

# **Cruel murderers, dangerous fanatics or exotic strangers**

The representation of Muslims and Islam in the French and Dutch press in the late nineteenth century



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May 2011  
Utrecht University



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Master thesis for the research master *Human Geography and Planning*

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*Cover illustration: Jules Cambon, governor-general of Algeria, at the Moroccan border  
(Le Petit Journal: Supplément illustré, 9 May 1897)*



## Preface

With the completion of this thesis, six wonderful years of studying at Utrecht University have come to an end. One year ago, in June 2010, I completed a master programme in *French language and culture: intercultural communication* with a thesis on the representation of Islam in the present-day French and Dutch press. Having worked on this fascinating topic, I felt that there was still much to learn, especially about the historical roots of Muslim stereotypes in Western European countries and the cultural differences that led to different representations.

Two other important events that have drawn my research interests towards this theme were an internship at the foreign desk of *De Volkskrant* and a summer course at the University of Catania. The internship at Dutch newspaper *De Volkskrant* confirmed my interest in journalism and the media. For the summer course in Catania (Sicily), which was about intercultural dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean basin, I wrote a paper about Muslim and Christian stereotypes during the Crusades. This strengthened my interest in the origins of the representation of Muslims in the European discourse.

When I had to decide about the topic for this master thesis, which was written for the research master *Human geography and planning*, in early September 2010, I was thus interested in the origins of the present-day representation of Muslims in the European media. My supervisor Ben de Pater inspired me to focus on the late nineteenth century and hence helped me define the specific topic of this thesis. I would like to warmly thank him for that, as well as for his helpful feedback during the writing process.

From the international comparison in this thesis, I learned how cultural differences do not only influence the national self-image, but also the position of the Muslim Other within the national discourse. The use of concepts from various disciplines proved very useful, since many scholars with different backgrounds have performed research into this theme.

This thesis contains a large number of fragments from French and Dutch newspaper articles, which I have translated to English. This way, I hope to make these intriguing texts accessible for all those who would otherwise be unable to read them. I have tried to stay as close to the original texts as possible, in order to preserve all of the nuances and subtle wordings, including typically nineteenth century phrasings that have nowadays become archaic. However, I realise that that these translations can never be a fully perfect reflection of the original texts. I encourage anyone who is capable of reading French or Dutch to explore the magnificent newspaper archives of the *Bibliothèque nationale de France* (at <http://gallica.bnf.fr/>) and the *Koninklijke Bibliotheek* (<http://kranten.kb.nl/>).

As the representation of Muslims in the media remains a key theme in the social and academic debate, there are still many questions that need to be answered and plenty of topics that could be addressed in future research.



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## 1. Introduction

In the last decade, the position of Islam has been a strongly debated topic in many European countries. Fear for Muslims and Islam has increased considerably; this fear was reflected or, according to many, even fostered by the media. Some critics even state that the “*media’s representational strategies have deteriorated, going from more moderate approaches to a classically Orientalist framework*” (Kumar, 2008, p. 1). Typically Orientalist viewpoints can be recognised in contemporary media representations of Islam. Media play a key role in the creation, diffusion and conservation of stereotypical images of Muslims and Islam (Shadid & Van Koningsveld, 2002, pp. 174-188; Eide, 2008, pp. 156-161). Although there are many similarities between the debates in the various countries, many differences can be observed as well. The different perceptions of Islam and Muslims are caused by differences in the national discourses, which form the frameworks through which people see the world around them. In turn, these discourses have been shaped by history over the centuries. In this regard, the era of imperialism was a crucial phase in history.

According to Edward Said (1978), the contemporary image of the East has been largely formed in the nineteenth century. He argues that ‘Orientalism’, which he defines as “*a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient*”, has developed as a result of European imperialism. Orientalism can be seen as a justification of this imperialism. Therefore, as Said argues, France and the United Kingdom were the countries in which Orientalism developed first. Orientalism is most deeply rooted in these two countries, from which it spread to other Western societies. Said does not pay particular attention to other countries (such as the Netherlands), which had nonetheless equally strong relations with the East through their colonies, with a predominantly Muslim population.

As nineteenth century imperialism has thus strongly influenced the European way of looking at the Orient, a better insight in the representations of Islam in that era would contribute to the understanding of present-day images. In addition, a comparative approach could help identify and explain differences between the national discourses of the Western European countries. Different perceptions and images of Islam can be related to different (historical) self-images. Numerous studies have already been consecrated to the media representations of Muslims and Islam in specific Western European countries, most often Britain (Saeed, 2007; Poole, 2002; Richardson, 2004), but also the Netherlands (D’Haenens & Bink, 2007) and France (Bowen, 2007). In addition, a few rare comparisons have been made between the present-day representations of Islam in two different countries, such as France and Germany (Kastoryano, 2006). However, empirical, structured comparisons between the historical representations of Islam in different national discourses have so far remained a research gap.

In this thesis, a comparative study will be made of the image of Muslims and Islam in France and the Netherlands in the late nineteenth century. Today, both of these countries have developed their own unique ways of dealing with Muslims and Islam, which can be considered as a legacy of their colonial pasts (Chambon, 2002, p. 216). France and the Netherlands were colonial powers; both possessed colonies with a predominantly Muslim population. The number of Muslims living in the Dutch colonies in 1900 is nowadays estimated at 45 million while approximately 20 million Muslims were living in the French colonial empire (Frémaux, 2006b, p. 549).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> It is difficult to determine the precise number of Muslims living in the French and Dutch colonies in the late nineteenth century. According to an estimate made in 1910, 14-15 million Muslims were living in the

For this reason, Muslims and Islam were important topics of debate in these countries in the late nineteenth century. In this regard, it is particularly interesting that Edward Said considered France as one of the two countries of origin of Orientalism, while he did not even mention the Netherlands in his famous book. Therefore, this thesis will focus on the following research question:

**To what extent did a different image of Muslims and Islam exist in ‘metropolitan’ France and the Netherlands in the late nineteenth century?**

This thesis focuses on the image of Islam in so-called ‘metropolitan’ France and the Netherlands. The term ‘*France métropolitaine*’ is commonly used in France to indicate the European parts of France, thus excluding the territories overseas. The reason to delimitate this research to ‘metropolitan’ France and the ‘metropolitan’ Netherlands is that we are interested in the image of the East in the West. For the purpose of this research, it would be less useful to look at the image of Islam and Muslims within the former colonies themselves.

The main question can be answered using the following sub-questions:

1. *Which elements of Orientalism and the specific national discourses have historically influenced the French and Dutch representations of Islam?*
2. *To what extent did the French and Dutch press associate Muslims with different stereotypical images in the late nineteenth century?*
3. *To what extent did the French and Dutch press pay attention to different Islam-related news events in the late nineteenth century?*
4. *What was the role of colonialism in the representation of Muslims and Islam in the French and Dutch press in the late nineteenth century?*

This thesis consists of two parts: a theoretical-historical analysis and an empirical one. The first part (chapter 2-5) contains the theoretical framework and a description of historical position of Muslims and Islam in the French and Dutch discourse. The structure of chapters 3 and 4, which are about the French and Dutch context, mirrors the theoretical framework (chapter 2). Chapter 5 brings the insights of these theoretical chapters together. The first sub-question is answered in this part.

The second part of the thesis contains an empirical analysis, in which the representation of Muslims and Islam in the largest newspapers is studied (sub-questions 2-4). The last decade of the nineteenth century was the ‘Golden Age of the written press’. The newspapers in France and the Netherlands were read by more people than ever before and reached unprecedented circulations (Chupin, Hubé & Kaciaf, 2009, pp. 27-38; Kussendrager & Van der Lugt, 2007, pp. 25-26). Because of these high circulations, the most popular newspapers had a large influence on the popular opinion. Their news coverage gives a good impression of the image and knowledge that the average French or Dutch citizen had of Islam, especially those in Paris and Amsterdam (circulation figures of the large newspapers were traditionally lower at the countryside). To trace the image of Islam in the late nineteenth century, 330 newspaper articles are analysed: 165 French and 165 Dutch articles. The articles in this sample, which are available in the online archives of the French and Dutch national libraries, were all published in the period 1895-1897.

The method used to analyse the newspaper articles is a quantitative content analysis, complemented by a discourse analysis of a limited number of noteworthy articles.

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French colonies in Africa and 30 million Muslims were living in the Dutch Indies. However, according to another estimate from the same year, 30 million Muslims were living on the island of Java alone (Montet, 1911, p. 6). This shows that there is a large variation in the estimates.

This method is explained in chapter 6, after which chapter 7-11 contain the actual empirical analysis. Attention is paid to the stereotypical images, the journalistic conventions, the news events described in the articles, the role of colonial policy and the over-all positive or negative associations with Muslims and Islam. Finally, the insights from the theoretical and empirical parts are combined in the conclusion (chapter 12).



## PART I

### THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

*« L'idéal colonial du Hollandais est de transformer l'indigène en vache satisfaite, celui du Français, en citoyen, c'est-à-dire en individu mécontent »*  
- Georges-Henri Bousquet, 1938



## 2. Theoretical framework: national discourse and the image of Islam

Many theorists from different disciplines have analysed, interpreted and explained the image of Islam in the European imagination and the factors that have influenced this image. This chapter will outline the most important insights from their studies. Section 2.1 will provide an introduction to the role of Islam in European imagination, by briefly explaining how this religion has been presented as the fundamental Other since the Crusades. Next, section 2.2 will summarise Edward Said's theory of Orientalism, which lies at the basis of this study. Subsequently, section 2.3 will elaborate further on the way in which imperialism has influenced the image of Islam. Section 2.4 will explain the concept of a national discourse system and its main characteristics, which forms the second key theory that is at the heart of this study, besides the before-mentioned theory of Orientalism. Finally, section 2.5 will stress the importance of journalists and the media in the construction of a specific image of Muslims and Islam. The conceptual model of this study is outlined in section 2.6. The concepts in this model are the ones that are introduced in sections 2.1-2.5.

### 2.1 Islam as 'the eternal enemy' of Europe

Within the European imagination, the Muslim World is often presented as the fundamental 'Other'. The existence or the construction of an enemy is widely considered as being indispensable for the identification and recognition of the own cultural identity. More specifically, the opposition to Islam is a way of preventing and fighting the risk of fragmentation in the West (Trumpbour, 2003, pp. 90-107). This explains why, in the course of history, Islam has been represented as the polar opposite of Europe (Shadid & Van Koningsveld, 2002, p. 180). According to Palestinian-American literary scientist Edward Said (1981, pp. 12-13), "*Islam has never been welcome in Europe*".

For Slovenian sociologist and political scientist Tomaž Mastnak (2003), the hostility against Muslims is inextricably bound up with the history of Europe. Without this animosity, the political unity that characterises Europe today could never have taken shape. Since the late eleventh century, the Muslims have been depicted as *the* enemy of Christianity and Christendom, in order to unify the Christian society in a frightening and uncertain era. The Catholic Church has created, strengthened and exploited this image of the Muslim as the sworn enemy of Christianity, which led to the Crusades. In the following centuries, the historical animosity against the Muslims has proven to be indispensable for the formation of Europe, because the confrontation with Islam has strengthened the European self-conscience. The development of sentiments of solidarity among the Europeans can largely be attributed to this confrontation with the Muslim 'Other'.

Even the greatest thinkers and 'heroes' of European history have taken stance against Islam and the Muslims. Mastnak (2003, pp. 214-230) refers to hostile quotes from Erasmus, Thomas More, Christopher Columbus, Martin Luther, Francis Bacon, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Voltaire and Volney. Malaysian historian and political scientist Farish Noor (1995, p. 42) has added Dante Alighieri and Thomas of Aquino to this list. This shows that the image of Muslims as a threat to Europe and Christianity is strongly embedded in the European imagination (and, as a consequence, in Western imagination, which also implies the United States). According to Noor (1995, pp. 46-49), the West has thus produced an *Epistemology of Terror*. He underlines the importance of colonialism for the creation of this epistemology. Colonialism and imperialism have strengthened the image within the European imagination that Muslims are inferior to Christians. During

the eras of colonialism and imperialism, the negative image of Islam has served as a justification for the conquest and submission of the Islamic World by the European colonial powers.

It has to be noted that other regions and people were stereotyped in a similar way: for example, the usage of the 'Dark Continent' metaphor served as a justification for the colonisation of Africa. Black Africans were described in a racist way, since their alleged inferiority was an argument for the Europeans to conquer their lands. Just like the stereotypical image of the Muslims, the African Other can be considered as a "*negative reflection of the Western self-image*" (Jarosz, 1992, p. 113). Hence, there were several 'Others' within the European imagination. However, as it is argued in this chapter, the Muslims are the oldest and thus most fundamental Others.

In the European imagination, the Muslims are often perceived as being the complete opposite of Europeans: the West is rational and progressive, the East is irrational and barbarian. The Muslims are fairly well fit for their role as the fundamental Other. More than for example Confucianism, Islam is considered absolutely incompatible with the philosophies and interests of Western liberal democracies (Mernissi, 2003, pp. 52-53). An important and long-lasting element of the European imagination is that the Western world is perceived as 'modern' and that Muslims do not know how to cope with this modernity. According to the popular belief, this anti-modernity of the Muslims has led them to be enraged with the West. American political scientist Samuel Huntington has even argued that the Islam is inextricably bound up with aggressive fanaticism and the use of violence (in: Trumbour, 2003, pp. 98-101). The European imagination is thus characterised by a dichotomy: Islam is seen as being opposed to the 'European values': democracy, tolerance and human rights (Zemni, 2002, p. 166).

'Representation' can be defined as a continuous construction of identities in a culture (First, 2004, p. 191), or as the way texts (and other media) present images of the world (Rigney, 2007, p. 415). It can also be seen as a 'stereotyping force' (First, 2004, p. 191). Authors (or journalists) choose certain individuals or groups to represent a bigger group or a whole nation. In their description of these individuals, they project certain characteristics upon the entire group or nation. In this way, "*'representing the group' through language is not only a (more or less) accurate reflection of existing states of affairs, but also a way of calling that group's identity into being*" (Rigney, 2007, p. 416). The stereotypes that result from these representations, reduce people to a limited set of simple and elementary characteristics, accentuating everything that is 'different' about them. They are constructed by selective perception and also by imagination. For this reason, the stereotypes often reveal more about the sensitivities and needs of those who construct or maintain them than about those who are the object of the stereotyping (Yumul, 2004, p. 36).

## 2.2 Orientalism

In the study of representations of the Islam, the principle of *Orientalism* as proposed by Edward Said in 1978 is of utmost importance (Poole, 2002, pp. 28-43; Eide, 2008, p. 153; Thum, 2007, pp. 389-393). Orientalism is a way of thought that is based upon a strong imaginary distinction between the East and the West, in which the Western cultures and societies are considered superior to the Eastern ones. This way of thought is completely institutionalised in the West and thus strongly embedded in the Western discourse. Said's ideas about Orientalism elaborate on the idea that the West needs an opponent in order to define its own position. The way in which the media represent other cultures is unavoida-

bly characterised by a certain ethnocentrism (Said, 1981, p. 4). Said defines 'Orientalism' as follows:

Taking the late eighteenth century as a very roughly defined starting point Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient (Said, 1978, p. 3).

The concept of Orientalism as used by Said is based upon Antonio Gramsci's notion of 'cultural hegemony' and Michel Foucault's idea of 'discourse'. While Said considered Orientalism as a Foucauldian discourse, he needed Gramsci's notion of hegemonic power relations to study the political motivations behind the ideological representations (Legg, 2008, pp. 270-271). Italian philosopher and political scientist Gramsci (1891-1937) argued that several different cultural frameworks can exist next to each other in every non-totalitarian society. However, certain cultural forms tend to predominate over others. According to Said (1978, p. 7), this is what gives Orientalism its durability and strength. He shows how the 'European culture' has become dominant over other cultures. The hegemony of European culture has resulted in the idea that the European identity is superior to others. In this way, the assumption of superiority that is embedded in Orientalism can be explained by using Gramsci's concept of cultural hegemony.

The notion of a 'discourse', as introduced by French philosopher, sociologist and historian Michel Foucault (1926-1984), is a framework of thoughts, expressions and texts that people use to represent their knowledge about a certain topic. In Foucault's view on discourse, there is no clear distinction between language and practice: discourse constructs the topic, since it restricts the way people can talk and think about this topic. Hence, it also influences how thoughts and presumptions result in human behaviour (Hall, 2001, p. 72). Said (1978, p. 3) argues that "*without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period*". Orientalism developed into an unavoidable scope through which Europeans looked at the East: a set of assumptions that could not be ignored nor abandoned. When a particular author wrote a text about the East in the late nineteenth century, he was strongly influenced by texts that had been published before as well as by ideas and stereotypes that were dominant in the European society. Therefore, this author almost unavoidably looked at the East through an Orientalist framework and contributed to the Orientalist discourse by producing an Orientalist text himself. Said argues that the Europeans had an 'ahistorical' view of the East: they saw the East as an unchanging, undifferentiated entity. However, Harrison (1988, p. 3) states that many Europeans regarded upon their own history in the same ahistorical way.

As mentioned before, Said considers the late 18<sup>th</sup> century as the starting point of Orientalism. The development of Orientalism was inextricably bound up with the rise of European imperialism. According to Said (1978, p. 17), Orientalism originated in Britain and France, "*the pioneer nations in the Orient and in Oriental studies*", which possessed "*the two greatest colonial networks in pre-twentieth century history*". While Britain and France competed for hegemony over the Muslim lands, texts from both nations reflected the assumption that the West was superior over the East. Literary as well as academic texts supported the idea that Western rule over the East was necessary, because the 'backward' people in the East were not able to govern their own countries. Said (1978, p.

201) explains that the institutions of Orientalism mainly developed during its first phase, from the late 18<sup>th</sup> century until 1870 or 1880. Orientalism thus reached its peak in the period between 1870 and the First World War. During those years, the ‘Scramble for Africa’ took place, in which France and Britain were the two strongest imperial powers that tried to occupy the African continent. In this same period, ‘Oriental Studies’ became a popular academic discipline. The East was studied in a more ‘scientific’ and institutionalised way than before. The Orientalists were particularly interested in the geography of the Middle East: “*Geography was essentially the material underpinning for knowledge about the Orient. All the latent and unchanging characteristics of the Orient stood upon, were rooted in, its geography*” (Said, 1978, p. 216). Geographical societies organised expeditions to study the people in the East. Inspired by Darwin, they applied theories of racial determinism to their studies of the Eastern people.

It is interesting to highlight that Said (1978) considers France as one of the two founding nations of Orientalism, while he pays virtually no attention to Dutch Orientalism. In the introduction of his book *Orientalism*, he states: “*the French and the British – less so the Germans, Russians, Spanish, Portuguese and Swiss – have had a long tradition of what I shall be calling Orientalism*” (1978, p. 1).

### **2.3 Imperialism and the image of the Islam**

During the heydays of Imperialism, in the late nineteenth century, the European colonial powers ruled over the Muslims in their colonies politically, economically and scientifically. European scientists collected as many facts and statistics about their colonial subjects as possible, because knowledge was considered essential for the control over the colonial territories (Harrison, 1988, p. 3).

Imperialism was presented as a way to modernise (and thus ‘Westernise’) the Islamic World. This explains why the dichotomy of the Modern West and the Traditional East was pivotal within the imperialist discourse. Within this discourse, Islam was not opposed to Christianity but instead to the West, to emphasise the idea that the West had surpassed the stage of religion. Remarkably, imperialism and the imperialist discourse with regard to Islam became a self-fulfilling prophecy. By cultivating Islam as a so-called antagonistic construction, the European colonialists unintentionally encouraged their Muslim colonial subjects to focus on their Islamic religion as the basis of their national identity. For example, the Algerian resistance against the French occupiers strongly focused on the importance of Islam for the Algerian national identity. The number of mosques in the Algerian region of Kabylia rose after the French conquest and the Islamic veil worn by women became a symbol of the national identity and the resistance against French colonial penetration (Mutman, 1993, p. 179).

Hence, the image of Islam in different European countries was not only influenced by different kinds of Orientalism. Muslims in their colonies also changed their attitude towards Islam as a result of the colonial occupation. This means that different colonial policies towards Islam may have led to changes in religious practices, such as an increased value attributed to religion as a symbol of the national identity. As a result, the image of Islam may have developed in a spiral-like way: different images of Islam led to different political attitudes and colonial policies towards Islam, which provoked different reactions of the Muslims in the colonies, which in turn strengthened the differences between the images of Islam in different European countries.

## 2.4 The importance of national discourses

As we have seen, Said's theory of Orientalism was based on Foucault's definition of a discourse, in which a discourse is a framework of thoughts, expressions and texts that people use to represent their knowledge about a certain topic. In fact, the notion of a 'discourse' has been used in three different ways (Scollon & Wong Scollon, 2001, p. 107). First, discourse referred to the "*grammatical and other relationships between sentences*". In the second and less narrow definition, discourse comprised the "*functional uses of language in social contexts*". In the third and broadest definition of discourse studies, "*whole systems of communication*" became the object of study. When discourses are seen as 'whole systems of communication', it is possible to study the discourses of very diverse groups of people, ranging from people with a certain, specific profession (for example: professors in Human Geography) to a whole nation. As Scollon and Wong Scollon (2001, p. 107) explain, "[s]uch broad systems of discourse form a kind of self-contained system of communication with a shared language or jargon, with particular ways in which people learn what they need to know to become members, with a particular ideological position, and with quite specific forms of interpersonal relationships among members of these groups". This means that people who share the same discourse, must possess some common assumptions, which people who are not a member of the same community do not have. These shared assumptions are embedded in a common language or jargon which may be hard to understand for people who do not share the same framework of thoughts.

According to Scollon and Wong Scollon (2005, p. 109 & pp. 140-141), discourse systems consist of four elements. First, people within the same discourse system share a similar *ideology*, which refers to a common history and worldview and may also comprise shared beliefs, values and religion. Second, the behaviour of human beings within an certain discourse system is the result of their *socialisation*. Through formal and informal means of education, people grow accustomed to certain social norms during their childhood. Third, a discourse system possesses specific, unique *forms of discourse*. This notion refers to the functional role language itself may play: it is not always merely the product of certain beliefs, values, a specific worldview and social organisation. The language in itself may also lead to different understandings. Fourth, people within a certain discourse system share the same *face systems*. The notion of 'faces' is an influential concept within the field of communication studies, which was introduced by sociologist Erving Goffman in 1955. However, it is unnecessary to elaborate on this concept here: for convenience's sake, it suffices to say that 'face systems' refer to the *social organisation* of a cultural group. As Scollon and Wong Scollon (2005, p. 142) put it, "*it refers to the way a cultural group organizes relationships among members of the group*".

It has to be noted that Scollon and Wong Scollon apply the four above-mentioned elements to the analysis of interpersonal (interindividual) forms of communication, not to the analysis of written texts. Although this renders some of the elements useless for this study, some others are clearly applicable in this analysis of Islam in the French and Dutch mass media in the late nineteenth century. In this study of the position of Islam in the French and Dutch mass media in the late nineteenth century, the *ideology* and *social organisation* of the French and Dutch discourse systems are very relevant. The point of departure of this study is that the way in which the French and the Dutch look at Islam is the result of "*their histories and the common worldviews which arise out of these histories*" (Scollon & Wong Scollon, 2005, p. 141). Two important elements of social organisation are *the concept of the self* and *ingroup-outgroup relationships*. People within different cultural discourse systems may have different perceptions of the position of an individual and of his or her relationships with people outside the cultural discourse system.

Moreover, it is often possible to distinguish discourse systems on the basis of its focus on either *Gemeinschaft* or *Gesellschaft*. When a society is strongly based upon the principle of *Gemeinschaft*, there is a strong sense of solidarity. People feel that they share a common history and common traditions. On the contrary, when a society is based upon *Gesellschaft*, relationships between its members are more “*contractual, rational or instrumental*” (Scollon & Wong Scollon, 2005, p. 148). People agree to protect mutual interests, without having the same sense of solidarity as in a *Gemeinschaft*-based society. A discourse system is never exclusively based on one of these two principles, but it is possible to distinguish discourses that tend more towards the principle of *Gemeinschaft* from those that focus more on *Gesellschaft*. The sections 3.4 and 4.4 will show that in the late nineteenth century, both the French and the Dutch nations were based on the principles of a ‘social contract’, although elements of *Gemeinschaft* were also present.

Within a discourse system, other cultures or social groups are often presented on the basis of a limited number of characteristics. A certain positive or negative value is given to this image, which is then considered as a full description. Such an “[i]deological statement or stereotyping often arises when someone comes to believe that any two cultures or social groups, or, as we prefer to call them, two discourse systems, can be treated as if they were polar opposites” (Scollon & Wong Scollon, 2005, p. 168). This explains why cultural stereotypes come into being within discourse systems. The stereotypes are ideological statements that focus on simplistic contrasts between the two groups. Members of the other cultural group come to represent the entire group. The characteristics of certain individuals are attributed to the entire group. Internal differences and exceptions are ignored. However, stereotypes are not merely overgeneralisations: they also carry an ideological position. They are either positive or negative and can be used as “*arguments to support social or political relationships in regard to members of those groups*”. Although stereotypes are thus largely ideological, they are usually also based on some accurate observations:

There is usually a good bit of accurate cultural observation which underlies stereotypes; it is not the truth of those observations which is the problem. The problem is that stereotypes blind us to other, equally important aspects of a person’s character or behavior. Stereotypes limit our understanding of human behavior and of intercultural discourse because they limit our view of human activity to just one or two salient dimensions and consider those to be the whole picture. Furthermore, they go on ideologically to use that limited view of individuals and of groups to justify preferential or discriminatory treatment by others who hold greater political power (Scollon & Wong Scollon, 2005, p. 169).

Scollon and Wong Scollon (2005, pp. 171-174) explain that there are four steps in the creation of negative stereotypes. First, people within one discourse system observe an opposition between their culture and another one in one single dimension. This statement is generally based on accurate observation, but exceptions are ignored. Second, they focus on this single dimension and leave other characteristics out of consideration. The choice to focus on a single, specific dimension, is an ideological one. Third, a positive value is assigned to the own group and a negative value is assigned to the other. Fourth, this process is ‘regeneralised’ to the entire group: the contrast between *some* people from group A and group B becomes a contrast between *all* members of both groups. Positive stereotyping is only different from negative stereotyping in the third step. Although no negative value is assigned to the other group in positive stereotyping, it still assumes that both groups are polar opposites.

Since stereotypes are formed within discourse systems, (national) discourses are inextricably bound up with (national) identities. If stereotypes are in fact simplified ideo-

logical representations of two cultural groups as polar opposites, they mostly reveal the way people within the discourse system see themselves. As Ochs (2005) argues, social identities can be studied as linguistic constructions. She shows how speakers “*may use a verbal act or stance in an attempt to construct not only their own identities but the social identities of other interlocutors*” (Ochs, 2005, p. 79). People present themselves in a certain way through language, thus shaping their own identity. At the same time, the way they are addressed and described by other people also influences their social identity. While Ochs focuses on this process in the context of verbal conversations, this theory may also be applied to written discourse, as will be done in this thesis.

## 2.5 The role of journalism

The media play an important role in the construction and diffusion of certain images of Muslims. As it has become clear by now, Islam and Muslims represent the Radical Other in the European imagination. The images in the media reflect this opposition between European and Islamic values: the image of the Islam in the Western media is essentially a negative one (Said, 1981, p. 136). According to Palestinian-Dutch intercultural communication scientist and anthropologist Wasif Shadid and Dutch islamologist Sjoerd van Koningsveld (2002, pp. 174-188), the media play a decisive role in the creation of new stereotypes and hence also in the diffusion and maintenance of the negative image of Islam. They argue that a lack of knowledge often leads to generalisations and simplifications. Muslims are described as being fanatic, irrational, primitive, aggressive and dangerous. However, the representations of Islam in the media cannot simply be explained as being the result of a ‘lack of knowledge’, according to Edward Said (1981, p. 46), who states that they are “*the result of a complex process of usually deliberate selection and expression*”.

Norwegian media scientist Elisabeth Eide (2008, pp. 156-161) states that journalists continuously construct ‘Others’, by means of polarisation and simplification. The images of the Other in the media are traditionally based upon a binary opposition: they are also strongly hierarchical. Journalists frequently use the words ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslims’ as if they designate a unified and homogeneous group. It is important to note that Muslims themselves sometimes confirm and strengthen these generalisations, by presenting themselves as representatives of the Islamic World (Qureshi & Sells, 2003, p. 14).

According to British media scientist Elizabeth Poole (2002, p. 31), the task of the scientist who studies images of the East is not necessarily to determine whether the representations in the media are right or wrong. She argues that ‘the media’ construct in fact their own reality. Therefore she proposes to analyse the representations that are constructed by the media without actually verifying them by comparing them with the ‘facts’. Poole warns that it may be misleading to criticise Western representations of Islam, because in doing so the West itself is also reduced to a simple, homogeneous unity. Said (1981, pp. 9-43) admits that this is a consideration that has to be taken into account while studying the representations of Islam in Western media. For this reason he proposes the concept of ‘communities of interpretation’. According to Said, ‘The Islam’, ‘The Muslims’ and ‘The West’ can only exist through the means of human interpretation. This ontological viewpoint is essential for the analysis of the images presented by the media. The media are at the core of the creation of these interpretations, since they offer a certain image of Islam and reflect the dominant interests in the society.

Said (1981, pp. 9-10) notes that the function of the generalised notions of ‘The Islam’ and ‘The West’ is twofold. First, the Muslims and the inhabitants of ‘The West’

identify themselves with the help of these notions. Second, the notions comprise a large number of stereotypes and assumptions with regard to the Other. The generalisations thus have an intrinsic significance, independent from the reality about which they are supposed to say something. The fact that the media nowadays usually refer to the opposition 'Islam versus the West' is for example very significant. It shows that in the Western popular belief, the West has surpassed the stage of religion. The society has gone through a phase of secularisation and the Church has lost its role as the binding force of the Western society already a long time ago. However, the Islamic World is still associated with religion and is thus considered primitive in the Western imagination. This example shows how the analysis of a mediated statement or image can reveal very significant underlying assumptions, even if one leaves the 'facts' out of consideration.

According to Noor (1995), the Western media depict the Muslims in general as being corrupt, immoral and sexually oppressed. In this stereotypical image, the Muslims are primitive: they do not know how to cope with the contemporary modern world. Noor cites a German journalist who states that a majority of the Europeans think Islam lacks legitimacy and justice. The attempts by Islamic organisations to change this image are ineffective, since they do not manage to gain the attention and the sympathy of the Europeans. Moreover, most Europeans assume that Islam is inextricably bound up with a political culture that is necessarily authoritarian and anti-democratic. Noor states that the stereotypes of Muslims in the Western media are even frequently characterised by a certain 'dehumanisation'. Muslims are presented as being diabolical and beastly: their human side and human qualities are often ignored. This supposed inhumanity of the Muslims legitimises (military) action against them.

Noor (1995, pp. 29-35) explains that the Western media are often incapable of reporting about the Islamic World in an objective way (or sometimes they even seem unwilling to try so, Noor argues). There is often little room for nuance in their coverage. Newspaper articles have to be attractive and easy to read. That is why many newspapers avoid extensive historical analyses and complicated interpretations. This leads to a superficial and simplified image of Islam and Muslims. Moreover, journalists pay a lot of attention to 'sensational' news, because they aim to sell as many newspapers as possible. While Noor suggests that the negative image of the Islam as presented by the Western media is at least partly the result of deliberate choices, Shadid and Van Koningsveld (2002, pp. 188-191) state that journalists are often simply unable to escape the images and stereotypes that exist in the society in which they live. Furthermore, they generally lack specific knowledge about Islam and Muslims. Since they have to deal with tight deadlines, they do not have the time to consult many experts who could give nuanced explanations. Finally, articles need to have a certain 'news value'. That is why few articles are published that highlight the similarities between Islam and the West. Articles about the different and 'strange' traits of Muslims are considered to be far more interesting for the readers. In this way, the media fail to show the complexity of the Islam and the Muslims. Often the entire religion and its followers are reduced to 'radical Islamism' or even to terrorism (Abu-Lughod, 2006, p. 5).

Shadid and Van Koningsveld (2002, pp. 188-191) also conclude that the media often give one-sided news coverage, by mainly citing non-Islamic politicians and scientists in articles about Muslims or the Islam. Eide (2008, p. 163) agrees that intellectuals from the East (Muslims) are seldom interviewed by Western journalists. More often, these journalists focus on aggressive crowds.

As has become clear before, researchers who criticise the simplified way in which the Western media present the Islam, may be tempted themselves to ignore the complexity of the Western media. Said (1981, pp. 44-45) noticed this problem and underlined that

the media are very complex and cannot be seen as a homogeneous unity, just as ‘The Muslims’ cannot be seen as one homogeneous group. Usually, it is possible to distinguish clear differences between the viewpoints of newspapers by comparing their ‘editorials’. Moreover, one cannot simply regard newspaper articles as Western propaganda, although according to Said “*a great deal of what is really propaganda is churned out by the media and even by reputable scholars*”. Despite all the differences between the various media, Said argues that “*what the media produce is neither spontaneous nor completely ‘free’: ‘news’ does not just happen, pictures and ideas do not merely spring from reality into our eyes and minds, truth is not directly available, we do not have unrestrained variety at our disposal*”. The images presented by the media are shaped by rules and conventions. The media compete with each other to make profit. They address themselves to a public to which they attribute certain common assumptions and expectations. That is why they often present a very uniform, monochrome and reductive image of Muslims and Islam. Despite the variation within the media, there is a tendency to choose certain representations and points of view over others.

## 2.6 Conceptual model

This chapter has outlined several theoretical considerations with regard to the representation of Islam and Muslims in Europe and its relation with imperialism. Now the most essential insights from this chapter can be summarised in a conceptual model (figure 2.1). Concepts, which have all been mentioned before in this chapter, are shown in boxes. The arrows between these boxes indicate the hypothetical relationships between them, which will be further analysed in the next chapters. The main focus of this research is to explain the different representations of Islam and Muslims in the French and Dutch media, by studying differences in their national discourse systems and Orientalist discourses. The colours of the arrows in the conceptual model indicate the chapters in which these hypothesised relations will be analysed. The green arrows refer to topics that will be addressed in part I of this thesis. These relations are studied on the basis of secondary sources. The hypothesised relations symbolised by the red arrows are empirically tested in part II of this thesis, using a quantitative content analysis and illustrated by elements of a qualitative discourse analysis.

As we have seen in section 2.4, social organisation and national ideology are two important elements of the national discourse system. Depending on the type of social organisation of a nation, national unity may be stimulated to a greater or lesser degree (arrow 1 in the conceptual model). The social organisation and national ideology of the national discourse system influence the image of the self. In other words, people within a nation see themselves in a particular way because of their shared beliefs and values and the way their nation is organised (arrows 2 and 3).

Section 2.2 has explained the concept of Orientalism, while 2.3 elaborated further on imperialism. Within the countries that possessed a colonial empire, imperialism became part of the national ideology. It could also be argued that imperialism developed in those countries where the national ideology permitted it to do so. Therefore, the relation between national ideology and imperialism is thought to be two-directional (arrow 4). As Said (1978) pointed out, imperialism caused a Eurocentric way of thought which was characterised by an essentialist East-West dichotomy. This essentialist dichotomy in Western thinking resulted in an antagonistic construction of Muslims (arrow 5). Imperialism also led to increased contacts with Muslims, as the European colonial powers conquered their lands (arrow 6). In turn, these increasing contacts with Muslims caused an

accumulation of the knowledge about Islam (arrow 7). This knowledge formed the basis of the colonial policy towards Muslims (arrow 8). Chapter 3 and 4 will show how Orientalism was put into practice in relation to the French and Dutch national discourse systems.

Within a national discourse system, a particular self-image will lead to stereotyping of other people, who do not belong to the same discourse system. The choice to highlight specific stereotypical images while ignoring other characteristics reflects the image of the self, as the so-called ideological statements (see section 2.4) focus on those attributes that are supposed to be in conflict with the own national ideology. These stereotypes, which are part of the national discourse, give shape to an antagonistic construction of Muslims (arrow 9).


This means that Muslims are constructed as the fundamental Others, as a result of the stereotyping that is part of the national discourse and the essentialist East-West dichotomy that is part of the Orientalist discourse. All kinds of stereotypical characteristics are attributed to them. This antagonistic construction may be strengthened by the tendency to promote national unity (arrow 10): the more a certain national discourse system aims at encouraging national unity, the more it needs Others to oppose to.

Since journalists are the product of the national discourse systems in which they live, they are thought to reproduce the antagonistic constructions of Muslims that exist in their society. However, their writings are also influenced by some other factors, such as the journalist conventions (arrow 11). They do not simply publish epistles on the otherness of Muslims; they publish articles which they think to be of interest for their readers. This generally results in relatively short articles that mostly focus on spectacular news events. However, there also might be some differences between the journalist conventions in France and the Netherlands, for example in their focus on either foreign or domestic news. Obviously, the representation of Muslims and Islam in the media is also influenced by the Muslim-related news events that take place (arrow 12). In turn, these news events are partially the result of the colonial policy towards Muslims (arrow 13). Part II of this thesis will show, among others, to which extent the French and Dutch newspapers focus on news events that are related to their respective colonies, or on events that are unrelated to the imperial ambitions of both nations.

Finally, the representation of Muslims and Islam in the French and Dutch newspapers reflects the antagonistic construction that has resulted from the specific national discourses and the late nineteenth century European trend of Orientalism (arrow 14), intermediated by the nation-specific journalist conventions and the Muslim-related news events. Hence, differences in all of the before-mentioned factors would, be it directly or indirectly, cause a different representation of Islam and Muslims in the French and Dutch press.

In turn, these representations in the media have supposedly functioned as a source of knowledge and hence influenced the colonial policy towards Islam. For this reason, an arrow could be drawn back from the box 'Representation of Muslims and Islam in the media' to 'Knowledge about Islam'. That is, however, not the focus of this thesis and therefore this arrow has been left out. Instead, as the conceptual model shows, this thesis focuses on the way in which the representation of Muslims in the media was given shape.

Figure 2.1: Conceptual model





### 3. Islam in the French national discourse

The previous chapter has shown that differences between national discourse systems and different interpretations of Orientalism may lead to different perceptions and representations of Muslims and Islam. Many academics have already studied the French and Dutch national discourses. These studies have provided many insights, which together form the starting point of this thesis. In this chapter and the next two chapters, the most important theories will be outlined, to answer the following research question: *Which elements of Orientalism and the specific national discourses have historically influenced the French and Dutch representations of Islam?*

This chapter focuses on the place of Islam and Muslims in the French national discourse, while chapter 4 does the same for the Dutch discourse. The insights from both chapters are combined in chapter 5. First, the historical relation between France and the Islam is introduced in section 3.1, since this historical relation has shaped the more recent image of Islam. Next, attention is paid to the specific French interpretations of Orientalism (3.2). We then look at French imperialism in the late nineteenth century (section 3.3) and the consequences thereof for the contacts with Muslims and the knowledge about Islam. The following section (3.4) outlines the most crucial aspects of the French national discourse. Finally, the position of the mass media in France is discussed in the last sections (3.5).

#### 3.1 The historical relation between France and the Islam

France and the Islam share a long history, which has led to a complex relationship between the two. This section will briefly describe this history, because it is assumed that the shared history of France and the Islam has influenced the image of the religion in the modern society. The firmly-rooted fear of Muslims, which has become part of the French collective subconscious, is the result of ages of fighting against Muslims, whether it was during the Crusades or the wars against Barbary pirates (Krieger-Krynicky, 1985, p. 31). Although the position of the Islam within the French national discourse has changed over the centuries, the fundamental otherness of the religion has always been accentuated (Henry and Frégosi, 1990). Jean-François islamologist François Clément (1990) distinguishes five waves of Islamic immigration in France, four of which took place well before the period studied in this thesis. The fifth one started just after 1900 and thus shortly after the period analysed in this thesis.

The first Muslims arrived in France as early as in 716. For the Franks, this marked their first acquaintance with the Muslims (Clément, 1990, pp. 89-90; Fetzer & Soper, 2005, p. 63). In the 7<sup>th</sup> and early 8<sup>th</sup> century, few people had been aware of the existence of the Islam and the Muslims. A small minority of clergymen had received word that the Holy East had been conquered by Saracens, but knowledge about them was extremely vague. Even the rare pilgrims who had actually travelled to Jerusalem and witnessed a newly built mosque, only had a very superficial impression of the Islam (Sénac, 2006a, pp. 162-163). Maghreb soldiers led by officers from the Near-East conquered Narbonne in 719 and the present-day Languedoc-Roussillon shortly after. Despite a defeat in the Battle of Toulouse (721), the Muslims managed to conquer Carcassonne, Nîmes, Lyon and even Bourgogne. In 731, a large Muslim army traversed the Pyrenees to conquer Bordeaux, before being defeated by Charles Martel in the Battle of Tours in 732 (also called the Battle of Poitiers). After forty years of Muslim presence in the South of present-day France, the Franks reconquered Narbonne in 759. However, some Muslims re-

mained in France and mingled with the Frankish population (Clément, 1990, pp. 89-91). In 793, the Muslims invaded France for the second time, but they were driven back by Charlemagne. A final attempt to invade France over land in 841 resulted in a complete failure.

The third large-scale arrival of Muslims in France took place in the 9<sup>th</sup> century. This time, the Muslims reached France over sea. Muslim pirates sacked Nice, Marseille and Arles between 812 en 838, followed by Fréjus, Toulon, Antibes, Villefranche-Sur-Mer and Aix-en-Provence. To facilitate these looting expeditions, the Muslim pirates built harbours and blockhouses in the Camargue and especially in the 'Massif des Maures' ('Plateau of the Moors', located between Hyères and Fréjus). In 972, a group of Saracens captured the influential and popular abbot Majolus of Cluny, who travelled through the region on his way back from a pilgrimage to Rome. Shortly after, the region was reconquered by an alliance of Provençals, Italians and Byzantines (Sénac, 2006b, pp. 55-59). The remaining Muslims in the area gradually assimilated in the French population. Muslim traders and slaves also continued to be present in Southern France over centuries (Clément, 1990, pp. 91-93).

During the 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> centuries, Christian writers referred to the Islam as the 'religion of the Antichrist' and asserted that the 'pagan' Muslims worshipped Satan. The prophet Mohammed was depicted as a heretic. The image of the Muslims became that of a menacing, aggressive and diabolic people. News about the destruction of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre<sup>2</sup> in Jerusalem by the Fatimid caliph Al-Hakim in 1009 filled the Christians in France with great indignation (Sénac, 2006a, p. 164). The image of the Muslims that had gradually developed among a relatively small group of Catholic scholars and clergymen during the 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> centuries, rapidly became more widespread and powerful in the 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> centuries. The 'chansons de geste' (epic poems about heroic deeds) reflected and strengthened the stereotypes about Muslims that took shape during that era. Contemporary representations of the Islam can be traced back to the Era of the Crusades, when the Church accentuated the opposition between Christianity and Islam, which was considered as a dangerous rival.

In 1095, Pope Urban II held a speech at the Council of Clermont (a synod that was attended by about 300 clerics from throughout France) in which he urged the Christians to fight the Muslims in the Holy Land. The Byzantine emperor Alexius I Comnenus had sent him a request for military support against the Seljuk Turks. This speech by Urban II in the French city of Clermont was the immediate cause for the First Crusade (Flori, 2006b, pp. 121-123). The Islam was 'diabolised': it was depicted as the religion of Satan. French historian Jean Flori (2006a, pp. 172-175) explains that the propaganda about the Muslims spread by the Church during the Crusades, focused on three alleged characteristics of the Islam and the Muslims. First, the Muslims were accused of idolatry. They were depicted as pagans or even as polytheists. Islam was believed to resemble the polytheist religions of the Antiquity. The 'evil' characteristics of the polytheists from the Antiquity were projected upon the Muslims: the Muslims were seen as the successors of the polytheists who persecuted the first Christians in Antiquity. They thus became the eternal enemies of Christianity, infidels that served Evil, in the eyes of the medieval Christians. Second, the Islam was described as a sumptuous religion, while poverty and chastity were seen as crucial Christian values. The existence of polygamy among Muslims was considered as scandalous and horrific. This element was accentuated and contrasted with the

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<sup>2</sup> This church had been an important Christian pilgrimage destination since the 4<sup>th</sup> century, because it had been constructed at the site that was considered as the place where Jesus had been crucified, buried and resurrected. It was completely destroyed in 1009, but the Byzantines financed its reconstruction several decades later and the Crusaders renovated the church thoroughly in the 12<sup>th</sup> century.

Christian ethics: Muslims were thus described as being indecent, immoral, perverse and as not being able to curtail their own primitive and sinful sexual desires. The third trait attributed to the Muslims was their alleged violence. Especially the Christians in the East were shocked by the fanaticism and cruelty of the Muslims who sacked and murdered in the name of their religion, something they considered incompatible with the principles of Christianity. However, the Church did not particularly stigmatise the warlike character of the Islam. On the contrary, the Catholic Church glorified the use of violence against Muslims, which made it impossible to sustain the opposition between the 'violent Muslims' and the 'peaceful Christians'. The Church did, however, exaggerate the size of the menace posed by the Muslims.

These stereotypical, negative images of the Muslims were reflected in the literary texts written during this period. In the *Chanson de Roland* (Song of Roland) for example, written in the late 11<sup>th</sup> century which makes it one of the oldest surviving French literary texts, the Muslims are presented as the enemies who murder the hero Roland, an officer in Charlemagne's army. In reality, Roland was killed by the Basques (Malek Chebel in: Lemonnier, 2009, p. 26). This is just one of the many examples of how the Muslims were presented in medieval arts and literature as the fundamental opponents of Christianity. In the late Middle Ages (the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> century), paintings showed Muslim soldiers using weapons that were considered as either ineffective or as coward: they created the image that the Muslims did not respect the chivalrous ideas of knightly warfare. Moreover, their defeats during the Crusades were presented as if they had been more humiliating than the defeats suffered by the Christians. Medieval paintings show Muslims falling off their horses and city walls considerably more frequently than the Christian heroes (Caroff, 2006, pp. 148-151).

In the late Middle Ages, the French continued to see themselves as the heirs of the Crusaders and thus retained their opposition to Islam (Veinstein, 2006, pp. 344-345). They particularly glorified King Louis IX (1214-1270), who participated in two Crusades (the Seventh and Eighth Crusade, respectively to Egypt and Tunisia). Louis IX was declared a Saint in 1297. In the late 15<sup>th</sup> and early 16<sup>th</sup> century, the French kings considered organising a new crusade to liberate not only Jerusalem, but also Constantinople, which had recently fallen into the hands of the Ottomans (Le Thiec, 2006, p. 436). However, King Francis I (1494-1547) introduced a more pragmatic (or opportunist) foreign policy. He forged an alliance with the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent (1494-1565). As a result, France became the first European country to establish formal relations with the Ottoman Empire. This alliance was highly controversial: Francis' opponents criticised his alliance with the 'infidels' and even accused him of betraying Christianity. However, the alliance was maintained by the later French and Ottoman rulers and continued to exist for centuries. The Ottoman Empire turned out to be a powerful ally in conflicts with common enemies and also a valuable trading partner (Veinstein, 2006, pp. 344-353). During the reign of Francis I, it became possible to study the Arabic language in Paris (Le Thiec, 2006, pp. 439-443).

Although there was no considerable and structural migration of Muslims to France between the 10<sup>th</sup> and the early 17<sup>th</sup> century, some Muslims came to France after the establishment of the Franco-Ottoman alliance. These Muslims who mostly lived in France for a limited period were mainly ambassadors of the Ottoman Sultan. During the winter of 1543-1544, none less than 30,000 Turkish soldiers stayed in Toulon, during a joint military operation against the Holy Roman Empire and its allies in Spain and Italy. King Francis I of France ordered all 5,000 inhabitants to temporarily leave their town to make place for the Ottoman soldiers. He also provided an abundance of food to keep the Turkish soldiers satisfied and to avoid tensions. For eight months, Toulon was a Turkish town

on French soil. Turkish accounts of their stay in Toulon were very positive: they described the town as a very pleasant place. The inhabitants of Toulon, however, complained about their properties that had been stolen or damaged (Poumarède, 2006b).

The fourth wave of Islamic immigration in France took place several centuries after the third, in the early 17<sup>th</sup> century (Clément, 1990, pp. 94-96). Although the Islamic presence in the Iberian peninsula was officially ended in 1492, when the Muslims surrendered Granada, a large number of Muslims stayed behind in Spain. As a result of the prosecutions by the feared Spanish Inquisition, they were forced to be converted to Christianity. However, many of these Spanish Muslims continued to practice their religion in secret. Despite their formal conversion to Catholic Christianity, they remained Muslims according to the Islamic principle of ‘taqiyya’, which says that Muslims may conceal their faith when they are under threat or persecution. These converted ‘Catholic’ Muslims were called ‘Morisco’, which means ‘Moor-like’ or ‘little Moor’. The Moriscos held friendly contacts with the French Huguenots (protestants), who saw the Catholic Church as a common enemy. In 1605, the Moriscos concluded an alliance against Spain with the French king Henry IV, who had been a Huguenot himself before his coronation. However, Henry IV was murdered by a Catholic fanatic in 1610 and the Moriscos thus lost their influential ally. At the 10<sup>th</sup> of January, 1610, the Spanish king Philip III issued an ultimatum: the Moriscos were forced to leave Spain within 20 days. About 500,000 of them fled to the Maghreb and about 150,000 fled to France. Of these 150,000, about 30,000 soon left France for Italy or the Maghreb, but the others settled in the Languedoc-Roussillon region (especially in Narbonne) and in the French part of the Basque Country (mainly in the Béarn). Clément (1990, pp. 95-96) argues that the ‘moriscisation’ could be seen as a sort of ‘proto-laïcité’: a forerunner of the typical French principle of laicism, which will be explained in section 3.4. In Spain, the Moriscos had grown accustomed to making a strict “*séparation entre l’homme intérieur qui peut suivre la religion de son choix et l’homme politique qui accepte la coercition de l’Etat et sa normalisation selon les valeurs dominantes*”. This distinction between the private life and the public life can be considered as a forerunner of laïcité. The total assimilation of the Moriscos in the French society has lasted several centuries.

In the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the French Kings Henry IV (1553-1610) and Louis XIV (1638-1715) presented themselves as protectors of the Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire. They used their diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire to secure the legal position of these Christians. Hence, the protection of the Christians in the Holy Land was used as a justification for the controversial alliance between France and the Ottoman Empire. Over the centuries, the alliance became a very successful example of ‘Realpolitik’: the Ottoman Empire was a very useful partner, but the French distrust of the Muslims did not decrease, even if French and Ottoman soldiers were fighting side by side. French merchants who returned from the East brought home not only precious merchandise, but also persistent stereotypes about the Muslims. They diffused and exaggerated stories about all kinds of offences, corruption and the alleged untrustworthiness of the Muslims (Veinstein, 2006, pp. 353-379). Yet whenever Ottoman envoys visited France, they were welcomed by crowds of inquisitive people. All the way from the Mediterranean harbours to Paris, impatient crowds were waiting to see the Muslims and their ‘strange’ habits. Poumarède (2006b, pp. 415-416) cites the Ottoman ambassador Mehmed Efendi, who visited France in 1721:

Il y avait toujours sur mon chemin une si grande foule d’hommes et de femmes qu’il semblait que dans la ville où j’arrivais, il n’y avait de monde que par les endroits où je passais. Après que j’étais descendu à mon logis, toute cette populace faisait de si grands efforts

pour entrer qu'il était impossible aux soldats qui gardaient la porte de l'en empêcher. Il y avait toujours quelques personnes qui, presque étouffées par la presse, se mettaient à faire des hauts cris et je voyais même venir devant moi des femmes évanouies. Quoique ceux qui entraient eussent souffert mille peines pour y parvenir, il ne faut pas croire que lorsqu'ils étaient sortis, ils s'en retournaient chez eux. Ils restaient dans la cour pour attendre l'occasion de demander encore une autre fois de rentrer, et j'en remarquai qui, malgré tout ce qu'il y avait à essayer, entraient jusqu'à trois ou quatre fois (Mehmed Efendi, as quoted by Poumarède, 2006, p. 416).

Moreover, Mehmed Efendi noticed that the French citizens were particularly interested in his eating habits. Groups of men and women kept gazing at him while he was having dinner.

The political relation between France and the 'Barbary states' (the countries located at the African-Mediterranean coast: contemporary Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya) was considerably less friendly than the one between France and the Ottoman Empire. Barbary corsairs and privateers continuously attacked French ships and coastal towns. The pirates ignored requests from the Ottoman Empire to cease these attacks. Since no diplomatic solution could be found, the French started to fight the Barbary piracy with force in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. In the 1680s, Louis XIV finally managed to inflict heavy losses on the pirates by bombarding Algiers and Tripoli. The Northern Africans were forced to sign peace treaties. This was followed by a relatively peaceful relation and the increase of trade between France and Northern Africa in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, interrupted by some short wars whenever the French feared their interests would be harmed (Poumarède, 2006a).

The 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century saw a considerable change of the image of the Islam in France. During the Middle Ages and the 16<sup>th</sup> century, knowledge about the Islam had been extremely limited. In the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century, more and more French intellectuals became interested in the Islam, travelled to the East and published books about it (Reig, 2006). Travel writing became a very popular literary genre and numerous fiction books and plays were situated in the Islamic East. Moreover, several books about Islam and Mohammed were published and the first French translation of the Coran was published in 1647. Therefore, the image of the Islam became more complicated and diverse than before. Nevertheless, the Muslim East was still presented as 'the Other'. Literary works focused on the despotism, luxury and sensuality in the Orient. The East was used as a mirror of the West. Positive or negative characteristics that contrasted those of the West were projected upon the East, depending on the aim of the comparisons. As a result, the image of the Islam became rather contradictory. On the one hand, the Islam could represent fanaticism, if the author wanted to underline the rationality of the French. On the other hand, the Islam could also represent tolerance, if the author wanted to stress the intolerance of the Catholic Church, for example. Consequently, the image of Muslims presented in 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century texts had usually more to do with the ideological reasoning of the author than with reality (Carnoy-Torabi, 2006).

As we have seen, the function of the Islam in the French discourse had been a comparative one for ages. Knowledge about Islam was used either to underline the uniqueness of Europe or to criticize certain European and French institutions. From the 1770s onwards, knowledge about the Islam started to serve another goal (Laurens, 2006, p. 517). The French wanted to learn more about the regions that could become colonies and were looking for scientific justifications to occupy these territories. The criticisms of Islamic despotism and fanaticism can be seen as such justifications. Colonisation was presented as a way to bring civilisation. If Muslims opposed colonisation, there were regarded as fanatics who tried to resist civilisation: "*Puisque l'on refuse d'appliquer aux musulmans le principe des nationalités, toute résistance à l'expansion coloniale devient*

*un signe de fanatisme, de rejet de la civilisation. Comme la religion devient le sanctuaire de toutes les résistances, l'islam est dès lors perçu comme l'ennemi de la civilisation. Il est l'anti-Europe par excellence* » (Laurens, 2006, p. 522). Another crucial development in the way the French looked at the Islam, was the 'laïcisation' of the French discourse that started after the French Revolution (the concept of laïcité will be explained in section 3.4). Before the Revolution, the French used to criticize the Islam from a Catholic point of view. With the gradual introduction of laïcité, however, the French national discourse was characterized by hostility towards religion in general (Laurens, 2006, p. 530).

It has to be noted that, in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, the French did not consider the Muslim World as one big homogenous unity. As we have seen before, France had an alliance with the Ottoman Empire since the 16<sup>th</sup> century, while the political relations with the countries in the Maghreb (Northern Africa) were strained. This was reflected in the image of both regions in the late nineteenth century. The Middle East was in the first place considered as a commercially attractive region. Stereotyping about this region focused on the 'sensuality'. Although the image of the Middle East was largely based upon imagination, it was considerably more positive than the image of the Maghreb (present-day Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia). The Maghreb was perceived as a highly dangerous, barbarian region, where peaceful French diplomats and traders did not dare to go (Frémeaux, 2006b, pp. 534-535). The differences between the images of the Maghreb and the Middle East would be sustained during the nineteenth century and had a large influence on the French colonisation of Northern Africa, as we will see in section 3.3.

One of the most crucial events in the development of the French image of the Muslims was Napoleon's expedition to Egypt in 1798, which ended the Franco-Ottoman alliance. According to Edward Said (1978), this expedition marked the beginning of Orientalism. The next section will elaborate on the rise and development of French Orientalism in the nineteenth century.

### 3.2 French Orientalism

Said considered France as one of the founding nations of the way of thought he called 'Orientalism':

In the first place, I had to focus rigorously upon the British-French and later the American material because it seemed inescapably true not only that Britain and France were the pioneer nations in the Orient and in Oriental studies, but that these vanguard positions were held by the virtue of the two greatest colonial networks in pre-twentieth-century history [...]. Then too, I believe that the sheer quality, consistency, and mass of British, French and American writing on the Orient lifts it above the doubtless crucial work done in Germany, Italy, Russia and elsewhere. But I think it is also true that the major steps in Oriental scholarship were first taken in either Britain and France, than elaborated upon by Germans (Said, 1978, pp. 17-18).

For Said, Napoleons expedition to Egypt in 1798 marks the beginning of modern Orientalism. On his military expedition to Egypt, Napoleon brought numerous scientists of all disciplines and artists with him to record the expedition. Napoleon was fascinated by the Orient in general and Egypt in particular, because he had read about it since his adolescence. According to Said (1978, p. 80), "*the idea of reconquering Egypt as a new Alexander [the Great] proposed itself to him, allied with the additional benefit of acquiring a new Islamic colony at England's expense*". Napoleon, who understood that his army force was too small to impose itself on the Egyptians, tried to flatter the Muslims by stating that

he was fighting for the Islam. In a speech to the people of Alexandria, he even declared: “*nous sommes les vrais Musulmans*” (Said, 1978, p. 82). Indeed, this strategy worked and the Egyptians seemed to lose some of their distrust for the occupiers. This paved the way for the scientists that accompanied Napoleon (chemists, biologists, historians, archaeologists, geologists and surgeons, among others) to perform research. The scientific accounts of the East gave more authority to the Western view of the East: by creating a vast body of knowledge about the East, the scientists contributed to the institutionalisation of the intellectual dominance of the West over the East. The results of the scientific expedition were published between 1809 and 1829 under the title *Description de l’Égypte*. According to Said, this project can be seen as the first complete example of scientific Orientalism: it was an affirmation of existing stereotypes, a confirmation of Western superiority and a justification of the Western dominance over the East:

To restore a region from its present barbarism to its former classical greatness; to instruct (for its own benefit) the Orient in the ways of the modern West; to subordinate or underplay military power in order to aggrandize the project of glorious knowledge acquired in the process of political domination of the Orient; to formulate the Orient, to give it shape, identity, definition with full recognition of its place in memory, its importance to imperial strategy, and its “natural” role as an appendage to Europe; to dignify all the knowledge collected during colonial occupation with the title “contribution to modern learning” when the natives had neither been consulted nor treated as anything except as pretexts for a text whose usefulness was not to the natives; to feel oneself as a European in command, almost at will, of Oriental history, time and geography; to institute new areas of specialization; to establish new disciplines; to divide, deploy, schematize, tabulate, index and record everything in sight (and out of sight); to make out of every observable detail a generalization and out of every generalization an immutable law about the Oriental nature, temperament, mentality, custom, or type; and, above all, to transmute living reality into the stuff of texts, to possess (or think one possesses) actuality mainly because nothing in the Orient seems to resist one’s powers: these are the features of Orientalist projection entirely realized in the *Description de l’Égypte*, itself enabled and reinforced by Napoleon’s wholly Orientalist engulfment of Egypt by the instruments of Western knowledge and power (Said, 1978, p. 86).

The way the French scientists who accompanied Napoleon described the East was, according to Said, characterised by euro-centrism. The French scientists had the power to travel to Egypt, and to study and describe the people there. The opposite would have been unthinkable: Egyptian scientists could never have organised a similar expedition to map France. The East served as a mirror for the West, “*in which the “bizarre jouissances” of Orientals serve to highlight the sobriety and rationality of Occidental habits*” (Said, 1978, p. 87). The eventual failure of Napoleon’s Egyptian expedition did not result in the end of the French fascination for the Orient. On the contrary: it only marked the real beginning. Many famous French authors wrote books about the Orient and recycled existing stereotypes. Said (1978, p. 88) mentions Chateaubriand’s *Itinéraire de Paris à Jérusalem* (1811), Lamartine’s *Voyage en Orient* (1835) and Flaubert’s *Salammbô* (1862). British geographer Derek Gregory (1995, pp. 50-51) shows that the *Description de l’Égypte* had a very direct impact on Flaubert’s work, as it served as ‘sighting-device’ during his travels through Egypt: it enabled him to make sense of what he saw. Flaubert had an idealised, exoticised impression of the Orient that did not disappear during his journey. Already before his departure to Egypt, Flaubert had written a description of the view from the top of one of the Pyramids.

Said (1978, pp. 217-225) notes that geographical associations blossomed in France in the late nineteenth century, hence offering a scientific underpinning of imperialism. The French were fascinated by the ideas of geographical exploration and colonial

adventures. After the defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, the French were looking for ways to restore the glory of their nation. This caused an increasing focus on colonisation and the construction of an imperial empire. The Orient was considered as a weaker and underdeveloped region that would benefit from French rule. When the Ottoman Empire, mockingly nicknamed 'the sick man of Europe', was falling apart in the late nineteenth century, France tried to increase its influence in the Middle-East mostly by constructing railways and by founding French schools. France also saw itself as the protector of the Christian minorities in the region. Syria became the main focus of the French activity, but France had to compete with Britain over the hegemony in the (former) Ottoman territories.

Although the French can thus be considered as the founders of Orientalism, the way they looked at the East in general and Muslims in specific changed during the nineteenth century. Two general developments could be observed in French Orientalism. First, French literary writers were more interested in the Islam in the first half of the nineteenth century and became more fascinated by the 'Exotic East' in the second half of the century, when scientific knowledge about the Islam accumulated (Taha-Hussein, 1960, pp. 476-477). Second, while the image of the Islam was still overwhelmingly negative in the early nineteenth century, it became more positive later on. In the late nineteenth century there was even a certain 'islamophilia' among particular groups of French. They were interested in the Islam and held nostalgic views of the Exotic East (Moussa, 2006, pp. 683-694). The next section shows how historical developments during the nineteenth century influenced this shift in French Orientalism.

### **3.3 French imperialism in the late nineteenth century**

In the nineteenth century, France conquered a number of countries with a Muslim population. This colonisation was justified by presenting it as a form of modernisation. The French argued that they brought justice, control and civilisation (Laurens, 2006, p. 531). This section will briefly describe the French colonisation of the Islamic territories in the nineteenth century.

Napoleon's expedition to Egypt, which was discussed in the previous section, can be considered as the first French colonial conquest of Muslim territories. It already possessed all the characteristics of the later conquests: it was a military operation, combined with an economic and a cultural mission, with a clear political purpose (occupying a strategically and economically important area, before the British would do the same). The Egyptian Campaign and the subsequent invasion of Syria became a failure, as the French were defeated by the British and their former allies, the Ottomans. The French influence in the Levant would remain cultural and economic instead of political throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century (Frémeaux, 2006b, pp. 535-537, p. 545).

In 1830 France invaded Algiers and the Algerian coastal regions in a campaign that closely resembled the Egyptian expedition organised by Napoleon thirty years earlier. There was a quick military victory, followed by the expulsion of the existing Turkish administration. Moreover, the military campaign was accompanied by a scientific expedition: the results of this expedition were published under the title *Exploration scientifique de l'Algérie*, which was similar to the *Description de l'Égypte*. However, the occupation of Algeria would become considerably lengthier than that of Egypt. The removal of the Turkish administration was followed by a period of anarchy. The French initially refused to support local rulers, which worsened the resistance against the French occupation. In 1840, the French decided to occupy Algeria entirely. The coastal region of Kabylia re-

mained the last stronghold that resisted the French colonisation: it was finally conquered in 1857. During the completion of the conquest, between 1840 and 1857, almost a third of the French army (80,000 to 100,000 soldiers) was permanently stationed in Algeria. Moreover, a large number of French civilians settled in Algeria. The large-scale immigration of French colonists in Algeria disrupted the traditional society. The country was divided in military and civil territories. The military territories covered the vast majority of the country (Frémaux, 2006b, pp. 537-538)

In 1844, a special institution was founded to establish contacts with the Algerian tribes and to control their leaders: the 'Bureaux Arabes' (Arab agencies). These agencies studied the Arab language and the local customs, practices and beliefs and hence strongly contributed to the knowledge about the Algerian Muslims, which would ultimately facilitate the occupation of Tunisia (Frémaux, 2006b, p. 550; Harrison, 1988, p. 16). When knowledge about the Islam accumulated, the image of the religion became more nuanced as people realised that it could not simply be reduced to 'fanaticism'. Although the French King Charles X and his Minister of War still made references to the Crusades while planning the invasion of Algeria just before 1830, humanitarian and 'civilising' arguments became far more important in the justification of the colonisation of Algeria. During the invasion of 1830, the French underlined that the Algerian Muslims could continue to practice their religion without any restriction (Frémaux, 2006a, pp. 560-561). France even financed the Islamic institutions in Algeria in exchange for control (Boyer, 2006, p. 742). This freedom of religion was maintained during the occupation of Algeria, even when the Islam turned out to be an important source of inspiration for the Algerian resistance. However, Catholic missionaries came to Algeria to convert the Muslims. The French State tried to limit these conversion projects, because it feared that they would cause unrest among the Muslims. As a result, only some orphans were converted to Christianity (Frémaux, 2006a, pp. 561-570).

The French emperor Napoleon III, who reigned from 1852 to 1870 (after having been President for four years), had plans for a 'grand projet oriental'. He wanted to increase the French influence in the Mediterranean, by restoring the friendship with the Ottoman Empire and by winning the sympathy of the native population of Algeria. To achieve this goal, he encouraged the creation of a large Arab nation, which would look up to the 'Great French Nation' with affection. He justified the French colonisation of Algeria by presenting it as a way to modernise and emancipate the people of the Maghreb. However, most of the French colonists opposed the idea of an Arab nation, which they found dangerous. In the meantime, the native population of Algeria had other worries. Over 300,000 people perished in the 1867-1868 famine, which was followed by a catastrophic cholera epidemic. The total population of Algeria decreased from circa three million in 1830 to just over two million in 1870. Napoleon III also tried to increase the influence of France in other Arab countries. Between 1859 and 1869, the Suez Canal was constructed in Egypt. It was developed by the French engineer Ferdinand de Lesseps with the approval of Napoleon III and it was mainly financed by France (Frémaux, 2006b, pp. 539-543).

During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, Napoleon III was taken prisoner by the Prussians in the Battle of Sedan and the Third Republic<sup>3</sup> was founded. Napoleon's

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<sup>3</sup> The First Republic was founded in 1792, after the fall of the (absolute) monarchy. It was replaced by the First French Empire in 1804 (when Napoleon I became the Emperor). Napoleon's final defeat in 1815 was followed by the Restoration. France remained a constitutional monarchy until 1848, when the country became a Republic for the second time (the Second Republic). After only four years, the first president of this Republic, Napoleon III, became the second emperor of France. The Second Empire lasted until 1870, when France became a Republic for the third time. This Republic would last until the Second World War.

ideas about the creation of an 'Arab nation' were quickly abandoned. The French colonial policy became considerably more repressive. Frémaux (2006b, p. 543) characterises the 1870s and the 1880s as a 'succession of gloomy years' for the Algerians. The situation improved somewhat in the 1890s, when improvements were made in the fields of public health and education. However, the discriminatory status of the native Algerians did not change. They did not have the same voting rights as the French colonists, nor did they have equal rights with regard to freedom of assembly, expression and movement. The French justified this discriminatory status by stating that the Algerians could not be granted full civil rights, since their strong attachment to traditional Islamic laws was incompatible with modern citizenship. Therefore, Muslims could not get the full French nationality (Frémaux, 2006a, pp. 569; Weil, 2006).

Tunisia was occupied in 1881. The French had learned from their mistakes in Algeria. To prevent the outbreak of anarchy (such as in Algeria in 1830), the existing administrative structures were maintained. This kept the Tunisians satisfied, while the French had *de facto* control over the country. France thus managed to occupy Tunisia with limited effort. Like in Algeria, large numbers of French colonists migrated to the newly occupied country to contribute to the 'modernisation' process (Frémaux, 2006b, pp. 543-544).

France had already established outposts near the mouth of the Senegal river in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. In the 1850s, the French started to expand their territory in Senegal by conquering the Kingdoms that surrounded their outposts. This expansion continued in the second half of the nineteenth century. The French colonists applied two opposite approaches to the Islam in the first years of the colonisation of Senegal. On the one hand, some colonial rulers chose a pragmatic approach and made concessions to the Muslims to keep them satisfied and to prevent civil unrest. For example, a Muslim Tribunal was created, although it did not satisfy Muslims because of its limited number of competences. On the other hand, some colonial rulers did not make any of such concessions and instead argued that they had the duty to spread French ideas and culture. They saw the Islam as an intolerant religion. These two opposite approaches alternated for some decades, but the latter one became more dominant in the 1880s, as the colonial administration became more self-confident and thus less sensitive for demands from the Muslim population (Harrison, 1988, pp. 9-15).

In the 1890s, the French also held military expeditions in various African regions. The Malinese city of Ségou, located on the Niger river, was conquered in 1890. Next, the French colonised Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire in West-Africa and Djibouti and the Comoros in the East. French imperialism was less successful in Sudan. An expedition led by Jean-Baptiste Marchand headed for Sudan to occupy territories around Fashoda. He arrived there in 1898, but the English general Herbert Kitchener arrived soon after with a flotilla and forced Marchand to back off. This 'Fashoda incident' marked a crisis in the Franco-British relations, as well as the end of the French aspirations to establish a colonial empire that spanned Africa from the West to the East (Frémaux, 2006b, pp. 544-545).

It should be noted that some prominent French intellectuals, such as the philosopher Auguste Comte (1798-1857) opposed the colonisation of Muslim territories. In 1884, sociologist Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931) published an influential book: *La Civilisation des Arabes*. Within Le Bon's racial world view, the Arabs were a superior race, which had civilised the formerly barbarian Europeans. According to Le Bon, the Arabs had been superior in many regards (religious, political and intellectual), but their civilisation had collapsed. Le Bon argued that this collapse had been caused by the mixture of several 'inferior' races (notably the Berbers and Asian people) with the Arabs. Despite this collapse of the Arab civilisation, however, Le Bon thought that the European coloni-

sation of the Arab World was illegitimate. After all, the Arabs were not intrinsically inferior to the Europeans, which would make the colonisation untenable. Le Bon's book was quickly translated into Arabic and inspired the first Arab nationalist movements. In addition, some Muslims reformists in exile stayed in Paris for some time in the late nineteenth century, where they met left-wing anti-colonial thinkers. One of them was Jamal-al-Din Afghani, the founder of political Islamism (Laurens, 2006, pp. 527-529).

The number of Muslims who came to France in the nineteenth century was still extremely limited. Some Algerian dignitaries and intellectuals were allowed to visit the country or even let their children study in Paris. In addition, some groups of Muslim pilgrims used Marseille as a hub to travel to and from Mecca. Moreover, Algerian Muslims served in the French army as *tirailleurs* (light infantry) or *spahis* (light cavalry). At first, they mainly participated in battles in Algeria, the Crimea, Senegal and Vietnam, but they also fought in Metropolitan France in the Franco-Prussian wars in 1870-1871 and suffered heavy losses. Ten years after a failed attempt by the Parisian Orientalist Society to found a mosque in Paris, a section of the Parisian Père-Lachaise cemetery was reserved for Muslims in 1856 at the request of the Ottoman Embassy. A small mosque was established at this cemetery, solely to accommodate the funerals. In 1895, a committee of influential Frenchmen lobbied for the construction of a real mosque in Paris (with financial support from the Ottoman sultan). This attempt turned out to be unsuccessful (Renard, 2006, pp. 596-613).

By the end of the nineteenth century, France possessed several territories with a Muslim population. The Islam had already been the second religion of France since the conquest of Algeria in 1830 (Benjamin Stora in: Lemonnier, 2009, p. 24). At the eve of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, approximately 20 million Muslims were living in the French colonial empire. Only the British and Dutch colonial empires had more Muslim inhabitants (respectively 100 and 45 million). Most Muslims in the French colonial empire were living in Northern Africa (12 million), while roughly 7 million were living in the French territories in Sub-Saharan Africa (Frémaux, 2006b, p. 549). In addition, there was a rare group of Frenchman who were converted to Islam. In 1896, a converted Muslim, Philippe Grenier, was elected into the French assembly, hence becoming the first Muslim member of the French parliament (Renard, 2006, pp. 613-618).




Image 3.1: Colonialised Africa in 1914

Source: <http://trudyamiller.wikispaces.com/The+Era+of+Global+Encroachment+in+Africa>

The expansion of the French colonial empire continued in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century (shortly after the period studied in this thesis): France established a protectorate over Morocco in 1912 (Frémaux, 2006b, p. 547). Image 3.1 contains a map of the colonies in Africa in 1914, after the completion of the so-called ‘Scramble for Africa’. Image 3.2 contains a map that was printed twenty years earlier, in 1894, in the illustrated supplement of French newspaper *Le Petit Courant*. The blue-green areas indicate the French territories, while brownish areas are either independent countries or colonies owned by other powers. Besides that, the map shows that large parts of the Sahara (including South-Algeria) were still considered no man’s land.

The first Muslim immigrants of the fifth wave, as distinguished by Clément (1990), arrived in France just after the turn of the century, between 1900 and 1905. On the eve of the First World War, there were 30,000 Maghreb immigrants living in France (Clément, 1990, p. 97). France was the first country in Western Europe that saw a large-scale immigration of Muslim workers: they arrived in France well before the first Muslim workers came to England (Bowen, 2010, p. 9). During the First World War, 175,000 Algerians (not including other Muslims, like Moroccans) came to France to serve in the French army. After the war, the number of Muslims living in France declined to 10,000 in 1919, before rapidly rising to 120,000 in 1924. From 1920 onwards, there was a large inflow of mainly Algerian immigrants in Metropolitan France. The Grand Mosque of Paris was inaugurated in 1926.



Image 3.2: French territories in West-Africa  
(Le Petit Journal: Supplément illustré, 5 March 1894)

### 3.4 Principal components of the French national discourse

The French relation with the Islam has been characterised by two contrary tendencies. First, as the previous section has shown, France has tried to closely supervise the practice of the Islam in its colonies, most notably Algeria. The State tried to control the religion by means of funding. The second tendency is completely opposite to this desire to control the Islam: a policy of *laissez-faire* has been promoted in the French Republic, according to the typically French principle of *laïcité* (Frégosi, 2001, p. 63).

The French secular tradition revolves around this concept of ‘*laïcité*’, which is an essential element of the French national discourse with regard to the Islam. *Laïcité* refers to the strict separation between the State and the Church. In France, the relation between citizens and the state is based upon a ‘*contrat social*’, a social contract. According to this principle, there is a clear distinction between the public and the private sphere. In the public sphere, differences in culture and religion between citizens are insignificant, because everyone behaves in the first place as a citizen of the Republic. Expressions of culture and religion are restricted to the private sphere. In return, the Republic intervenes as little as possible in the private sphere of its citizens (Phillips & Nossek, 2008, pp. 246-248; Fetzer & Soper, 2005, p. 73).

Although the contemporary strict separation between the State and the Church was only fixed by law in 1905 (Boyer, 2006), the *laïcisation* of the French discourse had been under way since the French Revolution (Laurens, 2006, pp. 530-531). It resulted from a strong rejection of the Catholic Church and the clergy, which had supported the absolutist monarchy. During the Revolution, many Christian traditions and even the Christian calendar were abolished. Napoleon reversed these measures in 1801 and signed an agreement with the Pope. According to this arrangement, the Church gave up its claims to its former properties in France. In exchange, the French State paid the salaries of the clergy, appointed the bishops and demanded the priests to swear loyalty to the French government. With some short interruptions, this arrangement persisted until 1905. In the late nineteenth century, the French population was strongly divided between clerical monarchists and anti-clerical republicans. When the latter gained parliamentary power in 1881, they immediately decided to reform the French education. The Ferry Law (named after minister of education Jules Ferry), which was passed in 1882, stipulated the *laïcisation* of the public education. In the 1880s and 1890s, *laïcisation* remained at the forefront of the public debate (Fetzer & Soper, 2005, pp. 69-70).

The *laïcisation* debate influenced the image of the Islam. This is still visible in the way the French look at Muslims today. Muslims who quietly practice their religion in the private sphere without asking any privileges, are considered as well integrated according to the French standards. However, if they oppose the ‘universal values’ of the Republic, like the *laïcité* and the freedom of expression, they introduce their religion in the public sphere. This is extremely objectionable and dangerous from the French point of view. Therefore, Muslims who behave in such a way become the ‘Others’ within the French national discourse (Phillips & Nossek, 2008, pp. 246-248). The fact that many Muslims support the principle of *laïcité* is often ignored by newspapers (Eide, 2008, p. 161).

Chambon (2002, p. 36) claims that “*malgré la laïcité proclamée de l’État français, à la différence des Pays-Bas, la religion est un sujet obsessionnel en France*”. He argues that the relation between the state and the religions is so well demarcated in France because the Catholic Church still has a very particular position within the French society. On the other hand, the state often tries to intervene in religious affairs despite the laws that prohibit it to do so. The ambiguous historical relations between the state and religion have resulted in a firmly rooted distrust of religion. The French have continued to fear the

return to power of the religion and, consequently, the oppression of the individual liberties. On the one hand, this attitude has resulted in a strong and passionate anti-clericalism. On the other hand, the links between the French society and the catholic culture can impossibly be eradicated (Chambon, 2002, p. 192).

Since the Revolution, the French presented themselves as the defenders of human rights. Liberty was (and still is) one of the most important so-called 'universal' values advocated by the French. As a reaction to their historical experiences, the French strongly rejected despotism. They also became extremely reluctant towards all forms of 'servitude'. As, according to the Revolutionary principles, all men were equal, submissiveness was seen as very negative, while individual autonomy was perceived as a positive quality. Liberty and equality became crucial values in all aspects of daily life: the French felt that employees should not be too submissive to their employers, just as a people should not be submissive to a political leader (D'Iribarne, 2006, pp. 35-53).

Another crucial element of the French discourse that has its roots in the Revolution of 1789, is the principle that the French nation is 'one and indivisible'. Since the nineteenth century, France is a *civic nation*, in which the society is based upon Rousseau's idea of a social contract. In this regard, France distinguished itself from Germany, which was an *ethnic nation* during the late nineteenth century. Advocates of an ethnic nation argue that the boundaries of the nation are determined by ethnicity, while supporters of a civic nation state that membership of the nation is voluntary: people who share the same ideals can become a member of this civic nation. However, this also means that minority groups with ideas that are in conflict with the principles of the nation are seen as a menace. Within the French perception of the nation, there is traditionally little room for cultural differences: since long, the policy has aimed at assimilation. Generally speaking, the French did not exclude people on the basis of their race or descent, but they did look down upon people who did not conform to the French cultural norms (Bryant, 1997, pp. 162-164). In the context of Islam and Muslims, this means that Muslims who embraced principles such as *laïcité* were held in high regard by the French. Moreover, the French tried to make Frenchmen out of their colonial subjects by means of education, something that would have been unthinkable if the French had adhered to the idea of an ethnic nation, as did the Germans. Hence, the French national discourse was characterised by a more *Gesellschaft*-based view than the German one.

### **3.5 French mass media in the late nineteenth century**

After having studied France's relation to the Islam in the previous section, it is necessary to elaborate on the position of the French mass media in the late nineteenth century, since that will be the focus of this thesis.

The late nineteenth century is often referred to as 'the Golden Age' of the written press in France. During the nineteenth century, the number of newspapers sold in France increased rapidly. Technological developments lowered the production costs of the newspapers, which made it possible to lower the prices and sell more copies. The more copies were sold, the more investments were made in the newspaper production to attain even better sales figures. Moreover, the illiteracy rate decreased dramatically as a result of a new law on primary education that was passed in 1833: 53% of the French was illiterate in 1832, this decreased to 17% in 1880. The 1870s and 1880s were characterised by a commercialisation of the newspaper industry. The newspapers developed into true mass media by presenting news in a compact and factual style, with a lot of attention for spectacular events. However, the freedom of press was limited in the 1870s, because the roy-

alist governments tried to control the newspapers. This changed when the republicans came into power. On 29 July 1881, the Law on the Freedom of the Press was passed. As a result of this law, the state lost much of its control over the press. Journalism became more professional, as schools of journalism were founded. Newspapers with clear political perspectives also blossomed, representing all ideological currents in the French society. However, they had a relatively low circulation compared to the popular newspapers that aimed at a broader public (Chupin et al., 2009, pp. 27-38; Charle, 2004, pp. 133-155).

The newspapers with the largest circulation were the so-called 'small' daily newspapers. These Parisian newspapers did not have a clear ideological perspective and tried instead to inform their readers of the most spectacular events. They were called 'small newspapers' because they were printed on smaller sheets than the ideologically-oriented newspapers. One of the most successful ones was *Le Petit Journal*, which was founded in 1863. In the first year, 83,000 copies were sold daily. Within two years, the circulation rose to 259,000 copies: more copies of *Le Petit Journal* were sold than of all the other Parisian newspapers together. As a result of a further increase of the purchasing power of the Parisians, the circulation of *Le Petit Journal* augmented to a million copies per day in the 1890s. Successful marketing strategies were applied to reach such high sales figures. *Le Petit Journal* was an evening newspaper, which was sold by street sellers who took up their positions near the exits of factories at the end of the working day. The newspaper mainly contained short articles about various news events. Some other newspapers were founded that tried to imitate the success of *Le Petit Journal*, of which the most successful ones were *Le Petit Parisien* (founded in 1878), *Le Matin* (1884) and *Le Journal* (1892) (Chupin et al., 2009, pp. 41-44; Charle, 2004, pp. 102-105).

Together, *Le Petit Journal*, *Le Petit Parisien*, *Le Matin* and *Le Journal* represented 75% of all newspapers sold in Paris and 40% of all newspapers sold in France. They also became remarkably widespread in the provinces. Unlike their more politically-oriented predecessors and counter-parts, the principal aim of the 'small newspapers' was not to convince their readers that a particular political perspective was right, but to satisfy as many readers as possible. The popular 'small newspapers' of the late nineteenth century had a very large number of editors and reporters, but relatively few foreign correspondents. This was part of their marketing strategy: it was assumed that the readers would be less interested in foreign news than in local news, unless the foreign news was sufficiently spectacular. In this regard, the quality newspapers such as *Le Figaro* had a completely different focus: they paid more attention to foreign news. These quality newspapers rose in the same period as the popular small newspapers but attracted a considerably smaller, elitist public (Chupin et al., 2009, pp. 43-44; Charle, 2004, pp. 155-157).

Hence, it seems that the most popular French newspapers of the late nineteenth century did not pay much attention to foreign news. In this regard, it is interesting to see that Edward Said (1981, p. 120), in a comparison of how the French newspaper *Le Monde* and the American Press have reported about the Iranian Revolution of 1979, argues that the French newspapers approach the East in a *different* way than the newspapers of other world powers and European nations.

France's (and by extension *Le Monde*'s) attitude to the East is an old and experienced one: studiously postcolonialist; concerned less with brute power than with deployment, strategy, and process; focused more on the cultivation of interest rather than on protecting top-heavy investments in isolated regimes; selective, provisional, and nuanced (some would say opportunistic) in the choice of what to regard with favour, what to criticize (Said, 1981, p. 120).

According to Said (1981, p. 120), the French newspaper *Le Monde* tried to cover ‘the entire world’, while the *New York Times* only focused upon those crises that were significant for the American public. Moreover, he observed that the distinction between facts and opinion were less straightforward in *Le Monde* in comparison with *The New York Times*. As a consequence, *Le Monde* was more flexible in its coverage of complex events, with regard to the length, the details and the nuances of the articles. Obviously, Said’s comparison between the way *Le Monde* and *The New York Times* covered the Iranian Revolution is only valid for this situation in 1979. Most certainly, it cannot simply be generalised to the late nineteenth century, 100 years before the events studied by Said. However, it would be interesting to see if the historical roots of this typically French approach of the East can already be recognised in the discourse of the popular French newspapers of the late nineteenth century.



## 4. Islam in the Dutch national discourse

This chapter will elaborate on the position of Muslims and Islam in the Dutch national discourse in the late nineteenth century, just like the previous chapter did for the position of Islam in the French discourse. The structure of this chapter is also the same as that of the previous one. First, the historical relation between the Netherlands and Islam is described (section 4.1), followed by the specific Dutch interpretation of Orientalism (4.2). Section 4.3 focuses on Dutch imperialism in the late nineteenth century. Next, some crucial elements of the Dutch national discourse in this particular period are outlined (4.4). Finally, the status of the large newspapers in the Netherlands is discussed (4.5).

### 4.1 The historical relation between the Netherlands and the Islam

As we have seen in section 3.1, Muslims have migrated to France on several occasions in history. The Netherlands have not witnessed similar historical immigration waves. In fact, the first Muslims only migrated to the Netherlands after the Second World War. However, this does not mean that there were no previous contacts between Muslims and the Dutch. On the contrary, the Dutch colonisation of the East Indies has resulted in a complex historical relation between the Dutch and the Islam. This section will briefly describe the colonisation of the East Indies from the early 17<sup>th</sup> to the nineteenth century and the Dutch attitude towards Islam during this period. Yet we will first look at the contacts between the Dutch and the Islam in the Middle Ages, before the colonial era.

In the Early Middle Ages, the image of the Islam in the Netherlands was mainly based upon stories that originated in Southern France and Spain. French ‘chansons de geste’ (epic poems) were translated into Dutch. The *Chanson de Roland* for example, which was mentioned in section 3.1, became popular in the Netherlands as the *Roe-lantslied*. It is assumed that there have also been direct contacts between Dutch pilgrims and Muslims in the Holy Land. However, no reports of such contacts during the Early Middle Ages have been preserved. During the Crusades, numerous Dutch travelled to the Holy Land to fight the Muslims. Robert II (1065-1111), Count of Flanders, was one of the most prominent participants in the First Crusade (1096-1099). William I (1167-1222), Count of Holland, made a considerable contribution to the Fifth Crusade (1213-1221), by leading a substantial Dutch fleet. As a consequence of the contacts between the Dutch and the Saracens, some Arab words found their way into the Dutch language.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, the Dutch awareness of Islam remained low, as knowledge about this religion was only available to the elite, via Latin books. In 1586 it became possible to study the Arabic language and the Islam at Leiden University. As late as the 17<sup>th</sup> century however, some people still tried to ‘prove’ that Mohammed was actually the Antichrist (Slomp, 2000, pp. 329-331).

The increasing trade with Muslims overseas and the colonisation of areas with a Muslim population greatly enhanced the Dutch awareness of the Islam (Slomp, 2000, p. 331). The Dutch first arrived in the Indonesian Archipelago in the early 17<sup>th</sup> century. They wanted to take over trade routes that had previously been controlled by the Portuguese. Ambon and the Moluccas islands were occupied in 1605; present-day Jakarta was conquered by Jan Pieterszoon Coen in 1619. It was renamed Batavia and became the seat of the Dutch East Indies Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie: VOC). In

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<sup>4</sup> Some examples of Dutch words that originate in the Arab language are: *alcohol*, *cijfer* (figure, grade), *muts* (cap, bonnet), *suiker* (sugar) and *spinazie* (spinach) (Philippa, 1989).

1641, the Portuguese lost their influence in the Indonesian Archipelago when Anthony van Diemen conquered Malacca. Initially, the VOC only possessed a relatively small territory in the East Indies, but its political influence concerned a considerably larger territory. The VOC effectively destroyed the existing governmental systems in most of the Indonesian Archipelago. The only sultanates that managed to maintain their independence for a longer period were those of Mataram (the region around present-day Yogyakarta), Aceh (North Sumatra) and the Northern Moluccan island of Ternate (Algadri, 1994, pp. 51-52).

The Dutch travellers and colonists of the 17<sup>th</sup> century already had an opinion about the Islam before they actually left for the East Indies. There were strongly influenced by theologians, who presented the Muslims as ‘detestable heretics’: “*These theologians assessed Islam in terms of unbelief, superstition or heresy*” (Steenbrink, 2006, p. 24). This view reflects the heritage of crusader ideals. Moreover, the Dutch protestant theologians echoed Martin Luther’s opinion that Muslims were a punishment by God. As a consequence of these views, the policy of the VOC towards the population of the East Indies was characterised by racial as well as religious intolerance. Raden Abdulkadir Widjoatmodjo (1942, p. 55) cites a church-order for the municipality of Batavia concerning the conversion of ‘pagans’ that was issued on 7 December 1643:

The high officials should see to it, that the Moorish circumcision and schools will be forbidden and Chinese and other pagans will be prohibited from having their services of pagan superstition and devil's worship, which they have especially in their temples and also at night in the streets. Also their devilish knowledge of fortune-telling should be forbidden, for in no Christian republic such a violation of God's Honor should be permitted for whatever reason it might be, for it will only give joy to non-Christians and annoy the Christians (cited by Widjoatmodjo, 1942, p. 55).

In 1716, the VOC explicitly prohibited the transport of Muslim pilgrims to and from Mecca on the VOC ships, because the influence of these pilgrims on fellow Muslims in the East Indies would be ‘harmful’ (Widjoatmodjo, 1942, p. 56). According to Algadri (1994, p. 54), the VOC pursued a policy of ‘divide and rule’, in which it always supported local kings “*whose religious belief of Islam was only formal*” in their struggle with other kings “*who were loyal to their religion*”.

Historically, the image of the Islam in the metropolitan Netherlands has been strongly influenced by traders, travellers, writers and soldiers who visited countries with a Muslim population and brought home stories about the East. Moreover, theologians have also played a key role in the development of the image of the Islam in the Netherlands. Theologians educated the priests and preachers, who would ultimately tell the churchgoers about other religions. These churchgoers strongly depended on their preachers for their information about the outside world. As a consequence, the theologians essentially determined the image of the Islam among a considerable part of the Dutch population. Hence, their influence was considerably more important than that of the ‘scientific orientalists’, whose works were only read by a relatively small elite. Among the theologians and the early Dutch Islam scientists, there were people with a negative as well as people with a positive opinion on the Islam (Slomp, 2000, pp. 332-333).

The VOC was disbanded in 1798. As a result, its territories in the East Indies were nationalised and officially came under the administration of the Dutch government in 1800. Section 4.3 will show how this influenced the relation between the Netherlands and the Islam.

## 4.2 Dutch Orientalism

As noted before (section 2.2), Edward Said (1978) does not pay particular attention to the Netherlands in his influential book *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient*. This is especially remarkable because he does mention the contributions of some other nations to Orientalism, which would deserve more attention in further research: “*Britain and France dominated the Eastern Mediterranean from about the seventeenth century on. Yet my discussion of that domination and systematic interest does not do justice to [...] the important contributions to Orientalism of Germany, Italy, Russia, Spain, and Portugal [...]*” (Said, 1978, p. 17). None of these five countries that have made ‘important contributions’ to Orientalism according to Said actually possessed colonies with a number of Muslim inhabitants that approached that of the Dutch East Indies. There are two possible explanations for the fact that Said does not mention the Netherlands in his book. The first possibility is that he has simply forgotten to mention the Netherlands in all the fragments in his book in which he refers to Orientalism in other countries than the United Kingdom, France and the United States. The second possibility is that he thinks that Orientalism did not really develop in the Netherlands.

De Hond (2008, pp. 359-363) argues that Orientalism did in fact develop in the Netherlands, but that it was too diverse to be captured under a ‘Saidian’ explanation. According to De Hond, the argument that Orientalism is the result of an unequal power relation between East and West is insufficient for the Dutch situation. In the Netherlands, Orientalism never became such a popular cultural trend as in France and Great Britain. Moreover, Dutch Orientalism developed considerably later than French and British Orientalism. It blossomed in the Netherlands between 1880 and 1920, when its heydays in France and Great Britain were already over.

The relatively limited and late Dutch interest for the East is related to the decline of the Dutch influence in the Middle East after the fall of the VOC. However, this does not explain why Orientalism as a cultural movement was even less successful in the Netherlands than in Belgium, Denmark, Austria and some German states. Another reason for the low popularity of Orientalism in the Netherlands was that it was associated with France. For a long time, the Dutch considered Orientalism as a French ‘freak of fashion’. They rejected French cultural trends because France was still considered as a threat after Napoleon’s conquest of the Netherlands in the early nineteenth century. The aspects of Orientalism that were immensely popular in France and other countries, such as the supposed abundance, eroticism and passion, were mostly seen as plainly negative characteristics in the Netherlands. They were ‘un-Dutch’ and hence morally reprehensible. As a result, there was little exoticism and desire for the East in the Netherlands for most of the nineteenth century (De Hond, 2008, pp. 364-366).

In the late nineteenth century, things changed when the Netherlands developed into a modern, industrial society. This caused an important cultural change: there was more room for a critical attitude towards the modern, civil society. As a consequence, people became more interested in foreign cultures and Orientalism became more influential. Artistic and intellectual elites criticised the industrialisation and the old norms and values and were fascinated by the pre-industrial, un-spoiled, sensual, mystical and spiritual East. More and more, the East functioned as an antipode of the Dutch mentality. Many people imagined the East as a place without the restrictive sexual norms of the Netherlands, with exiting attainments such as belly-dancing and prostitution. Others, such as the feminists and members of the Reformed Church, frowned upon the same imagined Eastern traits. The Reformed Protestant figurehead Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920) even tried to prove that Christianity was morally superior to the Islam by studying statistics on pros-

titution in Algiers. Whatever their opinion on the Eastern attainments or sins, most Dutch agreed that the East was more static than the West. It was in a lower stage of development and had not yet developed into the modern, rational society of the West (De Hond, 2008, pp. 359-367).

Without directly mentioning the Netherlands, Said (1978) does pay attention to Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936), who was an internationally renowned orientalist in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Textbox 4.1 briefly explains Snouck Hurgronje's contribution to the image of the Islam in the Netherlands of the late nineteenth century.

#### **Textbox 4.1: Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936)**

After having studied theology, Snouck Hurgronje studied Arabic languages and literature at the Leiden University. He visited Arabia in 1884-1885. He was formally converted to Islam to be able to stay in Mecca for six months. The reports on his observations were published in 1888 and 1889 (Waardenburg, 1963, p. 20; De Hond, 2008, p. 297). In 1889, he left for the Dutch East Indies to study the Indonesian Islam and work as a counsellor for native affairs. He wanted to lay a scientific foundation for the Dutch colonial policy towards Islam (Steenbrink, 2006, p. 88). Therefore, Widjoatmodjo (1942, pp. 55-56) credits him for having contributed to a better understanding of Islam in the Netherlands. In fact, the study of Islam in the East-Indies began with his arrival in Batavia in 1889. Snouck Hurgronje behaved like a Muslim to win the trust of the Indonesian Muslims and quickly learned their languages. He stayed in Aceh during the 1890s to gather intelligence on the Indonesian resistance. He stayed in the East Indies until 1906, after which he returned to the Netherlands to work as a professor at Leiden University and to give policy advice to the Minister of Colonies (Steenbrink, 2006, p. 88; Waardenburg, 1963, pp. 21-22).

Snouck Hurgronje wanted to counter popular misunderstandings and barriers between East and West. He argued that the Netherlands should play a pioneer role in this regard, because of its long history in the field of Islam studies (Slomp, 2000, p. 332). Snouck Hurgronje scrupulously studied Islam and all kinds of aspects of Muslim culture in a mostly empirical way (Waardenburg, 1963, pp. 128-129, pp. 293-295). However, he did not only publish scientific books and articles for the elite; he also joined in the public debate (De Hond, 2008, p. 21). In 1886 for example, he published an article in the popular newspaper *Rotterdamsche Courant* (Algadri, 1994, p. 82). As a consequence, he managed to reach a broad public. According to Waardenburg (1963, p. 128), his view on Islam was static: Snouck Hurgronje thought that Islam could not adapt to European modernisations. If the Muslims wanted to share in these modernisations, they needed to be in harmony with European secularisation. To reach this goal, they had to be emancipated from Islam.

In his days, Snouck Hurgronje was an internationally renowned Orientalist (De Hond, 2008, p. 19). Today however, Snouck Hurgronje is considered as a highly controversial figure. Although he promoted the emancipation and education of the Indonesian people, he also advised the fierce oppression of some regions that tried to maintain their independence. He is seen as one of the founders of modern Islam studies, who introduced a relatively nuanced and accurate view on the Islam. However, he is also “*despised as the personification of all the evils of colonialism*” (Steenbrink, 2006, p. 91), since he strongly contributed to the effectiveness of the Dutch colonisation. As Algadri (1994, p. 55) puts it: “*He did not only behave as a scientist, but also a scientist who wanted to use his science to serve the political interest of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia, and one of his most important services was “to emancipate” the Indonesian from Islam.*” Snouck Hurgronje advocated freedom of religion, but also thought that the number of Muslims participating in the Hajj should be limited and argued that political Islam (especially Pan-Islamism) should be oppressed (Algadri, 1994, pp. 82-1000; Waardenburg, 1963, pp. 26-27, pp. 101-102).

In a chapter entitled “*Modern Anglo-French Orientalism In Fullest Flower*”, Said (1978, pp. 255-256) uses a citation of Snouck Hurgronje as a “*good example of the prewar rationale*”. Apparently, Said thus considers Snouck Hurgronje as an exponent of the Anglo-French Orientalism. He notes that Snouck Hurgronje held a strongly essentialist view on the distinction between East and West: “*For Hurgronje the distinction between Orient and Occident was no mere academic or popular cliché: quite the contrary. For him it signified the essential, historical power relationship between the two*” (Said, 1978, p. 256). This shows that although Said does not count the Netherlands among the core nations of Orientalism, he does acknowledge that the Dutch orientalist Snouck Hurgronje represented Orientalism ‘in fullest flower’.

### 4.3 Dutch imperialism in the late nineteenth century

As we have seen in section 4.1, present-day Indonesia had already been dominated by the VOC since the early 17<sup>th</sup> century. The VOC pursued a rather repressive policy towards Islam. Indonesia, the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, officially became a colony of the Dutch State in 1800. As a result, the Dutch perception of Islam in the late nineteenth century was strongly related to the colonisation of the Dutch East Indies. Colonial expansion reached its peak after 1850, when colonialism was no longer merely aimed at reaching high profits: expansion of the colonial territory became a goal in itself. The contacts between Dutch individuals and the Indonesian farming population intensified as a result of the rise of plantations (Steenbrink, 2006, p. 76).

The Dutch State pursued a less repressive policy towards Islam than the VOC. More liberal regulations towards non-Christian religions were introduced in the post-Napoleonic years. In 1818, a law was passed that guaranteed government protection of prayer meetings for all religions, as long as these meeting did not pose a threat for the public order. This freedom of religion was confirmed by later laws and policy. The liberalisation of the Dutch policy and the increasing availability of affordable transport to Mecca, resulted in a steady growth of the number of *Hajj* pilgrims after 1850. At the same time, however, the Dutch still tried to discourage Indonesian Muslims to undertake the Hajj. Pilgrims were obliged to purchase a passport and to pay a specific tax. Moreover, they had to prove that they had actually travelled to Mecca upon their arrival back home. In 1872, the Netherlands established a consulate in the Arabian port city of Jeddah, which is the principal gateway to Mecca and Medina for pilgrims travelling over sea. The aim of this consulate was officially to look after the interests of the pilgrims from the Netherlands Indies, but in fact also to control these pilgrims.<sup>5</sup> Until 1902, the Indonesian pilgrims were obliged to report themselves to this consulate with their passports (Bousquet, 1938, pp. 35-36; Widjoatmodjo, 1942, pp. 54-56).

During the nineteenth century, many Indonesian farmers were converted to Islam. As a consequence, the power of the so-called Kiai’s (Islamic religious preachers) increased. With the help of Kiai’s, Indonesian kings were able to mobilise a large number of people. On numerous occasions, this led to uprisings against the Dutch administration, such as the Java War (1825-1830), the Banjarmasin War (1859-1863) and finally the Aceh War (1873-1913). During these wars, Kiai propagated the Holy War to motivate large crowds. Ethnic Arabs played a key role in the Aceh War. Indonesians of Arab de-

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<sup>5</sup> In 1923, the Netherlands were even allowed to open a vice-consulate in Mecca. This vice-consulate, which was run by an Indonesian Muslim, was the only foreign agency in Mecca (Widjoatmodjo, 1942, pp. 54-56). Both the consulate and the vice-consulate were passed on to Indonesia in 1950, shortly after its independence in 1949 (Nationaal Archief, 2006, p. 5).

scent occupied leading positions in the Muslim resistance against the Dutch. The Dutch perceived them as dangerous fanatics. According to Algadri (1994, p. 74), the Aceh War “*deepened the fear of the Dutch towards the danger of Islam, especially in connection with the role of the Arab descendants in that war. This fear increased with the appearance of the Pan-Islam movement among the Arab descendants in Indonesia [...].*” De Hond (2008, pp. 364-365) confirms that the Dutch considered the Islam as a threat to the colonial system. They distrusted Islamic cultures and strongly feared pan-Islamism.

This fear resulted in an intense hate of the Dutch towards the Arab minority in Indonesia. The Dutch held these ethnic Arabs responsible for the radicalisation of the Indonesian Muslims and the numerous uprisings against the Dutch administration. As Algadri (1994, p. 77) explains, the Dutch thought “*that Islam was their greatest enemy, and descendants of the Arabs, the race that gave birth to Islam, logically were also seen as their number one enemy, the source of trouble and resistance towards the Dutch, as well as agitators of the Kiais and Islam defenders, who unceasingly opposed the Dutch everywhere in Indonesia*”. The Dutch approached the ethnic Arabs in Indonesia in a considerable more negative way than the other ethnic groups.

As the contacts between Dutch colonists and Indonesian farmers intensified in the late nineteenth century, “*Muslims were considered less as heretics or outright enemies and increasingly as backward and teachable inhabitants of a colony that was turning into a developing country*” (Steenbrink, 2006, p. 76). Therefore, the Dutch colonists tried to educate and ‘civilise’ the Indonesians. Moreover, Catholic and Protestant missionaries travelled to the East Indies to convert the Indonesians to Christianity. These missionaries tried to curtail the influence of Islam on the Indonesian society (Steenbrink, 2006, pp. 98-99).

In an analysis of the Dutch colonial policy towards Islam, French observer Bousquet (1938, p. 50) argues that the Dutch attitude has been characterised by three principles. First, the policy was characterised by religious tolerance. The Dutch did not encourage any religious practices, but did not discourage them either. Second, the Dutch had an attitude of ‘favourable neutrality’ towards the evolution of Islam. This means that they welcomed ‘desirable’ civilising and modernising forces within the Muslim community, without directly supporting them. Third, political movements were fiercely oppressed, especially if they were influenced by foreign powers.

According to Bousquet (1938, pp. 124-129), the Dutch colonial policy was very different from the French policy. For example, relatively few Indonesians spoke the Dutch language, while the French language was widespread in Algeria. Bousquet argues that the Dutch did not want the Indonesians to learn the Dutch language, because they purposely maintained the ignorance of their colonial subjects. As long as the Indonesians did not speak a Western language, it was very hard for them to have contact with the outside-world. In this way, the language barrier was used as a way to confirm and maintain the Dutch ‘superiority’.

All in all, Bousquet (1938, pp. 154-155) explains, the contrast between French and Dutch imperialism can be summarised as follows. In the French colonial ideal, colonisation was above all a spiritual and moral conquest, which was facilitated by a military and political conquest. The French did not simply want to benefit from their colonies, they also wanted to contribute something durable themselves. Their ultimate goal was to make Frenchmen out of their colonial subjects. Colonialism would be completely successful if all inhabitants of French colonies shared the same feeling of being French, the same French identity. On the contrary, the Dutch were completely uninterested in turning their colonial subjects into surrogate Dutchmen. They simply wanted to benefit from the East Indies and focuses on economic transformations instead of cultural ones. To reach opti-

mal economic benefits, it was crucial to maintain the peace. The Dutch preferred not to upset the indigenous population by imposing the Dutch language and Dutch cultural norms, because they found it far more important to keep the Indonesians satisfied. Bousquet (1938, p. 155) uses an interesting metaphor to illustrate this contrast:

Il me souvient avoir lu un jour à la devanture d'un magasin en Amérique : *Milk from contented cows*. Aussi ai-je souvent proposé à mes interlocuteurs néerlandais, cette formule qu'ils ont acceptée avec un sourire : « L'idéal colonial du Hollandais est de transformer l'indigène en vache satisfaite, celui du Français, en citoyen, c'est-à-dire en individu mécontent. »

In this view, the Dutch approach was mostly pragmatic, while the French were motivated by ideological motives that in fact led to more discontent among the colonial subjects. The French approach could be described as *imperial colonialism*, while the Dutch approach is better characterised as *pragmatic colonialism*.

#### **4.4 Principal components of the Dutch national discourse**

The previous sections have described the historical relations between the Netherlands and Muslims. Now it is necessary how the Dutch saw themselves and what their society looked like, to be able to better understand the way they looked at Islam.

In the 1890s, most of the Dutch strongly identified themselves with the Dutch state and supported its imperialist ambitions. They also felt connected with the Dutch royal family (the House of Orange). Attempts were made to introduce a standard language and spelling and to determine the norms of cultural and socially acceptable behaviour. Moreover, the educational system was improved and standardised, as were the metrology and the currency. The measures encouraged the unity among the Dutch people (Wintle, 1996, pp. 16-17). Hence, the Dutch gradually developed a national identity, in which they characterised themselves as patriotic, devout and home-loving. The ideal Dutchman worked hard and was modest, calm, sober, chaste and faithful. On the contrary, the behaviour of the French for example was perceived as exaggerated, noisy and immoral. The Dutch argued that their national characteristics had brought the Netherlands plenty of glory in the past, especially in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. The century became known as the 'Golden Age' and was presented as an example of what the Dutch were capable of, as a result of their specific Dutch mentality (De Hond, 2008, p. 364).

One of the most essential aspects of the Dutch civic ideology were the moralities. The moralisation process reached its heydays in the late nineteenth and early 20<sup>th</sup> century. While the industrialisation and urbanisation processes gradually became more visible after 1850, the middle classes worried about fading norms and unchaste behaviour of the growing labour class. Churches, civic and private organisations and political parties, including the socialists, underlined the importance of strict sexual norms and family values. The Netherlands presented itself to the rest of the world as the paragon of morality and honesty and indeed obtained the image of a sexually puritanical nation. Priests and ministers frequently used the Eastern, Muslim society as an example of depravedness and immorality. Constantinople and Cairo were presented as the modern Sodom and Gomorra and polygamy and the Sultan's harem were constantly criticised. The size of the harem was greatly exaggerated and few people realised that most Muslim men only had one wife in the late nineteenth century (De Hond, 2008, pp. 201-202).

According to Georges-Henri Bousquet, a French social scientist who studied the Dutch Islam policy in the 1930s, the Dutch were lacking a real ‘colonial spirit’. Their colonial attitude was characterised by a certain soberness or even a lack of interest. He explains that he met numerous Dutchmen working in the colonial administration, but that none of them showed any sign of enthusiasm about colonialism. On the contrary, Bousquet (1938, p. 154) explains:

Je suis persuadé que tous ces hommes auraient travaillé avec la même conscience, le même dévouement, les mêmes capacités s'ils avaient été placés à Terschelling ou à Schiermonnikoog qu'à Sumatra ou Bornéo. Les Hollandais se vantent d'être le peuple le plus *nuchter* c'est-à-dire le plus rationnel, le plus objectif, le plus dénué d'enthousiasme et le plus terre à terre du monde.

Hence, it is suggested that a certain rationality, objectivity or lack of interest has influenced the Dutch attitude towards colonialism.

Another key element of the Dutch self-image is the idea that the country “*has only ever experienced dictatorship at the hand of foreign, conquering tyrants, never from within*” (Krul, 2007, p. 144). The Dutch thus consider dictatorships as fundamentally ‘foreign’ and absolutely incompatible with the Dutch mentality. The Dutch people strongly identify themselves with Dutch the nation. According to Krul (2007, p. 144), ‘egalitarianism’ is another characteristic of the Dutch national discourse. The Dutch are strongly attached to ‘equality’. As a consequence, they refuse to idolise ‘heroes’. In general, they sympathise more with the resistance against the authorities than with the authorities themselves, because they consider the existence of their nation essentially as the result of acts of civil disobedience.

The Dutch nation was a civic nation, just like the French one (section 3.4). This means that the Dutch view of the nation was also based on the principles of a social contract. However, the Dutch nation was completely different from the French one in its perception of unity. While the French tried to eradicate cultural differences as much as possible, the Dutch society was completely divided in different religious and political-ideological groups. In the so-called *pillarised* Dutch society, the Catholics, the Protestants, the liberals and the socialists all had their own institutions. There was minimal interaction between people from different pillars. This was the consequence of a strong ‘live-and-let-live’ attitude (Bryant, 1997, pp. 164-166). The Dutch tolerated the lifestyles of people in other pillars: unlike the French government, the Dutch government put little effort in eradicating these cultural differences. The Dutch found it more important to maintain the peace and hence avoided conflicts between people with different cultures by avoiding contact at all. Taking into account this lack of solidarity among the Dutch citizens, it seems that the Dutch national discourse was even more *Gesellschaft*-based (and thus less *Gemeinschaft*-based) than the French one.

The first paragraph of this section made clear that a national identity had developed in the Netherlands by the end of the nineteenth century. However, it could also be argued that in fact some different national identities existed next to each other, as a result of the pillarisation. The influential Calvinist thinker and politician Abraham Kuyper for example frequently used the word ‘nation’ to refer to his fellow Calvinists. This does not mean that the pillarisation necessarily undermined the entire principle of nationalism. Instead, diversity was incorporated in the national identity (Wintle, 1996, pp. 23-25). As Raedts (1996, p. 40) argues, the pillarised Dutch society could only function because the Dutch agreed that religion did not form part of the national consciousness. Instead, the national consciousness was based upon the principle of tolerance.

#### 4.5 Dutch mass media in the late nineteenth century

Just like their French counterparts (section 3.5), the Dutch newspapers blossomed in the late nineteenth century. The freedom of press was incorporated in the Dutch constitution in 1848, hence 33 years before it was fixed by law in France. However, 1848 did not yet mark the start of the Golden Age for the Dutch newspapers. The newspapers had economic problems, which were mainly caused by a high tax on newspapers and advertisements. This tax, the *dagbladzegel*, had been established under the French rule in 1812 and was not outlawed before 1869. Until that year, the Dutch newspapers were printed on a small paper size with a very high text density. After the abolishment of the tax, the newspapers were printed on considerably larger sheets. Moreover, the prices dropped (a subscription to the *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* became 50% cheaper), new newspapers were founded and old weekly journals became daily newspapers. Hence, the abolishment of the *dagbladzegel* ushered in the Golden Age of the Dutch newspapers. The number of newspapers sold in the Netherlands further increased as a result of the improved printing techniques, the population growth, the decreasing illiteracy and the increasing welfare (Kussendrager & Van der Lugt, 2007, pp. 25-26; Schneider, 1943, p. 156).

Before July 1869, there were nine daily newspapers in the Netherlands. At the end of the year, after the abolishment of the *dagbladzegel*, there were already fourteen daily newspapers. The number of daily newspapers further increased to 54 in 1890 and 62 in 1894. Like in France, politically-oriented newspapers blossomed, but the non-political, independent newspapers managed to reach far higher sales figures. The Rotterdam-based *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* and the Amsterdam-based *Algemeen Handelsblad* sold the most copies. In 1870, Amsterdam-based newspaper *Het Nieuws van den Dag: Kleine Courant* was founded as an imitation of the French *Petit Journal*. Just like *Le Petit Journal*, *Het Nieuws van den Dag* was printed on small-sized sheets and became very popular. It also sold relatively many copies at the countryside. Some similar newspapers, such as the *Rotterdamsch Nieuwsblad* and the *Haagsche Courant* did not manage to reach such a large range: they remained more locally-oriented. Most of these ‘non-political’ small newspapers held a moderately liberal editorial line (Schneider, 1943, pp. 156-163).

The Dutch newspapers sold considerably fewer copies than their French counterparts. In 1882, approximately 700,000 copies were sold of France’s most popular newspaper, *Le Petit Courant* (Albert, 1972, p. 301). The most popular Dutch newspaper, *Het Nieuws van den Dag*, only sold 25,000 copies (table 4.1).

Table 4.1: Circulation of the six largest Dutch newspapers in 1882

Newspaper	Circulation
Het Nieuws van den Dag: Kleine Courant	25,000
Provinciale Groninger Courant	10,000
Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant	9,500
Algemeen Handelsblad	9,000
Nieuwe Groninger Courant	8,000
Rotterdamsche Courant	8,000

Source: Van der Laan, 2005, p. 128 <sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> The circulation figures mentioned by Van der Laan (2005) are based upon a worldwide newspaper directory that was made in 1882 by an American advertising agent, Harlan Page Hubbard. These estimates may be somewhat on the low side, as Schneider (1943, p. 163) estimated that the circulation of *Het Nieuws van den Dag* was already 35,500 in 1874. At the front page of *Het Nieuws van den Dag* published on 1 January 1883, it is mentioned that the circulation was 31,200.




## 5. Differences and similarities between the French and Dutch discourses

The previous two chapters have described the historical position of Muslims and Islam in the French and Dutch national discourses. This chapter will combine the insights from both chapters to answer the following research question: *Which elements of the national discourse have influenced the French and Dutch representations of Islam?*

Figure 5.1 shows the part of the conceptual model that summarises the relations that were analysed in this chapter. Both France and the Netherlands saw nation building efforts in the nineteenth century. However, the organisation of both societies was different. Although most of the Dutch identified themselves with the Dutch state, its imperialist ambitions and the royal family, the Dutch society was strongly divided in four so-called pillars: the liberals, the socialists, the Protestants and the Catholics. This pillarisation was reflected in and confirmed by the educational system, in which every pillar had its own schools. In France, a similar division did not exist, since the state was strongly secularised. Although both states promoted national unity to a certain extent, the French unifying efforts were considerably more thorough (arrow 1 in the conceptual model).

Figure 5.1: Conceptual model



The secular tradition was strongly embedded in the French national consciousness. The principle of *laïcité* was widely accepted and considered as a modern way to organise the society. The French thought that a very strict separation between the Church and the State was necessary, because they feared that the return to power of the Church. Moreover, Rousseau's idea of a social contract was an important aspect of the French national ideology. This means that membership of the nation was voluntary: race did not matter, since people who shared the same French values would be members of the French nation. However, the other side of the coin was that (regional) minority groups and colonial subjects who retained their own ideology were perceived as a threat. The French state tried to eradicate cultural differences as much as possible to strengthen the national unity. Hence, *laïcité* and the social contract became essential elements of the French self-image: the French saw themselves above all as a modern, unified and secular nation. As we have seen, the Dutch society was neither based on a strong separation between state and religion, nor on a profound unity. Pillarisation was the most crucial element of the Dutch social organisation: diversity was institutionalised. Since this pillarisation was explained as a form of tolerance, the Dutch saw themselves as a tolerant nation (arrow 2).

Just like the social organisation, the French and Dutch national ideology contained opposite characteristics. In France, liberty and equality were two essential principles that had their origins in the Revolution. The French strongly rejected despotism. They felt that autonomy was 'noble' and therefore submissiveness should be avoided at all costs. The Dutch also opposed despotism, but their rejection was somewhat less emotional than the French one, since the country had never experienced absolutism and dictatorship like France. While the French strongly objected submissiveness, the Dutch thought modesty was a good virtue. The ideal Dutchman worked hard, was devout, home-loving and had a sober and modest lifestyle. Many organisations dedicated themselves to the moralisation of the Dutch people. The Dutch were proud of their image of a sexually puritanical nation, with strict sexual norms and family values. In this regard, they thought that the French mentality was opposite to the Dutch one. This shows how different national ideologies led to different self-images: the French saw themselves as the defenders of the human rights and the universal principals of liberty and equality while the Dutch presented themselves as the defenders of family values and sexual morality (arrow 3).

From the seventeenth century onwards, the Dutch Indies companies occupied numerous colonies, including the East Indies. These colonies were placed under government control in the nineteenth century. Colonial expansion reached its peak after 1850, when the policy no longer merely aimed at making high profits: the construction of a colonial empire became a goal in itself. Although France developed a colonial empire in a similar way as the Netherlands, it did not conquer its first colonies with a Muslim population before the nineteenth century. The nineteenth century imperialism was preluded by Napoleon Bonaparte's Egyptian Expedition of 1798. Imperialism became a way to restore lost glory, first after Napoleon's defeat in 1815 and later after the defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. The French wanted to establish a large sphere of influence. The fierce competition with the British culminated in the Fashoda Incident of 1898. As mentioned before, most of the Dutch supported imperialism. Most of the French supported imperialism as well, although some influential thinkers publicly criticised the colonisation of territories with a Muslim population (arrow 4).

The French accentuated differences between the East and the West to justify the colonisation of territories in the East. Expeditions organised by geographical associations strengthened the image of a weak and underdeveloped Orient, which would have to be modernised and civilised by the West. Like the French, the Dutch thought that the East was more static than the West and had not yet reached the stage of modernisation. Hence,

the East-West dichotomy was used both in the Netherlands and in France as a justification of imperialism (arrow 5).

Both France and the Netherlands have seen a long and complicated history of contacts with Islam. In France, however, this relation has been more direct and intense earlier in history, as several waves of Muslims immigrants arrived in the country long before the nineteenth century. By the nineteenth century, these Muslims had virtually completely assimilated into the French society. For almost 300 years, the French had maintained an alliance with the Ottoman Empire, until the treaty was violated by Napoleon Bonaparte. However, the contacts with Muslims became far more intensive after France conquered Algeria 1830 onwards. Large numbers of French colonists migrated there to govern the colony. The same happened in Tunisia, after its occupation in 1881. Missionaries travelled to the new territories to convert the Muslims to Christianity, albeit with little success. Since the VOC gained control over present-day Indonesia in the seventeenth century, the Dutch already had colonial experiences with Islam two centuries before France. These contacts become more intensive after the control had passed to the Dutch government, when plantations were established and more Dutch moved to the East. Like in the French colonies, priests tried to convert the Muslims into Christianity. Hence, both in France and the Netherlands imperialism contributed to more intensive contacts with Muslims in the nineteenth century (arrow 6).

Napoleon's Egyptian Expedition of 1798 formed the start of a new phase in the collection of knowledge about the Muslim World. According to Edward Said (1978), this event marked the beginning of modern Orientalism. Scientists of various disciplines gathered information about the Egyptians from a euro-centric point of view. In a similar way, the military conquest of Algeria went hand in hand with a scientific expedition. In 1844, the *Bureaux Arabes* were founded to gather information on local traditions and the Arab language. Dutch information gathering on Islam and Muslims was somewhat less structured and institutionalised. However, it was given a boost when Dutch Orientalist Christian Snouck Hurgronje gained international fame in the late nineteenth century. His studies, which were mostly the result of his method of immersion, were popular among the Dutch and strongly influenced the Dutch colonial policy. Hence, knowledge about Islam increased both in France and the Netherlands as a result of the augmented contacts with Muslims, which in turn were the result of imperialism (arrow 7). The French knowledge gathering was highly systematic, while there was clearly one individual who left his mark on the Dutch study of Muslims and Islam.

The late nineteenth century Dutch Islam policy in the East Indies was characterised by a certain relaxation. In comparison to the French, the Dutch were more tolerant towards Muslim practices, because they thought that the maintenance of peace was necessary for optimal economic benefits. They did closely scrutinise people who participated in the *Hajj* and particularly the ethnic Arabs among them, but only because they suspected these Muslims of causing civil unrest. In this regard, the Dutch approach was mostly pragmatic, while the French attitude was more idealistic (arrow 8). In France, there were also people who advocated a pragmatic approach. However, towards the end of the nineteenth century, the dominant idea was that the 'intolerant religion' of Islam had to be discouraged by spreading French norms and values.

All in all, this chapter has shown that there were several similarities between French and Dutch Orientalism. However, the French were fascinated earlier by the 'Exotic East' than the Dutch and this fascination was also more profound in France. Moreover, we have seen that the French and the Dutch had completely different, almost opposite self-images. The next chapter will show, among other things, the consequences of these different self-images for the representations of Islam in both countries.



PART II  
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS



## 6. Methodology and operationalization

The empirical research of this thesis focuses on the following research questions, which were formulated in the introduction:

2. *To what extent did the French and Dutch press associate Muslims with different stereotypical images in the late nineteenth century?*
3. *To what extent did the French and Dutch press pay attention to different Islam-related news events in the late nineteenth century?*
4. *What was the role of colonialism in the representation of Muslims and Islam in the French and Dutch press in the late nineteenth century?*

These questions are answered by using a quantitative content analysis on a large sample of newspaper articles, illustrated by some in-depth analyses of fragments from these texts. This chapter describes the used methodologies: a quantitative content analysis (6.1), complemented by elements of a discourse analysis (6.2). Section 6.3 outlines how the articles in the sample were selected, followed by a description of the newspapers from which articles have been selected (6.4 and 6.5). This chapter concludes with an operationalization of the important variables.

### 6.1 Quantitative content analysis

The method of quantitative content analysis is often used in textual studies and media studies. It offers the possibility to quantify qualitative information. For example, one can determine the themes of a large number of texts, in order to study the statistics with regard to these themes. In this study, the method is used to identify and analyse the differences between French and Dutch newspaper articles about Islam in the late nineteenth century.

According to the best known definition (Bryman, 2008, p. 274), “*Content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication*” (Berelson, 1952, p. 18). Hence, a systematic and objective approach is a crucial characteristic of content analysis. For this reason, it is necessary to establish an *observation schedule*, which is used to quantify the content of the text corpus. This makes the content analysis a quantitative and thus more transparent alternative to qualitative approaches, such as the semiotic approach (which closely looks at the role of language in representations). Compared to qualitative approaches, the quantitative content analysis is better suitable for the systematic analysis of a large number of texts. For this reason, the method is very useful in the study of mass media, such as newspapers (Bryman, 2008, pp. 274-276).

Because of the quantitative (‘objective’ and ‘systematic’) character of the content analysis, it is important to carefully select a sample, which forms the basis of the study. Another crucial step in the preparation phase of a content analysis, is the selection of the information that should be quantified. Bryman (2008, p. 280) states that one should usually at least count how often some important words are used. Moreover, one should generally also codify the characteristics of the principal actors that are mentioned in the sources. The importance of these details is that they may reveal mechanisms that underlie the way the media present their information.

Moreover, it is also possible to count the themes and topics of the texts within the corpus. This requires a more interpretive approach: “*the analyst is searching not just for*

*manifest content but latent content as well*” (Bryman, 2008, p. 282). The interpretation of the researcher becomes even more important if he or she tries to identify the point of view of the journalist. Content analysis is often used to codify and quantify ideologies or the presence of stereotypes. As a result, the data gathering is in fact already a combination of a quantitative method and a qualitative interpretation.

An important disadvantage of quantitative content analysis is that it often fails to explain *why* certain patterns, differences or relations exist. The method is very useful for the identification of differences between two categories of texts. However, it generally lacks explanatory value. For this reason, content analyses are sometimes combined with a qualitative method, such as a discourse analysis. The two methods can be complementary: when the content analysis for example shows that significant differences exist between two categories, a discourse analysis may be used to explain and interpret these differences (Bryman, 2008, p. 291).

Now it is useful to briefly look at two studies that use content analysis in a similar way as it is used in this thesis. First (2004, pp. 196-202) has applied this method to study the representation of Arabs in the Israeli television news bulletins. She took a sample of 251 Arab individuals who appeared in these news programs and mainly analysed the origins, profession and appearance of these persons. One of her conclusions was that the vast majority (84%) of the Arabs who appeared in the Israeli news are male. Moreover, 37% of them are politicians.

Poole (2002) used content analysis in a study on the representation of Muslims in two influential British newspapers (*The Times* and *Guardian*). She analysed 837 articles on British Islam that were published between 1994 and 1996. To analyse the context of these articles, she codified the topics and themes in an inductive way. This means that the categories were not based on previous theories, but instead resulted from the texts in the sample. Since the articles generally contained several topics and themes, Poole (2002, pp. 61-66) had to distinguish four variables that were all related to the topics: the topic, the subtopic, a first and a second reference to another topic. The interpretation of the researcher obviously influences the classification within such an approach. Poole found 51 different topics and subtopics within her corpus. Moreover, she also analysed the principal actors that appeared in these articles and she studied the types of articles (reports, editorials, letters to the editor, among others). Finally, she also paid attention to the ‘geography of British Islam’: she analysed the locations of the news events that were described in the articles. Poole concluded that while the media coverage of British Islam had increased, the majority of articles on Islam still concerned foreign news. Islam was essentially presented as a foreign phenomenon. Nevertheless, the coverage was not homogeneous. Especially the centre-left newspaper *Guardian* paid attention to different perspectives on Islam. However, the themes and topics of the articles were very similar in both newspapers. Women were marginalised, as they seldom appeared as the principal actor within an article (Poole, 2002, pp. 86-99).

## 6.2 Discourse analysis

The previous section has shown that the quantitative content analysis is very useful for identifying differences between the representations of Muslims and Islam in the French and Dutch press. However, it cannot be used to explain why these differences exist (Bryman, 2008, p. 291). Therefore, it is necessary to add some qualitative in-depth analyses of French and Dutch articles. A discursive approach will be used for this goal. The *discourse analysis* is a qualitative approach, based on the ideas of philosopher Michel Foucault. He

explained a discourse as the way in which linguistic representations of an object determine how people conceive this object. As a result, the ‘producers’ of a certain discourse have a certain power over the ‘receivers’. The discursive representation of reality becomes a ‘regime of truth’ (Poole, 2002, p. 101; Bryman, 2008, p. 499).

By analysing the discourse, it is possible to discover certain points of view that are implicitly present in the society. A fundamental assumption of the discourse analysis is that language is never objective or neutral: it is instead constructive and strongly depends on the context. A specific discourse is a version of reality that can compete with other discourses, which offer in turn other versions of the reality. The analysis of these discourses can thus reveal a very specific conception of the reality. In this case, a discursive comparison of late nineteenth century French and Dutch texts may reveal how people in both societies thought about Muslims and Islam. In a discourse analysis, it is important to look specifically at rhetorical details: the way in which an argument is formulated may reveal some implicit underlying assumptions (Punch, 2005, pp. 221-225; Bryman, 2008, pp. 500-507).

While analysing texts with a discursive approach, the researcher should ask the following questions: why do I interpret this fragment in a certain way? Which textual elements lead to this specific interpretation? To answer these questions, it is necessary to look not only at the textual constructions within the text, but also at the context. In this way, it is possible to analyse the so-called ‘interpretative repertoires’. These interpretative repertoires are ‘codes’ that can only be understood by members of a particular interpretative community (Flick, 2006, pp. 324-325). Hence, it is useful that the context of the late nineteenth century in France and the Netherlands has been described in chapter 3-5, since knowledge of this context is indispensable for an understanding of the discourse.

Hence, in a discourse analysis, the researcher looks at the content, structure and meaning of texts (the textual dimension), the implicit underlying assumptions and, finally the context (Bryman, 2008, pp. 508-509). According to Poole (2002, p. 102), it is particularly interesting to apply this method to the analysis of newspaper articles, because newspapers reproduce, confirm and diffuse the norms, values and interests of dominant groups in society. By critically analysing these texts, the researcher can thus reveal the dominant ideas in a certain society at a certain moment in time. In her own study of the representation of Islam in the British press in the 1990s, Poole explains the usefulness of the discursive approach as follows:

... I shall make explicit the implicit assumptions contained in them, the cultural indicators of the current political epoch [...]. Underpinning this is the theoretical conception that all texts are discursively constructed, reproducing available discourses in society. Meaning is never fixed, for it shifts at different moments in the communication process. However, discourse analysis aims to show how practices of representation attempt to secure meaning by favouring certain constructions over others (Poole, 2002, p. 103).

In this thesis, the discursive approach is used as a supplement to the quantitative content analysis, to explain the differences and resemblances between the way Muslims are represented in the French and Dutch press. Short articles and fragments from longer articles are cited, often in textboxes, to illustrate these representations. This method is especially important in chapter 9, in which some of the most crucial news events in the late nineteenth century are highlighted as case studies.

### 6.3 Selection of the sample articles

For the quantitative content analysis, a large number of late nineteenth century French and Dutch newspaper articles about Muslims and Islam had to be selected. The sample was drawn from the archives of the *Bibliothèque nationale de France* and the *Koninklijke Bibliotheek*. Both national libraries have digitalised historical newspapers and have made them publicly available on their respective websites.<sup>7</sup> As the digitalising process of both libraries is still under way, only a part of the newspapers can effectively be searched. For this research, it was necessary that the newspapers had been completely digitalised to searchable text files.

Since this thesis aims to uncover the image of Muslims and Islam in France and the Netherlands, the newspapers with the largest circulation had to be analysed. The Dutch newspaper with the largest circulation, *Het Nieuws van den Dag* (see section 4.5), had been almost completely digitalised. However, the late nineteenth century editions of the largest French newspaper (see section 3.5), *Le Petit Journal*, had not yet been converted to searchable text files. Therefore, the second largest French newspaper, *Le Petit Parisien*, was analysed instead. This newspaper was available from the year 1895 onwards. It was decided that newspaper articles from a three year period were to be analysed: 1895-1897.

Newspaper articles were selected by searching for the words ‘Muslims’, ‘Islam’ and their derivations and synonyms.<sup>8</sup> For 1895, all articles containing these words were included in the sample, because there were relatively few articles about Muslims and Islam. For the other years, a selection had to be made: for both newspapers, only the most *relevant* articles were selected for the sample. *Relevance*, as determined by the search engines of both websites, is based on the frequency and frequency density of the search-terms in the articles and newspapers searched. In total, the resulting sample consists of 330 newspaper articles: 165 articles from *Le Petit Parisien* and 165 articles from *Het Nieuws van den Dag* (table 6.1).

Table 6.1: Sample articles by newspaper and by year

	1895	1896	1897	Total
<i>Le Petit Parisien</i>	55	43	67	165
<i>Het Nieuws van den dag</i>	47	50	68	165
Total	102	93	135	330

### 6.4 Le Petit Parisien

The French popular newspaper *Le Petit Parisien* was founded in 1878 as an imitation of the successful newspaper *Le Petit Journal* (Chupin et al., 2009, p. 43). After a difficult start, the circulation of the newspaper augmented rapidly: 460,000 copies were sold daily in 1893. In 1901, the circulation had even increased to 850,000. In 1893, 45% of all copies were sold in Paris; this rate had slightly increased to 47% in 1903. When *Le Petit Journal* became less popular at the turn of the century because of its strong anti-Dreyfus

<sup>7</sup> Archive website of the *Bibliothèque nationale de France*: <http://gallica.bnf.fr/>. Archive website of the *Koninklijke Bibliotheek* : <http://kranten.kb.nl/>.

<sup>8</sup> The search-terms used were: islam\* (with the asterix meaning that derivations were also taken into account), musulman\* and mahométan\* for *Le Petit Parisien* and islam\*, muzelman\*, mohammeda\* and mosl\* for *Het Nieuws van den Dag*.

stance, the circulation of *Le Petit Parisien* kept increasing until it was the largest newspaper of France (Charle, 2004, pp. 309-313).

*Le Petit Parisien* mainly attracted readers who were more interested in some distraction than in political content. Feuilleton stories were added to attract more readers and the newspaper focused on ‘faits divers’: short, spectacular, exciting news events. The direction of *Le Petit Parisien* essentially focused on a public of labourers and countrymen, but also tried to appeal to female readers (Charle, 2004, pp. 310-317): “*Le succès du journal était sans doute dû plus à son habile exploitation des faits divers, du sport, à la qualité de ses romans-feuilletons et à la variété de ses reportages qu’à la qualité de ses articles politiques. La grisaille de sa mise en pages et l’apparent désordre de son contenu convenaient bien à une clientèle sans doute peu exigeante*” (Albert 1972, p. 308).

The editorial was a large in-depth article at the first page, published under the pseudonym Jean Frolo. It was often written by the owner of the newspaper, Jean Dupuy (1844-1919), a *self-made* business man. Dupuy carefully avoided taking a clear political stance to reach a very broad public. *Le Petit Parisien* tended towards the political centre. The editorial line was usually very moderate, although Dupuy sometimes supported his old friends of the Republican *Alliance démocratique*<sup>9</sup>. He mistrusted the socialists as well as the conservatives. The political prudence of Dupuy and *Le Petit Parisien* was clearly visible during the Dreyfus Affair. While many other newspapers chose sides, *Le Petit Parisien* remained relatively neutral and followed the public opinion. From November 1897, it started designating Dreyfus with ‘captain’ instead of ‘traitor’. Dupuy later became minister in different Republican governments (Albert, 1972, pp. 304-308).

The largest newspaper of the Third Republic reached its peak during the First World War, when around two million copies were sold every day (of which more than 80% outside Paris). The circulation declined during the 1930s, as a result of the economic crisis and the competition with *Paris-Soir*. *Le Petit Parisien* was dissolved in 1944, after having become the official newspaper of the collaborationist Vichy regime (Charle, 2004, pp. 311-325).

## 6.5 Het Nieuws van den Dag

In 1870, Dutch newspaper *Het Nieuws van den Dag: Kleine Courant* was launched. Just like *Le Petit Journal*, Dutch newspaper *Het Nieuws van den Dag* imitated the style of *Le Petit Courant*, with its feuilleton stories and its short articles about spectacular news events or ‘faits divers’. In 1876, the sub-heading ‘*Kleine Courant*’ was dropped (Van de Plasse, 2005, p. 28). *Het Nieuws van den Dag* was printed on a handy, small paper size. *Het Nieuws van den Dag* became the primary newspaper for the lower middle class. Like *Le Petit Parisien*, *Het Nieuws van den Dag* did not have a clear political point of view. Its editorial line was moderately liberal (Schneider, 1943, p. 163). *Het Nieuws van den Dag* reached a circulation of 250,000 in 1909, before finally being bought by the *De Telegraaf* concern in 1923 (Schneider, 1943, p. 164). As a result of this takeover, *Het Nieuws van den Dag* was merged with *De Courant* (Van de Plasse, 2005, p. 52).

As we have seen, *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag* strongly resembled each other, with the same broad target group (lower middle class), a similar content (faits divers, feuilleton stories) and a similar politically moderate editorial line. This makes a comparison even more interesting, since we are interested in different representa-

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<sup>9</sup> This political party could be characterised as centre-right within the Republican movement, but was centre-left as opposed to the Bonapartists and Monarchists.

tions of Muslims as result of the *national context*, rather than differences caused by accidental different viewpoints or styles of individual newspapers.

## 6.6 Operationalization

Before the quantitative content analysis in this chapter was executed, an *observation or coding schedule* was established (appendix 1). The resulting variables cover all of the hypotheses that are tested in this chapter. In turn, these hypotheses are based upon the conceptual model (section 2.6).

As we have seen in chapter 3, the French advocated the principle of ‘laïcité’, while the Dutch were proud on their (religious) tolerance. Moreover, the French considered themselves as the defenders of human rights and the universal principles of liberty and equality. The Dutch instead saw themselves as the defenders of family values and morality. Since stereotypical images generally mirror the self-image, it is hypothesised that *the French stereotypes put more emphasis on the ‘anti-modern character’ of Islam and the violations of the human rights and oppression in the Muslim World, while the Dutch focused more on immorality and related topics such as polygamy* (arrow 9). For every article, the principal stereotypical association is determined. There are no pre-defined categories for this variable: the categories derive from the stereotypical associations that occur in the sample. Since the French efforts to encourage national unity were more thorough than the Dutch ones, it is expected that *the Othering of Muslims was also more intense in France than in the Netherlands and that the Muslim stereotypes were hence more outspoken* (arrow 10).

However, the representation of Muslims and Islam in the media is not simply determined by this antagonistic construction. This representation is also influenced by journalist conventions with regard to the length and style of articles (arrow 11). It is hard to suggest a well-founded hypothesis in this regard, but it will be studied whether there were differences between length and categories of the French and Dutch articles. Moreover, some basic characteristics of the main actors in the articles are analysed (sex, profession and nationality), to see whether the French and Dutch newspapers choose to focus on different people.

Moreover, newspaper articles (with the exception of some extraordinary types of articles such as feuilleton stories) are mostly based on news events. This thesis will analyse if the French and Dutch newspapers focused on different types of events or on events in different countries. Based on Said’s (1981) findings on considerable more recent French coverage of the Muslim world (section 3.5), it is hypothesised that *the French newspaper paid more attention to foreign news* (arrow 12). For every article, the topic and subtopic are determined, as well as a first and a second reference to another topic (see textbox 6.1 for an example). This method is based on the one used by Poole (2002, pp. 63-63). The reason for this approach is that newspaper articles can be fairly complicated. For example while an article focuses on the massacring of Armenian Christians by Ottoman Muslims, it may also contain references to plans for the construction of a mosque in Paris and the expansion of Islam in Africa. The categories of these four variables are not pre-defined; they result from the analysed articles. Furthermore, there are two variables that cover the location of the news events described in the article: one for the primary and one for the secondary location.

Furthermore, it is expected that the French and Dutch newspapers focused on the events in their respective colonies. Since France pursued a more active ‘identity policy’ (trying to turn their colonial subjects into ‘little Frenchmen’), it is hypothesised that *the*

*French newspaper paid more attention to repressive policy towards Islam, while the Dutch newspaper focused on policy of rapprochement* (arrow 13). For those articles in the sample that are about Islam in the colonies, it is therefore determined whether they focus on a policy of repression (for example measures that hinder Hajj pilgrims), rapprochement (for example assistance in the foundation of a mosque) or indifference.

All in all, the different antagonistic constructions of Muslims in the French and Dutch discourse are expected to have resulted in different representations of Muslims in the press. Elaborating on the before-mentioned arguments, the last hypothesis of this chapter is that *the French newspapers represented Muslims and Islam in a more negative way than their Dutch counterparts* (arrow 14). This is tested by determining whether the Muslims in the French and Dutch articles are associated with positive, neutral or negative behaviour. If possible, the opinion of the author about Muslims is also determined, although this is usually only possible in some very specific types of articles, such as editorials.

### Textbox 6.1: Example of topic, subtopic and references in an article from the sample

The following article is a short news story from *Het Nieuws van den Dag* about the massacring of Armenian Christians by the hands of Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. As explained in section 6.6, a distinction is made between the main topic, subtopic and two references to other topics in each article. The *Hamidian massacres* are the main topic of this article. ‘Hamidian massacres’ is the present-day name for the massacring of Armenians in 1894-1896, during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II. More specifically, this article focuses on the forced *conversion to Islam*, which is the subtopic of this article (fragments about this subtopic are highlighted yellow). Next, this article refers prominently to the role of the Great Powers and their proposal for reforms (green fragments). Therefore, *international relations* is listed as the first reference. Finally, the article refers to slavery (blue fragment), which is noted as the second reference. A third reference that could be distinguished within this article is the *Ottoman policy towards Christians* and a fourth one is *polygamy* (harems), but only two references can be listed. In this case the Ottoman policy towards Christians is largely overshadowed by the international plan, while the harems are mentioned solely as a specification of the slavery. See appendix 2 for a filled-in coding schedule for this article.

#### **Het Nieuws van den Dag, 19 December 1895, foreign news, page 9**

The time of Christian martyrs isn't over yet – that's what one couldn't help thinking when confronted with the gruesome stories from Asia Minor. In that unfortunate country many Armenian Christians die by the sword of the Turks, rather than embrace Islam. But when standing before the decisive choice, a great many give up their faith to save their life. Hence, every day messages reach Constantinople about hundreds and thousands of people who have been converted to Islam 'by the sword'.

A reporter from the Daily News – who was already briefly cited here yesterday – tells of several martyrs. In Marash an Armenian, who was a vicar of the English Church and did not want to become a Muslim, was slowly tortured to death. In Kharput two Protestant clergymen and a Syrian preacher met the same fate.

In Ichme many Armenians had sought refuge in the Gregorian church. They were taken out one by one, to choose between Islam and Christianity. Fifty-two of them did not want to abjure their religion, and they were brought to death immediately.

In Ouzoon, not far from Ichme, on the bank of the Euphrates, a large group of Armenians was taken captive and brought to a Turkish village nearby, where they were to be forced to abjure their religion. At a point where the road followed the riverbank, fifty-two prisoners unexpectedly jumped into the water and drowned, rather than become apostates.

In Hoh 85 Christians, who did not want to be converted, were finished off. Their wives and daughters were brought to Mohammedan houses as slaves.

According to the correspondent, thousands of young women and girls are missing, who aren't dead yet, but who are supposedly in Turkish harems for now.

And those things happen while the Great Powers are reputed to take care of the execution of the reforms!

Now Daily News again publishes a letter in its very latest issue, in which “someone whose knowledge of the situation and events in Asia Minor is elevated above every doubt” gives an overview of the horrible events and thoroughly analyses the motives and conduct of the Turks.

The author points out that the massacres have been limited almost exclusively to the provinces in which reforms had to be undertaken, and that they started at the moment the Sultan finally had to submit to the pressure of the Great Powers and was forced to accept the plan they proposed.

It was mainly this proposal: to give the Armenians a share in the government of the six provinces in proportion to their numbers, about which the Muslims were embittered. And in order to reduce the number of Armenians, says the author, they undertook the large scale slaughters.

Everywhere the local governments were passive onlookers to the atrocities, and they did not interfere energetically before the crowd had already had quite some time for the murdering and looting.

The author of the letter concludes with an urgent pledge: “Make Europe and America realise that those people only have to suffer like this because they are Christians and because Europe interfered on their behalf, and for Heaven's sake let Europe and America hurry to redeem them.”

## 7. Stereotypical images

In section 6.6 it was hypothesised that *the Othering of Muslims was more intense in France than in the Netherlands and that the Muslim stereotypes were hence more outspoken*. Moreover, it was expected that *the French stereotypes put more emphasis on the 'anti-modern character' of Islam and the violations of the human rights and oppression in the Muslim World, while the Dutch focused more on immorality and related topics such as polygamy*. To find out if this is indeed the case, we look at the stereotypical images related to Muslims in *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag*.

A number of different stereotypical images of Muslims can be observed in the French and Dutch newspaper articles in 1895-1897 (table 7.1). It cannot be stressed enough that the fact that we speak of stereotypical associations does not exclude the possibility that these associations are based upon accurate and true observations: on the contrary, accurate observations generally form the basis of stereotypes (see section 2.4). In fact, Muslims *indeed* massacred Armenian Christians in Anatolia. Yet we speak of stereotypes if articles about Muslims massacring Christians confirm the image of the violent and cruel Muslim, because they only emphasise a single, one-dimensional element of Muslim behaviour. If a large share of the articles focuses on this single aspect, a generalised image will be shaped or confirmed.

Table 7.1: Stereotypical images of Muslims

	<i>Le Petit Parisien</i>		<i>Het Nieuws van den Dag</i>		total	
	count	percent	count	percent	count	percent
violence and cruelty towards non-Muslims	49	43%	63	57%	112	50%
fanaticism	23	20%	5	5%	28	12%
incapability of self-government	13	11%	7	6%	20	9%
peculiarity	8	7%	11	10%	19	8%
naivety or backwardness	3	3%	7	6%	10	4%
religious devotion	3	3%	6	5%	9	4%
untrustworthiness	3	3%	5	5%	8	4%
fairy-tale like, mythical	3	3%	3	3%	6	3%
repression of women, harem slavery	4	3%	1	1%	5	2%
slavery	2	2%	3	3%	5	2%
tough warriors	3	3%	0	0%	3	1%
total	114	101%	111	101%	225	99%

In total, stereotypical images about Muslims are found in 69% of the French articles and 67% of the Dutch articles. This is a negligible and statistically insignificant difference (appendix 3).<sup>10</sup>

In both newspapers, ‘violence and cruelty towards non-Muslims’ is the most regular stereotype: it can be observed in 43% of the articles of *Le Petit Parisien* and 57% of the articles in *Het Nieuws van den Dag*. On 12 August 1896 for example, *Het Nieuws van den Dag* (p. 7) states that according to the correspondent of the *Daily News*, “the roasting alive of priests on a fire of saint statues is only one of the fewest” of all the cruelties committed by Muslims against Christians on Crete. A short article published on 28 March 1896 (textbox 7.1) also clearly illustrates this image of the cruel Muslim. It highlights the brutal way in which the Muslims allegedly treat the Armenian Christians by focusing on the almost mythical story of a heroic 110-year-old woman. The plausibility of both stories cannot be tested, but priests being roasted on fires of saint statues and a 110-year-old woman resisting horrible threats clearly trigger the imagination. Similar accounts of Muslim violence against Christians can be found in *Le Petit Parisien*. In a short article published on 28 August 1896 (textbox 7.2), a Christian fighter from Crete is cited describing the atrocities committed by Muslims against the Christian population. The way this Christian combatant describes the violence strongly contributes to the image of the cruel Muslim, as he focuses on the mur-

#### **Textbox 7.1: Atrocities against Armenians**

In the Armenian village of Jibni, a reporter of *The Chronicle* tells, all inhabitants – sixty families – have recently been forced to embrace the Mohammedan religion.

Under threat of torture and death, they all abjured Christianity, with the exception of one, a 110-year-old woman. She refused. “I am too old to renounce my Lord”, she said. And when the Turks tore apart her Bible and burned it, she spoke: “You can do that, but you cannot tear the promises from my heart!”

It is unknown if the brutes also killed her after this.

This and other similarly striking and touching stories cannot be brushed aside by a single negative gesture from official sources, as they recently tried again (*Het Nieuws van den Dag*, 28 March 1896, p. 7).

#### **Textbox 7.2: A letter from Heraclion**

It seems that the affairs at Crete would soon have to be solved. The type of massacres that have taken place on this island are well known. But the telegrams are only related to the facts. We believe that it is also interesting to publish the following details that were sent to us by one of the combatants from Heraclion:

“Heraclion, 28 August

The rich plain of Heraclion, yesterday still so beautiful and so opulent, is now found devastated by iron and fire. In a vast area, Christian villages have been burned down or abandoned. Isolated farms are now deserted and ruined; the shutters have been torn off.

Often groups of armed Muslims enter our village and commit the worst excesses.

Every day brings us the news of a new catastrophe. Hence, we recently learned that the village of Thrapisanon had been turned into a heap of ruins, after having been previously sacked. A poor sick man, who did not manage to keep up with the fleeing inhabitants of the before-mentioned village, was mercilessly killed by the Muslims.

Seeing more than three hundred houses going up in flames, they fell on their knees to thank Allah for having offered them such a beautiful spectacle. They subsequently departed to other villages to renew their oeuvre of destruction.

Having come across some Christian families who were fleeing to the mountains, they terribly mistreated them and killed three of the guards that accompanied them. [...]” (*Le Petit Parisien*, 29 August 1896, p. 2).

<sup>10</sup> A Pearson’s chi-square test is used to determine if there exists a statistically significant difference between the percentage of articles containing stereotypes in *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag*. In this case, the p-value is 0.723, which is higher than the significance level of 0.05. Hence, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected: there is no statistically significant difference between the number of stereotypes in French and Dutch articles.

der of a 'poor sick man' and claims that the Muslims thanked Allah for the 'beautiful spectacle' of the burning houses of the Christians.

A stereotype frequently encountered in the articles of *Le Petit Parisien* (20%), and considerably less so in the articles of *Het Nieuws van den Dag* (5%), is the alleged religious 'fanaticism' of Muslims. Especially in the French articles, Muslims are often referred to as 'fanatics'. This stereotypical image thus perfectly opposes the late nineteenth century French self-image, in which *laïcité* is a crucial principle and religion is strongly distrusted. The French dismissed opposition against the colonisation of North- and West-Africa by armed groups as a sign of Muslim fanaticism and thus feared the rise of Islamist movements: "We have much to fear from a revival of Islamism, of a new wave of religious fanaticism in the south of our Algerian departments" (*Le Petit Parisien*, 3 May 1897, p. 1). The Dutch also feared the rise of fanaticism in the Netherlands Indies: "The dangerous tenor of fanaticism in Bantam has led to the introduction of a supervision on Mohammedan religious education. Political expulsion was applied on a guru that did not want to be bothered by this measure" (*Het Nieuws van den Dag*, 20 October 1897, p. 1). This fanaticism is perceived as a threat in many regards. French Egyptologist Gaston Maspero expresses his worries over the lack of protection of the Egyptian Museum in Cairo, for which he blames the British, by referring to the danger of Muslim fanaticism: "[...] if some revolution or riot would strike Egypt, the Muslims could easily, in a fit of fanaticism, throw in the Nile the treasures of the museum, which represent for them an ignored past, unknown divinities and which they consider profane" (*Le Petit Parisien*, 11 August, 1895, p. 3). Sometimes *Le Petit Parisien* even seems to approve the murder of Muslim fanatics: "In Arzindpan, the Armenians have killed an old fanatic, Kirili Khodja, who hated Christians and progress. Kirili Khodja was idolised by the Muslims" (*Le Petit Parisien*, 29 October 1895, p. 1).

A stereotypical association related to the one of 'fanaticism' is that of 'religious devotion'. 'Religious devotion' is the more positive (or neutral) equivalent of fanaticism. It is encountered as the main stereotype in 5% of the Dutch articles and 3% of the French articles. In the Netherlands, this religious devotion, together with qualities such as soberness and modesty, is sometimes praised as a positive characteristic of Muslims. An example of this is found in a travel story from Cairo by J.P. Lissone in *Het Nieuws van den Dag* of 25 February 1895 (see the fragment in textbox 7.3). Lissone founded the first travel agency in the Netherlands in 1876 (Van Druyten, 1989, p. 9). In the travel report

### **Textbox 7.3: Sketch of Cairo: Masr el Atika**

Read about Cairo as much as you like, admire the photographs of Egypt, which people show you, hear the stories from those who have visited the country, in all their enthusiasm, it is absolutely nothing compared to reality; but come here yourself, see, feel and convince yourself, because nobody is able to reproduce the wonders of the Nile and its delta or of Cairo, or of the natives of this ancient country with their manners and traditions, as old as mankind itself. So come here yourself and admire the simplicity of the many thousands that move past you along the large roads with their pack animals as an endlessly continuing diorama, or in their cramped spaces in the tumultuous narrow alleys of Masr el Atika where they practice their businesses, and you will feel transported to the time, of which the obelisks still remind you. So come here yourself and learn from them how little man needs for a living and to be satisfied. Because in spite of the fact that these Orientals see themselves surrounded by the refined wealth and comforts of Western civilisation, they strictly adhere to their old morals and are satisfied with almost nothing. "Allah! will take care of me!" is the slogan of the poor Arab, who during his work and wherever he may be, never forgets to pray, who never grumbles nor complains, who does not know that a word exists, which has the same meaning in all languages and which is called socialism – and whom you, in your enormous wisdom, call fanatic. It would be a blessing for the world, if all of the nations were so innocently fanatic, each in their own religion, I assure you! (*Het Nieuws van den Dag*, 25 February 1895, p. 13)

published in *Het Nieuws van den Dag*, he describes Cairo in a very vivid way, that reflects many of the typically Orientalist thoughts. At the end of the article, he argues that what is usually pejoratively interpreted as fanaticism, is in fact a very positive, innocent attitude, which he then goes on to describe as a blessing. Lissone admires the way in which the Muslims adhere to their old lifestyle and moral standards.

This same fragment also contains another noteworthy stereotype. Lissone describes how different the Egyptian Muslims are as compared to the Dutch, by highlighting numerous ‘peculiarities’: their strange manners and traditions, their sober lifestyle and optimistic mentality. ‘Peculiarity’ is a broad category of stereotypes that focus on the aspects of Muslim culture that are completely different from European cultural norms, in a positive or relatively neutral way. It is characterised by the underlying sentiment

of astonishment. These stereotypes are found in 7% of the French articles and 10% of the Dutch articles in the sample. This stereotypical association is frequently found in the articles about the French Muslim member of parliament Philippe Grenier (see section 9.8). An extreme version of the ‘peculiarity’ stereotype is the ‘fairy-tale like’ or ‘mythical’ stereotype, which is encountered in 3% of the French and Dutch articles. In these articles, supernatural or otherwise mythical powers are attributed to Muslims, such as witchcraft (textbox 7.4). These mythical events are hardly ever presented in a very serious manner (the tone of the fragment in textbox 7.4 seems rather ironical), but this stereotype nevertheless contributes to the mysterious image of the Oriental.

In 11% of the French articles and 6% of the Dutch articles, a stereotypical image can be found that asserts that Muslims are incapable (or less capable) of governing their own countries. This is an extremely interesting stereotype, because this assumption would justify the colonisation of Muslim territories. It focuses on examples of failed government. Textbox 7.5 contains a short fragment from a long editorial in *Le Petit Parisien* on the French colonisation of Tunisia. In the entire article, the author glorifies this colonisation, by summing up all of its merits. In this particular fragment, he lashes out at the former Muslim rulers of Tunisia. The negative stereotyping of the Muslim rulers clearly serves as a justification of the French colonisation of Tunisia: France can help the country to acquire the wealth and progress it did not get under centuries of oppressive Muslim rule. This argument is strengthened by the metaphore of a country getting awoken after fifteen centuries of sleep.

**Textbox 7.4: Worries about Siloah’s spring**

In Jerusalem, there are serious worries over the spring of Siloah, which started to dry up some months ago. Of course all sorts of miraculous explanations are given by the local population. Some say that the supply declined after some strangers did excavations. Others claim that a stone with an inscription was removed, which took away the blessing from the spring. Others blame a Mohammedan, who supposedly cast a spell on the spring, but who would certainly be willing to restore the old situation in exchange for a large amount of money (*Het Nieuws van den Dag*, 1 March 1895, p. 5).

**Textbox 7.5: Tunisia**

This Tunisia, of which the marvellous coasts contrast with the blue sea, dotted with sailing boats and fishermen, will again become the fertile and prosperous country that, thanks to the genius of Rome, functioned as the granary of Italy for four or five centuries. Devastated by the barbarians and the conquerors of Islam, she gets ready, after a fifteen centuries-long sleep, to rise from the ruins, to reconstruct her aqueducts and to bring back life to her deserted lands. Help has been offered.

France contributes colonists to achieve this awakening, for which she is the inspirer. She offers laws and relieves her from anarchy and misery; she liberates her pitiful population that was burdened with slavery; she frees them from the pillaging tribes that oppressed them relentlessly; she exempts them from the all too heavy taxes. [...]

And this is for sure. It is not a dream. This resurrection of an entire country, terribly stripped by the disastrous centuries, is sure (*Le Petit Parisien*, 12 December 1895, p. 1).

A closely related negative stereotype, which is encountered in 3% of the French and 6% of the Dutch articles, is that of ‘naivety or backwardness’. Within this stereotype, Muslims are mostly shown being either amazed or enraged at ‘progress’. The fragment in textbox 7.6 describes the Emir of Afghanistan, who on the one hand admires European civilisation (as he brings several European experts to his country, among them Dr. Gray), but on the other hand mistrusts their advice: he refuses to be treated by the English doctor. This refusal to fully embrace ‘modern’ Western health care confirms the stereotypical image of Muslims being naïve and backward as compared to Europeans.

**Textbox 7.6: The Emir of Afghanistan**

Recently a book appeared by Dr. Gray, who spent some years in Afghanistan as a physician and who presents the current Emir as a living person and not as the semi-mythical personality as which we are used to see him. Dr. Gray, who was certainly in the position to get to know him extensively, describes him as a man of powerful physique and iron will, a man, who sticks at nothing in cases of emergency, who is in turn extremely lovable and extremely cruel, who has adopted much of the European civilisation, but who has not managed to get rid of the suspicions, with which every Mohammedan looks upon the Englishman and the European in general. He recognises the advantages of a European civilisation and introduced all sorts of industries in his country; but when it comes to proving that he himself trusts the counsel of the Europeans he brought to his country, he shrinks back. Dr. Gray reformed the military hospital after his ideas, but when he was intensely suffering himself, he asked his advice, but did not have himself treated by him (Het Nieuws van den Dag, 19 August 1897, p. 9).

Sometimes, the same stereotype is presented in a positive way, if the naivety of the Muslims is praised as a virtue. Maurits Wagenvoort, publishing under the pseudonym Vosmeer de Spie, does exactly this in a travel report on Constantinople. He writes about the pleasure of drinking tea with Muslims in a Turkish coffee house, when he sighs: “*These folks, besides being politeness and kindness itself, are still so wonderfully naïve. They are still so close to nature, that a conversation with them is like a fresh bath*” (30 August 1896, p. 1).

Furthermore, the alleged ‘untrustworthiness’ of Muslims is the focus of 3% of the articles in *Le Petit Parisien* and 5% of the articles in *Het Nieuws van den Dag*. Dutch

**Textbox 7.7: Reports from Constantinople contradict Turkish press release**

The Turkish delegation in The Hague, retaining its role of ‘first naïve’, notifies the following:

“These days some European newspapers have published very unfriendly and completely fantastic reports on the situation on Crete. The truth is that everything has been limited to one incident, caused by the *Kavas* of the Russian Consulate. Without any reason, a certain Emin Effendi was killed by him with a revolver shot. This caused a fight, in which six Muslims and ten Christians were killed or injured.

“Thanks to the measures taken by the Turkish authorities, order was soon re-established and agitation subsided.

“Since then, nothing has occurred.”

This last calm sentence is oddly contradictory to the latest report from Constantinople in the London *Times*, according to which the Porte decided to send sixteen battalions under the lead of Abdulla Pasha from Saloniki, Syria and Smyrna to Crete to suppress the insurgence – by the way completely in violation of the promise made by the Sultan to the Greek patriarch.

Moreover it was reported from Constantinople that Edhem-Pacha relieved the besieged Turkish battalion in Vamos, without needing the interference of the foreign consuls in Canea requested by Abdullah. Pending the negotiations on this matter, Abdullah dislodged the insurgents from Tsivara with 3,000 men. Thanks to that move, the relief of Vamos was easy.

Hence it seems that the Turks desired to suppress the insurgence by force, after which the Cretans must be determined to defend themselves to the utmost.

In any case the situation is quite a bit more serious than the gentlemen in The Hague know or wish to know (Het Nieuws van den Dag, 2 June 1896, p. 9).

articles often highlight the unreliability of the Ottoman sources on the massacres in Armenia and on Crete. The Ottoman embassy frequently issued press releases with official explanations of the events in the Ottoman Empire, denying the guilt of Muslims and focusing on the misbehaviour of Christians in the Armenian and Cretan conflicts. These press releases were published in *Het Nieuws van den Dag*, which apparently wished to shed light on the Turkish point of view on the conflicts. At the same time however, the Dutch newspaper added comments on their unreliability, by underlining their inconsistency with other, more reliable sources. Textbox 7.7 contains an example of such an article. In the first and last sentence, it is implied that the Turkish delegation purposefully spreads incorrect or incomplete information.

Other stereotypical images are ‘the repression of women and harems’ (the main stereotype in 3% of the French and 1% of the Dutch articles) and ‘slavery’ (2% of the French and 3% of the Dutch articles). *Le Petit Parisien* especially blames Muslims for being responsible for slave trade, as it considers slavery as completely opposite to the values of the French Revolution. Textbox 7.8 contains a fragment from an editorial in *Le Petit Parisien* that illustrates this way of thought. In the first paragraph, the incompatibility of slavery with the principles of the French Revolution is stressed. In the second paragraph, Muslims (as well as their alleged Jewish accomplices) are strongly criticised for maintaining slave trade. The fragment also contains a reference to harems, as it is suggested that Muslims generally sleep in harems. These harems and woman rights in the Muslim world in general, were a much-debated topic in the late nineteenth century, as it is noted in another editorial: “*It is common ground to bemoan the fate of Muslim women, confined to harems, forced to veil themselves, treated in a rather humiliating way, or so it seems, obliged to accept the will of their husbands, who can have numerous wives*” (*Le Petit Parisien*, 8 April 1895, p. 1).

**Textbox 7.8: Slavery around the world**

By hoisting its flag at Madagascar, France has abolished slavery over there. That spark was sufficient to stimulate the flames of indignation and anger that were aroused by the sight of the remains of human slavery. Because the wound is still wide open. The French Revolution, which has had the everlasting honour of proclaiming freedom for mankind, did not manage to implement its heroic and marvellous decree by force. Streams of blood have flowed for the redemption of the helots of America. The omnipotence of the Tsar was needed to emancipate the serfs of Russia. Almost all European colonies scattered around the five corners of the world have exterminated this sore. But the wrong has not yet completely disappeared. It still pollutes and corrodes Central Africa. Sudan is the supplier of the markets of Morocco and Egypt.

During long centuries, this scandalous trade was the privilege of the Dutch, the Spanish and other Europeans, alas! Catholics none less than others. [...] Today, this business is in the hands of the Muslims, assisted by the scum of the Jews, wrapped around the African land as sticky snakes. The Koran only considers prisoners of war as slaves. But already since a long time, the followers of Mohamed, rich as a result of their plantations and sleeping amidst harems, comb out all the regions around the equator to provide themselves with slaves and women. The Arab considers the negro as a brute. He hates and despises him. And as he is much more perverted and much cleverer than him, he chases him like a prey. When he does not capture him by force, he gets him with slyness, most often through treachery (*Le Petit Parisien*, 3 July 1896, p. 1).


The last stereotypical image, which can be found in 3% of the French articles but in no Dutch articles within the sample, is that Muslims are ‘tough warriors’. This stereotype can be found in some articles in *Le Petit Parisien* about Muslims fighting in the French colonial army, such as the *Spahis* (light cavalry). When a reporter of the French newspaper tries to explain the failure of military expedition to Madagascar, he sighs that the young Frenchmen lacked the guts to fight a harsh war far from home; a regiment of hard-

ened African Muslims would certainly have succeeded in conquering Madagascar. Hence, this stereotype is clearly the result of mirroring: the author criticises the lack of courage and fighting skills of the young French soldiers and thus praises the Muslim soldiers for exactly these virtues.

To see if there indeed exists difference between the stereotypes in *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag*, as it was hypothesised, it is useful to reduce the number of categories by combining related categories. For example, ‘fanaticism’ and ‘religious devotion’ are merged into one category. In this way, the number of categories is reduced from eleven to five.<sup>11</sup>

This reclassification makes it easier to compare the stereotypes in both newspapers (figure 7.1). In fact, there is only one clear difference between the stereotypes in *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag*. The former pays relatively more attention to fanaticism and religious devotion, whereas the latter focuses more frequently on violence and cruelty against non-Muslims. Since the share of the stereotypical images ‘naivety and political backwardness’, ‘peculiarity’ and ‘repression of women and slavery’ is almost equal in the articles of both newspapers in the sample, no statistically significant differ-

Figure 7.1: Muslim stereotypes in *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag*



<sup>11</sup> Violence and cruelty against non-Muslims remains the same category. Fanaticism and religious devotion become fanaticism and religious devotion. Incapability of self-government, naivety and backwardness and untrustworthiness are merged to naivety and political backwardness. Peculiarity, fairy-tale-like/mythical and tough warriors together become the new category peculiarity. Repression of women/harems and slavery are merged to repression of women and slavery.

ence can be found when taking all five categories into account.<sup>12</sup> However, when only looking at the stereotype of ‘violence and cruelty against non-Muslims’, it can be concluded that there is a statistically significant difference: *Het Nieuws van den Dag* uses this stereotype more often than *Le Petit Parisien*.<sup>13</sup> Similarly, *Le Petit Parisien* uses the stereotype of ‘fanaticism and religious devotion’ significantly more often than *Het Nieuws van den Dag* (appendix 4).<sup>14</sup>

In this section we have seen that, contrary to the expectations formulated in section 6.6, articles in French newspaper *Le Petit Parisien* do not contain more stereotypical images of Muslims than those in Dutch newspaper *Het Nieuws van den Dag*. This means that no significant link can be found between the promotion of national unity and the antagonistic construction of Muslims (arrow 10 in figure 7.2). Moreover, the expectation that the Dutch newspaper would focus more on stereotypes on moral issues, while the French newspaper would focus more on violations of human rights, was not confirmed by the data. Differences between the stereotypes in both newspapers turn out to be relatively small. However, the French newspaper *does* focus more on religious fanaticism, which could be explained as being a result of the French mistrust of religion: the crucial position of *laïcité* within the French national self-image may be an explanatory factor for this relative focus on religious fanaticism in the Othering of Muslims. Similarly, the focus of Dutch newspaper *Het Nieuws van den Dag* on violence and cruelty by Muslims against non-Muslims could be seen as a result of the late nineteenth century Dutch self-image, in which modesty and the avoidance of conflicts were very important.




Figure 7.2: Fragment from the conceptual model, showing the arrows that were analysed in this chapter

<sup>12</sup> The Pearson’s chi-square test gives a p-value of 0.085, which is higher than the significance level of 0.05. Hence, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected with 95% reliability: there is no statistically significant difference between the number of stereotypes in French and Dutch articles. However, if a significance level of 0.10 was accepted, there *would* be a statistically significant difference (with 90% reliability).

<sup>13</sup> In this case, the Pearson’s chi-square test gives a p-value of 0.039, which is below the significance level of 0.05. As a result, the null hypothesis can be rejected with 95% reliability: there is a statistically significant difference between the number of French and Dutch articles referring to the stereotype of ‘violence and cruelty against non-Muslims’. The *phi* coefficient is 0.138 out of a possible maximum of 1, which means that there is a rather low association between the newspaper and the occurrence of the ‘violence’ stereotype.

<sup>14</sup> The Pearson’s chi-square test gives a p-value of 0.009, which is lower than the significance level of 0.05 and even lower than 0.01. Therefore, the null hypothesis can be rejected with 99% reliability: there is a statistically highly significant difference between the number of French and Dutch articles referring to the stereotype of ‘fanaticism and religious devotion’. The *phi* coefficient is -0.174, which means that the association is rather low.

## 8. Journalistic conventions

Journalistic conventions may have a large impact on the way Muslims and Islam are presented, as they determine the type and style of the articles. Therefore, this section looks at some basic characteristics of the articles in *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag*, before turning to the characteristics of the people cited in both newspapers.

The articles of *Le Petit Parisien* in the sample have an average length of 854 words. The articles of *Het Nieuws van den Dag* are considerably shorter, having an average length of 496 words (table 8.1). This difference is statistically significant (appendix 5).<sup>15</sup> The length of the Dutch articles ranges from only 16 to none less than 4,429 words, while the shortest and lengthiest French article count 47 and 2,956 words, respectively. This contributes to a larger dispersion among the Dutch articles, as is shown by the coefficient of variation: 130.5% for the Dutch articles and 75.5% for the French articles. The very shortest articles are nothing more than simple, factual announcements (see textbox 8.1). The lengthiest articles are mostly reports of parliamentary debates and detailed news stories, based on multiple sources.

### Textbox 8.1: Shortest articles in the sample

The French government has now given permission for the construction of a Mohammedan mosque in Paris (*Het Nieuws van den Dag*, 1 January 1896, p. 5).

In Scutari, serious fights between Catholic Christians and Mohammedans have taken place, in which many people were killed or injured (*Het Nieuws van den Dag*, 28 October 1895, p. 9).

Table 8.1: Number of words of the French and Dutch articles in the sample

	Le Petit Parisien	Het Nieuws van den Dag
average	854	496
standard deviation	645	647
coefficient of variation	75.5%	130.5%
minimum	47	16
maximum	2,956	4,429


Several types of articles can be found in *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag*. In the Dutch newspaper, the **short news article** is the most common type of article containing information about Muslims or Islam: 42% of the Dutch articles and 22% of the French articles in the sample belong to this category (figure 8.1). As the name gives away, this type of article is usually short: the longest ‘short news article’ in the sample counts 326 words and the average length is 122 words. The aim of these articles is to inform the reader of a news event in a very concise way. For this reason, the subject of the article has to be very concrete and topical: there is no room for interpretations, explanations or citations (Kussendrager & Van der Lugt, 2007, p. 196).

The **news story** is the most common type of article in *Le Petit Parisien* and also a very usual type of article in *Het Nieuws van den Dag*: 30% of the French articles and 28% of the Dutch articles in the sample belong to this category. In comparison to the short news articles, news stories are usually longer, but more importantly: they are also based on more than one source. Most often, the journalist has undertaken some attempt to gather more varied information, for example by reading additional sources or talking to experts (Kussendrager & Van der Lugt, 2007, p. 232). However, the news story resembles the

<sup>15</sup> The Student’s t-test gives a p-value of 0.000, which means that there is a highly significant difference between the length of the articles in both newspapers ( $0.000 < 0.01$ ).

short news article in the sense that the journalist does not really give his own opinion or interpretation. Moreover, its subject is just as concrete, topical and well-demarcated. The news stories vary greatly in length, from 188 words to 2956 words, with an average of 765 (589 for the Dutch articles and 927 for the French articles).

Figure 8.1: Type of articles



**Background stories** offer more information about the background of a certain question. The journalist has a wide range of techniques at his disposal, such interviews, research and own interpretations. Using the information from several sources, he gives an interpretation or explanation of certain events. He offers new knowledge or points of view to what the reader already knows. Unlike news stories, background stories do not necessarily have to be connected with recent events (Kussendrager & Van der Lugt, 2007, p. 305). Although the journalist does not clearly give his own opinion (a background story is no opinion piece), he may well reveal his point of view by choosing certain interpretations and explanations over others. The background articles in the sample have a similar length as the news stories, ranging from 106 to 2043 and with an average of 780 words (684 for the Dutch articles and 843 for the French articles). More French than Dutch articles belong to this category: 24% versus 15%.

In *Le Petit Parisien*, 18% of the articles on Muslims and Islam are **editorials**, while a mere 1% of the Dutch articles in the sample belong to this category. The editorials or leading articles are opinion pieces that reflect the ‘opinion of the newspaper’ (Kussendrager & Van der Lugt, 2007, pp. 335-337). As explained in section 6.4, the editorial of *Le Petit Parisien* was always published under the pseudonym ‘Jean Frolo’ and often written by the owner of the newspaper, Jean Dupuy. The editorial is not simply a short opinion piece: it is truly a leading article in the sense that it is a rather lengthy article (with an average length of 1573 words), always published at the front page, on an im-

portant question. Sometimes the editorials clearly reveal the opinion of the author, but often the character is rather interpretive.

**Reports** can be distinguished from the news articles by looking at the importance of the own observations of the journalist. While the news stories are based on a variety of other sources, the reports are based on first-hand observations: the reporter *goes* somewhere and describes what he sees. The reports often contain citations from people interviewed by the journalist. A good report gives a lively description of a certain situation, in which the author uses a varied literary style with different style figures. These reports do not necessarily have to be connected with a recent event (Kussendrager & Van der Lugt, 2007, pp. 304-305). The travel reports are a good example of this type of article. Textbox 8.2 contains some fragments from a travel report by Maurits Wagenvoort alias Vosmeer de Spie, which clearly illustrates this literary style.

#### **Textbox 8.2: Constantinople in a nutshell**

Through the narrow, shady streets of the East, past the open shops with their colourful displays of fruit and foodstuffs, past the ramshackle, yet still beautiful building of the Exalted Porte – the Turkish Binnenhof in Stamboul – we go to the beautiful mosque of Sultan Ahmed. To visit a Turkish mosque, an Infidel always has to wear a pair of loose-fitting slippers over his shoes; it is not easy to walk with them and the concern not to lose them on the way takes away some of the spontaneity of the admiration. Yet admiration it deserves, this wonderful dome, decorated with blue faience, carried by giant columns, in which the lisped prayers of the believers rise as a strange whispering. [...]

“*Bae jol*” – this way – said the friendly Muslim, who drew our attention to the possibility to see the well of Theodosius, and he opened a large, green door to a garden, where we, o surprise! were suddenly standing amidst a *harem*. Do not let this word make you expect any of the Oriental splendour or beauty of the Oriental women. The *harem* that we took by surprise consisted of three old women, who did not even find it necessary to veil themselves for the infidels, and one younger woman, who did veil herself, but not before we had had the opportunity to see that she was not beautiful at all. [...]

The *Aya Sophia*, that most delightful temple in the world, is located nearby. You should go there at sunset, when the Arabian *mollahs* explain the Koran in the marvellous and grandiose vaults. There, softa’s – students – lie or sit around them in a picturesque posture and clothing, while the grey teachers explain the Scripture with lively gestures and a cheerful voice, while the colourful group is shone upon by a sunbeam through one of the many windows. Here and there, the believers lie on their knees, the face turned to Mecca, praying with raised hands and a pious face to their God, who now gives them their daily bread and will later offer them the eternal *kéfin* in paradise. On the white mats that cover the floor of the entire temple, right in the middle under the awe-inspiring dome, some veiled women sit squatted to perform their prayers. And while the *muezzin* calls to evening prayer from the gallery of the minaret, high up in the sky, you can look through the windows of the side galleries so see many men rushing towards the fountain of the mosque to wash their hands, feet and face the way God demands, to bow down humbly for Allah soon afterwards.

If his behaviour does not give offence and if he obeys all prescriptions, the Christian, who is the ‘Infidel’, can move around freely, here and everywhere. The Muslim may feel a certain contempt for the dissentients, yet he always behaves with dignity and is friendliness and helpfulness itself. If you experience something unpleasant in Stamboul or anywhere else in Constantinople, you can be sure that the Turk is not to blame for it (Het Nieuws van den Dag, 9 August 1896, p. 1).


Kussendrager and Van der Lugt (2007, p. 246) distinguish another type of article that resembles the report: the *record*. Just like the report, the record is based upon the observations of the journalist, but his role is more moderate: he only makes factual, exact and impersonal observations. Records usually do not have the lively literary style of reports. Examples of this type of article include parliamentary debates that have been published almost integrally. Because of its low occurrence and strong resemblance to the reports, both categories have been merged here. Finally, there are some types of articles of which

Muslims and Islam rarely form the subject: the feuilleton story and the letters to the editor. In figure 8.1, these types of articles are part of the category **other**.

As we have seen in figure 8.1, there are some remarkable differences between the types of articles in *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag* in the sample. Statistically, these differences are strongly significant (appendix 6).<sup>16</sup> Hence, there Muslims and Islam form the subject of considerably different types of articles in both newspapers.

*Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag* not only contain different types of articles about Muslims and Islam, they also cite different kinds of persons. Muslims are cited in 8% of the French and 12 % of the Dutch articles; non-Muslims are cited in 20% of the French articles and 25% of the Dutch articles in the sample. These differences are not statistically significant (appendix 7).<sup>17</sup> With the exception of three, all cited persons are male.

Figure 8.2: Professions of people cited in the articles




The most common profession of people cited in both newspapers is politician or diplomat: 50% of the Muslims and non-Muslims cited by *Le Petit Parisien* and 63% of the Muslims and 47% of the non-Muslims cited by *Het Nieuws van den Dag* belong to this group (figure 8.2). Moreover, many of the cited persons are monarchs or princes: 21% of the Muslims and 12% of the non-Muslims in the French articles and 16% of the Muslims and 7% of the non-Muslims in the Dutch articles. Furthermore, some clergymen, both Muslim and non-Muslim, are cited by *Le Petit Parisien* as well as by *Het Nieuws van den Dag*. The only obvious difference between the professions of the Muslims and non-Muslims in the sampled articles, is that some non-Muslims are scientists and journalists,

<sup>16</sup> The Pearson's chi-square test gives a p-value of 0.000, which is lower than the significance level of 0.05 and even lower than 0.01. As a result, the null hypothesis can be rejected with 99% reliability: the types of articles in *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag* are significantly different. The Cramér's V of 0.362 indicates a moderate association.

<sup>17</sup> The chi-square tests give p-values of 0.359 for Muslims and 0.237 for non-Muslims, both higher than the significance level of 0.05.

whereas none of the Muslims are. Because of the limited number of people cited in the articles in the sample, it is not possible to test for significant differences.

Figure 8.3: Nationalities of the people cited in the articles



Similarly, it is also possible to look at the nationality of the people cited in the French and Dutch articles (figure 8.3). In *Le Petit Parisien* as well as in *Het Nieuws van den Dag*, the majority of the cited Muslims is from the Ottoman Empire (64% and 68%, respectively). Most of the other Muslims cited by the French newspaper are mostly from the French Empire (either metropolitan France or the colonies). Most of the non-Muslims cited by both newspapers are either from the own country (35-39%) or from the United Kingdom (33-37%). Moreover, 15% of the non-Muslims cited in the French articles and 9% of the non-Muslims cited in the Dutch articles about Islam are from Greece or Crete.

Conclusively, the sample shows that different journalist conventions lead to different types of articles in *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag* (arrow 11 in figure 8.4). The French




Figure 8.4: Fragment from the conceptual model, showing arrow 11, which was analysed in this chapter

articles are significantly longer. A considerable share of the French articles on Muslims and Islam are editorials, while there are only a few Dutch editorials on this topic. A relatively large share of the Dutch articles are short news articles. There are no significant differences between *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag* with regard to the number of articles in which people are cited. Most of the cited people are politicians, diplomats, monarchs and princes. There are also some scientists and journalists among the cited non-Muslims, whereas none of the cited non-Muslims holds this function. Most of the cited Muslim are from the Ottoman Empire, while most of the cited non-Muslim are either from the United Kingdom or from the own country (France or the Netherlands).

## 9. Topics and locations

The hypothesis in section 6.6 stated that *the French newspapers paid more attention to foreign news*. This chapter analyses the news events that form the topics of the Islam-related articles in *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag* to verify if this is indeed the case. It is interesting to see if different choices were made in the coverage of particular news events. Therefore, section 9.1 will look at quantitative differences between the topics of the articles that were published in both newspapers. Moreover, section 9.2 analyses the locations of the news events, to see if *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag* focused on different areas. Finally, section 9.3 to 9.9 elaborate on the most important Muslim-related news events in the period 1895-1897, to study differences between the news coverage by both newspapers in a qualitative way.

### 9.1 Topics

A very large number of topics, themes and references can be found in the French and Dutch articles on Muslims and Islam in the period 1895-1897 (table 9.1). Some of them are only used in a very small number of articles. A few conflicts clearly dominate the press coverage on Muslims and Islam: the Cretan Insurrection, the Armenian Massacres and the Greco-Turkish War. Additionally, there is a considerable number of articles on colonial policy and on the broad theme of Muslim culture, customs and traditions. International relations are frequently the subtopic or referenced topic of the articles, but never the main topic. Similarly, the Ottoman policy towards Christians is also mostly used as a subtopic or reference instead of a main topic. Articles on the various cholera, plague and smallpox epidemics form a distinctive category. The French member of parliament Philippe Grenier, who was converted to Islam, is also the subject of a number of articles.


Table 9.1 also shows that while all 330 articles by definition contain a main topic, only 218 of them also contain a subtopic and 179 contain at least one reference to another topic. Only 51 articles contain references to two other themes or topics (see section 6.6 and textbox 6.1 for an explanation and an example of this). As the large number of different topics, subtopics and references in table 9.1 make it impossible to compare the French and Dutch articles, these topics have to be reclassified. In this way, the number of categories is reduced from 39 to 13. With these 13 categories, a good comparison can be made (figure 9.1).

Figure 9.1 shows that the Cretan Insurrection, the Armenian Massacres, the Greco-Turkish War and other religious conflicts are together the topic of 50% of the articles in *Le Petit Parisien* and 56% of the articles in *Het Nieuws van den Dag*. The Cretan Insurrection is more frequently the main topic of the French articles than the Dutch articles: 26% versus 21%. The opposite goes for the Armenian Massacres, which is the topic of 19% of the Dutch and 13% of the French articles. Both newspapers also pay attention to colonialism and colonial conflicts, which together form the main topic of 22% of the French and 20% of the Dutch articles. Muslim culture, customs and traditions are the main topic of 15% of the articles in *Het Nieuws van den Dag* and only 7% of the articles in *Le Petit Parisien*. Inversely, conversion to Islam is the main topic of 8% of the French articles and only 2% of the Dutch articles. The cholera, plague and smallpox epidemics are the topic of 5% of the French and 3% of the Dutch articles.

*Table 9.1: Topics, subtopics and references in the sample*

	topic	subtopic	reference1	reference2	total
international relations	0	71	46	7	124
Cretan Insurrection	77	12	7	2	98
colonial policy	44	27	21	3	95
Armenian massacres	52	2	10	4	68
Muslim culture, customs and traditions	17	18	13	3	51
Conflicts between Muslims and Christians	13	15	8	4	40
Greco-Turkish War	19	6	12	1	38
Ottoman policy towards Christians	1	18	12	1	32
Cholera, plague and smallpox epidemics	14	0	3	3	20
Philippe Grenier	13	0	3	1	17
Aceh War	11	2	2	1	16
Ottoman politics	6	4	4	1	15
conversion to Islam	3	10	2	0	15
foundation of a mosque	10	1	3	0	14
Hajj	2	7	5	0	14
polygamy	0	3	6	5	14
slavery	4	1	2	5	12
Mahdist War	7	1	2	1	11
Christian mission	1	5	5	0	11
conflicts among Muslims	6	1	2	1	10
expansion of Islam	2	5	1	2	10
Conflicts between Muslims and Hindus	5	2	1	0	8
Pathan Revolt	4	0	0	1	5
oppression of women	1	1	0	3	5
Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje	0	1	4	0	5
Muslim monarch/prince visiting Europe	3	1	0	0	4
Islam studies	3	0	1	0	4
Religious feasts	3	0	0	0	3
archaeology	1	0	2	0	3
curiosity for modernity	0	2	1	0	3
Dungan Revolt	2	0	0	0	2
magic	1	0	1	0	2
theft	1	0	0	1	2
Jules Gervais-Courtellemont	1	0	0	1	2
conflicts between Muslims and other religions	1	0	0	0	1
Philippine Revolution	1	0	0	0	1
Persian politics	1	0	0	0	1
fear for/aversion to Islam	0	1	0	0	1
Islamic organisation	0	1	0	0	1
total	330	218	179	51	

Figure 9.1: Topics and subtopics of the French and Dutch articles<sup>18</sup>



<sup>18</sup> The 39 topics of table 9.1 have been merged into 13 categories. The *Cretan Insurrection*, the *Greco-Turkish War*, the *Armenian Massacres*, the *foundation of a mosque*, the *cholera, plague and smallpox epidemics* and *international relations* have remained unaltered as separate categories. *Conflicts between Muslims and Christians*, *conflicts among Muslims*, *conflicts between Muslims and Hindus*, *conflicts between Muslims and other religions* and the *Dungan Revolt* have been merged into the new category *religious conflicts*. *Colonial policy* and *Christian mission* together form the category *Colonialism and colonial policy*. The new category *Colonial conflicts* consists of the following conflicts: the *Aceh War*, the *Mahdist War*, the *Pathan Revolt* and the *Philippine Revolution*. Besides the original category with the same name, a wide range of other topics has been merged into the broad new category *Muslim culture, customs and traditions*: the *Hajj*, *polygamy*, *slavery*, *expansion of Islam*, *oppression of women*, *Islam studies*, *religious feasts*, *archaeology*, *curiosity for modernity*, *magic*, *theft*, *fear for/aversion to Islam* and *Islamic organisation*. The new category *Conversion to Islam* contains the original category with the same name, as well as *Philippe Grenier*, *Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje* and *Jules Gervais-Courtellemont*. *Ottoman politics* and *Ottoman policy towards Christians* have together become *Ottoman politics*. Finally, the remaining categories, *Persian politics* and *Muslim monarch/prince visiting Europe* have been labelled as 'other'.

One article cannot have the same topic and subtopic. If for example a certain article originally had slavery as its main topic and polygamy as its subtopic, it gets Muslim culture, customs and traditions as its topic and no subtopic after the reclassification, because slavery and polygamy both belong to this same new category. This explains why the number of articles containing subtopics is lower after the reclassification (205) than before (218).

The differences between the topics of the two newspapers seem to be small, but are nonetheless statistically significant (appendix 8).<sup>19</sup>

Remarkably, international relations form the subtopic of 34% of the French and 36% of the Dutch articles in the sample that contain a subtopic, while it is never the main topic. International relations are mostly presented as a subtopic in the articles that have the Cretan Insurrection or the Armenian Massacres as a main topic. In these cases, a lot of attention is paid to the six 'Great Powers' (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Italy), as well as the United States to a lesser extent, which discussed ways to force the Ottoman Empire to end these conflicts and finally interfered on Crete. Ottoman politics are also frequently the subtopic in these articles on the Cretan Insurrection and the Armenian Massacres, making it the subtopic of 8% of the French and 13% of the Dutch articles. Muslim culture, customs and tradition are the subtopic of 20% of the articles in *le Petit Parisien* and 11% of the articles in *Het Nieuws van den Dag*. It is mostly found in the articles that have colonialism, the epidemics and conversion to Islam as their main topics.

The number of articles containing subtopics is too low to execute a Pearson's chi-square-test. After yet another reclassification, to only six categories, it turns out that there is no statistically significant difference (appendix 8).<sup>20</sup>

When looking at the references (figure 9.2), a similar distribution of themes is found. These references are themes that do not form a key topic of the articles, but which are referred to sideways. International relations are not only the most common subtopic, but also the most-used first reference, in 31% of the French and 26% of the Dutch articles that contain a reference. Muslim culture (14% in *Le Petit Parisien* and 13% in *Het Nieuws van den Dag*) and colonialism (14% and 12%, respectively) are also much-referenced themes. *Het Nieuws van den Dag* contains more first references to Ottoman politics (13% versus 6%), the Armenian Massacres (9% versus 4%) and the Cretan Insurrection (7% versus 2%). On the other hand, *Le Petit Parisien* refers considerably more often to the Greco-Turkish War (12% versus 1%).

Just like before, in the analysis of the subtopics, the references need to be reclassified to six categories in order to execute a Pearson's chi-square test. This test indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the themes of the first references in *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag* (appendix 8).<sup>21</sup>

There are few articles containing a second reference. Their number is even further lowered by the reclassification, since an article cannot have the same theme as a first and a second reference, or as a topic and a reference (see footnote 18). As a result, only 22 French and 16 Dutch articles contain a second reference. Among these articles, Muslim culture is the most common second reference in the French articles (32%), while there are just as many Dutch articles containing a second reference to international relations as to Muslim culture (both 25%). A few Dutch articles (13%) contain a reference to colonial conflicts, while none of the French articles contains a second reference to this theme. In contrast, conversion to Islam forms the second reference of some French articles (9%), while it does not form the second reference in any of the Dutch articles. However, one should be careful drawing real conclusions from this, because of the low number of arti-

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
<sup>19</sup> The Pearson's chi-square test gives a p-value of 0.019, which is lower than the significance level of 0.05. As a result, the null hypothesis can be rejected with 95% reliability: the topics in *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag* differ significantly from each other. The Cramér's V of 0.263 indicates a rather low association.

<sup>20</sup> The p-value is 0.493; considerably higher than the significance level of 0.05.

<sup>21</sup> In this case, the p-value is 0.697; also considerably higher than the significance level of 0.05.

cles actually containing a second reference. This also makes it impossible to execute a statistical test on the significance of the differences.

Figure 9.2: References in the French and Dutch articles




## 9.2 Locations

After having looked at the topics of the articles in *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag*, it is now time to study the locations of the news events described in these articles. For every article the main location was determined, as well as a second location in 176 of the 330 articles.

As the previous section showed that 50% of the French and 56% of the Dutch articles were about the Armenian Massacres, the Cretan Insurrection and the Greco-Turkish War, it does not come as a surprise that 49% of the French and 57% of the Dutch articles focus on the Ottoman Empire, Crete and Greece (figure 9.3). During the period studied in this thesis, Crete was formally still part of the Ottoman Empire, although the Ottomans lost control over the island in 1896 after an insurgence that had started in 1895. From 1897, it was in fact governed by a coalition of ‘Great Powers’: the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Russia.

*Le Petit Parisien* pays some more attention to Crete as the main location than *Het Nieuws van den Dag* (26% versus 21%), while the Dutch newspaper pays relatively more attention to the Ottoman Empire than the French newspaper (29% versus 22%). Moreover, the Ottoman Empire is the second location in 33% of the Dutch and 24% of the French articles that contain a second location. Greece is hardly ever the primary location in the French articles, while it does form the main location in some Dutch articles (1% versus 7%). In both newspapers, it is the secondary location in 17% of the articles.

Figure 9.3: Locations of the news events described in the French and Dutch articles



Next, it is interesting to see that ‘metropolitan’ (European) France is not only the primary location of 12% of the French articles on Islam, but that it is also the main location in 6% of the Dutch articles. The Netherlands are the first location in only 1% of the Dutch and in none of the French articles. Obviously, Islam hardly played any role within the Netherlands, while already some Muslim-related events took place in France, most notably the election of a Muslim representative in the French parliament and the instauration of a committee for the construction of a mosque in Paris. France is the secondary location in 20% of the French articles containing a secondary location, while the Netherlands are the secondary location in 17% of the Dutch articles. Both newspapers pay a similar amount of attention to their respective colonies: the French colonies form the primary location in 16% of the French articles, while the Dutch colonies are the primary location in 19% of the Dutch articles. The Dutch colonies (the East Indies) are hardly ever the secondary location in *Het Nieuws van den Dag* (in 2% of the articles), while the French colonies are the secondary location in 8% of the French articles.

Finally, it is remarkable that *Le Petit Parisien* pays more attention to news events in the United Kingdom and its colonies than *Het Nieuws van den Dag* (16% versus 10% for the first location and 15% versus 12% for the second location). All in all, there is a statistically significant difference between the first locations of the news events described in the French and the Dutch newspaper. The differences between the second locations of the articles in both newspapers are not statistically significant (appendix 10).<sup>22</sup>

All in all, section 9.1 and 9.2 have shown that there are some clear differences between the Muslim-related news events that are the topic of the articles in *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag* (arrow 12 in figure 9.4). The Dutch newspaper pays more attention to the Hamidian massacres and Muslim culture, while the French newspaper focuses more on the events on Crete and colonialism. Moreover, the French newspaper pays more attention to news events in the own country and the British colonial empire than the Dutch newspaper.

Now that we have an impression of the topics and locations of the articles in *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag* in the period 1895-1897, we will have a closer look at the coverage of some of the most important news events in this period.

### 9.3 The Armenian Massacres of 1894-1897

The Armenian Massacres of 1894-1897, today known as the Hamidian Massacres, occurred under the rule of Sultan Abdul-Hamid II after a tax protest by Armenians. In the Treaty of Berlin (1878), a clause had been included that aimed for the emancipation of the Armenians, who were by then the subject of discrimination in many regards, such as taxation and jurisdiction. Moreover, this clause obliged the Sultan to protect the Armenians from tribal attacks. Originally, Russia would have had the responsibility to supervise these reforms and protection. However, the United Kingdom and the other Great Powers feared that the presence of Russian troops in Turkey would lead to the expansion of Russia. Therefore, the Treaty of Berlin appointed the Ottoman Sultan as the protector of the Armenians. Since reforms failed to materialise, the Armenians continued to protest until finally the Sultan responded with massacres, which reached their peak in 1894-1896. During this period, 100,000 to 300,000 Armenians were killed throughout the Ottoman Em-




Figure 9.4: Fragment from the conceptual model, showing arrow 12, which is analysed in this chapter

<sup>22</sup> The Pearson's chi-square test on the first locations gives a p-value of 0.000, which is lower than the significance level of 0.01. As a result, it can be concluded with 99% reliability that the primary locations of the news events described in *Le Petit Parisien* are different from those mentioned in *Het Nieuws van den Dag*. The Cramér's V of 0.302 indicates a rather low association. For the secondary locations, the p-value is 0.525: considerably higher than the significance level of 0.05.

pire, while thousands of others fled to Europe and the United States. Many of those who stayed behind converted to Islam in order to escape death. The massacres and mass conversions in Anatolia continued until the summer of 1897, when fear remained but life slowly returned to normal. With hindsight, the Hamidian massacres could be considered as a prelude to the better-known Armenian Genocide of 1915-1923 (Cohan, 2005, pp. 334-335).

Ottoman officials blamed the Kurdish nomad tribes for the forced mass conversions and most of the atrocities committed against the Armenians. The Armenians and Kurds had lived alongside each other for a long time, until the power of the big Kurdish lords was broken by the Ottoman centralisation policy of the 1870s and 1880s. The resulting power vacuum caused tribal conflicts. Sultan Abdul-Hamid II tried to curtail these conflicts and gain the loyalty of the Kurds by recruiting them as ‘Cossack-style irregular units’ that were tasked with eradication of Armenian criminal activities (Deringil, 2009, pp. 348-349).

There was a lot of media attention for these massacres in Europe and the United States. According to Cohan (2005, p. 335) this worldwide media attention was caused by the ‘unique nature’ of the killings: “*Armenians were unarmed and adhered to the perimeters set forth by the Ottoman government*”. First-hand reports from foreign diplomats and missionaries that were published in the international newspapers shocked the Europeans and Americans and caused widespread indignation. Collection campaigns in the United States yielded very large sums of money and the American Red Cross made the aid for Armenian victims its first international mission.

We have already seen two vivid examples of the coverage of the Hamidian Massacres by *Het Nieuws van den Dag* in textbox 6.1 and 7.1. In 76% of the French and 81% of the Dutch articles that have the Armenian Massacres as their primary topic, there is a negative association with Islam. A few different themes can be observed in the articles about these massacres. First, there is a number of articles about the negotiations between the Great Powers and the Ottoman government (which was called the ‘Porte’). While it is initially expected that the Great Powers will force the Ottoman government to protect the Armenians, perhaps even by force, the commentators of both newspapers become increasingly sceptical and critical of their indecisiveness. The fragment in textbox 9.1, which is from an editorial in *Le Petit Parisien*, is a clear example of this. The author is clearly indignant at the lack of serious international attempts to solve the situation in Ar-

**Textbox 9.1: In “the Country of Misery”**

It is a topic that recurs every now and then: the sorrows, the humiliations, the innumerable offences endured by the unfortunate Armenians that are subjects of the Ottoman Empire. I make use of rather pale words, because it is often not only about arbitrary acts, but in fact true cruelties, massacres take place.

When you learn about them, it fills you with indignation. But Europe, which the Armenians, who are suppressed by the Muslims, desperately ask for help, is too busy to listen seriously to these complaints. There is no time anymore for generous interventions. The nations, armed to the teeth, only think about keeping an eye on each other. They put on diplomatic plays for the government of the Sultan if the excesses are too violent, too abominable. The promises have never actually concerned Turkey: the Sultan promises to punish the perpetrators, does not do anything, and then the Armenians are treated even more severely.

Their current situation is intolerable. They are at the end of patience, at the end of ordeals. And yet it is not independence that they ask for. They only ask for a bit of justice and compassion; they ask to be no longer “outlaws”, eternal victims; they ask for the right to live.

But who will come to their rescue? The Great Powers still fear involvement in the Orient, do not want to take the initiative for measures that would assure their effective protection and so it can happen that one day Armenians who dare to speak out on their grieves are thrown into prison right in front of the European representatives, who have undoubtedly been charged with the mission of doing nothing (*Le Petit Parisien*, 14 September 1895, p. 1).

menia. He writes with a great sense of sarcasm, calling the negotiations ‘diplomatic plays’ and suggesting that the European representatives ‘have undoubtedly been charged with the mission of doing nothing’.

Gradually, more and more facts about the actual killings become known. At 16 January 1896, *Het Nieuws van den Dag* reports that according to some sources, the number of Armenian casualties has already reached 100,000. The attention shifts a bit from the international negotiations to the events in Anatolia. More and more detailed stories about the atrocities are published. *Het Nieuws van den Dag* bases its news articles mostly on reports by the correspondent of British newspaper *Daily News* (see textbox 9.2 for an example). These articles contain rather explicit descriptions of the murders, qualifications like ‘dreadful’ and vivid metaphors such as ‘slaughtered like sheep’. In general, the French news articles about the massacres are less explicit, often mentioning the number of deaths without going into detail. An explanation for this is given by *Le Petit Parisien* itself (textbox 9.3).

### **Textbox 9.2: New horror stories from Armenia**

New horror stories from Armenia have been reported by the Turkish correspondent of *Daily News* and give the lie to the recent official Turkish truth. They are based on reports received by consul Fitzmaurice from Urfa, Birdjik and other towns.

Especially the story of the murder in the Armenian church of Urfa, in which about 3000 people were killed, is dreadful.

Saturday night, 28 December, the priest provided the Sacrament to 1800 people, who had sought refuge there. Some 1500 to 1800 were added to that, and all of them spent the night in the church.

Sunday morning the Mohammedans forced their way into the church and killed the men downstairs by the hundreds. The galleries were crowded with women, and to kill them faster, they made a pile of mats and all kinds of furniture, which were sprinkled with petroleum and set on fire. In this way the suffocating smoke and the flames did the work for the murderers.

Moreover hundreds of young Armenians were slaughtered like sheep in Urfa, while a fanatic priest read the Koran.

The murders here and elsewhere happened, according to mister Fitzmaurice, on behalf of and under supervision of the government (*Het Nieuws van den Dag*, 11 May 1896, p. 17).

Textbox 9.3 contains the first part of a long article from *Le Petit Parisien* in which it is argued that journalists have the duty to present the facts and avoid stirring up the (Armenian) conflict. In particular, France, as a Great Power, has the moral obligation to humanity to contribute to the re-establishment of peace. Although *Le Petit Parisien* acknowledges that there is certainly ‘a grain of truth’ in the bombastic British coverage of the events in the Orient, it is reluctant to follow in this style of journalism. The British are accused of irresponsible behaviour (and even of lacking a sense of ‘moral obligation’). According to *Le Petit Parisien*, the British newspapers are strongly controlled by the state, because there is no free press in the United Kingdom. As a result, the British media coverage of foreign news fits the interests of the British government, which, in the view of *le Petit Parisien*, purposefully hinders a peaceful solution in the Orient. The French accuse the British of only being concerned with their own interests, which is the desire to expand their colonial empire at the cost of the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, the French present their own foreign policy as a continuation of the collective, universal interests. This example shows that there is a direct link between the French coverage of foreign news events and their self-image as the universal advocate of world peace. Interestingly, *Het Nieuws van den Dag* often bases its coverage of foreign news on the reports of the British newspapers, which are, according to *Le Petit Parisien*, strongly biased by the British political interests.

### **Textbox 9.3: The Armenian question**

One cannot speak anymore of the Armenian question, nor of the Macedonian question, nor of the Syrian question. The question of the Orient has risen, eclipsing all others; it is now this question, on which the attention of the embassies is focused and which dominates the European disputes. The situation is worrying – there is no room to close your eyes for it, – but it is not desperate, and despite all the exaggerations, despite the British declamations [...] it is still allowed to believe in a peaceful solution.

Anatolia on fire, Turks and Armenians going down by the thousands; the civil and religious war in all of the vilayets, from Smyrna to Siwas and Erzeroum; increasing agitation propagated by secret envoys as far away as the Ottoman dependencies in Mesopotamia, from Palestine to Yemen; the Cretans revolting or prepared to revolt; the Orthodox of the Balkan being incited to a rebellion from all sides; the population of Stamboul being manipulated by liberal doctrines or by the premises of fanatics; the Sultan besieged by multiple conspiracies in his own palace; exiles, nightly departures to far-away destinations; murder everywhere, terror, blood-stained anarchy: that is, in essence, the portrayal of the Orient that the most valued and attentive newspapers of London present to us this week.

There is, underneath the bombastic language, a grain of truth. To straighten this out, to purely present the facts, that is our duty – the duty for all those who wish to avert serious conflicts, for all those who wish to spare themselves every responsibility in the eventualities of tomorrow.

Surely Turkey is violently shaken by the persistent fights between the Kurds and Christians in the mountains of Anatolia. Savage massacres, horrible cruelties have drawn the attention of Europe to the vilayets of Armenia and provoked, as a logic consequence, by one of those universal quakes that are so frequent in half-paralysed countries, a shock of all sorts of fanaticisms, of all nationalist aspirations that exist next to each other in the Ottoman Empire, in an instable equilibrium. Facilitating the task of Abdul-Hamid, contributing to the reestablishment of the order, avoiding all agitation: that was the role that humanity, and with her the collective interests, dictated to the Great Powers (Le Petit Parisien, 11 November 1895, p. 2).

Both newspapers also publish the official Turkish accounts of the events in Armenia, in which the problems are played down and the Armenians are presented as the aggressors. *Het Nieuws van den Dag* clearly hints that these Turkish press releases should not be taken too seriously, by either contrasting them with reports from the other sources that are dubbed more reliable or by providing them with cynical comments. The remark in text-box 9.4 right after the citation is an example of this cynicism: the author in fact rejects the Turkish claim that peace ‘continues to prevail’ by referring to the Armenian Massacres, which are anything but peaceful.

### **Textbox 9.4: Press release by the Turkish embassy**

For form’s sake we now publish the latest announcement that we received from the Turkish embassy in The Hague:

“According to the official report, the number of soldiers that were in Zeitoun at the moment the barracks were occupied by insurgents was 562, not counting the guards from Eridjek and Gheukson. Of that number, only 97 soldiers managed to save themselves.

On several occasions about sixty corpses of Muslims have been found in the rivers that surround Zeitoun, murdered in the most cruel way. For the rest, with the exception of Zeitoun, order and peace continue to prevail in all parts of the Empire.”

As for this last, yes – in the devastated Armenian villages the peace of the grave prevails (Het Nieuws van den Dag, 20 January 1896, p. 17).

The Armenian Massacres were not the only source of trouble within the Ottoman Empire during the 1890s. As text-box 9.3 already made clear, unrest was brewing in almost all corners of the empire and for some years, it seemed that the ‘sick man of Europe’ was about to die. While the massacres in Armenia were at their peak, a large insurrection broke out in the Ottoman province of Crete. The next section will elaborate on this insurrection, which would dominate the French and Dutch articles on Muslims and Islam for most of 1896 and 1897.

#### 9.4 The Cretan Insurrection of 1896-1897

The island of Crete had been an Ottoman province since the middle of the seventeenth century. In the following centuries, a minority of the Cretans was converted to Islam. A large majority remained Greek-Orthodox (Pangerl, 2009, p. 136). In the nineteenth century, several Christian uprisings had taken place, of which the Cretan Revolt of 1866-1869 was the most significant one. However, all of these uprisings were finally suppressed by the Ottomans. After the Treaty of Berlin (1878), the European powers decided to preserve the status quo, in order to avoid a conflict among them. The repressive policy of the Ottomans and violence against Christians caused Christian officials to resign from the Cretan administration in the early 1890s. The Sultan appointed a Christian governor-general in 1895 in an attempt of appeasement, but this caused the Muslim minority on the island to rebel. Renewed clashes between Christians and Muslims were the result in April 1896. Greece sent weapons and volunteers to the island to support the Christians. Fearing for the lives of foreign citizens on Crete, the European powers sent warships to the island. As a result, the situation calmed down at the end of 1896 (Paschalidou, 2009, pp. 121-123; Pangerl, 2009, p. 138).

Just like the Armenian question, the Cretan question could be seen as an outcome of Ottoman misgovernment, although the involvement of Greece added a complicating factor to the Cretan question. According to Şenişik (2010, p. 28), the Cretan Revolt was not simply aimed at uniting the island with Greece. Instead, it should mainly be seen as an attempt by Cretan Christians to gain a dominant position in the Cretan society: “*Cretan Christians actually intended to change the socio-economic and political structure of Cretan society entirely and seize power by overthrowing the Ottoman administration and expelling Ottoman troops from the island*”. Paschalidou (2009, p. 122-123) also argues that a union with Greece was not the main goal of the insurrection, but that the insurgents “*naturally looked at the motherland for help and encouragement in their struggle against the Turks*” because they considered themselves as ethnic Greeks.

In early January 1897, tensions between the Christian and Muslim communities rapidly intensified again, with hostilities back and forth. The European powers warned the Ottoman Empire that military action would only worsen the situation, as it would strengthen Muslim fanaticism. On 7 February 1897, the Greek warship *Hydra* arrived in the Cretan port town of Chania. This was an encouragement for the Christian insurgents to launch an attack on Chania to conquer it. An estimated 12,000 rebels set Chania and the surrounding villages on fire. Five days after the *Hydra*, prince George, the second son of the Greek king, arrived in Chania with a small fleet, aggravating the situation even more. The highest ranking Ottoman officials, including the governor of Crete, fled from the island. On 15 February 1897, the Greek troops, led by Colonel Timoleon Vassos, issued a proclamation over Crete. Despite warnings from the European countries, Greece continued to send troops and warships to the island. Therefore, the European powers rapidly occupied Chania on 16 February with a joint peacekeeping force, consisting of British, French, Russian, Italian and Austrian-Hungarian marines. Soon after, a German boat joined this international force (Şenişik, 2010, pp. 30-32; Paschalidou, 2009, pp. 128-129, Pangerl, 2009, p. 140). The insurgence was not limited to the coastal town of Chania. Insurgents plundered Muslim villages in the interior of Crete and killed their inhabitants. In most places, the Muslims were no match for the Christian rebels, as they were heavily outnumbered. The European forces had to come to their rescue, relieving some thousands of besieged Muslims in March. Almost 50,000 Muslims fled to Heraklion, where the British troops established a military cordon to protect them. This cordon became the subject of an intense international dispute, as the living conditions were bad and various diseases

weakened the refugees, but they refused to migrate to the Turkish mainland (Şenışık, 2010, pp. 32-36). Meanwhile, the international fleet, which had by then grown to seventy-three ships, enforced a blockade on Crete to prevent Greek supplies of arms and rebels (Pangerl, 2009, p. 141).

The Greek defeat in the Greco-Turkish War (see section 9.5) caused the Cretan Christians to moderate their demands. Instead of being unified with Greece, the island became autonomous under a European protectorate. The Muslim inhabitants were mostly unhappy with the Cretan autonomy, as they felt marginalised. They gradually started migrating to the rest of the Ottoman Empire. The last Ottoman troops left Crete in November 1898. The Christians continued to identify with Greece: Crete finally united with Greece in 1913. The last Muslims left the island in the population exchange ten years later (Şenışık, 2010, pp. 36-43; Paschalidou, 2009, pp. 132-133).

As we have seen in section 9.1, the Cretan Insurrection is the most dominant topic in Muslim-related articles in *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag* in the period 1895-1897, being the main topic of 26% of the French and 21% of the Dutch articles. In 67% of the French and 71% of the Dutch articles on the Cretan Insurrection, Muslims are associated with negative behaviour. Remarkably, *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag* pay considerably more attention to cruelties committed by the Muslims than



Image 9.1: Ottomans slaughtering Christians on Crete (Le Petit Journal: Supplément illustré, 26 July 1896)

**Textbox 9.5: Turkish brutalities on Crete**

Again Turkish brutalities have been reported on Crete. In Heraklion 10 to 20,000 Muslims came to chase the Christians out of their homes, and they did not spare those of the foreigners either. The Russian vice-consul was ill-treated in the occasion, and the government is so powerless that governor Hassan-Pacha was severely injured.

At the moment, these strange intruders have thus insolently accommodated themselves in the town, which sometimes involved serious fights. The town is now calm, but the situation is serious; the shops are closed and troops are patrolling in the streets (Het Nieuws van den Dag, 8 August 1896, p. 5).

violence from the side of the Christian Cretans, while Şenışık (2010) claims that the Muslim minority was in general no match for the Christian majority. We already saw examples of this focus on atrocities committed by Muslims in textbox 7.3 and 7.7. At 31 August 1896, *Le Petit Parisien* (p.

2) reports: “*In the village of Platania, near Canea, the Muslims have killed eight persons and injured five; they have set fire to some houses and desecrated the churches*”. Image 9.1 shows a dramatic visual example from the other popular French newspaper, *Le Petit Journal*, showing Ottoman soldiers massacring helpless, unarmed Christian civilians, including women and children. Textbox 9.5 contains an example from *Het Nieuws van den Dag*, in which the Muslims are also the offenders.

Both *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag* favour the Greek cause. Their articles contain strong anti-Ottoman and pro-Hellenist sentiments. According to *Le Petit Parisien* (25 February 1897, p. 1), the revolts in the Hellenic territories were caused by “*the tyranny of the Turks, that merciless, nefarious vampire that sucks out to the marrow the provinces that have stayed within its power and that, at the first cry, responds with raid, rape and murder*”. Textbox 9.6 reveals the relief at the announcement that Crete will get its autonomy. It suggests that it would have been a blow for France if the island had not become independent, because France ‘has always fought for the independence of people and for the civilisation’. Hence, the sympathy for the Cretan cause is explained as a natural consequence of the French tradition of liberty: there is a direct link between the self-image and the support for the Cretan insurgents. The Ottoman Empire is held completely responsible for the unrest. As a result, *Le Petit Parisien* is extremely critical of the use of force against the Greek and insurgent troops by the international peacekeeping army, of which France is a key member. This is illustrated by the fragment in textbox 9.7. The author cites the Greek hero Marco Botzaris and claims that the Europeans in general and the French in specific sympathise with the

#### **Textbox 9.6: Cretan independence is near**

Every cloud has a silver lining. The day before yesterday, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has announced before the Parliament that the future independence of Crete is probable. That promise has been a consolation for everyone that, struck and angered by the bad faith of the Sultan, already saw it crowned with the pure and simple conservation of the *status quo* in the Orient. In fact, it would have been painful for France, which has always fought for the independence of peoples and for the civilisation, to give up the Hellenic cause and the rights of the Christians of Candia<sup>23</sup> to the Turkish brutality that came off triumphant from the massacres for which it is the only responsible to Europe and history. It will not happen. Crete will in reality be detached from the Ottoman Empire and will conquer its autonomy (*Le Petit Parisien*, 25 February 1897, p. 1).

#### **Textbox 9.7: In Greece**

“For the fatherland, you should sacrifice anything!”, said Marco Botzaris, defender of Missolonghi, in 1825 [sic].<sup>24</sup> These words have now been repeated and have recalled memories of that war of seventy years ago [the War of Greek Independence]. At that time, the European powers were on the side of Greece, against Turkey. Today, the sympathies in fact still go to the Greek nation, and we still have the same fear of the Muslim barbarity, but the treaties have arisen and instead of supporting Greece with arms, we speak about using force to pursue it to retreat its troops from the island of Crete (*Le Petit Parisien*, 19 February 1897, p. 1).

#### **Textbox 9.8: Crete will be autonomous**

It seems to have been decided [...] that by no means Crete will remain under the rule of the Sultan. I consider that fortunate. But it would have been wiser and safer to add the island to Greece. In principle the Great Powers can easily declare autonomy. But where is the machinery to make her come into operation? Making the Greek troops leave the island and letting the Turkish stay will only continue the current state of affairs. At least both parties need to be removed simultaneously (*Het Nieuws van den Dag*, 4 March 1897, p. 9).

<sup>23</sup> Historic alternative name for Crete.

<sup>24</sup> The cited Greek hero Marco Botzaris was killed in action in 1823, during the War of Greek Independence. This means that he cannot have spoken these words in 1825.

Hellenic cause. However, as a result of international politics, the French army does not support the Greeks in their ambition to unify Greece and Crete.

*Het Nieuws van den Dag* presents a similar view on the Cretan question. Just like the French newspaper, it sympathises with the Hellenic cause, as textbox 9.8 shows. The Dutch newspaper welcomes the future autonomy of Crete, but remarks that a union with Greece would have been even more desirable. The author regrets that the Greek troops are forced to leave the island, while Turkish soldiers stay behind. In an article published later in 1897, a journalist of *Het Nieuws van den Dag* sighs: “*One cannot say that, since the departure of Colonel Vassos and the Greek troops, the situation has become better. Rather worse*” (*Het Nieuws van den Dag*, 6 August 1897, p. 7).

The Dutch newspaper also condemns the blockade and the violence used by the international peacekeeping force against the Greek and insurgent troops. Textbox 9.9 contains an example of this. First, the author reports that an Austrian cruiser sank a Greek vessel, with no better reason than that it ‘did not turn around fast enough’. The explicit assumption that the Austrians have been ‘human enough to save the crew’ should be read as a cynical one, as the author strongly doubts the humanity of the international forces in the remainder of the article. He mockingly refers to the leaders of the Great Powers as ‘the Very Most Christian Majesties’ and criticises their decision to fire at Christians while Muslims can loot unhindered. The cynical name that he gives to the Muslims, ‘the beloved Turkish-Mohammedan scum’, is also a clear reflection of his point of view.

#### **Textbox 9.9: Blockade on Crete**

In the meantime the blockade-work [...] actually began, as a Greek vessel with arms and food that did not turn around fast enough was shot to the bottom by the Austrian cruiser *Sebenico* before Canea. We just assume that they have been human enough to save the crew.

While the Christians are thus being shelled and Greek ships are sent to the bottom by the warships of the Very Most Christian Majesties, they let things drift in Canea, the headquarters of the international fleet, where yesterday, right under the nose of the Great Powers, the beloved Turkish-Mohammedan scum, without being bothered by a shot, looted the Palace of Justice, where the office of the keeper of the mortgages is also located. A value of several hundreds of thousands of drachmas, belonging to the Christian population, was lost in the looting (*Het Nieuws van den Dag*, 20 March 1897, p. 5).

### **9.5: The Greco-Turkish War of 1897**

While the European powers tried to keep the Greek and Turkish troops apart on Crete, pro-war sentiments increased in both countries. Both countries gathered their forces on the border between Thessaly and present-day Greek Macedonia, which was still an Ottoman province at that time. A British attempt to prevent the oncoming conflict through diplomacy failed. After Greek rebels planned an invasion to Macedonia, the Ottoman Empire declared war on 5 April 1897. The Great Powers all remained neutral, except for Germany, which supported the Ottomans with ammunition and officers (Paschalidou, 2009, pp. 131-132). Over 2,000 Italian volunteers, under the command of Ricciotti Garibaldi, fought on the side of the Greeks (Pécout, 2004, p. 406).

The war was fought in Epirus and Thessaly (image 9.2). After just over a month of war, the Greek armies were defeated. The war effectively ended on 17 May 1897, although it would take until December until both countries officially signed peace. The defeat caused a political and moral crisis in Greece (Pécout, 2004, pp. 415-417). At the same time, the victory marked a turning point for the Ottoman Empire, which regained esteem at the international level and saw its economy rise again from an economic depression, as a result of increased foreign trade (Pamuk, 1984, p. 109). As we have seen

in the previous section, the union of Greece and Crete was postponed for sixteen years as result of the Greek defeat. Instead, the island became an autonomous country under international supervision.




Image 9.2: Fragment of a map showing the Greco-Turkish border during the war (Le Petit Journal: Supplément illustré 2 May 1897)

The Greco-Turkish War is the main topic of 3% of the French and 8% of the Dutch Muslim-related articles in the period 1895-1897. It is thus a considerably less common topic than the Armenian Massacres and the Cretan Insurrection. This can however be explained by the relatively short timespan of the Greco-Turkish War: while the unrests in Armenia and on Crete lasted more than two years, the war essentially occurred within just over a month time.

#### **Textbox 9.10: Hellenism and Islamism**

Islamism has grown even more than that Hellenism has decreased. Until last March, Turkey seemed only two inches away from being in ruins. The most extraordinary ideas could circulate without being judged unrealistic. Newspapers from all countries were full of disintegration plans. The Sultan was almost in a state of legal interdiction. It seemed that the disapproval provoked by the massacres of Armenia and Crete would in the end result in a total transformation of the Orient. It was even forgotten that an Ottoman army existed and that this army, before besmearing itself with the murders of Trabzon, Diyarbakir and a hundred other places, had distinguished itself in the fields of Plevna.

It is however this military power that had saved Turkey and returned it to its rank. We certainly do not aim to defend the politics of blood that Abdul-Hamid has pursued since three years. But it is an easily observable fact that the Porte has suddenly restored its prestige towards the Chancelleries. From now on, we need to take it more into account, and the solution of the Armenian question and the organisation of the reforms in the Turkish Empire will bring about even more difficulties. It could well be that Europe will soon notice that the victories in Thessaly will make its task strangely more difficult (Le Petit Parisien, 3 May 1897, p. 1).

As we have seen in the previous section, the French and Dutch newspaper took a pro-Hellenistic stance in the Cretan question. Interestingly, this perspective shifted during the Greco-Turkish War. *Het Nieuws van den Dag* strongly criticises the attitude of the Greek government in the peace negotiations, accusing the Greeks of recklessness and arrogance. On 25 May 1897 (p. 7), it remarks: “After plenty of squabbling, especially from the side of the Greeks, who remain extraordinarily hard to please, the Turco-Greek armistice will finally be signed [...]”. In the same article, it is mentioned that “the Greek national character again showed a very unsympathetic side of itself”, as the defeated Greek soldiers were treated in a very hostile and disrespectful way by their own people upon their return home.

With its fast victory over Greece, the Ottoman Empire largely reconquered its prestige and the respect of the European powers. Textbox 9.10 shows that while *Le Petit Parisien* does not go as far as to admire the Ottoman victory, it does show a strong surprise over its resurrection and underlines that Turkey has again become an important factor in international politics. It mentions that the fame of the Ottoman army had almost been forgotten, as the Armenian massacres had stained the memory of the Battle of Plevna (1877), in which the Ottomans gained admiration by holding up a large Russian army. The downside of the resurrection, as explained by the French newspaper, is that it becomes more difficult to solve the Armenian and Cretan questions, as it will be more difficult for the Great Powers to put pressure on the Ottoman Empire.

In comparison with the Cretan Insurrection, the Greco-Turkish War is seen more as a normal, ‘clean’ war. For example, image 9.3, a picture from *Le Petit Journal*, shows Greek (left) and Ottoman troops (right) engaging in battle, while a picture of the Cretan question depicted the Muslims cowardly massacring Christian women and children (image 9.1). What is more, the Turks gained respect because of the way they dealt with the peace negotiations and the prisoners of war. We have already seen in text-box 9.10 that the Greek attitude after the end of the war was strongly criticised in *Le Petit Parisien*. Textbox 9.11 contains an example of how *Het Nieuws van den Dag* praises the Turkish treatment of Greek prisoners of war. To the admiration of the correspondent in Constantinople, the Turks treat these prisoners extremely well (even better than their own soldiers), as if they are important guests.



Image 9.3: *The beginning of the Greco-Turkish War* (Le Petit Journal: Supplément illustré, 2 May 1897)

They are constantly entertained by their hosts. As a result of the great living conditions in Constantinople, the author expects that many of the Greek soldiers will decide to stay there after their official release. At the same time, the Turkish prisoners of war are treated badly by the Greeks. This urges the correspondent of *Het Nieuws van den Dag* to conclude that in the end “*semi-barbarian, Mohammedan Turkey has behaved considerably better than the so-called civilised, Christian Hellas*”. It is unclear if the author himself still thinks that Turkey is ‘semi-barbarian’, or that he simply refers to the popular negative view of the Turks in order to strengthen the stylistic opposition of a barbarian nation behaving well and a civilised country behaving badly. Nevertheless, this remark clearly marks a change in the point of view of the Dutch newspaper, away from the strong pro-Hellenistic stance to more appreciation for the Turks.

#### **Textbox 9.11: Treatment of Greek prisoners of war by the Turks**

The only ones who will probably regret the signing of peace are the Greek prisoners of war; because they have led a life here they never knew back home.

There are two-hundred-sixteen of them, all inferior in rank. They have been accommodated - because there is no question of being locked up – in the large barracks of *Selimich* in Scutari.

When they arrived here, they did not wear much else than rags. At the expense of the Sultan, they were immediately provided with a completely new outfit and dressed in a decent uniform.

They share a room with four people, they have their own kitchen and own lodging, an own bath, while three Turkish officers are solely charged with taking care of their prosperity. With their hosts, they go for a walk in Scutari and environs every day, twice a week a part of them goes to the Turkish theatre; in the meantime the others can visit three coffee houses that have been selected especially for them.

While the Turkish soldiers here have not received their pay in six months, they [the Greeks] get the weekly pay of a soldier or corporal every Thursday without exceptions and in addition they get a pack of tobacco every day. In short, in one word *on est aux petits soins* for them, which makes it completely understandable that several of their Turkish colleagues are jealous of them.

Several group photographs have been made of them, by order of the Sultan, to be put on the market, and the sales of which had to be used to make their life even more pleasant.

Most probably, many of the so-called prisoners will stay here after their expected release, since several among them already successfully practice some kind of craft in Scutari and some others have made acquaintances among the Turks, which will make it easy for them to find regular work here.

From this all, one can clearly see that there has been no question of hate as such between the two nations in war. More than three quarters of the enormous number of Hellenes living here calmly stayed here during the war, and except for the first week, when the government, keen on baksheesh (tips), saw a financial benefit in their prosecution, they have never been thwarted in any way.

In Greece, the Turks have not been treated so mercifully. No Turkish subject was able to stay there and the prisoners of war – fortunately there were only thirty-three of them – were far from being well off in the castle of Nauplia, with regard to their treatment and especially their nursing and freedom of movement.

In this respect the semi-barbarian, Mohammedan Turkey has behaved considerably better than the so-called civilised, Christian Hellas (*Het Nieuws van den Dag*, 20 December 1897, p. 9).

## **9.6 The epidemics and the Hajj**

During the mid-nineteenth century, the number of Muslim pilgrims travelling to Mecca increased as a result of the intensified network of regular steamship routes in the British Empire (Low, 2008, pp. 269-270) and the development of effective railway routes in the Caucasus and Egypt (Afkhami, 1998, p. 209). The technological development of steam-

ships and the political development of the British Empire made the *Hajj*, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, affordable for a considerably larger part of the Muslim population than before, including people from lower classes. The number of people participating in the Hajj increased from 112,000 in 1831 to 300,000 in 1910 (Low, 2008, pp. 269-274). The mass gathering of Muslims from all over the world in Mecca and Medina entailed (and still entails) large risks for public health, as it facilitates the spreading of infectious diseases: “*The severe congestion of people means that emerging infectious diseases have the potential to quickly turn into epidemics*” (Ahmed, Arabi & Memish, 2006, p. 1008). The situation is further worsened by the extreme heat and crowded accommodation.

Records of cholera epidemics spread through the Hajj areas go as far back as 1846 (Ahmed et al., 2006, p. 1011). The Hajj was soon recognised as the source of global epidemics, such as cholera and plague, which pilgrims from British India (and the Ganges valley in specific) carried with them to Mecca, from where it was further spread around the world. In 1865, a cholera epidemic, which was carried from Mecca to Alexandria and from there first to Marseille and then to the rest of Europe and even New York, cost the life of over 200,000 people. As a result of this epidemic, international attention was drawn to the role of the Hajj in the dissemination of infectious diseases. At the same time, the Hajj was also regarded as the source of Pan-Islamic fanaticism among Muslims in the British and Dutch Colonial Empires, which contributed to a double mistrust of the Muslim pilgrimage among the Europeans: from a public-health and a colonial point of view (Low, 2008, pp. 269-271).

Although cholera epidemics spread from the Ganges valley to Mecca and from there to the rest of the (Muslim) world on at least forty occasions between 1831 and 1912, the British government refused to take effective measures for a long time and publicly denied that its colonies and colonial subjects were the source of these epidemics. It ignored increasing international political and scientific pressure to act against the dissemination of cholera and other epidemics and even denied that cholera was a contagious disease, despite scientific evidence that proved the contrary. Low (2008, p. 271) gives three reasons for this British strategy. First, the British feared that restrictive quarantine measures would upset its Muslim subjects and cause an uprising. Second, Britain was anxious that the trade flows between India and Europe would be affected by such measures. Third, it refused



Image 9.4: Bedouins attacking the European consuls in Jeddah (Le Petit Journal: Supplément illustré, 16 June 1895)

to consent to international agreements that would grant the Ottoman Empire the power to govern the Hajj more affectively, as it did not want to give up any of its control over its own colonial subjects. In fact, this fear was not without reason. Sultan Abdul-Hamid II indeed pursued a Pan-Islamic policy, stimulating an Islamic ‘awakening’ to expand his sphere of influence to Muslims living outside the Ottoman empire. In this way, he managed to get significant financial support from Muslims living in British India (Low, 2008, p. 279).

In 1881, the British appointed a Bengal surgeon, Abdur Razzack, as the vice-consul in Jeddah. He was tasked to gather intelligence on the participation of British Muslims in the Hajj, as well as to improve the sanitary conditions. On 31 May 1895, the foreign community in Jeddah was attacked, reportedly by Bedouins. Razzack was killed and the British, French and Russian consuls were injured. At the same day, medical facilities in Mecca and Jeddah were attacked and destroyed, forcing foreign doctors to flee. The coordinated nature of these attacks soon led to the suspicion that they had been organised by the Ottoman or Meccan authorities (Low, 2008, pp. 284-285).

Low (2008, p. 286) states that “*With the outbreak of plague in Bombay in 1896, even Britain’s long-held policy of obstructing international sanitary regulations finally became untenable*”. Britain altered its Hajj policy after the Dutch example, where Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje had advocated the creation of a Hajj-agency in Jeddah. This agency gained the goodwill of most pilgrims because of its dedication to their health, while simultaneously offering insights in the movements and development of subversive elements.

In section 9.1, we have seen that the epidemics are the main topic of 5% of the French and 3% of the Dutch Muslim-related articles in the period 1895-1897. Additionally, a number of articles with other main topics contains references to this subject.

The before-mentioned 1895 attack on the European consuls in Jeddah (see image 9.4) is indeed explained as a reaction to the strict sanitary measures. In addition, *Le Petit Parisien* (8 June 1895, p. 1) gives yet another explanation: “*The irritation provoked among the Bedouins by the quarantine measures is naturally directed against the Christians; but, on the other hand, well-informed people assure that the recent massacres in Jeddah are not unrelated to the events in Armenia*”. The French newspaper suggests that the imams in Jeddah have stimulated anti-Christian sentiments by referring to the conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Armenia and presenting the Great Powers as the enemies in this matter.

Regardless of the precise reason of the attack, it is seen as the ultimate consequence of Muslim fanaticism. This association often recurs in the reports on the cholera, plague and smallpox epidemics in the Muslim world. Textbox 9.12 contains the beginning of an article in *Le Petit Parisien* on the way Muslims deal with sanitary measures and public health. It is reported that Muslims violently resist against these measures because they feel that they are in conflict with their religion.

It is significant that the author claims that ‘the fanatics reject progress’, as this is a clear value judgement. For the French author of this article, not implementing the rec-

#### **Textbox 9.12: Muslims and Cholera**

Cholera rages in Egypt and victimises many people every day. It is very difficult to implement the series of hygienic measures that the physicians recommend to fight the epidemic in Muslim countries. The followers of Mohammed turn out to resist any prophylactic system. Their resistance even involves violence. We still remember the blood-stained fights in Cairo and Persia that resulted from the measures of disinfection prescribed by the sanitary authorities.

It is in the name of the Koran that the fanatics reject progress, it is by invoking Allah that they, fatalists, refuse to defend themselves against the epidemic (*Le Petit Parisien*, 19 August 1896, p. 1).

commended measures against the cholera epidemic equals ‘rejecting *progress*’. Later in the same article, he argues that the Muslim objections against the measures could be countered by using theological arguments. To support this vision, he outlines some verses from the Koran and some Hadith that could be used to convince Muslims of the necessity to cooperate with the hygienic measures.

Just like the French newspaper, *Het Nieuws van den Dag* also contains articles about ‘fanatic Muslims’ opposing to the measures against the epidemics. However, *Le Petit Parisien* condemns the before-mentioned British refusal to implement effective measures in stronger words than the Dutch newspaper. In a long editorial published in 1895, the French newspaper first blames England for the outbreak of a new cholera epidemic, then describes the circumstances in Mecca and concludes by praising the French colonial policy and once again criticising the English ‘negligence’. Textbox 9.13 shows the beginning of this article, in which England is criticised. Among others, Britain is accused of not executing the measures proposed by the International Conference because it is more concerned (or ‘selfish’) about its commercial interests. This accusation corresponds with the explanations given by Low (2008). The editorialist suggests that the strict French policy could serve as an example for Britain. At the end of the article it is mentioned that as a result of this stringent policy, only 209 Algerian Muslims participated in the Hajj that year, which is complimented as a great achievement of the French authorities. Meanwhile, Britain, ‘doing nothing to diminish the number of travellers’, is accused of none less than ‘criminal negligence’. Hence, the article about the cholera epidemic and the Hajj in fact boils down to a plea for the French approach and against the British colonial policy towards Muslims and Islam.

#### **Textbox 9.13: The pilgrims of the cholera**

Cholera has broken out in Mecca. That is not at all something new. Now the most important thing is that it stays there. Unfortunately, it is feared that the opposite will happen. Yet already three times International Sanitary Conferences have been organised in Venice, Dresden and Paris to take measures to prevent the expansion of the terrible disease. Were these prophylactic measures thus insufficient? One cannot say that, because they have not been applied. And why haven’t they been applied? Because England has refused to ratify them.

The International Conference of Paris was especially dedicated to measures to prevent the cholera to be imported to Mecca by Indian pilgrims. Before the departure from India, a careful inspection of the pilgrims would have had to be made; only healthy men would have been permitted to travel to the holy city of the Muslims. [...] Moreover, as the travellers without financial resources, weakened by the hardships of the journey, are the first victims of the cholera in Mecca, it was decided that every traveller would have been demanded to demonstrate his means of existence for the duration of his stay in Mecca.

These prescriptions were excellent. England did not want to validate them. As a result, the cholera has again been imported to Mecca from the Indies, where it rages on a permanent basis, and from Mecca it can take its sinister flight around the world.

To justify its refusal to accept the conclusions of the Conference in Paris, the English government claims that the adopted measures would not have been efficient at all. How do they know? The truth is that, with its usual selfishness, it fears to see its commercial interests being hampered.

It would perhaps be urgent for the Great Powers to unite to convince it of the necessity to ratify the a hygienic and humanitarian project. England rules over the Indies: so it is up to her to take care that the germs of the cholera are not transported to other places. It only has to follow the example of France: in our great Algerian colony, the pilgrimage to Mecca is strictly regulated; the registrations of the pilgrims are checked and they are indeed strongly restricted; moreover, the government prohibits the pilgrimage if the cholera is noticed in Mecca: this is exactly what it did in 1891, for the pilgrims from Tunisia and Algeria; some of them went nevertheless, but their return was scrupulously monitored and submitted to a stringent disinfection.

Thanks to these wise provisions, the import of the cholera could be prevented.

In contrast, it has been proven that the criminal negligence of England permits the expansion of the epidemic (Le Petit Parisien, 24 May 1895, p. 1).

## 9.7 The Parisian mosque

In August 1894, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Gabriel Hanoteaux received a request from Charles Rouvier, governor of Tunisia, to build a mosque in Paris. Three weeks later, interim-Minister of Internal and Religious Affairs Eugène Guérin replied positively, stating there was indeed demand for a mosque in Paris and that therefore its construction should be authorised. At 8 May 1895, a committee was founded with the aim to organise this project. At 27 June, it moved into an office in the 8<sup>th</sup> arrondissement, near the Champs-Élysées. This committee, presided by Auguste-Louis Albéric (1837-1924), prince d'Arenberg, consisted of influential Parisians with diverging backgrounds: politicians, military men, business men, architects, artists, scholars and journalists. Later that year, geographer and anthropologist Roland Bonaparte (1858-1924), grandson of Napoleon I's brother Lucien, also joined the committee. The main argument for the construction of the mosque was that France needed to strengthen the ties with its colonial subjects, many of whom were Muslims. However, the reactions among the Parisians were mixed: especially the Catholic press disapproved the construction of a Muslim house of prayer in Paris (Renard, 2006, pp. 610-613).

The Ottoman Sultan Abdul-Hamid II welcomed the initiative and promised a financial contribution (Renard, 2006, pp. 610-611). The design of the mosque was supposed to be Ottoman-Turkish. Despite of the concrete plans and the enthusiastic announcement however, the plans were never realised. Bayoumi (2000, p. 277) attributes this failure to the Armenian Massacres of 1896, as a result of which the public opinion towards a Muslim place of worship in Paris became highly unfavourable. The plans were put on ice and it would take another thirty years until the *Grande Mosquée* of Paris was finally inaugurated, in 1926.

In the sample 3% of the French and 2% of the Dutch Islam-related articles is about the plans for the construction of a mosque in Paris. *Le Petit Parisien* welcomes the plans with a remarkable enthusiasm. Already sixteen days before the official foundation of the committee, it reports that a group of intellectuals is preparing an initiative to build a mosque. This initiative is presented as being completely natural and necessary: “*Paris, where all religions have their church, their temple or their chapel, where even Buddhism has a place dedicated to its ceremonies, Paris does not have a mosque, although it is the metropolis of a country that has several millions of Muslim citizens or protégés*” (Le Petit Parisien, 22 April 1895, p. 3). The same point of view can be found in the subsequent articles on the Parisian mosque. After the official announcement, the newspaper echoes that it would be ‘natural’ if there was a mosque in Paris, because of the millions of Muslim inhabitants of Algeria (textbox 9.14). Moreover, it is argued that the mosque will make these Muslims feel respected by France. Therefore, *Le Petit Parisien* characterises the possible construction of a mosque as an act of

### Textbox 9.14: A mosque in Paris (1)

A committee, composed of politicians, explorers and artists, has recently been created to construct a building devoted to the Muslim religion.

As this committee rightfully remarks in a speech addressed to the public, France, which has more than three-and-a-half million Mohammedan subjects in Algeria alone, is one of the large Muslim powers in the world: it is thus natural that one finds in Paris, among the many buildings with a cross on top, a building decorated with the crescent.

The faithful of the Prophet who live among us will gladly come there to meet each other, to find, besides a material shelter, their co-religionist friends. They will realise that France respects and protects their belief. It is desirable that the State or the City of Paris supports this initiative by providing a piece of land for the construction of the future monument. It would be an act of tolerance, of liberalism and also of good politics (Le Petit Parisien, 9 May 1895, p. 2).

tolerance, liberalism and ‘good politics’ in general.

While the French newspaper thus completely supports the plans, *Het Nieuws van den Dag* is more sceptical. It mentions the fact that the committee, consisting of well-known figures, wants to construct an Islamic house of prayer to please the Muslims in the French colonial empire and then explicitly doubts that Muslims would be prepared to do the same for the Christians (textbox 9.15).

**Textbox 9.15: A mosque in Paris (2)**

A mosque will be built in Paris.

The committee that has been formed to realise this plan contains among others the names of Prince Roland Bonaparte, the Prince of Arenberg, General Galliffet, Benjamin Constant, the Marquis de Noailles. This way these gentlemen want to furnish proof that they are good friends of the Muslims and respect their religion.

It will certainly take a long time before the Muslims start building Christian churches out of reciprocal politeness (*Het Nieuws van den Dag*, 24 June 1895, p. 9).

In an exhaustive editorial published on 30 June 1895, *Le Petit Parisien* explains why France would benefit from the presence of a mosque in Paris. Textbox 9.16 contains fragments from this article. The author gives several arguments for the construction of the mosque. First, he makes a clear reference to the French self-image by arguing that France has the moral obligation to have a mosque, because of its universal role as the ‘Land of the Revolution’ and the inventor of the *liberté de conscience* (freedom of and from religion). Interestingly, we hypothesised before that the French newspaper would possibly be more negative about Islam as a result of the historical mistrust of religion and the principle of laïcité. However, the principle of *liberté de conscience*, which is broader than freedom of religion alone as it includes the right to hold a non-religious philosophy of life, is here mentioned as a reason to embrace the construction of a mosque.

The second argument for the construction of the mosque follows from international prestige: England and Russia, the other two European powers with many Muslim subjects, already have mosques in their important cities, so France cannot stay behind. When speaking of the ‘three European powers playing a significant role in the nations of Islam’, the Netherlands are ignored. After all, there were more Muslims living in the Dutch Colonial Empire than in the French territories and Russia (Frémaux, 2006b, p. 549).

The third argument put forward by the editorialist of *Le Petit Parisien* seems mostly a pragmatic, tactical one. He claims that the mosque will make Paris more attractive for students from its Muslim colonies. Once these students have studied in France, he supposes, their hearts will be won, they will feel French and they will become advocates of the French interests in Africa. For the success of the French colonisation, it is believed to be crucial that influential families in the colonies support its cause. However, this argument is not merely a pragmatic, but also an ideological one. It reflects the French ideology of turning its colonial subjects into ‘little Frenchmen’ (see section 4.3). This ideal distinguishes the French colonialism from the Dutch one.

Fourth and finally, *Le Petit Parisien* argues that France should take example from the Roman Empire. In ancient Rome, all religions of the empire were represented in the capital by some temple or sanctuary. According to the editorialist, France should do a similar thing: the construction of a mosque would be the start of this strategy. The seemingly megalomaniac comparison with the Roman Empire reflects the strong colonial ambitions in France and the position aspired by the French at the world stage.

In conclusion, the way in which *Le Petit Parisien* reports about the plans for the construction of a mosque in Paris reveals a lot about the French self-image in the late nineteenth century.

### **Textbox 9.16: A mosque in Paris (3)**

We have indeed become a considerable Muslim power, as a result of our colonial expansion. Millions of Mohammedans in both hemispheres are subjected to our laws. The land of the Revolution, which has created for humanity the laws of freedom of and from religion, has to give the sons of Islam the means to practice their religion.

There is an obvious political interest, because London, Manchester and Saint-Petersburg already offer the Mohammedans buildings to practise their religion. By building a mosque in Paris, we will attract young Orientals, who are sent to Europe to complete their studies but who did not come to our country before because they did not have a place to do their religious duties for Allah. For our great work of colonisation, we need to win and assimilate their hearts. By attracting young Muslims to our country, we work on giving them the love for France. Later, their friendship will be valuable for us. [...]

It is assured that there are six to eight hundred Muslims living in Paris on a regular basis. This number will probably increase if there is a mosque at the bank of the Seine, a stone witness of the respect for the memory of the Prophet. [...]

We do our best to establish the higher education in our great African colony and to create a new, literate generation that unconditionally accepts to live in the shadow of our flag, which already flew above their cradles.

Whatever we do there, on the other side of the Mediterranean, the results of the assimilation will be smaller than when we would convince the notable families of the idea to educate their sons in France.

One naturally picks the impressions from the surrounding air in the middle of which one breathes. Arabs that have had their education in Paris would be more French than those who have never left Africa.

For them, the construction of a Parisian mosque could be a decisive argument. The Muslim fathers will hesitate less to send away their sons if they know that they will here find the facilities of their religion.

This was by the way also the classical method of the Romans, from which one should always draw lessons if one is engaged in colonising, because these masters of the world did not impose their laws solely by force. They were victorious also thanks to their political system. The Caesars did not only drag along captive kings on their triumphal processions along the Holy Road, they also brought along statues of the gods that were worshipped by the subjugated peoples. The gods of the universe themselves also seemed to be prisoners at the foot of Capitol Hill.

In Rome, at the banks of the Tiber, monuments were erected in honour of all religions. There, everyone could find the religion of his fatherland.

This mosque of Paris certainly will not be one of the lesser curiosities of our capital. It will form one of the visible manifestations of our colonial empire, and it will be interesting to see Mohammed being worshipped at the banks of the Seine.

It will be a start. Later, taking into account our Asian possessions, with no doubt there will be a temple for Buddha and pagodas for the glory of Confucius.

What would really give this mosque a distinctive touch is the construction of a minaret, from the top of which the muezzin would call the faithful to prayer three times a day. [...]

It is said that Bismarck, speaking of Paris, said that it was a large German city, because the number of Germans living there is high enough to reach the size of an important city.

By analogous reasoning, one could proclaim that France is a Muslim state of the first order. With England and Russia we form the three European powers playing a significant role in the nations of Islam. This entails some obligations towards the Mohammedans (Le Petit Parisien, 30 June 1895, p. 1).

## **9.8 Philippe Grenier**

In December 1896, a converted Muslim was elected as the representative of Pontarlier (department of Doubs, in the Franche-Comté region) in a by-election caused by the death of its previous representative. He defeated his opponent with 5,141 versus 4,856 votes, becoming the first Muslim Member of Parliament in the history of France. Philippe Grenier (1865-1944), born in Pontarlier, was a doctor who travelled through and worked

in Algeria between 1890 and 1894. There, he adapted to the lifestyle of the local people and converted to Islam. Back in Pontarlier, he continued to wear a traditional Algerian djellaba. Doctor Grenier quickly became popular because of his strong social engagement and modesty, selflessly helping the poor by treating them for free. Thanks to this popularity, he was elected in December 1896 (Jolly, 1960, p. 1881; Renard, 2006, p. 614).

When he first entered the National Assembly in January 1897, he was a remarkable figure. Fellow politicians and journalists did not know what to think of the strangely dressed man, who was also the youngest Member of Parliament at the time (31 years). He joined the left-winged parliamentary group and actively participated in the debates from his first day in the Assembly. His main political interest was, unsurprisingly, the colonial policy. He rallied for the rights of the colonial subjects. The Parisians observed his prayers in public with surprise, as Grenier's entrance in the Assembly was their first acquaintance with Islamic religious practices. As his electorate felt that he had not represented them sufficiently, he was not re-elected in May 1898 and he was also defeated in the elections of 1902, after which he retreated from politics. In 1926, thirty years after his election, he participated in the inauguration of the *Grande Mosquée* of Paris (Jolly, 1960, p. 1881; Renard, 2006, pp. 614-615).

Philippe Grenier is the main topic of 5% of the Muslim-related articles in the period 1895-1897 in *Le Petit Parisien*. He is also the main topic of 2% of the articles in *Het Nieuws van den Dag*. Especially during his first weeks in the National Assembly, in January 1897, the newspapers paid considerable attention to him. He even figured on the front page of *Le Petit Journal: Supplément illustré* (image 9.5). The image shows him wearing his djellaba in the National Assembly, surrounded by other MPs who watch him in amusement. Renard (2006, pp. 614-615) states that the French newspapers presented different opinions on Grenier, from positive curiosity to disapproval, the latter especially by the catholic newspapers. Moreover, some had doubts about the sincerity of Grenier's religious practices. However, the articles in *Le Petit Parisien* are mainly characterised by a sense of astonishment and curiosity (textbox 9.17). The newspaper describes his first day in the Palais Bourbon (the building of the French National Assembly) in detail,




Image 9.5: Philippe Grenier in the National Assembly (Le Petit Journal: Supplément illustré, 24 January 1897)

even mentioning that Grenier walks with a limp. It especially pays attention to his prayers. Apparently, Grenier bowed and kneeled down many times, to the amusement of the onlookers. It is impossible to check whether the reporter exaggerates the frequency of these prayers, or that Grenier indeed constantly interrupted his activities to bow down. Obviously, the journalist finds these customs strange, especially Grenier's habit of kissing the ground, even if it is 'soiled with mud'.

**Textbox 9.17: The Muslim MP (1)**

It was with a sentiment of very lively curiosity that the arrival of doctor Grenier, the Muslim MP from Doubs, was welcomed at the Palais-Bourbon yesterday.

Over his European redingote, Doctor Grenier wore an Arabian burnous that covered his head, around which he had wrapped a traditional cord of camel skin.

The MP from from Poncarlier walks with a limp as a result of an old fracture in his right leg, which detracts a lot from the majesty of his costume.

It was observed that the Muslim MP bowed down in the hall before the Salon de la Paix, that he held his hand over his lips before entering the corridors and that he passed through the curious crowd that he found on his way with some emotion.

In the inner corridors of the Palais-Bourbon, more specifically the one before the Assembly Hall, the Muslim MP bowed down once again, and then kissed the ground. [...]

During the ballot procedure, Doctor Grenier left the office on several occasions to kneel in front of the gallery, to the general surprise. At 16.30h, the Muslim MP left the Chamber. When he arrived at the corner of the Rue de Bourgogne, he kneeled next to the pavement, kissed the stone, which was soiled with mud, then stood up again, and saluted the numerous people that had gathered around him during this strange spectacle by bringing his head to his forehead, and returned home by foot via the Boulevard Saint-Germain, still followed by a curious crowd (Le Petit Parisien, 13 January 1897, p. 1).

From the article in *Le Petit Parisien*, it seems that the Parisians were very curious, but not necessarily hostile towards Philippe Grenier and his religious practices. *Het Nieuws van den Dag* presents a different image (textbox 9.18). The Dutch reporter describes how Grenier is ridiculed at his arrival in the National Assembly. He shows his admiration for Grenier's courage to stick to his religious principles despite the negative reactions. The admiration for Grenier finds clear expression in the description of his appearance, in which his 'earnest, young face' is described as having 'a beautiful profile'. The author mentions that he has been to Morocco and Algeria, where he has seen people with similar appearances as Grenier. He further strengthens Grenier's positive image by mentioning that he is loved in Pontarlier because of his help for the poor and unfortunate, whom he selflessly helped with dedication. This results in the expectation that the people who encounter him in the French Assembly will soon embrace him in a similar manner. While the correspondent thus clearly describes Grenier in a positive way, he strongly condemns the way he has been welcomed by fellow politicians, journalists and the Parisian crowd. He calls their comments 'foolish', 'very coward' and 'improper' and despises their whispers behind Grenier's back. He even suggest that these people themselves would never have the courage to continue practising their religion in such a hostile environment.

While, as we have seen, the description of Grenier by *Le Petit Parisien* reveals sentiments of surprise and curiosity, the report by *Het Nieuws van den Dag* is characterised by pure admiration. In the 'pillarised' Dutch society, different social and religious groups were allowed to live according to their own moral standards: Protestants and Catholics tolerated each other, religious oppression was considered unacceptable. Perhaps this partially explains why the Dutch correspondent is so convinced that Grenier should be left in peace and why he condemns the people who trouble him. Another possible explanation for his positive opinion about Grenier is that religious devotion was generally seen as a positive quality in the late-nineteenth century Netherlands (see section 4.4).

Hence, the fact that Grenier practised his religion in such a pious way was respected and even compelled admiration, even though his religion was Islam.

**Textbox 9.18: The Muslim MP (2)**

Yesterday there was [...] a reason to expect that the meeting [of the National Assembly] would be a bit more spectacular than usual. Not the one-day chairmanship of the *doyen d'age*<sup>25</sup>, seventy-four-year-old Count Lemercier, who was calmly snoozing most of the time out of boredom in the large and comfortable fauteuil; but the presence of the youngest of the members, thirty-year-old Dr. Grenier, brand new MP of Pontarlier, who, as a devout Islamite, has accepted the white habit of the children of the Great Prophet together with the doctrines of the Koran, and does not refrain from professing his religion in public, also regarding the appearance that it demands from its followers.

At first glance, the sight of this man, dressed as an Arabian amidst the dark coats around him, seems strange. There was laughter and I heard foolish, some very coward and improper comments when he, bowed down to the ground before climbing the stairs of the gallery, or when he, having received a letter, first brought it to his forehead, before opening it. When he entered the building, he kneeled down in the vestibule, touching the ground with his head, and there was no lack of merriment about this. When he left, I observed how journalists and MPs gathered in the court of the Quai d'Orsay, to miss nothing of the strange spectacle.

But this man, with his earnest, young face – a beautiful profile, which, with the peaked moustache and the sharp beard, reminds me of the elegant heads, so typically framed, which I saw in Morocco and Algeria, - with his equally earnest conviction he does not bother about what the people say about him; he is not shy of following the prescriptions of the Koran concerning the prayer and performs it on the street amidst the surprised crowd, even if he thus exposes himself to mockery and... malice. Because there are people who hate him; those are the followers of another doctrine, who would not have the courage to defy the mockery the way he does, if their religion prescribed it to them.

Dr. Grenier has only made himself friends among the population in Pontarlier, especially among the poor and unfortunate, whom he, as an able physician, helped, at the sacrifice of time and money, with devotion and love, even if his help was not demanded.

In the Chamber, people will soon get used to this white figure [...]. When he currently passes by, they turn their head, smile, whisper comments, seemingly jokes, in each other's ears, and within a week the fun has gone out of it and mister Grenier will move through the *Palais Bourbon* without drawing more attention than any other MP, and he will win the hearts of those who come into contact with him here, just like in his place of residence (*Het Nieuws van den Dag*, 18 January 1897, p. 5).

Just like the correspondent of *Het Nieuws van den Dag* predicted, the initial amazement soon subsided and curiosity for Grenier decreased after his first weeks in the Assembly, at least from the side of the press. The newspapers hardly published articles about him anymore. However, he remained a remarkable figure in the streets of Paris, where he was occasionally harassed (textbox 9.19).

This article, which describes how a man bullies Grenier, gets arrested and immediately released again upon the request of Grenier himself, shows that *Le Petit Parisien* has adopted a favourable stance towards the Muslim MP. It uses negative adjectives to describe the assailant: 'roguish' and

**Textbox 9.19: A rude character**

An incident has occurred yesterday in front of the fence of the Palais-Bourbon.

While the Muslim MP, doctor Grenier, was kneeling to perform, according to his habit, the rites of his religion, a person from the Pyrénées-Orientales, who was annoyed by this spectacle, suddenly approached the MP and threw his cap on the Muslim's turban in a mocking way. The guards at the entry of the Palace then intervened and arrested this roguish and rude character for offenses against a Member of the Parliament.

It was only at the request and pleas of doctor Grenier himself that this arrest was not maintained.

The spectacle attracted a considerable crowd of curious people to the Quai d'Orsay (*Le Petit Parisien*, 4 June 1897, p. 3).

<sup>25</sup> The 'doyen d'age' is the oldest member of the Assembly.

'rude'. Moreover, it is explicitly mentioned that this man is from the Pyrénées-Orientales, a region far away from Paris, to the border with Spain. This seems to imply that this 'rude character' is not accustomed to Grenier's religious habits, unlike the Parisians, who do not trouble him anymore. Finally, Grenier is presented as a merciful man, who even exculpates his own attacker.

## 9.9 The Aceh War

In 1873, the Dutch invaded the North-Sumatran region of Aceh, which they regarded as the last pirate state of the Straits of Malacca. However, they did not manage to conquer the area fast and easily, as the resistance proved much more persistent than expected. This resistance was mainly led by the so-called *ulama*, Islamic religious leaders. As a result, Islam was increasingly perceived as a threat. The growing number of people participating in the Hajj (see section 9.6) aroused suspicion among the Dutch. They believed that there was an Arab plot to incite the Hajjis to revolt against the colonial authorities (Laffan, 2002, pp. 80-94).

The Dutch invasion of Aceh was initially the result of political arguments: the Dutch wanted to mark their boundaries in the East Indies with regard to British colonial territories. Later in the war, economic motives gained importance, as the Dutch developed plans for a harbour at the northern tip of Sumatra and became interested in the oil reserves in Aceh. In 1896, influential Aceh headman Teuku Umar defected from the Dutch cause (Lindblad, 1989, p. 11). He had been hired by the Dutch army and provided with weapons when he switched sides, on 28 March 1896, taking his troops and arms with him (Missbach, 2010, p. 53). Teuku Umar became an important leader of the Acehnese resistance and is therefore still considered as a hero in Indonesia (Hasamoh, 2008, p. 197).

Shortly after Umar's defection, the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (later to be merged into Royal Dutch Shell) announced that its oil wells in East-Sumatra were drying up. Therefore, the company requested permission to exploit the oil-fields in Aceh. Both events urged the Dutch colonial authorities to pursue a more repressive and harsh approach in the Aceh war, which was effectuated with the appointment of Van Heutsz as the commander of the Dutch colonial army in 1898. He ordered the ruthless 'pacification' of the North-Sumatran region. Rebel leader Teuku Umar was killed in 1899. His wife Cut Nya' Diën took over command over the Acehnese army, until she was arrested. The Aceh War officially ended in 1904 (Lindblad, 1989, pp. 11-15). By 1914, when the fighting in Aceh was finally really over, an estimated 70,000 Acehnese and 37,000 Dutch had died in the war (Hasamoh, 2008, p. 197).

The Aceh War is the main topic of 7% of the Muslim-related articles in *Het Nieuws van den Dag*. It has to be noted that in fact an enormous amount of articles was published on the Aceh War, but only a relatively small share of these articles explicitly referred to 'Muslims', 'Mohammedans' and 'Islam' and are thus part of the sample (see section 6.3 for an explanation of the sample selection). The sample does not contain any article of *Le Petit Parisien* on this topic.

In the Dutch articles about the Aceh War, Muslims and Islam are mainly associated with violence. In 1895, *Het Nieuws van den Dag* published a few articles about Muslims committing crimes in Aceh, such as setting fire to a village of ethnic Chinese and injuring Dutch officers. In 1896, the news about Aceh is dominated by the defection of Teuku Umar. The journalists are confused over this unexpected move, stating that "*it is a complete mystery*" why Umar defected. It is also suggested that "*he probably does not have a conscience*" (Het Nieuws van den Dag, 8 April 1896, p. 9).

After a victory over insurgents in 1897, the Dutch newspaper remarks that “*maybe this fight will add a stone to the building that we have been busy to erect since twenty-three years: a satisfied and happy Aceh, from which no more piracy is committed, where the inhabitants no longer fight each other and where no European or American power can settle*” (Het Nieuws van den Dag, 30 March 1897, p. 5). The arguments for the invasion of Aceh that are mentioned in this quotation corresponds with the before-mentioned motives: most notably the extermination of piracy and the tactical demarcation of the boundaries of the Dutch East Indies, to prevent English or American occupation of the region.

In November 1897, the House of Representatives of the Netherlands debated on the budget for the East Indies. Henri van Kol, one of the first two social democratic representatives, submitted a motion in which he requested the government to appoint an impartial commission, which would have to analyse the ‘*moral-political and financial consequences*’ of the Aceh War and the possibility and desirability to end this war. He objected the exploitation of the Indonesians and called the Aceh War the “*cancer that prevents all reforms*”. He stated that the before-mentioned arguments were not the true reasons for the war. In fact, he argues, “*we wanted war because of our untameable imperious spirit*”. He calls the war “*unjust and unfair*” and a “*disgrace*” for the Netherlands (Het Nieuws van den Dag, 17 November 1897, p. 11). His social democratic colleague Pieter Jelles Troelstra added that “*threatening that Aceh will be brought under Islam is fear-mongering with a bogeyman*” and should thus not be feared (Het Nieuws van den Dag, 19 November 1897, p. 1).


Libertarian socialist Geert van der Zwaag also supported the motion, but the conservative liberals and Christian democrats emotionally disapproved it. Minister of Colonies Jacob Theodoor Cremer, a progressive liberal, admitted that the Aceh War was a “*national disaster*”, but argued that the reasons for the war were already known. Furthermore, it would be impossible to appoint an impartial commission, because there were no unprejudiced people in the Netherlands with regard to this question. He also stated that he just continued the policy of his predecessors and that it would be a bad decision to retreat from Aceh, as the war seemed to be on the right road and a retreat would only cause unrest: “*The Aceh War is like a disease; we have lived through the crisis; we just have to wait for recovery; but if we now, in the presence of the patient – in Aceh they hear everything that is being said right here –, say: he won’t make it, he’ll die, that would be a wrong suggestion*”. In addition, Cremer points out that Van Kol himself has written a book in which he claims that “*even the worst Dutch government is better than the best indigenous one*”, which suggests that the Dutch should certainly not leave Aceh (in: Het Nieuws van den Dag, 19 November, p. 2). The motion was ultimately rejected with 72 versus 3 votes: Van Kol, Troelstra and Van der Zwaag were the only ones who voted in favour of the proposal.

The next section will elaborate on the way in which colonial policy with regard to Islam was presented in the French and Dutch newspapers.

## 10. Colonial policy

Chapter 3 has shown that France pursued an ideological, imperial colonial policy, as a part of which the French identity was actively promoted among the inhabitants of its colonies, by encouraging the use of the French language and the acceptance of French norms and values. The French had the ambition to help their colonies develop by turning their colonial subjects into surrogate Frenchmen. At the same time, the Dutch preferred a different, more pragmatic and less ideological strategy. They did not attach so much value to the distribution of the Dutch language and Dutch customs in the East Indies, since they found it most important to get economic benefits from this colony. An active Dutch identity policy, which could possibly upset the colonial subjects, was judged not to be in the best interest of the Dutch trade. Moreover, there was a strong mistrust of the role of religion within the society in late-nineteenth-century France. In contrast, religion still held a prominent place in the pillarised Dutch society. Because of these reasons, it was expected that the French policy towards Islam was more repressive and that hence *the French newspaper paid more attention to repressive policy towards Islam, while the Dutch newspaper focused on policy of rapprochement*.

Figure 10.1: Characterisation of the colonial policy described in the articles



Only a relatively small number of the articles in the sample is about the French and Dutch colonial policy towards Islam: 15% of the French articles and 13% of the Dutch articles. Contrary to the expectations, *Le Petit Parisien* focuses more on policy of rapprochement, while *Het Nieuws van den Dag* concentrates on repressive policy (figure 10.1). This difference is statistically significant (appendix 10).<sup>26</sup> In none less than 67% of the French articles, colonial policy is about rapprochement, while this is the case in only 27% of the Dutch articles. Inversely, only 29% of the French articles on colonial policy concentrates

<sup>26</sup> The Pearson's chi-square test gives a p-value of 0.010, which is lower than the significance level of 0.05. Therefore, the null hypothesis can be rejected with 95% reliability. The phi coefficient is -0.395, which means that there is a moderate association between the newspaper and the type of colonial Islam policy.

on repression, versus 64% of the Dutch articles. Half of these Dutch articles that focus on repressive policy have the Aceh War as their main topic. In other words, the Aceh War (section 9.9) is a key reason for the Dutch focus on repressive policy.

In France, the plans for the construction of a mosque resulted in a relatively large number of articles on a policy of rapprochement. As section 9.7 has pointed out, the Parisian mosque is often presented as a way of showing the respect of the French motherland for the religion of the people in its colonies, to win their trust and confidence. Other examples of articles on France's rapprochement policy include those about Muslims in the French colonial army (see textbox 10.1). It is argued that the presence of Muslims in the

#### **Textbox 10.1: The Spahis**

Colonel Yusuf was the first one to have the idea of organising these Arabs and Turks in separate companies, even though it was not possible yet to count on their loyalty. He made the French generals understand that the presence of Muslims among our troops would give us a large moral influence and the populations would look to the progress of our occupation and conquest with less anxiety if they would observe the presence of their fellow believers in our army (*Le Petit Parisien*, 11 May 1897, p. 1).

French army, just like the construction of the mosque in Paris, would make the colonial subjects more loyal. In addition, it is also suggested that Muslims would be more fit as soldiers in the colonies than the French, because they were more used to the difficult circumstances. Still, their loyalty and trustworthiness is a matter of dispute. The French newspaper mentions that there is some debate in France and the colonies about the degree of responsibility that could and should be given to Muslims in the French army. According to *Le Petit Parisien*, it would be imprudent to grant these Muslims the same rights as the French. The French newspaper claims that many Muslims do not even want to become France citizens, because “*there are regulations in the French laws of which the application is in direct opposition to the practices and beliefs of the Muslims*” (11 May 1897, p. 1).

Both *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag* pay attention to Pan-Islamism, which they consider as a major threat for their colonies: “*Pan-Islamism is for us, as well as for all other European countries that have many Muslims among their inhabitants or subjected peoples, the largest and most dangerous enemy for the peace in our colonies*” (*Het Nieuws van den Dag*, 19 October 1897, p. 1). ‘Pan-Islamism’, which was already briefly addressed in section 9.6, refers to Sultan Abdul-Hamid II’s ambition to exert influence over Muslims far beyond the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire (Low, 2008, p. 279). It was feared that his ‘Islamic propaganda’ would cause a chain reaction. Throughout the world, Muslims “*welcomed the victories of the Sultan in Thessaly and Epirus with enthusiasm, of which they were informed day by day, or even hour by hour, by newspapers inspired by Constantinople*” (*Le Petit Parisien*, 27 August 1897, p. 2). Hence, the French and Dutch were afraid that the Greco-Turkish War would inspire their Muslim subjects to revolt against the colonial authorities.

Despite the fact that, contrary to the expectations, *Le Petit Parisien* focuses more on colonial policies of rapprochement while *Het Nieuws van den Dag* concentrates on repressive policy, both newspapers do approach Islam in ways that correspond with the French and Dutch self-images, as explained in chapter 3. As we have seen, the construction of a mosque in Paris is presented as a way of attracting Muslim students from the colonies to France, which is supposed to increase their loyalty towards France and to ultimately turn them into surrogate Frenchmen. *Le Petit Parisien* makes clear that the ultimate goal of colonisation is to spread the French norms and values, even though this may be hard: “*The Muslims think and feel so differently from us. How could they recognise, just by what they have been told, that our ideas and principles are better than theirs?*”

(17 October 1896, p. 1). This quotation shows that it is fully assumed that the French are morally superior: they just need to find a way to convince their Muslim subjects of this ‘fact’. In an article on the colonisation of Tunisia, it is stated that “*it is the moral conquest that asserts itself after the material conquest*” (12 December 1895, p. 1). This means that the factual, territorial conquest of a new colony, inevitably has to be followed by an ideological, moral colonisation. It is repeatedly suggested that the French colonisation of Muslim Africa will eventually be at the benefit of the people living there (this was for example emphasised in textbox 7.5). Since they are thus convinced that the colonisation is in fact a gift for the population of Africa, the journalists of *Le Petit Parisien* sometimes show their annoyance over the Muslims’ resistance against “*the progress of European penetration into Central Africa*” (16 September 1895, p. 1).

An important issue in the Dutch debate on Islam in the Netherlands Indies was that of Christian missionary activities. On the one hand, as section 4.4 has made clear, the Dutch saw themselves as a pious nation and were proud of their moralities. Within the Dutch society, the protestant and catholic pillars were interested in the propagation of these moralities in the colonies. On the other hand, section 4.3 showed that the Dutch favoured a policy of ‘favourable neutrality’ towards the development of Islam in the East Indies. This meant that the Netherlands welcomed modernising forces within the Muslim society without directly encouraging them. Hence, there was a clash between two views in the Netherlands: one favoured a passive approach so as not to upset the Muslims, the other advocated an active Christian missionary approach. In November 1897, a debate about the budget for the East Indies was held in the Dutch House of Representatives (see section 9.9). The articles about this debate in *Het Nieuws van den Dag* reveal an opposition between the view of the Christian democratic opposition and the liberal government (textbox 10.2).

#### **Textbox 10.2: Debate in the Dutch house of Representatives**

Mister [Johannes Theodoor] *De Visser* [of the Protestant ‘Christian Historical Union’] was the first speaker of the second day. [...] Although he also recognised that the government could not make propaganda for Christianity, he thought that the standpoint of impartiality, which it had adopted, resulted in the favouring of Islamism over Christianity, since we gave the indigenes, through all sorts of official homage, the impression that his religion is better than ours. The acceptance without permission of Mohammedan propagandists, while a permission is needed for Christian missionaries, was in his eyes an injustice, which was in conflict with our vocation as a Christian state. If the government really wanted to encourage the mission, it should not only send out assistant preachers, but it should also no longer give the Mohammedan priests as such a place in the *desa*<sup>27</sup> administration, not accept the official participation of civil servants in Islamic feasts, not close the schools at Fridays and leave them open at Sundays.

[Jacob Theodoor Cremer, Minister of Colonies, replied that] without making propaganda in a country of which the population is not Christian, the government wanted to protect all subjects and guarantee equal rights with regard to religion; sympathy and financial support for the missionaries, especially for nursing and education, was therefore always guaranteed. It would not be possible to impose the same demand for permission on the Muslim as on the Christian-propagandists, because the first occur by the thousands in all kinds of shapes (*Het Nieuws van den Dag*, 19 November 1897, pp. 1-2).

Justifying our participation in Mohammedan feasts, the Minister pointed out that these are reciprocal courtesies; that we as a Christian nation rule over non-Christians over there; that the taxes in the Indies are paid by non-Christians and that for that matter it was no betrayal of principles, even for [Protestant-Christian] Ministers and pastors, to attend a feast of dissenters (*Het Nieuws van den Dag*, 20 November 1897, p. 1).

<sup>27</sup> The *desa* was the lowest level of administration in the Netherlands Indies.

Christian democratic MP De Visser strongly disapproves the policy of religious neutrality. He even claims that it gives the impression that the Islam is a better religion than Christianity, because unlike the ‘Mohammedan propagandists’, the Christian missionaries need a permission. Minister Cremer counters this by stating that it would be impossible to impose such regulations on the Muslims, because of their numbers. He also denies that Islam is favoured over Christianity, pointing out that the missionaries also get some financial support. Cremer also disagrees with De Visser’s wish to stop the participation of Dutch officials in Islamic feasts, by explaining that that the Dutch should show some sympathy for their colonial subjects, who, after all, pay taxes as well. Textbox 10.3 shows how catholic senator Van der Biesen argues that the Hajj should be obstructed because of the danger of Islam, while the Christianisation of the natives should be encouraged. He even speaks of ‘the fight against Islam’. Liberal senator Fransen van de Putte opposes these ideas, by referring to the freedom of religion. He also states that missionaries form a threat for the peace in the Netherlands Indies, because they follow their religious ideals without taking into account the political interests. Minister Cremer agrees with his liberal party-member, adding that the government cannot permit, let alone participate in the fight against Islam. This clash between the Christian and the liberal view on colonial Islam policy in the Netherlands shows that opposite views existed within the Dutch national discourse as a result of the pillarisation of the society.

**Textbox 10.3: Debate in the Dutch Senate**


[Catholic senator Jacob] *van der Biesen* joined issue with our governmental system in the Indies, which was in conflict with Christian righteousness, prudence and Christian love. Those who expected an argument for higher civilisation, better rewards and more human rule over the natives were disappointed. The argument of the speaker was solely aimed against the pilgrimages to Mecca, which he desired to be prohibited or obstructed through expensive passes. The Minister wanted to hamper them because of the danger of the plague and cholera, but the speaker considered Islam as a larger plague than these diseases, because the hadjis menace peace and order. In his opinion, the highest interests of our colonies were at stake in the fight against Islam, especially after the success of the Turkish arms in Greece. Nothing obstructed the Christianisation of the natives to such an extent as Islam and he did not understand why the Christian missionaries were not left free while the Muslims were (Het Nieuws van den Dag, 30 December 1897, p. 1).

[Liberal senator Isaïc Dignus Fransen van de Putte] argued that freedom of religion should remain guaranteed for Christians and Mohammedans; the [Dutch] Reformed Church should be free in its choice of clergymen; that was not the task of the government. But he strongly advised against the free admission of missionaries, and against leaving the decision to the ecclesiastical authorities and chiefs. Priests, clergy and missionaries are people – he said – who persuade what they think is good, without taking into account our interests. Their politics is a threat. You should be generous and gentle for them, but keep the keys of your home in your own hands. [...]

The Minister [of Colonies] opposed the fight against Islam by referring to the freedom of religion, which is guaranteed by the governmental regulations [...]. An absolute prohibition of pilgrimages to Mecca was in conflict with article 199 of these governmental regulations. The State is impartial. Even though the Minister is an advocate of the missionary activities, he strongly disapproves active propaganda against any religion (Het Nieuws van den Dag, 31 December 1897, p. 1).

Hence, there were debates about the policy towards Islam in the colonies in the French as well as the Dutch press. In both countries, the discussions revolved around the question of how much freedom should be given to the Muslims. Some argued that the colonial subjects should actively be encouraged to adopt the culture of the European motherland: mainly the secular tradition in the case of France and Christian norms and values in the case of the Netherlands. Others preferred a more liberal, pragmatic approach, in which the

Muslims in the colonies were mostly left free to practise their religion in the way they desired. Sometimes, this approach even included considerable rapprochement efforts, such as the plans for the construction of a mosque in Paris and the participation of Dutch officials in Islamic feasts in the Indies. As we have seen in chapter 3 and 4, the first view would become dominant in France, while the latter was the main guideline for Dutch colonial policy.



*Figure 10.2: Fragment from the conceptual model, showing arrow 13, which was analysed in this chapter*




## 11. Positive and negative associations

Based on the assumption that the French national unifying efforts would require a stronger form of Othering, the following hypothesis was proposed in section 6.6: *the French newspapers represented Muslims and Islam in a more negative way than their Dutch counterparts*. To verify if this hypothesis is true, this section will look at the associations with Muslims and Islam within the articles as well as the point of view of the author.

To begin with the latter, the opinion of the author (the journalist) can be recognised in 45% of the French and 36% of the Dutch articles. This difference is not statistically significant (see appendix 11).<sup>28</sup> In both newspapers, the point of view of the journalists towards Islam and Muslims is overwhelmingly negative (figure 11.1): 63% of the French and 73% of the Dutch articles from which the opinion of the journalist can be inferred has a negative point of view. The share of articles with a positive point of view is equal in both newspapers: 18% in *Le Petit Parisien* and 17% in *Het Nieuws van den Dag*. Hence, the differences are small and not statistically significant (appendix 11).<sup>29</sup>

Figure 11.1: Author's point of view




Besides the opinion of the author, some articles also contain other points of view, namely those of the people cited in the article. Section 4.6 has paid attention to the nationality and profession of these people. Figure 11.2 summarises their point of view on Islam. It has to be noted that opinions of cited persons can be found in less than a third of the articles in the sample. Negative opinions about Islam are found in 43% of the French and 36% of the Dutch articles, while 33% of the French and 28% of the Dutch articles contain positive citations about Islam. Moreover, some of the people cited in *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag* are neutral, in the sense that they for example explain Islamic traditions without giving their opinion about it. This is the case in 19% of the French and

<sup>28</sup> The Pearson's chi-square test gives a p-value of 0.117, which is higher than the significance level of 0.05.

<sup>29</sup> In this case, the Pearson's chi-square test gives a p-value of 0.324.

17% of the Dutch articles. Finally, there are articles in which both critics and defenders of the Muslims are cited. This happens remarkably more often in *Het Nieuws van den Dag* (19%) than in *Le Petit Parisien* (5%). Nevertheless, there is no statistically significant difference between the opinions of the people cited in both newspapers (appendix 12).<sup>30</sup>

Figure 11.2: Opinions of people cited in the articles



An interesting article is found in *Het Nieuws van den Dag* (textbox 11.1), in which travel writer and journalist Maurits Wagenvoort is cited. Wagenvoort (1859-1944) was a journalist and writer, who started travelling in 1892: first through the United States, Germany and Italy and from 1896 through Greece, Turkey, Macedonia, Serbia, Palestine, Spain, North-Africa, Egypt, Persia, South-Russia, Hindustan, Ceylon and the Netherlands Indies (Robert, 1997, pp. 131-138). To finance his travels, he published reports in a number of Dutch newspapers (including *Het Nieuws van den Dag*, see textbox 8.2 for an example) and magazines. He also wrote books, both fiction and non-fiction. During his travels, he became a friend of well-known Dutch writer Louis Couperus (1863-1923).

In the fragment in textbox 11.1, a journalist of *Het Nieuws van den Dag* cites from an article by Wagenvoort in the magazine *Nederland*. The journalist thinks that this article deserves the attention of the readers because of the way in which Wagenvoort defends the Muslims. Wagenvoort is cited criticising the European travellers in the Holy Land who cannot get rid of the prejudice that Muslims are bad. Even if they have only travelled in the Orient for a very short time, they consider themselves expert enough to write a book. In their travel reports, they echo the stereotypes in each other's works. In fact this last argument is one of the basic principles of Orientalism as defined by Said: stereotypes were constantly reproduced and travellers only managed to see the Orient through the perspective of pre-existing conceptions. Wagenvoort then goes on to describe the virtues of the Muslims, including their gentleness and tolerance. It is very remarkable that he mentions this last quality, which may or may not have something to do with Wagen-

<sup>30</sup> The Pearson's chi-square test gives a p-value of 0.237, which is higher than the significance level of 0.05.

voort's sexual orientation: he was reportedly homosexual (Robert, 1997, p. 131). For him, the Orient might have been a place to escape the restrictive sexual norms and moralities that were so characteristic of the Netherlands in the late nineteenth century. Whether this be the explanation for Wagenvoort's point of view or not, he further praises the Muslim men and criticises the Europeans, using words that somewhat shock the journalist of *Het Nieuws van den Dag*.

**Textbox 11.1: Maurits Wagenvoort on Muslim men**

A remark by mister Wagenvoort about the quality of the travel writers in Palestine deserves our attention [...].

Many travellers in the Holy Land are clergymen and they tend to consider Palestine as their private property and most often they come there with the unconscious bias to find everything of the Christians good and everything of the Muslims bad. They stay there too short and it happens that they, after having travelled between Dan and Ber-Séba<sup>31</sup> for fourteen days, think that they know enough of the Holy Land to write the unavoidable book about it. In this, the Muslims and their religion always get bashed. The writers echo each other, make up a lot and often speak lies. The Muslims are called cruel murderers of the Christians, immoral people, enemies of civilisation, development and Christian virtues. And the Islam is called: a doctrine of materialism and unholiness.

Now Maurits Wagenvoort agitates against such statements, with all the original power of persuasion that resides within him. He calls the Mohammedans, and the Turks in specific, a special, chivalrous, courageous and gentle people, charitable and tolerant to the utmost, and he concludes his tribute with these words: "I have got to know some Mohammedans, and when I soon leave the Orient – hopefully not forever – , I will always think back about them with a kind feeling, with a high esteem for their virtues. I have often tried to approach them, often held out my hand towards them; every time I was welcomed as a friend, every time I shook hands with men, who..."

Yes, here the author uses a comparison and says in the superlative (o, very superlative!) degree: "who possess just a bit more of the manly audacity and spirit than (do not be shocked, my male reader!) the electrified corpses, of which the male population in Europe exists for one third, and the twaddlers, of which it exists for another third" (*Het Nieuws van den Dag*, 22 August 1897, p. 2).

Textbox 11.1 is an example of how Muslims are defended by a person cited in the Dutch newspaper. Textbox 11.2 contains a similar example from *Le Petit Parisien*.

The cited 'Alihé-Hanoum' (real name: Fatma Aliye Hanım, 1862-1936) was a respected and popular Ottoman writer, one of the first female writers in the Empire. She tried to promote a feminism that was in line with a relatively conservative interpretation of the Koran. As a result of this, her work fell into oblivion after the establishment of the secular Republic of Turkey in 1923. As a well-educated upper-class woman, she read French books and magazines during her youth. In 1891-1892, she published the book *Nisvân-ı İslâm* (Women of Islam), in which she described the status of Turkish women by addressing European women. It was a theological and political work: she defended women's rights by analysing Islamic texts and the life of the Prophet Mohammed. The book was first published in a Turkish newspaper and later (in 1894) translated into French (Yıldız, 2008, pp. 153-166). It is from this book that the editorialist of *Le Petit Parisien* cites in textbox 11.2.

The French editorialist cites Fatma Aliye with a combination of curiosity, admiration and some scepticism. He is amused by her argument that the women actually benefit from being in a harem, but immediately replies that the French will find it hard to accept

<sup>31</sup> Dan is a Biblical city in the extreme north of the Kingdom of Israel; Beer sheva (Ber-Séba) was the southernmost of the ancient kingdom. Therefore, 'from Dan to Beer Sheva' is a Biblical reference to the whole Kingdom.

that harem slavery is not fundamentally detestable. However, he also mentions that she uses ‘good arguments’ and dedicates an article of over 1,600 words to her writings. This way, he suggests that the life of Muslim women is at least not as bad as commonly believed. In this sense, textbox 11.1 and 11.2 are nice examples of how some newspaper articles cite people who challenge the dominant image of the Muslim Orient. While these articles are relatively exceptional, they indicate that different, pro-Islam opinions existed within the discourse that was most often critical of Muslims, as we have seen in the previous sections.

**Textbox 11.2: Alihé-Hanoum on Muslim women**

But let’s have a look at a curious reply from Constantinople to the ideas that we generally have about the existence of a Muslim woman. It is a Muslim woman herself, a Turkish lady, Alihé-Hanoum, who dares to explain that everything we say is just a legend, and that we should not have pity on those other women. [...]

Admit that it is curious to hear this defence of the harem life from the side of one of those who are subjected to it. Aren’t these original notes worth being called attention to?

Alihé-Hanoum truly seems to find good arguments to support her premise and according to what she says, the Muslim women could in fact pity the Christian women... [...] This woman brings along a liveliness that is in strong contrast with the traditional Oriental indolence, to show that her co-religionists are the most happy women in the world. [...]

It is no secret for anyone that slavery still exists in Turkey, despite all opposite declarations. Alihé-Hanoum assures that the “djaries”, the harem slaves, have a fate that is not only supportable, but even pleasant. Besides that they are provided with everything, they receive presents and their future is assured. [...] At this point, our ideas would have difficulty being compatible with the Muslim ideas, despite this glorified gentleness. It is possible that there are today moderations in the fate of its servants; but it would be difficult to make us admit that slavery is not detestable on principle.


Of course Alihé-Hanoum cannot deny that the Muslim husbands have, by the law of the Prophet, the right to have several women.

But she replies that in fact, at least in Turkey, polygamy disappears more and more. The majority of the husbands are satisfied with one woman; that is because, while Islamism permits its adepts to marry up to four times in legitimate weddings, it imposes conditions and duties that are rather hard to fulfil. The Muslim who wants to marry more than one woman has to have a separate households for every one of them, and there should be no difference between them, from furniture to the painting of the walls. The same jewellery, the same clothing should fall to their share; he is forced by his religion not to make any distinction between them. If it would not be for another reason, he hesitates to take such a financial burden. [...]

But what really enrages this advocate of the Muslim life, is that we in Europe dare to imagine that the women are not treated with respect over there. She claims that, on the contrary, respect and appreciation are the privilege of the Muslim woman. This respect is almost equal to the respect for the Koran. A passage from the Holy Books says that it is forbidden for a small caravan to bring a Koran or a woman with them, because of the risk that they could not be defended in case of an attack (Le Petit Parisien, 8 April 1895, p. 1)

Having looked at the opinions of the journalists and the people they cited, it is finally determined for every article within the sample whether Muslims and Islam are associated with positive or negative events. For example, if an article describes the murdering of Christians by Muslims, the association is clearly negative. An article about enthusiastic attempts to construct a mosque in Paris is an example of a positive association. In some cases the association is ‘neutral’, for example if an article describes Muslims being massacred by Christians. In that case, Muslims are neither associated with positive or with negative behaviour.

Figure 11.4: Association with Islam and Muslims



As expected in the hypothesis, *Le Petit Parisien* contains some more articles with negative associations than *Het Nieuws van den Dag*: 60% versus 56% (figure 11.4). However, the French articles also contains more articles with positive associations (16%) than the Dutch newspaper (11%). *Het Nieuws van den Dag* contains more neutral articles. Since the differences within the sample are fairly small, they are not statistically significant (appendix 13).<sup>32</sup> This means that Muslims were represented in a negative way in the French as well as in the Dutch press (arrow 14 in figure 11.3): in this regard, there was no difference between the two countries.




Figure 11.3: Fragment from the conceptual model, showing arrow 13, which was analysed in this chapter

<sup>32</sup> The Pearson's chi-square test gives a p-value of 0.134, which is higher than the significance level of 0.05.



## 12. Conclusion and discussion

The following research question was formulated in the introduction of this thesis:

*To what extent did a different image of Muslims and Islam exist in ‘metropolitan’ France and the Netherlands in the late nineteenth century?*

In addition, four sub-questions were used:

1. *Which elements of Orientalism and the specific national discourses have historically influenced the French and Dutch representations of Islam?*
2. *To what extent did the French and Dutch press associate Muslims with different stereotypical images in the late nineteenth century?*
3. *To what extent did the French and Dutch press pay attention to different Islam-related news events in the late nineteenth century?*
4. *What was the role of colonialism in the representation of Muslims and Islam in the French and Dutch press in the late nineteenth century?*

In France as well as the Netherlands, the press coverage about Muslims and Islam was mostly negative. Muslims were associated with violence and cruelty against Christians, as a number of harsh conflicts dominated the media: the Armenian Massacres, the Cretan Insurrection and the Greco-Turkish War. In the Netherlands, the Muslims were relatively more often stereotyped as being violent and cruel. This may be related to the Dutch self-image and national ideology, in which the avoidance of conflicts between the different social and religious ‘pillars’ was crucial. Hence, the Dutch social organisation influenced the way the Dutch looked at Islam. In France, Muslims were more frequently linked to fanaticism than in the Netherlands. This is probably the consequence of the French attachment to the principle of *laïcité*, which was a fundamental component of the French national ideology. The French saw themselves as a modern nation that had expelled religion from the political sphere. They considered Muslims as people who had not yet succeeded in doing the same and therefore strongly associated them with religious fanaticism.

In the Armenian Massacres and the Cretan Insurrection, *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag* generally chose the side of the Christians. They showed compassion for the Armenian victims of the Ottoman atrocities and also supported the Hellenic cause in the Cretan conflict. The official statements by the Turkish authorities about these conflicts were mocked in the Dutch press. For some time, it seemed that the Ottoman Empire was being torn apart by internal conflicts and could not be considered as an international power anymore. However, the Turkish victory in the Greco-Turkish War marked a significant change. Not only did the French and Dutch journalists realise that the Ottoman Empire should still be taken into account as a world power, they also showed their respect for the decent Turkish attitude in the peace negotiations after the war.

While most Islam-related news events described in the newspapers occurred overseas, two key events took place on French soil: the foundation of a committee for the construction of a mosque in Paris and the election of Muslim convert Philippe Grenier in the French Assembly. The coverage of *Le Petit Parisien* on these two events was mostly positive, hence contributing to the idea that Islam could have a future in France, which was presented as ‘one of the large Muslim Powers in the world’. There were no similar events in the Netherlands. The most direct interactions between the Dutch and Muslims took place in the East Indies. The Dutch believed that the resistance against the Dutch admin-

istration in the Aceh War was led by Muslim fundamentalists and fostered by Hajjis, who were suspected of bringing radical Pan-Islamic ideas with them from Mecca. Mainly as a result of this Aceh War, *Het Nieuws van den Dag* focused strongly on a repressive colonial policy towards Islam, while *Le Petit Parisien* focused on a policy of rapprochement.

In both countries, there were debates about the colonial policy towards Islam, in which two distinctive lines of thought could be recognised. First, there were those who thought that the colonial subjects should be encouraged to adopt the European culture and ideas as much as possible. In the Netherlands, this idea was mainly propagated by the advocates of missionary activities within the Protestant and Catholic pillars. In France, this way of thought was dominant among a completely different group of people, namely those who thought that the secular principles (*laïcité*) should be spread in the colonies. The second line of thought opposed the previous one: its supporters insisted that the Muslims in the colonies should not be encouraged to adopt the European culture, because this could upset them and cause unrest. In the end, this last way of thought would dominate the Dutch policy towards Islam in the Netherlands Indies. This corresponded with the Dutch self-image of a tolerant nation. In the meantime, the French tended more towards the first approach: they tried to turn the colonial subjects in Algeria into 'little Frenchmen'. However, as we have seen, this does not mean that the French policy was by definition more repressive. On the contrary, the plans for the construction of a mosque in Paris were proposed because it was seen as a way to attract Muslim students to the French capital, where they would be submerged in the French culture.

Yet the different policies towards the Hajj exemplify the differences between the French and Dutch approach. The French managed to limit the number of pilgrims to an absolute minimum, even prohibiting participation in the Hajj altogether on several occasions. Officially, this was a measure to prevent the dissemination of diseases like the cholera, but in fact it was also related to the fear that Hajjis would spread dangerous Pan-Islamic ideas. The Dutch had the same fear, but thought that such strict prohibitions would only worsen the situation and enrage the Muslims in the East Indies. Therefore, the Netherlands chose another policy, at the advice of Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje: it closely monitored the pilgrimage (amongst others via the consulate in Jeddah), under the pretext of sanitary measures.

The word clouds in figure 12.1 illustrate the focus of the Islam-related news coverage in *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag* in the period 1895-1897. The size of the words gives a relative indication of how frequently they are found in the articles: the larger the words, the more often they occur in the Islam-related articles. The word clouds show a number of resemblances between the French and Dutch press coverage: there was a lot of attention for the role of the Great Powers (*puissances* or *mogendheden*) in the large wars (*guerre*, *oorlog*) and conflicts between Muslims and Christians (*chrétiens*, *Christenen*), which took place in Greece, Turkey and on Crete. During the Cretan insurrection, the most intense fighting took place in Chania (*Canée*, *Canea*). In all of these events, the Ottoman Sultan was the crucial political and religious leader. The most obvious differences between the two word clouds are the French focus on France and the Dutch focus on the Indies and Aceh.

All in all, this thesis has shown that the image of Muslims and Islam was equally negative in France and the Netherlands in the late nineteenth century. However, there were significant differences between the French and Dutch images with regard to the stereotypes used, the journalistic conventions, the news events and locations associated with Muslims and the chosen colonial policy towards Islam. The unique historical comparison of the image of Muslims in France and the Netherlands that was made in this thesis has

shown that the representation of Islam in Western-European countries can be seen as the result of Orientalist ideas as well as the specific national discourses.



Figure 12.1: Word clouds of the Muslim- and Islam-related articles in *Le Petit Parisien* (top) and *Het Nieuws van den Dag* (bottom) in the period 1895-1897

This thesis started with two important statements. First, there was Edward Said’s claim that France was one of the founding nations of Orientalism, while he did not consider the Netherlands as such. This difference did not lead to completely different discourses with regard to Islam in the late nineteenth century, as elements of Orientalism could be recognised in both countries. In many ways, Muslims were described as the Others: fanatic, violent, dangerous, exotic and rather incapable of governing their own countries. However, the French role as the founding nation of Orientalism was reflected in the French interest in Muslim countries around the world, of which the continuous negative comments on the British colonial Islam policy were characteristic. Moreover, the French self-image as one of the largest Muslim powers in the world also reflected this special position in the history of Orientalism. The French argument that the construction of a mosque in Paris would be reminiscent of the temples built in ancient Rome for the religions of the defeat-

ed peoples is significant. It illustrates an Orientalist way of thought that was all about dominating and having authority over the Orient. Although the Netherlands Indies had more Muslim inhabitants than the French colonies, *Het Nieuws van den Dag* never referred to any Dutch ambition of becoming a Muslim world power. With the notable exception of the Aceh War, the Dutch newspaper rarely paid attention to Islam in the East Indies. The Dutch hardly seemed to be aware of the fact that there were circa 45 million Muslims living in their colonies.

The second statement in the introduction of this thesis was that according to critics, a return to a classically Orientalist framework can be observed in the present-day representations of Muslims and Islam in the media. This thesis has shown that the media coverage on Muslims was mostly negative in the late nineteenth century, alternated by a seemingly naïve astonishment over the strange, exotic Muslim habits and traditions. As this research has only focused on one three-year period, it is not possible to draw conclusions on the development of Muslim images. A more exhaustive diachronic research would be necessary to shed light on changes and continuities over time. On the one hand, Muslims were already represented in a mostly negative way in the last decade of the nineteenth century. On the other hand, there were also examples of a fascination for Muslims that are today less likely to be found. The French enthusiasm for the construction of a mosque in the late nineteenth century is in sharp contrast with the recent debates about Islamic symbols in the public sphere. In a similar way, the Dutch debate about colonial policy towards Islam in the late nineteenth century is very interesting in the light of the recent political developments. Today, Netherlands are governed by a coalition of Liberals and Christian Democrats, supported by Geert Wilders' anti-Islam party PVV. From this perspective, it is interesting to see how the liberals in the Dutch assembly defended the participation of Dutch officials in Islamic feasts in the East Indies and disapproved of the anti-Islam viewpoints of some Christian democrats in the 1890s. Although it may well be possible that certain elements of the Orientalist framework have recently made their comeback in the media coverage on Islam, some things have most definitely changed.

## Summary

Many scholars, most notably Edward Said, have argued that the present-day images of Muslims and Islam in the Western society have resulted from the imperialist conceptions in the nineteenth century. Muslims were represented as the fundamental other: they were depicted as the complete opposite of the self. If this is indeed the case, contemporary differences between the position of Muslims in different national discourses should have their origins in the nineteenth century. Therefore, this thesis has made a comparison between the image of Muslims and Islam in two European colonial powers in the late nineteenth century, when imperialism was at its height. The two selected countries were France and the Netherlands: both of them possessed colonies with large numbers of Muslim inhabitants, but Said (1978) mentions France as a founding nation of Orientalism, while he does not consider the Netherlands as such. The main question was:

*To what extent did a different image of Muslims and Islam exist in 'metropolitan' France and the Netherlands in the late nineteenth century?*

To answer this question, we first made a historical analysis of the French and Dutch relation with the Muslim world. Next, a content analysis was made of 330 newspaper articles published in the largest French and Dutch newspapers (*Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag*) in the period 1895-1897. Both of these newspapers reached very high circulation figures (especially in Paris and Amsterdam) by aiming at labour and middle class readers and by avoiding a clear political perspective. This made a comparison between the representation of Islam in both newspapers very relevant, since they could be considered as a good indication of what the average inhabitant of Paris and Amsterdam read about Muslims.

In the theoretical framework, it was explained that there is a long history of hostility against Muslims in Europe. Since the Middle Ages, Muslims have been stereotyped in a very negative way to strengthen the unity within Europe. Orientalism, which was inextricably bound up with the rise of imperialism, added a new dimension to this negative image of the Muslim Other. Said (1978) outlined how a framework of thoughts, expressions and texts developed that aimed at proving the moral superiority of the West and served as a justification for imperialism. The Western nations gathered knowledge about Muslims to facilitate their dominance over them. This Orientalism reached its peak between 1870 and 1914. In this period, Islam was cultivated as a so-called antagonistic construction. The media played (and still play) a key role in the construction and diffusion of a certain image of Muslims. Journalists reflect, reproduce and hence confirm the dominant thoughts and ideas in the society. Their selection of news events and opinions largely determines how their public sees the world.

The theoretical framework also paid attention to cultural discourse systems, a concept from communication studies. People within a specific discourse system share basic ideological ideas about the world and stereotype people who do not belong to the same discourse system as 'the Others'. At the national level, the most important elements of the discourse system are the national *ideology* and *social organisation*.

The following question was answered in the historical analysis: *Which elements of Orientalism and the specific national discourses have historically influenced the French and Dutch representations of Islam?*

Before the nineteenth century, Muslims had already migrated to France in four waves, the last being in the seventeenth century. The Netherlands had never witnessed similar migration waves of Muslims. In the centuries after the Crusades, Muslims were

depicted in an extremely hostile way in both countries. In the sixteenth century, King Francis I of France established an alliance with Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent of the Ottoman Empire. He also made it possible to study the Arabic language in Paris. A few decades later, it also became possible to study the Arabic language at Leiden University in the Netherlands. The Franco-Ottoman alliance would hold out for three centuries. However, even though French and Ottoman soldiers were fighting side by side, the French mistrust of the Muslims did not decrease.

The image of Muslims in France gradually changed as knowledge increased in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. French intellectuals travelled to the Orient and wrote travel books about their experiences, as well as Oriental fiction works that became very popular. While the Muslim Orient was still presented as the opposite of the West, the image was no longer by definition negative. Depending on what aspect of the French society the author wanted to criticise, he attributed the opposite characteristics to the Muslim World. He could for example highlight the tolerance of the Muslims, if he wanted to expose the intolerance of the catholic Church. As a consequence, the representations of Muslims had usually more to do with the ideological viewpoint of the author than with reality.

The Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) started conquering the East Indies in the early seventeenth century. Its policy was characterised by racial and religious intolerance. Protestant theologians echoed Martin Luther's opinion that Muslims were a punishment by God. For most inhabitants of the Netherlands, the priests and preachers were the most important source of information about other religions. Hence, they essentially determined how the Dutch looked at the Muslims. Gradually, some alternative views reached the Netherlands via traders, travellers, writers and soldiers who returned from the Orient.

Napoleon's expedition to Egypt (1798) marked the beginning of Orientalism in France. He brought numerous scientists and artists with him to describe and analyse the Orient and hence ensure the intellectual dominance of the West. After this, many important French authors wrote books about the Islamic Orient in which they continuously reproduced stereotypical images of the exotic East. Geographical associations offered a scientific underpinning of imperialism. The image of Islam became more positive over the course of the nineteenth century, while France conquered Algeria, Tunisia and territories in West-Africa. A special agency, the *Bureaux Arabes*, was founded to gather knowledge about the Algerian Muslims. Some Algerian intellectuals let their children study in Paris; other Algerian Muslims served in the French colonial army.

In the Netherlands, Orientalism never became such a popular trend as in France. Initially, the Dutch did not share French fascination for the Orient. They held a negative view on most of the exotic elements that were romanticised by the French. This changed somewhat towards the end of the nineteenth century, when the Netherlands finally developed into a modern, industrial society. Dutch Orientalism blossomed considerably later and less intensively than in France. Dutch orientalist Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936) had a large influence on the way the Dutch looked at the Islamic world in the late nineteenth century. He held a strongly essentialist view on the distinction between East and West. The Dutch State, which took over command over the East Indies in 1800, pursued a considerably less repressive policy towards Islam than the VOC. Freedom of religion was an important principle. The number of *Hajj* pilgrims who travelled from the Indies to Mecca steadily increased. The Netherlands tried to control this flow by establishing a consulate in the Arabian port city of Jeddah. The Aceh War (1873-1913) led to an increased fear that *Hajj* pilgrims brought radical ideas back home from Mecca. Pilgrims and ethnic Arabs were largely held responsible for the resistance against the Dutch colonial authorities in Aceh.

A fundamental difference between the French and Dutch colonial policy towards Islam was that the French tried to make Frenchmen out of their colonial subjects, while the Dutch did not have a similar ambition. The French wanted to spread the French norms and values and thus pursued a policy of assimilation. The Dutch simply wanted economic benefits and thought that an active policy to spread the Dutch culture would upset the Muslims and cause unrest. Religious tolerance was an important principle in the pillarised Dutch nation, where Protestants, Catholics, Liberals and Socialists lived alongside each other in separate social 'pillars'. As a result, diversity was incorporated in the Dutch national identity. Values that were shared throughout these pillars were modesty, calmness and soberness. The Dutch were proud of their image as a sexually puritanical nation. Equality was also an important principle: the Dutch considered dictatorships as fundamentally 'foreign' and generally sympathised with resistance against authoritarian states.

Secularism was a crucial characteristic of the French national ideology and social organisation in the late nineteenth century. The typically French concept of *laïcité* refers to a strict separation between the State and the Church, in which there is a clear distinction between the public and the private sphere. People are generally supposed to restrict expressions of religion to the private sphere. Moreover, the French also saw themselves as the founders and worldwide defenders of human rights, in which liberty and equality were key values. Finally, the French considered their nation as 'one and indivisible'. France was a civic nation, which meant that anyone who shared the French ideas (including the colonial subjects) could become a member of the nation. The downside of this way of thought was that groups that opposed these ideas were considered as a threat. There was little room for cultural differences: the French policy was aimed at assimilation.

Three research questions were answered using a quantitative content analysis of 330 French and Dutch newspaper articles, complemented by a discourse analysis of some of these articles. The first of these questions was: *To what extent did the French and Dutch press associate Muslims with different stereotypical images in the late nineteenth century?*

Within the Muslim-related articles in French newspaper *Le Petit Parisien* and Dutch newspaper *Het Nieuws van den Dag*, Muslims were mainly associated with the stereotypical image of violence and cruelty towards non-Muslims. This stereotype was found significantly more often in Dutch articles than in French articles (57% versus 43%). In France, Muslims were more often associated with fanaticism than in the Netherlands. Other frequently encountered stereotypes were that Muslims were incapable of governing their own country and had a very peculiar, strange culture with odd habits. The French focus on fanaticism could be seen as a result of the French self-image, in which *laïcité* was a crucial value: the French strongly mistrusted religious fanaticism. Similarly, the fact that the Dutch newspaper paid more attention to religious violence could be related to the Dutch self-image, in which tolerance and the avoidance of (religious) conflicts were important.

The second question that was analysed empirically was: *To what extent did the French and Dutch press pay attention to different Islam-related news events in the late nineteenth century?*

*Le Petit Parisien* published significantly longer and more in-depth articles than *Het Nieuws van den Dag*. Both newspaper cited twice as many non-Muslims as Muslims in their Islam-related articles. The three most important Islam-related international news events were the Armenian Massacres, the Cretan Insurrection and the Greco-Turkish War, which were all related to the Ottoman Empire. The Dutch newspaper paid relatively more attention to the Armenian Massacres and the Greco-Turkish War, while the French

newspaper focused more on the Cretan Insurrection. The Armenian Massacres of 1896-1897, in which 100,000 to 300,000 people were killed, contributed to a strongly negative image of Muslims. The Dutch articles contained more explicit details about these massacres than the French ones, which strengthens the image of the cruel Muslim. Both newspapers criticised the Ottoman policy and the lack of international action. In 1896 and 1897, Christian Cretans revolted against the Ottoman authority. International forces intervened when Greek troops were about to conquer the island. *Le Petit Parisien* and *Het Nieuws van den Dag* both clearly favoured the Hellenic cause and opposed the use of force by the international troops against the Greeks. This point of view changed during the Greco-Turkish War of 1897, which resulted from the conflict on Crete. As the international peacekeeping force prevented a war between Greece and Turkey on the island of Crete, the countries engaged in war in Epirus and Thessaly. Within a month, the Ottomans had defeated the Greeks, much to the surprise of the French and Dutch journalists. After the war, the point of view of the Dutch newspaper had completely changed, from a strong pro-Hellenistic stance to more appreciation for the Turks.

Another important Muslim-related event in the period 1895-1897 was the series of epidemics that were spread around the world via the Muslim Hajj pilgrims. Cholera, plague and smallpox epidemics that had their origin in India were brought to Mecca, from where other pilgrims brought them back home to the entire Muslim world. *Le Petit Parisien* strongly blamed the British for refusing to take effective measures in their colonies, as France had introduced a very strict Hajj policy. An additional reason for this was that the Hajj was also associated with religious fanaticism, radicalisation and the spread of Pan-Islamic ideas. *Het Nieuws van den Dag* did not criticise the British colonial policy with the same indignation as the French newspaper.

Two important Muslim-related news events took place on French soil. In 1895, a committee was established for the construction of a mosque in Paris. In 1897, a Muslim convert was elected into the French Assembly. *Le Petit Parisien* welcomed the plans for the construction of a mosque with warm enthusiasm. It was argued that Paris needed a mosque because the French Colonial Empire had a large number of Muslim inhabitants. The mosque would attract Muslim students to the French capital and would lead to an increased loyalty of the Muslims towards the French State. The French newspaper even drew a comparison between ancient Rome and Paris, as the Romans also used to build temples of the conquered nations in their capital to gain their respect. *Het Nieuws van den Dag* reacted to the French plans with scepticism. In the end, the plans were cancelled due to the bad image of Islam after the Armenian Massacres.

For many Parisians, the election of Muslim convert Philippe Grenier in the French Assembly was the first real-life acquaintance with a Muslim. They were amazed at the sight of his traditional Algerian dress and his public prayers. The French newspaper mostly described his movements with curiosity. *Het Nieuws van den Dag* presented him as a very brave man, because he remained faithful to his religious duties in spite of the hostile reactions by the Parisians. This may be related to the Dutch attachment to freedom of religion.

The third and last question studied in the empirical analysis was the following one: *What was the role of colonialism in the representation of Muslims and Islam in the French and Dutch press in the late nineteenth century?*

The colonial Islam policy of France described by *Le Petit Parisien* was mostly one of rapprochement (in 67% of the cases), while the Dutch colonial policy described by *Het Nieuws van den Dag* was mainly repressive (64%). The key reason for this Dutch focus on repressive policy was the Aceh War. The Aceh War was an important Islam-related news event in the Dutch media, to which the French did not pay any attention. Muslim

leaders were held responsible for the resistance against the Dutch. There was some debate in the Dutch Assembly about what kind of policy should be pursued. In the end, the chosen policy remained the use of force. In France, articles about the plans for the Parisian mosque and about Muslims successfully serving in the French colonial army were the reason that *Le Petit Parisien* paid more attention to an Islam policy of rapprochement.

In the Netherlands, a lively debate about Islam policy took place in the Dutch Assembly in November 1897. The liberal government was criticised by Protestant and Catholic politicians for not doing enough to fight Islam and even favouring Islam over Christianity by letting officials attend to Islamic feasts. They also demanded support for missionary activities. The liberals opposed the ideas by referring to the freedom of religion and by outlining that missionary activities would cause unnecessary unrest.

Finally, a majority of the French and Dutch newspaper articles associated Muslims and Islam with negative events (respectively 60% and 56%). The points of view in the opinion articles were also equally negative. Hence, there was no difference between France and the Netherlands in this regard, but as we have seen, the images of Muslims nevertheless had different characteristics. While the French newspaper articles clearly reflected the Orientalist ambition of dominating the Muslim world, the Dutch newspaper did not refer to such an ambition at all. Unlike the French, the Dutch did not seem to consider their country as a large power in the Muslim world. As this thesis focused on a specific period in the 1890s, future research is necessary to show how the image of Muslims in France and the Netherlands has developed since then.



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## Appendix 1: Coding schedule

1. Number: all articles in the database are numbered.
2. Title of the article [own title between square brackets if a title is missing above the article].
3. Date of publication
4. Newspaper name
  1. Het Nieuws van den Dag
  2. Le Petit Parisien
5. Country of publication: France or the Netherlands?
  1. France
  2. Netherlands
6. Word count (arrow 11)
7. Page (arrow 11)
8. Section (arrow 11)
  1. Mixed news
  2. Foreign news
  3. Miscellaneous
  4. Front page
  5. Domestic news
  6. Letters to the editor
  7. Netherlands East Indies news
  8. None
  9. City news
9. Type of article (arrow 11)
  1. Short news article
  2. Interview
  3. Column
  4. Editorial
  5. News story
  6. Background (in-depth) story
  7. Report
  8. Record
  9. Letter to the editor
  10. Portrait
  11. Feuilleton
10. Islam count (arrow 11)
11. Musulman / Muzelman count (arrow (11))
12. Mohammedaan count (arrow 11)
13. Moslim count (arrow 11)
14. Topic (arrow 12)
  1. Colonial policy
  2. Aceh War
  3. Snouck Hurgronje
  4. Muslim culture, customs and traditions
  5. Expansion of Islam
  6. Conversion to Islam
7. Foundation of a mosque
8. Conflicts between Muslims and Hindus
9. Armenian massacres
10. Ottoman policy towards Christians
11. International relations
12. Religious feast
13. Fear for/aversion to Islam
14. Islamic organisation
15. Conflicts between Muslims and Christians
16. Islam studies
17. Theft
18. Conflicts among Muslims
19. Magic
20. Muslim monarch/prince visiting Europe
21. Curiosity for modernity
22. Dungan Revolt
23. Conflicts between Muslims and people
24. Cretan insurrection
25. Oppression of women
26. Slavery
27. Polygamy
28. Cholera, plague and smallpox epidemics
29. Mahdist War
30. Christian mission
31. Ottoman politics
32. Courtellemont
33. Archeology
34. Hajj
35. Philippine revolution
36. Philippe Grenier
37. Persian politics
38. Greco-Turkish War
39. Pathan Revolt
999. none
15. Subtopic (arrow 12)  
(same categories as variable 14)
16. First reference (arrow 12)  
(same categories as variable 14)
17. Second reference (arrow 12)  
(same categories as variable 14)
18. Primary location (arrow 12 and 13)
  1. France
  2. Netherlands
  3. Netherlands Indies
  4. Lagos
  5. Morocco
  6. England

7. India
  8. Ottoman Empire
  9. Syria & Lebanon
  10. Russia
  11. Palestine
  12. United States
  13. Austria-Hungary
  14. Afghanistan
  15. China
  16. Persia
  17. Crete
  18. Egypt
  19. Arabia
  20. Ireland
  21. Macedonia
  22. Algeria
  23. Italy
  24. Congo
  25. Sudan
  26. Sahel
  27. Bulgaria
  28. Chad
  29. Madagascar
  30. Côte d'Ivoire
  31. Guinea
  32. Mali
  33. Tunisia
  34. Unspecified Muslim country
  35. South Africa
  36. Ethiopia
  37. Greek Macedonia
  38. Philippines
  39. Spain
  40. Zanzibar
  41. Greece
  42. Pakistan
  43. Nigeria
  44. Serbia
  45. Belgium
  999. none
19. Secondary location (arrow 12 and 13)  
(same categories as variable 18)
  20. Positive or negative associations (events) attributed to Islam? (arrow 14)
    1. Negative
    2. Neutral
    3. Positive
  21. Stereotypical association (arrow 9 and 10)
    1. Peculiarity
    2. Fanaticism
    3. Violence and cruelty towards non-Muslims
    4. Religious devotion
    5. Untrustworthiness
    6. Fairy-tale like, mythical
    7. Incapability of self-government
    8. Naivety or backwardness
  9. Repression of women / harem slavery
  10. Slavery
  11. Tough warriors
  999. none
  22. Author's view on Muslims and Islam (arrow 14)
    1. Negative
    2. Neutral
    3. Positive
    999. No opinion
  23. Colonial (Islam) policy (arrow 13)
    1. Repression
    2. Indifference
    3. Rapprochement
    999. No information about colonial policy
  24. Sex of the primary Muslim actor (11)
    1. Male
    2. Female
    999. No Muslim actor
  25. Profession primary Muslim actor (11)
    1. Journalist
    2. Politician
    3. Monarch or prince
    4. Clergyman
    5. Military
    6. Scientist
    7. Employee
    8. Insurgent
    99. unknown
    999. No Muslim actor
  26. Nationality of the primary Muslim actor (11)  
(same categories as variable 18)
  27. Sex of the primary non-Muslim actor (11)
    1. Male
    2. Female
    999. No non-Muslim actor
  28. Profession primary non-Muslim actor (11)  
(same categories as variable 25)
  29. Nationality of the primary non-Muslim actor (11)  
(same categories as variable 18)
  30. View on Muslims and Islam of the primary actors in the article (14)
    1. Negative
    2. Neutral
    3. Positive
    4. Various
    999. None

## Appendix 2: Example of a filled-in coding schedule

Filled-in coding schedule for the article in textbox 6.1

- 1. Number**  
16
- 2. Title of the article**  
[De tijd der Christenmartelaren is nog niet voorbij]
- 3. Date of publication**  
19.12.1895
- 4. Newspaper name**  
1. Het Nieuws van den Dag
- 5. Country of publication: France or the Netherlands?**  
2. Netherlands
- 6. Word count**  
502
- 7. Page**  
9
- 8. Section**  
2. Foreign news
- 9. Type of article**  
5. News story
- 10. Islam count**  
3
- 11. Musulman / Muzelman count**  
2
- 12. Mohammedaan count**  
1
- 13. Moslim count**  
0
- 14. Topic**  
9. Hamidian massacres
- 15. Subtopic**  
6. Conversion to Islam
- 16. First reference**  
11. International relations
- 17. Second reference**  
26. Slavery
- 18. Primary location**  
8. Ottoman Empire
- 19. Secondary location**  
999. None
- 20. Positive or negative associations (events) attributed to Islam?**  
1. Negative
- 21. Stereotypical association**  
3. Violence and cruelty towards non-Muslims
- 22. Author's view on Muslims and Islam**  
1. Negative
- 23. Colonial (Islam) policy**  
999. no information about colonial policy
- 24. Sex of the primary Muslim actor**  
999. No Muslim actor
- 25. Profession of the primary Muslim actor**  
999. No Muslim actor
- 26. Nationality of the primary Muslim actor**  
999. No Muslim actor
- 27. Sex of the primary non-Muslim actor**  
1. Male
- 28. Profession of the primary non-Muslim actor**  
99. Unknown
- 29. Nationality of the primary non-Muslim actor**  
6. England
- 30. View on Muslims and Islam of the primary actors in the article**  
1. Negative

### Appendix 3: Pearson's chi-square test on the articles containing Muslim stereotypes

Stereotype or not? \* Newspaper Crosstabulation

		Newspaper					
		Het Nieuws van den Dag		Le Petit Parisien		Total	
		Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper
Stereotype or not?	stereotypical association	111	67,3%	114	69,1%	225	68,2%
	no stereotypical association	54	32,7%	51	30,9%	105	31,8%
Total		165	100,0%	165	100,0%	330	100,0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	,126 <sup>a</sup>	1	,723		
Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup>	,056	1	,813		
Likelihood Ratio	,126	1	,723		
Fisher's Exact Test				,813	,407
Linear-by-Linear Association	,125	1	,723		
N of Valid Cases	330				

a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 52,50.<sup>33</sup>

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

<sup>33</sup> There are two important assumptions for the Pearson's chi-square test with regard to the expected frequencies in the contingency table: no expected frequencies should be below 1 and a maximum of 20% of the cells can have an expected count below 5 (De Vocht, 2009, p. 157; Field, 2009, p. 692). In this case, there are no expected frequencies below 5, which means that the chi-square test should be accurate.

## Appendix 4: Pearson's chi-square tests on the stereotypes

Stereotypes in new categories \* Newspaper Crosstabulation

	Newspaper					
	Het Nieuws van den Dag		Le Petit Parisien		Total	
	Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper
Stereotypes in new categories						
peculiarity	14	12,6%	14	12,3%	28	12,4%
fanaticism and strong religious devotion	11	9,9%	26	22,8%	37	16,4%
violence and cruelty against non-Muslims	63	56,8%	49	43,0%	112	49,8%
backwardness: incapability of self-governance	19	17,1%	19	16,7%	38	16,9%
repression of women and slavery	4	3,6%	6	5,3%	10	4,4%
Total	111	100,0%	114	100,0%	225	100,0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	8,193 <sup>a</sup>	4	,085
Likelihood Ratio	8,377	4	,079
Linear-by-Linear Association	,499	1	,480
N of Valid Cases	225		

a. 1 cells (10,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4,93.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>34</sup> There are no cells with an expected frequency below 1 and only one cell (10% < 20%) has an expected frequency just below 5: this means that the chi-square test should be accurate.

**Violence or not? \* Newspaper Crosstabulation**

	Newspaper					
	Het Nieuws van den Dag		Le Petit Parisien		Total	
	Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper
Violence or not?	63	56,8%	49	43,0%	112	49,8%
violence and cruelty against non-Muslims						
other stereotypes	48	43,2%	65	57,0%	113	50,2%
Total	111	100,0%	114	100,0%	225	100,0%

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4,268 <sup>a</sup>	1	,039		
Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup>	3,735	1	,053		
Likelihood Ratio	4,282	1	,039		
Fisher's Exact Test				,046	,027
Linear-by-Linear Association	4,249	1	,039		
N of Valid Cases	225				

a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 55,25.<sup>35</sup>

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

**Symmetric Measures**

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	,138	,039
Cramer's V	,138	,039
N of Valid Cases	225	

<sup>35</sup> There are no cells with an expected frequency below 5, which means that the chi-square test must be accurate.

**Fanaticism or not? \* Newspaper Crosstabulation**

	Newspaper					
	Het Nieuws van den Dag		Le Petit Parisien		Total	
	Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper
Fanaticism fanaticism and religious devotion	11	9,9%	26	22,8%	37	16,4%
or not? other stereotypes	100	90,1%	88	77,2%	188	83,6%
Total	111	100,0%	114	100,0%	225	100,0%

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	6,808 <sup>a</sup>	1	,009		
Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup>	5,902	1	,015		
Likelihood Ratio	6,986	1	,008		
Fisher's Exact Test				,011	,007
Linear-by-Linear Association	6,778	1	,009		
N of Valid Cases	225				

a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18,25.<sup>36</sup>

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

**Symmetric Measures**

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	-,174	,009
Cramer's V	,174	,009
N of Valid Cases	225	

<sup>36</sup> There are no cells with an expected frequency below 5, which means that the chi-square test must be accurate.

## Appendix 5: Student's t-test on the number of words

**Group Statistics**

Newspaper		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Number of words	Het Nieuws van den Dag	165	495,64	646,994	50,368
	Le Petit Parisien	165	854,16	644,734	50,192

**Independent Samples Test**

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Number of words	Equal variances assumed	6,516	,011	-5,042	328	,000	-358,521	71,107	-498,405	-218,637
	Equal variances not assumed			-5,042	327,996	,000	-358,521	71,107	-498,405	-218,637

## Appendix 6: Pearson's chi-square test on the types of articles

### Chi-Square Tests

Type of article in new categories \* Newspaper Crosstabulation

	Newspaper					
	Het Nieuws van den Dag		Le Petit Parisien		Total	
	Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper
Type of article in short news article	70	42,4%	36	21,8%	106	32,1%
new categories editorial	2	1,2%	30	18,2%	32	9,7%
news story	46	27,9%	50	30,3%	96	29,1%
background story	25	15,2%	39	23,6%	64	19,4%
report	19	11,5%	9	5,5%	28	8,5%
other	3	1,8%	1	,6%	4	1,2%
Total	165	100,0%	165	100,0%	330	100,0%

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	43,206 <sup>a</sup>	5	,000
Likelihood Ratio	48,452	5	,000
Linear-by-Linear Association	1,241	1	,265
N of Valid Cases	330		

a. 2 cells (16,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,00.<sup>37</sup>

### Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	,362	,000
Cramer's V	,362	,000
N of Valid Cases	330	

<sup>37</sup> There are no cells with an expected frequency below 1 and only two cells (16.7% < 20%) have an expected frequency just below 5: this means that the chi-square test should be accurate.

## Appendix 7: Pearson's chi-square test on the cited persons

Cited Muslims or not? \* Newspaper Crosstabulation

		Newspaper					
		Het Nieuws van den Dag		Le Petit Parisien		Total	
		Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper
Cited Muslims or not?	yes, Muslims cited	19	11,5%	14	8,5%	33	10,0%
	no, no Muslims cited	146	88,5%	151	91,5%	297	90,0%
Total		165	100,0%	165	100,0%	330	100,0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	,842 <sup>a</sup>	1	,359		
Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup>	,539	1	,463		
Likelihood Ratio	,845	1	,358		
Fisher's Exact Test				,463	,232
Linear-by-Linear Association	,839	1	,360		
N of Valid Cases	330				

a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 16,50.<sup>38</sup>

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

<sup>38</sup> There are no cells with an expected frequency below 5, which means that the chi-square test must be accurate.

**Non-Muslims cited or not? \* Newspaper Crosstabulation**

		Newspaper					
		Het Nieuws van den Dag		Le Petit Parisien		Total	
		Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper
Non-Muslims cited or not?	yes, non-Muslims cited	42	25,5%	33	20,0%	75	22,7%
	no, no Muslims cited	123	74,5%	132	80,0%	255	77,3%
	Total	165	100,0%	165	100,0%	330	100,0%

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1,398 <sup>a</sup>	1	,237		
Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup>	1,104	1	,293		
Likelihood Ratio	1,400	1	,237		
Fisher's Exact Test				,293	,147
Linear-by-Linear Association	1,393	1	,238		
N of Valid Cases	330				

a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 37,50.<sup>39</sup>

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

<sup>39</sup> There are no cells with an expected frequency below 5, which means that the chi-square test must be accurate.

## Appendix 8: Pearson's chi-square test on the topics, subtopics and references

Topic in categories1 \* Newspaper Crosstabulation

		Newspaper					
		Het Nieuws van den Dag		Le Petit Parisien		Total	
		Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper
Topic in categories1	Cretan Insurrection	34	20,6%	43	26,1%	77	23,3%
	Colonial policy	21	12,7%	24	14,5%	45	13,6%
	Armenian Massacres	31	18,8%	21	12,7%	52	15,8%
	Muslim culture, customs and traditions	24	14,5%	11	6,7%	35	10,6%
	Religious conflicts	13	7,9%	14	8,5%	27	8,2%
	Colonial conflicts	12	7,3%	11	6,7%	23	7,0%
	Greco-Turkish War	14	8,5%	5	3,0%	19	5,8%
	Conversion to Islam	4	2,4%	13	7,9%	17	5,2%
	Cholera, plague and smallpox epidemics	5	3,0%	9	5,5%	14	4,2%
	Ottoman politics	1,6%		6	3,6%	7	2,1%
	Foundation of a mosque	5	3,0%	5	3,0%	10	3,0%
	other	1,6%		3	1,8%	4	1,2%
	Total	165	100,0%	165	100,0%	330	100,0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	22,826 <sup>a</sup>	11	,019
Likelihood Ratio	23,840	11	,013
Linear-by-Linear Association	,920	1	,338
N of Valid Cases	330		

a. 4 cells (16,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,00.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>40</sup> There are no cells with an expected frequency below 1 and only four cells (16.7% < 20%) have an expected frequency below 5: this means that the chi-square test should be accurate.

### Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	,263	,019
	Cramer's V	,263	,019
	N of Valid Cases	330	

### Reclassified subtopics \* Newspaper Crosstabulation

		Newspaper					
		Het Nieuws van den Dag		Le Petit Parisien		Total	
		Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper
Reclassified subtopics	Cretan Insurrection, Greco-Turkish War and Armenian Massacres	11	10,9%	9	8,7%	20	9,8%
	Colonialism and coloni- al conflicts	10	9,9%	19	18,3%	29	14,1%
	Muslim culture	20	19,8%	23	22,1%	43	21,0%
	Religious conflicts	10	9,9%	10	9,6%	20	9,8%
	Ottoman politics	13	12,9%	8	7,7%	21	10,2%
	International relations	37	36,6%	35	33,7%	72	35,1%
	Total	101	100,0%	104	100,0%	205	100,0%

### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4,405 <sup>a</sup>	5	,493
Likelihood Ratio	4,463	5	,485
Linear-by-Linear Association	,889	1	,346
N of Valid Cases	205		

a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9,85.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>41</sup> There are no cells with an expected frequency below 5, which means that the chi-square test must be accurate.

Reclassified first references \* Newspaper Crosstabulation

	Newspaper					
	Het Nieuws van den Dag		Le Petit Parisien		Total	
	Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper
Reclassified first references	12	17,4%	17	18,9%	29	18,2%
Cretan Insurrection, Greco-Turkish War and Armenian Massacres						
Colonialism and colonial conflicts	10	14,5%	15	16,7%	25	15,7%
Muslim culture	15	21,7%	19	21,1%	34	21,4%
Religious conflicts	5	7,2%	6	6,7%	11	6,9%
Ottoman politics	9	13,0%	5	5,6%	14	8,8%
International relations	18	26,1%	28	31,1%	46	28,9%
Total	69	100,0%	90	100,0%	159	100,0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3,019 <sup>a</sup>	5	,697
Likelihood Ratio	3,004	5	,699
Linear-by-Linear Association	,035	1	,852
N of Valid Cases	159		

a. 1 cells (8,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4,77.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>42</sup> There are no cells with an expected frequency below 1 and only one cell (8.3% < 20%) has an expected frequency below 5, which means that the chi-square test should be accurate.

## Appendix 9: Pearson's chi-square test on the locations

Location in new categories 2 \* Newspaper Crosstabulation

		Newspaper					
		Het Nieuws van den Dag		Le Petit Parisien		Total	
		Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper
Location in new categories 2	Ottoman Empire	48	29,1%	37	22,4%	85	25,8%
	Crete	35	21,2%	43	26,1%	78	23,6%
	Greece	11	6,7%	2	1,2%	13	3,9%
	own country	2	1,2%	19	11,5%	21	6,4%
	own colonial empire	32	19,4%	27	16,4%	59	17,9%
	British colonial empire	16	9,7%	28	17,0%	44	13,3%
	other	21	12,7%	9	5,5%	30	9,1%
	Total	165	100,0%	165	100,0%	330	100,0%

### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	30,733 <sup>a</sup>	6	,000
Likelihood Ratio	33,688	6	,000
Linear-by-Linear Association	,041	1	,840
N of Valid Cases	330		

a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6,50.<sup>43</sup>

### Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	,305	,000
Cramer's V	,305	,000
N of Valid Cases	330	

<sup>43</sup> There are no cells with an expected frequency below 5, hence the chi-square test must be accurate.

**Location 2 in new categories \* Newspaper Crosstabulation**

	Newspaper					
	Het Nieuws van den Dag		Le Petit Parisien		Total	
	Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper
Location 2 in Ottoman Empire	28	33,3%	22	23,9%	50	28,4%
new categories Crete and Greece	19	22,6%	18	19,6%	37	21,0%
own country and colonial empire	16	19,0%	25	27,2%	41	23,3%
British colonial empire	10	11,9%	14	15,2%	24	13,6%
other	11	13,1%	13	14,1%	24	13,6%
Total	84	100,0%	92	100,0%	176	100,0%

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3,199 <sup>a</sup>	4	,525
Likelihood Ratio	3,213	4	,523
Linear-by-Linear Association	1,528	1	,216
N of Valid Cases	176		

a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11,45.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>44</sup> There are no cells with an expected frequency below 5. As a result, the chi-square test must be accurate.

## Appendix 10: Pearson's chi-square test on the colonial policy

Colonial policy \* France or the Netherlands Crosstabulation

		France or the Netherlands					
		France		Netherlands		Total	
		Count	% within France or the Netherlands	Count	% within France or the Netherlands	Count	% within France or the Netherlands
Colonial policy	Repression	7	30,4%	14	70,0%	21	48,8%
	Rapprochement	16	69,6%	6	30,0%	22	51,2%
	Total	23	100,0%	20	100,0%	43	100,0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	6,702 <sup>a</sup>	1	,010	,015	,011
Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup>	5,212	1	,022		
Likelihood Ratio	6,886	1	,009		
Fisher's Exact Test					
Linear-by-Linear Association	6,546	1	,011		
N of Valid Cases	43				

a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9,77.<sup>45</sup>

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-,395	,010
	Cramer's V	,395	,010
N of Valid Cases		43	

<sup>45</sup> There are no cells with an expected frequency below 5, which means that the chi-square test must be accurate.

## Appendix 11: Pearson's chi-square tests on the opinion of the author

Opinion author or not? \* Newspaper Crosstabulation

		Newspaper					
		Het Nieuws van den Dag		Le Petit Parisien		Total	
		Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper
Opinion author or not?	article contains opinion of the author	60	36,4%	74	44,8%	134	40,6%
	article does not contain opinion of the author	105	63,6%	91	55,2%	196	59,4%
	Total	165	100,0%	165	100,0%	330	100,0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2,463 <sup>a</sup>	1	,117		
Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup>	2,123	1	,145		
Likelihood Ratio	2,466	1	,116		
Fisher's Exact Test				,145	,072
Linear-by-Linear Association	2,455	1	,117		
N of Valid Cases	330				

a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 67,00.<sup>46</sup>

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

<sup>46</sup> There are no cells with an expected frequency below 5, which means that the chi-square test must be accurate.

**Author's point of view \* Newspaper Crosstabulation**

		Newspaper					
		Het Nieuws van den Dag		Le Petit Parisien		Total	
		Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper
Author's point of view	negative	44	73,3%	47	63,5%	91	67,9%
	neutral	6	10,0%	14	18,9%	20	14,9%
	positive	10	16,7%	13	17,6%	23	17,2%
	Total	60	100,0%	74	100,0%	134	100,0%

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2,252 <sup>a</sup>	2	,324
Likelihood Ratio	2,317	2	,314
Linear-by-Linear Association	,637	1	,425
N of Valid Cases	134		

a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8,96.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>47</sup> There are no cells with an expected frequency below 5, which means that the chi-square test must be accurate.

## Appendix 12: Pearson's chi-square tests on the opinion of the people cited in the article

View on Muslims and Islam of the people cited in the article \* Newspaper Crosstabulation

	Newspaper					
	Het Nieuws van den Dag		Le Petit Parisien		Total	
	Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper
View on Muslims negative and Islam of the people cited in the article	19	35,8%	18	42,9%	37	38,9%
neutral	9	17,0%	8	19,0%	17	17,9%
positive	15	28,3%	14	33,3%	29	30,5%
various	10	18,9%	2	4,8%	12	12,6%
Total	53	100,0%	42	100,0%	95	100,0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4,237 <sup>a</sup>	3	,237
Likelihood Ratio	4,666	3	,198
Linear-by-Linear Association	1,803	1	,179
N of Valid Cases	95		

a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5,31.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>48</sup> There are no cells with an expected frequency below 5, which means that the chi-square test must be accurate.

## Appendix 13: Pearson's chi-square tests on the associations with Islam

Positive or negative association \* Newspaper Crosstabulation

		Newspaper					
		Het Nieuws van den Dag		Le Petit Parisien		Total	
		Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper	Count	% within Newspaper
Positive or negative association	negative	93	56,4%	98	59,4%	191	57,9%
	neutral	54	32,7%	40	24,2%	94	28,5%
	positive	18	10,9%	27	16,4%	45	13,6%
	Total	165	100,0%	165	100,0%	330	100,0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4,016 <sup>a</sup>	2	,134
Likelihood Ratio	4,036	2	,133
Linear-by-Linear Association	,093	1	,760
N of Valid Cases	330		

a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 22,50.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>49</sup> There are no cells with an expected frequency below 5, which means that the chi-square test must be accurate.