CO2 emissions performance standards: Which factors are key to influence policy formulation?

Master Thesis

Submitted by
Lars Hummel
01/946833 | 8589623

at

Universität Konstanz

Universiteit Utrecht

Faculty of Politics, Law and Economics
Departement of Law, Economics and Governance

1st Surveyor: (Assistant Professor Dr. Alexander Hoppe)
2nd Surveyor: (Prof. Dr. Ines Mergel)

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1. Introduction

Climate policy is the major challenge of our time. Whether in the German election campaign or at the G7 meeting, it is the dominant topic, alongside pandemic control. Climate policy has also long been on the political agenda at the European level. On 11 December 2019, the European Green Deal was presented in Europe (Green Deal, 2019). The European Union has set itself the goal of becoming climate neutral by the year 2050. In order to achieve the climate targets, the EU is active as the main regulatory actor in this field. On the basis of Articles 191 and 192 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, regulations are drafted with the aim of combating climate change and preserving and protecting the environment. These are adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure.

Road transport plays a key role in implementing European climate policy. It accounts for a large proportion of CO_2 emissions in the EU. CO_2 emissions are a proven cause of global warming (European Commission, 2020). Although the negative effect of emissions is well known, transport-related emissions increased slightly again in 2017 (European Parliament, 2019).

In order to reduce emissions, the regulation 2019/631 -CO_2 emissions performance standards for newly registered cars and vans was adopted. In essence, the regulations contain a reduction of CO_2 levels by 37.5% in 2030 compared to 2021. These regulations are now to be tightened by a revision. In the upcoming "Fit for 55" package of the European Commission, this revision will be presented to the public along with some other climate legislation (Fit for 55, 2021) . This legislation is of great interest to various stakeholders in Europe. In addition to the automotive industry, which would like to prevent a ban on the internal combustion engine, these are also environmental organizations or individual citizens. The political process is currently ongoing.

The political process in the EU is characterized by a large number of interest groups and representatives. According to Transparency International, Brussels is home to 25,000 lobbyists with an annual budget of €3bn euros. Of these, approximately 7,500 have accreditation in the European Parliament. But as Nick Aiossa of Transparency International states "Deep pockets do not equal effective lobbying". But what does? This question is of high relevance for the understanding of how and by whom European legislation is shaped (The Economist, 2021)

However, far from being disreputable or illegal, interest representation in the EU is enshrined in the Treaties. Article 11 TEU states that the European institutions should interact with stakeholders.

Interest groups are key actors in the formulation of policy in the European Union. Interest groups are organizations that pursue political interests but at the same time do not seek office, but interact informally with politicians, bureaucrats and business representatives (Beyers et al., 2008). They play an important role both in the implementation and formulation of policies. The term is to be seen independently of the type of interest or the members. Interest groups can be environmental organizations, industry associations or any other kind of organized group. Like political parties, they aggregate and represent the interests of the group. Unlike parties, groups do not seek public office and represent more narrowly defined goals. The ways in which policy is influenced can vary greatly. Advocacy is legitimate and necessary. Interest representation serves the purpose of connecting the population with politics (Truman, 1951), through the representation of population groups (Greenwood, 2007), as well as contributing to the quality of laws through technical expertise (Beyers et al., 2008). Interest representation is therefore necessary and a democratic good. After all, those affected by a law know best how it should be designed in order to be effective. The large number of interests is accompanied by the question of which interests will prevail. Especially the presented environmental policy is characterized by strongly opposing positions. Environmental protection and economic interests are not always congruent.

The latest rumors about the revision of the CO2 norms suggested a target of 0 emissions as early as 2035 (Politico, 2021). This would mean that no new internal combustion engines would be allowed. The European Automobile Manufacturers' Association, (ACEA), for example, advocates that no bans should define the regulatory landscape (ACEA, 2021). On the other hand, Transport & Environment calls for a clear road to zero emissions. (Transport & Environment, 2021). It quickly becomes clear that the interests differ greatly. The practical question arises as to how one's own positions can be taken into account as strongly as possible in the law.

The scientific literature discusses various approaches to generating influence on politics. First, access to the political system must be gained in order to be heard at all. From the quality and legitimacy as a basis for representing interests, the possibility arises to exert influence from within through professionalization and know-how. On the other hand, the broader society can influence the content from the outside through public pressure. In addition, the legislative process is characterized by the three European institutions: the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU. Each institution can be described as a separate actor with a different approach. Finally, it is up for debate whether the group type is of

importance or whether all groups in the system are similarly structured. I will elaborate on these considerations in the subsequent literature section. However, due to the difficulty of generating data in this field of research is under-researched. The influence on concrete policies is difficult to trace. Especially since there are many interest groups at the EU level that form coalitions among themselves or pursue short-term and long-term strategies.

The question therefore arises as to how interests are made audible and subsequently taken into account. A case study can deepen the understanding of interest group influence by providing insights in the reality of the acting stakeholders as well as prviding the possibility to do a comparative study in a later stage with other case studies (Coen, 2007). Therefore, this master thesis will contribute to narrowing the research gap of effective European advocacy. This is done through a single case study of the revision of the CO_2 performance standards presented in the introduction. Eleven interviews were conducted to obtain the perceptions of the respondents. The aim of this thesis is to investigate which factors led to influence and which role they play. This led to the research question:

CO_2 emissions performance standards: Which factors are key to influence policy formulation?

The research question is followed by some guiding questions:

How is the policy formulation of the Revision influenced by the interest group population?

What strategies are pursuit by the interest groups?

How do you get access to the institutions?

How do you convince the institutions of your point of view?

2. Literature Discussion

2.1 Interest Groups

Interest groups are key actors in the formulation of policy in the European Union. Interest groups are organizations that pursue political interests but at the same time do not seek office, but interact informally with politicians, bureaucrats and business representatives (Beyers et al., 2008). Interest groups play an important role both in the implementation and formulation of policies. The term is to be seen independently of the type of interest or the members. Interest groups can be environmental organizations, industry associations or any other kind of organized group. Like political parties, they aggregate and represent the interests of the group. Unlike parties, groups do not seek public office and represent more narrowly defined goals.

Interest groups are important and needed actors for two main reasons, namely legitimization and expertise.

a. Legitimization

Interest groups are important for the functioning of democracies and connect citizens and the state (Truman 1951). Organizations in which like-minded people come together and pursue interests are a valuable asset of democracy and contribute to the formation of opinion in society. Legitimacy in this sense can be derived from the understanding of democracy. Democracy is the rule of the people. Politicians as representatives should represent the interests of their constituents. Interest groups channel the interests of voters and act specifically in politics. Legitimacy of politics therefore means that the interests of the people are reflected in politics. Policies that are supported by interest groups therefore legitimize their actions through the base of the population that is represented (Greenwood, 2007). Interest representation is therefore necessary and a democratic good. Nevertheless, there is always criticism that some groups exert disproportionate influence on politics. Economic interests in particular are seen as privileged (Bindenkrantz et al., 2014). This can decrease legitimate legislation as there can be unbalanced interests due to who is involved in the process.

b. Expertise

Another component is the design of good policies that is not only a question of legitimacy but also of the qualtity of legislation. Therefore, expert knowledge is needed to generate content in policy. This is where interest groups play an important role (Beyers et al., 2008). Due to their specialization in one topic area, interest groups have an information advantage over policymakers who rely on information from many different topic areas (Coen, 2007). Expertise

can be traded for participation in the policy process. Also, the preparation of information is automatically an influenceable resource of the interest group. Information is formulated by the group, what leaves room for arguing against opposing viewpoints or using supporting data.

Those two reasons for participation of interest groups lead to the first assumption:

Assumption 1: Interest groups participate in the legislative process because of their expertise and the provision of legitimacy

Interest groups are considered as democratic good. On the flipside politics cannot take into account all interests. Some interests oppose each other, some are never heard by politicians, and yet other interests are prioritized. Therefore it´s an important question how a group can influence effectively the political decision process. This is not only important for each interest group to use scarce resources the best way possible. But it´s also important to understand how policies are shaped in terms of quality in its content and if the formulation is legitimate. Influence is understood as "actor´s ability to shape a decision in line with her preferences" (Dür, 2008, p. 561)

c. Elite Pluralism

The question about the legislative process automatically addresses the discussion about corporatism and pluralism. Classical pluralism assumes a large mass of equal actors participating in politics and representing the interests of society. They are in competition and not institutionalized. On the other side are corporate systems in which for example some associations are formally integrated as political control and advisory body into politics. They serve as a bridge between business and government. (Lehmbruch, 1979; Almond, 1983). Criticism of this system is aimed at its selectivity, legitimacy and efficiency. Key questions here are how the institutionalized groups were selected and in whose interest they act. Criticism can also be directed at whether these groups do not receive disproportionate influence, whereas in pluralism every group receives opportunities to exert influence. Components of corporatism according to Siaroff (1999) and Jahn (2016) include peak organizations, a shift of decision-making processes away from parliament, strong political coordination or active exchange between state and associations, strong consensus orientation, balancing of diffuse and concentrated interests and political coordination between rival interests. The consideration which system applies lays the ground for the behavior of the interest groups (Coen, 2007). Do they compete each time again to convince policy maker from their point of views or are there

fixed connections that give advantages for certain groups. I assume the EU can be classified in between the two systems.

In the EU, all opinions are treated equally in public consultations, regardless of who transmits the contribution. This is also laid down in article 11, Treaties of the EU. There is written that the European Institutions shall exchange their views with representative associations and citizens, be in an open, transparent and regular dialogue and consult concerned parties. In this sense, the EU is a pluralistic system. On the other hand, there is the informal exchange. It is simply not plausible that everyone who wants to talk to the EU gets equal access. Here, groups are preferred thematically, presumably for reasons of time alone. Further theory suggests that there are established pathways to certain persons or groups, not only because of time issues but also as means of working most efficient and in a stable environment. On the other hand interest groups have an interest in maintain this connections and use this structure (Mazey and Richardson, 2006). Further difficult to establish a truly pluralist system is through the multilayer composition of the EU. To work on the national and EU level as well as with every institution there is knowledge and resources needed (Dür & Mateo, 2012). That gives advantage to the interest of bigger interest groups (Putnam, 1988). There is also a statistical advantage in numbers, that mayor part of interest groups in the EU are business interests. Coen (2007) calls this an elite pluralism system with a trust-based principle between groups and officials. This assumption leads to two takeaways. On the one hand is to note, that every citizen per se has an ability to voice its concern in European politics and that there is political will to build reputation as open system (Coen, 2007). On the other hand, there is an elite group whose concerns are prioritized in the policy process.

A2: In the EU every interest group can be heard, but there are advantages for certain groups.

Figure 1, Interest Group System

After the assumption of the system in which the representation of interests moves has been made (Figure 1), the question arises how the legislative process looks like and which interpretation the actors have for representation of interests.

2.2 EU-Legislative process

The political framework provides the basis for lobbying activities. This takes place in an ordinary legislative procedure with a clear structure involving three institutions. The Ordinary Legislative Procedure is the EU's standard procedure for drafting legislation. The European Council sets the priorities for the European agenda. On this basis, the European Commission publishes legislative proposals. The Commission is the only institution with the right of initiative for legislative proposals. The Council of the European Union and the European Parliament are co-legislators (European Parliament, 2021a).

a. European Commission

The European Commission is the executive body of the EU. It represents the interests of the European Union as a whole, not the interests of individual countries. The Commission has the Legislative right. It´s the only institution that proposes legislation which is subsequently adopted by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. According to McLaughlin et al. (1993, p. 201) the Commission is characterized by an "extensive policy agenda and limited

policy resources". Within the Commission there are around 23,000 people working in the Directorates General (DG) or services. Each DG is responsible for a specific policy area and is headed by a Director General. The DGs formulate legislative proposals, but they do not become official until they are adopted by the College of Commissioners. The directorates-general also conduct public consultations. The process in the Commission itself starts in the mentioned work program, which announces the projects. Roadmaps are announced for these, in the context of which an impact assessment of the project is carried out. Both the roadmap and the impact assessment have publicly accessible participation platforms, where any person or organization can submit a document, which will be taken into account by the Commission in further work. Internally, all DGs and services can comment on the initiative. Once an initiative has been adopted, it is submitted to the European Parliament and the Council of the EU (European Commission, 2021)

The Commission sets the agenda and formulates the draft laws that are later negotiated. Thus, it also has the power to determine which issues are addressed and what content is included in the draft. This makes it perhaps the most important institution when it comes to influencing the policy formulation process (Mazey & Richardson, 2006). It´s vital to influence the proposal before it´s given to the other institutions as the direction of the proposal is decided in the draft of the proposal. Within the Commission there are the DGs mentioned. It is decisive which DG handles the dossier and how one is adapted to these requirements. In addition, the equipment of a DG decides how much input it needs from outside or whether it can carry out studies itself (Coen & Katsaitis, 2013). Especially in the field of environment and health there are many interest groups represented. In addition, commissioners have varying degrees of influence on policy direction in the commission (Wonka, 2008). Finally, the Commission is not elected by the European people and therefore not directly dependent on the will of the voters. This could make the public interest less important than the economic interest. Nevertheless, the Commission is also interested in being open to the will of the citizens in order to generate prestige (Coen, 2007). Coen and Katsaitis (2013) state that as a regulatory agency the Commission requires input as well as output legitimacy and therefore cares about the public opinion as well as technical input.

In sum, the Commission is perhaps the most important institution when it comes to enshrining positions in law. Since the law is written here, the need for technical expertise is present. Due to the lack of elections, it is less necessary to listen to the public will, even though the Commission is also interested in supporting the broad interests. Not to be neglected is also that

subsequently Council and Parliament must be able to find a compromise on the basis of the proposal, so realistic demands must be anticipated.

A3: The commission is the main actor for interest groups

A4: The commission is particularly open to expertise

b. European Parliament

The Parliament is one of the two legislative institutions. Together with the Council of the EU, it can adopt and amend legislative proposals. It also oversees the work of the Commission and the other EU institutions, and works with the national parliaments of the EU member states to enable them to have their say. The European Parliament is made up of 705 Members of the European Parliament (MEP) elected in the 27 member states. (European Parliament 2021b). Members of the European Parliament belong to political groups according to political affiliation. The political groups ensure their internal organization by appointing a chair, a bureau and a secretariat. Before each vote in plenary, the political groups examine the reports prepared by the parliamentary committees and submit amendments to them. The position of each parliamentary group is determined by debates within the respective group. No MEP can be forced to vote in a particular way. In order to prepare the work of the European Parliament in plenary session, MEPs are divided among standing committees, each of which is responsible for specific areas. The committees prepare, amend and approve legislative proposals and own-initiative reports. They examine the proposals of the Commission and the Council and, if necessary, draw up reports that are presented in plenary (European Parliament 2021c)

Rapporteurs are responsible for the reports. Each political group can, if it wishes, appoint a shadow rapporteur for each report, who writes a report in addition to the rapporteur. However, the rapporteur's report, which is voted on in the lead committee and in the plenary, is ultimately relevant. The rapporteur's report considers the Commission proposal and proposes amendments. The members of the relevant committee, in turn, have the opportunity to submit amendments to the report. Through their role as rapporteurs, MEPs are key players in influencing the position of the parliament just as the relevant committees are (Kaeding, 2005). Since members of parliament are elected, they are in the public focus. Whether one follows the congruence approach, according to which the position of politics and the public overlap, or the responsiveness approach, according to which politics moves toward the opinion of the public, it is in any case apparent that public opinion influences (Beyer & Hänni, 2018, Eising, 2007). For elected representatives in particular, public opinion is therefore relevant in addition to technical considerations in the report. This manifests itself in national considerations when

voters or location factors are taken into account in the position. Location factors and jobs in the constituency influence the work of the MEP (Proksch & Slapin, 2010). Finally, a report must generate majorities in order to be adopted. For this, the parliamentary group and party as well as the position of coalition partners are important. No deputy can freely follow his positions without taking into account the factions position. The position in the report must ultimately find majorities, otherwise it will not be found in the law (Archick, & Mix, 2010). An informal route to rapporteurs is via their secretariat. The secretariat provides policy information to the rapporteur. Marshall indicates, that they are generalists missing the expertise in the various specific topics and therefore rely on outsider knowledge (Marshall, 2012).

In summary, there are key people in Parliament such as the rapporteur. The rapporteur takes into account considerations such as the will of the voters, as well as the majority in the plenary. In writing the report, he also needs expertise, which can be brought to the MEP in a direct exchange but also via staff members who are responsible for the briefing.

A5: The European Parliament is in tension of majorities, public opinion and technical expertise

c. Council of the European Union

The Council of the EU is the other decision-making body. It negotiates and adopts legal acts together with the European Parliament under the ordinary legislative procedure (European Council, 2021a). At each reading, the proposal goes through three stages in the Council, namely Working Groups, Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper 1 or 2) and the corresponding Council formation (European Council, 2021b).

The Council is more tied to the nation-states than the Parliament. The position taken in the European context comes from the capitals of the governments. This makes the accompaniment of the national level of crucial importance if one wants to influence this institution. This also makes it the most difficult institution for advocacy, since compromises with qualified majority multiplies the positioning process to many states (Hayes-Renshaw, 2009). The bigger a country and its representation in Brussels the higher its capacity for network and cooperation building in the Council (Naurin, 2007). Overall, the Council is considered as powerful but hard to access for interest group representation, especially since its decicions are intransparent and have to be accompanied by national lobbying (Hayes-Renshaw, 2009; Mazey & Richardson 2006, Eising, 2007).

A6: The Council is influenced via a national lobbying strategy

After both Parliament and Council have found their positions, trilogue negotiations can be held. In the event of a trialogue agreement at first reading, a compromise is adopted by both institutions and then published in the Official Journal of the EU. The law then enters into force. In the absence of agreement, technical discussions and a second or third trilogue are held. These negotiations are inherently informal and not public, although information of the negotiations are accessbible (Greenwood & Roederer-Rynning, 2021). In these informal settings the three institutions can negotiate and find a solution in early first readings. This is a important since Council and EP both have a strategic interest in finding an agreement in the first reading (Brandsma, 2015). The Council can hardly change the proposal and would like the Parliament to propose amendments that are acceptable to the majority of the Council. In the second reading, on the other hand, the voting procedure becomes more complicated for the Parliament, which is why amendments coming through the Council are sought. It is therefore common to negotiate a joint bundle of demands (Brandsma, 2015). The earlier focus on key actors is of great importance, as only key actors, such as the rapporteur, are represented in these negotiations (Héritier & Reh, 2012). As positions in the trilogue are decisive, it is necessary to start the lobby process as early as possible corresponding each institution to have as many roots in each position possible.

A7: Each institution should be approached at the right time and as early as possible

Since these three institutions are legislative, they are all potentially important for advocacy. The Commission is enormously important as an agenda setter and formulator of initiatives. Parliament and Council are important in shaping the law and finding the final compromise. Each of the insitutions can be approached and talked to, although the institutions differ in their constitution. The legislative process is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2, Ordinary Legislation Prodcedure

2.3 Routes to influence

So far I defined the institutional setting and which considerations for institutions and their actors are important. The underlying principle of expertise and legitimacy were also explained. Both factors as well as the link to participation as well as conviction need deeper theoretical thoughts..

a. Resource Exchange theory

I would like to start with expertise. This can be seen as a resource. In terms of exchange theory, there is a seller and a customer. The seller offers his customer a benefit, for example exclusive information, and in return receives payment from the customer, for example influence. If both actors benefit, a long-term cooperation can be achieved (Salisbury, 1969). With regard to the EU, these resources are money, legitimacy, political support, knowledge, expertise and information on the part of the interest groups (Dür, 2008). Specialists in a policy field, for example, offer expertise in how a policy should be formulated. In essence, resources are exchanged for influence. To own resources, one way is to professionalize the interest group. By training and acquiring expertise, an organization can achieve a unique selling point, which can then be traded for influence as a resource. The EU, on the other hand, is characterized by an extremely broad agenda with many different issues, whereas political resources are limited (Dür, 2008). Therefore, the demand for by interest groups is high. Interest groups that offer many resources should therefore have a greater influence (cf. Dür & Matteo, 2012). Through providing the expertise the legislative text orients on the position offered.

Expertise can be generated by professionalization. Professionalization includes five characteristics according to McGrath (2005). These are professional values (serving others is more important than one's own economic success), membership in a strong professional organization (values of the profession), adherence to these values, expertise in their field, and technical skills taught through training (process of acquisition to provide a unique service). This definition refers primarily to the characterization of Profession. In practical application, professionalization as a process can be distinguished from the degree of professionalization. In particular, the acquisition of expertise through training is a longer-term process of qualifying employees. The degree of professionalization, on the other hand, is a snapshot of the organization in which, for example, it could be queried how many lawyers are active in the group. Klüver and Saurugger (2013) define professionalized stakeholders as "increasing hiring of professionals (or specialists) whose competencies have been certified by a specific profession (such as lawyers or economists). It describes the creation of positions that require a high degree of qualification in terms of educational training and relevant working experience." (p.187f). To become professional, they emphasize the importance of finances.

In sum, professionalized groups are more likely to gain access to decision makers in this process (Saurugger, 2008). Influence in this scenario can be equated with the ability of a group to generate and effectively share information (Chalmers, 2011).

This arguing is in line with institutional pressure that leads to a similar structured mass of interest groups in the field. This view comes from organization theory. In it, all groups pursue the goal of generating political influence. To achieve this goal, institutional pressure, for example from the EU institutions, shapes all groups to work according to a certain pattern, regardless of the group type (Meyer et al., 1998, Klüver & Saurugger, 2013). In order to pursue one's goals as effectively as possible, it is therefore advisable to fulfill the requirements of the institutions. Klüver and Saururgger (2013) for example can´t find difference in group types in their finding and rather see a similar professionalization pattern. Also, they find professional groups in social movements are more successful than non-professional organizations. In their results they find that both groups operate in the same institutional environment and have to cope with the same demands, they have similar professionalization patterns. In addition, they emphasize the importance of finances as a factor leading to professionalization as more important than the group type. However, there is generally too little empirical research on professionalization. This is also reflected in the large remaining variance that the authors cannot explain. Resources, financial or other types, nonetheless seem to play an important role, for

example in the hiring of experts. In terms of bundling of expertise associations also play an important role. In associations industries come together and form a joint position. This makes them more visible as bigger player and also allows the sharing of information and other resources (Mahoney, 2007; Dür, & Mateo, 2012). On the output side the conversation with an association is easier for a political decider then to speak with each organization on its own (Eising, 2007). In sum, I expect that trade associations therefore have more influence on policy than groups with fewer resources.

A8: A factor to increase influence is expertise via professionalizing

A9: Through institutional pressure interest groups are similar professionalized

b. Insider Strategy-Outsider Strategy

As I mentioned group types before, there is a competing view on this issue that takes into account the difference purpose groups follow.

According to Olson's logic of collective action (1989), interest groups are distinguished by their goals and the resulting group size. The fundamental problem is that, regardless of membership, all members of a society benefit from the efforts of a group. It is therefore rational to be a passive member and a free rider. However, this problem does not affect all groups uniformly. The organizational capacity of group interests varies widely, for example, between large and small groups. The larger a group the more visible it is, but at the same time the different perspectives on an issue increase, making it more difficult to agree on demands (Dehling & Schubert, 2011). At the same time, the amount of information and coordination required increases. Smaller groups represent more specific interests and can organize more purposefully, but they must make themselves visible in some way in order to be noticed. Olson classifies this as diffuse or concentrated interests.

Klüver and Saurugger (2013) assumed sectional and cause groups, as differentiation of concentrated interests or the general public. Even more differentiated is the classification of Bindenkrantz et al. (2015) that distinguish between seven different group types. These are differentiated into "(1) business groups (2) unions (3) institutional groups (e.g., schools) (4) identity groups (e.g., students) (5) public interest groups (e.g., Fridays for Future) (6) professional groups (e.g., doctors) and (7) recreational groups (e.g., sports)" (p.5). These cover not only economic interests but also differentiated public interests that include both broad interests such as climate protection and sectional groups such as students. Similarly, professional groups such as doctors or sports groups are included in the category of leisure

groups. Business groups and unions also cover potentially opposing positions in the area of economic groups. The strongest representation in the EU is expected in the area of business groups.

According to the type of a group and adding to the resource exchange approach, each group can own different resources and pursue a different strategy.

Interest groups can pursue both insider and outsider strategies. Outsider strategies are usually chosen by groups with a broad membership base and are carried out in the form of demonstrations. The goal is to raise their voice and build pressure on decision-makers through publicity. This requires less well-trained people (Klüver & Saurugger, 2013). Insider strategies tend to be chosen by business interests with small membership bases and more specialized interests. Here, access to actors is the goal in order to influence them directly. Depending on the strategy chosen, there are losses in the other direction. For example, constant public pressure hurts a relationship that could be built while working together internally (Eising, 2008). Thus, following the argumentation of the first section, it is especially necessary for organization pursuing insider strategies to professionalize themselves in order to offer exclusive expertise. In contrast, groups pursuing outsider strategies have incentives not to professionalize in order to keep the membership base broad and not to exclude anyone (Dür, 2008). Based on this groups of the general public may act less professionally in order not to demobilize their members and endanger the "purity of purpose".

Insider and outsider approach have implications of the political arena a group wants to compete in (Bindenkrantz et al, 2015). Rationally, groups would have to choose the arena for which they can present the best arguments. For the EU possible arenas are the institutions (political and administrative body) and the media. Public arenas are more attractive for groups pursuing broad political goals, such as environmental issues. When masses are mobilized, issues can be pushed. Politicians legitimize their decisions when a broad mass is behind them. This is an outsider resource. Expertise, on the other hand, is an insider resource. Groups provide decision-makers with relevant resources and thereby secure access (Eising, 2007). Business interests are generally found in less visible arenas. In summary, each interest group has specific resources. The arena is chosen according to the greatest likelihood of success. Bindenkrantz et al. (2015) study also shows that resources, both financial and non-financial, such as staff, provide spillover effects and generally have a positive relationship with access. This is a prerequisite for engaging professionally with actors. Their results show that a small

group of groups appear in all arenas and share the lion's share of the presence among themselves. Expectations were largely confirmed, but business groups are best represented across all arenas. Transferred to the EU, it can be assumed that the Parliament is suitable for insider and outsider strategies, whereas insider strategies seem to be more suitable for the Commission and the Council. The media are regarded as outside arena for agenda setting. Administration is contrarily declared as insider arena with decision making.

In the Bindenkrantz study, businesses in Denmark can achieve the greatest access to politics in both public arenas and non-public arenas. Since professionalization leads to trading of resources, it can also explain why companies might be privileged in other arenas over other groups due to their assumed high level of professionalization and thus resources to offer.

On the one hand, this is consistent with the assumption of the insider strategy that companies take the largest role especially in non-public arenas.

Given the environmental topic, this has perceived wide interest in movements like Fridays for Future. I want to add here, that this discussion connects not only to expertise but also the legitimacy variable to participation. Publicly active groups with a broad membership base offer political leaders' greater legitimacy to work with. Depending on the group type, the strengths could distribute. Business groups might on the on hand represent less people in general and therefore provide more the aspect of expertise and societal groups might provide less expertise but through the broad member base provide legitimacy. The reach of a topic and its polarization has an impact on the success of a topic (Bunea, 2013).

A10: Insider Strategies are pursuit in less visible arenas: Commission, Council

A11: Outsider Strategies are pursuit to influence the agenda

A12: Business interest tend to insider, while broad interest tend to outsider strategies.

c. Power

To this point influence is described over the provision of expertise and legitimacy through resource exchange. Another view on influence is power and conflict capacity. Related to the members is also the question of conflict capacity (Bunea, 2012). What pressure can a group generate in the event of a conflict? A classic means would be, for example, a strike organized by a trade union. On the European level, this factor is immensely more difficult due to the different countries. Given the environmental topic, this has perceived wide interest in movements like Fridays for Future. The degree of conflict potential is a way to excert power

(Klüver et al., 2015). Associations concentrate groups at the European level. For example, ACEA represents all European automakers. This leaves an important industry with possibilities for action in the background. Migration to countries with lower environmental requirements, for example, would be a drastic factor with a high capacity for conflict Fridays for Future, on the other hand, particularly concentrates students in the movement who first have limited resources in conflict.

Conflict, however, is a form of escalation to make influence heard when this has not been done successfully before. This finally leads to the last aspect I want to discuss in this literature discussion, namely power. There are as shown a lot of consideration how to take part in the policy formulation process.

Ebbinghaus (2015) elaborated power resource theory. In this theory, the power of associations plays a major role. The basic assumption is that politics is the result of the power relations of social groups and their influence. Mobilization of social groups (e.g. employees) and their power vis-à-vis other groups (e.g. companies) determine political influence. The channels of influence are elections and, in corporatist systems, institutional codetermination. In the past, this theory was particularly evident in strong labor movements, such as in Sweden (Korpi 1978).

However, the concept of power in terms of mobilizing resources, for example in terms of a strike is complementary to the conflict capacity discussed earlier. Korpi includes in the power dimension besides punishment furthermore the rewarding aspect (Korpi 2001). That means for example that designing a policy has a positive impact on the legislator such as support of the industry in another topic Thus, in my view, the power resource theory ultimately does belong to the exchange theory. Strike or reward is exchanged with the desired political development. Strike in this sense would be quasi a negative bargaining chip and reward a positive bargaining chip.

A13: The possibility to conflict or reward is a resource to excert power

2.4 Summary

The literature can be summarized in three parts. First, advocacy is necessary to bring expertise and legitimacy to the political process. Legitimacy comes from the grouping of citizens into larger organizations that represent the group in a concentrated way. Expertise comes from expertise from the profession.

This justification in political participation is then shaped by the institutional incident. Each institution is a heterogeneous actor with specific points of connection. In addition, existing linkages are important.

In conclusion, participation does not automatically mean that influence is generated. Influence can be generated through the different approaches. The overarching assumption of this thesis is based on resource exchange theory.

Moreover, the discussion does not claim to be exhaustive. However, it is apparent that advocacy with the goal of influencing policy formulation must pursue a strategy that covers multiple factors. Which factors are particularly important, undiscovered or interdependent will be examined in the following case study.

3. Method

3.1 Qualitative method

First, I will answer why a qualitative design is suitable for answering the research question. The aim of the work is not to test a causal relationship between variables with the help of hypothesis tests, but to capture the perspective of the respondents. Through this single case study, a holistic and realistic picture of the social world of the case will be presented (Lamnek, 2005). The question therefore isn´t about one factor and its strength in explaining part of influence in the policy formulation process but the perception of each respondent. The approach from the inside offers the possibility to reveal new aspects in the relationship of interest groups in the policy formulation process but also to strengthen assumptions of existing factors, their possible interconnection for example regarding time or local dependencies since each institution plays its role at different times in the policy process. A lack of openness to the views of the respondents would exclude much information that could be included through this approach (Becker, 1996). In order to capture the respondents' point of view it is necessary to interact with them and to capture reality from every possible perspective. Reality cannot be seen objectively, but is socially constructed by the participants.

Working in an interest group Is a human activity an experienced subjectively. An interpretive approach is suited for analysing the subjective, since it assumes situatedness and that reality is nothing "objective" (Blatter et al., 2018, p. 34). The search for "an understanding of meaning" and for "reasons" rather than "causes" is central to interpretive approaches (Haverland, & Yanow, 2012, p. 404). Due to its acknowledgement of subjectivity and (perceived) meaning, an interpretive approach is appropriate in uncovering the experiences of people working in this field and which factors they perceive as most important in their work context. To obtain this view from within, a qualitative case study is the appropriate method (Yin, 2012). Studying one or few cases is suitable to better understand such "perceptions and motivations of important actors" (Blatter, & Haverland, 2012, p. 6).

Goal is to describe the case as detailed as possible. Since influence is difficult to understand, especially in surveys, an intensive individual case study can provide detailed information. Purpose of this study is to show the relevant factors of a population of stakeholders and to connect them to the discussed theory.

Therefore, the next step is to define the case to be researched.

3.2 Case Selection

Case Following the purist advice of King, Keohane and Verba (1994) the best intentional design select observations to ensure variation in the explanatory variable. Therefore, a project in climate policy has been selected, more precisely the revision of the CO_2 performance standards for newly registered cars. This regulation determines what emission values a new car may have. Assuming it would be set at 100% reduction, this means in fact the ban of the internal combustion engine (VDA, 2021). Therefore, it is guaranteed that industry interests have great interest in the proposed legislation and would like to influence it in order not to destroy their business case. On the other hand, as a climate issue with a major impact on transport emissions, it is of great interest to environmental organizations to promote effective environmental protection. Due to the inherently opposing interests, competition in the case is ensured and different approaches can be observed. Based on the literature discussion, it can be observed, for example, whether group distinctions are useful or whether an insider strategy promises more success than an outsider strategy. The interest in the revision is also shown by the number of 129 contributions in the public consultation (Consultation, 2021). From the institutional side also various DGs and committees are working on the law. So the case ensures that many different actors are involved.

According to Gerring (2017), the goal of a case study is to ensure various factors. First of all, intrinsic importance must be established. Due to the fact that one of the largest industries in Europe is affected and due to the challenge of combating climate protection, the intrinsic importance of who has what influence on this legislation is given. The second important factor is the independence of the case. This is partly given. The legislation as such stands on its own, but it is possible that other legislation has an influence on the strategy in the revision process. The question of Within-Case Evidence is reflected in the data collection process and in the limitations regarding possible bias. The same applies for Logistics, as the data sample is centered about German nationals. The final criteria representativeness is also addressed in the limitations as the case can provide insights into environmental policy making but is not as easily transferrable in other contexts. Nonetheless, its setting provides the possibility to adopt it to other environmental policies as well as testing it in other political fields.

3.3 Data collection

According to Yin, the first step of the case study is to define the case, determine the unit of study (Yin 2012) and focus on the group relevant to the research question (Noor, 2008; Miles and Huberman 1994). Generally, it is important to consider to which extent interview partners

can yield generalisable insights (Goldstein, 2002, p.669). I will address generalization later in the limitations.

The stakeholders addressed must first be identified. To do this, a stakeholder analysis must be carried out and the Interest group population has to be identified. The next step is to gain access to the actors in order to generate as comprehensive a picture of the case as possible. The criterion for inclusion in the data is involvement in the policy formulation of the regulation.

3.4 Expected actors

The aim is to generate qualified information that enables the most heterogeneous possible views on the topic. Therefore, the goal was to include the views of a diverse set of for the research question relevant interview partners (Noor, 2008; Miles and Huberman 1994). The starting point for identifying the stakeholder population was the participation in the public consultation of the European Commission. Stakeholders who participated in it are demonstrably working on the topic and are interesting as interlocutors. Further the position papers of the organizations were scanned to develop insights to the content they want to transmit. In addition, stakeholders working on the proposed legislation were identified from the three institutions. From the Parliament's point of view, members of the Environment Committee ENVI, the Transport Committee TRAN and the Industry Committee ITRE are potentially the most interesting and working on the legislation. In the Commission, DG Climate Action and DG Move are likely to deal with the issue. To have the focus on interest groups the contributions of sole citizens were excluded. A population of 11 people took the time to arrange an interview (See Figure 3). The interviews took around one hour each. To classify the type of interest group in the anonymization process the classification of the transparency register was used (Transparency register, 2021). That includes Consultancies, Associations, Companies, Non-Governmental Organizations, Research institutions, religious groups and regional groups.

Number	Interest Group Type	Profession	Working field	Length	Date
Interview 1	Association	Leading position	Climate Policy, Automotive sector	58:31 min	11.05.2021
I2	Consultancy	Leading position	Climate Policy, fuel sector	50:03 min	12.05.2021
I3	Permanent Representation	Leading position	Environmental Policy	58:08 min	19.05.2021
I4	Company	Policy Advisor	Climate Policy, Automotive sector	51:06 min	20.05.2021
I5	Company	Leading position	Climate Policy, Automotive sector	49:54 min	20.05.2021
I6	Company	Leading position	Climate Policy, Automotive sector	45:30 min	21.05.2021
I7	Business Group	Policy Advisor	Climate Policy, Digitization	54:05 min	26.05.2021
I8	Member of the EP	Member of the EP	In relevant Committee	51:33 min	28.05.2021
I9	Company	Leading position	Climate Policy, Automotive sector	56:15 min	28.05.2021

I10	Company	Policy Advisor	Climate Policy, Automotive sector	1:02:53 min	02.06.2021
I11	NGO	Leading position	Climate Policy, Automotive sector	56:42 min	21.06.2021

Figure 3, Interview Respondents

3.5 Interviews

The interviews are conducted in a semi-standardized guided interview (Gläser & Laudel 2010; Flick, 2007). Semi-structured interviews allow for in-depth questions in combination with closed questions (Leech, 2002). There is room for exploration, while the semi-structure prevents drifting off-topic (Aberbach, & Rockman, 2002; Leech, 2002). In order to focus the interview directly on the topic at the beginning, a short explanation of the aim of this work is given. In addition, a personal connection to the interviewer and a pleasant atmosphere are created through a brief introduction and some get to know talk. Iceberg effects are also avoided, as the cooperative nature of the interview is emphasized (Bogner, Littig & Menz, 2005). The questions asked are written down in an interview guide. The questions are obtained from the literature by means of deductive codes and structured according to thematic areas (See Interview Outline 1). These include: Introduction, Emission regulation, position formulation (Beyers et al. 2008; Klüver and Saurugger 2013), Communication (Greenwood 2007, Beyer & Hänni, 2018, Eising, 2007), interaction with the institutions (Salisbury, 1969, Coen 2007, Dür & Mateo, 2012, Mazey & Richardson, 2006, Coen & Katsaitis, 2013, Hayes-Renshaw, 2009), enforcement (Dür 2008, Archick, & Mix, 2010, Brandsma, 2015, Ebbinghaus (2015) and contextual factors. The interview outline was further adapted in the interviews with officials from the insitutions since the questions needed to be reversed and could be specified regarding the institution represented. This led to changes regarding more detailed questions about the work in the Council and Parliament (See Interview outline 2 and 3).

In order to let the interviewee speak as much as possible, the questions are mostly openly formulated (Merton & Kendall, 1946). Further the questions are asked to encourage the interviewee to reflect and to allow explanations and not to limit the answers. The order of the questions is therefore not fixed and is adjusted accordingly during the interview. This kept

thematic disruption to a minimum and allowed the interview to continue fluidly. Furthermore, questions that arise during the interview will be asked to discover non-covered factors of relevance. The Interview Outlines are in German, to prevent translation errors since the interviewees were all German. After the interviews have been conducted, short memory protocols have been created, which represent the first steps in making sense (Miles & Huberman, 1994).

3.6 Ethics

To comply with ethics, informed consent was embedded at the start of the interview. This was in terms of authorizing the recording of the interview as well as expressing that all data will be anonymized and no further inferences can be made about individuals in the work. After the work is completed, all audio files are deleted. This prevents the interviewees from being harmed by critical statements. In order to do justice to the participants, the results are substantiated with quotes (Flick, 2007).

3.7 Data analysis

The analysis is preceded by a transcription of the audio files. All spoken words are transcribed verbatim, but non-verbal communication is not recorded, as this is not necessary for the research question (Flick, 2007). The data is then coded. This is already the first step of the analysis, since "coding is analysis" (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 56). The coding is created in several runs. A first coding scheme is developed with a deductive approach from the literature and the questionnaire. After conducting the interviews, the second pass will add more codes using the inductive approach and revise the existing codes. The codes are added inductively using Saldana's coding methods (Miles, Huberman & Saldana 2014; Saldana, 2016).

Coding Method	Example
Causation Coding	Expertise through engineers defining technical boundaries
Descriptive Coding	The position in the revision is … e.g. life cycle approach.
En Vivo	"Outstanding" (I6)
Attributes	Position, Information about person
Sub-Codes	Technical – political level
Evaluation-Codes	Defining Success
Longitudinal Coding	Before-After Proposal

Versus Coding	Political Opponents

Figure 4, Coding Methods

Categories are then developed from the codes (Saldana 2016, p.10, Miles et al. 2014). For this purpose, patterns are identified in which codes that belong together are grouped together (Miles & Huberman, 1994). This is illustrated in a coding taxonomy (See Coding Taxonomy). From the categories, superordinate more general themes emerge in the next step from the subjective reality (Saldana, 2016). The final step of the analysis relates the existing data to the existing literature (Miles & Huberman, 1994). This involves identifying how the data supported or extended existing literature. The results are presented according to the coding taxonomy and its categories. The whole research process is shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5 Research design

4. Results

4.1 Timing

The timing to contribute in the legislative process can be broken into two parts according to the analysis of the interviews. The crux is the publication of the legislative proposal by the Commission and the handover to Parliament and Council (I4, I6, I7). This is logical insofar as the initiative for action changes. The proposal requires action by the Commission and afterwards the negotiations of Parliament and Council start (I2, I9). However, the assessment of the extent to which one can get involved in the process diverges. Primarily, it is important to know the status of the process (I4, I7). All stakeholders agree on the need to be involved at every stage of the legislative process. To influence the basis of the law, the Commission is identified as a key player in its policy formulation process. In the Council and Parliament, according to Interviewee 5, only the fine points are adjusted. Fundamental changes are no longer achieved here (I5). In the preparation phase the argumentation is more technical (I9). The Commission is open for expertise and commissions it from external sources. In addition, the position can be presented via public consultation and an impact assessment evaluates the expected effects of the legislation initiative. After publication, Interviewee 9 points out that the arguments become more political.

In summary, it is necessary to know at what stage the law is and adapt its approach to it. The most important stage is considered to be the drafting of the proposal in order to introduce its positions. Interviewee 2 sums it up, with the quote: "the better you were at the beginning, the less you have to do later". Nevertheless, it is helpful during the proposal phase to already prepare the ground for the work in Council and Parliament. I2, for example, mentioned an accompanying social media campaign to already create awareness for the importance of the position.

4.2 European Commission

As the timing indicates the first institution I´ll focus on is the Commission.

The European Commission, through its policy formulation role, is the primary and first point of contact. The Commission is the primary point of contact until the legislative proposal is published. Discussions are held with Commissioners, Cabinets and Directorates General. These discussions are considered most effective throughout the legislative process because "facts can be explained directly and questions can be responded to" (I9). Moreover, it is fundamentally easiest to introduce one's position in the formulation process than to change that position later on (I7).

However, the Commission is not a homogeneous interlocutor. Different DGs are structured differently and respond differently to stakeholders. DG Grow, for example, is described as more open to industry whereas DG Clima tends to have a different guideline (I4). The former DG wants to consider industry concerns and sees economic constraints and wants to give a planning horizon (I4). The second DG is more focused on achieving the climate goals (I4). So, before the process starts, it is important who will finally take care of the dossier in the Commission. The work in the DG is then the technical level and the concrete formulation of the content of the law (I4, I10). Since they write the law, they are technically sufficient well positioned that one cannot make "tactical demands" (I2) but should argue openly and honestly (I10). Since the commission and its officials are not elected there is no need for public communication (I2). Technical cooperation also takes place in expert groups, where different stakeholders can collaborate and provide feedback (I7, I9). In general, interviewees emphasized bringing about decisions at the technical level, if possible, since the political level ultimately cannot assess the technical issues in terms of content (I2, I5, I10). The technical level defines the important annexes and application of the law.

The political level is guided by the orientation of the cabinets of the Commission and its Commissioners (I1, I2, I4, I7). Depending on the hierarchy and the commissioner in charge, the political agenda is defined differently. Currently, Frans Timmermans as Commissioner for Climate is very high in the hierarchy and sets the political direction towards climate protection (I7). Depending on the political direction, arguments are treated differently. Arguments that serve the political agenda are prioritized (I4). Especially in the area of the CO2 Directive, much is politically determined from above (I10). According to the interviewees, the separation of the political level and the technical level is not clear-cut. In general, however, the higher the hierarchy, the less technical the discussions (I5). Since many topics are bundled in the high hierarchy, the technical level cannot be conveyed. However, the political level gives the technical level the final say on what must be in the law (I7).

Another way to formally provide feedback to the Commission is through public consultations. All participants took part in this form of participation, but the weighting of its importance varies. Various interlocutors see the influence on the law as low, because, for example, the weighting of the feedback cannot be the same. Citizens making a submission cannot be weighted the same as businesses (I5). Otherwise, "you would have to mobilize every employee at a site and make thousands of submissions." (I4) That doesn't appear to make sense. Participation in the consultation process is seen as mandatory for transparency, but not with

much benefit (I4, I5). Other respondents weight participation differently. Besides the transparency of being present in the consultation and submitting the position there, the phase is also seen as important content wise (I7, I10, I11). The consultation is seen as a basis for later discussions, which makes it important to formulate the position extensively already at this point. The positions will be taken into account in the Commission's draft (I7).

Finally, however, the Commission also considers the necessary majority of the other legislators in the policy formulation process. Binding targets and measures, for example, are not so welcome by the member states, which are reluctant to be told how to achieve the targets (I5). Parliament must also ultimately approve the proposal, which is why the Commission must anticipate which positions can be adopted (I5). Through anticipation, both institutions become non-negligible stakeholders already in the formulation process. They also exchange views with the Commission (I3, I8).

4.3 European Parliament

The starting point for the work with the Parliament is the agreement of the College of Commissioners on the proposal and the following next step in legislative procedure in the parliament (I6). The Parliament is far from being a homogeneous player too. As a working parliament, dossiers are worked out in committees and then voted on in plenary. Who works on the dossier as rapporteur or shadow rapporteur is also an important component. In addition, political groups through their nationalities and mixed parties are another necessary differentiation.

In the case of emission standards, either the Environment Committee ENVI or Transport Committee TRAN will write the parliamentary report (I8, I10). Perhaps also with shared competence. The Industry Committee ITRE will also almost certainly formulate an opinion (I8). Thus, at least three committees are already involved in the final report and will propose amendments. The committee with decision-making authority is of special importance if one wants to influence the final product (I10).

The report is written by a rapporteur. Here it is important which political group and nationality the person has (I9). There are clear differences according to political groups, whether one has better or worse relations with industrial or environmental organizations (I7). For example, the Greens and the Left tend to be more distant from industry (I7, I8). Nevertheless, all interviewees are in talks with all factions, except the extremes. Only one respondent mentioned exchange with extreme parties too, as they also from time tom time provide the rapporteur (I5). However,

the impact achieved through these conversations varies. When contacting the members of parliament, the national reference or, for example, a location in the constituency is a great advantage (I1, I5, I6, I7). The process who gets on a report can hardly be influenced from the outside (I8, I9). What can happen is that interest groups point out to members of the parliament that this dossier is important and that it would be good that the responsible person is of a specific faction (I9). For the investigated emission legislation as a publicly perceived dossier this is without impact as it is a prominent dossier that provides public visibility for the fractions, which is why there is great interest from all parliamentary groups to take it (I2). The role of public opinion as such will be presented in a separate paragraph.

If one would like to influence the delegate in its opinion there are different ways. First of all, mentioned by all interviewees is through bilateral talks with convincing arguments. Here the network is important and to know which MEP is more open for input (I4). Furthermore, the economic factor of the location and the protection of jobs is an amplifier of the arguments (I7, I9, I11). You have to communicate to the MEPs why the dossier is important to their constituents. Then there is the indirect approach via the employees (I10, I11). They write briefings to the deputies and are dependent on input from outside because of the various issues. This information is provided by stakeholders, which additionally indirectly influences the MEP. Another influencing factor is public opinion and the goal of re-election (I4, I6). In addition, MEPs are the ones who formulate amendments to the report. This is the active tool for interest groups to actively participate in the policy formulation process. In large numbers, amendments are submitted to MEPs and pre-formulated (I1, I4, I8). According to the interviewees, it is unusual for these to be adopted verbatim, but the good proposals are readily accepted as incentives for the report. In addition, the national orientation of a party plays a role. It is not uncommon for the home country government to call and ask what should be in the report (I8).

In the end, it is important to generate majorities. Both amendments and final reports must generate majorities. Therefore, it is not enough to just convince the rapporteur, but to generate broad support. There are key players in this. One is of course the rapporteur with his own network in the group (I8). There is also "tit for tat", that if one supports the other on this dossier, then they´ll support you on another dossier (I8, I2). In addition to the rapporteurs and, according to the same principle, shadows, group chairs, coordinators, committee chairs and important people in the country groups are key players who can generate majorities. For the MEP, too, finding a majority is defined by diligence, reputation in the party and addressing the right people (I8).

In summary, for interest groups, parliament is the "active part" of the job (I9). "Door-to-door canvassing" (I6) and "door-to-door salesman" (I5) symbolize the active role of representatives in this phase. Here, there are opportunities to actively work Members of Parliament and introduce amendments to the bill. In addition to amendments to the report, it is crucial to generate majorities at the end. This has become more difficult due to the fragmentation of the parliament (I5). In the past, it was possible to act alone with the EPP and S&D, but today you have to cover much broader groups.

4.4 Council of the EU

After the Commission has finished writing its proposal, the dossier is handed over not only to the Parliament, but also to the Council. This is seen as the most difficult institution, but one that has great input into the final agreement (I5). From the interviewees' point of view, the Council has much more influence than the Parliament.

There is great difficulty in influencing the Council through its national and European dimension. The position is determined in each case by the government of the country and then represented in the European context via the Permanent Representation (I7). To be active here, the representation of interests must be accompanied nationally and act in the capitals (I2, I3, I4). This involves a correspondingly large number of people if one wants to be active in each country. National governments are more responsive to resident sites (I4). The role of the associations is important here to bundle different national organisation (I2). The offices of sole organizations are too small to follow up each member state, which is why you have to rely on the associations to play this role (I9). The role of associations will be elaborated in more detail in a separate paragraph.

The permanent representations also have different levels of involvement. Small states have more leeway to decide in Brussels (I1, I2). Small states are also used to forming coalitions to achieve a critical mass of influence (I2, I9). The larger the country, the more difficult the exchange. It is easy to make contact with smaller countries (I2). Nevertheless, in the final position, small countries take their cue from the large countries with the most influence which makes it difficult to anticipate if you were able to convince them. To be successful you have to lobby small and big states (I2). From Interviewee 2´s point of view, for example, France and Germany are the most important players, and when they agree, the position is usually decided. The permanent representation generally is the "long arm" of the government. This means that in the absence of a national position, there also does not exist a European position (I3).

Permanent Representation are furthermore channel into the country. Information is passed on to the ministries via the permanent representation. The exchange should not be underestimated (I3). In addition, the Permanent Representation anticipates which position will emerge in the Council and which states will position themselves and how (I3). Although unanimity is not mandatory, it is usually sought (I3, I5). Coalition building is also attempted in the Council. Therefore the Permanent Representation offers valuable information to arrange meetings in member states not aligned with one's position.

In summary, the Council is very important but difficult to influence. The position can mainly be brought in via the national level. In the end, the Council is the important lever, because in the end the states "look at their industries and value chains when they take their position" (I5).

4.5 National level

The national aspect of European politics should not be underestimated. The interviews revealed that the national level is an important door opener for MEPs on the one hand and important for the positioning of the Council on the other. Representation of European interests goes hand in hand with national support from the respective federal government (I2, I5, I10, I11). In addition, it is evident that large companies with several locations in several countries have advantages in making their positions heard in many places (I4, I5, I10). An important aspect here is also the national language. It seems to be advantageous to approach members of parliament via national commonalities (I2).

In order to approach members of parliament, the connections to them are considered (I9). In the case of the enterprise representatives the opinion is unanimous that over locations jobs can be addressed. A delegate has an interest to hear which development can develop locally by political decisions (I7). One example was that the shaping of the emission norms contributes to the transformation of a construction plant in the election district. Therefore the MEP has the interest to accompany important political topics for its homeland (I7). In addition to the geographical reference, an interest in industry-related topics can often be observed even before contact is made (I2, I8). Via monitoring of MEPs interest groups can map out to whom they can speak easily. It can thus be stated that to a certain extent national or even regional topics are important for a Member of the European Parliament. In this context, the language and culture of the MEP plays an additional role. Knowledge of another language is not a prerequisite for membership in Parliament (I2). In addition, the customs in the countries are different. Several interviewees said that it is an advantage when one is approaching a MEP through a compatriot or a person from a location with the same language (I1, I2, I6, I9).

On the part of the interviewed MEP it is added that the position of the parliamentary group in the orientation naturally also has an effect. In the case of important topics, party resolutions influence the orientation of the European delegates on a national level, and they try to consistently develop a common line (I8). All national interests then meet in the European Group and sound out which European course is to be pursued as a group (I8). Although this is not fundamentally necessary, it is relevant at the latest in the votes on a report, for example, when it is a matter of generating majorities.

In addition to the connection to members of parliament, the location factor is also used for the approach to "soft" actors. This applies, for example, to the state representations or the Committee of the Regions (I4). These have no legislative competence but additionally influence the institutions through their reports or position. Federal States with a strong focus on industry, for example Baden-Württemberg, have an open ear for the concerns of industry in order to secure jobs or to align themselves economically for the future (I4).

The approach at the national level also takes place at the level of the federal government. Most of the stakeholders maintain a Berlin office. This allows them to talk to the environment or transport ministries and to exert influence in the Bundesrat (I4). This approach accompanies the process in Europe and is coordinated in terms of transmitting the same content (I4, I8, I10, I11). The national parliament is not considered to play a major role in exerting pressure on the government (I2). At the national level, the aim is to offer oneself as a partner in dialogue, to create awareness of issues and to be generally present (I10).

As the Permanent Mission also points out, the position in the Council comes from the home country (I3). There is little room for maneuver in the process of taking a position, but ultimately the national ministry decides how to proceed in the Council.

The importance of the national level is also demonstrated by the upcoming federal election in Germany. All interviewees agreed that the national election has a great influence on their work in Brussels. This is understandable after the previous issues, as future coalitions may prioritize other issues. The national strategy must then adapt to the new reality or are already in anticipation (I5, I10). The interviewee from the Permanent Presentation pointed out that an upcoming election delays the positioning of the country in the Council. In advance of the election, one does not want to create facts, and in the aftermath of the election, the position of the new government must be awaited. This can sometimes take a long time and also lead to the country not taking a position in the Council (I3). This opinion is also shared by the

representatives of the organizations. In particular, this is evident in the CO2 standards. The presentation and processing of this important dossier falls at a time when Germany is not able to speak (I10). There is a silent agreement not to make irreversible decisions (I3).

4.6 Dependencies

Since the fleet regulation is published in a rather unusual (I2, I9) situation of a package with many different bills, it makes sense to ask whether the laws are considered individually or seen as a matter of negotiation. It turns out that the respondents emphasize that they consider all laws individually and do not show a willingness to negotiate in the sense of Tit for Tat. Nonetheless, all agree that some of the proposed laws are mutually dependent. It does have significance in the daily work, as various issues are raised in discussions with decision-makers. In principle, however, there is no discernible willingness to weaken a position in exchange for a strengthening in another law. On the contrary, the interviewees emphasize that their arguments are strong in each case and should therefore in principle be taken into account everywhere.

From a parliamentary point of view, I8 sees few linkages between laws, since the committees have to find compromises in different compositions for each dossier. In this context, parliamentary groups, rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs vary. The coordination effort across different bills seems unrealistic (I2, I4). The interviewed MEP shares the fear that even within the parliamentary group the coordination on the many issues will not happen. However, there is a fundamental possibility of organizing in such a way that the laws are all aimed at the same goal of climate neutrality (I8).

In the council, on the other hand, there are possibilities for compromise. Problematic is seen here if the connections in between the laws would not be considered. For example, it is stated that if the emission targets are tightened, the charging infrastructure must be expanded in order to offer alternative mobility (I3). From the point of view of the interviewee from the permanent representation, however, the framework is also limited here. None of the laws are unimportant and could not be implemented (I3).

At the Commission, the overload of topics could lead to an overload of the inherently few employees, as a result of which fundamental changes to laws do not happen, but existing legal frameworks are further developed (I9). Contrary to this view is the assessment of Interviewee 11 that the step was deliberately chosen in order to make oneself less vulnerable to attack by lobbyists. The mass of laws also means a great deal of work for lobbyists and thus simply a lack of time to lobby on every law (I11).

In summary, laws are linked by their content. However, in terms of processing, both stakeholders and representatives of the institutions believe that the dossiers are processed individually. Although it would be logical from the point of view of all participants to work on the projects together, the coordination effort is probably too great. In the position, which one would like to bring in, one is not ready to make concessions in favor.

4.7 Path Dependence

Subsequent to the horizontal dependency of the legislative projects is the possible vertical path dependency. The study examines the revision of CO2 standards, which is why a regulatory framework already exists. Thus, basic parameters and legal means were set in the existing regulation.

When the first regulation was established, the basic parameters, such as measurement at the tailpipe, were set (I2, I5, I7). These basic parameters now define the way forward. The political goal of CO2 neutrality remains at the end. Whether the instrument is effective and appropriate will be evaluated and adjusted. But the logic is difficult to change, rather an adjustment is made (I4). The path dependency as such is considered to be very strong (I6, I7, I9). This is reinforced by the short period of time since the last amendment, which did not allow for fundamental new studies by the Commission (I9). Changes are more likely to be introduced via complementary measures, such as new points of zero-emission vehicles (I9).

4.8 Position

After the initial situation of institutions and laws has been explained in detail, the next step is to look specifically at how the position of interest groups emerges and how this is introduced into the legislative process. Since the research process aims at the influence in the policy formulation process and not at how positions are reflected in the law in the end, contents are only presented in general. This also serves to preserve the anonymity of the respondents. For the research question, it is also less interesting what exactly the position contains, but rather how it emerges, for example, with regard to the expertise and the procedure of the interviewees.

It should be noted that the revision under investigation is considered very important for all respondents and accompanies the legislative process. One respondent even refers to it as the "mother of legislation in the automotive industry"(I5). Depending on the level of emissions targeted, this could effectively ban the internal combustion engine and thus have a lasting impact on companies in terms of their orientation (I9). It is important to emphasize that representatives from the business community have all committed to climate neutrality by 2050. Therefore, there is no principled opposition between environmental organizations and industry

(I11). The possibility of coalition building and common positions is taken up in the paragraph on associations. Here it is considered how the respondents develop a position.

The basis for the position is the product and market situation (I4, I5, I9). The industry is oriented toward shaping a regulatory framework that drives its economic development. Balancing climate and economic policy plays a major role in this (I2). To develop a feasible solution, different departments are involved in all of them. Engineers or technical experts are consulted for technical feasibility (I1). Technical goals must fit the corporate strategy (I4, I7, I10). The public affairs offices, on the other hand, first look at which laws make participation necessary and then at the political goals and what sticking points there are. In the interplay, the technical and political feasibility is cast into a position (I4, I5).

It can be said that the companies spend a great deal of time and effort evaluating what technical and political possibilities exist in the legislative process. The final position is based on the expertise of various departments within the company. The goal is a "transparent, professional and correspondingly effective formulation" (I6). The NGO surveyed differs in its approach only in the number of people involved. Here, too, a position is developed on the basis of data and analyses (I11).

In this context, it is of course also important how the position of the institutions is formed. The Council and the Parliament differ fundamentally in this respect. The Council, or rather the Permanent Representation, is bound by instructions to the national position, which is why it does not develop a position itself.

The members of parliament develop their position from different influences. First, there is a personal conviction on the subject. Then, of course, there is interaction with the stakeholders involved, more on this in the section on Parliament. In addition, the party and parliamentary group are important, since ultimately a conviction must generate majorities. Then the exchange with the Council plays a role regarding the position of Germany. Finally, the MEP's staff works on the issues and is responsible for the briefing. The staff member "has to be better informed than I am" (I8).

The position builds the foundation for the lobbying process. Next step is how to bring this position into play.

4.9 Network

A network in political Brussels was described as important by all respondents. Important actors in the network are, in addition to the political actors from the Commission, Parliament and Council, representatives from their own and related industries as well as their associations. In addition, NGOs and other representatives from the scientific community are important, as are state representatives. The network is rounded off by contacts at the national level. The population of potential stakeholders in the political process thus covers a broad set of different actors. In sum, it is an interaction with a variety of political, economic and societal actors. That is a lot of organizations, but Interviewee 10 also points out that the actors at events or in the field of a law are not an undefined mass but a set of actors who know each other. Generally, it´s required to be present in this "bubble" (I10) to get access to this network. A network is a door opener that not automatically means you convince somebody (I1).

The network serves too primarily as an exchange platform of information. The exchange takes place bilaterally in personal conversations, at events and increasingly, due to the Corona pandemic, online. Interviewee 4, whose organization had an office in Brussels for only a few years, was able to provide interesting insights. In order to build up the representation of interests, the first step mentioned by all was that one had to make oneself known to the addressed actors. Especially important are the political decision-makers and possible supporters of the goals. The prerequisite for this is the identification of the important people for the laws that one wants to influence, in this case the processors and interested parties of the CO2 fleet values (I9). Not to be forgotten here is that there are few companies or organizations that do not need to make themselves known (I9, I10). Depending on the location or membership base, there can be strong differences depending on the country of origin. The knowing of each other also serves as an entry door since one has more ambition to react for a date if you know the person requesting it (I5).

Once the first step of getting to know each other has been taken, the factor of trust and the time that has to be invested to build trust is a recurring pattern of responses. The network serves here to prove over a longer period of time that one contributes with reliable facts and constructive advice (I1, I2, I7). Interviewee 11 describes the function of the network also with the fact that he knows whom he can ask for advice, reliable information and an honest opinion receives. According to I2, a "resilient network" should be the result in the end. The example was given of a rapporteur taking on a dossier even though he could end up being accused of being beholden

to industry. The prerequisite for this could be either personal interest in the topic or trust that the stakeholder is reliable. In addition to the technical component, politics is also a business of "people, characters and moods" (I2). Factors that have nothing to do with the dossier should not be neglected here. The human element is important to build a relationship for example (I10). It is also important to reflect on the extent to which the personal network is sufficient. I6 points out that in the case of great opposition or rapporteurs from a politically distant group, it is necessary to step out of one's bubble and try to be heard.

On the part of the institutions of Council and Parliament, the network is also considered extremely important. The MEP emphasizes that without a network, a "Member of Parliament is nothing at all" (I8). For him, the network means information and coordination and, ultimately, the ability to make a difference. I2 adds to it that a delegate must find in the long run majorities for its requests. In case of doubt, this is not done by persuasion but in exchange for a dossier that the other deputy may be working on. Representatives of interest groups can also act as a bridge here, bringing MEPs together at one table. On the Council side, the network also serves as a source of informal information. In the negotiation process, compromises can also be found in advance in order to form the necessary majority in the Council (I3).

In summary, Interviewee 5 states that the network and the maintenance of it is the main rent of the job. However, due to the pandemic and basically digitalization, there is a shift to online formats. These are seen both critically and positively. On the one hand, it's easier to keep appointments and have conversations. On the other hand, getting to know each other in person is limited.

4.10 Associations

The personal network is followed by the joining of organizations in associations or informal alliances. According to the respondents, associations are of outstanding importance. "As a representative of a company, you don't carry enough weight to be able to voice your opinion." (I7). The association serves as a catalyst for an industry.

The strength of the association lies in representing a common position of the entire industry (I1, I7). A European umbrella association is considered even more important than a purely national association (I10). In order to be strong as an association, it is first necessary to find a position in order to be able to speak. The industry representatives attach great importance to this step. In order to contribute as much as possible of one's own position to the association, constructive cooperation and early involvement are mentioned (I7, I9, I10). The size of the company is also

important. However, it was also pointed out that a blockade due to size is counterproductive and is therefore not normally used (I7).

Working in an association has further advantages. The offices in Brussels are generally small with few people. Through the federation one has further resources in the form of information, personnel and the participation as well as organization of events (I4).

On the other hand, the association is dependent on the input of the companies. The assessments are divided here, but there are indications that technical expertise is less to be found in the association. The engineers with expertise are in the companies. In order to do justice to this, however, there are the working groups in which the common position is worked out (I1).

Once the position has been formulated, the association opens the door to political decision-makers. Legislative projects have many stakeholders and decision-makers therefore have little time for each individual (I4). The association can be used to organize meetings and work through the position. At the same time, a joint appearance sends a strong signal to decision-makers that an industry has common demands that should be taken into account (I1, I4, I7).

What is seen as problematic about association work is the dilution of one's own position. In the search for compromise, all participants must of course approach each other and abandon partial interests. If there are red lines, the association is in doubt and unable to speak, which weakens its position (I7). Even more critical is when the association and the company have different positions. Then one becomes alert (I8).

Informal coalitions are listed as an alternative or weakened version of an association. These are essentially structured like an association. Various companies, associations or other interest groups come together on a topic in which a common interest is pursued (I2). In contrast to an association, there is no membership or anything similar. The association is seen as a "speedboat" and bundles companies to increase their importance for decision-makers (I10).

In summary, mergers of organizations into associations or coalitions serve to increase the impact of the position. A strong collective voice lends emphasis to the position. In addition to strengthening the position, the association serves as the center of a network at which appointments and resources are bundled.

The strong voice of all or even individual actors comes through in dialogue with political deciders.

4.11 Conversations

When preparing for talks, it is important to prepare one's positions, take along useful material and be prepared for critical questions. It is helpful to consider the political opponents and their arguments (I8). The interviewee MEP noted, for example, that he likes to cite the opposing arguments to see if and how they are invalidated. Not to be forgotten in the introduction is to make clear who you are and who you represent (I7). The EU is so big that few organizations can assume that everyone knows what they are standing for. In the preparation it is also important to adapt your arguments to the person you are talking to (I4). The higher the level of hierarchy, the less technical the discussions often are. The trick is to offer the recipient a position that he can process and understand (I2). It does not help the interest to talk about a technical annex with the commissioner who neither understands nor writes it. So, a distinction between the technical and the political level is necessary. However, this distinction is fluid (I6).

In the discussion, an open and constructive discussion culture is desired on the part of the stakeholders as well as the Council and Parliament (I1, I2, I7). People want to exchange honest and comprehensible arguments. Critical is, if interest representatives represent an opinion disguised as an "argument" (I8). Through the mass of appointments with interest representatives, it also crystallizes which arguments are frequently mentioned and thus enjoy a certain consensus (I8). Who the interlocutor is, is of secondary importance for the delegate, he does not differentiate according to organizations, but arguments. On the part of the industry, a technical expert from the company is usually brought into the technical discussions to convey these issues (I5, I7, I9, I10). The public affairs team serves as an interface to thread and translate the conversations from technical experts to politicians.

In summary, all interviewees want to have the most honest and constructive conversations possible and convince with expertise and arguments.

4.12 Digital Formats

One development in advocacy in Brussels, reinforced by the Corona pandemic, is the increasing importance of digital formats. A distinction should be made here between social media and digital events, although both serve the purpose of raising awareness and visibility as well as providing information (I2, I5). The target audience is not only policy makers but also to influence public perception (I2).

Social media, especially Twitter and LinkedIn, are opportunities to act publicly, share positions and engage in dialogue. Via social media campaigning is used to raise awareness about an issue (I1, I2, I5). However, sharing positions online is severely limited in the depth of argumentation.

Limited characters as well as accessibility to the reader severely limit the depth of content (I5). Face-to-face contact is preferred for substantive discussions (I5). Discussions on social media tend to be emotional and carry the risk of a shitstorm (I7, I11).

Public events in digital format are direct result due to pandemic. Events had to take place on the Internet, which includes advantages and disadvantages. It is easier to participate in the appointments. In particular, it is easier for institutions to hear many stakeholders in a cost-effective manner (I5, I6). This starts with digital public formats, but extends into bilateral discussions as well. Stakeholders, however, tend to be critical, as face-to-face relationships fall by the wayside in digital events. The MEP and the Permanent Representation are also undecided about how they feel about these events, as informal exchanges on the sidelines of such events are also important (I3, I8).

In general, digital media are a way to reach a broader audience. NGOs enjoy more experience in campaigning and seem to have advantages over industry (I5). Industry also complains about the lack of content in digital discussions. Presenting complex technical issues online with limited characters presents a difficulty. This is exacerbated by emotionally charged discussions, especially on the topic of climate and cars (I1, I4). Although it is believed that public discourse has a great influence on parliament and governments in particular, the benefits are offset by the risk of a shitstorm. Parliament and governments in particular respond to public attention. They are elected and have an interest in strategically aligning their position with public discussion (I4, I9). This is contrasted with Interviewee 8 assessment that the voter's decision criterion is ultimately less the actions in the legislature than moods and hopes. The industry sees personal conversations as more effective than online campaigns. I11 assessment that NGOs have difficulties in approaching decision-makers is interesting here.

However, interaction with the public is an important tool to influence the political agenda. Climate issues in particular are publicly visible and politically hotly debated (I11). By drawing attention to an issue, political direction can be influenced and the issue can be put on the agenda. However, the direction of the discussion can also be influenced, especially through participation in events and expert panels. The participants set the focus of the discussion and thus also deprive potential opponents of visibility (I9).

4.13 Enforcement

The various ways in which positions are formed and communicated results in the end in a legislative text. Against this background, the interviewees were asked how they enforce their

position and how they evaluate successful work. The latter can be answered simply. Almost every interviewee referred to whether their position is enshrined in law. In further elaboration, however, it was also pointed out that this assessment is, of course, too short-sighted and impractical. The evaluation of successful work is also a big question mark for the respondents. The position can be completely in the law without having been particularly active oneself. Or the other way around, it can be that one was enormously active and still not heard (I2). There are simply too many players to evaluate how successful one was based on the final product of the law. To make it at least somewhat accessible, the number of conversations held and the general activity was mentioned as a factor that one can at least not blame oneself should the law look different than desired (I1, I2, I5, I7, I10).

Furthermore, external factors are very important. National elections or external shocks such as the diesel scandal have a huge impact on the final product (I7). But it is also clear that the Green Deal has decided the political direction (I1). All participants here also agree that it is only about the design of the transformation and not about the political direction in general. It fits in with this that the actual political opponents, environmental organizations and companies, draw up joint position papers and bundle their interests on points that are jointly demanded (I7). Ultimately, enforcement also results from the political priority of the decision-makers. There is a personal connection. The political agenda influences the prioritization of arguments (I4). In this respect, environmental organizations and industry are no different. Both pursue their own political agenda (I4, I11). In the case of conflicting positions, the aim is to refute the opponent's technical arguments (I4, I7). Often, the truth lies in the middle, which is helpful in finding a compromise (I11). However, there is the assessment that companies are much better organized and can approach decision-makers (I11). There are simply more experts to fall back on.

In addition to the technical component, it is an interpersonal job. Several interviewees emphasize the importance of trust and honesty with each other. Interviewee 5 summarizes that one has to be "people-compatible" and that the interpersonal is even more important than the technical. This trust can be built in the long term, through professionalism and credibility (I2, I5).

In summary, the ability to convince is, on the one hand, that "you simply have a clue and can solidly justify your opinion" (I2) and communicate in a way that is appropriate for the addressee. On the other hand, it is a communication job where a relationship of trust and resilient relationships are important.

5. Conclusion

The results show that expertise is required in particular on the content side of the law, whereas legitimacy is relevant for the agenda. In order to convey content, technical know-how is emphasized on the one hand, and the interpersonal element based on trust and honesty on the other. The agenda is influenced by public opinion. For this, visibility in the digital media is relevant, as well as factors such as elections. In the end, content must find majorities. For this, it is necessary for each institution in the EU to pursue the appropriate strategy. Finally, positions are strengthened by bundling interests in associations and alliances. A joint voice is louder and more convincing.

"Politics is the competition of opinions." (I1)

This statement summarizes well what, according to the respondents, is important when it comes to anchoring one's own opinion in the final law. The final conviction depends on the quality of the arguments. As a practical advice for anyone who wants to represent an interest in the EU is therefore to build the arguments on solid facts and to be able to communicate them convincingly.

Now, of course, this view falls short, as the detailed discussion of the results shows. Even if both the respondents of the institutions and the stakeholders call this the foundation for legislation many factors have been mentioned which influence how the opinion can be strengthened. To structure the summary, I would like to address the assumptions in the literature section before formulating the final verdict on the research question. Generally the assumptions of the literature are largely supported by the results.

A1: Interest groups participate in the legislative process because of their expertise and the provision of legitimacy

The justification for advocacy lies in the provision of expertise and legitimacy (Beyers et al., 2008; Greenwood, 2007). Expertise is found in the design of legislation. The interviewees all placed great emphasis on the technical soundness of their arguments. Institutions also acknowledged that input from advocacy groups is important to substantive work. Legitimacy was primarily reflected in elections, as well as pressure from public opinion. While expertise seems more relevant at the substantive work level, legitimacy is perceptible in influencing the agenda. This assumptions is supported.

A2: In the EU every interest group can be heard, but there are advantages for certain groups.

The premise of elite pluralism (Coen 2007) is difficult to answer. Since the interviewees all tend to be elite, it is difficult to draw conclusions about other groups or whether this distinction even applies. On the other hand, there is evidence of the existing Ties. Comments regarding good contacts with MEPs or being approached seem to confirm the assumption. However, the weighting of the interest group is rather answered by jobs or economic relevance or expertise on the part of the respondents.

A: The commission is the main actor for interest groups

A: The commission is particularly open to expertise

A: The European Parliament is in tension of majorities, public opinion and technical expertise

A: The Council is influenced via a national lobbying strategy

The assumptions about the institutions are reflected in the results. The Commission, as the agenda setter, is the first and most fundamental actor when it comes to legislative text, supporting Mazey and Richardson (2006). The relevance of the public opinion (Coen &Katsaitis, 2013) is especially relevant for the political agenda. The Parliament is the institution where stakeholders are most active. Amendments can be used to contribute to the final text. However, the parliamentarians are in tension with the contributions from the business community and public opinion, supporting Eising (2007). Influencing is most difficult in the Council. This can be done primarily through national locations and capitals as indicated by Hayes-Renshaw (2009).

A: A factor to increase influence is expertise via professionalizing

Professionalization was assumed by the respondents. The described process of adding engineers to evaluate the technical part of regulation confirms this. This is accompanied by the political expertise of the public affairs offices. The distinction between technical and political expertise is not reflected in the literature review. Possibly this opens possibilities for a further differentiation of the factor.

A: Through institutional pressure interest groups are similar professionalized

All respondents placed great emphasis on their expertise and how it is supported by data. The approach to the institutions is also largely the same, which is why this assumption is confirmed (Saurugger, 2008).

A: Resources are important to provide expertise

This assumption is confirmed. However, it becomes apparent that economic interests are also rather poorly positioned here. The offices in Brussels are generally small. At the technical level, the resources are much greater. Here, however, the importance of associations and coalitions becomes apparent. These serve to bundle resources and thus provide a strong voice.

A: Insider Strategies are pursuit in less visible arenas: Commission, Council

A: Outsider Strategies are pursuit to influence the agenda

A: Business interest tend to insider, while broad interest tend to outsider strategies.

As I will pick up in the Limitation, the data have a strong business focus. Therefore, answering these assumptions should be taken with a grain of salt. The distinction between outsider and insider strategy is reflected in the data (Bindenkrantz, 2015). The Council and the Commission are mainly insider driven. However, the Commission also shows responsiveness to the public, especially through the Commissioners. The political agenda is co-influenced from the outside. The technical level of the legislative text is influenced from within. Parliament is influenced from both sides. The differentiation by group type is found only to a limited extent. All respondents emphasized that both public opinion and working from within are important. However, there seem to be advantages for economic interests from within and for environmental movement from outside. Especially in the area of social media, economic actors fear negative effects due to emotional discussion. Further the opposing interests as such were neglected by the respondents. Environmental protection is a common goal and alliances in between environmental organizations and business is possible. This connects to the last assumption made.

A: The possibility to conflict or reward is a resource to excert power

Conflict is according to my data especially possible via the social media, as one example the shitstorms as form of polarization (Bunea, 2013). But also, the business interests mentioned the lever of manufacturing sides. One example made is the possible transformation and new jobs in the home region of a MEP. This connects to the reward perspective (Korpi, 2001).

Following this, I would like to answer the research question.

CO2 emissions performance standards: Which factors are key to influence policy formulation?

It has been shown in this case that advocacy is a complex matter. Various factors have to be taken into account. In general, it can be said that knowledge is power. It is necessary to know who is working on the dossier, in which stage the dossier is and also which potential opponents there are. The personal network as well as associations or coalitions support this. These also play another crucial role. Knowledge does not mean influence. Influence is generated among respondents through expertise, economic factors, awareness of an issue and the bundling of interests. Associations serve the latter purpose in particular. When the industry speaks with a united voice, it represents a mass that cannot be ignored.

On the other hand, the by no means homogeneous composition of each institution determines the starting point of the work. Be it the DG in the Commission, the rapporteur in the Parliament or a coalition of member states in the Council. Adapting to the realities of the institutional context is crucial. A strategy that worked in a law can be rendered null and void by a new rapporteur who is, for example, critical of industry. Finally, it is a matter of promoting majorities in each institution. For this, the right actors must be approached at the right time.

Practical implications:

Precondition to put the position forward is to have access. The first recommendation is therefore to be as active as possible, to network in the bubble of interest and to find out which key actors need to be addressed. Since building trust and a resilient network takes time, one should start acting early and not just when the law appears in the Commission's working paper.

As it turns out, the basis of argumentation is crucial to prevail in the competition of arguments. Therefore, practitioners should both well ground their own position and anticipate what arguments their political opponent may put forward. This should be able to be factually refuted. In the discussion, the focus was on trusting and honest cooperation.

To compensate for any lack of resources, for example in monitoring, it is advisable to find like-minded people. Associations and alliances are ideal for this purpose. In addition, this has the advantage that one's own voice is strengthened, the more organizations are behind the voice. It is also advisable to discuss which points mark a red line. Both in approaching institutions and in associations, compromises capable of gaining a majority must be found. In the end, it is necessary to focus on the feasibility of a compromise in order to preserve at least parts of the desired legislation in case of doubt.

6. Limitations

Finally, the quality criteria validity, reliability and objectivity, which are often difficult to apply to qualitative work, are discussed. (Flick, 2007; Lamnek, 2005). Therefore, this work is oriented towards the six quality criteria according to Mayring (2002, cited from Lamnek, 2010, p.131). These include procedural documentation, argumentative interpretive validation, rule-guided, proximity to subject matter, communicative validation and triangulation. The procedural documentation is presented transparently through the research design and the individual steps of the work. In addition, all the documents mentioned are in the appendices to show in a comprehensible way which steps were carried out. To prevent arbitrariness, the results were presented based on the taxonomy and strictly on the statements of the respondents. The research design clearly lays out the steps that the work follows. Interpretation is based on the respondents' statements what ensures that their views and lifeworld are reflected in the results and that as little of the respondents' own interpretation as possible is included. However, it cannot be ruled out that subjective interpretation will occur in the analysis. Qualitative research is generally easier to influence as a researcher (Bogner, 2005; Mayring, 2002). This can happen in every step of the research process and is unavoidable in the interview, for example. The taxonomy also supports the traceability of the procedure, even if the codes and categories might be classified differently by other researchers (Flick, 2007). Depending on the conversation, information from the literature or other interviews was incorporated into the conversation which weakens the communicative validation criteria. Triangulation was partially met by different interviewees. However, there is a risk of overdetermination regarding the strong business representation (Sekhon 2004).

Another limitation reflected in the results is the possibility of systematic error (Marks, 2007). The interviews conducted have a strong focus on industry interests. Thus, it must be taken into account that potentially the distinction of group types addressed in the literature could not be shown in such a way, since small or environmental groups hardly appear in the sample. Following on from this, there is only one MP and one representative from the permanent representation in the sample. One person from the institution does not allow any general statements to be made about the institution. In the case of the deputies in particular, the fact that a different parliamentary group or nationality could lead to different views is a reinforcing factor. The nationality factor is another problem in the study at the EU level, since a strong German focus is evident in the population. In the selection of interviewees, great focus was put on including different data sources (King, Keohane, Verbam 1995). Unfortunately, the response rate determined the industry focus.

Another major limitation is that no one from the Commission was available for interview. Given the importance of the institution in the legislative process, it is a great pity that information about the institution could only be given from the outside.

In addition, I would like to take up the points raised in the methods section. Gerrings (2017) criteria of independence of the case, within case evidence, and representativeness. The independence of the case is not present according to the results. There are overlaps with other legislative initiatives from the Fit for 55 package. While this does not relate to the interests represented per se, it is at least reflected in the dialogue with policy makers. However, this also leads to another line of research. The laws of climate policy can hardly be considered individually, since the ultimate goal is climate neutrality. It might be fruitful to set up a larger-scale study with comparative case studies.

In the case of Within Case Evidence, I would like to go back to the study approach. By focusing on the perception of the respondents and their evaluation, the within case evidence is given by the research approach. Another question is whether this evidence is transferable, which addresses the third assumption of representativeness. This targets the biggest limitation of qualitative research- generalizability. The small number of interviews is an additional limitation in terms of generalizability. First, of course, the work is a single case study and thus not transferable to other legislative initiatives. However, it is also important to note that generalizability was not the goal of this study. Thus, this work does not offer a generalized solution, but rather what the perceptions of the respondents are. Practical and theoretical implications can be derived from this. However, these need to be replicated in larger and different contexts to test their external validity (Slater & Ziblat 2013). The case as such is similar to other climate legislation. The acting individuals, DGs, cabinets, and committees may or may not be the same. Again, it would be useful to deploy further research to see if the findings of this work could be replicated in other contexts.

Since the case is currently in the legislative process, another limitation arises. It is disadvantageous to mention that the evaluation of the success of the introduction of own positions by the interviewees cannot take place, since neither proposal of the Commission nor ultimately the finished revision is available. I accepted this for practical research reasons, since the paper cannot be written after the law has been completed as this will be in unknown future. Since the focus is on the perceptions of the respondents and how they track their work, looking

at the end result, while potentially informative in the aftermath, is not necessary to answer the research question.

Another debatable point about the case selection is that it is not a new law, but a revision of an existing law. In the analysis, it was therefore important to consider that there are possible path dependencies in the law. That also offers a possible venue for future research. Since Revisions are common it might be fruitful to separate completely new legislative initiatives from revisions and check for differences in the approaches of interest groups. My results indicate that the strategy might differ widely as the regulatory framework in a new initiative leaves more room to act while a revision is bound to ancestor decisions.

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9. Annexes:

9.1 Coding Taxonomy

Interest Group Influence in the European Union

Revision CO2 Emission Performance Standards: Which factors are key to influence policy formulation?

Timing		European Commission		European Parliament	
Before proposal	After proposal	Agenda-Setting	Public Consultation	Who	Majorities
		Who	Other institutions	Access	
		Content		Convincing	

Council of the EU		National Level		Dependency other Laws	
National Level	EU-Level	MEPs	Industry	Negotiations	Path Dependency
		Council	Elections		

Position		Network		Association	
Interest Groups	Council	Composition	Use	Position	Power
Parliament				Informal Coalition	

Conversation		Enforcement		Digital	
Preparation	Dialogue	Activity	External Factors	Social Media	Events
		Political Agenda	Interpersonal		

Category	Code

9.2 Coding Description

Category	Code	Subcode	Description
Timing			This Category includes all statements regarding the correct timing of interest representation
	Before Proposal	Preparation, interaction, information, public consultation	This Code includes all statements regarding actions before the publishing of the proposal
	After Proposal	Interaction, Content	This Code includes all statements regarding actions after the publishing of the proposal
European Commission			This Category includes all statements regarding the role of the European Commission.
	Agenda Setting		This Code includes all statements regarding the role of the COM as agenda setter
	Public Consultation	Transparency, content	This Code includes all statements regarding the role of public consultations
	Who	Cabinet, Commissioner, DG	This Code includes all statements regarding the relevant actors in the COM

	Other Institutions	Anticipation parliament, anticipation council	This Code includes all statements regarding the other institution's role in the formulation of the proposal
	Content	Political, technical	This Code includes all statements regarding the formulation of the legislative text
European Parliament			This Category includes all statements regarding the role of the European Parliament.
	Who	MEPs, Rapporteur, Committee, Faction	This Code includes all statements regarding the relevant actors in the parliament
	Majorities	Plenum, Faction, Ammendment	This Code includes all statements regarding the forming of majorities
	Access	Nationality, Network	This Code includes all statements regarding the factors to access the parliament
	Convincing	Arguments, Election, Economy	This Code includes all statements regarding the convinction of the parliament
Council of the EU			This Category includes all statements regarding the role of the Council of the EU.

	National Level		This Code includes all statements regarding the relevance of national factors for the Council
	EU-Level	Information, Permanent Representation, Coalition	This Code includes all statements regarding the interaction at the EU level
National Level			This Category includes all statements regarding the role of the national level.
	MEPs	Faction, Region, Government	This Code includes all statements regarding national considerations for MEPs
	Industry	Language, Factory location	This Code includes all statements regarding national considerations for the industry
	Council	Permanent Representation, Government	This Code includes all statements regarding national considerations for the Council
	Elections	Political Agenda, Government	This Code includes all statements regarding the national elections
Dependency other laws			This Category includes all statements regarding the influence of other legislations on the case.

	Negotiations	Individual, dependency	This Code includes all statements regarding the negotiations in between laws
	Path Dependency		This Code includes all statements regarding the vertical dependency of the revision
Position			This Category includes all statements regarding the forming of the position.
	Interest Groups	Technical, political, professional	This Code includes all statements of interest groups
	Council		This Code includes all statements of the Council
	Parliament	Interest, Stakeholder, Majority	This Code includes all statements of the Parliament
Network			This Category includes all statements regarding the network of the interviewees.
	Composition		This Code includes all statements regarding the composition of the network
	Use	Information, Awareness Trust, Interpersonal	This Code includes all statements regarding the use of the network

Association			This Category includes all statements regarding the role of associations.
	Position	Formulation, Timing	This Code includes all statements regarding the building of the position in a association
	Power	Bundle, Resources	This Code includes all statements regarding the power of an association
	Informal Coalition	Forming, Role	This Code includes all statements regarding informal coaltitions
Conversation			This Category includes all statements regarding the procedure of conversations.
	Preparation	Anticipation, Argument, Expectation	This Code includes all statements regarding the preparations of talks
	Dialogue	Honesty, Facts, Openess	This Code includes all statements regarding the happening of the talks
Enforcement			This Category includes all statements regarding contribution to the conviction of one's opinion.
	Activity		This Code includes all statements regarding the activity of interest groups

	External Factors		This Code includes all statements regarding external factors that affect the revision
	Political Agenda		This Code includes all statements regarding the relevance of a political agenda
	Interpersonal		This Code includes all statements regarding the relationship of actors
Digital			This Category includes all statements regarding digital formats.
	Social Media	Awareness, Agenda, Public Opinion	This Code includes all statements regarding the use of social media
	Events	Awareness, Agenda, Public Opinion	This Code includes all statements regarding digital events.

9.3 Interview Outline Interest Group

Einführung: Vielen Dank, dass Sie sich Zeit nehmen für das Interview.

Vorstellung meine Person

Ich würde heute gerne mit Ihnen über Ihre Arbeit als Interessenvertreter Sprechen

Es geht darum herauszufinden, welche Faktoren für Sie am Wichtigsten sind, um Ihre Positionen einzubringen und Politik zu beeinflussen. Ziel ist es den Politikformulierungsprozess zu untersuchen. Es geht um Ihre persönliche Erfahrung damit.

Ich möchte das Interview zur genauen Auswertung gerne aufzeichnen. Alle persönlichen Daten werden in der Arbeit unkenntlich gemacht, sodass es nicht möglich ist Rückschlüsse auf Ihre Person zu ziehen. Ist dies für Sie in Ordnung?

Ausgangspunkt fit for 55 - Größere Ambition bei Reduktionszielen, in dem Paket werden verschiedene Rechtsakte überarbeitet. Darunter die Flottenwerte aka CO2 Emissionsperformanz standards für PKW und Vans.

Die Kommission erhofft sich Stellungnahmen zum Ambitionsniveau der Zielvorgaben, zur Anreizregelung für emissionsfreie und emissionsarme Fahrzeuge und zu den Gestaltungselementen des Regulierungsrahmens, die es ermöglichen, den Beiträgen von erneuerbaren und CO 2-armen Kraftstoffen Rechnung zu tragen

Vorstellung:

 (kurz berufliche Tätigkeit zur Einordnung später) (Name, Position, Datum, Länge des Gesprächs festhalten)

Einstieg Flottenregulierung:

Welche Bedeutung hat die Revision für Sie und was möchten Sie erreichen?

Welche Position und Ziele vertreten Sie?

Wir sind ja Mitten im Prozess aktuell: Welcjhe Schritte haben Sie bisher unternommen? Welche Schritte sind als nächstes geplant?

Gibt es eine grundsätzliche Strategie, wie Sie Ihre Ziele erreichen möchten?

Entwicklung Position:

Wie entsteht Ihre Position?

Welche Informationsquellen beziehen Sie dabei ein?

Wie arbeiten Sie intern an Themen? Mitarbeiter mit Themenschwerpunkten etc.

Wie wichtig ist die Höhe von Ressourcen? Personal, Geld?, Research?

Wie stimmen Sie sich mit anderen Akteuren ab? Wie wichtig ist das?

Welche Rolle spielt Ihr persönliches Netzwerk? Verbände?

Kommunikation:

Wie kommunizieren Sie Ihre Forderungen?

An wen kommunizieren Sie Ihre Position?

Sprechen Sie an oder werden Sie auch angesprochen`? Mit welchem Ziel?

Welche Resonanz erhalten Sie darauf?

Welche Rolle spielen öffentliche Veranstaltungen für Sie?

Welche Rolle spielt die Öffentlichkeit/Presse bei Ihrer Arbeit? (insbesondere Klimathemen sind relevant in der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung)

Wie hat die Corona Situation Ihre Arbeit verändert?Gibt es Vorteile Nachteile für die Interessenvertretung?

Institutionen:

Welche Gesetzgebungsphasen sind für Sie besonders relevant?

Welche Institutionen sprechen Sie an? Welche sind besonders wichtig für Sie? Wieso? Berichterstatter? Kommissar? Ständige Vertretung?

Wie unterscheiden Ihre Herangehensweisen sich je nach Institution?

Wie wichtig sind für Sie persönliche Gespräche?

Wie bekommen Sie Zugang zu Gesprächen?

Welche Erwartungen haben Sie an den Gesprächspartner und was wird von Ihnen erwartet?

Wie wichtig die institutionalisierten Kanäle wie öffentliche Konsultationen, Feedbackphasen..

Welche Rolle spielen die Verwaltungsmitarbeiter für Sie?

Durchsetzung:

Welche Zeitpunkte sind besonders geeignet, um Gespräche zu erhalten / Inhalte zu vermitteln?

Wie verleihen Sie Ihrer Meinung Gewicht?

Welche Rolle spielen Gegensätzliche Meinungen für Sie, wie begegnen Sie diesen?

Welche Möglichkeiten haben Sie um Druck aufzubauen?

Woran messen Sie, ob Sie erfolgreich arbeiten?

Kontextfaktoren:

Welche Rolle spielen andere Regulierungen wie Euro 7 etc in der Ausrichtung Ihrer Strategie? Wie wägen Sie ab/ Verhandeln Sie?

Welche Rolle spielt nationale Politik für Sie?

Welche Rolle spielen Wahlen sowohl europäisch als auch national für Sie?

Strategische Interessen: Extreme Forderungen um einen Kompromiss zu finden naha am Ideal?

Denken Sie es gibt priviligierte Interessen? Wenn ja wieso?

Wie schätzen Sie die Bedeutung Ihrer Position im Vergleich zu anderen Interessensvertretern ein? Wieso? Wer hat denken Sie am meisten Macht?

Wie groß sind die Unterschiede in verschiedenen Gesetzesvorhaben/Woran können Sie abschätzen ob sie mehr oder weniger Einfluss ausüben können?

Welche Handlungsempfehlungen geben Sie Ihnenwürden Sie einem Kollegen geben, beispielsweise mir als Berufseinsteiger wenn ich in diesem Kontext arbeiten möchte: Was sind die Wichtigsten Dinge die ich berücksichtigen sollte? Was haben Sie gelernt und was würden Sie anders machen? Das waren alle Fragen – gibt es etwas, das ich noch vergessen habe oder das ich beachten sollte?Ist Ihnen noch etwas wichtig zu erwähnen? Vielen Dank, dass Sie sich die Zeit genommen haben! Wenn mir im Nachgang noch etwas auffällt, melde ich mich bei Ihnen.

9.4 Interview Outline European Parliament

CO2 Emission regulation: Which factors are key to influence policy formulation?

Themen:

Einführung: Vielen Dank, dass Sie sich Zeit nehmen für das Interview. Ich würde heute gerne mit Ihnen über Ihre Arbeit im Parlament Sprechen Als Abgeordneter und Stellvertreter im TRAN Ausschuss sind Sie ja in einer attraktiven Position für Interessensvertretung aller Art. Ziel ist es den Politikformulierungsprozess zu untersuchen. Es geht darum herauszufinden, wie Sie mit Interessensvertretern sich austauschen und wie Sie in Brüssel arbeiten. Es geht um Ihre persönliche Erfahrung damit. Ich möchte das Interview zur genauen Auswertung gerne aufzeichnen. Alle persönlichen Daten werden in der Arbeit unkenntlich gemacht, sodass es nicht möglich ist Rückschlüsse auf Ihre Person zu ziehen. Ist dies für Sie in Ordnung?

Aufschlag Thema:

Ausgangspunkt fit for 55 - Größere Ambition bei Reduktionszielen, in dem Paket werden verschiedene Rechtsakte überarbeitet. Darunter die Flottenwerte aka CO2 Emissionsperformanzstandards für PKW und Vans. Die Kommission erarbeitet beispielsweise am Ambitionsniveau der Zielvorgaben oder an Anreizregelungen für emissionsfreie und emissionsarme Fahrzeuge und zu den Gestaltungselementen des Regulierungsrahmens, die es ermöglichen, den Beiträgen von erneuerbaren und CO 2-armen Kraftstoffen Rechnung zu tragen

kurze Vorstellungsrunde (kurz Ihren Werdegang zur Einordnung später) (Name, Position, Datum, Länge des Gesprächs festhalten)

Einstieg Flottenregulierung

Welche Bedeutung hat die Revision für Ihre Arbeit und was möchten Sie erreichen? Wir sind ja Mitten im Prozess aktuell: Welche Schritte haben Sie bisher unternommen? Wann beginnt die Arbeit für Sie an solch einer Revision?

Entwicklung Position:

Wie entsteht Ihre Position?

Welche Informationsquellen beziehen Sie dabei ein?

Welche Rolle spielt Interessensvertretung für Sie?

Wie stimmen Sie sich mit anderen Akteuren ab? Wie wichtig ist das?

Wie unterschiedlich behandeln Sie die technische und politische Ebene?

An wen und wie kommunizieren Sie diese?

Welche Resonanz erhalten Sie darauf?

Wie passen Sie sich an die Reaktionen an?

Welche Rolle spielt Ihr persönliches Netzwerk?

Welche Rolle spielen Verbände für Sie ACEA, VDA, DUH?

Wie wählen Sie Gesprächspartner aus?

Welche Erwartungen haben Sie an diese/ Diese an Sie?

Wann ist der beste Zeitpunkt, um mit Ihnen zu sprechen?

Welche Rolle spielen öffentliche Veranstaltungen für Sie? Teilnahme oder Organisation?

Sie haben ja sicherlich viel Kontakt nach Deutschland: Welche Inputs geben Sie dort und vice versa?

Sind Sie in nationalen Lobbying involviert?

Arbeit im Ausschuss Sie sind ja Stellv. Vorsitzender im TRAN: Emissionsnormen- wie wird die Zuständigkeit geklärt?

Ebenso wer verfasst die Stellungnahme?

Welche Rolle spielt Interessensvertretung in der Arbeit im Ausschuss? Bei Änderungsanträgen? Bei der Besetzung der Berichterstatter?

Wie ist die Zusammenarbeit mit der Fraktion/ mit anderen Fraktionen? Welche Rolle spielt Interessensvertretung bei der Bildung von "Meinungskoalitionen?

Durchsetzung: Wie verleihen Sie Ihrer Meinung Gewicht?

Wie formulieren sich Koalitionen?

Woran messen Sie, ob Sie erfolgreich arbeiten?

Arbeit mit Rat: Wie arbeiten Sie mit dem Rat zusammen?

Arbeit mit Kom: Wie tauschen Sie sich mit Europäischer Kommission aus?

Kommissar? DG?

Wie viel Einfluss können Sie in der Vorbereitung eines Proposals auf die KOM nehmen?

Worüber tauschen Sie sich aus?

Welche Erwartungen hat die jeweilige Insitution an Sie? Was bieten Sie an?

Öffentlichkeit:Welche Rolle spielt die Öffentlichkeit/Presse bei Ihrer Arbeit? (insbesondere Klimathemen sind relevant in der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung)

Wie ändert sich Ihre Arbeit insbesondere mit Blick auf Wahlen europäisch/national?

Kontextfaktoren: Welche Rolle spielen andere Regulierungen wie Euro 7 etc in den Verhandlungen?

Strategische Interessen: Extreme Forderungen um einen Kompromiss zu finden naha am Ideal?

Denken Sie es gibt priviligierte Interessen? Wenn ja wieso?

Schlussfrage: Was ist Ihrer Meinung nach besonders wichtig, wenn ich Interessen im EP einbringen möchte?

Abschluss

Welche Handlungsempfehlungen: Was sind die Wichtigsten Dinge die ich berücksichtigen sollte? Was haben Sie gelernt und was würden Sie anders machen?

Das waren alle Fragen – gibt es etwas, das ich noch vergessen habe oder das ich beachten sollte?Ist Ihnen noch etwas wichtig zu erwähnen?

Vielen Dank, dass Sie sich die Zeit genommen haben! Wenn mir im Nachgang noch etwas auffällt, melde ich mich bei Ihnen.

9.5 Interview Outline: Permanent Representation

Einführung: Vielen Dank, dass Sie sich Zeit nehmen für das Interview.Ich würde heute gerne mit Ihnen über Ihre Arbeit bei der StäV Sprechen Ziel ist es den Politikformulierungsprozess zu untersuchen. Es geht darum herauszufinden, wie Sie mit Interessensvertretern sich austauschen und wie Sie in Brüssel arbeiten. Es geht um Ihre persönliche Erfahrung damit.

Ich möchte das Interview zur genauen Auswertung gerne aufzeichnen. Alle persönlichen Daten werden in der Arbeit unkenntlich gemacht, sodass es nicht möglich ist Rückschlüsse auf Ihre Person zu ziehen. Ist dies für Sie in Ordnung?

Ausgangspunkt fit for 55 - Größere Ambition bei Reduktionszielen, in dem Paket werden verschiedene Rechtsakte überarbeitet. Darunter die Flottenwerte aka CO2 Emissionsperformanzstandards für PKW und Vans. Die Kommission erarbeitet beispielsweise am Ambitionsniveau der Zielvorgaben oder an Anreizregelungen für emissionsfreie und emissionsarme Fahrzeuge und zu den Gestaltungselementen des Regulierungsrahmens, die es ermöglichen, den Beiträgen von erneuerbaren und CO 2-armen Kraftstoffen Rechnung zu tragen

Vorstellungsrunde

(kurz berufliche Tätigkeit zur Einordnung später) (Name, Position, Datum, Länge des Gesprächs festhalten)

Einstieg Flottenregulierung

Welche Bedeutung hat die Revision für Ihre Arbeit und was möchten Sie aka Deutschland erreichen?

Wir sind ja Mitten im Prozess aktuell: Welcjhe Schritte haben Sie bisher unternommen? Welche Schritte sind als nächstes geplant?

Entwicklung Position

Wie entsteht Ihre Position?

Welche Informationsquellen beziehen Sie dabei ein?

An wen und wie kommunizieren Sie diese?

Welche Resonanz erhalten Sie darauf?

Wie viel Spielraum haben Sie bei der Position?

Wie passen Sie sich an die Reaktionen an?

Sie haben ja viel Kontakt nach Berlin: Welche Inputs geben Sie dort und vice versa?

Sind Sie in nationalen Lobbying involviert?

Wie stimmen Sie sich mit anderen Akteuren ab? Wie wichtig ist das?

Welche Rolle spielt Interessensvertretung für Sie?

Welche Rolle spielt Ihr persönliches Netzwerk?

Welche Rolle spielen Verbände für Sie ACEA, VDA, DUH?

Wie wählen Sie Gesprächspartner aus?

Welche Erwartungen haben Sie an diese/ Diese an Sie?

Werden Sie viel angefragt oder haben Sie das Gefühl unterlobbiert zu sein?

Wann ist der beste Zeitpunnkt, um mit Ihnen zu sprechen?

Welche Rolle spielen öffentliche Veranstaltungen für Sie? Teilnahme oder Organisation?

Arbeit im Rat

Wie laufen die Verhandlungen in der Arbeitsgruppe ab?

Wie läuft die Vorbereitung für den Ministerrat ab/ arbeit bei der AstV I

Welche Gesetzgebungsphasen sind für Sie besonders relevant?

Wie tauschen Sie sich mit Europäischem Parlament und Europäischer Kommission aus?

Berichterstatter im EP? Rolle, Wie? Wer/Fraktion?

Kommissar? DG?

Worüber tauschen Sie sich aus?

Welche Erwartungen hat die jeweilige Insitution an Sie? Was bieten Sie an?

Welche Rolle spielt die Öffentlichkeit/Presse bei Ihrer Arbeit? (insbesondere Klimathemen sind relevant in der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung)

Durchsetzung

Wie verhandeln sie mit anderen Mitgliedsstaaten?

Wie verleihen Sie Ihrer Meinung Gewicht?

Wie formulieren sich Koalitionen?

Woran messen Sie, ob Sie erfolgreich arbeiten?

Kontextfaktoren

Welche Rolle spielen andere Regulierungen wie Euro 7 etc in den Verhandlungen?

Welche Rolle spielt nationale Politik für Sie? Insbbesondere Wahlkampf jetzt

Welche Rolle spielen Wahlen sowohl europäisch als auch national für Sie?

Strategische Interessen: Extreme Forderungen um einen Kompromiss zu finden naha am Ideal?

Denken Sie es gibt priviligierte Interessen? Wenn ja wieso?

Abschluss

Welche Handlungsempfehlungen geben Sie Ihnenwürden Sie einem Kollegen geben, beispielsweise mir als Berufseinsteiger wenn ich in diesem Kontext arbeiten möchte: Was sind die Wichtigsten Dinge die ich berücksichtigen sollte? Was haben Sie gelernt und was würden Sie anders machen? Das waren alle Fragen – gibt es etwas, das ich noch vergessen habe oder das ich beachten sollte?Ist Ihnen noch etwas wichtig zu erwähnen? Vielen Dank, dass Sie sich die Zeit genommen haben! Wenn mir im Nachgang noch etwas auffällt, melde ich mich bei Ihnen.