Securitising Insecurity?

A Security-Development Nexus Reader

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Acknowledgments

Abstract

The argument that securitisation pertains to existential invocations is not new. securitisation is seen and experienced as the capacity for undemocratic norms. Securitisation of human insecurity, while abstract, is the heart of this consideration. There is a normative ambition to the dual and triple nexus approaches. However, they perform broad-stroked world disclosing acts. In turn, decoupling' politics from rules and realities allows for security's 'gaming' to cater to specific audiences. In recent years, the concept of the security-development has undergone a reconceptualisation along these lines. What remains unfaltering is the presupposition of an 'answerability' in the form of a dynamic between the 'securitiser' and 'securitised'.The dynamic of the securitisation of development is shown by departures and perceptions. The prioritisation of issues leads to politicisation, and the prioritisation of already politicised issues towards the securitisation of development efforts. Nevertheless, it is still best to avoid terming the nexus a securitising of insecurity, as it will have to prove this in substance for better or worse.

Introduction

Human insecurity, the interrelated deficit of peace, prosperity, and/or possibilities,[1] reigns supreme even among the various challenges facing protracted (or intractable) contexts. Attempts at restoring human security are increasingly understood by the humanitarian field (and others) as requiring multisectoral, rights, and risks-based approaches that recognise the context of local dynamics instead of resolving the 'manifested' symptoms of fragility.[2] Alpaslan Özerdem (2002) makes this point in relation Berdal's (1996) work and the contestation of traditional military solutions as fostering security (such as the disarmament of combatants and buy-back schemes to collect arms).[3]

Conflict experts, like Collier et al. (2003), have similarly emphasised the existence of structural drivers of human insecurity (principally as socio-economic ones) that perpetuate social divergence and violence. With one of the seminal works on the interrelation between society, development, and security, Collier et al. assert that certain policies, even fairly established ones, can amalgamate to achieve "a major impact".[4] Yet, they are not alone in calling for more cooperative practices at the local and regional levels in conflict and post-conflict settings to achieve such an outcome.[5]

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[1] UNDP. 1994. "Human Development Report 1994.", 18-23; Barakat, Sultan. 2002. "Setting the Scene for Afghanistan's Reconstruction: The Challenges and Critical Dilemmas." *Third World Quarterly* 23, no. 5, 809

[2] State and Peacebuilding Fund, Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, Focus Area Note

[3] Özerdem (2002) Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants in Afghanistan: Lessons learned from a cross-cultural perspective, Third World Quarterly, 23:5, 965-66

[4] Collier, Paul et al. "Breaking the conflict trap: civil war and development policy" *World Bank Group* (2003), 172

[5] Cf. Ibid, 184-185; ASPR. "The HDP Nexus in the Context of Peace Operations in Sub-Saharan Africa" (2021)

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Caparini and Reagan (2019), Kaldor (2013), and Aytakin Mustafayeba (2020) cite the increasing prevalence, interrelation, and duration of conflicts to underscore the necessity for renewed approaches by the international community to solve protracted crises through new understandings of security (in accordance with the UN's ambitious 2030 Agenda).[6] Others, like David Chandler (2007), and Maria Stern and Joakim Öjendal (2013) do not fully entertain the assumptions of an expanding human security culture, although they do recognise that evolving 'risk states' are increasingly complex and used as the pretext for changing considerations of security.[7] Such are the cases with the dual "security-development" and triple "security, development, peace" nexuses. They have, at times, taken on performative and presumptive traits specific to the interest and influence of the donor community and what has been described as the 'political elites'.[8]

A securitization of insecurity, and the humanitarian sphere's interests and influences, are making themselves known by acting upon 'security gaps' in protracted contexts, such as by involving locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts invoking a host of themes and topics in relation to fostering durable peace . Since 2004, the Government of Afghanistan has itself stated *"[t]he success of Afghanistan's state-building effort depends on the establishment of a well-functioning and well-structured security sector, which will provide a basic level of safety and*

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[6] Cf. Caparini, Marina and Reagan, Anders. 29 November 2019. "Connecting the dots on the triples nexus." ; OECD. 2021. "DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus." OECD/LEGAL/5019, 5

[7] Chandler, D."The security–development nexus and the rise of 'anti-foreign policy'." **J Int Relat Dev** 10, (2007): 362–64

[8] Cf. Thierry Balzacq. "Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve" (Routledge 2011), 12 ; Stern, M., & Öjendal, J. 2013. "Exploring the Security-Development Nexus." In R. Amer, A. Swain, & J. Öjendal, *The Security-Development Nexus: Peace, Conflict and Development,* 15

security for the public and facilitate a return to normalcy".[9] In this context, the understanding of both security and a capacity to attain it pertain to traditional strategic considerations.

To this point, much of the ongoing reporting on Afghanistan by foreign press has remained state-centric and focused on how fighting has edged nearer to key urban settings and cities like the capital Kabul. Reports emerged of how the Presidential Palace, and Ashraf Ghani's cabinet members, marked Eid al-Fitr (the most Holy of Islamic holidays) under shelling from the Taliban. Also reported heavily were the attacks on the Afghan Defense Minister's residence.[10] Much less is related to the security of civilians. Less is said of the civilians who are increasingly displaced.

State-centric approaches to security are widespread despite the failures they have engendered; both Ambassador Ryan Crocker (Michael Hirsh 2019) and Seth G Jones (2021), subscribe to a state-centric approach where the focal concern of security is the state fighting off the Taliban, and no more, yet also recognise how disastrous the current predicament is. As Sultan Barakat (2002) sees it, there is more to consider regarding why people acquiesce to Taliban rule recognising a 'pattern' in history and a trajectory of worsening conditions compounded by intersecting issues (ideology, displacement, climate change, poor governance and competing interests).[11]

Importantly, what evidence is there to support the assertion that America did not invade Afghanistan under the auspices of state-building or to foster peace between "modernisers" and "conservatives" and between 'Pashtun' and 'non-Pashtun' ethnic groups?[12] American policymakers were aware of these dynamics, however seemingly overlooked them in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

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[9] Afghan Government/International-Agency Report. 2004. "Securing Afghanistan's FUTURE: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward - Afghanistan." *ReliefWeb*, reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/securing-afghanistans-future-accomplishments-and-strategic-path-forward.

[10] "Gunmen Attack Home of Afghan Defence Minister in Kabul." *BBC News*, BBC, (4 Aug. 2021)

[11] Barakat, Sultan. "Setting the Scene for Afghanistan's Reconstruction: The Challenges and Critical Dilemmas." *Third World Quarterly* 23, no. 5, (2002), 807-808

[12] Ibid, 803

This point was recently reiterated President Biden has emphasised that the pursuit of American security in Afghanistan was not a state-building affair[13] and the current flip-flopping in and out of Afghanistan. Afghanistan and Iraq are examples of the re-emergence of social conflict in heterogenous societies owed to partial efforts at relief, state-building and mediation after security interventions impact and aggravate local dynamics without fully resolving them, argues this work.

In such a way, Afghanistan has failed to develop a notion of statehood, or 'collective goals', for the competing subnational groups since at least 1989 when Soviet forces withdrew after a ten-year effort at occupation.[14] Even from 2001 onward, 'securing' Afghanistan' has involved attempting to *'fundamentally restructure'* its society, which to some extent has succeeded with *"a new globalized, cosmopolitan and complex Afghan society [...] looking for a new, more representative politics to match* .[15] Still, this is not a shared identity among all people in Afghanistan, as there remains a large divide between urban and rural settings, showing quite clearly the hand of development in fostering security. Yet, not all are in favour of the urban/rural dichotomy. *Breaking the Rural-Urban Divide* (2016) describes the urban/rural dichotomy as an artificial binary by invoking urban-rural 'interlinkages'.[16] However, then so is urbanisation, which the report goes onto include (from a leading participant's remark in the development sector) *"as an*

[13] "Remarks by President Biden on the Drawdown of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan." *The White House*, The United States Government, 8 July 2021, www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/07/08/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-drawdown-of-u-s-forces-in-afghanistan/.

[14] Barakat, Sultan. 2002. "Setting the Scene for Afghanistan's Reconstruction: The Challenges and Critical Dilemmas." *Third World Quarterly* 23, no. 5, 805

15 Kawano, Melanie and McGuire Amy "State-Building in Afghanistan" *Human Rights and Post-War Reconstruction* (2005), 33; Crews, Robert and Osman, Wazhmah. "Perspective | The Taliban Wants to RULE Afghanistan Again. but the Country Has Changed." *The Washington Post*,(19 July 2021), para 17

[16] UN-Habitat., Breaking the Rural-Ubran Divide: Examining Afghanistan's city regions for improved rural-urban linkages (2016), 1

effective instrument and driver of rural prosperity as well as general economic development".[17]

The Afghan intervention was succeeded by subsequent security interventions like in Saddam Hussein's Iraq, as the Middle East increasingly shouldered the 'cost' of Western security, as suggested by Collier et al (2003, 188), however most of it would encumber the local and not the global order. The way in which the U.S. has disengaged from these contexts speaks to this broader issue.

The increasing frequency of protracted crises, their inherently longwinded nature, and their susceptibility to relapse (into social divergence and thus conflict) can lead to a cyclical and downward spiral in the confluence of multiple, often interrelated, drivers of conflict and 'residual' impacts.[18] For instance, *"insufficient donor interest in funding protracted refugee situations could heighten the vulnerability of Congolese refugees in Burundi […] where ageing infrastructure needs substantial repair.[19]"* The example of Afghanistan is another lesson of how quick donor fatigue can set in.

Experiences in Afghanistan have challenged a number of assumptions and trends in terms of conflict dynamics. One is the assumption that some societies (homogenous ones) have more capacity for divergence and violence than others (heterogenous ones).[20] The past two decades have shown there is an unlimited capacity for states to deteriorate. Some have placed an emphasis on ethnic rivalries to explain security deteriorations. Mary Kaldor (2008) discerns the increasingly complex distinctions among participants as well as processes, like in the example of the Bosnian

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[17] (UN-Habitat. "Breaking the Rural-Ubran Divide: Examining Afghanistan's city regions for improved rural-urban linkages" (2016): 4

[18] UNDP. "Human Development Report 1994.", 18-23; Barakat, Sultan. 2002. "Setting the Scene for Afghanistan's Reconstruction: The Challenges and Critical Dilemmas." *Third World Quarterly* 23, no. 5, (1994): 809

[19] OCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview, (2020), 120

[20] de Soysa I, Noel C. Does ethnic diversity increase violent crime? A global analysis of homicide rates, 1995–2013. *European Journal of Criminology*. 2020;17(2):175-198. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1477370818775294

Genocide, which make increasingly difficult demands on the international community and its response.[21] Both Kaldor and Sasha Jesperson (2014) discern the convolution of ethnological dimensions in the Bosnian experience, a convolution to which Alpaslan Özerdem (2002) in the case of Afghanistan proposes to change through adopting thoughtful policy considerations that take account of social divisions.[22]

Notwithstanding, messages focusing on the ethnic dimension of conflicts are neither generally substantive nor helpful to approaches. Indra de Soysa and Carmen Noel (2018) find a misplaced emphasis on *"ethnic diversity for explaining social dislocation and violence, in so far as it relates to a country's homicide rate"*.[23] According to Gilles Dorronsoro (2009) the Taliban have been able to exert their influence on Non-pashtun groups, such as Uzbeks and Turkmen for years.[24] As such, heterogenous contexts, like Afghanistan and Iraq, are multidimensional and have only grown in complexity since.

Akin to Iraq's, Afghanistan's borders are a relic of times passed and European influence that fragmented local societies, such as the Pashtun who straddle both Afghanistan's Southernmost region and areas in Northern Pakistan.[25] The re-emergence of the Taliban as a threat to international security has been helped by their ability to exploit the weaknesses of both the Afghan and US governments, in particular by evading border detection, uniting some Afghans, moving freely across

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[21] Kaldor, Mary. 2008. "From Just War to Just Peace." In *The Viability of Human Security*, edited by Den Boer Monica and De Wilde Jaap., 27-8

[22] Özerdem (2002) Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants in Afghanistan: Lessons learned from a cross-cultural perspective, Third World Quarterly, 23:5, 970-71

[23] Soysa, Indra de, and Carmen Noel. "Does Ethnic Diversity Increase Violent Crime? A Global Analysis of Homicide Rates, 1995–2013." *European Journal of Criminology* 17, no. 2 (March 2020): 175–98.

[24] Dorronsoro, Gilles. "The Taliban's Winning Strategy in Afghanistan." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (2009), 27

[25] Rafiq, Arif, et al. "The Durand Line: A British Legacy Plaguing Afghan-Pakistani Relations." *Middle East Institute (*25 May 2021), para 7

the region, and receiving clandestine support.[26] This has allowed them not only to displace Afghan 'sovereignty' but many Afghans who are fleeing their homes in droves. The government's inability to control its borders, and the Taliban's ability to exploit the government's weaknesses, is a distinct security gap, while another is its continued ability to gain support from non-Pashtun 'pockets' of society counter to the methodology employed in Iraq.[27]

Resolving security gaps is not easy. As Willy Bruggeman (2008) states, "*[i]n the absense of [...] military threat, other factors can and will constitute the underlying causes of [...] armed conflict between or within countries".[28]* Therefore, some countries in the Global South where 'security' interventions have occurred continue to suffer from some of the same underlying drivers of conflict and fragility that have given rise to (human) security interventions in the first place.

The nexus dialogue places an emphasis on the diversification of activities and actors. This is relevant in relation to the coverage of broadening 'security', which has at points emerged as an academic debate in itself with divisions over the incorporation or rejection of humanistic concepts of security.[29] David Haglund, a 'strategic culture' advocate, opposed broadening security considerations while the likes of Mary Kaldor and Christopher Daase favoured people-centred considerations.[30] What continues to unfold in Afghanistan speaks to the limited emphasis that was

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[26] Dorronsoro, Gilles. "The Taliban's Winning Strategy in Afghanistan." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (2009), 7-8, 12, 23, 28

[27] Dorronsoro, Gilles. "The Taliban's Winning Strategy in Afghanistan." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (2009), 10, 27

[28] Bruggeman, Willy. "Failing Global Justice and Human Security." In *The Viability of Human Security*, edited by Den Boer Monica and De Wilde Jaap, 47-70. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press (2008), 62

[29] David G. Haglund. "Let's Call the Whole Thing Off"? Security Culture as Strategic Culture", Contemporary Security Policy, 32:3 (2011), 494-516

[30] Cf. Kaldor, Mary. "Global Security Cultures: A Theoretical Framework for analysing Security in Transition", (2016) 3, 6-11; Daase, Christopher "On Paradox and Pathologies: A Cultural Approach to Security", in: Schlag, Gabi; Junk, Julian; Daase, Christopher (ed.), Transformations of Security Studies. Dialogues, Diversity and Discipline, London/New York, NY: Routledge (2016), 82-83

placed on the former by not resolving socio-political divergence at the underlying levels (i.e conflict drivers like social inequalities), still outstanding issues retain their capacity to become elevated (politicised) and securitised (mobilised), causing divergence.

(policy) To avoid this, certain issues - and their solutions - become either drastically overstated or strategically 'gamed' (or politicised) and 'securitised' in a performance of 'leveraging'.[31] This sentiment is highlighted by the the reiteration of the security-development nexus proposed as the practical and 'New Way of Working' *"over multiple years, based on the comparative advantage of […] actors, towards collective outcomes."*[32] This, in 2016, offered a tentative roadmap to retract intractable contexts and foster durable solutions (one was assured). Despite this, the emphasis on cooperative measures inherent to the nexus is now new. As early as 2004 Secretary General Kofi Annan recognised "terrorism or civil wars or extreme poverty" cannot be treated in "isolation"[33].

The nexus dialogue is disseminating a knowledge proposition and a way of understanding complex contexts, or a way of systematising them, through a cooperative and constructive lens, in a bid to securitise insecurity. At the forefront of this approach, several organisations, including multilateral bodies like the UN and CSOs (civil society organisations), are calling for a remarkable and timely countermeasure to the lack of coordination of the past.

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[31] Balzacq, Thierry. "Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve" (Routledge 2011), 7

[32] Cf. DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (2019), 5; OCHA. "New Ways of Working" (2017), 6; Nguya, Gloria and Siddiqui, Nadia. "The Triple Nexus (H-D-P_ and implications for Durable Solutions to Internal Displacement, UNSG High Level Panel on Internal Displacement Work-stream 3 (2020), 2

[33] UN General Assembly. "A/59/565" (2 December 2004), 2

Chapter 1 - Theoretical Framework

1.1 **Research Area and Problem**

This study hypothesises that the 'Nexus dialogue' is a moment of securitization, involving the notion of the absence in order to reconfigure or re-legitimate the essence of what 'security' is. Accordingly, this work deals - in part - with exploring said considerations of security and whether the 'nexus dialogue' securitises the lack absences, to what extent, and to what relevance. The historiography seeks to discern this through a thematic consideration of security and development. Through these considerations, this study will endeavour an exploration of the underlying dynamics at play and why certain actors engage dual and triple nexus in certain, often similar, ways. For a logical and ontological order we must then first consider security and its derivatives.

Some actors who 'act' on the notion joining 'security' and 'development', (and 'peace' as proposed by the triple nexus), had levied their full support behind a renewed bid at securitization from the earliest stage. Limited accounts of success are encouraging but require in-depth substantiation to warrant full-fledged adoption. Yet, the idea of a nexus is nothing new. It first emerged as the security-development nexus. Moreover, peace, security, and development are not without underlying assumptions, contestations, influences, expansions, and entanglements as according to Maria Stern and Joakim Ojendal (2010), Osei-Hwedie and Kurantin (2020), London E. Hancock and Johanna Solomon (2020) and Paul Jackson (2020).[34] In such a way, it figures into a 'pattern' of accepting renditions neo-liberal policies and their agendas often without scrupulous consideration or problematisation. The consideration of 'humanitarian principles' to solve the most pressing issues in humanitarian contexts is to reduce the whole set of intricate dynamics present in

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[34] Landon E. Hancock, London E and Solomon, Johanna. "Meanings of Peace" (2020), 11-12; Paul Jackson. "Conceptions of Security". Routledge Handbook of Peace, Security and Development. (2020), 29 ; Osei-Hwedie, Bertha Z. and Kurantin, Napoleon. "Security-Development Nexus: China's Policy Framework towards Africa" ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF SOCIAL AND STRATEGIC STUDIES - Volume 1, Issue 1, (Aug-Sep 2020), 3

the world today by limiting considerations and prioritisation of security to neoliberal parameters wherein space is augmented for state involvement wherever defensible, however defensible. In such a way, humanitarians on the ground are left to tackle the most critical aspects of human security.

Some social scientists, like Max Weber, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, recognise knowledge patterns in the 'nomological' and have linked these to the system of 'international security'.[35] The 1994 Human Development Report, which was a defining point for 'human security' heavily emphasising patterns to indicate both referent objective values and referent subjective threats to said values.[36] Max Weber is described an advocate for nomological use in social and historical sciences.[37] However, these are only partly informative.[38] In such a way, 'patterns" are a possible misnomer for the dynamics of society itself, which can be aided by the framework on securitisation to discern dynamics of politicisation, and securitisation, which requires the participation of a legitimating audience to act as an ad-hoc stakeholder, however moves past pure legitimacy.[39] This same effort to legitimise the humanitarian sphere dates back to at least the 1950s when, as Carsten Stahn and Henning Melber (2014) put it, former Secretary-General of the UN, Dag Hammarskjöld "traced the contours of a 'United Nations ideology', based on Christian and universal notions".[40]

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[35] Cf. Drysdale, John. "1. Weber on Objectivity: Advocate or Critic?" In Max Weber's 'Objectivity' Reconsidered, 40. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016 ; Buzan, Barry, and Ole Wæver. Regions and Powers : The Structure of International Security, Cambridge University Press, 2003. ProQuest Ebook Central, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uunl/detail.action?docID=221064.; Buzan, Barry, and Wæver, Ole. Regions and Powers : The Structure of International Security. Cambridge (Cambridge University Press 2003), 3

[36] UNDP, Human Development Report, 1994, 101

[37] Drysdale, John. "1. Weber on Objectivity: Advocate or Critic?" In Max Weber's 'Objectivity' Reconsidered, 41. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016

[38] UNDP. "Trapped: High Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean". (2021): 6

[39] Juha A. Vuori, "Religion Bites: The Securitization of – and Desecuritization Moves by", securitization theory, *Routledge* (2011), 187

[40] Stahn, Carsten and Melber, Henning. "Human Security and ethics in the Spirit of Dag Hammarskjöld". *Cambridge University Press* (2014): 3

12.

While the practical implementation of the Nexus, some argue, would solve the 'drivers' and underlying root causes of conflict, it has yet to be problematised with the consideration of politicisation and securitisation at its core augmented by an extensive reading of the relevant historiography and interviews. Linda Martín Alcoff's treatment of Foucauldian normative epistemology recommends a conceptualisation of epistemology as the *"normative inquiry into the categories of knowledge, truth, justification, and belief […] not merely concerned with describing the ways in which human beings have claimed to know, but with considering how this has been done poorly, and how it might be done better.[41]"* This recommendation is employed to problematise the nexus dialogue, through securitisation theory.

Calls for harmonisation in assistance are not new but are renewed. Perhaps one of the best examples is linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development. This is a formative precursor of the dual and triple nexuses in numerous if not most ways. There are remarkable similarities and parallels to the 'security-development' nexus. However, as this study will find, the 'remarkable' nature of this topic is found in the dynamic of how both the dual and triple nexuses have been proposed hinting strongly at a plausible politicisation and securitisation of human insecurity along a self-referential bias (selection bias as invoked by Balzacq).[42] While this study recognises the arguments in favour of 'Peace' in the 'HDP' nexus, it follows the 'standard' order of the dual nexus, as the idea of peace is not mutually exclusive to development and security. Moreover, most arguments and even policy documents on the topic, even by the World Bank, still refer to the nexus mostly in the dual form.

As such, this study will in part address the question of what securitisation and 'human security' imply and why they matter in relation to relief and assistance efforts. The respective case

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41 Alcoff, Linda Martín. "Foucault's Normative EPISTEMOLOGY." *Wiley Online Library*, John Wiley & Sons, onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781118324905.ch9. (2013), 207

42 Balzacq, Thierry. "Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve". (Routledge 2011), 34-35

studies undertaken involve the promotion and adoption of the 'nexus dialogue' by development actors, like the World Bank Group and UN agencies, Humanitarian/CSO actors, such as Oxfam, and Peace actors like UN 'Assistance' Missions located throughout many of the regions impacted by protracted crises today.

1.2 **Methodology & Methods**

Though unable to cover all the relevant areas of 'knowing' and 'believing' in human security's policies and practices, this study seeks to expand on a discourse that is becoming increasingly relevant and worth considering. However, this discourse is still limited in terms of engagement by 'outsiders'. This helps to underscore the importance of a wider discourse by a larger audience, particularly at both the local, professional, and academic levels. Moreover, this study understands two critical criterion. One is the causal relationship between legitimacy and human security linked by 'visibility'. The second is an appreciation that, though parsimonious, 'better' investment in human capital and 'donor fatigue', seemingly counterintuitive when proposing reduced assistance, can be beneficial to building human capacity, and thus human security, bridging the gaps in the ability to meet local needs and their resolution. Afghanistan receive some of the highest sums of official development assistance and aid according to the World Bank.[43] Afghanistan had already become overwhelmingly dependant on outside assistance for absorbing shocks and maintaining confidence years before the withdrawal of US forces this year.[44] However, the solutions presented

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[43] "Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received (Current Us$)." *Data*, data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?most_recent_year_desc=true&view=map.

[44] Byrd, William "What Can Be Done to Revive Afghanistan's Economy?" *U.S. Institute of Peace.* (2016): pp. 2-5

by some are fairly reductionist and neoliberal conceptualisations of economic improvement-linked stability through reformed social structures.[45]

This thesis goes beyond functionalist understandings securitized by Nexus advocates in order to maintain a more critically reflective and well-rounded contribution. The framework is mixed qualitative with an emphasis on securitisation through an anti-positivist, interpretive, and inductive epistemology building on the theoretical discussions of security and development. Likewise, this work is a bid to further the envisaging of overlaps and possible areas and/or avenues towards collaboration and, thereby, collective outcomes as has been proposed by the adoption of the 'Nexus approach'. This methodological framework will help to conjecture the added value of this knowledge proposition, which is important at a time of still limited evidence.

This research will problematise the securitisation of humanitarianism, development, and peace with an emphasis on Afghanistan and Iraq on the basis of their protracted contexts, development challenges, and their drivers of fragility. The following assumptions are distinguished as lending themselves to this study through securitization (theory), as well as concepts of 'security' in order to:

a) Highlight the process in which a knowledge proposition is no longer imparted but rather instructed

b) Problematise the linkages between Humanitarianism, Development, and Peace actors.

c) Show that biases are applied in rights and resilience-based approaches, which do not inherently ensure the protection of civilians despite repeated references to such frameworks in the nexus dialogue.

d) Acknowledge the presence of an international human security culture to which the nexus is an addendum.

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[45] Ibid, 2-11

The following chapter will more closely familiarise readers with notions of changing security before undertaking case studies of securitising humanitarianism and securing development.

The supposition of securitization pertains to the 'Nexus dialogue' politicising and securitising protracted crises and 'drivers of fragility' and thereby human insecurity in the broader sense, also. To explore this hypothesis, this work undertakes to problematise several assumptions underlying the 'Nexus dialogue'. It does so through a mixed qualitative assessment of the 'nexus dialogue' in conjunction with humanitarian and Security Studies literature. Consequently, the methodology involves theories and concepts pertaining to security and development, such as the theory of change, as well as notions of 'security culture', 'security dispositive', 'human security' and their respective experiences.

Beyond discourse and qualitative analysis, the discussion undertakes an inductive approach to augment the value of the 'Nexus dialogue' by incorporating a series of interviews and responses by a number of representatives from several major institutions implementing or developing the 'Nexus'. To ensure the most honest responses, and thus the most accurate views of participants, this study abides by the Chatham House Rules to not disclose their identity. Beyond practical reasons for confidentiality, this ensures all participants's views receive equal weight.

Both the notions of 'security' as well as its derivatives, in both practical and theoretical sense, imply a 'recipient' - or referent object - for it deals with 'their' security and a 'risk' - or referent subject - to it.[46]

The knowledge proposition of a distinct security threat in Iraq emerged not in 2003 but earlier. Security - a realtime matrix of securitising movies invoking social and subjective norms - demonstrates arguments both in favour and in critique of 'nexus implementation,' subsumed in the

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[46] Thierry Balzacq. "Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve" (Routledge 2011), 35-37

wider nexus dialogue.[47] However, there is an illocutionary and performative character to much of the nexus dialogue that is undermining its effort to securitise insecurity.

1.3 **Limitations**

As stated above, this study focuses on the securitisation of humanitarianism and development, which limits the discussion on the incorporation of peace into the nexus. However, that allows this paper to focus on the key debates and maintain more coherence than otherwise, as 'peace' has been incorporated rather haphazardly.[48]

With diverse and competing notions of security across several discourses, this study acknowledges the constraints of reasonably accounting for all of their prescribed and normative features. While the main focus is on the idea of a 'security-development' nexus, this work attempts to simultaneously handle the question of incorporating "Peace" in the security-development nexus, although not in exhaustive detail. This is not to say that the peace component is not as inherently problematic as are the others.

Instead, this work attempts to incorporate modestly theoretical and secondary sources while interpreting primary and secondary evidence in case studies of humanitarianism and development, recognising limitations and recommendations for these sectors. The review of literature, though concurrent with this study itself, can still only offer a tentative perspective from which to critique the 'nexus dialogue' through a larger assemblage of security and development discussions. Likewise, this study cannot reasonably aim to fill all theoretical gaps although the interviews that were conducted seek to augment both the knowledge and the space for problematising notions of security and insecurity (where this has proven practicable for the scope).

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[47] Salter, Mark B "Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve" (Routledge 2011), Securitisation theory, 119

[48] ASPR, 32-34

This study acknowledges that its limited number of submissions is not necessarily reflective of all attitudes in the humanitarian apparatus, but discerns that it as a useful sample that allows all participants to speak freely on their experiences with fostering security and the nexus theories.

Although the number of interviews incorporated is fairly limited, 5 experts in relevant fields have generously offered their time and provided their insights during in-depth discussions on security and development, often in the context of Afghanistan and in some places with other examples, such as Iraq and the LAC (Latin America and the Caribbean).[49] This is augmented with public 'on-the-record' interviews that are also helpful in correlating the proposition of the 'triple nexus' with their sentiments and motivations. Since the methodology abides by the Chatham House rules, the names of interviewees in published reports will not be specified although these secondary sources are made available in the footnotes and references do include their subject matter. While this decision may seem somewhat arbitrary it would mark a departure from the methodology otherwise and compromise the equal weight of participants' views that is aimed at here.

Adding to this point, there are numerous theories and concepts that apply to this research, and the limitation of this work to entertain them all at at equal length or include them should incentivise further academic debate and discussions on the nexus. This work instead aims to provide a new way of assessing policy efforts and balancing understandings, neither in favour nor in critique, to provide a holistic view of the nexus dialogue and its raison d'être through the paradoxical proposition of securitising insecurity.

Lastly, while this study recognises that some scholars have, fairly, criticised the "philosophical-ontological space" of "mind–world dualism and phenomenalism"[50], it discerns that human security experiences and voices are a key indicator of causal relationships, trends and

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[49] UNDP. "Trapped: High Inequality in Latin America" (2021)

[50] Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. "The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics". *Routledge* (2016), 79-80

patterns on a contextual continuum. Regardless, it is recognised that there is no entirely dependable indicator that alone or in conjunction can fully foresee causes or solutions to human insecurity.

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Chapter 2 (Literature Review)

The preoccupation of the United Nations founders was with State security. When they spoke of creating a new system of collective security they meant it in the traditional military sense: a system in which States join together and pledge that aggression against one is aggression against all, and commit themselves in that event to react collectively. But they also understood well, long before the idea of human security gained currency, the indivisibility of security, economic development and human freedom. In the opening words of the Charter, the United Nations was created "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights" and "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom

Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.[51]

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[51] General Assembly, UN "A/59/565, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change" (2004), 11

2.1 'Securitisation' theory & the Nexus overlap

Securitisation of underlying insecurities is ongoing and the argument in favour of collaboration is well established. The argument that securitisation (and its adjoined theory) pertain to the most existential invocation of security, particularly in relation to the state, is not new. Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Matthias Leese describe it as a *"a type of security that is discursively tied to the highest possible political stakes, since it is about existential threats".*[52] Both they, as Paul Jackson (2020) conceptualise securitisation in relation to the state and its subjects over whom they exercise jurisdiction.[53] Dunn Cavelty and Leese's and Matt McDonald's (2011) methodologies problematise securitisation as a form of "hyper-politicisation"[54]. However, Dunn Cavelty and Leese invoke Lene Hansen (2012) to specifically propagate politicisation as a form of resistance *"to re-politicise issues that are already securitised or to keep issues from being securitised.*[55]*"* Dissimilar from this, McDonald sees veritable dangers in the politicisation of the asylum question in Australia a short distance from full securitisation.[56] McDonald's critique of deliberation on securitisation echoes criticisms afforded to the nexus; in particular, McDonald sees this as "narrow, reactionary and exclusive views that render the securitization of marginalised outsiders more likely" and echo

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[52] Cavelty, Myriam Dunn and Leese, Matthias. "Politicising Security at the Boundaries" (2018), 49; Jackson, Paul "Conceptions of Security". (Routledge Handbook of Peace, Security and Development 2020), 26

[53] Jackson, Paul "Conceptions of Security". (Routledge Handbook of Peace, Security and Development 2020), 27

[54] McDonald, Matt. "Deliberation and Resecuritization: Australia, Asylum- Seekers and the Normative Limits of the Copenhagen School" (Australian Journal of Political Science (2011), 46:2, 282

[55] Hansen, Lene. "Reconstructing Desecuritisation: The Normative-Political in the Copenhagen School and Directions for How to Apply it". (Review of International Studies 38, no. 3, 2012), 528 as cited in Cavelty, Myriam Dunn and Leese, Matthias. "Politicising Security at the Boundaries" (2018), 64

[56] McDonald, Matt. "Deliberation and Resecuritization: Australia, Asylum- Seekers and the Normative Limits of the Copenhagen School". (Australian Journal of Political Science 46:2, 2011), 283

certain aspects, such as visibility through the humanitarian dichotomy on non-interference and

neutrality.[57] Dunn Cavelty and Leese similarly elaborate on the dichotomy, inherent relationship,

and outward dynamic of these respective terms invoking Hansen (2012) in the following:

> *One form (securitisation) is dominated by the logic of urgency and the other*
>
> *(depoliticisation) by improving economic efficiency. Both engage with the repercussions of a*
>
> *subtraction of a pluralistic, legitimate and fair debate about policy issues from government.*
>
> *Subsequently, scholars have pondered how such a removal of proper politics from*
>
> *government could be prevented or reversed, in other words, how issues could be*
>
> *repoliticised or desecuritised*
>
> (Lene Hansen 2012).[58]

Securitisation is seen by numerous authors (Dunn Cavelty and Leese, Hansen, Haysmans, and

Wæver) as the capacity for undemocratic procedures, however there is disagreement as to whether

the 'speech act' of securitization is a politicising or depoliticising "answerability" or 'authorisation

of authority'.[59] The answerability of the nexus is caught in a similar dilemma. In most senses it is a

top-down imposition of an approach, seeking the acceptance of backers and donors, however it is

also an approach seeking the acceptance of local contexts and to spur bottom-up change and

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[57] Ibid, 284

[58] Hansen, Lene. "Reconstructing Desecuritisation: The Normative-Political in the Copenhagen School and Directions for How to Apply it". *Review of International Studies* 38, no. 3 (2012): 528 as cited in Cavelty, Myriam Dunn and Leese, Matthias "Politicising Security at the Boundaries: Privacy in Surveillance and Cybersecurity." *European Review of International Studies* 5, no. 3 (2018): 64

[59] Huysmans, Jef. "What's in an Act? On Security Speech Acts and Little Security Nothings." *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4–5 (August 2011): 373-374

development.[60] For instance, Justifications for the triple nexus include its "holistic and gender-transformative approach" and calls for leveraging the intersection between the localisation agenda and feminist approach to achieve greater agency and empowerment of women through exercising leadership[61] and through:

> Involving women's rights actors can help move humanitarian action beyond a 'one-size-fits-all approach' and tailor assistance to particular communities. Without such involvement, assistance can fail to understand a context and thus be ineffective
>
> (Lambert, et al. 2018).[62]

Gender and Diversity constitute one of the cross-cutting criteria for engagement among United Nations partners' frameworks, for instance, in GCR (Global Compact on Refugees), SDG (Sustainable Development Goals) UNHCR, and SDG UNDP contexts (Roberts 2020: 22; Concept Note 2018: 1-2). The same body of work elaborates on the challenges facing the Nexus, such as working across mandates, the pre-determined 'link to linking,' and meaningfully addressing needs of empowerment.[63] This constitutes an important perception of the Nexus not as a (passively or actively) reinvented humanitarian 'wheel,' but a mix of old and new.

Answerability is raised by a number of analysts of the Afghan contexts like Seth J Jones (2021) and Michael Hirsh interviewing Ryan Crocker (2021) establishing a traditional and state-

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60 ASPR, "The HDP Nexus in the Context of Peace Operations in Sub-Saharan Africa" Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH (2021): 32-34

61 Lambert et al. "A Feminist Approach to Localization: HOW CANADA CAN SUPPORT THE LEADERSHIP OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS ACTORS IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION". (Oxfam, 2018): 1-5)

62 Ibid, 6

63 Roberts, Rebecca. "Responding to Protracted Displacement Using the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus Approach: UNDP and UNHCR Theory of Change". (UNRISD 2020), 4; IASC Humanitarian-Development Nexus Task Team (HDN TT) Technical Support to the Field: 1-2

centric notion of security and securitisation, as well as their dilemmas and democratic normative features.[64] In relation to these traditional considerations, and in regard to what Hirsh remarks was a 'poor' military performance by the government even in 2019, former Ambassador Crocker questions, *"What's the doctrine? Where are the enablers? How are command decisions made?"*[65]

Citing extensive literature in the Critical Security Studies field, Beatrice de Graaf also discerns these expanding notions of security and the added value of a securitization theory to explore their underlying dynamics.[66] The spheres of politics and security, inherently intertwined, make acts "knowable and actionable.[67]" However, "contemporary expressions of (in)security and (under-)development […] spill over the well-worn frameworks for their understanding."[68] Security is thus both permeable and permeating. In Afghanistan, however, events are following a pre-determined pattern, one that has been suggested by Paul Howe (2019), and Ambassador Crocker (2019),[69] More recently, military insecurity has had a spillover into most other aspects of overall human security. Such spillovers can occur most anywhere, especially in the humanitarian field, which is distinct from the 'political' sphere, but is hardly apolitical. These questions still await a substantive answer but are outside of the realm of 'seemingly possible,' to answer to without foreign assistance and coordination, and some may inevitably lead to undemocratic procedures.

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[64] Jones, Seth G. "A Taliban Victory Is Not Inevitable: How to Prevent Catastrophe in a Post-American Afghanistan". (Foreign Affairs, 2021), par 13, par 13; Hirsh, Michael et al. "Ryan Crocker: The Taliban Will 'Retake the Country'." *Foreign Policy.* (28 Jan. 2019), para 10

[65] Hirsh, Michael et al. "Ryan Crocker: The Taliban Will 'Retake the Country'." *Foreign Policy*, (28 Jan. 2019): para 10

[66] De Graaf, Beatrice, and Zwierlein, Cornel. "Historicizing Security - Entering the Conspiracy Dispositive." *Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung 38, no. 1 (143)* (2013), 50

[67] Ibid, 49

[68] Stern M, Öjendal J. Mapping the Security—Development Nexus: Conflict, Complexity, Cacophony, Convergence? *Security Dialogue*. (2010): 17

[69] Howe, Paul. "The triple nexus: A potential approach to supporting the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals?" (World Development 2019), 3

Jones highlights this in sketching a tentative option of denying aid from Afghanistan as the Soviet Union had done.[70] While apparently Jones does not favour this route, as he discerns it would undoubtedly and exponentially worsen the situation, he includes as the first possible sanctions to use.[71] Jones then offers a tentative military solution in the form of 'armed overwatch'.[72] This a, still, limited solution that does not recognise the role of development in conflict and only tackles manifested violence's exponential trajectory, not the trend of increasing violence.

Dylan O'Driscoll and Dave van Zoonen (2017) discern similar challenges in the case of Iraq where the balance of socio-political interests and ethnic divisions have made the state prone to a 'disproportionate domination' and ethnosectarian nationalism (O'Driscoll 2015), as in 2014 when Iraq's shiite majority made up the bulwark of the Iraqi security apparatus.[73] As such, the 'answerability' of the Iraqi security was limited and in parts overtaken by that of militias who brokered their own security and peace along 'ethnosectarian lines'.[74] O'Driscoll and Zoonen discern the answerability of militias in their imaginative analogy of a double-edged sword entailing both positive and negative implications and not a lopsided affair.[75] This is shown by the securitisation of militias like the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in the fight against the Islamic State, just one of many militias in Iraq.

[70] Jones, Seth G. "A Taliban Victory Is Not Inevitable: How to Prevent Catastrophe in a Post-American Afghanistan". (Foreign Affairs, 2021), par 13

[71] Huysmans, Jef. "What's in an Act? On Security Speech Acts and Little Security Nothings." *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4–5 (August 2011), 373-374

[72] Seth G Jones, A Taliban Victory Is Not Inevitable: How to Prevent Catastrophe in a Post-American Afghanistan, (Foreign Affairs 2021), par 13.

[73] Cf. O'Driscoll, Dylan and van Zoonen, Dave. "The Hashd al-Shaabi and Iraq: subnationalism and the State". *Middle East Research Institute* (2017), 38-39; O'Driscoll, Dylan "Autonomy Impaired: Centralisation, Authoritarianism and the Failing Iraqi State". *Ethnopolitics* (2015), 1-18

[74] Ibid

[75] O'Driscoll, Dylan and van Zoonen, Dave. "The Hashd al-Shaabi and Iraq: subnationalism and the State". *Middle East Research Institute* (2017), 14

This is where restrictive and arbitrary considerations of security bear 'widening' to accommodate local realities as well as multilateral and non-governmental priorities, which through being brought together can then resolve the same subtraction of "*a pluralistic, legitimate and fair debate about policy*" that has taken hold in security and development discourses.[76] This is in many ways a Realpolitik approach to security where decisions and configurations have to be contextually and specifically mandated to meet most possible needs with a keen awareness of security gaps.

Otherwise, 'security' will sooner or later, but inevitably, take precedence over development, and this might then be challenged and politicised through boundary objects, such as privacy, according to Dunn Cavelty and Matthias Leese.[77] How the 'Nexus dialogue' is an instance of securitising human insecurity, has not been extensively deliberated and, this omission shows the limited engagement of this topic by the academic community considering the 'scholarly cachet' of securitisation.

Securitisation of human insecurity, while at first somewhat abstract, is relevant to ponder since securitization is associated with *"powerful mobilis[ing] that can help legitimise extraordinary responses and undemocratic procedures.[78]"* This underscores a need for critical reflection on all fronts, so as to abide by the 'Do No Harm' Principles that are an intrinsic instrument for proper humanitarianism, to properly legitimate these efforts. By invoking the humanitarian dichotomy, the nexus dialogue often takes on a performative cue with lofty aspirations. Being subjected to the

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[76] Cavelty, Myriam Dunn and Leese, Matthias "Politicising Security at the Boundaries: Privacy in Surveillance and Cybersecurity." *European Review of International Studies* 5, no. 3 (2018): 51

[77] Ibid, 63

[78] Wæver, Ole. "Securitization and Desecuritization," in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York/ Chichester: *Columbia University Press,* (1995): 46–86; Huysmans, Jef. "The Jargon of Exception – On Schmitt, Agamben and the Absence of Political Society," *International Political Sociology* 2, no. 2 (2008): 165–83; Buzan, Barry, Wæver, Ole and de Wilde, Jaap "Security: A New Framework for Analysis" *Boulder: Rienner.* (1998), **as cited in** Cavelty, Myriam Dunn and Leese, Matthias "Politicising Security at the Boundaries: Privacy in Surveillance and Cybersecurity." *European Review of International Studies* 5, no. 3 (2018): 49-69. Accessed July 31, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26593815.

security priorities of certain actors and stakeholders, 'utterances' in the name of humanitarianism are securitised. Oft repeated lines are further abstracted with limited theoretical discussions. This presents a 'grey' area in this discourse and an apparently undemocratic discursive employ. Moreover, this limits the substantive nature of discussions as well as the practical side of implementation.

Despite limited accounts of success in security-development(-peace) approaches, and through the 'New Ways of Working', that is not where the proverbial 'buck' stops (as Chandler argues in terms of democratising and burden/responsibility-sharing).[79] Certain exclamations on the nexus, what it is and what it can do, are better off avoided, as its elaboration is dependant on its ability to meet yet undetermined criteria where multiple solutions are proposed and wait for enactment.[80] Even so, in some contexts where security interventions have taken place, fragility continues to manifest from its underlying drivers, and the idea of the nexus is challenging to implement. This is not inherently due to the constituency of the approach being unhelpful to policymaking but the presence of certain 'sectoral and temporal gaps', such as in the 'answerability' of the nexus.[81]

2.2 **Notions of 'Security' and 'Development'**

What, then, are security and development? While discussions at the policy-level have elaborated the practical vision of "New Ways of Working," one of the major initiatives by the UN since the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, much is left to the imagination. Nonetheless, security is among the

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[79] Chandler, 364; Summary, High Level Workshop 7-9

[80] Summary Report of Multi-Stakeholder Regional Workshop on the New Way of Working for East/Southern Africa (2017), 3-7

[81] FAO, NRC, and UNDP. "Financing the Nexus: Gaps and Opportunities from a Field Perspective". (2019): 22-25

most influential invocations in socio-politics. It holds more sway than most any other term in

legitimating actors - or stakeholders - and their respective roles. Crucially, even militias have gained

political leverage through the provision of (social) security.[82] This is particularly problematic when

considering that 'security' and its dynamics are highly 'visible' yet rarely 'transparent' and that such

roles can be illegitimately served. The Security-Development Nexus, and thereafter the

Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, have emerged in a bid to widen the considerations of,

and measures for, security, however could be argued are *"subsumed, even thwarted, through [...]*

securitization".[83] Stern and Öjendal's work distinguish between six approaches and understandings

of security; the broadened realisation of human security includes *"feminist analysis of security as*

deeply gendered [...] throughout all of these moves to deepen, widen and humanize security, raising

vital questions of voice, identity, power and location".[84]

There is a normative ambition to both the dual and triple nexus; no one denies that the

international community should do more to ensure crises do not become protracted, but there is

disagreement as how to best achieve it particularly in regard to abiding by humanitarian principles.

David Chandler (2007) discerns that the security-development nexus *"betrays"* a separation

between rhetorical and practical considerations of implementing such an approach.[85] Chandler,

Maria Stern and Joakim Öjendal (2013), have voiced similar points on the security-development

nexus. Namely, as Stern and Öjendal's work shows, the nexus has been criticised for being a notion

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82 Dylan O'Driscoll and Dave van Zoonen, The Hashd al-Shaabi and Iraq: subnationalism and the State, (Middle East Research Institute 2017), 8

83 Stern, M., & Öjendal, J. 2013. Exploring the Security-Development Nexus. In R. Amer, A. Swain, & J. Öjendal (Eds.), *The Security-Development Nexus: Peace, Conflict and Development*, 23

84 Stern, M., & Öjendal, J. 2013. Exploring the Security-Development Nexus. In R. Amer, A. Swain, & J. Öjendal (Eds.), *The Security-Development Nexus: Peace, Conflict and Development.* (2013): 15

85 Chandler, D. "The security–development nexus and the rise of 'anti-foreign policy'. *J Int Relat Dev* **10,** 362–386 (2007): 362

of security that is inherently political on numerous key issues while lacking specificity on others.[86]

Citing Chandler, Stern and Öjendal see the terms 'security' and 'development' (and the nexus by

that logic) as a *"discursive constructions which create the reality they seem to reflect, and thus*

serve certain purposes and interests".[87] Stern and Öjendal certainly pinpoint their issue with

the*"broad sweeping brushstrokes"* of the security-development nexus, so has the 'HDP Nexus'

resolved the question of what security is or should entail?

2.3 **Reconceptualising State and the Individual**

In recent years, the concept of the security-development has undergone a reconceptualisation.

Human security is now understood as a shared outcome between "peace, security, and

development".[88] The security-development nexus was then redefined, along with its understanding

of security, but not the underlying assumption that beneficiaries' safety is interrelated with that of

the state (in which they reside and on which they depend for security).[89] Sara Hellmüller's (2020)

writing, in agreement with Dylan O'Driscoll and Dave van Zoonen (2017), takes stock of discourse

to support the assertion that certain actors' activities overlap with, or even replace, the efforts of the

state to provide security and social services (which O'Driscoll and van Zoonen show in their

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[86] Stern, M., & Öjendal, J. 2013. Exploring the Security-Development Nexus. In R. Amer, A. Swain, & J. Öjendal (Eds.), *The Security-Development Nexus: Peace, Conflict and Development.* (2013): 6-8

[87] Ibid, 15

[88] Mustafayeva, Aytakin. "Promoting peace and security through Sustainable Development Goal 16". *Routledge Handbook of Peace, Security and Development,* (2020): 264

[89] OECD, "The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice". *OECD Publishing* (2007), 13

assessment of militias).[90] Accordingly, Hellmüller contradicts the UN General Assembly's view of the differentiation of state and human security as (d) 'distinct from responsibility', (e) 'not replacing state security', and (f) 'national ownership'.[91]

As such, concepts like security remain contested and sometimes conflict with the roles of humanitarian, development, and peace actors, as "in conflict contexts, where the entire political system is redefined, and where individuals may act in various capacities.[92]" In the dual nexus the role of the government is described as a technical partner whereas in the context of the triple nexus, and with the addition of 'peace', the government's role widens into a central 'enabler'.[93] The state is to bear the proverbial cost of its citizens' security, so as to maintain its own and most obvious socio-economic prerogatives (security, development and justice).[94] In order to achieve this, for instance, the government should prioritise peace initiatives and economic recovery.[95] Collier et al. recognise that this can result in a trade-off between policies that promote security (by way of peace initiatives) and those that promote development (through economic initiatives).[96]

Aytakin Mustafayeva (2020), writing on promoting peace and security, is in agreement with Collier et al. (2003) on their understanding of the inherent challenge to 'notions of security' being

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[90] Hellmuller, Sarah. "The Role of Civil Society Actors in Peacemaking and Peacebuilding". *Routledge Handbook of Peace, Security and Development,* (2020): 408

[91] UN Resolution 66/290, 2

[92] Hellmuller, Sarah. "The Role of Civil Society Actors in Peacemaking and Peacebuilding". *Routledge Handbook of Peace, Security and Development,* (2020): 408

[93] FAO, NRC, and UNDP. "Financing the Nexus: Gaps and Opportunities from a Field Perspective". (2019): 17

[94] OECD, "The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice". *OECD Publishing* (2007) 13

[95] Collier, Paul et al. "Breaking the Conflict Trap : Civil War and Development Policy" *World Bank* (2003): 166

[96] Ibid

socio-economic in nature.[97] However, whereas Collier et al. destine that poorer countries can 'preserve peace through prudent policies'[98] Mustafayeva describes the 'Rwandan example' as a show of poor governance giving way to social conflict by way of underlying risk factors.[99] Regardless of whether or not, such risk factors were pertinent genocide at the scale witnessed in Rwanda would not have occurred without the complacency of the international community and its presence in Rwanda, a dimension of accountability that Mustafayeva does not problematise in his work. However, political incentives have undeniably impacted the dynamics of security.

2.4 **What Security and for Whom?**

A number of opinions on the security-development(-peace) nexus (Sasha Jesperson 2014; Kate Willis 2011) have been offered that show an agreement on the existence of numerous political dimensions to development.[100] Scholars, for instance, recognise that in assisting any side of a conflict the internal dynamics between diverging factions of that society will be impacted, however that is tantamount to agreeing that humanitarian efforts in themselves serve as a **'feedback' loop'** for

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[97] Cf. Mustafayeva, Aytakin. "Promoting peace and security through Sustainable Development Goal 16". *Routledge Handbook of Peace, Security and Development,* (2020): 265-67; Collier, Paul et al. "Breaking the Conflict Trap : Civil War and Development Policy" *World Bank* (2003): 108, 126,

[98] Ibid

[99] Mustafayeva, Aytakin. "Promoting peace and security through Sustainable Development Goal 16". *Routledge Handbook of Peace, Security and Development,* (2020): 265-66

[100] Cf. Mustafayeva, Aytakin. "Promoting peace and security through Sustainable Development Goal 16". *Routledge Handbook of Peace, Security and Development,* (2020): 265-66; Sasha Jesperson (2014), 110

violence. Collier et al. discern such 'feedback loops' as an indicator.[101] Others, like Willis see the threat to security that development can bring and the need for protectionist measures.[102]

Security Studies experts Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Matthias Leese (2018) also discern the contestation of security and problematise privacy as a boundary object *"to politicis[ing] security"* as a form of resistance to it.[103] However, it is in this same method, often by eluding members of society indirectly or even directly, that securitizing actors are able to undertake certain extraordinary measures, *"by instituting an imperative of secrecy.[104]"* Dunn Cavelty and Leese discern the principal question as being *"do we want politics of exceptional measures or do we want democratic politics of slow procedures which can be contested?"* Their answer is resoundingly in favour of normative commitment to good governance, such as *"democratic responsibility and accountability.[105]"*

The humanitarian invocation of security has at times failed to abide by normative commitments. All-too often, promises of contextually mandated 'peace', 'humanitarianism' and/or 'development' have failed to bear the fruit of 'positive' peace and therein a reduction of the overall underlying fragility. However, such invocations are not specific to the humanitarian sphere alone. The notion of 'security gaming' has been broached in Security Studies and by academics like Jef

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[101] Collier, Paul et al. "Breaking the Conflict Trap : Civil War and Development Policy" *World Bank* (2003): 84-87

[102] Willis, Kate. "Theories and Practices of Development" *Routledge* (2011): 202

[103] Cavelty, Myriam Dunn, and Matthias Leese. "Politicising Security at the Boundaries: Privacy in Surveillance and Cybersecurity." *European Review of International Studies* 5, no. 3 (2018): **ADD PAGE**

[104] Huysmans, Jef. "What's in an Act? On Security Speech Acts and Little Security Nothings." *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4–5 (August 2011): 373

[105] Cavelty, Myriam Dunn, and Matthias Leese. "Politicising Security at the Boundaries: Privacy in Surveillance and Cybersecurity." *European Review of International Studies* 5, no. 3 (2018): 51

Huysmans (2011) to promulgate security as a way of *"break[ing] [...] normal political rules"*[106].

Following in the direction of Engin Isin (2008), Huysman's ontology of security understands

security as an act that is perceived to imply the reconfiguration of relations and dynamics in ways

that are unchartered.[107] Huysmans describes 'ruptures,' which mark departures from prior practices

and are acted on by speech acts giving way to a political critique, also.[108] While certainly true in

some sense, securitization favours specific audiences especially for what Huysmans terms

'answerability' following Isin and Bakhtin.[109] The 'decoupling' of politics from certain rules and

realities, according to both national and multilateral priorities, allows for 'gaming' security as a

performative and employing it specifically, often skilfully, to cater to audiences' needs or wants.

More specifically, Huysmans expounds the following:

> *The 'realization' of an act consists of the creation of a rupturing scene itself, irrespective of*
>
> *its acceptance and institutionalization. 'To act, then, is neither arriving at a scene nor*
>
> *fleeing from it, but actually engaging in its creation' (Isin 2008, 27). What matters is that*
>
> *the scene is brought into existence as 'an assemblage of acts, actions and actors in a*
>
> *historically and geographically concrete situation' (Isin 2008, 24) because actors remain at*
>
> *the rupturing scene rather than flee from it.*

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[106] Huysmans, Jef. "What's in an Act? On Security Speech Acts and Little Security Nothings." *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4–5 (August 2011): 372-373

[107] Isin EF (2008) Theorizing acts of citizenship. In: Isin EF and Nielsen GM (eds) *Acts of Citizenship*. London:
Zed, 15–43 as cited Huysmans, Jef. "What's in an Act? On Security Speech Acts and Little Security Nothings." *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4–5 (August 2011): 372-373

[108] Huysmans, Jef. "What's in an Act? On Security Speech Acts and Little Security Nothings." *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4–5 (August 2011): 374

[109] Ibid: 374, 379

Speech acts rupture a given situation in a decision to create.[110]

Security in the context of the dual(security-development and triple (H-D-P) Nexuses aims to, likewise, 'rupture' the scene of insecurity instead of fleeing from it. The crucial difference mainly being the Peace component. Both resemble a dedication to creating an uncontested path toward 'durable solutions' and thus perform as rhetorical speech acts outside of their policy purpose. As such, adding 'Peace' to an already robustly rhetorical exercise does not have any inherent purchase outside of donor communities. Both security-development and H-D-P are remarkably assured that linking separate scopes of humanitarianism with development, (and peace) into collaborative efforts and collective goals will help to "support" the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and will achieve more along the lines of the '2030 Agenda'.[111]

Accordingly, while the 'HDP dialogue' conceptualises various notions of security as highly intricate and interrelated, yet also generalises some understandings and precedes substantive evidence, thus is not 'highly' evolved yet.[112] Security, in this sense, has undergone both an ontological as well as epistemic reconfiguration with the passage of time and with the changing dynamic of an evolving international arena, which subjugates it and 'plays' security in different ways. Security is ongoing and will in fact remain time-bound continually balancing certain interests and imply specific meanings to those who evoke in dissimilar places and different times and fit into new or old patterns and/or trends, likewise.

Humanitarian literature emphasises the importance of recognising not only trends but

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[110] EF, Isin. "Theorizing acts of citizenship" In: Isin EF and Nielsen GM (eds) *Acts of Citizenship*. London: Zed. (2008), 15–43 as cited in Huysmans, Jef. "What's in an Act? On Security Speech Acts and Little Security Nothings." *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4–5 (August 2011): 373

[111] OCHA. "COLLECTIVE OUTCOMES Operationalizing the New Way of Working" (2018): 1-3

[112] Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. "The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics". (Routledge 2016): 58

'patterns' to which some have likened the 'international security' apparatus (or security culture).[113] The 1994 Human Development Report, heavily emphasising patterns to indicate both referent subjective life and referent objective threats to it, was a defining point for 'human security'.[114] In such a way the conception of 'patterns" is a possible misnomer for the dynamics of society itself that can give rise to predictable repetition. The dynamic of politicisation, securitisation and de-politicisation, require the participation of a legitimating audience to act as an ad-hoc stakeholder.[115] It is not the repetition, and pattern, of this fact that allows legitimisation but the underlying dynamic at play. Yet, the effort to legitimate humanitarianism dates back to at least the 1950s when, as Carsten Stahn and Henning Melber (2014) put it, former Secretary-General of the UN, Dag Hammarskjöld "traced the contours of a 'United Nations ideology', based on Christian and universal notions".[116]

While there are worsening trends in human security, there are no practicable reasons to generalise an approach or universal notions of security especially on the basis of predictable repetition from one context to another. Yet, these understandings of conjunctions, 'patterns', or as Paul Howe terms (2019) "action bundles" in nexus thinking are overstated, increasingly widespread and "directed towards the development of 'higher forms of an international society'.[117]" Stahn and Melber see efforts to legitimate the UN undercut by respective national agendas, which is not

[113] Buzan, Barry, and Wæver, Ole. "Regions and Powers : The Structure of International Security", *Cambridge University Press*. (2003): 3, 14, 17, 41, 46-7, 51-52, 55, 61-5, 72-3

[114] UNDP, "Human Development Report" *Oxford University Press* (1994): 101

[115] Hopf, Ted. "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations" *International Security Vol. 23, No. 1* (1998): 178

[116] Stahn, Carsten and Melber, Henning. "Human Security and ethics in the Spirit of Dag Hammarskjöld". *Cambridge University Press* (2014): 3

[117] Cf. Ibid, 2; Howe, Paul. "The triple nexus: A potential approach to supporting the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals?" *World Development* (2019): 124

tantamount to saying that the UN, or the idea of peacekeeping, has failed altogether.[118] Some CSOs

also defend institutional practices and patterns (ASPR 2021, 2) finding that the nexus should 'work

with the grain' of established means. However, the nexus is seen as a 'gain of function' exercise by

many who are critical of the emerging pattern of failures in protracted settings and argue that these

need to be solved through a re-thinking of efforts and through 'best practice' templates like the

"1960 Indus Waters Treaty, which divides the Indus River tributaries between India and

Pakistan"[119].

The conceptualisation of the nexus along with its 'best practices' and 'guiding principles'

'promise' to address situations of *manifested* or *underlying* fragility and their dilemmas, although

this is a work still in progress with a number of limitations.[120] Howe, for instance, discerns six areas

of concern in implementing the HDP nexus: conflicts, trade-offs, monitoring, redundancy, and

exclusion. Howe distinguishes the humanitarian-development's neutrality, impartiality and

operational independence as compared with development's state-centric approach to fostering

human security.[121] However, where Howe sees room for 'repeatable bundles' or actions "undertaken

at predictable intervals" Kaldor, in her 'New Wars' thesis (2013) argues against notions of

predictability.[122] As time progresses, contexts will evolve into new sets of interrelated dynamics and

the ability to rely on prior frameworks may not be realistic or achievable. Kaldor's work presents an

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[118] Stahn, Carsten and Melber, Henning. "Human Security and ethics in the Spirit of Dag Hammarskjöld". *Cambridge University Press* (2014): 4-6

119 OCHA, WORLD HUMANITARIAN DATA AND TRENDS
 https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/WHDT2018_web_final_spread.pdf, (2018): 35

[120] ASPR, "The HDP Nexus in the Context of Peace Operations in Sub-Saharan Africa" Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH (2021): 4

[121] Howe, Paul. "The triple nexus: A potential approach to supporting the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals?" *World Development* (2019): 124

[122] Kaldor, M. "In Defence of New Wars." *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*. (2013): 5

awareness of this and recognises the need for changing development approaches to conflict drivers.[123]

The end of the Cold War saw a strategic shift in national priorities made possible by the thawing of tensions between East and West.[124] A new resolve was born to integrate ‘humanity’ into ‘security’ and to outwit the remaining socio-political issues, such as poverty, conflict, and disease. Accordingly, security in the ontological has undergone transformations under the rubric of time, space, and even leadership. **Security, thus, in changing leads both to paradoxes and dilemmas where one’s increased capacity for security implies stagnation of the other’s and a resulting dynamic of tension and/or conflict.[125]** This is one of the most obvious drivers of intra-state conflicts. However, since the late 1980s conflicts have become increasingly complex, state-centric, and intractable. The challenges of these contexts apply to both certain beneficiaries and stakeholders. As such, the pursuit of security has become an increasingly intra-state challenge.

2.5 **Security Gaps**

The notion of ‘human security’ has its supporters and critics. Edward Newman, however, can be best described as a security pragmatist. Like Willy Bruggeman, Newman describes the “policy movement around human security following the end of the Cold War” as a way to augment “non-

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[123] Kaldor, M. “In Defence of New Wars.” *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*. (2013): 4

[124] Cf. Bruggeman, Willy. "Failing Global Justice and Human Security." In *The Viability of Human Security*, edited by Den Boer Monica and De Wilde Jaap, 47-70. *Amsterdam University Press*, (2008): 47-50 ; Mustafayeva, Aytakin. “Promoting peace and security through Sustainable Development Goal 16”. *Routledge Handbook oF Peace, Security and Development,* (2020): 264

[125] Gassmann, Pierre. “Rethinking humanitarian security”. *Humanitarian Policy Network* (July 2005): 32-34

traditional" security[126] and regards it as oriented around the referent "principal beneficiary.[127]" Whereas it follows logically that the situation of civilians, the referent beneficiaries, is impacted by war and violence, and thus human security in the broadest sense, certain actors have fundamental disagreements on this. This is particularly true for the United Nations who adopted Resolution 66/290 distinguishing between the 'Responsibility to Protect' (commonly referred to as R2P), and 'human security'. Ostensibly, since the R2P framework seeks to foster human security there is a crucial interlinkage that can't be overlooked. Newman skilfully raises this fault line from the perspective of human security supporters who would argue to the contrary that the notion of human security and the Responsibility to Protect are indistinguishable.[128] This is particularly relevant in contextualising the role of the international community where it relates to 'security interventions' and stakeholders in those processes.

According to Resolution 66/290 state security is not replaced by human security, although many concerns have been raised on this point, also. Among them Newman exclaims that "the UN conception of human security does not acknowledge that states may sometimes be the primary threat to human security".[129] This is an oft repeated concern in relation to the 'Nexus dialogue' where the necessary breadth of the approach implies 'security gaps' and sometimes questionable collaboration. However, some see this enhanced collaboration as inherently a part of the process and even "well accepted".[130] Newman describes the evolution of literature on security being

[126] Newman, Edward. "Human Security". *Routledge Handbook oF Peace, Security and Development* (2020): p. 33; Bruggeman, Willy. "Failing Global Justice and Human Security." In *The Viability of Human Security*, edited by Den Boer Monica and De Wilde Jaap, 47-70. *Amsterdam University Press*, (2008): 49, 52, 55-57, 60, 62

[127] Newman, Edward. "Human Security". *Routledge Handbook oF Peace, Security and Development* (2020): 33

[128] Ibid, 35

[129] Ibid

[130] ASPR, "The HDP Nexus in the Context of Peace Operations in Sub-Saharan Africa" Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH (2021): 4

challenged on the basis of its state-centric approach and the considerations of how security is

"defined and applied.[131]" Conversely, Aytakin Mustafayeva describes the enlargement of the notion

of security and the role of the 1987 Brundtland Commission Report which "highlighted that

insecurities arise not only from military and political threats but also from development-related

challenges.[132]" This approach to human security resonates with intentions of the proposed

enlargement of humanitarian efforts through the HDP nexus, although Newman launches a more

robust problematisation of 'security' than some 'nexus dialogue' authors have been willing to do

with the underlying 'Nexus' assumptions. Newman describes the limitations of human security in

the intent of stakeholders, lack of critical and theoretical engagement, as it relates to securitisation,

and the legitimising factor for "existing institutions of power.[133]"

Barry Buzan, one of the founders of the Copenhagen School, takes an even more skeptical

view of the capacity, or far more likely idealisation, of "security as the desired end goal." Buzan

sees the term 'human security' as inherently problematic and overlaying human rights; what's more

Buzan sees it as *"mixing up the quite different agendas of international security, on the one hand,*

and social security and civil liberties, on the other.[134]" The idea of 'mixing up agendas' evokes the

'Nexus dialogue' to those who have attempted to extricate meaning from it. Buzan sees human

security as a reductionist attempt *"to collapse all the possible referent objects for security into a*

single one, human security" thereby excluding "the claims of both collective and non-human (e.g.

environmental) referent objects in a way that defies both other moral claims and the actual practices

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[131] Newman, Edward. "Human Security". *Routledge Handbook oF Peace, Security and Development* (2020): 35

[132] Mustafayeva, Aytakin. "Promoting peace and security through Sustainable Development Goal 16". *Routledge Handbook oF Peace, Security and Development,* (2020): 264

[133] Newman, Edward. "Human Security". *Routledge Handbook oF Peace, Security and Development* (2020): 37

[134] Buzan, B. "A Reductionist, Idealistic Notion that Adds Little Analytical Value". *Security Dialogue,* vol 35, no 3, (2004): pp. 369-70

of securitization.[135]" Buzan's argument is relevant, as the Nexus attempts a colossal undertaking and presents numerous overlaps with these notions of 'human security'. Security conflicts are emerging as the cost of interventions in a number of contexts. Here, security is not assured in the underlying sense and its objective concerns humanitarians just as much as the beneficiaries of fragile contexts. There are measures to mitigate risks and e*ffective security risk management by fostering "a positive security culture in your organisation [that] will require a collective sense of awareness and responsibility among all staff;[136]"* However, none of these will fully resolve security conflicts. As such, security provided in the assistance form to beneficiaries remains 'conflicted'.

Accordingly, security practices, and gaps, have emerged not hermeneutically but specific to the context and history of interventions. Pierre Gassmann (2005) describes the "faulty appraisals of local conditions" as one of the primary reasons that led to the destructive bombing of the UN presence in Iraq in 2003. This was a security gap in the humanitarian perspective and a wakeup to humanitarian actors, ones who sought to mitigate the effects of war in Iraq, that they themselves were also targets of the conflict. They would have to be perceived differently at any cost.

The notion of security that emerged was of helping Iraqis that had to be helped and excluding Iraqis who had to be excluded (maintaining physical and other separation from perceived threats). The attack on the UN on August 19th highlights an omission to contextual understanding that left scores dead including the head of mission Sérgio Vieira de Mello. One participant interviewed, an acquaintance and colleague of de Mello, provided some insight to de Mello's work in East Timor and Iraq. According to the participant, de Mello was keenly aware of the situation in Iraq and recognised the danger his work entailed. However, in the context of Iraq, Gassman blames

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135 Ibid

136 Bickley, S. "Security Risk Management: a basic guide for smaller NGOs." *European Interagency Security Forum* (EISF) (2017): 11

faulty considerations of security by the UN, of which locally de Mello was in charge of at the outbreak of wartime.

Similar to de Mello's bid to de-securitise assistance efforts in Iraq, some see a burdensome emphasis on security in the security-development configuration like Katie Willis (2011) and Sasha Jesperson (2014). They see security-development as dominated by security prerogatives and prone to politicisation.[137] Jesperson sees pitfalls in such a developmental security, for instance highlighting the experiences of the West African Coast Initiative where the status quo remained and *"processes followed a traditional security approach, with elements of development added on"* Jesperson sees both the security value of development and the value of securitisation:

> *The implementation of the security-development nexus through a security lens appears to support the arguments on the securitisation of development, as development is implemented to enhance security outcomes.*

Sasha Jesperson (2014)[138]

Security is both transformative and transformed, created and creating.[139] Widely-regarded academics appear to problematise notions and implied costs of security. One is Johan Galtung who conceives positive peace possibly understood as a form of 'emphatic human security'. Such a security is wholehearted and unambiguous, as is positive peace broached by Galtung. Emphatic security resolves both manifested and underlying fragility, so that society could become prosperous and free, although peace theory has itself been subject to change and Samir Kr Das (2004)

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[137] Jesperson, Sasha. "Inhibiting Integration? Tensions in the Security- Development Nexus in Sierra Leone and Bosnia- Herzegovina. *London School of Economics* (2014): 206

[138] Ibid, 11

[139] Thierry Balzacq. "Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve" (Routledge 2011), 22

recognises it has increasingly failed to foresee the aftermath of the Cold War.[140] One cognisant

takeaways for Das is that this has shown the futility and counter-productiveness of applying

universality to our socio-political structures.[141]

The remarkable demise of the bipolar world order saw a strategic shift in national priorities

made possible by thawing Cold War tensions.[142] Liberal principles had prevailed, or so it was

thought. This would impact the international order as well as its responses to conflict and protracted

crises. The 'euphoria' of the moment was misguided, as the world order would not resolve the

underlying security dilemma, but would instead slowly grow the "Post Cold War […] in its mirror

image.[143]" For Willy Bruggeman, this was a missed opportunity to resolve the intersecting issues of

civil conflict and bad governance.[144] Socio-political issues are interrelated and multifaceted as

presented in issues of "[c]orruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability

[that] corrode states from within and contribute to regional insecurity."[145] There is a price to be

paid, according to Bruggeman's who recognises that we live in an interrelated society in which the

"wellbeing of millions in the developing world" can be jeopardised by extremist attacks anywhere

in the "industrial world.[146]"

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[140] Das, Samir Kr "Peace Studies An Introduction To the Concept, Scope, and Themes" (2004):
19-30

[141] Ibid

[142] Cf. Bruggeman, Willy. "Failing Global Justice and Human Security." In *The Viability of Human Security*, edited by Den Boer Monica and De Wilde Jaap, 47-70. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008, 47-50 ; Mustafayeva, Aytakin. "Promoting peace and security through Sustainable Development Goal 16". *Routledge Handbook of Peace, Security and Development,* (2020): 264

[143] Bruggeman, Willy. "Failing Global Justice and Human Security." In *The Viability of Human Security*, edited by Den Boer Monica and De Wilde Jaap, 47-70. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008, 47-50

[144] Ibid

[145] Ibid

[146] Ibid

The notion of security, through the constructivist prism, is one from which multiple, often competing, realities can be constructed or construed. As such, securitization of insecurity can be - and has been - a nefarious activity (the Bush Administration's decision to 'politicise' and 'securitise' non-existent weapons of mass destruction led to a major security gap for Iraqis between 2003 and the withdrawal of the coalition).

Chapter 3
Securitising Insecurity

3.1 Securitising Humanitarianism

The argument that propagates states as inextricably involved with the humanitarian process is limiting in principle, as there is no guarantee a 'state' will continue to exist - as shown by Afghanistan's faltering situation - or that it will be a noble actor when humanitarian frameworks and guiding principles can only guide in principle. Some scholars discern:

> the essence of human security […] shifts […] referent of the concept of security from the state to the individual (and to particularly vulnerable groups such as women and children). In discourse on human security, state sovereignty and the primacy of the state are justified only to the extent that the state's claim to protect the people within its boundaries is credible.
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> **Neil Macfarlane S. (2004).**[147]

The securitisation of insecurity, and humanitarian efforts, can thus be seen as a dialectic move to counter

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[147] McFarlane, Neil "A Useful Concept that Risks Losing Its Political Salience, *Security Dialogue, vol 35, no 3,* (2004), 368-9

fragility through the proposed proximity of state and self, however the emphasis is increasingly placed on the latter in the midst of changing paradigms and the securitising of humanitarian efforts.[148] This is best described as in Jef Huysman's (2011) ontology citing Isin (2008) wherein *"[s]peech acts rupture a given situation in a decision to create"* or in terms of Thierry Balzacq's (2011) *"bringing threats into being"* analogy.[149] In such a way, there is at times a dynamic in the humanitarian sphere, which promotes and furthers respective agendas and efforts through the self-referential construction and perception of dangers and solutions; Weber has supported this phenomena in line with his views on historical, and nomological, sciences.[150]

Selection bias is integral to politicising and securitising insecurity. A self-referential bias in the humanitarian policy scheme proves selectivity and echoes Alexander Wendt's (1992) description of the international regime as self-serving and anarchic. In a similar vein, Balzacq discerns the issue of self-referential bias, and recognises that discursive means are rhetorical employs with underlying technocratic concerns.[151] Selection biases, such as through policy and procedures, make themselves known as shared knowledge propositions (if a securitising move is felicitous)[152] undertaking a specified and specific course of action, i.e 'breaking down silos' between humanitarian, development, and peace actors, so that durable solutions will culminate.[153]

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[148] Ibid

[149] Cf. EF, Isin (2008) Theorizing acts of citizenship. In: Isin EF and Nielsen GM (eds) *Acts of Citizenship*. London: Zed, 15–43 as cited in Huysmans, Jef. "What's in an Act? On Security Speech Acts and Little Security Nothings." *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4–5 (August 2011): 373; Balzacq, Thierry. "Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve" (Routledge 2011), 3-12

[150] Drysdale, John. "1. Weber on Objectivity: Advocate or Critic?" In Max Weber's 'Objectivity' Reconsidered, *Toronto: University of Toronto Press.* (2016), 40

[151] Thierry Balzacq. "Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve" (Routledge 2011), 71

[152] Ibid, 5

[153] Fanning, Emma and Fullwood-Thomas Jessica. "THE HUMANITARIAN-DEVELOPMENT-PEACE NEXUS: What does it mean for multi-mandated organizations?" *Oxfam* (2019) pp. 5-7

Stephan Keukeleire and Kolja Raube (2013) sketch a tentative move toward what could be termed 'selections' and 'patterns' of security invoking Buzan, Hansen, and Waever's terms covering an audiences, or referent subject's, acceptance or rejection of perceived threats and a dynamic of perceived interests and stakes, such as economic prerogatives.[154] Keukeleire and Raube (2013) cite Chandler (2007) to promote more holistic and inward-looking assessments of the nexus, though perhaps not entirely.

Employing Huysman's ruptures helps tentatively explore how the humanitarian and development sectors are securitised and securitising through the selection of its proposed policies and practices. Thus, there is a connection between the process of selections of security and departures in procedures during both politicising and securitising moves. Some primary evidence points to the bias in answerability in the form of what the World Bank Group (2019) refers to as "evaluability" inherently rife with the assumption that stakeholders can agree on what to evaluate and how to evaluate it.[155] This bid by the WBG to 'build an evaluation culture', akin to Mary Kaldor and Christopher Daase's security culture, can be perceived as a rupture in 'what works' and 'identifying lessons'.[156] One of the selected biases of the WBG's philosophy is in assuming that assessments of capacities will practicably help to foster human security along the lines of a dual commonality and social construction of an assemblage.[157] To this point, the WBG has stated that *"development of evaluation capacity is a major strategic focus"[158]* This may prove particularly true as the thinking, language, and presentation of the World Bank Group and its strategic interests are increasingly noticeable in humanitarian literature, such as in the triple nexus dialogue.

Scholars and participants recognise and problematise discursive departures (or ruptures) in

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154 Keukeleire, Stephan and Raube, Kolja. "The security–development nexus and securitization in the EU's policies towards developing countries". *Cambridge Review of International Affairs.* (2013), pp. 2, 9

155 World Bank Group. "Evaluation Principles" (2019): 11

156 Ibid, 1

157 Ibid, 11

158 Ibid, 15

augmenting space for plausible politicisation and securitisation of development and humanitarian

assistance along the lines of an assumed development-induced conflict dynamic (or vice versa with

a conflict-induced development dynamic as per the World Bank Group and Collier et al.).[159]

Securitisation accorded to these views is many things, both tangible and non-tangible,

discursive and non-discursive, and focally, a means and an end. Maria Julia Trombetta (2011) sees a

mutual dynamic whereby securitisation is both fostering politicisation of issues and being fostered by the

politicisation of issues.[160]

What remains unfaltering is the presupposition of an 'answerability' namely in the form of a

dynamic between the 'securitiser' and the entity (or entities) receiving security as the referent

subjects.[161] This dynamic involves choosing threats and solutions with an underlying self-

referential motivation and starting point. This is supported by interviewees as well as security-

development scholars alike recognising, as Patrick Thaddeus Jackson (2016) does (citing Habermas

1990), the ontological basis of security's legibility substantiates its empirical foundations toward

politicising, legitimating, securitising, and in different ways exploiting the discursive practice of

[159] Cf. Fast, Larissa. "Securitization". (Humanitarianism: Keywords, 2020), 191 citing Duffield, M. "Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security". (Zed Books, 2001), 7; Chandler, D. "The security–development nexus and the rise of 'anti-foreign policy'. *J Int Relat Dev* 10, 362–386 (2007): pp. 364, 372, 374-381; Howe, Paul. "The triple nexus: A potential approach to supporting the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals?" *World Development* (2019), 11; Collier, Paul et al. 2003. "Breaking the conflict trap: civil war and development policy" (2003) Overview, 2

[160] Trombetta, Maria Julia. "Rethinking the securitization of the environment: Old beliefs, new insights" in *Securitisation Theory. Routledge* (2010),142

[161] Huysmans, Jef. "What's in an Act? On Security Speech Acts and Little Security Nothings." *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4–5 (August 2011): 373-374

'world disclosing' in policy streams.[162] In accordance with these views, not all of security is 'seen' or transparent to the public, and not all security is measured in objective terms.[163]

The perception and reception of (in)security is in these cases then dependant upon a privy or wary public, often the core legitimating factor, in the formulation, participation, acknowledgement, or rejection of self-referential threats as triggered by Western-centric 'political elites'.[164]

In 2012, Oxfam rejected such a securitising move to ascend to the neutrality principle within the context of cross-sector engagement stating:

> "Oxfam assumes that defending and promoting rights could be the basis of many conflicts. Oxfam does take its own stand in the analysis of the conflicts that provoke disempowerment of people's rights and takes position on it. This position is not translated into partisan action which would work against our independence and impartiality principle, but guide the best strategy to apply at each moment"
>
> (Oxfam 2012).[165]

Sasha Jesperson (2014), in a seminal work on the nexus in a Bosnian context highlights securitisation citing Duffield (2007; 2010), and persuades a more nexus receptive audience than some of the broader range of critiques. What's more, Jesperson losses the relevance of some arguments in this work when stating that *"calls for 'desecuritisation' aim to discard the nexus*

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[162] Cf. Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. "The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics". *Routledge* (2016): 58-59; Jesperson, Sasha. "Inhibiting Integration? Tensions in the Security- Development Nexus in Sierra Leone and Bosnia- Herzegovina" *London School of Economics* (2014), 3 ; Balzacq, Thierry. "Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve". *Routledge* (2011): 70

[163] UNDP. "Trapped: High Inequality in Latin America" (2021), 7

[164] Balzacq, Thierry. "Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve" (Routledge 2011), 12

[165] Oxfam, "The Oxfam Humanitarian Dossier" (2012), 16

without considering the potential benefits it can bring to post-conflict reconstruction."[166] This is superfluous if not contentious. Jesperson - in stating this - disregards a critical mass of expert opinions that arrive at their critique of a nexus approach, whether in dual or triple formulation, as posing a substantive security gap on the basis of the potential benefits offsetting the potential risks (or vice versa). There have been relatively few calls to re-think nexus priorities, crucially where it relates to funding and humanitarian principles, however public rebuke has been even rarer, such as on the occasion of Medicins san frontier's attempt to 'de-securitise' humanitarianism in the nexus agenda.[167] Moreover, and despite this, there have been no consistent efforts or movements to counter the rise and spread of the nexus dialogue. This is not the same as implying that the securitisation of humanitarianism is not real and veritable. Jocelyn Vaughn's (2009) work highlights the dynamic of securitisation as *"determined by an audience's conviction [...] that inaction jeopardizes its survival"[168]*

An example demonstrating securitisation along such a dynamic can be extrapolated from the experiences of certain camps.

Some have become increasingly excluded, politicised, or securitised by their host communities; Matt McDonald (2011) discerns this phenomena in the Australian politicisation of the asylum question, as asylum-seekers live tangentially to society and become increasingly pawned or securitised by becoming socially imbued and construed as threats to security (sovereignty, health, society) and as the 'other' necessitating social exclusion.[169] Crucially, refugee camps lack

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[166] Sasha Jesperson. "Inhibiting Integration? Tensions in the Security- Development Nexus in Sierra Leone and Bosnia- Herzegovina" (LSE 2014), 12

[167] Belliveau, Joe. "Development and humanitarian action are not the same: MSF Canada's Joe Belliveau on the errors of the UN's 'Nexus' approach". (20 November 2019), para 11-12

[168] Vaughn, Jocelyn. **"**The Unlikely Securitizer: Humanitarian Organizations and the Securitization of Indistinctiveness". *University of Exeter* (2009): 266

[169] McDonald, Matt. "Deliberation and Resecuritization: Australia, Asylum- Seekers and the Normative Limits of the Copenhagen School". *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 46:2 (2011), 281

fundamental humanity and dignity paving the way toward further socio-political disenfranchisement and security dilemmas.

Refugee camps have on numerous occasions and in numerous contexts come under attack in both the physical and political senses. Likewise, a number of camps have sourced insecurity through combatants against the state and the explicit use of violence 'embodying' the securitisation of humanitarianism (and displacement) through their participation in such acts. Others have held former ISIL members. A Wall Street Journal report (2021) by Isabel Coles and Benoit Faucon found in the place of one camp "a mini-caliphate itself, where female leaders nurture the group's violent ideology and run money-making schemes that help keep the insurgency alive outside the razor wire."

Whether internally or externally displaced, part of the overwhelmingly civilian majority in camps or not, refugees are in fact disparately vulnerable to socio-political repercussions and persecution according to one participant with "Humanitarian" and "Peace" experience.

Through a dilemma of competing interests, some camps become zones of insecurity for both those who are assisted and assisting in them. In such a view, war not only causes and perpetuates underdevelopment (and conversely as per Collier et al.) conflicts do the same to grievances and perceived stakes. However, it could be said - according to Chandler - that the nexus securitises stakes rather than insecurity itself by attempting to shift responsibility whilst also attempting to simultaneously achieve legitimacy for itself.[170]

To make things inextricably worse, the Covid-19 Pandemic is quite possibly the major securitising event that the humanitarian security culture has had to endure to date. An invisible referent object, in this case a virus, jeopardises the referent subject of global public health. The UN Secretary-General spoke this year at the Global Humanitarian Overview in Geneva and

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[170] Chandler, D. "The security–development nexus and the rise of 'anti-foreign policy'." *J Int Relat Dev* (2007) 10, 371-378; 381

stated *"the impact of the global pandemic continues to worsen. Together, we must mobilize resources and stand in solidarity with people in their darkest hour of need."*[171] There is a striking disconnect between the rhetorical and practical urgencies of such a statement when made from one of the quintessentially prosperous, stabile, and developed nations on the planet. Carsten Stahn and Henning Melber (2014) refer to Dag Hammarskjöld's vision for the UN as an 'ideology' with a conjecture of Universal and Western morals .[172] These sentiments are still alive and prominently-situated in the philosophy of the nexus.

It is not only humanitarianism in the practical sense that is undergoing securitisation evidenced by these experiences. It is undergoing a policy shift along the same lines. In order to decipher a process in which a perceived world view is no longer imparted but instructed, in line with the methodology's undertaking, it is relevant to consider the backdrop. What is causing the securitisation of humanitarianism and its policies? Moreover, where does this process become instructed and implemented?

In many ways, and true to the sentiments of securitisation and security-development scholarship and some of the interviews conducted, there have been expressions of concern particularly in relation to legitimating efforts of humanitarian assistance.[173] As Jocelyn Vaughn (2009) has very well-described:

Humanitarian organizations overcome the questionable legitimacy of their primary referent object (the organization itself) by associating its survival with the survival of referent objects that possess a greater claim to legitimacy. Said otherwise, humanitarian securitizers argue that threats to one organization in one locale also existentially threaten the survival of local beneficiaries and the survival of the greater humanitarian project.

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[171] Guterres, António United Nations Secretary-General "Launch of the Global Humanitarian Overview" (2021)

[172] Stahn, Carsten and Melber, Henning. "Human Security and ethics in the Spirit of Dag Hammarskjöld". *Cambridge University Press* (2014), 3

[173] Cf. The notion of legitimacy and legitimisation was reiterated by interviewees, particularly on the Afghan and Iraqi contexts, as well as the literature on the security-development nexus. See Chandler, D. "The security–development nexus and the rise of 'anti-foreign policy'." *J Int Relat Dev* (2007): 268-269

Jocelyn Vaughn (2009)[174]

Some securitisation efforts are therefore evident and are, then, more easily questioned for selection bias. There is a tendency by Development actors to de-securitise, and re-politicise, the nexus due to its selectivity in participation and allocation. In such a way, development actors may 'choose' to go against collective outcomes and challenge the process therefore rendering a failed securitisation.[175] This can make linking and coordinating efforts in protracted contexts a hurdle.

3.2 Securitising Development

Some, like Neil Macfarlane (2004), see securitising development as a rhetorical employ designed to attract a larger share of public resources.[176] Inherent to this assumption is the presence of power that the self-referential basis of security and development imply, such as the presence of strategic considerations (or interests), biases, assumptions, and conditionality that Kari Pahlman sees as posing "major risks to human security and development".[177] Others, like Sasha Jesperson,

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[174] Vaughn, Jocelyn**. "**The Unlikely Securitizer: Humanitarian Organizations and the Securitization of Indistinctiveness". *University of Exeter* (2009): 271

[175] FAO, NRC, and UNDP. "Financing the Nexus: Gaps and Opportunities from a Field Perspective". (2019): 20

[176] McFarlane, Neil "A Useful Concept that Risks Losing Its Political Salience, *Security Dialogue, vol 35, no 3,* (2004), 369-370

[177] Pahlman, Kari. "The securitisation of aid and the associated risks to human security and development" (2014): pp. 52-55

promulgate that the "*proponents of the securitisation of development argument contend that development is being co- opted by security actors to further their own agenda. [...] These arguments derive from earlier attempts at integrating security and development, such as counterinsurgency strategies to _win hearts and minds', where development tools were employed to directly support military objectives.* While certainly true in many underlying senses, there are more concerns than mentioned above. Both David Chandler (2007) and Thierry Balzacq (2011) - for instance- observe or address the self-referential nature of security with the latter stating that:

> *Security practices are enacted, primarily, through policy tools [...] in which*
> *discourses and ideologies are increasingly hard to disentangle, and differences*
> *between securitizing actors and audiences are blurred*
>
> Thierry Balzacq (2011).[178]

Chandler cites the lack of policy beyond a shift in paradigm, from macro-development approaches to 'good governance', as there is seemingly no more than a gesture of good will and a hand-off of responsibility.[179] Inasmuch, underlying biases that motivate politicisation and, subsequently, securitisation become increasingly interconnected and difficult to decipher, or a theoretical 'grey' zone in the securitisation of humanitarian efforts.

However, an interviewee, outside of this series of interviews, with experience in the development 'silo' in ECOWAS, remarked a shift in paradigm must occur especially in the Sahel region and that this is made possible within the thinking rendered by the framework of the triple nexus.[180] The comment and its commitments to development were in alignment with the move towards resilience-based programming since 2016 with the adoption of the 3RP planning process focusing on areas of 'prevention', 'stabilisation', 'transformation' and 'sustainability' and the World

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[178] Thierry Balzacq. "Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve" (Routledge 2011), 15

[179] Chandler, David. "The security–development nexus and the rise of 'anti-foreign policy'." *J Int Relat Dev* (2007): pp. 363-364; 375

[180] "UNDP and JAPAN engage Sahelian voices" (2020): 4

Bank Group's own discourse history.[181] This is described also in relation to working to "*(i)*

strengthen national/ local capacities and institutions, (ii) contribute to sustainable benefits, and (iii)

contribute to social cohesion".[182] However, some analysts note that there is a continued failure to

involve regional stakeholders in the implementation of the re-iteration of the dual nexus, and

particularly in relation to the failure to involve ECOWAS and the African Union.[183]

It may seem that the securitisation of development commenced in a *"commitment to action*

[that was] also endorsed by the world bank and the IOM, to take the new way of working toward

operationally by advancing joint analysis and joined up planning, improving coordination and

leadership as well as financing.[184]" To this point, the 'articulation' of collective outcomes since

then has become perceived by actors, like OCHA whose primary focus is the coordination of

humanitarian assistance, as the proverbial vehicle driving 'planning, programming, and

financing'.[185]

Nevertheless, a string of failures, as in Bosnia, Rwanda, Darfur, and now Afghanistan point

to the resurgence of historically and socially imbued conflict dynamics and the failure of the

international community to take stock of these dimensions in order to "impose" norms and instead

jolting the 'responsibility to protect' back on the onto non-Western actors. What then remains then

is merely the veneer of cooperation and self-referential dynamic in which Western-centric power-

relations have entrenched their understanding of security and then failed to foster it. As Mark B

Salter (2011) states, "[s]ecurity issues must be brought into the realm of the political before it is

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[181] Cf. Ibid, 4, 6; THE STATE OF RESILIENCE PROGRAMMING: THE SYRIA REGIONAL REFUGEE AND RESILIENCE PLAN (3RP), IX

[182] THE STATE OF RESILIENCE PROGRAMMING: THE SYRIA REGIONAL REFUGEE AND RESILIENCE PLAN (3RP), IX-X

[183] ASPR, "The HDP Nexus in the Context of Peace Operations in Sub-Saharan Africa" Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH (2021): 10

[184] Summary Report of Multi-Stakeholder Workshop on the New way of Working, (2017): 1-10

[185] OCHA. "Collective Outcomes: Operationalizing the New Way of Working" (2019): 6

redefined as outside normal politics." So, before all of this can happen, there has to be an understanding of prioritisation (understood as selection bias herein) that remains relevant.

The prioritisation of issues by securitising actors in the development 'silo' is context-driven and leads to politicisation, and the prioritisation of already politicised issues towards the securitisation of development efforts. Crucially, politicisation of development includes participation/participants, attitudes, message, and tone, and other drivers also.[186] Inasmuch, security gaps are selectively presented to cater to audiences in performative and locutionary ways. These security gaps emerge as part of an apparently 'socially constructive' agenda in the development sector and, at times, make forceful or unnecessary demands or claims on the regulation of other regions of the world, according to perceived realities, threats, patterns and assumptions, so that 'problems don't turn up at *"our"* proverbial door'.[187]

The dynamic of the securitisation of development is best shown by recent departures in 'big business' and how it perceives itself. The World Bank is arguably the biggest business, after all. Bayliss et al. (2011) provide a critical account of the WBG's emergence as a 'knowledge bank' and the ensuing clash of culture emerging from ideological shifts, such as the one that had occurred during the "birth of the post-Washington Concensus (PWC).[188]" This calls into question the viability of any 'knowledge bank,' which is - for all intensive purposes - constantly evolving as is knowledge itself. Likewise, the perception of the WBG as a proprietor of development knowledge is - according to Bayliss et al - indicative of its sway over development discourse and in such a way helps discern the role of the WBG as a 'securitiser' with a capacity to rupture. Bayliess et al.

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[186] Salter, Mark B "Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve" (Routledge 2011), Securitisation theory, 119

[187] Sjöstedt, Roxanna. "Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve" Routledge (2011): 165

[188] Bayliss, Kate, Ben Fine, and Elisa Van Aeyenberge, eds. The Political Economy of Development: The World Bank, Neoliberalism and Development Research. London: Pluto Press, (2011): pp. 1-2

recount this in the unprecedented and 'urgent' reorientation attempt by the WBG and its former

Chief Economist Joe Stiglitz in the late 1990s to counter the 'Washington Consensus' in line with

the 'holistic' and 'broad-based' nexus proposition of today. Moreover, the idea of a selection bias, as

promoted by Balzacq (2011) in his work on securitisation, was also prominent in the form of

capacity-based allocation of assistance, which is arguably a trap for 'low growth' and 'high

inequality' settings.[189]

Today, Uganda is relatively stable in a social security sense. However, it has not always been

the same way. To stem out a number of referent subjective security threats to the referent objective

harmony and stability of state sovereignty, a review of the capacity of national defence was

undertaken in conjunction with the U.K. government between 2002 and 2004. Selective bias was

"placed on developing an understanding" of the security apparatus and its actors.[190] Inasmuch,

development was politicised and securitised along an understanding of strengthening sovereignty

and national capacity.

The WBG's Eurocentric concern with organisational alignments and assessments are in

accordance with its efforts to securitise development and is not limited to the nexus approaches.

RPBAs *"assess the existing coordination architecture and propose the creation of dedicated

institutional forums to steer and monitor implementation.[191]"* Despite efforts, the adoption of the

RPBAs has been described by some as fragmented and rejected,[192] in essence a failed bid to

securitise development in places like Ukraine.

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[189] Bayliss, Kate, Ben Fine, and Elisa Van Aeyenberge, eds. The Political Economy of Development: The World Bank, Neoliberalism and Development Research. London: Pluto Press, (2011): 51

[190] OECD, "The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice". *OECD Publishing* (2007): pp. 98-102

[191] FAO, NRC, and UNDP. "Financing the Nexus: Gaps and Opportunities from a Field Perspective". (2019): 21

[192] Ibid

In "Trapped: High Inequality and Low Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean", there is a politicisation of development beginning with an argumentum ad populum that 'violence is linked to lower economic growth' from which the referent object and subject can be extrapolated.[193] Here, the referent subject is the subjective threat of violence posed to the objective state dimension of productivity. Social divergence threatens state stability, as in the case of Latin American and the Caribbean context, argues that source.[194] Accordingly, an emergent and existential threat is exclaimed to the audience, stakeholders in the political process, that promulgates the region's *"struggles with political violence"* and in such a way establishes a self-referential incentive for participation and legitimisation of an effort to securitise absent security through balancing and enforcement acts.[195] In obtaining this 'knowledge' and performing an act of world-disclosing, perceived threats and stakes are raised, various measures - even extreme ones - are legitimated along the lines of utilitarian thinking, in the public interest, and helping to 'contain instability' from the referent object's perceived wellbeing, in such a way making the 'menace' or encountering the 'menace' that has been made.[196] This is a prerequisite, in many ways, for success in a securitising move, and thus, for securitising development strategies.

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[193] UNDP. "Trapped: High Inequality in Latin America" (2021): 14

[194] Ibid: 5

[195] Ibid: pp. 10-12

[196] Chandler, David. "The security–development nexus and the rise of 'anti-foreign policy'." ***J Int Relat Dev*** 10, (2007): 363; Balzacq, Thierry. "Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve" (Routledge 2011): 35-37

Chapter 4

Conclusion

Employing Balzacq's framework on securitisation has in many ways proved helpful in this work. Yet it has not answered definitely whether the dual (and triple) nexuses are securitising insecurity. What it helps with is making a connection between a theoretical selection bias, such as in the evidence of collective outcomes, and security moves and motives that engender them.

Accordingly, the question of what the HDP Nexus is deserves continued engagement, as this work has set out to do with particular attention to where experts 'from the field' actually agree with the proposition of linking practices. There is certainly a lot to counter the nexus proposition and the fairly substantial evidence of a securitisation does not lend itself well to democratic norms. The dynamic of securitisation leaves very little, if any, room for the non-legitimating public to partake and this has in certain instances proved true in the nexus, having still only managed in many ways to achieve a top-down institution of this approach. More engagement with local organisations, such as the African Union and ECOWAS will be particularly helpful to its elaboration. Until then, the many concerns about mandates of various organisations colliding will remain fairly pervasive and with good reason. The evidence to support the nexus and a full-fledged implementation is still limited but politicising and securitising moves have been taking place since 2016. Interviews conducted as part of this work did not reveal any remarkable details, as many participants remain skeptical.

A discussion should be had on how to best familiarise the operational setting with the 'nexus approach'. Some organisations are, for instance, providing workshops, which is creating viral

awareness necessary for real adoption to take place. These are sometimes known as multiplier modules and can be provided both internationally and in the targeted community.

In unison with these efforts, the idea of a 'nexus approach' is a step in the right direction towards proactively meeting human development needs as a standalone aspect of stopping and preventing The question of whether the 'nexus approach' will lead to durable solutions is not as simple as the underlying notion of breaking silos. Durable solutions can only be tested by time and for the HDP nexus this is no different. Similarly limiting is the idea that the 'nexus' definitively has a positive impact 'on the ground' considering the limited evidence to reliably support that conclusion by any literature. This work does not claim to resolve this, either

While the idea of breaking from former practices and establishing new ways is often promising, more attention should be focused on how much this work recommends more attention be turned from discussing what the nexus is to testing the limits of this 'approach' by evaluating its capacity in practice. For instance, more consideration should be given to what impact shorter funding cycles can have on the impacted populations in FCV settings. It is possible that the role of the Nexus will be more influential as part of the bargaining process for international organisations to incentivise donors thus - in part - powering one of the fundamental mechanisms of rendering aid collectively and proactively short of the efforts being carried out on the ground. Yet, the branding value of the HDP nexus, per se, doesn't mutually exclude its practicable value.

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- including a translation of one of the sources named above without quotation marks or
  footnotes;
- paraphrasing (parts of) the texts listed above without proper references: paraphrasing
  must be marked as such, by expressly mentioning the original author in the text or in a
  footnote, so that you do not give the impression that it is your own idea;
- copying sound, video or test materials from others without references, and presenting it as
  one's own work;
- submitting work done previously by the student without reference to the original paper,
  and presenting it as original work done in the context of the course, without the express
  permission of the course lecturer;
- copying the work of another student and presenting it as one's own work. If this is done
  with the consent of the other student, then he or she is also complicit in the plagiarism;
- when one of the authors of a group paper commits plagiarism, then the other co-authors
  are also complicit in plagiarism if they could or should have known that the person was
  committing plagiarism;
- submitting papers acquired from a commercial institution, such as an Internet site with
  summaries or papers, that were written by another person, whether or not that other
  person received payment for the work.

The rules for plagiarism also apply to rough drafts of papers or (parts of) theses sent to a lecturer
for feedback, to the extent that submitting rough drafts for feedback is mentioned in the course
handbook or the thesis regulations.
The Education and Examination Regulations (Article 5.15) describe the formal procedure in case of
suspicion of fraud and/or plagiarism, and the sanctions that can be imposed.

Ignorance of these rules is not an excuse. Each individual is responsible for their own behaviour.
Utrecht University assumes that each student or staff member knows what fraud and plagiarism