an article, written in 1962 for an American magazine, Adenauer stated:

*'Europe could not and cannot achieve unification all by itself; it requires the support of the Atlantic Alliance, another great success of our common policy. Since NATO came into existence Communism has not been able to make further progress in Europe. The defensive power of the free world organized under NATO safeguards peace and preserves the traditions of our peoples.'*⁵⁵

Adenauer always realized that U.S. support of Europe was essential due to the nuclear threat of the Soviet Union. The Soviet threat was too great for Western European nations to face by themselves, let alone the Federal Republic with its restricted military capability. However, the former statement also shows that Adenauer saw the American partnership as a means to an end. Adenauer's ultimate goal was European unity. As he states in 1959, during one of his *Teegespräche*: *'...es [ist] ein absolute Notwendigkeit, dass die europäischen Völker zusammenkommen und zusammenarbeiten.'*⁵⁶ For Adenauer this was a long term endeavor where economic integration was subordinate to political integration. As he says in October 1959: *'Der Zusammenschluss zum Gemeinsamen Markt hat nicht in erster Linie einen wirtschaftlichen Zweck, darüber sind wir uns ziemlich klar.'*⁵⁷

⁵³ K. Adenauer, 'The German Problem, A World Problem', *Foreign Affairs an American Quarterly review* 41 (1962), 59.

⁵⁴ Haftendorn, 'Introduction: relations in a strategic triangle', 12.

⁵⁵ Adenauer, 'The German Problem, A World Problem', 59.

⁵⁶ Adenauer, *Teegespräche 1959-1961*, 91.

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*, 145.

The development of German-French relations

*'Man darf niemals 'zu spät' sagen. Auch in der Politik ist es niemals zu spät. Es ist immer Zeit für einen neuen Anfang.'*⁵⁸

During the 1950s Adenauer tried to pursue a dual policy of friendship with the U.S and with France. After witnessing the two world wars, Adenauer had become increasingly convinced that European security could only be obtained through Franco-German reconciliation. Developing closer ties with France was a difficult undertaking given the anti-German sentiments in France. Adenauer however remained persistent in his policy. In shaping the Franco-German relations, the personal relationship between Adenauer and de Gaulle had a great influence. Piere Maillard, de Gaulle's diplomatic counselor, referred to the relationship between these 'two old Europeans' as the decisive factor in leading Adenauer to support de Gaulle in his policy towards Great-Britain.⁵⁹ Between 1958 and 1963, the two statesmen met as many as fifteen times and corresponded in over forty letters.⁶⁰

The personal chemistry between the Chancellor and the General

When Charles de Gaulle came to power in 1958, Adenauer initially was relieved. He expected that the return of 'the General' as the president of the fourth republic would restore some order to France, which had been at the brink of civil war. However, many West-German politicians, including the Chancellor, doubted if the coming to power of de Gaulle would be a positive event in relation to Germany in the long run. Just as Adenauer dominated the Federal Republics policy making, de Gaulle was prominent in determining the French foreign policy.⁶¹ His past record seemed to suggest an anti-German and anti-European integration policy and Adenauer believed the president's sole aim was French hegemony in Europe. He feared that France under de Gaulle's leadership would take a negative attitude towards the Federal Republic and that further European integration and reconciliation would be stalled due to the new focus on French grandeur and nationalism.⁶²

Adenauer's perception however seems to have changed radically after meeting de Gaulle for the first time in September 1958. This first meeting took place on invitation of de Gaulle, at his home in Colombey-les-Deux-Églises. It was regarded as a diplomatic gesture of good will that the French president invited Adenauer at his private home,

⁵⁸ Ortsverband Buschdorf Buschtrommel (Die Bonner CDU) 2006 <http://www.cdu-bonn.de/Presse/Anlagen/20060828025712051002D1.pdf> (last accessed 19-06-2011)

⁵⁹ Bange, *The EEC crisis of 1963*, 28.

⁶⁰ Bariéty, 'Die Rolle der persönlichen Beziehungen', 13-14.

⁶¹ Giaouque, *Grand designs & visions of unity*, 79.

⁶² K. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1955-1959* (Stuttgart 1967), 409-410. Schwarz, *Adenauer der Staatsmann*, 441.

where until then, no other political leader had been welcomed.⁶³ According to Adenauer, de Gaulle started the meeting by asking him how he viewed the situation in the world. The Chancellor took this opportunity to share his vision, in which European integration and especially French-German reconciliation were an '*unbedingte Notwendigkeit*'.⁶⁴ According to Adenauer, de Gaulle listened with great interest and expressed a similar world view. De Gaulle wanted Europe to stand on its own, independent from the U.S, and he believed that European military, economic and political cooperation would achieve this. De Gaulle shared Adenauer's view that cooperation between Germany and France was absolutely necessary in this matter. Both Adenauer and de Gaulle were dissatisfied with the dominant role of the U.S. in the Atlantic Alliance and especially Washington's dominant position concerning nuclear weapons. However Adenauer and de Gaulle did have crucially different visions of how to approach this 'problem'. De Gaulle promoted a distancing from the U.S. and a minimizing of further Atlantic cooperation. He believed that America would never give up its dominant position and therefore Europe should become an independent 'third force', not subordinate to the United States. Furthermore, the partnership with Germany was never meant to be an equal one, but this de Gaulle of course did not express to Adenauer.⁶⁵ In contrast, Adenauer believed that *further* Atlantic integration would provide a more balanced situation in which 'Europe' would have a say.⁶⁶ He did not wish to turn his back on the Atlantic partnership. At Colombey the two men avoided this topic of conflict. They did not go into detail on how 'their' united Europe should take form and only discussed their broad political goals and common interests. Both men believed that Franco-German cooperation was vital for European peace and this laid the basis for a firm commitment with respect to each other.⁶⁷

After returning to Bonn, Adenauer announced at a press conference that he had found de Gaulle to be a completely different person than what he had expected. In his memoirs he notes that de Gaulle was '*sehr Frisch*' and '*kein Nationalist*'.⁶⁸ According to the Chancellor, the French president had great insight in world affairs and was very much aware of the need for Franco-German partnership. However, only a few days after Colombey, this trust seemed totally out of place: de Gaulle proposed a tripartite directorate in NATO with the U.S. and Great-Britain. With this memorandum de Gaulle wanted to break what he perceived as Anglo-Saxon control of the Atlantic Alliance but with this move he in fact would have excluded the Federal Republic from any say in

⁶³ Haftendorn, 'The NATO crisis of 1966-1967', 85.

⁶⁴ Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1955-1959*, 426.

⁶⁵ Giauque, *Grand designs & visions of unity*, 78-79.

⁶⁶ R.H. Lieshout, *Een Duitsland dat zijn plaats weet: Konrad Adenauer, het Franse plan voor een Unie van Staten en de opdracht aan de hedendaagse Duitse Europapolitik* (Nijmegen 2001), 15-17.

⁶⁷ Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1955-1959*, 426.

⁶⁸ Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1955-1959*, 424-425.

NATO. Adenauer was furious! Most of all however he was very disappointed in de Gaulle. The Chancellor thought de Gaulle had been open and honest during their confidential meeting in Colombey, but this memorandum caused serious mistrust of de Gaulle's real intentions.⁶⁹

Nevertheless, it is clear from Adenauer's memoirs that the Chancellor quickly regained his faith in de Gaulle. This is very remarkable, especially when considering that de Gaulle had actually stabbed him in the back with this proposal. Why then was Adenauer willing to overlook this? This confidence in the French president might be explained by the fact that the two men had much in common on a personal level. Both were high in age and had witnessed massive changes in the world. They experienced the two world wars and saw how Europe from being the world's leading power now was just a puppet in a world stage dominated by the two new world powers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Both men sought to revive Europe, to regain some of its past glory.⁷⁰ Both men were devout Catholics and shared common values. On multiple occasions during this first meeting Adenauer emphasized that a politically and militarily strong united Europe would have to be the guardian of true Christian values.⁷¹ Furthermore, de Gaulle's firm opposition to make any concession to the Soviet Union during the Berlin crisis, reassured Adenauer that the French were committed to the Franco-German cooperation.⁷²

Adenauer and de Gaulle's 'special relationship' developed further during several meetings between 1958-1963. This was by no means a smooth development since the political goals of the two leaders differed. Both men however were very willing to focus on areas of agreement and to overlook discord.⁷³ The personal Adenauer-de Gaulle relationship was crucial in this respect. As J. Giauque states: *'When Adenauer met with Couve de Murville and Debré, they disagreed on almost everything, but when he met de Gaulle, the two men found areas of agreement.'*⁷⁴ Usually Adenauer and de Gaulle met, out of the public eye. The encounters between the two emphasized the personal nature of the relations between the German Chancellor and the French president and a firm and consistent mutual confidence was built during these private conversations.⁷⁵ De Gaulle referred to Adenauer as his *'illustre ami'* in his memoirs and expresses with firmness that *'nos relations se poursuivront suivant le même rythme et avec la même cordialité.'*⁷⁶

⁶⁹ Schwarz, *Adenauer der Staatsmann*, 456-460.

⁷⁰ Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1955-1959*, 413.

Adenauer, *Teegespräche 1961-1963*, 329.

⁷¹ Bariéty, 'Die Rolle der persönlichen Beziehungen', 13.

⁷² Schwarz, *Adenauer der Staatsmann*, 460-63.

⁷³ Haftendorn, 'The NATO crisis of 1966-1967', 97.

⁷⁴ Giauque, *Grand designs & visions of unity*, 90-91.

⁷⁵ *Ibidem*, 85.

⁷⁶ C. de Gaulle, *Mémoires d'espoir. Tome I: Le renouveau 1958-1962* (Paris 1970), 191-192.

During 1960 however the relations cooled due to the French president's attitude toward the NATO alliance. Hans Peter Schwartz concludes that Adenauer, at this point in time had great doubts of de Gaulle.⁷⁷ In a speech given at a military school in Paris, late 1959, de Gaulle had stated in relation to the NATO alliance, that the military integration was over.⁷⁸ Adenauer spoke about this matter with the former French minister of economic affairs, Pinay in July 1960. They both agreed, that de Gaulle's statement were bold and not appropriate since the peoples of Europe were dependent on the American military capability. Adenauer and the *Auswärtigen Amt* did not want to threaten the NATO alliance and American commitment to the continent. The next disturbance in the Franco-German friendship during 1960 was the French position toward the Federal Republic in nuclear matters. The French had during the spring of 1960 for the first time, successfully detonated a nuclear bomb. After this the French prime minister Debré, according to Adenauer stated: '*Staaten ohne Atombomben seien Satellitenstaaten*'.⁷⁹ Adenauer was deeply offended by this. A further disturbance to Adenauer was the military parade, held at the Champs-Élysées on the 14th of July. The Federal Republic was not invited to this event, while General de Gaulle had invited British, American and Soviet representatives. Yet again Adenauer felt betrayed since it seemed to confirm that the Federal Republic was just a mere satellite state to the French.⁸⁰

This unease with the French was of short duration. The Gaullist rhetoric was downplayed and the Franco-German relations were reconfirmed at a summit on the 29th of July, 1960. For a moment, Adenauer had doubted if he should even attend this summit but Blankenhorn, Adenauer's confidant, convinced him that a personal encounter would defuse the situation.⁸¹ Adenauer and de Gaulle met at Rambouillet and discussed their visions on Europe and the NATO alliance. Here de Gaulle again criticized the dependence of France and of Europe on the U.S. According to Adenauer, de Gaulle stated that he viewed the NATO as '*eine Filiale Amerikas auf dem Kontinent*'.⁸² Adenauer confirmed de Gaulle's doubts in relation to the U.S. policy but also told de Gaulle that he believed that the French should be more cautious in how they position themselves, that they must avoid giving the impression that Europe wished to isolate itself from the U.S. In sum, de Gaulle was able to convince the Chancellor that his actions, which had disturbed Adenauer prior to the meeting, were by no means meant to exclude the Federal Republic

⁷⁷ Schwarz, *Adenauer der Staatsmann: 1952-1967*, 562-563.

⁷⁸ K. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1959-1963 Fragmente* (Hamburg 1970), 50-59.

⁷⁹ *Ibidem*, 59.

⁸⁰ Schwarz, *Adenauer der Staatsmann: 1952-1967*, 564.

⁸¹ *Ibidem*

⁸² Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1959-1963*, 60-61.

and that certainly there was no question of a tripartite arrangement between Great-Britain, the U.S. and France.⁸³

That same year Adenauer agreed to have de Gaulle act as a representative for Western Europe at the East-West summit in Paris. At this summit with Macmillan, Eisenhower and Khrushchev, de Gaulle advocated the Federal Republic's interests, and with this confirmed to Adenauer the durability of Franco-German relationship.⁸⁴ However, Adenauer did remain cautious of such meetings between the U.S., France and Great-Britain, since he could not influence the course of affairs directly and he still feared a possible 'tripartite' agreement between the three states.⁸⁵

During 1961 and 1962 the meetings between de Gaulle and Adenauer were mostly geared to the French *Fouchet* proposal. The basic idea of the plan was to establish a *Europe des patries*, an intergovernmental alternative to the European Community. De Gaulle, who feared a loss of national influence in the EEC, wished to ban any supranational arrangements. NATO would also have to be reformed. The U.S. dominance in the alliance was to the General unacceptable, and power would have to be returned to the member states. The French vision of a Europe of Nations did not align with Adenauer's vision. The Chancellor leaned towards a supranational, federal 'United states of Europe', and he did not wish to turn back what had been accomplished with the Treaty of Rome. But from the conversations between the Chancellor and de Gaulle it is clear that, yet again Adenauer had been willing to give up his supranational ideas of Europe, to ensure the Franco-German partnership.⁸⁶ The strengthening of the link Bonn-Paris was more important to the pragmatist Adenauer, than the particular form the European community would have. Due to the success of the European Communities and the lack of enthusiasm of other states for this idea, the Fouchet Plan never became a serious alternative. The Fouchet proposal was eventually rejected by the Dutch and Belgians, who feared the dominance of France and Germany in the European Community.

It is clear from the negotiation between the two leaders that Adenauer, to a large extent, was willing to accept de Gaulle's differing vision for Europe even when it went against his own policy objectives. Adenauer was willing to accept the Fouchet plans, accepted the CAP and stayed committed to the Franco-German reconciliation, even after de Gaulle broke his trust. This must be seen in the light of how Adenauer perceived certain dangers. The Federal Republic was still restricted by its past, as part of a divided state

⁸³ Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1959-1963*, 50-62.

⁸⁴ Giauque, *Grand designs & visions of unity*, 89-92.

Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1959-1963*, 42-47.

⁸⁵ Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1959-1963*, 54-59.

⁸⁶ Haftendorn, 'The NATO crisis of 1966-1967', 95.

Giauque, *Grand designs & visions of unity*, 134-136.

and prohibited from access to nuclear weapons.⁸⁷ Even though Adenauer and de Gaulle developed a 'friendship' the Chancellor remained fearful that France would turn its back on Europe and seek rapprochement to the Soviet Union.⁸⁸ France had done this before (in 1944, with the Franco-Soviet pact) and more importantly the communist party was the largest party in France. Adenauer was convinced that a Franco-German partnership was crucial for German security, since the FRG could otherwise, once again, end up between two enemy 'fronts'.⁸⁹ However, above all, Adenauer accepted de Gaulle's policy because he believed, and had believed this for over 50 years, that Franco-German reconciliation was crucial for European peace. Adenauer was prepared to make extensive political and economic concessions to French interests in order to advance his fundamental goal, namely European unity.⁹⁰ This, by no means meant that disagreements were resolved. The Chancellor chose to focus on their broad common interests and to smooth over disagreements.

Until 1963 Adenauer tried to balance his support of de Gaulle since he did not want to go directly against the U.S. This is very clear during the Fouchet negotiation, where Adenauer was relieved that he did not have to 'choose' between his two allies. The British application for membership forced Adenauer to openly acknowledge in which direction he was leading the Federal Republic.

Gaullists versus Atlantics: The internal bureaucratic struggle

From 1949 onwards Adenauer's foreign policy, especially his policy relating to Europe, had been deeply contested in West Germany. Until 1961 the differences had mainly been between the different parties of the Bundestag. The SPD had contested Adenauer's *Westbindung* since this policy delayed unification. The primary objective of the SPD was German unification, even if this meant a neutralization of Germany. The SPD had, after the construction of the Berlin wall, to a large extent accepted the status quo but tensions continued to divide the West German government.⁹¹ Adenauer's once united party became divided as Adenauer's foreign policy became increasingly French-orientated. The Chancellor's, seemingly unconditional support of de Gaulle was not backed by many of his own Cabinet members and the German Christian democrats split into 'Gaullists' and 'Atlanticists' camps.

⁸⁷ Haftendorn, 'Introduction: relations in a strategic triangle', 13.

⁸⁸ Dinan, 'Building Europe', 37.

⁸⁹ Adenauer, *Teegespräche 1961-1963*, 225.

Irving, *Adenauer: profiles in power*, 130.

⁹⁰ Giaucque, *Grand designs & visions of unity*, 13, 87.

⁹¹ A. Deighton, 'British – West German relations, 1945-1972' in K. Larres and E. Meehan (ed), *Uneasy Allies: British-German relations and European Integration since 1945* (Oxford 2000), 28-29.

Both the Gaullists and the Atlanticists were committed to the NATO alliance as well as to Franco-German reconciliation. The differences between the two were therefore more in what they prioritized. The 'Atlanticists' were very much committed to a supranational, 'Big Europe' which would be orientated toward free trade and would include Great-Britain. The Franco-German reconciliation was viewed as subordinate to strong ties with Washington. The German Gaullists favored a European Community in which France and Germany would be predominant and were more inclined to criticize the influence of the U.S. in the Western Alliance.⁹²

The British application to join the EEC was one of the main topics that brought this quarrel between Atlanticists and Gaullists within the CDU to a head. The 'Atlanticists' believed Adenauer prioritized his political objection over economic ones.⁹³ The most outspoken Atlanticist was Erhard, the minister of economics who had had an important role in transforming the West German economy after the war. Already early on in 1958 Erhard and Adenauer had disagreed on the Rome treaty and on the direction Bonn should take both in economic issues and political ones. Erhard believed that the EEC and its institutions were protectionist in nature and that room should be made for a free trade arrangement. He never shared Adenauer's enthusiasm for close Franco-German cooperation since this lacked the broader concept of Atlantic partnership and restricted the FRG economically by cutting off vital German markets. He strongly supported the British proposals for a European Free Trade Area in 1956 and later on stressed that British accession to the EEC would bring the Federal Republic clear economic gains. Erhard criticized Adenauer's willingness to make concessions to the French and stated that: *'The French are always making new demands. When you concede them half of what they demand, they act like they are making a great sacrifice.'*⁹⁴

The *Bundestag* and the public opinion was also divided. Many West-Germans favored an alliance with Great-Britain and an economic free trade arrangement. The Gaullist-Atlanticist split was, besides a debate on which direction Bonn should follow, also a struggle for power. The German ministers were well aware of the fact that the elderly Chancellor would not hold the reins forever. So, motivated by their own aspirations, ministers such as Schröder and Erhard sometimes constrained their criticism, in order to assure their own political career, while at other times they spoke out clearly to earn the support of other cabinet members.⁹⁵

Due to this internal Franco-American struggle and lack of consensus within the German foreign policy decision-making system, Bonn was not able to develop a coherent policy.

⁹² Irving, *Adenauer: profiles in power*, 133.

⁹³ *Ibidem*, 126.

⁹⁴ Giaouque, *Grand designs & visions of unity*, 13.

⁹⁵ Bange, *The EEC crisis of 1963*, 53-59.

This is particularly evident during the Brussels Negotiations, where Atlanticists such as Erhard and Schröder remained positive to British accession to the common market, while Adenauer pursued a different policy. Erhard and his economic motives were not able to divert Adenauer from his focus on France and the Common Market. In the end it is evident that Adenauer retained the last word in German policy, even against the wishes of his own ministers. ⁹⁶

⁹⁶ Dinan, 'Building Europe', 49.

The British application for admission to the Common Market

*'Wir leben alle unter dem gleichen Himmel, aber wir haben nicht alle den gleichen Horizont.'*⁹⁷

From the end of the 1940s, Britain's foreign policy was strongly connected to the U.S. and cooperation with Western Europe was not a priority. Great-Britain wanted '*..to lead the integration movement away from exclusively European ideas towards an Atlantic community*', as was stated in a Foreign Office memorandum for the Permanent Secretary's Committee on the 9th of June 1951.⁹⁸

British-German relations

The question of how to deal with Great-Britain was already mentioned at the first meeting between Adenauer and de Gaulle in 1958. At this point in time Great-Britain was not willing to join the Common Market but was committed to the establishment of a Free Trade Area. The Commonwealth no longer provided Great-Britain with the economic means to function independently from the European continent. The British therefore sought to draw strength from the developing integration of Western European economies by proposing in 1957 a Free Trade Area which would prevent Great-Britain from becoming isolated. De Gaulle had been very outspoken about this matter in Colombey where he told Adenauer that he believed France and Germany should have a common policy towards Great-Britain, rejecting its free trade proposal since it threatened the Common Market.⁹⁹ De Gaulle's negative position toward the FTA proposal is somewhat remarkable, considering that the FTA with its intergovernmental character conformed more closely to his views on Europe than did the EEC. In Colombey, Adenauer refrained from answering de Gaulle, but did mention that he believed that *'Macmillan ehrlich sei und dass er durch dieses Mittel versuche, sich Europa zu nähern.'*¹⁰⁰ In the following year de Gaulle rejected the FTA and Adenauer supported him, since cooperation with France advanced European unity.

In contrast to the Franco-German relations, the Anglo-German relations were not strengthened by the Berlin crisis of 1958-1961. According to the Chancellor both London and Washington were far too willing to make concessions to the Soviet Union, when put under pressure. Moreover, Great-Britain had resisted integration and close ties to the continent, and in a political sense therefore did not offer Bonn (and especially) Adenauer

⁹⁷ Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1955-1959*, 428.

⁹⁸ J. Ellison, 'Separated by the Atlantic: The British and de Gaulle, 1958-1967' *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 17, 417, 4 (2006), 856.

⁹⁹ Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1955-1959*, 425-435.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibidem*, 433.

any solid benefits.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, in contrast to Adenauer and de Gaulle, Adenauer and Macmillan did not get along on a personal level. Macmillan referred to Adenauer as '*falls and cantankerous old man...half-crazy*' and Adenauer expressed that Macmillan was weak.¹⁰² Here again it becomes clear how important personal contact between statesmen can be in policy making.

Only one and half years after the breakdown of the Free Trade Area negotiations, Great-Britain founded the *European Free Trade Association* (EFTA), an intergovernmental association which aimed to provide a framework for the liberalization of trade amongst its member states. At the same time the EFTA was established to compete with the European Economic Community. As has been noted in the previous chapter, the economic issues were a major point of discussion within the German Government, especially between Erhard and Adenauer. Erhard stressed that the EFTA was economically very attractive for the Federal Republic, with its export driven economy. He proposed a '6 + 7 = 1' Europe, in which the EFTA and the EEC would merge, creating a wider free trade area.¹⁰³ But Adenauer, as he had done previously went against his minister's advice and instead went along with de Gaulle's proposal to counter the EFTA by accelerating the EEC integration. The tariffs between the EEC member states were reduced and the common external tariff was introduced more quickly than originally anticipated. This early implementation of the Common Market represented a political break with Great-Britain and the other countries outside the EEC since they would now be forced to accept the EEC as a *fait accompli*. Furthermore, with this de Gaulle had proven his loyalty to the EEC and his commitment to European integration.¹⁰⁴

Due to domestic problems and increasing awareness of its political and economic isolation from the continent, this British policy was revised. After obtaining the backing of his government, the British prime minister, Harold Macmillan, prepared for application to the Common Market and from early 1960 onwards the British policy was geared to integrate Great-Britain into 'the six'. On the 9th of August 1961 Macmillan, sent a letter of application to Ludwig Erhard, at that time President of the Council of Ministers of the EEC. The Council responded positively to Macmillan's declaration and unanimously approved to start negotiations. It was considered a turning point in post-war European politics. The Council was resolved '*to contribute to the realization of this new step in the economic and political unification of Europe, and thereby to tighten the bonds which link*

¹⁰¹ Haftendorn, 'The NATO crisis of 1966-1967', 88-96.

¹⁰² Deighton, 'British – West German relations, 1945-1972', 40.

¹⁰³ Dinan, 'Building Europe', 45.

¹⁰⁴ Bange, *The EEC crisis of 1963*, 20 .
Giauque, *Grand designs & visions of unity*, 64.

the free world on both sides of the Atlantic."¹⁰⁵ This application for full accession to the Common Market occurred under (covered) pressure of Washington. After the FTA failure, American leaders had increasingly voiced their support for the Common Market. Washington feared that the EFTA might threaten U.S. economic interests and compromise the Atlantic partnership. The U.S. was convinced that the EEC provided a framework which would fuel economic growth and that the only long term-solution for the continental EFTA-EEC split, would be British accession to the Common Market.¹⁰⁶ In the light of the already long existing doubts of American influence on the continent, particularly by de Gaulle but also shared by Adenauer, the British accession to the EEC was also viewed with some suspicion. Was this another attempt of Washington to retain its influence on the continent?

The political parties and (economic) pressure groups in the Federal Republic responded with great enthusiasm to Britain's application. Increased trade would benefit the FRG economically as the Atlanticists in Adenauer's CDU had stressed during previous negotiations about the British FTA proposal and EFTA. It was presumed that Adenauer stood positively toward British entry to the Common Market, since rational-cost benefit arguments would lead that way. However, Adenauer's own vision at this point in time, as evident in Adenauer's *Teegespräche*, was not clearly articulated on the entry of Great-Britain. During a conversation in June 1959, with a British journalist, Adenauer announced that he believed it to be of the utmost necessity that Great-Britain joined the Common Market: '*Großbritannien, seine Wirtschaft, seine Freiheit und seine Existenz ist nach meiner Meinung untrennbar verbunden mit der europäischen Freiheit und dem Weiterbestehen der europäischen freien Wirtschaft.*' He proceeded to say: '*..eine Europa ohne Großbritannien kann ich mir nicht vorstellen.*'¹⁰⁷ During this conversation Adenauer makes known that the Common Market by no means should be viewed as a force against Great-Britain and that one must understand that he, Adenauer, has to consider France in his actions.¹⁰⁸

However, during a following meeting with Felix von Eckardt and several journalist in October 1959 it becomes clear that the Chancellor does have great doubts concerning Great-Britain entering at that time. As he states: '*Ich habe immer bedauert, dass Großbritannien sich doch irgendwie von dem europäischen Kontinent distanziert.*'¹⁰⁹ Adenauer was particularly disturbed by, what he thought to be, anti-German sentiments

¹⁰⁵ Communiqué from the Commission of the European Economic Community (1 August 1961) http://www.ena.lu/communique_commission_european_economic_community_august_1961-020002944.html (last accessed 19-06-2011)

¹⁰⁶ Bange, *The EEC crisis of 1963*, 12.

Giauque, *Grand designs & visions of unity*, 70, 106-108.

¹⁰⁷ Adenauer, *Teegespräche 1959-1961*, 90-91.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibidem*

¹⁰⁹ Adenauer, *Teegespräche 1959-1961*, 139.

among the British population. The British press continued to express allegations of Nazism against the Federal Republic.¹¹⁰ In May 1961 de Gaulle and Adenauer discussed the matter of British entry to the EEC. Here de Gaulle directly asked the Chancellor what his opinion was on the matter. Adenauer replied and said he wished Macmillan knew what he wanted. Von Brentano proceeded and elaborated on how he viewed the situation at this point in time. He was of the opinion that London had recognized the economic need for cooperation with the continent but he did not believe Great-Britain had any willingness for genuine political cooperation. '*Eine Bereitschaft zu der von de Gaulle eben dargelegten politischen Zusammenarbeit gebe es in London nicht. Vielleicht wolle England sogar bewußt oder unbewußt diese Zusammenarbeit stören, indem es dabei sei.*'¹¹¹ Thus, already early on, even prior to the Brussels negotiations, Adenauer and his advisers voiced their concerns.

The Brussels enlargement negotiations 1961-1963

The negotiations on the United Kingdom's accession to the European Community started on the ninth of October 1961.¹¹² Erhard was still chairing the European Council at this time, which seemed to be advantageous for the British, considering his outspoken positive position toward the British application. The German representative in Brussels, the State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry Rudolf Lahr, also was a strong proponent of British entry in Bonn. The six representatives of the EEC member states and Great-Britain came together in seventeen conferences where they discussed the accession.¹¹³

During the Brussels negotiations it became clear that the British were not willing to accept the treaty of Rome in full. The British wanted to secure satisfactory conditions for the British agriculture, industry and the Commonwealth trade.¹¹⁴ The full common external tariff, which the six had agreed upon, was not acceptable for Great-Britain since this would compromise the trade with the Commonwealth countries. The British representatives in Brussels pushed for nil tariffs in raw materials and did not want to accept the Common Agricultural policy.¹¹⁵ Ultimately, Great-Britain wished to reform the EEC to something much like the FTA: a non-supranational economic association of all

¹¹⁰ *Ibidem*, 140.

¹¹¹ Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1959-1963*, 109.

¹¹² Irving, *Adenauer: profiles in power*, 140.

¹¹³ Council of the European Union, 'Introduction to the Fonds of the Central Archives relating to the First Enlargement of the European Economic Community, 1961-73' http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/archives-Report_Enlargement.pdf (last accessed 21-06-2011)

¹¹⁴ Bange, *The EEC crisis of 1963*, 55.

¹¹⁵ The National Archives, *Common Market Negotiations: Commonwealth Implications* <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/ExternalRequest.asp?RequestReference=CAB+129%2F110> (last accessed 19-06-2011)

Western European nations, under the umbrella of a wider Atlantic security system.¹¹⁶ Even though differences became evident very early on in the negotiations, especially with the French, the British believed the negotiations were going quite well. As the British Lord Privy Seal Edward Heath, notes in August 1962 in a memorandum on the Brussels negotiation:

*'Germany, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands have all made it clear that they are keen for us to join. The French have never been enthusiastic and they will drive a hard bargain, particularly where their own interests are affected, but in my judgment they will be reluctant to accept responsibility for a breakdown in view of the desire of the other countries that we should go in, and of the incalculable results that would follow, both for the Community itself and for the Western world as a whole.'*¹¹⁷

The Brussels ministerial talks represent the multilateral viewpoint, but do not show the positions of the European leaders, in particular those of Adenauer and de Gaulle. Adenauer refers to the Brussels talks during one of his *Tee Gespräche* in June 1962, and speaks with annoyance of his foreign minister Schröder, who, according to the Chancellor was far too positive during the negotiations on British entry. Adenauer stated: *'Es werden die noch bestehenden Schwierigkeiten - und die sind sehr groß - behandelt, als wenn sie gar nichts waren.'*¹¹⁸ The Chancellor proceeded and said: *'Ich wundere mich über England, und da sprach ich auch den deutschen Außenminister nicht frei von einer Schuldfrage, von dem übertriebenen Optimismus, der gezeigt wird.'*¹¹⁹ It is clear from these remarks that Adenauer had reservation in relation to the British accession to the EEC in that he did not agree with the positive stance of the German representatives in Brussels. Publicly, the German government remained supportive until the very last day in Brussels, but obviously the Chancellor's vision was more complex. Adenauer's memoirs and his recorded bilateral and trilateral talks with the different parties involved give insight into what the Chancellor actually thought of British accession.

As stated earlier, Adenauer's position in relation to British accession prior to 1961 was ambivalent. The Chancellor expressed to be positive, but also expressed reservations when speaking to his foreign policy advisers and de Gaulle. Once the negotiations had started this remained this way. In January 1962 Adenauer spoke to Macmillan in Bonn where he reassured the British prime minister, that the Federal Republic was absolutely in favor of Great-Britain joining the EEC.¹²⁰ During other meetings, with de Gaulle and

¹¹⁶ Giaouque, *Grand designs & visions of unity*, 67.

¹¹⁷ The National Archives, *Common Market Negotiations: Commonwealth Implications* <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/ExternalRequest.asp?RequestReference=CAB+129%2F110> (last accessed 19-06-2011)

¹¹⁸ Adenauer, *Teegespräche 1961-1963*, 224.

¹¹⁹ *Ibidem*, 229.

¹²⁰ Bange, *The EEC crisis of 1963*, 59.

with policy advisers, the Chancellor voiced his doubt about the British accession to the EEC. In January 1961 Adenauer spoke freely to his French counterpart, de Gaulle, and told him that he questioned if the British would, eventually, be willing to except the common external tariffs. Adenauer stated: *'Wenn man die europäische Organisation weiterführen wolle, müsse man einfach einen gemeinsamen Zollltarif haben, sonst sei es kein Gemeinsamer Markt. England könne sich aufgrund seiner Wirtschaftslage und wegen seiner Commonwealth- Verpflichtungen dem Gemeinsamen Markt nicht anschließen.'*¹²¹ During this meeting, de Gaulle and Adenauer agreed that *'Immerhin sei nicht ausgeschlossen, daß England eines Tages zu einem Zusammenschluß bereit sei. Diese Möglichkeit sei heute jedoch noch nicht gegeben.'*¹²²

In June 1962, during another *Teegespräche* Adenauer refers to a meeting between De Gaulle and Macmillan that took place in June 1962 and asks Charles Jackson, an American reporter for Times magazine who was present at this meeting, what was said during these negotiations. Jackson remarks that de Gaulle got very emotional during this meeting with Macmillan, when talking about the European integration process. According to the General, Adenauer and he, de Gaulle, had created something extraordinary (referring to the Franco-German alliance and the EEC). According to Jackson, Macmillan also showed some emotion and made statements which aligned with Adenauer's vision of Europe. Adenauer's response to this is interesting. He was glad to hear that Macmillan showed an emotional connection towards European integration but still he follows Felix von Eckardt who concluded concerning the British motives to join the EEC: *'Das ist eine Portemonnaie-Angelegenheit, aber keine Herzensangelegenheit.'*¹²³ With this Adenauer voiced his long held, one might say passionate, commitment to the creation of a united Europe, which for Adenauer was not just a matter of economic interest.¹²⁴

During this same meeting in June 1962 Adenauer also expressed his concern that British entry might compromise the progress which had already been made, with the Common Market. He questioned if the existing arrangements which existed between the six, both economically as political, could be maintained.¹²⁵ During a state visit to France in July 1962, Adenauer expressed these concerns to de Gaulle. The two statesman agreed that the character of the EEC would change completely if Great-Britain would join. Adenauer concluded to say: *'Ich wiederholte, man müsse die ganze Frage auch unter dem Gesichtspunkt betrachten, ob das Werk der EWG nicht schweren Schaden erleiden werde.'*¹²⁶ His doubts seem understandable when viewing the position Great-Britain took

¹²¹ Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1959-1963*, 88.

¹²² *Ibidem*

¹²³ Adenauer, *Teegespräche 1961-1963*, 226.

¹²⁴ Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1959-1963*, 87.

¹²⁵ Adenauer, *Tee Gespräche 1961-1963*, 228.

¹²⁶ Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1959-1963*, 162-165.

during the Brussels negotiations. The Common Wealth, the external tariffs and the CAP are just a few examples of the many obstacles which came to the surface during the Brussels talks.

De Gaulle also had his reservations with the British entry from a very early date onwards. The General wished to create a continental political association in which France had a leading roll and the British constituted a rival for leadership on the continent.

Furthermore, the British-American special relationship made de Gaulle believe that Great-Britain would act as a surrogate for American influence, which he intended to repel.¹²⁷ For de Gaulle, the American Multilateral Force (MLF) proposal of 1962 and the following Nassau negotiations were a major point of disturbance in this matter. After de Cuban missile crisis, Washington was increasingly in favor of a *flexible response* in relation to the use of nuclear weapons. In Europe this was perceived to be a threat to security because the Western European states could no longer, automatically, count on American protection through *massive retaliation* if confronted with a Soviet attack. Washington realized that its European allies wanted more of a guarantee for protection but did not want them to take the nuclear defense issue in their own hands. This could, according to Washington, cause problems in the Atlantic Alliance and, more importantly, the U.S. wished to keep complete control of nuclear weaponry. The U.S. wanted to restrict (and eventually eliminate) independent national nuclear forces and therefore proposed a European nuclear force, which would be coordinated by NATO. This would ensure American control in nuclear matters while calming the European fears, that America would not automatically protect against the Soviet Union. In return the U.S. offered to equip Great-Britain with its Polaris nuclear missiles. The U.S. and Great-Britain signed the Nassau agreement in December 1962, in which Great-Britain agreed, on certain terms, to place its nuclear weaponry under NATO control and under American supervision.¹²⁸

For de Gaulle, the MLF was the worst possible outcome in nuclear matters, since it proved to him that America and Great-Britain were working together to ensure Anglo-Saxon hegemony on nuclear issues, and in that sense in world affairs. Washington did offer to equip France with nuclear weaponry but this was contrary to de Gaulle's plan. De Gaulle wished to preserve French autonomy in nuclear issues. He wanted to develop his own independent nuclear force, so France (and Western Europe as a whole) would not be so dependent on the U.S. Alarmed by the matter de Gaulle decided to reject the MLF proposal and thwart any possible American influence on the continent. For the French

¹²⁷ Giaouque, *Grand designs & visions of unity*, 66-68, 74-79.

¹²⁸ *Ibidem*, 114-118.

The conditions were that Great-Britain could use the nuclear force for national security in cases of supreme emergency. The British thus always remained to some extent in control of their nuclear force.

president, the Nassau arrangement probably was the main topic which triggered his veto against British entry to the EEC.¹²⁹ His negative feelings toward the British were enhanced, due to the fact that Macmillan had not even mentioned the Polaris plan at the Rambouillet meeting.¹³⁰

For Adenauer the MLF proposal was actually quite positive, since this offer would at least give the Federal Republic some say in nuclear issues, a matter in which Bonn was totally restricted due to its recent past. However, the fact that Bonn had been left out in these negotiations bothered the Chancellor, considering this in fact meant that the Federal Republic was not recognized as an equal Western partner. Furthermore, Adenauer rejected the idea that Great-Britain, under certain circumstances, would be able to decide on the use of its weapons without the consent of the other members. De Gaulle pressured Adenauer that an independent French *Force de Frappe* would enhance European unity and would provide a more solid option than this MLF plan. Increasingly Adenauer leaned towards the French in this matter, against the strong voices in his own cabinet who preferred American leadership over French dominance in nuclear matters.¹³¹

The basic situation late 1962 and early 1963 thus was one of tensions, particularly between Washington and Paris, but due to this also between Paris, London and Bonn. Against this backdrop the negotiations of the Council of ministers of the EEC continued.

¹²⁹ Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1959-1963*, 198-200.

¹³⁰ M. Lindemann and I.D. Pautsch (ed), *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1963: 1 Januar bis 31 Mai 1963* (München 1994), 116.

¹³¹ Pautsch (ed), *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1963*, 118.

The French Veto and the Elysée friendship treaty

*'Nothing hits an Englishman harder than not being admitted to a Club, and especially to one he really believes himself to be too good for.'*¹³²

On the 14th of January 1963, General Charles de Gaulle, after months of negotiations ended Britain's attempts to enter the European Community, by pronouncing his *'non'* at a press conference in Paris. The negotiations on Britain's admission dragged on for two more weeks, but in fact the 14th of January marked the end of the road. It took another decade before Great-Britain became a member of the EEC, on 1 January 1973. During the seventeenth ministerial meeting on 29 January 1963, the Brussels talks culminated with France submitting a proposal to end the enlargement talks with Britain. At this last conference, the governments of Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Luxembourg protested at France's unilateral use of the veto. But Adenauer said nothing.¹³³

Brussels Breakdown

Giauque states that the German leaders understood that they *'had no choice but to align with France against Britain, when forced to choose.'* However, the question must be asked, whether de Gaulle would still have obstructed British membership if this was against Adenauer's wishes. Questions of this kind are difficult to answer and open a field of speculation, but it is obvious that de Gaulle's major political goals in Europe could not be realized without the cooperation of the Federal Republic. Adenauer's accord in the matter was absolutely necessary, since it obstructed any chances for the other EEC members to form a block, with Great-Britain, against France. Thus, before excluding the United Kingdom de Gaulle had to make sure that he had a partner: he would have been totally isolated in Europe if he did not have the (quiet) backing of the German Chancellor. Bonn was aware of the French need for a European partner and at that point in time, the Federal Republic was the foremost candidate, well recognized by de Gaulle during the many meetings with Adenauer. Bonn thus realized that they had some degree of bargaining power to influence de Gaulle's attitude towards British entry into the Community. This by no means implies that any German attempt to discourage the General would have been successful. Yet the fact that the German *Bundeskanzler* made little effort to place pressure on de Gaulle seems significant.¹³⁴ As Irwin states, referring

¹³² Bange, *The EEC crisis of 1963*, xv.

¹³³ Council of the European Union, 'Introduction to the Fonds of the Central Archives relating to the First Enlargement of the European Economic Community, 1961-73'
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/archives-Report_Enlargement.pdf (last accessed 21-06-2011)

¹³⁴ Zimmermann, 'Adenauer Chooses de Gaulle', 91-93.

to the British application to the EEC: *'De Gaulle opposed it, while Adenauer did nothing to promote it.'*¹³⁵

Giauques statement displays the assumption that Adenauer *had* to go along with de Gaulle. But does this analysis, and do Adenauer's statements on the issue not display that the Chancellor actually agreed with de Gaulle? Adenauer had a very clear vision of Europe, of the Franco-German alliance and also, of the British accession. His views were not without a degree of idealism.¹³⁶ Adenauer was a statesmen with a long term vision for Europe. He envisioned a united Europe, which for him meant a union of peoples not just an agreement between statesmen, who only play a role for a short time. If European (political) integration was to be successful, the peoples of Europe would have to stand behind it.¹³⁷ As he states during a *Teegespräche* in June 1962, several months before the French Veto:

*'Nach meiner Meinung können die führenden Leute von Staaten wohl den ersten Schritt tun zur Annäherung zweier Länder, aber entscheidend ist, ob die Volker mitgehen, weil die leitenden Männer heute oder morgen verschwinden - das ist der Lauf der Welt-, und die Volker bleiben. Deswegen, so glaube ich, muß man sich fragen, ob das englische Volk sich aus seiner jahrhundertealten Tradition her doch mehr oder weniger als ein besonderer Erdteil oder als eine Insel vor Europa fühlt.'*¹³⁸

Adenauer proceeded and said:

*'Sehen sie, Frankreich und Deutschland liegen auf einem Kontinent, haben eine Grenze. Unsere Kulturen sind sehr verwandt. Wir stammen eigentlich ja aus einer Wurzel. Unsere Kultur beruht letzten Endes auf der römischen Kultur, auf der lateinischen Kultur, während Großbritannien, nachdem es in dem Großen Hundertjährigen Krieg mit Frankreich von Frankreich aus dem Kontinent vertrieben worden ist, sein ganze Aufgemerkt der See gewidmet hat und dem, was jenseits der See vor sich ging. Daher muß man sich ja darüber klar sein, daß die geographischen Gegebenheiten und die geschichtliche Entwicklung, die ja nur die Menschen bilden doch sehr viel leichter ein Zusammenwachsen zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland ermöglichen als ein Zusammenwachsen zwischen Großbritannien auf der einen Seite und Frankreich und Deutschland auf der anderen Seite.'*¹³⁹

It is clear from these statements that Adenauer's position towards Great-Britain's application was to a large extent rooted in Adenauer's political thinking about Europe. His ultimate goal was a politically united Europe, and he doubted if the British, at that point

¹³⁵ Irving, *Adenauer: profiles in power*, 142.

¹³⁶ Haftendorn, 'The NATO crisis of 1966-1967', 81.

¹³⁷ Adenauer, *Teegespräche 1961-1963*, 223.

¹³⁸ *Ibidem*

¹³⁹ *Ibidem*

in time, were actually committed to the continent. The Chancellor thus was in principle positive toward the accession of Great-Britain but questioned if the British were really ready to join the EEC. This is confirmed by Adenauer's statement during the *Teegespräche* in June 1962 where the Chancellor remarks: '*..nach meiner Meinung wird de Gaulle wedersagen: Ich bin dafür, noch wird er sagen: Ich bin dagegen. Wir würden aber wahrscheinlich beide sagen, die Sache muß sehr genau geprüft werden.*'¹⁴⁰ The question then is, when did de Gaulle and Adenauer shift from having doubts to outright opposition? The signals given by Great-Britain were decisive in this matter. Instead of proving a real commitment to the continent, what became clear was the special relationship with the U.S. which was, and maybe still is today, Britain's top priority. O. Bange states that '*the British did not manage to persuade Adenauer.*'¹⁴¹ This seems to be a correct analysis of the situation. In contrast to de Gaulle, who had proven his commitment to the continent and to the EEC in various ways during the 1950s and early 1960, the British did not.¹⁴² The British had twice rejected an invitation to join the European integration process and had during the late 1950s countered the EEC with the formation of the EFTA. The British could have 'proven' their commitment to the continent by accepting the treaty of Rome but during the Brussels negotiations, they did quite the contrary. The many discussions on the Common Wealth, external tariffs and agriculture showed that Great-Britain was not willing to really commit to Europe. Ultimately, Great-Britain wished to enter on its own conditions and wanted to safeguard its own interests, which were not reconcilable with those of the six.

According to the Chancellor, de Gaulle shared this opinion and to a large extent de Gaulle did voice these misgivings during the press conference of 14 January 1963. De Gaulle summed up differences between continental Europe and Great-Britain, varying from industrial, commercial and agricultural ones to differing past history and traditions. Especially economic problems were addressed by de Gaulle, relating to agriculture and the fact that Great-Britain was a maritime nation, different from continental Europe. For the General it was quite clear, that due to all these differences, Great-Britain was simply not suitable as a European partner. The underlying tone of de Gaulle's objections however was much more of a political nature than economical. As de Gaulle stated: '*..la Grande-Bretagne a posé sa candidature au Marché commun. Elle l'a fait après s'être naguère refusée à participer à la Communauté qu'on était en train de bâtir, après avoir créé une sorte de libre-échange avec six autres Etats, après avoir...fait quelques pressions sur les Six pour empêcher que ne commence réellement l'application du*

¹⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, 228.

¹⁴¹ Bange, *The EEC crisis of 1963*, xiii.

¹⁴² As has been noted in the previous chapters de Gaulle convinced Adenauer of his commitment, by pushing through the implementation of the Treaty of Rome, by his stance during the Berlin crisis and by defending Bonn's interest at summits with the U.S. and Great Britain.

*Marché commun. L'Angleterre donc a demandé à son tour à y entrer, mais suivant ses propres conditions.*¹⁴³ Here de Gaulle, expresses what Adenauer had voiced during several meetings, namely that Great-Britain had not shown commitment to the continent. The British wished to enter the EEC on their own terms, and this was something de Gaulle opposed, as did Adenauer.

During the press conference, de Gaulle expressed his fear that, in a 'Big Europe' including Great-Britain, and in the future maybe other European countries, the cohesion which existed between the six would be lost. According to de Gaulle, such a community would, due to its numerous and diverse members, eventually come to resemble a '*Communauté atlantique colossale sous dépendance et direction américaines et qui aurait tôt fait d'absorber la Communauté européenne.*'¹⁴⁴ Here, de Gaulle expresses his main obstacle, namely that such a community would inevitably be under U.S. control and direction and this was contrary to what France had envisioned for Europe. De Gaulle wanted to protect the European institutions from American influence. He wished to create, '*une construction proprement européenne*', as he states during the press conference of January 1963.¹⁴⁵ The concerns voiced by de Gaulle, could have literally been said by Adenauer, who especially during 1962, but also earlier on, had expressed the strong will to ensure that the EEC would be a truly, European political community.

It is questionable if either of the men had anticipated things to go as they did. Only two months before the French veto, Adenauer wrote an article in the American Quarterly in which he stated: '*The most important negotiations- those with Great Britain- are well under way and we hope they will succeed. Their outcome will greatly influence the envisaged negotiations with other countries.*'¹⁴⁶ It seems to be inconsistent that only a few month later Adenauer backed de Gaulle in his veto. How can this be explained? The ambivalences shown in Adenauer's memoirs and talks and the fact that Adenauer did not speak out earlier should not be misunderstood as inconsistencies. In principle, Adenauer was in favor of the British joining, and he remained so even when de Gaulle blocked the accession. But the British did not commit to true European integration, so Adenauer backed de Gaulle. Adenauer's statement thus should be read as, yes he wanted British accession, but not yet. Adenauer in his memoirs often states that things need time. In May 1963, several months after the Brussels negotiations had been ended due to the French Veto Adenauer remarks that the failure was mostly due to the fact '*daß man zu*

¹⁴³ Conférence de presse de Charles de Gaulle (14 janvier 1963)
http://www.ena.lu/press_conference_held_general_gaulle_14_january_1963-020000863.html
(last accessed 19-06-2011)

¹⁴⁴ *Ibidem*

¹⁴⁵ *Ibidem*

¹⁴⁶ K. Adenauer, 'The German Problem, A World Problem', *Foreign Affairs an American Quarterly review* 41 (1962), 59-65.

*schnell war.*¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, this statement was made in an American magazine, so Adenauer probably did weigh his words carefully. In his personal conversations, as recorded in his *Teegespräche* and memoirs, Adenauer's actual thoughts on the matter are much more explicit.

Just as Adenauer had expressed the hope that Great-Britain would join in the future, de Gaulle also announced that he believed it to be possible that one day England might be sufficiently European to join. France would then open the door to the British and welcome them to become part of the European community.¹⁴⁸ Here the same tone is visible as Adenauer: the time was not right, and Great-Britain was (not yet) ready to join. Both men did not oppose British entry in the future.¹⁴⁹

What is interesting to notice, is how little of a shock de Gaulle's press conference, and the later suspension of the Brussels talks, was to Adenauer. During the discussions with other German policy makers and with de Gaulle in the weeks after the veto, the Chancellor does not express to be at all surprised with what de Gaulle announced. Adenauer and de Gaulle met on the 21st of January and discussed what had occurred. During this conversation, de Gaulle elaborated on his decision to block Great-Britain from joining the EEC. De Gaulle emphasized that Great-Britain was bound to America and therefore would not follow a truly European policy.¹⁵⁰ Adenauer agreed with the General and stated: *'Dies sei charakteristisch. England wolle die besonderen Beziehungen zu Amerika. Das sei seine Politik, der es alles opfere, was es für nötig halte. Darüber müsse man sich vollkommen im Klaren sein. Jedesmal, wenn die Amerikaner anders dächten als die Europäer, würden die Engländer nicht so denken wie die Europäer, sondern wie die Amerikaner. Dies sei heute eine Tatsache, an der sich auch morgen nichts ändern werde.'*¹⁵¹ Here again it is clear where Adenauer stands: his wish is European unity and he has great doubts of Great-Britain.

Summarizing, what is evident from Adenauer's memoirs and conversations is that he was in principle very much in favor of British accession. However, the Brussels negotiations showed that Great-Britain was, at that time, not truly committed to European integration and this would compromise what the Chancellor envisioned for the future, namely 'real integrating' of peoples and political unity in Europe. He therefore backed de Gaulle in his veto. Adenauer did not want to jeopardize his relations with France in exchange for a

¹⁴⁷ Adenauer, *Teegespräche 1961-1963*, 350.

¹⁴⁸ R. Davis, 'Why did the General do it? De Gaulle, Polaris and the French veto of Britain's application to join the Common Market', *European History Quarterly* 28 (1998) 391-392. Conférence de presse de Charles de Gaulle (14 janvier 1963) http://www.ena.lu/press_conference_held_general_gaulle_14_january_1963-020000863.html (last accessed 19-06-2011)

¹⁴⁹ Pautsch (ed), *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1963*, 67-72.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, 115.

¹⁵¹ Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1959-1963*, 195.

questionable British commitment to the European continent. As Giaque states: '*France was simply a higher political priority than Britain.*'¹⁵²

But, could the same be said for America? Was France a higher political priority than the U.S.? As has been explained previously Washington was in favor of the British accession, and viewed de Gaulle's actions as provocative and threatening to the Atlantic Alliance (which was very important in countering the Soviet threat) and the American hegemony on the continent. Washington surely was not in the same sense as Great-Britain was, of lesser political concern to Bonn than France. The support of Adenauer to de Gaulle was viewed to be a choice: a choice for Europe instead of for the Atlantic alliance, and the American partnership. But, Adenauer never thought of this in this way. First of all, he rendered such a 'choice' between his two most important allies impossible: both partnerships were indispensable to Adenauer. Furthermore, Adenauer never viewed the whole topic to be a choice. According to the Chancellor reconciliation between France and the Federal Republic was essential for European peace and unity, and in this way also was of prime importance to the U.S. who wanted a strong ally against the Soviet threat. Adenauer never viewed his support to de Gaulle to be a policy against the U.S. During a *Teegespräche* which took place on the 29th of January 1963, Adenauer expressed that he was surprised about 'all the fuss' around the rejection of Great-Britain. He asked one of his advisers if they had forgotten that Great-Britain twice rejected to join the EEC, and proceeded to say: '*Hat man sich damals so aufgeregt? Haben wir geschrien: die Welt geht unter?*'¹⁵³ The Chancellor viewed the French rejection as a logical political choice, not as something that might be disturbing to Washington. During this same conversation Adenauer proceeded to say that both de Gaulle as himself were fully aware of the need for cooperation with the U.S.¹⁵⁴

On January the 29th of 1963, Adenauer spoke about this matter again, after an article had been written in the New York Times, in which it was stated that Germany had to choose between France and the U.S. According to the Chancellor it was '*doch einfach lächerlich, so etwas zu sagen, direkt lächerlich und beleidigend und auch unklug, dumm.*'¹⁵⁵ One of the men present at this *Teegespräche* did not agree with Adenauer, and voiced his opinion that in his view it was quite an accurate statement, considering de Gaulle's rejection of Great-Britain went against the American policy. Adenauer responded and states that he did not believe that the U.S. identified itself with Great-Britain and that therefore there was no question of a 'choice' between America and France.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵² Giaque, *Grand designs & visions of unity*, 74.

¹⁵³ Adenauer, *Teegespräche 1961-1963*, 323.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, 323-325.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, 332.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibidem*

The treaty of Elysée

Only a weeks after de Gaulle's famous press conference, on the 22nd of January 1963, de Gaulle and Adenauer signed the Élysée friendship treaty, which formalized the Franco-German cooperation. This treaty stipulated that the leaders of both countries would meet twice a year. Regular consultations between the governments of both countries were to strengthen German-French cooperation on foreign policy as well as military, economic and cultural affairs. In fact, the scope of the proposed cooperation was very limited. Adenauer and de Gaulle already met more frequently than the suggested biennial visits and the treaty did not entail any binding commitments. The Elysée treaty was therefore more a political statement: an official recognition of the 'special relationship' between France and the FRG. According to Adenauer this treaty underlined what both de Gaulle and he himself believed to be central for European unity and peace, i.e. cooperation between the two nations.¹⁵⁷ The friendship treaty was, according tot he Chancellor someting good, '*für Deutschland und Frankreich, für Europa und für den Frieden in der ganzen Welt.*'¹⁵⁸

In contrast to Adenauer, the *Auswärtigen Amt* was in shock after de Gaulle's statements in Paris during the press conference. How could this have happened? The German ministers doubted whether Adenauer should sign such a treaty after de Gaulle's strong statements in relation to the British entry. During a meeting of the *Auswärtigen Amt* on the 20th of January, 1963, the situation was discussed and the ministers concluded that, if Adenauer wanted to prevent huge protests at home, he would have to abstain from signing and would have to try to convince de Gaulle to take back his statements. The *Auswärtigen Amt* was particularly critical of Adenauer's position toward de Gaulle. According to the ministers, this 'special relationship' was one-sided, and its durability ultimately depended on Adenauer's consistent conformity to de Gaulle's political ambitions.¹⁵⁹

Adenauer's persistence in the matter, was met with great opposition at home. In the West-German *Auswärtigen Amt* the signing of the Élysée treaty was perceived as a distancing from the U.S. At the press conference which had taken place, a week before the signing of the Elysée treaty, de Gaulle had not only vetoed the British entry but he had also thwarted the American MLF plan, which in fact meant a rejection of the Atlantic partnership. The Kennedy administration did voice strong discontent with the signing of the Franco-German friendship treaty. In a conversation which took place between the German ambassador to Washington, Stikker and president Kennedy, a day after the

¹⁵⁷ Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1959-1963*, 192.

¹⁵⁸ Address given by Konrad Adenauer (23 January 1963)
http://www.ena.lu/address_given_konrad_adenauer_23_january_1963-020003402.html (last accessed 19-06-2011)

signing of the treaty, it becomes clear that Adenauer's policy was viewed as undermining the NATO alliance. Furthermore, president Kennedy questioned if the treaty meant Bonn's compliance with French anti-Americanism.¹⁶⁰

To de Gaulle's great disappointment, the Elysée treaty was revised due to this American pressure, and due to the discontent of the Auswärtigen Amt. The German government did not wish to antagonize the U.S. and therefore demanded the adding of a preamble, in which the preservation of close Atlantic cooperation and American partnership were emphasized.¹⁶¹ Here Adenauer's position thus was not as absolute as it had been. The Auswärtigen Amt only ratified the friendship treaty after adding the preamble which secured American support.

Adenauer's turn to France, as evident in his support of de Gaulle's veto and the signing of the Elysée treaty, thus was downplayed by the preamble. Furthermore Bonn agreed to go along with the American MLF plan, reassuring Washington of the German commitment to the Atlantic alliance.¹⁶² Konrad Adenauer retired in October 1963 and was succeeded as Chancellor by the Atlanticist, Ludwig Erhard. The Adenauer era was over.¹⁶³

¹⁶⁰ Pautsch (ed), *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1963*, 162-165

¹⁶¹ Preamble to the Élysée Treaty ratification Bill (Bonn, 15 June 1963)
http://www.ena.lu/preamble_elysee_treaty_ratification_bonn_15_june_1963-020002910.html
(last accessed 19-06-2011)

¹⁶² During the first meeting with de Gaulle, after agreeing to the MLF, Adenauer showed the French president the complete MLF agreement, which was again a sign of the close cooperation between the two statesman.

¹⁶³ Pautsch (ed), *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1963*, 137.

Conclusion

In January 1963, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer signed the Elysée friendship treaty. This treaty did not only mark the alliance between France and the Federal Republic of Germany which had been built during the previous decade, but also implied a shift in the West German policy. Only days before, de Gaulle had vetoed the British application to join the Common Market; thus by signing the Elysée treaty, Adenauer (quietly) consented to de Gaulle's veto. With his French orientated politics, Adenauer went against Washington's wishes, against the German public opinion and against the advice of many of the West German ministers who favored British entry for economic reasons. How then can Adenauer's prioritizing of the French alliance over the Atlantic alliance, as reflected in the Franco-German friendship treaty and the implicit support of the French veto blocking Great-Britain from the EEC, be explained?

The West German foreign policy was to a great extent determined by one man, namely Konrad Adenauer. His position during the early 1960s was a result of closely connected historical circumstances, influenced by the internal bureaucratic struggle and personal beliefs as well as his perception of the state of affairs in Europe and the world. The evolution of German policy in the international context of the period 1958-1963 was an extremely complicated process, in which a large array of domestic and foreign policy questions interfered with the issue of British membership.

Adenauer's support of de Gaulle, was influenced by the 'special relationship' between the two statesmen. De Gaulle and Adenauer had a lot in common and their personal contact made it possible for them to smooth discord, and focus on areas of agreement. Furthermore, when assessing the British application it becomes clear that Adenauer, to a large extent, agreed with de Gaulle. Adenauer's misgivings largely coincided with de Gaulle's, namely that Great-Britain was not really committed to European integration. The British wished to secure their own economic and political interests and ultimately Great-Britain's main priority was not European integration, but the special relationship with the U.S. Adenauer feared that the admission of Great-Britain would harm the progress which had been made with the establishment of the EEC. The Chancellor wanted a truly integrated Europe, not only economically but politically. For Adenauer, the perceived halfhearted British attempt to join the EEC thus was not sufficient. It proved to him that Great-Britain was not, at that point in time, ready to join the six.

Most importantly, Adenauer's support of de Gaulle was driven by his long term vision of the future shape of Europe. A strong, politically integrated Europe would be a stronghold of Christian values against the Atheist communist threat, and would be able to have a voice as a world power. Furthermore, Adenauer was convinced that the only guarantee for peace on the continent was close Franco-German cooperation. Adenauer had already

mentioned this as early as 1919 and this conviction was enhanced by witnessing the devastation of World War Two. His long held, long term vision for the future, which entailed a true, political integration of European peoples was to the Chancellor totally dependent on the Franco-German friendship. Adenauer therefore was, to a large extent, willing to sacrifice his own more supranational vision of Europe and was also willing to follow French policies, even when Washington did not agree. Adenauer's approach was met with strong criticism of his cabinet members who felt that the alliance with the United States should not be sacrificed in order to strengthen the Franco-German bond. But Adenauer never viewed his rapprochement to France to be at odds with a partnership with the U.S. He continued this policy persistently until the end of his chancellorship.

Today, almost half a century after the signing of the Elysée friendship treaty, the Franco-German axis, now under the leadership of Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy, is still solid. The joint actions by the two states contributed, often decisively, to the development of the European communities. However, Adenauer's envisioned political unity and integration of European peoples has not been accomplished. Even though today we speak of the European 'Union', no actual unity has been obtained. The 'European policy', or better said the lack of a coordinated European approach, toward the ongoing upheavals in North Africa and the Middle East only demonstrate the absence of political unity. The referenda held in the Netherlands and France in 2005, on the establishment of a European constitution, show how 'the citizens of Europe' do not identify with the European Union. So far, differing national interests have kept a common European policy and especially lasting political unity out of reach.

Amongst today's leaders, a clear vision of Europe, such as Adenauer had, is no longer evident. The cohesion between European nations seems as far away as ever. Even de Gaulle's and Adenauer's suspicions with respect to the entry of Great-Britain seem in hindsight justified. Great-Britain's policy is still often orientated towards the U.S. rather than towards Europe. Recently this lack of cohesion has become even more evident, due to the 'Big Bang' enlargement of the EU, in which 10 states acquired membership, followed later with the admittance of two more countries. The European process of integration is often referred to as an uncontrolled moving train: an out of control process, with no one at the wheel with a clear vision or goal. The ultimate question is, to what end? What is the goal of European integration? For Adenauer the central question was, whether Great-Britain was ready to join the EEC. Perhaps the more accurate question today is, is the EU ready to cope with its new members, and future members such as Turkey without losing its cohesion completely.

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