# Race and the City

Looking into the Relationship between Fear of Crime and Racial
Dynamics in Lima, Peru

Stefan Blokker

3082814

University of Utrecht

Master Thesis

Latin American & Caribbean Studies

August 20th, 2010

# <u>Abstract</u>

The goal of this thesis is to gain insights on the relationship between fear of crime experiences by the upper middle-class in the Peruvian capital, Lima, and racial dynamics in Peruvian society. Empirical data for this research was gathered during my four-month fieldwork period, which lasted from February until June, 2010. Theoretical information was gathered in advance as well as during and after this fieldwork period.

Following Norbert Lechner's theory on the authoritarian appropriation of fears in which fear becomes both the product as well as the mechanism to maintain repression, I argue that fear of crime does not only reinforce racial dynamics due to coping strategies such as racial profiling and segregation, it also becomes the result of these policies. In order to better understand the racial dynamics in Peruvian society, this thesis will also extensively look into the concepts of race and ethnicity, how these are created and defined, and how they create a racial hierarchy.

# **Contents**

# 1) Introduction

## 1.1) Problem Statement

The Peruvian capital, Lima, is a bloating metropolis with a population of almost nine million people. Like most other large cities in Latin America, there is great socioeconomic and racial inequality in Lima, the city has a very diverse population; from the wealthy, and primarily of European descent, members of the higher classes in districts such as Miraflores and San Isidro to the poor rural migrants of indigenous and *mestizo* descent living in the *pueblos jovenes[1]* and everything in between these two extremes.

Tensions based on socioeconomic and racial status have always been present in this city. In the era of so-called "new violence", defined as organised coercion through the evasion or undermining of the formally democratic state's legitimate monopoly on violence for criminal/economic purposes (Koonings, 2009), these tensions remain and have intertwined with crime and more specifically with the fear of crime. The main research problem in this study is the relationship between the socioeconomic and racial dynamics in Peru and the fear of crime experienced by members of the upper middle-class in Lima. The central question used to define this problem is as followed:

> To what extend can the fear of crime amongst the upper middle-class
> in Lima be seen as not only a cause of, but also the mechanism to
> maintain, the already existing and perceived racial, cultural and
> socioeconomic dynamics in Peruvian society?

This thesis is based on a four month research from February until June that was anthropological in nature, which means that the primary methodology used to obtain data were qualitative in nature. The goal of this thesis is two-fold. On one hand it is aimed at exploring the fear of crime discourse that is present amongst the urban elite in Lima; on the other hand this research's goal is to provide insights on the relationship

---

[1] Literally translated as "young villages", the *pueblos jovenes* are the slums in the periphery of Lima

between fear of crime and tensions between the different racial, cultural and socioeconomic groups in the Andean nation.

## **1.2) Research Area**

The basic structural division of Lima is very much along the lines of the Spanish colonial cities. This is not so strange or surprising since Lima was the capital of the Spanish viceroyalty of the Spanish Americas. Peters and Skop (2001: 160) demonstrate that those of higher socioeconomic status generally populate the older and more centralized districts of the Peruvian capital whilst the poorer members of Lima's society lives in the areas surrounding the centre. Poverty would then determine how far in the periphery one would live; the poorer the people, the farther they would live from the old colonial centre. This however, is an oversimplification of the tenancy patterns, in their article the two authors (Peters & Skop, 2001: 152-159) argue that Lima is a very fragmented city rather than homogeneous. One of the examples for this provided by them is the so called *cono este*[2], despite having a high percentage of poor people living there, there are also gated communities populated by those with wealth.

Like many other cities in not only Latin America but also in the rest of the world, Lima's population has increased exponentially during the second half of the twentieth century. Whilst Lima's population at the end of the 1940s numbered around half a million people, today the Peruvian capital is a bloated metropolis filled with nearly ten million people (Kruijt & Degregori, 2007: 104; Peters & Skop, 2007: 152). The city's form changed due to the immense growth of the slums that are known as *barriadas*[3] or *pueblos jovenes*. According to Kruijt and Degregori (2007: 104) in 1957 only 10% of Lima's population lived in the slums. In 1981 this number increased to 32% and in 2004 it was 62% of the *Limeños* who were living in the *cono norte* (around the northern part of the Pan-American Highway), *cono este* (around the Central Andes Highway) and the *cono sur* (around the southern part of the Pan-American Highway) which surround the old colonial city center.

---

[2] Eastern cone

[3] In other Latin American cities the word *barrio* is generally used to describe a slum, in the case of Lima the word *barrio* is used to define a neighborhood within a district. The word *barriada* is used instead to describe the slums.

Whilst this research looks into the dynamics of the entire Peruvian capital, its main focus lies in the district of Miraflores. Miraflores has always been one of the wealthier districts of Lima, populated by those of higher socioeconomic status and generally of European ancestry. Along with the city centre, Miraflores functions as a touristic area of Lima, people from all over the world stay in Miraflores while visiting Lima before continuing to other locations in Peru. The district is full of hotels, bars, clubs, shops, restaurants and souvenir markets known as *artesanías* to entertain not only the tourists, but also the locals. Northwest of Miraflores lies the district of San Isidro, the banking and business centre of Lima. The less wealthy middle-class district of Surquillo lays north/northeast of Miraflores. Going south from Miraflores are the districts of Surco and the bohemian Barranco. Miraflores' population numbers somewhere between ninety and one hundred thousand people, based on the projections based on the 2005 and 2007 censuses provided by the municipality (Municipalidad de Miraflores, 2010).

## 1.3) Informants and Methodology

The method of greatest importance during this investigation was the use of participant observation. By living amongst the research population and joining them in their daily activities I managed to obtained most information on how the upper middle-class in Lima deals with the fear of crime, but also with the socioeconomic and racial dynamics in the Peruvian capital.

In-depth interviews have also been used to collect data, but have generally proven to be less effective than participant observation, especially when looking into themes such as race and racism. Most answers on questions dealing with these themes could be placed in the category of "socially acceptable", denying or downplaying the existence of racism in Peru. Through the use participant observation I managed to get better insights on the perceptions that the various racial groups have of each other. I believe this is due to the fact that during an in-depth interview the informant is directly confronted with one's views on the so-called Other. However, in-depth interviews were very effective in looking into one's experiences with crime.

Another method applied during this research was the use of group discussions. Like the in-depth interviews, this method was not that great in uncovering data on

racism, but proved to be more effective when dealing with the theme of crime. However, for the more personal experiences of being a victim of crime, the in-depth interview proved to be more effective since not everybody was comfortable discussing their experiences in public, this was especially the case for the male informants.

One source of information I was having a hard time obtaining is statistical data on crime. I was hoping to obtain this information from the police, but during my entire time in the field I have not been able to get any sort of serious contact with the police. This unwillingness (in the form of constant letting me know they were too busy and that I should return the next day/week) of the police to corporate became one of the major points of frustration during the fieldwork period. I have been able to find some statistical data online, but most of it was either too vague and general or even self-contradicting. Another difficulty I've experienced during the research period was my ethnic background. In many cases the anthropologist is a total outsider in the community that is being researched. In my case however I was not a complete outsider because I had friends and family in Lima, furthermore I didn't look that different from many Peruvians. Being an outsider can bring various advantages to a research, the primary one being that one can keep on asking without this being considered that strange. However, due to my ethnic background I was not seen as an outsider, it was assumed that I am a Peruvian who already knows how everything works. I could not get away with errors in social situations as other foreigners could.

My search for informants was harder than I thought. The police in Miraflores were not very cooperative, telling me every time to come back tomorrow. The municipality diverted me to some of their websites. And several of the informants were not who they claimed they were or were introduced as. In order to adapt to this problematic reality I placed higher importance to the people of Miraflores themselves rather than finding professional key informants. I started out with my direct contacts such as friends and relatives and moved on from there, establishing contacts amongst their friends and relatives. Furthermore I also talked to more random people such as shopkeepers, taxi drivers and people I generally encountered in stores, bars, recording studios, clubs and markets. These people were able to introduce me to others who were able to provide more needed data. In order to protect the privacy of the informants I have avoided using their real names in this thesis; all names in the following text have been replaced by pseudonyms.

## 1.4) Structure of Thesis

This thesis is divided into three analytical sections in which both the theoretical and empirical data have been integrated with each other rather than the more traditional model of a separate theoretical framework.

Chapter two delves into the theme of race in Peru. The chapter is divided into two sections, the first one dealing with the definition of race in Peru and the second one looks into the theme of racism. When defining race in, it is important to note that race amongst humans is a social concept. The first paragraph therefore looks into the criteria that have been used to define race in Peru. In the first subparagraph I will explain the relationship between race and ethnicity and how they function in the Peruvian context. The second subparagraph will function as a description of the racial terminology used in Peru. The third subparagraph will explain the racial debate that has been taking place in Peru on how to define race. The second paragraph will deal with the theme of racism in Peru, with the first subparagraph explaining how it is possible that on one hand racism is denied but at the same time is very much present in the Andean nation. The second subparagraph will place Peru's racial dynamics in the context of the urban discourse, explaining why these more subtle forms of racism fit in urban life. In the third subparagraph I will show how European descent and phenotypes are perceived as superior in Peruvian society.

Chapter three looks into the theme of fear and more specifically the causes. Its first paragraph deals with the fear people have of becoming a victim of crime. Fear of the outside and fear of outsiders are closely connected to fear of crime, for this reason the second and third paragraphs of the chapter will be dealing with these two fears. The second paragraph will be focused on the fear of the outsider with the first subparagraph looking into the fear of phenotypes. In the second subparagraph I will describe some of the schemes criminals come up with in their attempts to rob people. The third subparagraph deals with rural-urban migration and people's perceptions of this migration. In the third paragraph will delve into the fear of the outside and is primarily based on empirical data. The fourth, and final paragraph of this chapter, demonstrates how the fear of crime is both a product and cause (of the continuation) of exclusion.

In chapter four I will explain the consequences of fear, or more accurately put the strategies that are applied to help people cope with fear of crime. The first paragraph

will look into how people try to protect themselves, by fortifying their living spaces, placing guards in those areas and applying all sorts of safety strategies when leaving those areas. The second paragraph describes the fragmented character of the Peruvian capital and could be considered somewhat of a social-geographical paragraph. In the third paragraph I will delve into the political consequences of these fears, how fear of crime has become the mechanism to create and maintain more subtle forms of repression such as racial profiling.

# **2) Racial Dynamics in Lima**

In order to gain better understanding on the relationship between fear of crime and racial dynamics in Peruvian society, it is important that there is clarity on the topic of race in Peru. Race is more than simply dividing people into groups based on the colour of their skin. Race has become a complex social construction with definitions and criteria that have changed over the years. Whilst these changes have occurred there still remains a racial hierarchy with those of European descent being perceived as superior. New, more subtle and insidious, forms of racism have emerged from the racial debate. The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate how race and racism are created and maintained in Peru.

## **2.1) Defining Race in Peru**

As mentioned above, race is a complex social construction. The goal of this paragraph is to gain insights on how these constructs are created and function. The construction of race in many cases, not only Peru, has been used to legitimize and maintain certain racial hierarchies in order to preserve social order. This is reflected in how certain racial stereotypes, such as for example the belief that people with lighter skin colour are wealthier, have eventually become part of the dominant racial terminology. One's status in society is thus influenced by race, a marker whose ascribed status carries some ambivalence, meaning that in some cases it might even be an achieved status.

### 2.1.1) Race and Ethnicity: Different and the Same

It is impossible to define race amongst humans biologically (Kottak, 2006: 293); there are no biological or genetic markers that separate humans into different racial groups. Robin Andreasen (2000: S654-S655) argues that most theorists today favour the belief that race is a social construct which he formulates as a three-part thesis. The first part, defined as the "negative thesis", argues that race, as a biological reality, is false. The second part is the "explanatory thesis" in which the origins and persistence of beliefs in the biological reality of race are explained. These beliefs would be used to reinforce a certain social order that not only legitimizes racial inequality but also

deems it inevitable. The third and final part is the "positive thesis", questioning the ontological status of race, what is race if it is not a biological reality? Is race a social fiction or a social reality?

Even though this is the case, Kottak (2006: 293) continues that most people perceive "race" according to biological parameters; this means that race is an ascribed status, people have no choice about being of that status (Kottak, 2006: 292). Racial groups are generally defined through common physical phenotypes within groups of people. Ethnicity on the other hand is not based on phenotypes but rather on cultural similarities and differences; similarities in cultural aspects such as language, kinship, history and geography define who is part of the ethnic group whilst the differences exclude outsiders (Kottak, 2006: 290). However, Kottak's definition falls short on providing and explanation on how race and ethnicity could be mixed up. In this case a Weberian definition of ethnicity, as provided by Cornell and Hartmann (1998: 16), might be more fitting. The Weberian definition of ethnicity states that at the foundations of an ethnic group lay on subjective (which could be real or assumed) beliefs that all members of the group share common descent, in other words shared blood or shared genetics.

In many cases there is no clear separation between the concepts of race and ethnicity, meaning that the terms get mixed up. However, race and ethnicity are two different concepts, but not always mutually exclusive characters. Cornell and Hartmann (1998: 35) present a scheme, which clearly shows the differences between race and ethnicity. The factors presented help us gain insights on how group identities are constructed, both by themselves and by others. The two authors give five main differences between identities based ethnicity and race. The first difference is that ethnic identities are based on a subjective belief of a common descent history and symbolism of peoplehood whilst racial identities are based on perceived physical differences. The second difference between these two types of identities is that ethnic identity can originate from either assignment by others or assertion by selves with racial identity being shaped through assignment given by others. The third difference delves into the power relations between the various groups. Cornell and Hartmann (1998: 35) argue that ethnic identities may or may not reflect power relations; racial identity on the other hand typically reflects power relations. Fourth difference is that ethnic identity can potentially imply inherent differences in worth between the various groups; racial identity implies inherent differences in worth. The fifth and final

difference between these two kinds of identity is that both the members of the groups themselves and the outsiders usually construct ethnic identity whilst racial identity is constructed by outsiders. With this last point the authors note that if self-construction takes place in the creation of a racial identity, that group would be defined as both an ethnic as well as a racial group.

When looking at how race and ethnicity are defined in the United States, race is generally defined by skin colour, by an oversimplified five-colour palette to be more precise. These five racial groups are given the colours black (Negroid or African), yellow (Mongoloid or Asian), white (Caucasoid or European), red (indigenous or Amerindian) and brown (Hispanic). Ethnicity is then placed within these racial groups, as argued by Cornell and Hartmann (1998: 26). Hispanics can for example be divided into ethnic groups such as Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and etcetera. The different ethnic groups are defined along similar criteria, however many then mention that Hispanics can belong to any "race" (Kottak, 2006: 290).

The Peruvian racial palette I found during my research is very similar to the one used in the United States, except for the exclusion of the colour brown. In Peru the oversimplified palette consists of four colours: black (Afro-Peruvians), white (Peruvians of European descent), yellow (Asian Peruvians) and copper (indigenous Peruvians). Whilst this palette could be used to define certain groups of the Peruvian racial hierarchy, it is a rather incomplete one. Other ethnic groups such as Middle Eastern migrants and their descendants or those who are of mixed blood are not included in the group; even though the "*cholo*", when defined as a mixture between a *mestizo* and an indigenous person, is generally placed in the "copper coloured group".

When looking at these different groups, we could apply the scheme presented by Cornell and Hartmann (1998: 35). The various groups in Peru are based on both perceived physical differences, as well as on putative commonalities such as descent and history. In that aspects the groups are both ethnic as well as racial. Identity is assigned by both outsiders as by members of the groups themselves.

> Your books, or those *cholos*, will probably call me "*pituco*", "white"
> or "European", but I'm Peruvian! I'm mixed, my great-grandfather is
> from Germany, but on my grandmother's side I'm part Spanish and

French. All I know is that me and my parents have lived here all our lives.[4]

-Raul

People with darker skin and other indigenous features such as larger noses and straight hair are usually designated as *cholos* who are rural migrants. This is very much an assigned status even though this might very well not be the fact. Not every person with indigenous blood is a rural migrant. The third and fourth differences presented by Cornell and Hartmann's (1998: 35) scheme delve into worth and power relations. What we see is that there are inherent differences in worth and positions of power between the groups. Generally those of European descent, and with European phenotype features, are in higher positions in Peruvian society whilst the other groups find themselves in lower positions, especially those of African and indigenous descent. This is also reflected by the fact that these two groups suffer most from racism and discrimination (Caretas, 2005).

2.1.2) What to Call Oneself?
Whilst there are official terms to define the different racial groups by using scientific sounding terms such as "Caucasian" or "Mongoloid", the general population have created their own terminology to define the different racial or ethnic groups, the people in Peru are no exception to this.

   Those of European descent are generally called "*pitucos*", which is also used to describe somebody who is wealthy. Another, also common, means to translate "*pituco*" would be along the lines of "snobby", especially when the term is used as an adjective. If a person has "European looking features" such as blond hair and blue eyes, the term "*gringo*" is also commonly used. It should be noted that, unlike in many other Latin American countries, *gringo* is not only used to describe somebody from the United States (in an offending way), but is used to describe everybody who has physically features that look Caucasoid. In many Latin American countries the word "*criollo*" is also used to describe somebody of European descent, in Peru however *criollo* is generally used to describe somebody from the coastal regions of the country.

---

[4] Conversation held on March 30th, 2010

Most Afro-Peruvians are the descendants of Africans slaves who were brought to the Americas by the European colonizers. Common terms for Afro-Peruvians are "*negros*", "*morenos*" or "*morochos*". "*Negro*" as definition of somebody of African descent does not carry the racist connotation that the word has in the Dutch language, which is "*neger*".

The abolishment of slavery meant that the *criollo* elites of Peru were forced to look elsewhere to find their workers. According to Mariátegui (1971: 9) Peru's geographical proximity towards Asia enabled the replacing of the African slaves, who were brought in during the viceroyalty, with the masses of Chinese immigrants since slavery was abolished in 1854. These Chinese migrants would become the dominant workforce in the Peruvian coast during the nineteenth century. In Peru, but also in other Latin American countries, it is common to call those with Asian facial features a "*chino*" (Chinese). The question whether the person is Chinese or of Chinese descent is completely irrelevant. People of Japanese descent for example are also called *chinos*; one of the most famous Japanese Peruvians is former president Alberto Fujimori who was also known as a "*chino*". *Chino* is not only used as part of Peru's racial terminology, it is also a common nickname for a person who has Mongoloid looking features.

Finally there is the indigenous population, who tend to be called "*indios*", "*cholos*", "*indigenos*" or "*serranos*". *Indio* is pretty straightforward; it can be translated as "Indian". The term *serrano* is used to describe somebody who originated from the Andes Mountains and *indigeno* means indigenous.

The term *cholo* however is more complex because it can have various meanings. According to an article in the Economist (2004) a *cholo* can be defined as an "urban Indian", de la Cadena (1998) presents various definitions of *cholo*, varying from "indigenous intellectuals" to *serranos* to *mestizos*. A *mestizo* is generally defined as somebody of mixed blood, as in a person who has one parent of European and another of indigenous descent. Another definition of *cholo* is somebody who is of mixed descent, with one parent being a *mestizo* while the other one is indigenous. In everyday language however, *cholo* is primarily a pejorative for somebody who is of indigenous descent.

In slang the word "*cholo*" functions in a manner very similar to the use of the English word "nigger" in the United States. Self-defined *cholo* and *mestizo* tattoo artist, Renzo[5], provided more insight on the comparison between the concepts of "*cholo*" and "nigger". Like nigger, *cholo* can function as a pejorative for a racial group, but at the same time is used in a non-racial manner to describe a lazy and bad person. In bad English he explained that "one does not have to be black to be a nigger".

The interview was interrupted when Renzo's phone went off, a friend called since the conversation seemed to be very informal, with lots of local slang and laughing. However, on both sides of the conversation they were calling each other "*cholo*" in a joking and friendly manner, as if the pejorative definition of the word did not even exist. The closest English translation of the word "*cholo*" in that conversation was something along the lines of "dude" or "man". When asked about their use of "*cholo*" in that context, Renzo explained that the word could also be used in an informal conversation to address a friend. Again he compared the word to the North American use of the word "nigger", or in this context more accurately "nigga", amongst African Americans in the United States, which can have a non-offensive definition (Blacfax, 2004: 20-22).

## 2.1.3) Creation of Race in Peru

As mentioned in the first sub-paragraph, the line between race and ethnicity is a vague one. In the Peruvian context this means that one's race in Peru is not simply defined by physical characteristics such as the colour of one's skin; criteria to characterize ethnicity such as geography, descent, and cultural background, but also socioeconomic concepts such as class and wealth play crucial roles in creating the parameters used to define race in Peru. In her article Marisol de la Cadena (1998) presents three different paradigms of the Peruvian racial debate. The first period lasted from 1910 until 1930 during which race in Peru was defined by geography; those living on the coasts were defined as white or *criollo* whilst the *serranos*, who lived in the mountains, were seen as Indians. The term *criollo* is normally used to define somebody living Latin American who is of European descent. However, in the case of Peru the *criollo* is somebody who lives in the coastal areas, thus linking geography with ethnicity.

---

[5] Interview taken on May 6th, 2010

In the second period, which started in 1930 and ended in 1960, the term race was defined as culture. Fundamentally the definitions remained the same, the Indians from the mountains and the whites from the coast. The biological component of race was removed by calling it culture, but the already existing divisions and tensions remained; the *serrano* was no longer considered to be biologically inferior but belonged to a culture that was deemed inferior.

This belief that those of European descent living on the coasts were of a superior culture background compared to the indigenous population who lived in the mountains draws parallels to the evolutionist paradigm in anthropology in its early years. Several criteria of evolutionist anthropology present themselves here. The first one is ethnocentrism, the belief in inevitable progress and the so-called "unilinear scheme" (Barrett, 1996: 48). Its ethnocentrism lays in the belief that one's own culture, in the case of those debating race in Peru this meant being of European descent and living in the coastal areas, is superior compared to others. The unilinear scheme assumes that all cultures undergo through the same stages of evolution in a similar order, meaning it is possible to defined cultures as "superior" or "inferior". The belief in inevitable progress meant that each culture evolved into something superior from its previous form.

The third period in Peru's racial debate lasted from the 1960s until 1980, the era in which Peru was ruled by military regimes. Race was no longer defined as culture but it was placed in a Marxist context of class struggle. Racial terms such as proletariat and peasants replaced racially tinted designations such as *cholos* and *mestizos*. The reason for why the Peruvian military regimes, and more specifically the regime under Juan Velasco from 1968 until 1975, did this was to attempt to eliminate the term "Indian" (Gelles in Guevara-Gil, 2005), or more precisely eliminating those societal cleavages which stand in the way of a fragmentation of society based on class in the Marxist sense of the word. Even after this paradigm of the racial debate, the connection between race and class remained. In Guevara-Gil's publication (2005), Skar argued that during the internal conflict that lasted from 1980 until 2000 between the Peruvian governments and leftist guerrilla groups such as the *Sendero Luminoso*

and MRTA[6], the Maoist-Leninists of the *Sendero Luminoso* perceived the indigenous population of Peru to be "revolutionary class".

Socioeconomic status has always been closely linked to the concept of race; those of European descent tend to be viewed as wealthy while the indigenous population is perceived as poor. This already becomes evident through the use of the word "*pituco*", as mentioned in the previous paragraph, which generally is used to describe somebody who is wealthy, but generally has become the slang term for a person of European descent. *Criollos* in Lima have come to resist the term though arguing that not every *pituco* has fair skin colour and that there are also poor white people in Peru. Peters and Skop (2001: 157-160) present four different criteria to define socioeconomic status in Peru, these four criteria are education, employment, tenancy and socioeconomic status. The use of socioeconomic status to define socioeconomic status might seem like a repetition, a stylistic error, but this is not the case. The reason why the two authors have included it as a factor to define socioeconomic status is because they argue that poverty is a heavily politicized topic. Depending on what can be gained the poverty numbers will be downplayed or made look bigger than they really are. Therefore official statistics providing data on socioeconomic status are not totally reliable. Data on socioeconomic status thus has to be placed next to the other three factors in order to determine one's socioeconomic position more accurately.

Education, the first indicator for determining one's socioeconomic status, is seen as the central input to the social system. The individual's education does not only directly influence one's own employment and tenancy; one's education also tends to influence the education that the children of this person will follow. Education is also a crucial factor when looking at racial definition. It is believed that "culture" could be educated to the people, placing this in the context of the racial debate in Peru, it could thus be said that it would be possible to change race through education. De la Cadena (1998: 143-144) presents this argument through her concept of "silent racism", legitimate exclusion based on intellect and education. The racial debate whether race should be defined by external appearances or through "internal qualities" resulted in a redefinition of race in which the phenotype of the *serrano* was silenced if the *serrano* in question was an intellectual, therefore implicitly deeming the *serrano* an "honorary white".

---

[6] Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru

It might thus seem that in this context race is no longer an ascribed status, as Kottak (2006: 292) argued, but an achieved one. Racial definitions are not automatic, but are determined by choices, actions, achievements and/or talents. In the daily lives of people this is not totally the case. Unknown people will by racially defined purely by their physical characteristics, their biological and ascribed characteristics rather than their achieved ones.

## 2.2) Racism and Discrimination in Lima

2.2.1) Racism Without Being Racist

> Racism? In Peru we're all mixed man! Look at Chino; he's half
> Japanese. My grandfather is from Hungary. [7]
> -Nestor

> I don't know *Peluca*[8], I don't really care about your colour or
> religion; as long as you are cool with me I'll be cool with you. [9]
> -Raul

The two quotes here present rather standard answers to questions dealing with race and racism in Peru. Most people tend to present answers that could be deemed as socially acceptable. If these answers alone would provide all the needed information on race in Peru a distorted image would be produced. There would be no real racism in Peru; according to most of the people I spoke to the entire population is one big mix of different races, cultures, ideologies and trades. Everybody would be of mixed blood because of Peru's multiethnic nature; discrimination based on the phenotypes of its population would be nonexistent.

Upon closer inspection it becomes evident that racism does exist though, only its form has slightly altered. The three paradigms of the racial debate as discussed in the previous paragraph demonstrate how biology has been removed from race. De la

---

[7] Conversation held on April 3rd, 2010
[8] *"Peluca"* is the Spanish word for "wig"; because of my long hair it became my nickname in Peru.
[9] Conversation held on March 30th, 2010

Cadena (1998: 143-144) goes further than the three paradigms that are responsible for interconnecting the concepts of race, culture and class and adds education as another factor. Her concept of "silent racism" has become the legitimization of exclusion based on education and intellect. The term gained its silence due to its changing nature, as race was first defined as a biological marker; it later on became based on geography, culture and class. However, this does not mean the end of discrimination. In the end of her article de la Cadena (1998: 160) argues that discrimination in today's world is legitimated by the achieved status of education. Sentiments of intellectual superiority that underpinned the modern concept of race are now also present in the concepts of "culture" and "class", thus creating a new legitimate racial hierarchy. What we thus see is a racial hierarchy based on education, a form of "racism" without race.

Racism without race is also a concept used by Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt (2000: 191-193) in their book *Empire*. They use the term "imperial racism" to explain this concept. In imperial racism biology has been removed from race, defining its markers as sociological and cultural constructions. Whereas biology is fixed and unchangeable, culture is fluid, its shape can be altered through political, economic and technological changes a mixed with other cultures. Imperial racism however believes in rigid borders between cultures, which seriously limit the flexibility and compatibility of cultures. In imperial racism the concept of culture is no less essentialist than biology. However, it presents us with no clear hierarchy but could rather be seen as a theory of segregation. The two authors argue that racial hierarchy is thus not the cause, but rather an effect of social circumstances.

An empirical example of this are the lower living standards many of African or indigenous decent have compared to those of European or Asian decent. A reason given by many upper middle class members is that the socioeconomic dispositions of many Afro-Peruvians and indigenous people are because of their culture which is deemed inferior. Poverty in their perceptions is thus caused by culture, or at least the hierarchic interpretation given to culture, rather (macro) economic factors. In other words, racial hierarchy does not determine the social reality per se, but rather the hierarchy is created by social factors. With imperial racism, Hardt and Negri (2000: 193) argue that racial hierarchy arises through free competition, a market meritocracy of culture.

Both imperial and silent racism could be seen as a form of racism that Jorge Larrain (2000: 197-198) defines as "masked racism". The author quotes an observation made by Flores Galindo who states that in Peru nobody defines himself or herself to be racist. However, racial categorisation is responsible for conditioning the existing social perceptions. "[…] Racial terms are suppressed in the procedures of public identification and do not have official circulation." He continues to explain that racism, despite being masked and (therefore) denied, is still a concept that is very real and present in Peru.

Another, more common means in which racism is hidden, is through the form of humour. Racial slurs used in a joking manner diminish its offensive meanings on the surface, by taking away their serious demeanour, but at the same time preserve racism by making it more socially acceptable. It is not uncommon for Afro-Peruvians to be called "*primate*" or "*mono*" in informal settings. Whilst these remarks would normally be considered racist, its offensive character has been stripped off due to the fact that it is not perceived as racism but rather as a joke. This comedic view is racial stereotypes is further reinforced in Peruvian media. Cartoons in newspapers and even whole television programs are dedicated in maintaining racial prejudices, primarily to non-European ethnic groups.

### 2.2.2) Racism and the City

Many of the people I have spoken to seemed to deny that there was any form of racism and segregation in Lima. They picture the Peruvian capital as being a metropolis, the idiocy of rural life, a space of opportunity and liberty in which difference is celebrated. This belief is very similar, if not the exact definition of the positive discourse of urban life as described by Hubbard (2003: 58) and Bannister and Fyfe (2001: 807). However, there is a great difference between how people say they live their lives and how they actually live them. If we look at the actual daily lives of people in a large city such as Lima, we also see the negative discourse of urban life as described by these three authors. Bannister and Fyfe (2001: 807) present the negative discourse of urban life; difference is not something that is celebrated, but rather viewed as overwhelmingly dangerous, to be excluded or segregated. Hubbard (2003: 58) continues on this notion, arguing that the city is perceived as immoral, anonymous and filled with risks and dangers.

Those of fairer skin colour are perceived as wealthy, educated and civilized whilst those belonging to the other races are viewed as inferior and potentially dangerous. This negative discourse becomes visible in how those with African and Andean features are treated in Lima. It is not uncommon for those who don't have European phenotype features to be rejected entry from bars, clubs or restaurants. An example of how this negative discourse towards urban life was brought to practise happened one night in a restaurant in San Isidro, Lima's business and banking district. It was a small group of friends having dinner together; another friend who is an anthropologist of indigenous descent would meet up in the restaurant later. However, when he arrived at the restaurant he was refused entry because he did not look "appropriate", meaning he looked indigenous. Two of the friends in the group, who didn't know the anthropologist, seemed quite satisfied that rejected visitor wasn't allowed to enter the restaurant, arguing that the restaurant was a "decent place" because there were only "gringos and people who looked like gringos" in there.

There are two beliefs on how the positive and negative discourses of urban life are related to each other. Bannister and Fyfe (2001: 807) argue that the negative discourse of urban life evolved out of the positive one, namely that the fear of difference grew from its celebration. Hubbard (2003: 58) on the other hand argues that both discourses have always coexisted with each other. Placing the relationship between these two discourses in the context of the Peruvian capital, it becomes evident that Hubbard's vision is closest to truth. The celebration of diversity is evident in the daily rhetoric in Lima, but the fear of it is ever present in the daily lives. The coexistence of these two opposite discourses in combination with the changing definitions of race in Peru and newer forms of racism have led to a very complex and in some aspects paradox system in which the various societal cleavages in Peruvian society are created, defined and maintained. What does this mean? When asked about race or racism, many responded with answers that were deemed socially acceptable, that in Peru everybody is of mixed descent and that life in Lima is very diverse. However, at the same time we see that those who possess different characteristics than those of European descent are perceived as inferior.

2.2.3) Becoming Less *Cholo*

Racial characteristics are both external and internal as mentioned in the racial debate by de la Cadena (1998: 143). The *serrano* or *cholo* is viewed as culturally inferior

because he lacks education or "culture". As de la Cadena argued, education could be perceived as a tool to theoretically move up in the racial hierarchy. In the case of Peru education could thus be viewed as the mechanism used to redeem oneself of the perceived racial inferiority, the social factor of education is responsible for altering the racial hierarchy, combining de la Cadena's (1998) views on silent racism and Hardt and Negri's (2000) argumentation on imperial racism. Peruvian author and former president candidate Mario Vargas Llosa (Winn, 2006) argued that it is impossible for the indigenous population of Peru to survive in the modern world due to their cultural identity. The biological component has been removed and replaced for culture; the difference between the Andean and *criollo* is not one of nature but of degree, an accidental one rather than a necessary one. Vargas Llosa argues that the Andean man has to shred off his indigenous past and embrace modernity. Education would thus be the needed tool to rid the population indigenous descent of their perceived inferiority and enable them to fully participate in this modern world.

This belief that education could function as a means to redeem one of "cultural inferiority" came forward in a conversation with a woman named Milagros with whose family I had lunched on several occasions because they were friends of my family. Milagros is a woman from Miraflores who lives near the beach with her family consisting of her husband, her son, her mother-in-law and the maid. The maid was a young woman of nineteen years old who lives in a small room built on the roof of the house where Milagros and her family live. According to Milagros the girl was from the mountains, "from one of those villages where they don't know how to wash themselves and have tons of babies" [10]. Milagros made sure the maid became "educated" by paying her night school where the girl learnt to read and write, and also tried pushing her into continuing her education, to learn a useful trade so she doesn't have to "clean houses for the rest of her life or return to her village to make babies". The educated *serranos* thus become "honorary whites" as mentioned by de la Cadena (1998: 143-144), no longer having their perceived "inferior" internal qualities others of their race might possess. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, dealing with the definition of socioeconomic status, education was deemed an extra important factor since it is a determining factor for one's employment. Economic status and race, or at least the perception of race, are closely related. The general perception, or stereotype,

---

[10] Conversation held on April 11th, 2010

is that those with fairer skin colour, of European descent, are better off economically than the other racial groups such as the Afro-Peruvians and the indigenous.

When looking at the slang term used to describe a white person in Lima, we see that the word "*pituco*" is very common. As mentioned earlier, *pituco* can also be used to define somebody who is wealthy. However, many in the upper layers of Lima society have been resisting the "racial stigma" brought by the word *pituco*. They argue that not everybody who is wealthy is automatically white; furthermore they argue that there are also poor people who are of European descent. If this argument is true, it could be that one has the ability to move up the racial hierarchy not only through education, but also through the acquisition of wealth. The negative stereotype of the Andean Peruvian, or the *cholo* as he is commonly called, is that he is poor, uneducated, unhygienic and uncultured.

Whilst education might provide the means of turning the *cholo* into an "honorary white", wealth does not seem to have that fine quality. "Culture cannot be bought", was a sentiment many members of the upper classes expressed during interviews and conversations.

> Look, it's great that he got a good job and all, and I know he is working hard and making good money. Did you know he bought a big screen television for his son the other day? To get back to my point, the *cholo* can have money, but he will always remain a *cholo* with his culture.[11]
>
> -Oscar

This means that it does not matter if an indigenous person has a lot of wealth for his position in the racial/cultural hierarchy, the person would still be perceived as a *cholo* with all its negative stigmas, the only difference would be that he would no longer be viewed as "just a *cholo*", but as a "*cholo con plata*"[12] (Caretas, 2006). "Culture", or "class" as some defined it, could thus not be obtained by simply having a lot of money; "culture" was something that had to be learned from an early age, through education. In other words, it is only possible to obtain the desired cultural position in

---

[11] Conversation held on March 1st, 2010
[12] "*Cholo* with money"

the racial hierarchy through conditioning from an early age. The educated *serrano* can therefore only become an "honorary white" rather than a "full white" because he only started to learn to "become cultured" later on at school, rather than originating from it.

It could thus be argued that despite the fact that in theory one could "eliminate" one's perceived racial inferiority through social cultural methods, the physical characteristics one has forever places them in a certain racial group, with all the ups and downs that come with this categorization. Education might thus not totally serve as the redemption towards perceived cultural inferiority. People who do not know that the darker skinned person is an "honorary white" will still perceive that person to be racially inferior.

Because of this many people in Lima, even today, try to "whiten" themselves physically. Whereas the internal alteration has not brought the desired effect, people seek to alter their phenotypes in order to gain acceptance. Common methods of altering one's appearance is through the use of make up to make one look paler or dyeing one's hair blonde, another alteration done to the hair is to make it curly. However, beside these relatively simple modifications, other methods are also used, but are not so common. These methods include plastic surgery or attempting to make the skin look paler through the use of chemicals. Despite these attempts to look more European, they are not defined as such, similar to how being of European descent is perceived as being wealthy and educated, European features are also perceived to be more beautiful. I remember encountering a girl in a bookstore once who used a lot of make up to make her face look paler and dyed her hair blonde. When asked if she did this to hide her Andean features she said she simply did this to look more beautiful. Herein we can see her definition of beauty is to look more "European".

In her article Rebecca Lee (2010: 50) demonstrates that many Peruvian newspapers' job listings specify that only people of "very good appearance" need to apply for a job: this very good appearance is defined as "looking non-indigenous". Peruvian journalists, such as those working for the magazine *Caretas*, a politically critical journalistic magazine, have already delved in the relationship between European phenotype and perceived beauty. In their articles the journalists criticize the Peruvian fashion industry to promote a definition of beauty that is based on race. When entering stores or shopping malls that sell clothes in Peru one gets to see all sorts of pictures of models wearing these clothes.

Whilst the customers possess various phenotypes which show the multiethnic character of Peruvian society, the models who are pictured to sell these clothes all look as if they originated from Northern European countries. Tall and thin girls with long blonde hair, large foreheads and big blue eyes appear in sizes bigger than life to promote the products they are wearing, this while most of the customers' physical characteristics are very different, if not opposite, to those appearing on the posters and billboards (Cabanillas 2010; Cabanillas 2007). The girl who used make up to make her skin look paler view it as normal that European looking girls are used as models to sell products: they are indeed perceived to be more beautiful. This custom is criticized because, as the articles argue, it alters the subjective and personal character of beauty into a concept that is based on ethnic parameters, meaning that those who have European characteristics are seen as beautiful while those with other phenotypes are not.

# 3) Causes of Fear

This chapter will look into some of the fears and their causes that are present amongst members of the upper middle-class in Lima. In order to gain better insights on the relationship between fear of crime and racial tensions it is crucial not only to understand the racial dynamics in Peru, but also what it is that in the upper echelons of Peruvian society fear. In this chapter we will not only delve into what it is that is fear, but also look at some of the causes of these fears.

## 3.1) Fear of Crime

The discourse of fear amongst upper middle class members in Lima could be defined as fear of crime, and more specifically the fear that they themselves, or their loved ones, become victims of crime. When speaking of crime, and more specifically becoming a victim of crime, members of the upper middle class in Lima primarily fear becoming a victim of property related crime such as thefts and robberies. Whilst there is also a certain level of violence involved with these types of crime, the main fear is of property and money being stolen rather than becoming victims of physical violence such as murder or kidnapping. This is partly due to the fact that robberies committed in Lima aren't as extremely violent as in other Latin American megacities such as for example the Venezuelan capital Caracas. In Caracas it is not uncommon for victims of a robbery to get killed by the robber. The non-dominance of fear of violence becomes also evident by the way people react towards drug related violence in Lima, a rather apathetic response. The reason given for their apathy rather than sentiments of worry towards this violence was that the people themselves were not directly affected by it. In other words, drug related violence in Lima is primarily seen as an internal problem amongst those involved with the drug trade, which in their eyes primarily consist of Mexican and Colombian *narcos*[13].

   Fear of becoming a victim of crime is shaped by one's direct experiences of being a victim of crime and indirect experiences through stories about dealings with crime

---

[13] *Narco* is a common word to describe a drug dealer.

by friends, family, co-workers and others around the individual. When looking at indirect experiences, one should not only look at experiences of those in the direct environment such as friends and family, but also those experiences covered by the media; these experienced could be expressed by information providing media such as newspapers, news on the television or online sources, but also fictional experiences through police/detective shows on television which are becoming more and more popular every day all around the world. Fishman and Mesch (1996: 76) argue that a consequence of this fear is that social and territorial movement of those who live in fear are constraint. The two authors continue their argument by stating that those who live in fear of becoming a victim of crime generally try to live their lives in safe places (Garofalo, 1981; Skogan, 1986 in Fishman & Mesch, 1996: 76). Various methods of defence have turned the places where people live, work, shop and entertain themselves into safe havens (Low, 2004: 113). These methods include encapsulating oneself from the outside world, both territorially and socially. This encapsulation will be covered to some extend in the coming paragraphs dealing with fear of outsiders and fear of the outside, but will primarily be covered in the next chapter which will delve into the consequences of fear.

Fear of crime, and more specifically the means with which people deal with this fear, separates those living in the areas that are deemed safe from those people and places that are perceived to be dangerous. What we thus see are two other fears that are interconnected with the fear of crime, namely fear of the outside and fear of the outsiders. In the previous chapter the two opposite discourses of urban life were already mentioned. Bannister and Fyfe (2001: 807) and Hubbard (2003: 58) have presented these discourses as a positive and a negative one. In the positive discourse the city is perceived as the idiocy of rural, a space of opportunity and liberty and the celebration of diversity. The negative discourse presents us with the exact opposite view, namely that the city is an anonymous, immoral place, filled with dangers that have to be excluded, with the differences between people being one of those dangers.

## 3.2 Fear of Outsiders

Outsiders are those who don't belong to the group one is part of. The affirmation that one belongs to a group is by being able to determine who does not. Larrain (2000: 29)

calls this a process "othering". Whilst this in itself does not say more than who belongs to a group of not, when placed in a context in which the outsider, is feared, we need to look another concept to gain better understanding of this construct. The concept of dualistic thinking (Low, 2004: 138-139) is applied to further reinforce the creation of the outsider. In order to differentiate the other from the self, cultural definitions and social expectations are oversimplified and dichotomized. In other words, the outsider is not simply different from the self, but rather becomes a created opposite. When placed in the context of the definition of the wealthy upper middle-class of European descent in Lima, this oversimplified and dichotomized other becomes the poor rural migrant of indigenous descent.

### 3.2.1 Don't Look Peruvian

It might seem strange that the upper echelons of Peruvian society perceive North American and European foreigners to be closer to them than many of their countrymen. "Looking Peruvian" is generally perceived as having Andean features. If we look at the racial hierarchy in Peru as presented in the previous chapter, it becomes clear that *gringos* are viewed as being "closer" to the Peruvian elite (who are primarily of European descent) than the Peruvians of the other racial groups are. "*Cholo*" and "*negros*" are perceived as very different to the "*pitucos*" and "*gringos*", not only in physical appearance, but also in "culture" and socioeconomic status. The upper middle class members perceive the poor to be potentially more bound to a life of crime. This perception of difference and how it should be feared and therefore excluded is something that was already expressed by Bannister and Fyfe (2001) and Hubbard (2003) who dealt with the negative discourse towards urban life. Several people expressed these sentiments, arguing that those of different racial groups are more bound to rely on crime because they are poor, with this poverty having been caused by their own cultural ignorance. This belief on a correlation between race and crime will be looked into further in the next chapter, which will also deal with the concept of racial profiling. It is further argued that a *gringo* wouldn't commit a crime such a robbery because he is already wealthy enough and that everybody would notice/recognize him if he were to do it.

> Look, when a *cholo* robs you, you can't simply say, "that *cholo* robbed me", they all look the same! However, with a *gringo* it's

different, a guy who is almost two metres tall with blonde hair and a
burnt red face will stand out.[14]

-Nestor


This becomes evident when looking at the case of Joran van der Sloot. Van der Sloot
is a Dutch young man currently incarcerated for being suspecting of murdering a
Peruvian girl. This might seem slightly contradicting to what was written above, that
the Peruvians don't believe that *gringos* would commit crimes. But if we look at the
motivations of this belief, the apparent contradiction fades away. The crime of which
van der Sloot is being accused off is murder, and whilst money of the victim was also
taken, the perceived main motivation of the crime remains murder rather than a
violent robbery. The second seemingly contradicting point was the fact that the
*gringo*'s physical appearance would work against him, preventing him from
committing the crime, since he would stand out clearly and could be found relatively
easy because of this. What we see here is that this belief is justified; Joran van der
Sloot was accused of murder, and within days the Peruvian and Chilean police forces
tracked him down and had him arrested. This was partly due to two factors, Joran's
behavior and appearance, and the Peruvian police. Apparently van der Sloot quickly
tried to escape the country, rumoured to have taken a taxi to leave Lima and paying
this taxi with jewellery. Furthermore, whilst Joran looked like most other *gringos*, he
was a wanted *gringo*. A foreigner generally sticks out in a crowd, especially when in
an area with little or no tourists. Besides Joran's behaviour and appearance were
cause why he was apprehended rather quickly, but also due to the belief that the
Peruvian police had to prove themselves to the world that they can function
efficiently.

However, it should be noted that this distrust towards outsiders is not exclusively
based on racial phenotypes; outsiders are generally those who do not belong to one's
own social group. This group includes friends and family, but to a certain extend also
the friends and family of those people. During my research I managed to define four
different groups of separation in relation to the individual. The first group is the
individual's direct environment; this would consist of family members, friends but
also co-workers and classmates. The second group is the indirect environment,

---

[14] Conversation held on April 3rd, 2010

namely the friends, family, co-workers and classmates of one's direct environment. Further away from the individual is the third group that consists of people who belong to the same racial/cultural/socioeconomic group. For upper middle class Lima this means people who belong the upper middle class or a higher class and are of European descent. However, since the racial hierarchy applies to all of Peruvian society, Europeans and North American are generally viewed as superior or at least as a curiosity. In other words, those with European phenotypes generally belong to the third group, no matter whose point of view we take here. The belief that those of the higher echelons of Peruvian society (both socioeconomically or according to the racial hierarchy) are more decent could be seen in the following case. One Sunday night I was forced to stay in the house because Simon would bring a couple of dozen stools and tables he borrowed from my cousin for a birthday party of the daughter of a general who lived in the well-to-do district of San Borja. Almost at midnight Simon arrived with the stools and tables, but several of them were broken for which he apologized.

> Mister, I'm terribly sorry about the stools and the tables. I know they were just borrowed and that they cost money, which the client will repay. It's just so strange you know. Kids of good class from a well-established neighbourhood such as San Borja normally don't behave this way, jumping on glass tables and putting out cigarettes in those stools. I mean, I could have expected this from some *chibolos*[15] from Callao or one of the other shitty parts, but not San Borja kids, these are good people you know![16]
> -Simon

The fourth and final group are those of other racial/cultural/socioeconomic backgrounds, the total outsiders.

---

[15] Slang term for a young person
[16] Conversation held on March 7th, 2010

<u>3.2.2 The Trojan Horse and Midnight Phone Calls</u>

Distrust of non-familiars is created by various factors. One of these factors is the rather creative methodology that is used by criminals to obtain money and other material from their victims. Whilst Peruvian media, or actually the media in general, deem the coverage of the more gruesome and (therefore more) spectacular crime of higher importance, many people in Lima have had experiences with (attempted) robberies through rather creative schemes. A very common scheme is a relatively simple one, which could be defined as the "Trojan Horse scheme". Where conventional breaking into the houses has become practically impossible (more on this in the next chapter), those who desire to enter the house without the inhabitants' permission have to attempt to obtain that permission. Like the wooden horse used to enable the ancient Greek soldiers to enter the city of Troy, the perpetrators disguise themselves as cleaners, plumbers or whatever profession enables them to enter the victim's house without raising too much suspicion, thus neutralising the fortification by obtaining permission to enter. Without knowing the true goal of who were allowed to enter the house, the victims are subdued after which the perpetrators take whatever valuables they can get their hands on.

Another common scheme is also meant to circumvent the fortifications of the living space. In this scheme the perpetrator calls the victim late at night, most likely waking him or her up. The caller introduced himself as a police officer responsible for the apprehension of the victim's friend or relative for "a serious crime". The perpetrator accentuates the gravity of the crime in an attempt to scare the victim. In order to really scare the victim, the so-called "apprehended loved one" is put on the phone; the co-conspirator is acting to be in a state of panic in which (s)he is crying and begging for help. Before any real conversation can be held with the co-conspirator, the pretend police officer takes the conversation over again in which he provides the instructions such as the meet up location and amount of money for bailout to be brought along in order to pick up the detainee. If the victim falls for it and follows the instructions, they will show up at the meeting place where the so-called police officer and detained loved one rob the victim. During the research period I myself have experienced this scheme two times, both directly and indirectly, but managed not to fall for it. The first time I was called and the second time my mother,

with one of the perpetrators pretending to be me. The first time[17] went more or less along these lines:

-[Phone rings]

-Me: Hello?

-Perpetrator 1:

      Good evening, this is colonel Espinar from the Lince police station. I have some serious news, several hours ago we have detained your brother who was carrying a bag filled with several kilos of drugs.

-Me:

      Brother? Drugs?

-Perpetrator 1:

      Yes, we have apprehended your brother for smuggling drugs; you can talk to him now.

-Perpetrator 2:

      Brother, [crying noises], brother, help me. You got to help me! [More crying and sniffing noises]

-Me:

      Who are you?

-Perpetrator 2:

      Why do you ask such things, I am your brother of course!

-Me:

      What is your name?

-Perpetrator 2:

      I am your brother! [Loud crying]

-Perpetrator 1:

      Colonel Espinar here, look, we have your brother, if you want this problem solved you meet us at the Kennedy Park in Miraflores where you can go to a bank to get some money to bail out your brother…

-Me:

---

[17] Conversation held on February 2nd, 2010

I don't know who you are talking about, I don't have a

brother!

-Perpetrator 2:

Brother, please! [Sobbing sounds]

-[Conversation ends]


Upon telling people about this experience, some of them mentioned they had been in this exactly the same situation. Apparently they deemed my handling of the situation perfect. Several weeks later my mother, who was visiting Peru, experienced the similar scheme, only she reacted differently. This time the pretend police officer claimed that they had detained her son (that would be the author of this thesis) for the possession of several illegal firearms. As with the previous example they called in the middle of the night, trying to get the victim not fully aware. And as the previous time a crying man was put on the phone. The man was simply muttering *"mama, ayudame, mama!"* ("Mom, help me, mom!") In parental instinct my mother told the perpetrators that she had several hundred Euros after which they provided her with the instructions for the "exchange". Before she was able to leave the house and get robbed by the pseudo police officer and my on-the-phone-copy-cat, my aunt and uncle stopped her, explaining to her how this scheme worked. She refused to accept this because she believed that the "police officer" also mentioned my cousin's name. Whether his name was really mentioned remains debatable, it might have been in a moment of shock that she mentioned his name that the perpetrator then used, or she simply thought he mentioned it.

Many people have adapted to this scheme in a similar way as the first example, by asking the name of the detained person or even simply calling them on their cellular phone or NexTel (radiophone). Because of this adaptation, perpetrators were forced to come up with means of countering this if they wish to continue this scheme. In order to keep robbing people in this manner, perpetrators have become forced to gather more intelligence on their targets. Whilst the scheme was originally rather random as in that the targets were almost picked at random, nowadays many of the perpetrators first seek out information about their victims before trying to rob them. The pretend police officer and his co-conspirators do this by looking through the victims' social network profiles such as Facebook and Hi5.

Another, more insidious method used by these people is to recruit people who work for mobile phone providers into their schemes. With the newly gained intelligence the scheme gains a new level of credibility. Once they call the victim they could actually pretend to be the victim's detained loved one by having certain personal information about this person. Another means the perpetrators use to improve their credibility is through the use of people who work for the mobile phone providers. They, or perpetrators pretending to work for the mobile phone provider, will first call up the victim's "imprisoned loved one", telling them to turn the mobile phone off because of some sort of technicality at a certain hour. Coincidentally this will then also be the time when the so-called police officer calls the victim.

3.2.3) Migrant Invasion and Socialist Infiltration

It are not only the a creative schemes used by criminals in which they try to rob people that has contributed to the climate of general distrust which is so intertwined in the fear of crime discourse. In their article Sparks, Girling and Loader (2001: 887) state that the fear of crime discourse is primarily focused on protecting one's territory from incursion. This siege mentality becomes more visible when looking into the perceptions people, and especially those of the older generations, have of the changes that Peruvian capital has undergone in the second half of the twentieth century.

This change starts with the demographics, whereas at the end of the 1940's Lima's population numbered about half a million, today this number has risen to almost nine million and is still growing. This exponential increase of the city's population has also changed the characteristics of the Peruvian capital. Where once (semi) elite living areas, parks and European colonial architecture dominated Lima, today the city is characterized by its periphery filled with shantytowns. Whereas in 1957 only 10% of the capital's population lived in the slums, by 1981 this number grew to 32% and by 2004 62% of the population were living in these poor areas.

Rural migrants from the other departments of Peru moved to Lima to find better lives. After the military regimes of the late 1960s and 1970s Peru's agriculture had practically collapsed, many were forced to move to the cities because of subsistence crisis, being unable to provide for themselves or their families (Mason, 1998). The internal conflict between the guerrilla movements and the Peruvian state, which lasted from 1980 until 2000 further, reinforced this rural-urban migration. However, when asking people of the upper middle-class whose families have lived in Lima for many

generations about the reasons of this migration, the information they provided on the motivations for the migrants to migrate is quite different. According to them most migrants move to the cities not to cope with a subsistence crisis, but to be able to buy modern technological products and engage in a "more modern lifestyle".

> What do you mean, "they come to Lima because they can't survive on
> their lands"? They have land, crops, animals, and all that stuff! They
> can survive just fine over there; they've been doing it for thousands of
> years. Look, those *cholos* come to Lima because they want to have
> televisions, mobile phones and some nice *flacas*[18]![19]
> -Ramon

The once considered elegant city has grown into a lumbering metropolis (Kruijt & Degregori, 2007: 104; Peters & Skop, 2007: 152) filled with poverty and pollution. It is thus not that surprising to see that many of the older generations who have lived in Lima their entire lives have a harder time coping with this change. Some of the older people I've spoken to looked back at their younger years in parts of Lima such as Miraflores with certain nostalgia, lamenting that Miraflores was once such a peaceful and quiet district where everybody knew each other. If we look at Miraflores today we see that it is filled with traffic, thousands upon thousands of cars and busses clog up the streets; the exhaust fumes turned the air filthy, one only has to look at the white napkin turned black to wipe the sweat of one's face or the black water coming from one's hair when washing it to see the effect of this pollution.

> I remember many years ago, before the times of the military.
> Miraflores was so beautiful; everybody knew each other. We would
> go on our bicycles to San Borja to get some wine, good wine mind
> you! Today this place is dirty and noisy, something I don't even
> recognize this place anymore! [20]
> -Milagros

---

[18] "*Flaca*" means "skinny", but in Peruvian slang the word can also be used to describe a girl
[19] Conversation held on April 14th, 2010
[20] Conversation held on April 11th, 2010

For many there is not a single moment of the day in which it is quiet, twenty four hours a day and seven days a week the streets of Lima are filled with noise and chaos. It is not surprising that those who are able to escape to the gated communities, residential areas who entryways are heavily guarded, thereby controlling the movement of traffic and people into or out of these areas. There are also less extreme and permanent solutions, it is also common for people of wealth to find their temporary refuge in places such as the private country clubs or beach resorts. Some of the people I have spoken to expressed sentiments of a siege mentality, as if the barbarians from the mountains and jungles, the primarily rural migrants from the Andean and Amazon regions of Peru invaded Lima, their once so peaceful hometown.

> I believe they (the people living in the Andean and Amazon regions
> of indigenous descent) want some sort of revenge on us for what
> happened to them centuries ago, or perhaps because we are better off
> than them.[21]
> -Rodolfo

This siege mentality is reinforced by the extraordinary numbers members of the upper middle class in Miraflores present when talking about migration to Lima. Some mentioned a number as high as 400,000 migrants to move to the Peruvian capital on a yearly basis, this would mean that every year almost the entire population of Lima during the late 1940's gets added to the current population. The true numbers, or at least the statistical data provided by the Peruvian government, on the other hand provide a more realistic picture on the number of people who move to Lima. Instead of an annual number of 400,000 migrants the statistics of the Peruvian government claim that between 2002 and 2007 little over 600,000 people moved from the surrounding departments to the Peruvian capital (INEI, 2010).

The Peruvian media can be held responsible for further reinforcing these fears of the other. This is not only because of the way the media maintains racial stereotypes through comedic forms, but also the ways the Peruvian media provide news coverage of subjects dealing with those groups that could be considered "outsiders", by those who are of European descent, originated from the provinces surrounding the

---

[21] Conversation held on April 11th, 2010

metropolitan area. Like in most other countries in the world, the media in Peru has been heavily privatised. This means that the media's primary goal is not to provide information, but to maintain a growth in ratings. The result of this is that media coverage tends to be focussed on the spectacular, be it in the morbidly detailed description of how a German girl was beaten and raped by two shamans in the jungles while being in an *ayahuasca*[22] trip, or the proclamation of a potential comeback of the *Sendero Luminoso* every time there is a social protest in the mountains or jungles. When the coverage of the surrounding departments isn't about something that could be considered negative, it will be about certain local customs and celebrations that are carried out in the various departments, emphasising their differentness and exotic nature. What this does is that it creates an image of those from the rest of Peru as different, in some cases even backwards and/or dangerous.

## 3.3 Fear of the Outside

It is not only the outsider that is feared, but also the location from which they originate, namely everything outside of the zones that are considered safe. In order to cope with this fear of the outside, people generally only move between areas that are deemed safe to enter. Areas outside the safe zones are avoided and only entered when there are no other options available. Those of the higher socioeconomic milieus generally avoid poorer areas in the *conos* surrounding the older zones of Lima. If we look at how the *conos* are connected to the older districts of the Peruvian capital, it becomes clear that they are connected through large and dangerous freeways that function as the metropolis' veins; moving people and goods between the city's core to its periphery. A major infrastructural project that recently finished was a busline, made to connect Lima's centre with the wealthy districts Miraflores, Barranco and Chorillos districts.

When looking at the use of public transportation in Lima, we see that those who are not wealthy enough to have their own car primarily use public transportation. The main clientele of this bus connection are not the wealthy who have to move between these districts, but rather those who have to work in the wealthier areas, for example

---

[22] Ayahuasca is a psychedelic drug generally used in the Amazon regions

the *empleadas* who don't live with their employers in the wealthier districts. To a certain extend this could be seen as an aspect of what Dennis Rodgers (2008) would call "infrastructural violence". In his article Rodgers describes this concept through a case study of the Nicaraguan capital Managua. He demonstrates how in the last years of the twentieth century the Nicaraguan government carried out some large infrastructural projects. Managua's former infamously bad road system was repaired, by 2000 the municipality had resurfaced and widened major infrastructural arteries, and traffic lights were replaced for roundabouts. However, when taking a closer look at these improvements it became evident that these improvements were primarily to benefit the lives of the urban elites, the living and working spaces of the elites were now joined into what Rodgers calls a "fortified network" (Rodgers, 2008: 112). Whilst the construction of the busline in Lima is not such an extreme example of infrastructural violence and the modifications carried out in Managua, we do see that the improvements of the infrastructure by providing a fast connection between these districts (indirectly) benefits the urban elites of the Peruvian capital.

It is not only the *conos* surrounding the original Lima that are considered dangerous by the higher classes. Lima's heart, the political centre of the city, is also considered an unsafe area. Whilst there are many bars, restaurants, clubs, shops and other facilities of recreation, it is an area that is deemed unsafe to go to at night. If people do go to these areas from places such as Miraflores or San Isidro they travel in groups. This belief that going to the centre alone is dangerous was further reinforced during interviews with two of my informants, a young man named Alberto and a girl named Maria[23].

During a night out in town Alberto and his friends decided to go a club on the *Plaza de San Martin* which is a few blocks away from the *Plaza de Armas*, the actual central point of the Peruvian capital. Because the centre is deemed an unsafe area they decided to go together. However, at a certain point Alberto got tired and decided to go home earlier. Because his friends weren't tired yet and wanted to stay, Alberto was forced to get a cab and return to Miraflores on his own. On his way home the taxi all of a sudden turned into another street, driving away from Miraflores rather than towards it. The taxi driver explained that one of the streets was being repaired; hence he was forced to turn around. However, at a certain point the taxi stopped, two men

---

[23] Interviews taken on March 26th, 2010

approached the cab from both sides, opened the door and choked Alberto until he passed out. A while later Alberto woke up on a street in Callao, Lima's harbour and one of the city's more dangerous zones; his money, house keys and mobile phone were stolen. After his robbery Alberto ended up having to beg a taxi driver to drive him to Miraflores and that his mom will pay for the cab fare.

The story told by Maria was somewhat similar. Like Alberto she was out one night with some of her friends for drinks. Because she ran out of money she was forced to go to an ATM machine in order to get some more money. At the machine the girl got robbed at gunpoint. The perpetrator forced her to pin all of the money she had on her account and hand it over to him. That night she lost about 400 *soles* (which at the time was little over 100 Euros) to a robber who then escaped into the darkness of night. The next morning Maria went to the police to report the robbery, but at the station the police officers apparently literally laughed at her, telling her that she should have been happy that she hadn't gotten raped and that it was foolish of her being out in that part of Lima at night.

The reaction of the police is particularly interesting, besides that it shows the inability of the police to maintain control over certain parts of Lima, it presents another example of fear of location by telling Maria that she should have stayed in the zones considered safe rather than going out in the dangerous areas.

### 3.4 Product of Fear Becoming Its Cause

The previous paragraphs might have given the impression as if fear of outsiders and fear of the outside itself are two different entities that are somehow connected to the fear of crime. However, it should be noted that these two fears are very closely intertwined with each other, if not actually being the same fear. The areas of the city which are deemed unsafe are not perceived as dangerous because the physical constructs of the area are unsafe, but rather because its population. Those who generally belong to different cultural, socioeconomic and racial groups, the total outsiders, inhabit these areas.

Once again this reality can be placed in the context of the negative discourse of urban life as presented by Bannister and Fyfe (2001: 807) or Hubbard (2003: 58); the city is an anonymous and immoral place filled diversity that has to be excluded. It

could be said that McIlwaine and Moser (2007: 118) continue on this argument of exclusion. These two authors argue that exclusion results in ignorance. Because these groups don't really get to know each other because they do not come together, they become ignorant of each other, defining each other through the use of stereotypes.

The so-called outside zones are thus deemed as dangerous, potential hotbeds of crime and violence. What we thus see is that this segregation is caused by fear, but also is the mechanism that maintains this fear. However, the idea of fear being both the reason and product of exclusion and repression is not a new concept.

In her article Rossana Reguillo (2002: 193) presents the reader with a theory by late Chilean philosopher Norbert Lechner which deals with this theme. With his theory of the "authoritarian appropriation of fears" Lechner (1992) argued that the military dictatorships in the Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Brazil and Chile) exploited natural societal fears for social disorder to legitimize their authoritarian domination over the population. Jorge Balán (2002: 5) also delves into the theory presented by Lechner and concludes that fear is not only the product brought by authoritarianism but rather also the mechanism employed to ensure its continuity.

Reguillo (2002: 193-194) applies the late Chilean philosopher's theory to the strategy used by former governor of California, Pete Wilson. During his campaign he managed to appeal to many U.S. voters' fear of Hispanic migrants, who were deemed to be savage, filthy, criminal and generally dangerous, for his policies which could be seen as racially repressive.

However, unlike the past military regimes in the Southern Cone and former Californian governors, the current context of socioeconomic, cultural and racial exclusion that takes place in Lima could not totally be described as such. It is not a conscious process carried out by a small political elite employed to subjugate its population but rather a process brought though a Foucault like social conditioning, becoming a natural part of Peruvian society rather than an externally enforced ideology. In the final chapter we shall delve into the consequences of the fear of crime discourse and see how the coping strategies used are also the mechanisms to maintain fear.

# 4) Consequences of Fear

This chapter is closely related to the previous chapter. To a certain extend it would be possible to first read this chapter and then return to the previous one. In the final chapter of this thesis I will take a closer look on the consequences of fear, namely the coping strategies. How do people cope with their fear of outsiders and the outside, embodied in the fear of crime discourse? What we see is the emergence and continuation of segregation. But we also see a potentially larger problem through the political consequences of this fear…

## 4.1) Fortified Lives

In order to cope with the fear of crime, outsiders and the outside, people live what I call "fortified lives". Living spaces are constructed in such a way that undesired elements are kept at bay and the inhabitants of the house and their property remain safe. Movement out of these fortified houses is primarily to other locations which have been deemed safe, areas protected by walls, fences, gates, cameras and guards to keep the unwanted out. However, the routes between these areas also need to be safe, infrastructural project have made sure that the wealthy and those who work for them can safely move from one protected area to the other.

### 4.1.1) Fortification Starts at Home

The previous chapter dealt with the fear of crime and other fears that are connected with it. This chapter will look into the means in which members of the upper middle class in Lima create a sense of security for themselves. The negative discourse of urban life in which the city is perceived as a dangerous and anonymous place, a place in which difference has to be excluded, results in a siege mentality.

Sparks, Girling and Loader (2001: 887) argue that the fear of crime is primarily expressed in a need to protect one's territory from an external invasion. In this belief people see themselves forced to defend themselves against perceived threats from the Outside and the Outsiders. People in Lima use various methods of fortifying their lives so that they can keep themselves in and the perceived undesired elements out;

thus creating, or at least attempting, to create a sense of security. In other words, fear of crime has the effect of provoking anxieties to turn inwards, to create a sentiment of both social and physical separation from others (Sparks, Girling and Loader, 2001: 889). The siege mentality of fortification in an attempt to create a sentiment of security already begins at home. Many of those who have the resources available to them will use these to modify their houses to such lengths that it will become rather difficult, if not totally impossible, for outsiders to enter the premises without the inhabitant's permission. The fortification of most houses starts with the application of a method which has been used for thousands of years throughout the world, namely through the construction of additional walls or fences in order to prevent outsiders from coming too close or being able to look into the building; thus generating a feeling of security for those living behind these walls.

According to McLaughlin and Muncie (2000: 110 in Bannister & Fyfe, 2001: 810) this process of fortifying the living space is the embodiment of processes such as inclusion and exclusion, thereby providing a clear marking of who is in and who is not. Whilst a wall might offer some protection, a wall alone will not prevent a person from entering the premises without the owner's permission; it is namely possible for one to simply climb over a wall or fence. To prevent undesirable elements from climbing over walls and fences, the homeowners have reinforced them to such extend that it would become quite a painful endeavour to climb over these obstacles without some serious protection. One common means in which the primary walls of the "*casa fortificada*" are protected is by placing barbed wire on top of them. Another method which is also commonly used is more expensive is the deployment of electric fences on top of the walls. Electric fences, like barbed wire, work both physically and psychologically, if one were to actually try to climb over them without protection, they could get seriously injured; the idea of getting injured because of this is also quite an effective way of preventing people from trying to climb over them, in other words it is not always the injury sustained by these fortifications that keeps people out, but the idea of injury. A shopkeeper named Oscar, had the following to say about his electric fence:

Look, this hasn't worked for many years, I think the last time this
fence worked was the first month we've had it here. But, those

42

> *huevones*[24] don't know that and the idea of 20,000 volts of electricity
> through their bodies makes them scared. Don't tell anybody though! [25]
> -Oscar

However, not everybody is able or willing to buy barbed wire or electric fences to place on top of the walls. There are other cheaper but cruder methods of reinforcing the fortifications surrounding people's houses. It is not uncommon for people to simply use broken glass to make sure that climbing over the obstacle will become a very painful and bloody action. This glass is collected by smashing whatever glass objects people can get their hands on, be it empty bottles, jars or even collecting the remains of broken windows and mirrors. These shards of glass are then cemented on top of the walls.

If one does manage to cross the first obstacle, either by climbing over it with protection or finding a gap in the wall (such as for example picking the lock of the door) or fence, the next obstacles will become visible. Barred windows almost give the impression as if the house is a prison, but here they will prevent anybody from entering the building through them. Heavy (and in some cases double) doors with multiple locks and inner barricades make it impossible to simply pick open the locks or kicking the door in. If one would want to break that barricade, more serious siege equipment, such as a ram used by police forces, would be needed.

A consequence of this architectural security is that it has become rather hard for criminals to simply break into a house to steal property. Because of this criminals have become forced to use other, more creative, methods if they desire to break into houses. One such method was mentioned in the previous paragraph in which robbers will disguise themselves as for example insect exterminators who were sent by the municipality in an attempt to get the victims to let them in after which they could rob the house.

> Stop! Don't open that door, *huevon*! What did I tell you? Never open
> that door for anybody without looking through the hole first and ask
> them who they are and what they want. If you're not careful they will

---

[24] A *huevon* normally means something along the lines of "idiot" or "dumbass", but it is also used as a more amicable word amongst young people, something along the lines of "dude" or "buddy".
[25] Conversation held on February 25th, 2010

come in, put their guns to our faces, tie us down on the chairs and take

all the shit we have in the house.[26]

-Ramon


4.1.2) Fortifying the Block

There is a more extreme variant of turning houses into fortresses, which is closer to the nature of the pre-modern European cities. This variant on the normal means of fortifying the living spaces is more common in districts where there is more diversity amongst the population's socioeconomic status. This method of fortification is not by simply providing protection for a single house, but to protect an entire block of houses.

The buildings are constructed in such a way that they all face inwards, meaning that all entryways to these houses face to the centre of the block rather than to the outside streets; by doing so the outer houses of the block function as a large walls, thus turning the entre block of houses into an almost impenetrable fortress, designed to keep the outsiders out. From the outside such a street block does not look that strange or fortress like, besides the impression that these houses have no front doors. These fortified city blocks can only be entered through certain streets that are closed off by guarded fences. When entering the gate it looks as if one is simply entering another normal neighbourhood with roads and houses. The houses that border with the streets outside have all their doors directed inwards to this little fortress. These street block fortresses might give the impression of a gated community. However, unlike the gated community these areas are not that self-sustainable, many gated communities have their own stores and other facilities whilst these blocks do not have this, people are forced to leave their guarded safe zones to go shop, work and entertain themselves. Also, unlike many gated communities, it is rather easy to enter these blocks; security hardly demands people to show their identification papers to prove that they are inhabitants or invited visitors.

Whilst these blocks are not gated communities, they do provide a more or less similar fulfilment to the same needs for comfort and emotional security. Wilson-Doenges (2000: 598) defines this as "a set of networks amongst people who share interactions". With the inward turned doors which turn the outer houses into walls and

---

[26] Conversation held on February 9th, 2010

the streets entering this block as guarded gates, the people living inside these blocks live with a sense of community, they together are part of this micro cosmos surrounded by the chaos of anonymity, diversity, immorality and danger that is the metropolis Lima.

### 4.1.3) *Guachiman*: Guardian of the Neighbourhood

The guardians of these city block fortresses are known as "*guachimanes*". *Guachimanes* are private security guards, generally employed by private security firms, who are assigned to guard certain buildings, streets, city block fortresses or whatever project he is assigned to. The word "*guachiman*" itself is a derogative from the English word "watchman". Whilst the concept of the *guachiman* is present throughout the world, I have not yet encountered the word used to define them in Peru in other Spanish speaking countries. The *guachiman* is meant to have that look of authority, the neighbourhood guardian who can protect the inhabitants from the undesirables. The *guachiman*'s militaristic outfit is the expression of this meant goal. Generally all *guachimanes* dress the same; they wear brown or in some cases black military styled uniforms, combat boots and vests that are meant to resemble Kevlar.

Despite the outfit that looks as if the wearer could potentially be in a situation of urban warfare, the aesthetics is purely psychologically. The vest worn by the *guachiman* is not made of Kevlar and would never be able to stop a bullet; the fact that most *guachimanes* do not carry weapons would make them unable to protect themselves or other people if the need were to arise. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for *guachimanes* to be under the influence of alcohol or even be asleep during nightshifts.

> Don't worry about the *guachiman*, dude. He's ok! He has to sit there,
> across the street all night long. Sometimes I give him some beer or
> some *chorizos* when we're having a barbeque out front where the cars
> are. The *playas*[27] are closed around that time so I have to put the car

---

[27] Normally "*playa*" means beach, but in this case it is means a guarded area where one can park his or her car.

in front of the house when we make the barbeque. The *guachiman* will
watch and make sure nobody will try to steal my car.[28]
-Ramon


Despite the fact that the *guachiman* is not very effective at his job due to alcohol use,
lack of good equipment and other distractions such as falling asleep; the
psychological impact of the *guachiman*'s presence in an area has a preventive effect.
People are less prone to engage in illegal activities if a "watchman" is watching them.


4.1.4) Leaving the Fort

When people do leave their houses they will move from one secured area to the other.
Most of the upper middle-class in Lima will do this by using their own cars or take a
taxi if they are forced to. Public transport is generally avoided; those who have the
resources don't trust public transport, since those in lower socioeconomic positions
primarily use it because it's so cheap, many believe that using public transportation
increases the risk of getting robbed.

   An interesting exception to this belief however is young women who lack the
financial resources to buy their own car. They argue that taxis are more dangerous
than busses or *combis* (mini busses). The reasoning for this argument is simple,
namely social control. In a cab a woman would be all alone with the taxi driver, if this
man has any bad intentions with the girl, such as robbery or sexual assault, she would
be completely vulnerable against him. When using public transportation this would be
different, busses are never empty meaning that there are always witnesses present.
Furthermore, as some of the girls I've spoken to have argued, *machismo* has
maintained the image that women are vulnerable and must be protected, in other
words if something like a robbery or attempted rape would occur in a bus, the other
passengers would step in to prevent this from happening.

   Once again the concept of infrastructural violence, as mentioned in the previous
chapter, makes its comeback. The case study about the Nicaraguan capital as
presented by Rodgers (2008) on how the improvements of Managua's infrastructure
were primarily to benefit the lives of the urban elites, could to a certain extend also be
applied to Lima. Infrastructural projects primarily entail the improvement of the

---

[28] Conversation held on February 2nd, 2010

asphalt arteries that connect the wealthy and important areas with each other, thereby creating a "fortified network", as mentioned by Rodgers (2008). This become evident when looking at how important streets in Miraflores such as *Avenida Arequipa* or *Petit Thouars* have been resurfaced and upgraded with traffic lights while streets in districts such as Villa El Salvador or La Victoria, such as *Avenida Mexico*, still have many potholes and lack sufficient traffic lights.

Looking at the areas in which between people move around it is once again possible to draw a comparison to the pre-modern European cities. Bannister & Fyfe (2001: 810) argue that the connections between the built environment and fear are mediated by various conditions that are economic and political in nature. Besides protecting the citizens of external physical threats, the walls had the purpose of providing protection to the profitability of economic activity within the cities. Those in power of the cities and commerce were thus able, as Marcuse (1997: 106 in Bannister & Fyfe, 2001: 810) argues, to "control entry, regulate commerce and set rules for business activity within their precincts". This logic of the pre-modern cities behind providing protection can still be applied today in cities such as Lima. Walls and guards around houses, supermarkets, shopping malls, clubs, restaurants and the infrastructural improvements between those areas have thus created secure zones of fortified networks wherein people can safely live, work, shop and entertain themselves (Low, 2004: 113).

## 4.2) Fragmented City

Like most other cities throughout the world, Lima is characterized by a high degree of segregation; when asked about this though, many people denied that there even was such a thing as segregation. To quote Luis: "What do you mean, segregation? We all live together here, *cholos*, *chinos*, rich and poor." [29]

Various people argued that there is no real segregation in Lima because people live together in the same areas; an example of this is the district of La Molina. When talking of La Molina, most who don't live there will mention its gated communities and expensive houses. However, when talking with people from that part of Lima and

---

[29] Conversation held on April 23rd, 2010

visiting it, it becomes clear that La Molina is not only filled with expensive houses, as Pedro, a young television program maker confirms[30]:

-Me:

So where in Lima are you from?

-Pedro:

I live in La Molina.

-Me:

Ah, so you live in one of the gated communities?

-Pedro:

No, no, not all of La Molina is rich and beautiful. I'm from the not so pretty part…

Yes there are gated communities and yes there are expensive houses there, but there are also poor people living there and houses that are not beautiful and expensive. If we look at it in this way, the people I've spoken to were correct to state that there is no real segregation in Lima because on a macro-level we can see that in Lima economic activities and social relations are homogenized. However, when looking at the micro-level the exact opposite becomes evident as demonstrated by what Pedro had to say about La Molina or the example presented by Peters and Skop (2007: 159) below.

In their article about socio-spatial segregation in metropolitan Lima Peters and Skop (2007: 152) argue that this perceived contradiction between the macro and micro levels is due to Lima's fragmented nature. Geographical boundaries between the living spaces of the different socioeconomic groups might be vague or even non-existing on the macro-level; the fragmentation in Lima however shows that on a micro-level this separation does take place. A good example of this is the *Cono Este* (Eastern Cone), the eastern zone of Lima. Generally speaking the *conos* surrounding the older neighbourhoods in Lima could be considered to be a periphery populated by rural migrants of lower socioeconomic status and perceived racial inferiority. However inside the *Cono Este*, despite its high percentage of poverty, there are many gated communities (Peters & Skop, 2007: 159), island of wealth surrounded by a sea of poverty. We can thus see that segregation takes place on a micro-level; various

---

[30] Conversation held on April 24th, 2010

districts have mixed socioeconomic and multiethnic populations, but these peoples do not live their lives together; as mentioned in the previous paragraph and chapter, they live separate lives, those who are deemed outsiders and those places which are deemed to be outside are avoided.

## 4.3) Desired Repression

In his essay Marcuse (1997: 101 in Bannister & Fyfe, 2001: 811) presents a rather interesting question. The author questions whether walls in a city provide security or create fear. Wall, gates, guards and surveillance systems provide security, but at the same time contribute to the accentuation of fear by creating a climate of paranoia and distrust in which all others are considered to be suspicious (Ellin, 1996: 153). This paradox brings us back to Lechner's theory (Reguillo, 2002: 193) presented in the previous paragraph, namely that through the appropriation of fear, distrust and paranoia, both elements of the expression of fear, become the product of exclusion, but at the same time become the mechanism to maintain this segregation because the people demand fulfilment of their need for security.

From a psychological viewpoint the physical methodology that is applied to separate the self from the others could be placed under a process that is known as dualistic thinking. Setha Low (2004: 138-139) defines dualistic thinking as the dichotomization and oversimplification of cultural definitions and social expectations that are used to differentiate the other from the self. In other words, a form of "us-versus-them" ideology is created in which there are two clearly different groups. Larrain (2000: 29) describes this as a process known as othering in which the identity of the self is shaped through the creation of the other. The position of the self is thus affirmed by the rejection of those who do not fit the demanded criteria. These criteria are formed through socioeconomic status and the regarded socioeconomic definitions of race.

This micro-level segregation based on the perceived socioeconomic definitions of race becomes evident when looking at the use of racial profiling. In his article Mathias Risse (2007: 4) defines racial profiling as any action that is initiated by the police that is based on one's race, ethnicity or national origin rather than on the behaviour of the individual. Annabelle Lever (2007: 20) separates two types of racial

profiling, namely post-crime profiling and preventive profiling. Post-crime profiling entails creating a profile based on witness reports after the crime has occurred. Preventive profiling on the other hand is the creation of a profile based on statistical evidence on who is prone to commit a crime. By doing so the police hope to capture a criminal before the crime is committed. With racial profiling however, there is also the racial/ethnic/national aspect, as mentioned by Risse (2007: 4). Racial profiling thus encourages seeing those of certain ethnic groups to be perpetrators, or at least potential perpetrators, thereby giving "the face of crime" a racial character (Lever, 2007: 23).

Racial profiling in Lima, or at least amongst police and security workers in Lima is that in many cases those with non-European phenotypes are treated as potential suspects. Various articles in *Caretas* delved into this theme, presenting cases in which the police detained people, suspecting them of crimes purely based on their ethnic features. One such story was about two cyclists who were arrested for suspicion of having stolen the bikes they were riding. The police officers in charge assumed the bikes were stolen because the riders had darker skin colour (Cabanillas, 2008; Bullard, 2008). The perceived socioeconomic definition of race states that those of European descent are wealthy while those with other ethnic backgrounds are poor.

What this meant was that the officers believed that the two cyclists were not able to have paid for those bikes and thus must have stolen them. Another case of racial profiling took place in the park near the beach of Miraflores; the police arrested several young men for suspicion of several home robberies. Apparently several houses in the neighbourhood experienced break-in robberies. Then all of a sudden there was a group of four young men with Andean features playing football in the park, because of these features they were perceived as suspicious, also since they were not from their neighbourhood it was deemed that therefore they must have been the robbers, thus providing the police with a justification to detain them (Carpio, 2008).

Racial profiling is not only carried out by the police, *guachimanes* and bouncers in shopping malls, clubs bars and other locations where people go to entertain themselves also use this method in providing the visitors of their establishments with a feeling of security. Some of those who I have spoken to who are *mestizos* have experienced this first hand on many occasions, being denied entry to bars and clubs or

being followed around in stores because of the belief that the "*cholos*" and "*morochos*" are more prone to steal.

> Look, I don't like to go out in Miraflores that much. Barranco[31] is much nicer, not only are there better bars that stay open later, most of the time the guard in front of the door isn't such a *pendejo*[32] as at those places near *Parque Kennedy*[33] who won't let us in because they think we will rob all the *gringos*.[34]
> -Renzo

Distrust of others out of fear has created the need for people to fortify their houses and live separated lives; this creation of architectural security and micro-level segregation have resulted in an reinforcement of the already existing distrust of others for two reasons.

The first reason is related to the creation of architectural security. The transformation of living spaces to impenetrable fortresses has forced those who desire to break in to come up with more creative methods the penetrate the house's defences; the methodology used could be seen as a form of infiltration in which robbers disguise themselves are people who have to do work in the house in order to gain access.

Secondly, (micro-level) segregation has resulted in the diminishment of urban spaces which provide opportunity of encounters between those who belong to different groups bound by age, religion, class, race, ethnicity and socioeconomic status (Berman, 1986: 484 in Bannister & Fyfe, 2001: 811). As already argued by McIlwaine and Moser, (2007: 118) this separation affects how the other is perceived. Because of separation the other becomes an unknown; this ignorance towards outsiders results in fear of outsiders, with these outsiders being stereotyped as a threat to security.

---

[31] Barranco is the district next to Miraflores, it is generally known to be the "bohemian" part of Lima, in the past it was the place where writers, poets and other artists would come together.
[32] Literally translated as "pubic hair" or "coward", *pendejo* is also used to describe somebody who doesn't want to contribute, be it paying for something or letting someone in.
[33] Miraflores' central park
[34] Interview held on May 6th, 2010

However, the article by Bannister and Fyfe (2001) presents the political consequences of the disappearance of urban spaces where the diverse groups can come together. The disappearance of spaces in the city brought by the attempts to provide security in urban life could actually be seen as the destruction of any truly democratic space as Davis (1992: 156) argues. Davis' argument thus shows how Lechner's theory of authoritarian appropriation of fears could truly be applied. Due to fear of social disorder the people will accept the authoritarian appropriation of fears, legitimizing the deterioration of democratic life by actions such as the diminishing of privacy, racial profiling, and further segregation.

However, unlike the original context in which Lechner originally formulated his theory, some political enemy who want to commit political violence with the goal of acquiring power no longer represents fear of social disorder; the new embodiment of these fears is crime. Also, fear is no longer consciously constructed by some military bureaucratic organ, like those present in the Southern Cone countries of the 1970s and 1980s that provide the context for Lechner's theory. The diminishment of democracy, as argued by Davis (1992), through the loss of urban spaces in which people of different ages, ethnicities, classes and religions come together is not only justified through fear of crime, but it also reinforces fear.

# __Conclusion__

The goal of this thesis was to gain better insights on the relationship between fear of crime amongst upper middle-class *Limeños* of European descent and ethnic/racial tension in Peru. To what extend do racial tensions influence fear of crime and in how far are racial tensions reinforced through this fear? When looking at Lima, we see that these two realities are closely intertwined; fear of crime is heavily present and racial tensions are the norm. Like in many other cities in the world fear of crime amongst the upper middle-class in the Peruvian capital is reinforced by ethnic and racial tensions within these cities. Lima is populated by various ethnic groups; descendants of European migrants, descendants of the African slaves brought in by the European conquerors, Asian migrants who moved to Peru after the abolishment of slavery, Peru's indigenous populations and various other minorities such as Middle Eastern immigrants. Tensions between these groups are partly caused by racial inequality; those of European descent are perceived as superior whilst the others are deemed to be inferior, especially the Afro-Peruvian and indigenous Peruvians have the bare the brunt of this belief (Caretas, 2005).

Race is a social construct, as is ethnicity, and whilst both are different, they also share similarities (Cornell & Hartmann, 1998). In the case of Peru the different groups have both ethnic as well as racial characteristics. These are based on physical features, a criterion for racial identity, and common descent and history, a criterion for ethnic identity. Racial/ethnic status is assigned by others as well as determined by members of the groups themselves. And the differences between the various groups reflect on the power relations within Peruvian society. When looking at the parameters according to which race is defined in Peru, we see that the construction of race has been a long scientific debate consisting of several paradigms as described by Marisol de la Cadena (1998). First race was based on geography, with white people originating from the coast and the indigenous population living in the mountains and jungles. Later on geography was replaced by culture, the biological and geographical components were removed from race but its hierarchical structure remained. In the epoch of the military regimes from the late 1960s until 1980 the concept of race was placed in a Marxist context of class struggle. Those in power attempted to eliminate the concept of identity based on ethnicity and race by turning the racial groups into

elements of class struggle. Because of the different ways in which race is constructed more hidden forms of racism were able to emerge that enabled racism without biological race to exist.

Fear of crime in Lima is primarily the fear of having money and property stolen, be it through armed robberies on the streets to break-ins into one's house. Because of this there is a general distrust, or fear, of those who could be considered outsiders but also of locations that are deemed to be outside of the safe zone. Taken from a perspective of white upper middle-class Lima, the outsiders could be defined as those who belong to the lower socioeconomic classes, as well as those who are deemed as racially inferior. Sparks, Girling and Loader (2001: 887) argue that fear of crime is primarily focussed on territorial protection from incursion by others; in other words, invasion from outsiders. The opinions expressed by some of the people I've spoken and the demographic numbers on Lima's population growth reinforce this argument presented by the three authors. Greater racial diversity, increasing poverty and exponential growth of the population have affected the sentiments of security of the higher middle-class.

How do people cope with this reality? Some have fully isolated themselves in gated communities, others have taken less extreme measures but both are living, what I define to be, "fortified lives". People build more barricades around their houses to prevent outsiders from getting in. Guards and police officers are placed on the streets, in front of stores, schools, shopping centres and everywhere else where the wealthy go to for work, entertainment and education. Infrastructural improvements are carried out which primarily benefit the urban elites, enabling them and their servants to move quickly and safely from one area to the other, a concept that Dennis Rodgers (2008) would define as a "fortified network". What we thus see is segregation, but not in the more traditional macro-level sense in which the city is divided into large zones with each very different characteristics. Lima is a very fragmented city (Peters & Skop, 2007: 152), giving the impression that the various socioeconomic and racial groups live besides each other. However, the fortified networks make sure that the wealthy in Lima can live out their lives with minimal to no incursion from undesirable outsiders.

Because of this kind of segregation people live separated lives, we see that the urban spaces that provide opportunity of encounters between different groups have diminished. Racial profiling, profiling solely based on racial and ethnic features rather than behaviour, has further reinforced this diminishment because those of

54

"undesirable appearance" will avoid certain places. This separation, as argued by McIlwaine and Moser (2007: 118) influences how the other is perceived. Because of the diminishment of urban spaces where diversity could flourish, there is no contact between the different groups. In other words, they will not really know each other, meaning they are ignorant of each other. Ignorance turns into fear, a fear of outsiders, in which the outsiders are perceived as a security threat. With his theory on the authoritarian appropriation of fears Norbert Lechner (1992) argued that fear is both the product as well as the mechanism to maintain repression. In the context of this research repression could be viewed as the various forms of exclusion, such as for example racial profiling or micro-level segregation through fortified lives. These separated lives, and with it the diminishment of urban spaces in which people of different ethnic, racial, socioeconomic, and etcetera background could encounter each other, are not only the product of fear, but are also the reason why fear is maintained.

What is the relevance of this research? Most authors who have delved into themes such as fear of crime and ethnic tensions in large cities have generally written about cities that are located on the northern hemisphere, namely cities in Western European and North American. Whilst there is a lot of literature on cities in Latin America, most of it is focussed on crime and its perpetrators rather than the fear of it that is experienced by (potential) victims. With this research I hoped provide some insights on these themes but placed in a Latin American context. Fear of crime is not only experienced in the northern hemisphere; many in the Latin American megacities live in constant fear of crime and have their ways of coping with it.

# **Bibliograpy**

Andreasen, Robin O. (2000) "Race: Biological Reality or Social Construct?" *Philosophy of Science*, 67(3): S653-S366

Balán, Jorge (2002) "Introduction" In Susana Rokter (ed.) *Citizens of Fear: Urban Violence in Latin America*. New Brunswick, New Jersey, and London: Rutgers University Press: 1-6.

Bannister, Jon & Fyfe, Nick (2001) "Introduction: Fear and the City" *Urban Studies*, 38(5-6): 807-813.

Barrett, Stanley R. (1996) *Anthropology: A Student's Guide to Theory and Method*. Toronto, Buffalo & London: University of Toronto Press.

Berman, M. (1986) *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air*. London: Verso.

Blacfax (2004) "Nigger and Nigga" *Blacfax*, 11(45): 20-22.

Bullard, Jose Ignacio (2008) "Razas y Razones" *Caretas*, 2035, July 10th.

Cabanillas, Carlos (2007) "Me Fascina Picho" *Caretas*, 1974, May 3rd.

Cabanillas, Carlos (2008) "Que Buena Raza" *Caretas*, 2034, June 3rd.

Cabanillas, Carlos (2010) "Lugar Común" *Caretas*, 2126, February 11th.

Cadena, Marisol de la (1998) "Silent Racism and Intellectual Superiority in Peru" *Bulletin Latin American Research*, 17(2): 143-164.

Caretas (2005) "Color Legal" *Caretas*, 1902, December 1st.

Caretas (2006) "Acción por la Inclusion" *Caretas*, 1953, November 30th.

Carpio, Ana (2008) "Desagravio Vecinal" *Caretas*, 2033, June 26th.

Cornell, Stephen & Hartmann, Douglas (1998) *Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World*. London: Pine Forge Press.

Corradi, et. al. (eds.) (1992) *Fear at the Edge: State Terror and Resistance in Latin America*. Berkeley, Los Angeles and Oxford: University of California Press.

Davis, M. (1992) "Fortress Los Angeles: the militarization of urban space" In M. Sorkin (ed.) *Variations on a Theme Park: The New American City and the End of Public Space*. New York: Hill and Wang: 154-180.

Economist (2004) "A Politcal Awakening" *The Economist*, 370(8363): 35-37.

Ellin, N. (1996) *Postmodern Urbanism*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Ellin, N. (ed.) (1997) *Architecture of Fear*, New York: Princeton Architectural Press.

Fattah, A.E. (ed.) (1986) *From Crime Policy to Victim Policy*. London.

Fishman, Gideon & Mesch, Gustavo S. (1996) "Fear of Crime in Israel: A Multidimensional Approach" *Social Science Quarterly*, 77(1): 76-89.

Garofalo, James (1981) "Fear of Crime: Causes and Consequences" *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 16: 80-97

Guevara-Gil, A. (2005) *Official Law and Indigenous and Peasant Water Rights in Peru*. Lima/Wageningen: Wageningen University/IWE and United Nations/CEPAL.

Hardt, Michael & Negri, Antonio (2000) *Empire*. London: Harvard University Press.

Hubbard, Phil (2003) "Fear and loathing at the multiplex: everyday anxiety in the post-industrial city" *Capital and Class*, 0(80): 51-75.

INEI (2010) "Lima: Inmigranted 2002-2007"
http://www1.inei.gob.pe/perucifrasHTM/inf-dem/cuadro.asp?cod=9182&name=d15_08&ext=jpg (April 15th, 2010).

Kottak, Conrad Philip (2006) *Anthropology: The Exploration of Human Diversity (Eleventh Edition)*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Koonings, Kees & Kruijt, Dirk (eds.) (2007) *Fractured Cities, Social Exclusion, Urban Violence and Contested Spaces in Latin America*. London: Zed Books.

Koonings, Kees (2009) *Lecture 1: Conceptual Overview – Armed Actors, Violence and Fear in Latin America.* University of Utrecht

Kruijt, Dirk & Degregori, Carlos Ivan (2007) "Lima Metropolitana" In Kees Koonings & Dirk Kruijt (eds.) *Fractured Cities, Social Exclusion, Urban Violence and Contested Spaces in Latin America*. London: Zed Books: 101-116.

Larrain, Jorge (2000) *Identity and Modernity in Latin America*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Lechner, Norbert (1992) "Some People Die of Fear: Fear as a Political Problem" In Juan Corradi, et. al. (eds.) *Fear at the Edge: State Terror and Resistance in Latin America*. Berkeley, Los Angeles and Oxford: University of California Press.

Lee, Rebecca L. (2010) "Putting a face on free-market economics: the politicisation of race and ethnicity in Peru", *Race and Class*, 51(3): 47-58.

Lever, Annabelle (2007) "What's wrong with Racial Profiling? Another Look at the Problem" *Criminal Justice Ethics*, 26(1): 20-28.

Low, Setha (2004) *Behind the Gates: Life, Security, and the Pursuit of Happiness in Fortress America*. London & New York: Routledge.

Mason, T.D. (1998) "Take Two Acres and Call Me in the Morning – Is Land Reform a Prescription for the Peasant Unrest" *Journal of Politics*, 60(1): 199-230.

Marcuse, P. (1997) "Walls of fear and walls of support" In N. Ellin (ed.) *Architecture of Fear*, New York: Princeton Architectural Press: 101– 114.

Mariátegui, José Carlos (1971) *Seven interpretive essays on Peruvian Reality*. Austin and London: University of Texas Press.

McIlwaine, Cathy & Moser, Caroline O.N. (2007) "Living in fear: how the urban poor perceive violence, fear and insecurity" In Kees Koonings & Dirk Kruijt (eds.) *Fractured Cities, Social Exclusion, Urban Violence and Contested Spaces in Latin America*. London: Zed Books: 117-137.

McLaughlin, E. and Muncie, J. (2000) "Walled cities: surveillance, regulation and segregation" In S. Pile, C. Brook & G. Mooney (eds.) *Unruly Cities?,* London: Route-ledge: 103-148.

Municipalidad de Miraflores (2010) "Información General" http://www.miraflores.gob.pe/infogeneral.asp (August 17th, 2010).

Peters, Paul A. & Skop, Emily H. (2007) "Socio-spatial Segregation in Metropolitan Lima, Peru" *Journal of Latin American Geography*, 6(1): 149-171.

Pile, S. Brook, C & Mooney G. (eds.) (2000) *Unruly Cities?,* London: Route-ledge

Reguillo, Rossana (2002) "The Social Construction of Fear: Urban Narratives and Practices" In Susana Rokter (ed.) *Citizens of Fear: Urban Violence in Latin America*. New Brunswick, New Jersey, and London: Rutgers University Press: 187-206.

Risse, Mathias (2007) "Racial Profiling: A Reply to Two Critics" *Criminal Justice Ethics*, 26(1): 4-19.

Rodgers, Dennis (2008) "A Sympton Called Managua" *New Left Review*, 49: 103-120.

Rokter, Susana (ed.) (2002) *Citizens of Fear: Urban Violence in Latin America*. New Brunswick, New Jersey, and London: Rutgers.

Skogan, Wesley (1986) "Fear of Crime and its Behavioral Implications" In A.E. Fattah (ed.) *From Crime Policy to Victim Policy*. London: MacMillian: 167-188.

Sorkin, M. (ed.) (1992) *Variations on a Theme Park: The New American City and the End of Public Space*. New York: Hill and Wang.

Sparks, Richard; Girling, Evi & Loader, Ian (2001) "Fear and Everyday Urban Lives" *Urban Studies*, 28(5-6): 885-898.

Wilson-Doenges, Georjeanna (2000) "An Exploration of Sense of Community and Fear of Crime in Gated Communities" *Environment and Behavior*, 32(5): 597-611.

Winn, P. (2006) *Americas: The Changing Face of Latin America and the Caribbean.* Los Angeles: University of California Press.