Universiteit Utrecht

Return migration and rural livelihood in Southwestern Burkina Faso

Final thesis

Valentina Gini

Student number: 3443884
Faculty of Geosciences
International Development Studies
Supervisor: Dr. Annelet Broekhuis
Date: January 2011

FOREWARD

This research is the outcome of field work conducted between February and May 2010 in Burkina Faso. During that period, I worked in ISSP – Istitut Superieur des Science de la Population - the institution which is responsible for carrying out research in population issues. Moreover, I spent four weeks in the Comoé province where I conducted very interesting fieldwork in rural villages in the south west of the country. The experience at ISSP allowed me to achieve a fundamental knowledge on migration dynamics in Burkina Faso. For that reason I would like to thank ISSP, and in particular my local supervisor, B. Dabire for providing me with the opportunity to attend an internship in such an important institution.

I also want to convey my deepest gratitude and appreciation to my supervisors at Utrecht University Dr. Annelet Broekhuis who supported me and for all her contribution to this work, with all her advice, suggestions and interesting criticisms from the start of the research to its completion.

I would also like to thank my interpreter, Harouna Derra and Soma Aicha, and all the people I encountered during my work in the villages of Mitieridougou, Boko and Dèréguè, who were very hospitable and kind in dedicating their time to answering my questions in the interviews. Without their valuable information this research paper would not have been possible.

A final thanks goes to all the people back home in Italy who supported me, first during my experience in the Netherlands, and afterwards in Burkina Faso, it is thanks to their strength and active support that this work was possible.

Last but not least, a special thanks goes to the person who took me by the hand and introduced me for the first time to the African continent, "le sorcier blanc" Franco. I will always hold on to your precious advice,

Valentina Gini

January, 2011

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Land is fundamental to the lives of rural people. It is a source of food, shelter, income and social identity. Secure access to land reduces vulnerability to hunger and poverty. However, for many of the world's extremely poor rural people in developing countries, secure access is becoming more tenuous than ever with respect to the rising competition over land. The research was carried out in Burkina Faso, where after the coup d'etat in Cote d'Ivoire in 2002 some (official) 350,000 Burkinabè migrants went back to Burkina Faso. Return migrants' status was not the same for all: some returnees were the children of Burkinabè immigrants born in Cote d'Ivoire who had never been given full Ivorian citizenship, and many of them were entering Burkina Faso for the first time.

Due to the hard environmental conditions of the north and central area of the country, the majority of returnees did not necessarily decide to go back to the areas where they or their family originated from, they also moved to other areas of Burkina Faso that had become attractive because of the availability of land. The newly returned migrants (who added three percent to Burkina Faso's 12 million population) though put a strain on the already scarce resources as they caused an increase in the competition over land endangering the delicate local environment and social balance. Moreover, with the returnees resettling the risk of them failing to reconstruct safe livelihood strategy increased.

The main argument of this thesis is that the necessary prerogative for any sustainable livelihood approach to the reintegration process is to secure land tenure. In order to achieve this diverse issues played a part, such as personal (human-financial capital), environmental (availability of natural resources) and social (social capital) and area (physical capital) characteristics. Moreover land tenure security is at the base of food security which is the first objective for sustaining any livelihood, which also includes housing, social status and a means for future generations.

Keywords: Burkina Faso, Return Migrants, livelihood strategies, land tenure security

LIST OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CSBE – Conseil Superieur des Burkinabè de l'Etranger

CONASUR – Comoté nationalle de secours d'urgence et de réhabilitation

COPROSUR- Comités provinciaux de secours d'urgence et de réhabilitation

DFID – Department for International Development

DFN – Domain Foncier National

FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization

IFAD – International Fund for Agricultural Development

IDP – Internally displaced person

INS – Institut National de la Statistique (Cote d'Ivoire)

INSD – Institut National de la Statistique et Demographie

IOM – International Organisation for migration

ISSP – Institut Superieur des Science de la Population

MBDPH – Mouvement Burkinabè des droits de l homme et des peuples

MSF – Medecins sans Frontiers

NELM - New Economics of Labour Migration

OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

RAF – Reorganisation Agraire et Foncier

RGPH : Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitation

SIAMO - Syndicat Interprofessionnel d'Acheminement de la maind'œuvre

UERD – Unité d'Enseigment et de recherche en demographie

UNHCR – United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF - United Nation Children's Emergency Fund

WAEMU - West African Economic and Monetary Union

WHO – World Health Organization

WFP – World Food Programme

BURKINA FASO: THE COUNTRY, AND ITS MIGRATION HISTORY

This chapter will give a short introduction of the historical, political, economic and cultural characteristics on migration in Burkina Faso, which as other countries of West Africa has a long history of population mobility, both regionally and internationally. The reasons and factors for deciding to migrate are diverse: long-distance trade, the search for pasture, urbanisation and plantation agriculture, armed conflict, land degradation, drought and rural poverty. Certainly, migration played a major role in shaping settlement patterns in the region (Adepoju 2005).

The second part introduces the historical migration path of Burkina Faso which, following the West African trends, has experienced important migration flows in and especially out of the country for a long time. However, because of the strong historical, cultural and then migratory links between Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast – topic of the third part – when the Ivory Coast went through a severe economic crisis at first and subsequently a deep political crisis, there was a surge of violence against foreigners, many Burkinabè nationals had to return to their country in very difficult circumstances.

1.1 Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso is a landlocked country in West Africa. It is surrounded by six countries: Mali to the north, Niger to the east, Benin, to the south-east, Togo and Ghana to the south and Cote d'Ivoire to the south-west. Burkina Faso formerly called Upper Volta gained its independence on August 5th 1960; the name Burkina Faso was given in

1984 to the country after the Sankarà revolution and means "Le pays des hommes intègres"[1] .

Figure 1.1. Location of Burkina Faso on the African Continent
Source: Ministere des Affaires Entrangér et de la cooperation
regionale au Burkina Faso

The current head of state is President Blaise Compaore who has headed the Government since October 15, 1987. Under his leadership Burkina Faso has moved towards market-oriented reforms and re-engagement with the international community. Burkina Faso has been taken on as the headquarters of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and in 2007 President Compaoré took up the presidency of the organization. Despite the decentralization process the political system is still highly centralized by the central government and is still rooted to hierarchical traditions. However, civil society is still much embedded in customary tradition and even in traditional concepts of hierarchy. The country depends strongly on foreign donor financing, indeed, at least 20% of the government budget is financed from international aid, and the majority of infrastructure investments are externally financed.

Administratively, Burkina Faso is organized into thirteen regions, forty-five provinces, and eight thousand two hundred and twenty eight villages (INSD 2006). The regions are: Boucle du Mouhoun, Cascades, Centre, Centre–Est, Centre–Nord, Centre–Ouest, Centre-Sud, Est, Hauts Bassins, Nord, Plateau Central, Sahel, Sud Ouest.

---

[1]   Burkina means "free man" in Mooré, Faso means "land" in Dyioula. Burkina Faso is thus the "the country of free men".

Figure 1.2: Burkina Faso's administrative regions and provinces.
Source: INSD

Burkina Faso is a very poor landlocked West African country with 42,8 per cent of its population living on less than 1USD per day (OECD 2008). The enclosure of Burkina Faso is one of the most important obstacles to its economic development and the availability of only few natural resources make this country one of the poorest in the world. Indeed, Burkina has a low HDI value (0.305) and is ranked at the 161st place in the UNDP Human Development Index (2010)[2]. In 2008, GDP per capita was estimated at only US dollars PPA $ 1,185 and about 86% of the population is engaged in subsistence agriculture, vulnerable to periodic drought. Poverty, thus, remains a predominantly rural phenomenon in Burkina with the proportion of poor people living in the countryside increasing from 92.2 percent in 2003 to 93 percent in 2005 to 94.1 percent in 2007 (INSD 2006). Although urbanization know some growth since 1985, as the table below shows, the urban population represents just a small part of the total

---

[2] About 40% of the population is risk of food insecurity, and 42% of residents have limited access to drinking water. Life expectancy at birth is estimated at 45.7 years, and the adult literacy rate is 27%, falling to 13% for women (IFAD 2003).

population (3,181,967). In fact, Burkina Faso is one of the least urbanized countries in West Africa (INSD 2006).

Table 1.1. Total population according to place of residence

Population according to place of residence			
	1985	1996	2006
Rural areas	6,912,367	8,711,441	10,835,295
Urban areas	1,052,338	1,601,168	3,181,967
Total Burkina Faso	7,964,705	10,312,609	14,017,262
Source : INSD, Recensements généraux de la population 1985,1996 et 2006			

Estimated at 4,349,600 inhabitants in 1960, the population of Burkina Faso went up respectively to 5,638,203 in 1975, 7,964,705 in 1985, 10,312,609 in 1996 and 14,017,262 inhabitants according to the General Census of Population 2006 (INSD 1960, 1975, 1985, 1996, 2006). The population growth rate first went down from 2.7% to 2.4% per year between 1975-1985, increased successively, from 1996 to 2006, from 2.4% to 3.1% per year.

This demographic dynamic is sustained by a quasi-stability of fertility rate at high level between 1960 and 2006 (6.2 children per woman[3]). This high fertility rate can be explained by the pro-birth environment: the customs, the social representation of the child as a guarantor of the pension scheme, the low contraceptive use and low levels of female education (INSD 1996, 2006).

In Burkina Faso, there are some sixty ethnic groups speaking almost as many languages, and three main religious groups: animists (25.9%), Christians (Catholics 17.6 % - 3.1% Protestant) and Muslim (52.4%). Under ethnicities, the main ones are the Mossi (48%), Peulh (10.4%), the Lobi (7%), Bobo (6.8%), the Mande (6.7 %), The Senufo (5.3%), Gurunsi (5.1%), the Gourmantché (4.8%), Tuareg (3.3%) and other ethnic groups represent 2.6% of the population (INSD, 2006). These groups share a common cultural background and demographics but differ as regards their culture and socio-economic and political organization.

---

[3]   This level of fertility is very high compared to the average African is leveled to 5.1 children per woman.

The average density per square kilometre went from 23 inhabitants in 1975 to 58 inhabitants in 2009 with regional disparities.

Figure 1.3: Population density in Burkina Faso (2006)

Most of the population in Burkina Faso is concentrated in central areas of the country called "plateau Mossi", while other areas are less populated. Except for the northern area of the country (region of *Sahel* and *Nord*), which is sparsely populated due to hard climate conditions, other moderately populated regions correspond to the southern fringe of the country, which are well watered *(Boucle du Mouhoun, Hauts Bassins, Cascades, Centre-Ouest, Sud-Ouest, Centre Sud, Centre-Est)*. Moreover, the areas of highest density are those where climatic conditions are unfavourable for agricultural development (Draubo and al. 2003). In 1996, population density registered an average of 38 inhabitants / km ². However, there are many disparities: the central region recorded the highest density (Centre-Est : 58, Centre-Nord : 46.8, Centre- Ouest : 43.4, Nord : 59) and less populated are the peripheral areas (Sud-Ouest : 30, Ouest : 31.2, Est : 18.5).

Since the '70s Burkina Faso has experienced environmental deterioration leading

to the phenomenon of desertification. However there are some spatial differences: the northern half of the country is more concerned by the deteriorating climate condition compared to the southern region. Furthermore from a geological point of view the southern part of the country is better endowed with good land than the north (DRABO and al). The southern regions of the country, that are better-watered and where land is available, have attracted migrants and are experiencing strong population growth, and a new challenge in the area is to solve the issue of gaining access to land. Burkina's fragile Sahelian environment is drought-prone (1973-1974, 1983-1984, 1987-1989, 1990-1991) and susceptible to flooding and soil erosion. Overall, national food production is heavily dependent on climactic conditions, and highly variable from one year to another[4].

The vast majority of the population depends on rain fed subsistence agriculture, mainly cereals for local consumption, cotton and livestock. Cereals' production (millet, sorghum, peanut, rice, corn) averages 2.9 million tonnes per year, but production varies from year to year depending on environmental conditions affecting the prices of cereals on markets (FAO 2008) Cereals are grown on 88% of the land that is cultivated for crops, while only a modest amount of fruit and vegetables are grown (INSD 2006). Other production include: rice, groundnut, cotton[5], tobacco, sweet potatoes, cassava and sesame are the major cash crops. Intensive agriculture method poses a threat to soil fertility.

Burkina Faso is the largest cotton producer in sub-Saharan Africa. Cotton is the largest source of foreign exchange earnings [6]. More than 2.5 million people depend on cotton production for their livelihood. It is responsible for generating 50-55% of all income. The sale of cotton seed is the main or the only source of cash revenue for many farmers. The economy also remains overly dependent on the export of a few products

---

[4] Moreover, The low level of food availability does not match the daily calorie needs, which is estimated at 2283 kcal per person per day (INSD 2003). In consequence the government in order to improve the poor's access to food relies on food aid (WB 2009).

[5] Cotton is the main cash crop and the government joined along with Mali, Niger, and Chad (cotton producing countries in the region) to lobby in the World Trade Organization for fewer subsidies to producers in other competing countries.

[6] The sector has been undermined recently by the sharp decrease in world prices and the strengthening of the Euro (to which the CFA franc, the currency of Burkina Faso is pegged) against the dollar. Other factors have also undermined the sector including cotton producer subsidies in the United States and China, low yields, lack of resources for research, increased competition from Brazil and losses recorded by the major ginning companies (W.B. 2009).

(cotton, lately gold, and to a lesser extent livestock) and particularly vulnerable to exogenous shocks, notably weather and terms of trade fluctuations.

Suffering environmental constrains, agriculture is also limited by poor access to credit, the intense heat, current floods, poor roads and low level of mechanization. However it is at the core of the economy and occupy over 86% of the total population, while counting for 21% on total GDP [7](OECD 2008). Livestock, forestry and fisheries account for 10% of GDP, employs 6% of the working population and represent the second largest source of income after cotton (ibid). Livestock farming was traditionally concentrated in the north, where it was the main activity in the hands of pastors in the search of grazing and water. Nowadays, the deterioration of rearing conditions (problems related to availability of water and grazing land) have forced shepherds to leave the traditional area of pasture (Sahel) to settle where land and water availability are safer (Est, Centre-Est, Boucle de Mouhoun, Hauts-Bassins and increasingly Comoé et Sud-Ouest) (IIED 2006). There has been an increase in livestock, since the drought of 1970, in regions of South west and West, where animal trypanosomiasis represents a risk to livestock. Consequently, the increasing inter-regional mobility of herds worsens space competition between livestock and crop in these regions.

Overall, the agricultural productivity suffers from some main constraints: rainfall, landlocked country, the limited resources available and finally, low diversification of production. The combination of these factors increases the vulnerability of rural actors, as well as the whole national economy.

Finally, the combination of the high rate of population growth, environmental conditions and scarce resources make the proneness to migration understandable. Burkinabè population are known for their high degree of spatial mobility, indeed, perceived by people as one of the pathways out of poverty, the phenomenon of migration affects more than one in four families, more rural than urban areas (RGPH 2006). Migration is thus a response to harsh environmental and economic conditions and increasing population pressure (A. Broekhuis 2007).

National and international migration of Burkinabè is widely considered temporary, based on a circular movement (Cordell and al 1996). However, there are many people who remain abroad for several generations. It should be noted that the Burkinabé

---

[7]   industry and services for their part ensure respectively 5% and 11% of total employment.

nationals are composed of several types of migrants: there are migrants who have long invested in various fields, among these, some are stable and others are shuttling between the country of origin and the home country.

Migration regards internal, as well as international and intercontinental movements, and it regard in particular the most vulnerable groups, who decide to diversify their livelihood strategies through migration to diminish shocks (A Broekhuis 2007). For some it represent an escape from dryer regions where the climate risks are high, for others the simply search for waged labour. Indeed, except in the case of humanitarian crisis, international migration represent for Burkinabè a rational strategies based on economic opportunities (D.Ouedraogo 2002). When these opportunities interrupt, migration stops, change to some other destination; or return to home country waiting for better possibilities. These flows, within West Africa, has been generally dominated by a predominantly North-South movement from landlocked countries of Sahel West Africa (besides Burkina Faso Mali, Niger and Chad) to the more prosperous plantations, mines and cities of coastal West Africa (Yaro 2008). Internal migration, either rural-urban and rural-rural flows, is due in part to the overpopulation of the plateau central and northern region, where the insufficient availability of resources for the population, led people to migrate to the less populated and more fertile west regions. However immigration in these fertile regions caused many environmental problems due to the rapid increased population pressure. Emerged only recently, intercontinental migration, regard only wealthier household, who can effort the high cost of migration to European or North American destinations (A. Broekhuis 2006).

1.2 International migration of Burkinabé in a historical context

The international migration of Burkinabé is a good example of the general West-African migration patterns[8]. This region has a long history of short and long distance population mobility. In pre colonial times the tribal populations in West Africa used to

---

[8] This macro-region includes 15 states, which are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea – Bissau,Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. All countries belong to ECOWAS with the exception of Mauritania which belongs to Union of Arab Maghreb (AMU)

move southwards to the present locations in search of better ecological conditions and new land safe for settlement and fertile for farming. Integration between diverse ethnic groups transcended beyond trade in commodities to include intermarriages between powerful kingdoms, exchange of slaves and military alliances (Cordell et al 1996).

Along with this regional trend, the movement of people in and out of Burkina Faso started long before the colonization period. The space currently occupied by Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta) was the site of ancient migrations which contributed to its peopling. Thus, according to oral traditions, sedentary peasants and shepherds, who were organized into autonomous social systems, settled on the territory of Burkina Faso already before the sixteenth century: in the West the Bobos, the Bwaba arrived in successive waves between the tenth and twelfth centuries, and the Senufo, the Wara and Natioro. The Nioniossés (very formerly constituted) and Ninsi (which would be related to Samo) settled in the centre. The Gourounsi (Lyell, Ko, Kassena, Nakane, Puguli, Kussace, Nuna, Sissala) settled in the centre, to the west and south. In the Northwest: the Dogon peoples who constituted one of the oldest known and the Sana. The Dogon experienced a strong migratory wave from the twelfth century and took refuge in large part on the cliffs of Bandiagara (Mali today). From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century the country experienced large waves of migration and early formation of a pre-colonial, well-structured state: the Mossi kingdoms, Fuls, Yarcé, Marka, Bobo-Dyula and Zara, Dyula (Cordell and al. 1996).

Over time migration in Burkina Faso undertook several forms, historically migrants were characterised by a traditional or "archaic" migration, which did not bring social transformation but recreated the original society in a new environment and this occurred largely due to people who were searching for security, new, safe and fertile land suitable for farming. As the main example, from the end of 1800, the Mossi group dominated all northern, eastern, and central Burkina[9], they first settled in the area, arriving from the south in the fifteenth century (Mangin 1921; Cordell and al 1996). Their settlements were gradual: small numbers of horsemen whose superior military technology allowed them to dominate the local people. The most important settlement of the Mossi became Ouagadougou. Migration played a key role in Mossi culture, and in

---

[9] which is why all research in the area consider Mossi people central to any analysis of Burkinabè social life.

their reproduction system. Marriage remained predominantly patriarchal, hence, the migration of women to the villages of their husbands was a very important form of mobility. Furthermore, because women also worked in the fields themselves, this contributed to the reproduction of the labour force. Slaves were another important part of the Mossi labour force (Cordell and al.).

It was during the colonial period that migration acquired its present magnitude, characteristics and implications. With the arrival of the colonial system, the contours of movement in West Africa changed. In fact, colonial powers introduced and enforced various blends of political and economic structures, imposed tax regimes and established territorial boundaries (Adepoju 2005). When French colonization began in 1886 Burkina Faso experienced the transformation of local subsistence economies into the capitalistic creation of cash crop and plantation economies. This stimulated important migration labour flows toward the most important colonies such as Gold Coast, Ivory Coast and Nigeria (Cordell and al. 1996). One effect of colonization was to move the centres of gravity of economic activity and to transform migration routes. Monetarised economy, development of transport and especially the expansion of export crops have helped to change the matrix of migration in West Africa (Toure Fadayomi, 1992).

In 1919 Upper Volta, which initially had been part of the colony of the Haut-Senegal-Niger, was created. The French rulers forced local people into wage-labour jobs. They introduced taxation payable only in French francs, which was the currency used to compensate only those who worked on plantations and in construction[10]. As Mande Issiaka observed (1992), during colonization every country within West Africa used to have a specialization: the role of Upper Volta was "the provider of labour force" to sustain the main building site. This was an early transfer of abundant Voltaic workers to principally the Ivory Coast. With the rise of labour migration from Mali, Togo and Upper Volta to road networks, plantations and mines in the Gold Coast and Ivory Coast, these movements stimulated and altered large-scale population migration giving rise to the male-dominated, seasonal and cross-border migration which subsequently became institutionalised. In the period 1900-1931, (Cordell and al., 1996) migratory movements

---

[10]   Some Burkinabè farmers avoided tax collectors by migrating to Ghana, where there was no forced-labour policy and where wage labourers were needed. After the work they returned home when the tax collectors had left, in time to maintain their crops.

concern mainly the Plateau Mossi to or from mainly Ghana while, the Ivory Coast was only partially involved at that time.

Between 1932 and 1947 the southern part of the colony was annexed to Ivory Coast in order to stimulate migration labour force to the Ivory Coast[11]. The dismemberment of the Upper Volta helped the Ivory Coast to consolidate its position by receiving an area equivalent to three fifths of the territory (154,000 km2) and two thirds of the population of the colony (about 2 million inhabitants) (Cordell and al. 1996). From then on, migrants in the Ivory Coast constituted very cheap workforce which enabled them to move from one point to another without permission of the administration. After the abolition of forced labour in 1946, the initial mandatory departure migration became voluntary and included women and children. As a result people could choose where to settle. They also had the opportunity to work independently. In that period, migratory flows became an individual and spontaneous socio-economic decision and no longer were dependent on labour recruitment (Balac, 1997; Blion and Bredeloup 1997).

In the first half of the 20th century, Burkinabè migrations were oriented toward two main destinations: the Ivory Coast and the Gold Coast (now Ghana), the latter offered better working conditions and wages than the Ivory Coast and gave the opportunity to migrants to escape from the above restricting French policies. Therefore, massive migrations to Gold Coast occurred until 1946. In 1923, the distribution of migrants among the two main countries of immigration was 100 voltaic workers in Gold Coast against 33 in the Ivory Coast (Amin 1974). This pattern of migration generated a shortage of workers for the plantations in the Ivory Coast up until 1946 (Cordell and al 1996).

The reconstruction of Upper Volta in 1947 did not end the flow of migrants to the Ivory Coast, which was the main destination for Burkinabè migrants. Instead, initiatives were adopted to promote and strengthen the emigration to this country such as free transport (1946) and the creation of the SIAMO (1951 - Syndicat Interprofessionnel d'Acheminement de la maind'ceuvre), which was encharge to the work force recruitment in Burkina Faso (230,000 Burkinabe during until 1958 when it was abolished) (Cordell and al 1996). These initiatives, along with the abolition of slavery

---

[11] It was a strategy to encourage labour migration to Mali as well, because the northerôôn part of Burkina had been annexed to Mali.

(1946) produced some of the earliest wage labour migrants. The economy of the Ivory Coast was labour intensive and depended on good transport infrastructure (especially road and railways) to facilitate the development of a cash crop economy. In fact, in the '20s and '30s the need for cash – to pay taxes and to pay imports – had provoked the migration of many men (Cordell and al 1996). Moreover, lower prices for cash crops such as cotton and kapok, made it all the more imperative to migrate toward capitalist zones of development as a way of accumulating needed funds. Burkinabè supplied labour force for public works throughout Burkina, for military service, rail road and for private enterprise within West Africa.

In the post war period, the economic situation in Gold Coast deteriorated while Ivory Coast experienced expansion in the agricultural sector and an increase in the demand of labour. Therefore, between 1947 – 1959 the movement towards the Ivory Coast became the predominant international flow for male Burkinabè. A key factor in the change seems to have been a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment in Ghana (at least partly fuelled by the government), whereas Ivorians continued to accept, even encourage Burkinabè migration.

Mobility has always been an important aspect of people's lives, whether related to nomadic movements, trade or agriculture. While in the pre-colonial period change of residence were generally short distances (Adepoju, 1995)subsequently, during colonial periods onwards, distances became wider and migration changed considerably. Population movements involved entire families, then they became labour movements affecting only men looking for paid work (Amin 1995), though later in the '80s and '90s there was once again a greater involvement of families in migration. While historically in West Africa the migration of women to their husbands' communities constituted an important form of pre-colonial and colonial mobility (Zlotnik, 2003), and traditional male-dominated migration increasingly became feminised. Independent female migration became a major survival strategy in response to deepening poverty in the sub-region.

After independence in 1960, the new leaders of the Upper Volta decided to continue the migration policy to provide labour to bordering countries (including the Ivory Coast and Gabon), but with the intention of making appropriate arrangements for labour migrants in order to benefit them and their country.

1.3 The Ivory Coast, major destination of Burkinabé migrants

The West African region includes both sending and receiving countries. Notably, traditional countries of immigration were the Ivory Coast, Ghana and Nigeria (especially from the 1970's when the oil boom generated availability of employment). On the other hand, the major sending countries were: Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Guinea and Togo, mainly labour exporters. Since the late 1980s, traditional labour-importing countries (the Ivory Coast, Ghana and Nigeria) have experienced political and economic crises, which have resulted in the out-migration of their nationals. Forced (expelled) migration and voluntary return migration is becoming common arising from economic and political stabilisation of sending countries or economic and political crisis of receiving countries. The political crisis in Liberia, Sierra Leon and the Ivory Coast has led to the return of many West Africans to their countries of origin. Some migrants return wealthy and establish farms and businesses while some return poorer than before.

In 1960, the Ivory Coast became an independent country, and the President Houphouët-Boigny ruled the country with the vision of an Ivory Coast with open doors to migrants. So he favoured, like the French at their time, flows of migrants to the plantations. In fact, the so called "Ivorian Miracle" was actually partly sustained by the enormous number of migrants working in that country. Part of the economic success of the Ivory Coast was also due to the unusual economic policy of openness to world economy, which actually created wealth (Akindès 2004). Immigration flows were encouraged by a liberal policy, as well as an administrative protection for immigrants, based on the idea that they were more responsive and dynamic than the local people (Akindes 2004). In fact, their contribution in the development of the economy of the Ivory Coast, through the development and growth of the plantation economy, was determining. Migrants have been attracted either to areas where there was an abundance of work in agriculture and to the region of the lagoons, where Abidjan is situated, where there were more opportunities for salaried job and self employment than elsewhere. The consequence of these economic migrations has been long-term settlement in the region, which has lead to an intermixing of ethnic groups. Economic success in the Ivory Coast has made it possible to build Abidjan and Yamoussoukro thanks to these foreign

workers and to the capital generated from their labour.

The Ivorian miracle, or the Ivorian mirage as others say – s. Amin (1967), was almost based exclusively on the export of agricultural commodities. Given the development in cash crops and prices which supported products, especially coffee and cocoa, the country experienced since independence a high growth rate, averaging 7.6% per year in the first two decades (Blot 2003). All the Ivorian economic and social system was based on this uncontrolled growth that was strongly dependent on exportation. This period was accompanied by a population explosion, largely related to the influx of foreigners into West Africa. Between 1975 and 1977, supported by the favourable world economic situation, and the high prices for its main exports, Ivory Coast's growth was unique in the West African region (Akindes 2004). But in 1980, prices of agricultural commodities on the world market began to weaken. Côte d'Ivoire then paid its economic policy based on exports, and the Ivory Coast found itself deeply indept. Agriculture, which occupies two thirds of the population and which maintains all the state apparatus is permanently affected. The growth rate falls to 0.3%, Cote d'Ivoire entered a recession that is still continuing, characterized by a decrease in available resources and population growth (Blot 2003). This lead to the worsening of the basic economy and caused a rapid degradation of living conditions, as well as the disruption of social relationships.

Ivorian nationalism and hostility towards foreigners had already started in the 'early '70s (Blot 2003). The process of "Ivorisation" started in 1972, when the President Houphouët-Boigny implemented an operation which intended to replace all foreigners working in public administration, both African and European, by qualified Ivorians. Without having a significant impact on the Burkinabé, the vast majority of whom were working in rural areas in the plantation and in the (formal or informal) private sector, this initiative was the precursory of a change in the government's attitude toward migration (Blot 2003). Ivoirization was partly motivated by a severe employment crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. After its implementation, companies were required to report periodically Ivoirization's rates of their personnel, by sector and by level of qualification. The Ivoirization process was set in a five Year Plan [12] and strictly controlled. Ministère du Travail, supported it by issuing work permits to foreigners and giving financial incentives to Ivoirization (Blot 2003). Burkinabè, as the first foreign

---

[12] The target for the period 1981-1985 was 2000 items per year

community in Côte d'Ivoire, were inevitably affected by these measures, even though they related only to urban workers, excluding agricultural sectors where they are longer present.

To ensure electoral *clientele* the Ivorian government even gave foreigners the right to vote (Balac 1997). However, this decision had very difficult consequences. The Ivory Coast opted for the right of blood rather than place of birth right for citizenship rights. This precluded to many second generation foreigners in that country to effectively gain the citizenship[13].

After the middle '80s migratory policy, which from that moment remained very open to migratory flows, was readopted to the time crisis and lead the government to reconsider the place of foreigners in the Ivorian society hence accusing them of being the cause of the crisis (déclaration du Conseil économique et social de Côte d'Ivoire 1998). This resulted in a degradation of living conditions for foreigners who gradually started to return home or migrate to other countries (Liberia, Maghrebian countries, Italy, Gulf regions etc.). Overall, more than the tension on the labor market, and its translation in terms of political decisions with Ivoirization, the economic crisis has very concrete effects on Burkina nationals installed in Cote d'Ivoire. Under these conditions Burkinabè immigrants assisted to a rapid increase in their precariousness status. On the one hand their lives, like those of the majority of population of Côte d'Ivoire, deteriorated steadily. On the other hand, given the increased economic competition, they became the target of a rejection phenomenon.

In the 1998 census in the Ivory Coast showed the total number of migrants was 2,163,644, representing 28% of the population and they were even more numerous in national parts of the forest zone (Aboisso, Abengourou). In Abidjan almost 50% of the population consists of foreigners, and it proves to be the second city of Burkina Faso and Mali (Traoré 1998). Of those, the majority came from Burkina Faso (54.3%), Mali (18.1%), Guinea (5.5%) and Ghana (4.9%) (INS, 1998). Moreover, it is important to count in this second generation of migrants those who lived especially in the South and Southwest region (only between 5 and 10% are in the North) and believes that it has

---

[13] Indeed, the Ivorian code on nationality specifies that an Ivorian is any person born in the Ivory Coast unless his/her parents are foreigners (art. 6) and any person born outside the Ivory Coast if they have an Ivorian parent (art. 7). Because the Ivorian nationality may be acquired by declaration (art. 17-23) or by public authority decision (art. 24-33), being born on Ivorian soil does not automatically entitle a person to Ivorian nationality.

rights to remain in the country. In 1988 those people were 43% and 10 years later were 47.3% of the total foreign population (INS 1998).

Taking the pretext of insecurity, on October 14, 1991 the following government of Alessane Ouattara imposed a residence permit card to all foreigners living in Cote d'Ivoire, including nationals member countries of ECOWAS, in violation of all agreements signed within this regional framework. This measure, which was aimed to control foreigners, on 8th December 1994, was followed by a new electoral code excluding foreigners.

However the success of migrant integration in the Ivory Coast depended on the chances of obtaining arable land. Land system in Ivory Coast was inherited from the colonial period which asserted that the state is the owner of all non- registered lands, customary tenure is still very important, especially in rural areas, in fact the dominant idea[14] was that "*la terre appartient à celui qui la met en valeur*" (Chauveau 2002). Thus customary authorities had important power on land issues in rural areas and government was not really involved in migrants' settlement, but its role was mainly of administrative protection. However, the loss of impetus of the plantation economy, the scarcity of arable land and the economic crisis in the early 80s, created instability in the country (Chauveau 2002). Indeed, for decades, the South, which had been under-populated, needed labour and lands were delegated to foreigner workers. As a consequence migrants became the main owner of land both through the monetary purchase or the plantation of perennial crops (30 to 40 years for a cocoa tree which traditionally were considered to be a sign of ownership). Faced with the gradual depletion of available land reserves, local people who were unable to live off the land rent, sought to reactivate the prior right and tensions emerged. It also happened that Burkinabè migrants, because of the crisis became more well-off than their ancient Ivory employer (Chauveau, 2002). In 1998 a new law on land was approved, and all non-Ivorians were not allowed to possess their own land[15]. The situation kept worsening, with young Ivory people who came back to rural areas and wanted to reclaim their land which had been sold by their parents to the Burkinabè. All this situation degenerated, during the '90s, in an exclusion

---

[14] This principle is rooted in administrative practices, but also emphasized by the President of the Republic Houphouët-Boigny.

[15] Law n. 98 − 750 of December 1998. This means that some 30% of the country's population, a considerable proportion of which has lived in the country for generations and has been the backbone of the success of the plantation sector, is excluded from land ownership.

ideology in which the migrants were seen as being the principle cause of the Ivory Coast crisis and the rising importance of the concept of *ivorité[16]*, (Chauveau 2002). Consequently, Kru (local) and Burkinabè clashed in the Southwest in late 1999. On 1999, in Tabou (south-west) of the country there was a land conflict between an Ivory citizen and a Burkinabè one. Inter-ethnic confrontation followed which resulted in the expulsion of about 15,000 Burkinabè . Afterwards, in Bloléquin (2001) a conflict between a local person and an immigrant (Burkinabè), degenerated becoming an inter-ethnic conflict with the displacement of 6000 Burkinabè (Shwartz, 2000).

The indigenous, which constitute a minority especially in the south-west areas, fear of seeing immigrants to take over local power[17] and started to chase away migrants. The concept of ivoirité, launched earlier by the President BEDIE, drifted into a ghetto ethno nationalism. When Konan Bedie became president of the Ivory Coast and later with the two coup d'état in 2000 and 2002, nationalist campaigns increased against foreigners, and by then, the Ivory Coast was effectively divided into northern ethnic groups against southern ones.

Figure 1.4. Ivory Coast in 2002. Division between North and South groups.
Source: www.developingdemocracies.com

---

[16] The concept of Ivoritè did not rise for racial reason, but was used for the first time by the Senegal President Leopold Sedar Senghor to identify the characteristics of Ivory people: style, accent, customs … thus it was used for cultural reason. However, at the beginning of '90 the concept of ivoritè was used by politician with a ethno-nationalist meaning.

[17] In some rural areas of the country they were a minority in respect of migrants: According to the democratic principle "One man, one vote", they risk losing their political prominence.

September 19th 2002 signed the start of civil war. The country was cut into two parts: in the south *Forces Armées nationales de Côte d'Ivoire,* and in the north, les *forces armées des Forces Nouvelles*. This event comes together with many abuse and violence to Burkinabè. From September 21, the Abidjan neighborhoods with a large majority of foreigners plundered and razed by the forces of order, but also by president's supporters which aim to flush out the rebels. While the Ivory government accused the Burkinabè leader of being involved with the rebels, the Burkinabè of the Ivory Coast were considered to be rebel supporters and accused of complicity.


Figure 1.5: Groups in the Ivory Coast conflict (2003). Burkina Faso had a role in sustaining rebels in the north.
Source: Club du Sahel et de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (2003)

As a consequence the Burkinabè community has been the object of violent reprisals, from both the civil population and forces. This conflict lead to the displacement of migrants, some of them grouped together, generally in the closest urban areas, and others returned to their country of origin. However for some Burkinabè the situation was very critical, such as long time migrants or second generation who did not have any linkage with their origin country.

Although a cease fire was signed already after a month many of the major political and ethnic issues that ignited the civil war – nationality, voting rights – remained unsettled and the country remained divided in two parts. Outbreaks of violence continued to occur regularly until a 2007 the Ouagadougou peace agreement created a new transitional government with Soro, leader of the rebel "New Forces", as Prime Minister and Gbagbo remaining as President[18].

Despite the history of migration flows between Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast, this community registered diverse changes during the last decades. Having invested in agriculture, in commerce or in real estate did not prevent Burkina from returning to their home country when migration' objectives declined, especially since the socio-political upheavals in the Ivory Coast over the past two decades have shown that its integration was not guaranteed. Although return migrations flows have been always present, in different size[19], in the movements between Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso, those from the end of the '90s have been impressive and driven by raising of violence against foreigners.

Burkinabè in Ivory Coast, mainly origin from the Central Plateau in Burkina, returned to Burkina not all together, but during different waves. The moment of return, reasons and time spent in Ivory Coast are all important factors which influence their resettlement in Burkina.

---

[18] The peace deal also set the terms of the most recent election – notably, that Ouattara would be allowed to run and that the UN had to certify the election results for them to be valid.
[19] Early flows were in a circular mobility system institutionalized by rural households to ensure their material well-being and the perpetuation of the Burkinabè linages. Young men were sent to the Ivory Coast for approximately two years to take part in the wage economy. Once they returned to Burkina Faso, they reintegrated into their villages of origin, the domestic economic sphere and local marital market (Cordell et al. 1996).

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL APPROACH

The theoretical and empirical literature on migration has paid little attention to the fact that many migrants return to their home countries after having spent a number of years in a host country. The second chapter begins with a review of the literature regarding return migration. The process of return migration is very broad and influenced by several determinants. While refugees are forced to flee, migrants are supposed to have some degree of choice, but when their livelihood is in danger, it is difficult to distinguish the level of choice. Central to the discourse on return migration is migrant reintegration and the opportunities they have to access resources.

These issues are introduced and discussed with respect to the livelihood approach. Nevertheless to sustain a sufficient livelihood a returning migrant needs to have access to resources and this idea will be developed along with the implications on conflict over resources.

2.1 Theoretical approach on return migration

Return migration comprises a highly heterogeneous group of players in terms of migration experiences, length of stay abroad, reason for returning, patterns of resource mobilisation, legal status and the place they return to. There are various typologies of return migration depending on various dimensions which return movements can take. These make all the discourse on return migration wider and more complex. Clearly, as Bimal Ghosh points out, return *"is largely influenced by the initial reasons for migrating as well as by the duration of the stay abroad and particularly by the conditions under which the return takes place"* (Ghosh 2000).

Starting from the reasons for migrating, I will elaborate the concept of return migration on the following levels: duration of migratory experience, place of return and preparedness for return.

As a category of international migration, return migration has been subject to various approaches or schools of thought, from neoclassical economics, the new economics of labour migration, structuralism, transnationalism to social network theory. Despite the various interpretations, return migration remains a complex field because its extent is hardly measurable nor comparable, owing to the lack of reliable large-scale quantitative data (Cassarino 2004).

Mainstream theoretical thinkers regarded debates on return migration as being a subcomponent of their analytical approaches. Historically the Neoclassical approach, has seen return as being part of a labour migration strategy, in their view, people engage in return migration because they "failed" to integrate in the host country (Herzog and Schottman, 1982). Therefore, it is believed that people move with the intention of settling permanently in the new location, but due to the fact that they have little information before migrating, they may miscalculate the benefits of migration. Those who make mistakes may have to migrate once again to obtain success. A successful migrant is supposed to integrate successfully and be more productive than in his/her country of origin, so that there will be no reason for returning. Thus, motivation for returning is in this view the failure of the migratory experience (Reyes 1997).

Different to the negative view of neoclassical thinker on return migration, New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM), sees migration as a temporary stage during which individuals want to achieve their targets in order to return to their home country (Cassarino 2004). Return, is thus intentional and the outcome of a planned strategy and will only happen once they have managed to save enough financial and human capital in order to realize their investment plans. In these two approaches the reasons for returning are driven by economic factors (Stark 1996).

From this constraint, anthropologists, sociologists and social geographers contributed to elaborating the structural approach. According to Gmelch (1980), depending on the migrant's original motivation for leaving, returning migration may represent either success or failure from the perspectives of the migrants themselves. With a broader dimension, structuralists focused on the impact of returnees to their country of origin. By doing so they deem factors in the home country as being crucial in the decision of whether or not to migrate once more and then to be able to assess whether it has been a failure or a success (Cesare 1974). Nonetheless, return takes place when individuals

27

have gained enough financial resources, information and, more importantly, when the conditions in the home country are seen as favourable. With this in mind, the Social Network theory sustains that return depends on the strength of their bond to the home country (Boyd, 1989; Fawcett, 1989). For the first time , these two schools of thought represented return migration as a stage of the migration cycle, in fact they sustained that return can be either considered temporary or permanent.

As we have briefly seen, throughout time different scholars have interpreted return migration in different ways representing it as either a failure or a success.

Returning migrants involve different players, and along with this, different reasons for returning. In fact there are various reasons for returning and these differ among labour migrants, students, women or refugees. Nowadays, migrants may return to their countries for different reasons: conflict, economic crises, human rights violations, ethnic persecution, or environmental changes are all reasons why people may choose to come back. Moreover, as well as these macro constraints there are always other personal reasons such as retirement, home sickness etc. It might be part of the initial project of migration and closely related to a successful and lasting move. The reasons for staying or for moving are always a complex combination of different factors.

Moreover, motivation to return also depends on the migratory plans: those who emigrated with a view to establish themselves permanently, will see returning as a failure rather than as an predictable outcome of their experience (Cassarino 2004). While those who migrated to experience and gain knowledge already planned to return; there are those who choose to raise children back in the home country, some others return to get married or to take care of elderly parents. Clearly, returnees have different reasons which can even overlap (R.Rogers 1984). Nonetheless, motivation for returning influence the resettlement and reintegration path back to the home country.

Another factor which greatly influence the resettlement is the length of period spend abroad. King (2000) defines return migration *as the process whereby people return to their country of origin after a significant period of residence in another country.* In the above definition it is not clear what is meant by "significant period" and nor where people return to, whether it is sufficient to return within the border of the country or return to the place of origin. Indeed, the time and spatial dimension are essential aspects that need to be clarified. The length of time spent abroad - which can

be temporal, circular or permanent migration – certainly influence a migrant's livelihood strategy. Time dimension refers to the duration of stay abroad and to all the changes experienced during the migratory experience. The process of reintegration takes is also influenced by migration experience (Dustmann 2001).

The definition of IOM (International Organization for Migration) glossary on migration (2004) refers to return migration as "*The movement of a person returning to his/ her country of origin or habitual place of residence usually, after spending at least one year in another country*". This classification is incomplete as it refers exclusively to one typology (seasonal migration); however migrations which we observe today take diverse forms. In fact, temporary migrants are those who stay in the host country for a limited period of time. Although the initial intention is to settle permanently in a country, the migrants may end up deciding to leave earlier and consequently are classified as temporary migrants. During these temporary movements people spend between three months and three years in another location before returning to their home (Cordell and al 1996). They always intend to return to their homes when they leave their homes. This generally occurs when people migrate to look after a sick relative, or to work to earn money to start a new business, or to attend school or university, or to work on a contract. Many short-term migrants are single, or move on their own. Temporary migration may again be sub-classified as circular or seasonal migration. With circulatory migration, migrant workers move frequently between the host and the home country and maintain interests in both centers. This occurs when for instance elderly people visit family in one place during one part of the year and return to stay with other family at other times of the year. Circular migration also occurs where people work in the cities during the week and return to their villages during the weekends or where people work in several locations and move between these centers regularly. In the case of seasonal, indeed, they only stay for a short period as for the harvest season or to see the family or to do business and this is determined by the seasonal character of the activities conducted, as for example agricultural work in the home country that requires significant labour input.

Finally some migration is permanent as families move and never return to their birthplace. They establish homes and lives in another location and they do not plan to return to their homeland. They are often married and move with their families, or are joined by their families later. While some of the literature refers to return as temporary,

29

such as in the case of those, like M. van Haute (2008), who believe that return migration is an open-ended movement within the ongoing migration process, other scholars refer to it as implying that return migration is the definitive end of a migration process (Gmelch 1980).

Many elderly migrants have spent a long time in the host country and have children who grew up, or were even born, in the host country. Some of these migrants may still feel homesick and have the "myth of returning", although the longer you spend abroad the lesser, in many cases, the chance of being able to reintegrate in the home country and after many years return migration is no longer an option. Some studies argued that the propensity for return migration decreases as time spent in the host country increases (Constant and Massey 2002) and the likelihood of return migration.

According to King (1986) the duration of the migration experience abroad should be optimal *"neither too short nor too long"*, so that migrants have the opportunity to invest their human and financial capital acquired abroad upon return (Dustmann 2001; Kilic. 2007).

Another characteristic of the time dimension is the second generation or further return migration because it is not rare that a significant proportion of those "returning" have never lived there and may not even have visited before (Rogge, 1994; Matsuoka and Sorensen, 2001). Those people leave behind their place of birth and travel to countries in which they have never themselves set foot, thus critically blurring the heretofore sacrosanct emigration/immigration and home/ host country dichotomies' (Stefansson, 2004). In the particular case of African countries where nationality documents are usually missing, people are not able to prove their nationality, thus they cannot even pass it on to next generations. While it is true that returning migrants who never relinquished their citizenship are typically full members of the nation, ethnic returning migrants, who may be generations removed from the kin state, are usually not full members of the nation – even if they are preferred over other foreigners. Is not rare that those people returning "home" after generations may feel foreigners in their home country, at the same time other returnee may feel a strong bond with the country of origin.

Furthermore, as I explained above, another important dimension in the debate on return migration is the place of return. Once migrants return, whether voluntarily or not,

where are they going to settle? They can either choose to return to the village of origin, or elsewhere in the country. Is it enough for a returning migrant to settle once again within the border of a country or is it necessary to settle in the place of origin? It is not that unusual for migrants to choose to settle in other areas of their country of origin if they spent a long time abroad and if they no longer have any links with the place of origin. However migrants might have lived in different places within their homeland, and thus it might be difficult to recognize the place of origin. Then, to what extent can we consider the place of origin? Should it be considered at the national, regional or local level?

Theorists on return migration do not agree on the place of return. In fact, the concept of home can mean either a specific place of residence (town, village) or the homeland as the country of origin. For some homecoming studies, such as those of Koser and Black (1997), it represents a return to the country of origin, but in particular to the place of origin where refugees (Black and Koser actually refers to refugees) had a piece of land and owned a house. Differently, Peek (1981) argued, referring to rural/urban type of migration, that a person who after having lived in an urban area returns to a rural area but not to the village of origin should not be considered to be a returning migrant. The bond with the place of origin is incredibly important for migrants, however over time these bonds may weaken: while the network plays an important role at the beginning, with the passing of time it becomes weaker.

Many factors can affect the choice of where to return: the availability of natural resources, kinship ties, economic possibilities and information. Urban areas can offer greater working conditions and opportunities, but rural areas on the other hand can offer the chance to cultivate land and can secure households a livelihood.

In particular, African literature has always focused on a return to the village of origin (Franqueville, 1987; Gubry 1996; Guimapi, 2003). Things get more complicated in the cases of returnees to very arid areas or whether the returning migrants do not find enough means and links to ensure their livelihood. Although the original village is always presented as a reference point in the lives of migrants, it may, end up not being the best one, due to a combination of economic, social and environmental constraints. For instance people might not be interested in coming back to the village of origin where they do not know people anymore, or where they are not welcome because they

did not send remittances, or where the environmental conditions are not favourable. Generally because of emotional bonds, the village of origin seems the most likely place to return to, however all the little neighbouring towns or big cities where migrants can find more economic and social possibilities are not to be excluded. Not of lesser importance is the fact that second or more generation returning migrants might not find any attachment to the village of 'origin' and might better integrate in an urban context. In fact, there are several studies which testify the growing importance of migration that leads individuals to not settle in their villages of origin, but rather in the small neighbouring towns. This is sometimes the case for retirees, who prefer to settle in urban localities or semi-urban areas to benefit from the proximity of services and to receive more facilities, visits from their children (Peil, 1995). This is also true of those who wish to engage or remain engaged in non-agricultural activities (artisans, shopkeepers, civil servants) while getting closer to their village (Chaléard, 1997; Dupont et al. 1986; Franqueville, 1987).

It is clear that "returning" does not simply mean "going home" (Hammond, 2004). Return does not only represent a return to the village but, it represents the wider notion of "homecoming" at the national level. In fact many returnees might decide to return to their home country but settle in some particular fertile area or where economic opportunities are better.

Moreover, returning to a changed country, where social relations, political structures and economic conditions are not what they used to be may be equivalent to arriving in a new place.

Cassarino (2004) points out that along with the duration of the experience abroad and the motives and the kind of migration, voluntariness is another important dimension of returning. Indeed, he (2008) defines return migration as *the return of an individual to his country of origin, based on the free will, preparedness and well informed decision of the individual and in the absence of coercive measures*. Moreover, Ghosh (2000) added that return depends, beyond the degree of preparation of return, on the socio-economic and institutional situation existing in the home country.

Key concepts of voluntariness are free will and preparedness (Cassarino 2004). In Cassarino's words (2004), the "*returnee's preparedness refers to a voluntary act that must be supported by the gathering of sufficient resources and information about post-*

return conditions at home". Preparedness regard the mobilisation of both tangible and intangible resources needed to secure their return and resettlement. Reasonably, resource mobilisation patterns vary with the experiences of migration of the returnees as well as with their social backgrounds. Moreover, preparedness pertains to the willingness of migrants to return home and their readiness to return. Some returning migrants may provide for their resettlement back home, through making sure their personal belongings and accommodation[20].

Free will excludes automatically any forced evictions. However, because of the diverse experience and socio-economical characteristics of returnee free will is a very approximate concept whose contours are fleeting. Sometimes, they may choose to return because their situation in the host country has become worse than the situation in the country of origin. Considering the "free will" as the determining factor between voluntary and non voluntary migration the frontier is still not perfectly clear. After all, all migration involves some degree of choice and in some cases people might choose to stay behind, suffering violence, hunger or both (Van Hear, 1998). Voluntary or non voluntary migration greatly depends on each situation and the period of time: some people can either choose to stay or leave and at the same time there is a certain degree of choice related to both staying and migrating. In this regard, involuntary returnees have no realistic options left other than to return, even though they often do not have sufficient means to do so. In spite of that, a unforced decision does not necessarily represent a voluntary choice.

This theoretical representation may help to understand those cases of return migration which are of course not forced eviction but do not even seem completely voluntary. However the reality is more diverse and heterogeneous than the one represented above and this framework is just a rough representation. This definition can include those migrants who might be satisfied with their situation abroad and would have preferred to remain if they had been able to do so. It can also include those who failed to adapt to the way of life in the host society and feel homesick. In the worst case free will can compromise hard economic or social factors, such as economic and social

---

[20] They prepare their return through provision of financial and investment advice for those wanting to start business or acquire land (Athukorala 1986); provision of information on labour market entry; language training for children born abroad and their preparation for entering the school system at "home" (Dumon 1976).

difficulties, or violence among different ethnic groups. Return can also be the outcome of unfavourable and unexpected circumstances abroad, forcing the individual to return home. This situation can occur as a result of restrictive and selective immigration policies, and owing to the reinforced control of borders between countries of origin and destination.

With this in mind, I wonder to what extent the "decision" to leave is based on the will of those migrants that lost their means of livelihood (land, job, etc ...) or on the political or social conditions in the country that are no longer favourable? Hence, to what extent can a migrant be prepared to return? This paper sustain that decided or chosen return should not be confused with "voluntary" return. Nevertheless willingness and preparedness are two variables which strongly influence the process of a migrant's reintegration along with motivations for leaving the country, length of experience abroad and free will really affect the chances of a successful return. Finally, the diverse dimension on the type of return (free-will *vs.* compelled return etc...) affects different patterns of reintegration back home.

2.2 Return migration and migrants' rights: a livelihood approach

Once returned, migrants have to deal with their own reintegration. This process is strongly dependent on the time one has spent abroad and the set of means (capital) he/she has been able to bring back. Reintegrating into a country might be very difficult: the return process does not always and does not necessarily translate into reintegration. According to Hammond (1999) the return process is not only about going back to something that once existed, but returning to a new, different situation and constructing new livelihoods. Obviously, reintegration strongly depends on access to resources: rights to and access to food and land, along with economic facilities, health and educational services. The latter will be discussed in the last part of this chapter.

There is an increasing consensus that the factor most commonly associated with the infringement on the human rights of migrants is their vulnerability (Bustamante 2002). Vulnerability is widely used referring to the weakness or inability to cope with a specific situation or event (Watson 1996). Vulnerability includes external (seasonal,

unforeseen events) and internal issues (inability to defend oneself) and indicates the nature of trends, problems and culture, and the ability of the poor to withstand their impact. Vulnerability can be exacerbated because of some personal characteristics such as gender, or ethnicity (Kings 2000). In addition a confounding determinant can be added concerning movements / migration of persons, referring to the extent of their embedment in a local subsistence context. Therefore, it is important to make clear that vulnerability is different to poverty: the latter describes a state with respect to an absolute or relative norm (poverty line), while differently, vulnerability, refers "to proneness to a sudden, catastrophic, fall in the level of a variable, usually access to enough food for survival" (Ellis, 2000). People move in and out of poverty and the concept of vulnerability can capture these changes better than poverty line measurements.

Return migration itself place migrants in a position of vulnerability. Moreover vulnerability depends on a variety of factors: from the characteristics of returning migrants themselves (free will, preparedness, enough social and financial capital...) and local characteristics (housing and availability of resources). Returning migrants may become victims of economic deprivation, political or social discrimination, or environmental degradation (e.g. they may be the object of discrimination and exclusion because of their belonging to a specific -ethnic or outsider- group, or discriminated by local or national government). Besides, vulnerability is strongly linked to the status of the returnee (e.g. they may encounter difficulties in proving their (national) identities and so claiming the normal rights which accompany a national in his or her own country — such as access to free health care, employment, freedom of movement). Most of the time they are homeless, unemployed and during their return they might have been victims of discriminatory practices. After settling back in their country of origin, vulnerability may effectively be created as a result of the allocation of inappropriate dwelling sites, or the unequal distribution of land (King 2000).

In order to fully understand the returnee experiences, it is necessary to examine the relationship between the returnee and the people that have remained in the country and how they subsequently perceive and react to one another. Social distance between returnees and stayers can arise from the different experiences and changes in cultural identities (Stefansson 2004). Returnees carry with them new ideas and customs from

their migratory experience and sometimes they are labelled from stayees for their different behaviour (King 2000). In the case of those who return to their village of origin, stayers and returnees might find that they differ from each other in the traditional culture, and no longer share many of the basic notions that underlie their traditions (Gmelch 1980). Returnees are often no longer aware of the life style in the society of origin, and they may have problems relating to the local community which they belong to. Other problems lie in more practical issues such as the loss of property and/or land rights, or a changed context. Returning to a home country, and sometimes to a different village within this country, where social relationships, political structures, and economic conditions are not what they used to be may be equivalent to arriving in a new place (Hammond 1999). Then, what are the opportunities that are to be accepted or how is one to feel as a returning migrant? How can returning migrants who decide to settle back in a different areas (from their origin) reconstruct new livelihoods if they are seen as immigrants?

In their struggle to achieve a secure livelihood, households try to cope with and even to mitigate or prevent such risks. Whether they succeed in this struggle or not is so crucial that it determines the sustainability or vulnerability of their very livelihood. In order to cope with this vulnerability returning migrants adopt diverse livelihood strategies in order to broaden their livelihood sources.

The livelihood approach sustains that migration is an important way of escaping poverty as it decreases household vulnerability thanks to diversification of cropping patterns or through the combination of farming and non-farming activities for example Migration often offers the only effective alternative to reducing risks (de Haan 2002) for example, for food, insecure rural households, out-migration of members during off seasons is important for the survival of the entire household that remains in the village reducing the number of people that need feeding (Ellis 2004). The absence of young men who do not eat from the common pot may be a help to households in coping with periods of food shortages (called eat away migrants). Circular migration has, for a long time, had an important role in a livelihood strategy in this regard. On the side of labour migrants (individual level) and especially in urban areas, they are vulnerable to changes in labour demand, or migratory policy changes, while in rural areas individuals have to ensure their livelihoods in a risky environment (severe climactic conditions like famine

and drought in particular in semi-arid regions etc.). However the importance of migration in livelihood experience is only of partial importance in this research. I would rather focus on the importance of the factors which contribute to building a new livelihood in the place where the returning migrants have settled again

As Chambers and Conway (1991) stated, *a livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base.*
What this definition underlies is the importance of all capabilities, and social, financial and personal assets in the formation of livelihoods.

This approach is also grounded in the idea that people's livelihoods largely depend on the opportunity to access to capitals which form the basis of their livelihood strategy. Overall, it must be remembered that at the core of livelihood approach there are different capitals:

- **Human capital** which is represented by labour and skills, experience, knowledge, creativity and resourcefulness;

- **Financial capital** is money, savings from income derived from wage labour, pensions and remittances;

- **Social capital** is about the quality of relations among people, for example, whether one can count on support from one's family or (mutual) assistance from neighbours.

- **Physical capital** can be houses, tool and machinery, food stocks or livestock, jewellery and farm equipment;

- **Natural capital** is resources such as land, water, forests and pastures. It is of particular importance for those who derive all or part of their livelihoods from natural resource-based activities, as it is often the case for the poor rural areas but also more generally, because good air and water quality represents a basis for good health and other aspects of livelihoods.

Material gains are only a part of what migrants obtain and bring back. Many labour migrants come back with acquired skills, like for instance, speaking a foreign

language or practical skills which help returning migrants to start trading or other activities (human capital asset). Starting from the consideration that returning migrants need all tangible and non tangible assets in order to achieve a sustainable livelihood, it should be noted that human, financial and social assets are all household endowments which can be brought back into the country of origin. Differently, physical and natural capital must be gained in the new place of resettlement, and might be very difficult to achieve. To some extent when migrants are able to return with a successful migratory experience (enforced human, social and financial capital) the achievement of a sustainable livelihood might be relatively easy, however its acquisition is strongly related to the level of preparedness and free willingness to return. However in absence of these prerequisites, thus in cases of a flight or a sudden escape, vulnerability might even increase. Those household that are unable to cope (temporary adjustments in the face of change) or adapt (longer term shifts in livelihood strategies) are inevitably vulnerable and unlikely to achieve sustainable livelihoods.

Returning migrants differ from each other in their level of preparedness and capacity of mobilizing all resources needed to sustain their construct of a new livelihood strategy. Moreover, the possibility for returning migrants to reduce their vulnerability situation is dependent on the extent to which they have provided for the preparation of their return (Cassarino 2004). As already mentioned above, return preparation requires time, resources and willingness on the part of the migrant. If these goals are positively achieved returning migrants are likely to reduce their vulnerability and achieve a successful livelihood strategy.

Nevertheless, the preparedness returnees is shaped by circumstances in host and home countries. Different degrees of preparedness to return bear on reconstruct livelihoods in the new place. The higher the level of preparedness, the greater the ability of returnees to mobilise resources autonomously (Cassarino 2004) and the greater their chances of escaping risky situations. Those returnees with a high level of preparedness will be able to organise their own return autonomously while mobilising the resources needed to secure their return and these migrants will have gained enough tangible and intangible resources to be able to reconstruct a livelihood strategy in new places.

The returning migrants with a low level of preparedness, are those who did not spend enough time away, thus they have not been able to mobilise tangible and

intangible resources to ensure that they are able to settle back in the home country. These migrants consider that the costs of remaining are higher than those of returning home, even if few resources were mobilised before their return. Thus, if resource mobilization in the host country remains weak, the returnee will tend to rely on resources available at home in order to reintegrate. The last case pertains to returnees whose level of preparedness is non-existent. These people have never considered returning and for this reason they did not provide for preparation to return. Depending on the resources people have and the vulnerability context under which they operate people choose livelihood strategies that will best provide them with livelihood outcomes (Ellis 2000).

2.3 Migrants' access to resources and conflicts

Reintegration process requires access to resources, a sufficient grade of preparedness and basic services to establish a self-sustained livelihood in conditions of equal rights with other residents and citizens. Self sustainability is the major objective of all returning migrants of course, but not always do they have the means to reach it. On this concern, returning migrants need access to resources (such as income, or land, education, health, house) in order to sustain their livelihood. While returning migrants in urban areas are less concerned with access to natural resources, rural people can face a lack of access in a very concrete way. Moreover the increasing environmental degradation confirmed in many areas of West Africa is negatively impacting rural community. These include loss of forest cover, depletion of soil fertility, loss of fishing stocks and pollution of water sources (Jacobs 2008). The increasing competition over resources can represent a major limit for access.

The importance of land is not only represented as a source of livelihood in rural areas but more importantly as a central element in the complexity of community social relations. In fact, land can represent social status as well as adulthood, and as a precondition for marriage. Beyond the importance of land to produce capital and high income, secure access to land provides a valuable safety net as a source of shelter, food and income in times of hardship, and a family's land can be the last available resort in

the instance of a very bad crisis (COHRE 2007). In particular some groups, as returning migrant, refugees and IDP's often have limited access to land, livestock, jobs or other sources of livelihood during their time of displacement, and the next one of resettlement.

Concerning the Sub-Saharan context, it is necessary to highlight the flexibility of indigenous land tenure arrangements which, along with growing population pressure and increasing commercialization of agriculture, particularly since colonial times (when cash crops such as cocoa, coffee, cotton, groundnut, were introduced), have given rise to gradual changes in land tenure practices in the direction of enhanced individualization of tenure, and larger incidence of land sale transactions. Historically rights to cultivate or use a piece of land have been arranged from the community itself in an inalienable element of tribal membership, generally managed by the elderly. This allocation process has contributed for some time to the redistribution of land within the community based on land and population needs (Deininger and Feder 2000). However with continuing population increase, land has started to be a scarce resource. When land acquires a scarcity value, households begin to feel uncertain about their customary rights. As population pressures on land and the critical process of saturation of land appears, local people's control of land weakens. This uncertainty can lead to commercialization and individualization of land rights or, when serious problem arise, with conflict over ownership of land, inheritance and land boundaries.

Conflict over land can take different forms and explodes especially where population is much more concentrated and resources are limited. Some situations can include competing claims to the ownership or use of the same piece of land. Whether claims are within formally recognized rights or customary ones, parties compete over the same land use or for different uses; for example, pastoralists versus farmers. Another reason for violent conflict are inequities characterizing land-holding patterns, particularly when a large landless or land-poor population has limited livelihood opportunities or inequalities in access to or control over environmental endowments and these can be exacerbated when inequalities are based on ethnicity, religion, race or class (Nafziger and al 2000). Insufficient resource management on local government can also lead to conflict. However, resettlement of returning population, which is the scope of this thesis, contributed to or led to conflict among (returning) migrants as well as

between the settled population and the original inhabitants.

After all, the sudden increase of the number of people in a region can represent a great deal of stress on the availability of resources such as: availability of food, housing, jobs and land. Conflicts between returnees and stayers may also arise from disagreements over access to property, land rights, and jobs. Studies on return migration suggest that one of the most unexpected aspects of return migration is the cool welcome, sometimes even hostile, that the returning migrants receive from the population that remained (Gmelch 1995; Stefansson 2003).

Large-scale movement of people can weaken land fertility, water balance, and organisation of resources. The impact of environmental impoverishment and depletion is crucial in the livelihood of rural communities: increased population can deplete the carrying capacity of the environment. Households therefore require more time to access resources such as water, fuel, wood or livestock. Reduced availability can thus have direct and substantial impact on household income, consumption, nutrition and health this means, that if the local population is likely to accept immigrants when there is availability of resources, when these resources then become scarcer, ethnicity and steers rights may have a stronger bearing, in order for livelihoods to be sustained.

In this picture, returning migrants can represent an additional strain on the scarce resources of the home population, especially in those communities which rely upon natural resources for their livelihood. Thus, returnees might cause a potential threat to the livelihoods of stayers if they come back to claim occupied land or property, thereby dispossessing the new occupants. Stayer populations may also view repatriates as a burden as their return might increase competition in the labour market. On the other hand, local people with scarce or saturated land availability cannot be expected to welcome large numbers of returnees. When the population of an area increases rapidly, so does the level of demand for services such as health care, education, training and transport, as well as resources such as water, land, pasture, forest produce, and housing. Unless assistance is provided to upgrade existing facilities or to provide previously non-existing ones, an influx of returnees and IDPs may cause new forms of hardship, tensions, conflicts and migratory pressures.

As illustrated, return migration is not always simply a matter of going home. Particularly returning migrants, whether or not they returned vuluntary, and whether

they were more or less prepared, faced several obstacles upon return, such as lack of financial, human, social and natural capital.

This thesis aims to explore the extent of a sustainable return for Burkinabè nationals from the Ivory Coast. According to Gent and Black (2005) the sustainable return depends on the socio-economic factors the returnee is faced with upon return. These factors include availability of employment or resources depending on the context of return. Furthermore, return can be considered sustainable if the returnee is able to construct livelihood strategies which allow him/her to survive without any external inputs (Gent and Black).

The extent of the sustainable return process and the factors which influenced it has been explored during research and they are going to be explained in the next chapter.

Chapter III

METHODOLOGY

In this chapter the focus will lie on the methods that have been used in this research paper. Firstly, the research question will be explained followed by an elaboration on the key concepts and methods used in carrying out the research. The last part of the chapter aims to explain the reasons for the sample and the location of the research and presents a short description of the research bias and challenges that were encountered.

3.1 The research question

The conflict in the Ivory Coast has had an impressive impact on Burkina Faso. Following the political crisis which began there on 19 September 2002, when the attempted coup d'état in Abidjan degenerated into an armed uprising, more than 350,000 Burkina Faso nationals who were living in the Ivory Coast returned home in very difficult circumstances. This massive influx of returnees, has deeply affected land relation in Burkina. While on customary tenure, migrants would settle on non monetized arrangements – establishing long term tutorat relationships – during the last decade the increased presence of migrants has lead to strongly monetized land transactions, and the emergence of land sales.

All these events culminated in a transformation in the economic, demographic, social and political sphere, which at times became the cause of various conflicts. This research aims to answer the following questions:

What is the context of burkinabè returning migrants from the Ivory Coast who opted for a rural livelihood and what problems did they encounter after their resettlement regarding access to land?

The massive return of migrants raises the issue of national and local reception of returnees or sometimes "foreigners" and their adaptation and integration in the area where they settled. This paper aims to answer the following questions:

- What are the migratory routes of returning migrants?

- What are the socio-demographic and economic characteristics of returning migrants?

- How do returning migrants have access to land?

- What is the institutional framework provided for enabling returning migrants to gain access to land?

- What are the returning migrants' worries regarding the land situation?

- What do local people think of returnees, and how do they cope with this phenomenon and their pursuit of a livelihood?

3.2 Definition of key concepts

Return migration and sustainable rural livelihood are the central research concepts. The definition of return migration will be defined gradually, taking into account all dimensions. The definition of sustainable rural livelihood is taken from Chambers and Conway's (1992) researches.

Return Migrants is widely, defined as any national Burkinabè person returning, temporary or permanent, to Burkina Faso, from abroad, having spent at least five years abroad (RGPH 2006).

The definition encompasses different categories of people by their place of birth, their status under the international jurisdiction, the type of migration and the generation of migrants to which they belong. Due to methodological reasons, some of them were not included in the sample although they are part of what is defined as return migration. This definition reflects the complex reality found in Burkina Faso. However, the results obtained are limited to the groups researched and should not be generalized for return

migration as a whole. As I tried to demonstrate, the attempt to study this wide category of returnees is quite complex and requires dealing with complex issues. However in an attempt to choose among these in the Burkina rural context, it resulted important to focus on returnees who spent long time in Ivory Coast (they are not into a circular strategy), settled in area different to theirs' origin and arrived in the area in the period 1999-2004.In fact, the return migration definition adopted in these study is: "*all national Burkinabè returned from Ivory Coast during the aftermath of arising violence in the Ivory Coast (1999 - 2004) having been a long-term international migrant in the Ivory Coast. Return may be permanent or temporary. It may be independently decided by the migrant or forced by unexpected circumstances, but in either case it was due to the political and social instability in the host country*".

It was often used inappropriately the term "returnee" to refer to all those returning from Côte d'Ivoire. As we understand, it comprises all the Burkinabè returning from the Ivory Coast, including those who were born there (while some arrive in Burkina Faso for the first time). However, Burkinabè who were born abroad and returning to Burkina Faso are in fact not returning migrants, even if they return to the region of origin of their parents; indeed, according to this study, they have to be considered as immigrants.

Whether national Burkinabè returning from Ivory Coast have been identified as returnees, some of them have been called *rapatriés*. While rapatrié is widely used to identify all Bayiri returnees[21], it tends increasingly to characterize migrants whose economic integration has failed and who are in precarious social or economic conditions (Zongo 2003). Moreover the term "diaspora", while strictly speaking refers to persons living outside a country and not on the national territory, and widely used to refer only to students who have lived abroad has now been extended, by those who remained, to explain the difference between second-generation migrants and the others who remained or were born in Burkina Faso. Overall *"diaspos"* are considered as not entirely burkinabè and in the Ivory Coast, they are not fully Ivorian.

Return is not considered strictly as a return to the village of origin, but widely considered return to a place within the territorial boundaries of the country of origin.

---

[21] the term "Bayiri", originally used to denote the National programme of Burkinabe nationals' repatriation

This is because many factors have influenced the decision to return which include not only place of lineages, but availability of resources and paid jobs as well. Moreover, as Burkina Faso still is a country that is primarily focused on rain fed agriculture in a context of a semi-arid (drought prone) climate, it is assumed that the agro-climatic zone influenced their choice of destination more than the place of origin of the migrants' family. Moreover for those migrants who had left long before, it was harder to re-establish linkages with the community of origin as I already explained in the first chapter.

Figure 3.1: Conceptual Model

As shown in the conceptual framework, Livelihoods is as well at the core of this approach. It comprehends all the way in which households and communities derive food, shelter and clothing to sustain their living (DFID). In this study, access to land and land tenure security are regarded as key to human livelihoods. Secure access to land reduces vulnerability to hunger and poverty. A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural resource base (Chambers and al. 1992).

Some other concepts have been used throughout this study, especially those referring to land tenure. I thus felt it was necessary to define them to better understand the context in which we use it. Access to land for the rural poor is often based on custom. Access to land refers to "the ability to use land" (FAO 2003), to control it and to transfer the rights to the land. Main aspect to enhance access to land is strenghtening land tenure security and land rights. Alternatives to enhancing access to land for agriculture may include promotion of non-farm activities and urbanization.

Land tenure as defined by FAO (2003) is the relationship, whether legally or customarily defined, among people, as individuals or groups, with respect to land. It defines how access is granted by right of use, of control, and the right to transfer land, along with relative responsibilities and restraints. Generally, land tenure systems determine who can use what resources for how long, and under what conditions.

Land tenure security refers to people's ability to control and manage a parcel of land, use it and dispose of its produce and engage in transactions, including transfers (IFAD). There are various debates about what constitutes secure tenure. An important work on this issue has been made by Bruce and Migot-Adholla (1994) who suggest that there are three components of security. These are:

• breadth, which considers what rights are held (use, transfer, exclusion);

• duration, which refers to the length of time during which the rights are valid;

• assurance, which concerns the certainty of the rights.

Land tenure security is important not only for agricultural production. It also

47

allows poor people to diversify their livelihoods by using their land as collateral, renting it out or realizing its value through sale.

In some cases multiple rights can be held by different people: rights to the same parcel of land, such as the right to sell the land, the right to use the land through a lease, or the right to travel across the land, may be held by different parties. This has given rise to the concept of "a bundle of rights". Each right may be held by a different party.

In particular:

- **Use rights**: rights to use the land for cultivation, forestry or grazing;

- **Exclusion rights:** rights to make decisions. It make possible to determine the potential beneficiaries of access rights to the property and the conditions under which access rights may be obtained, lost or transferred. This can also be a collective right. This right is only enjoyed by the legitimate and/or de facto owners.

- **Transfer rights**: right to sell or mortgage the land, to convey the land to others through intra-community reallocations, to hand the land down to heirs through inheritance, and to reallocate use and control rights (leasing arrangements and sales).

3.3 Methodological approach

The approach of the study is intentionally political and social, merging qualitative and quantitative data. The study is based on secondary sources such as contents of legislative and policy documents and census on national and regional migration, and on primary data collection through interviews in rural villages.

The methodology includes two parts: one on the search and review of existing literature, (legislative and policy documents on national and regional migration) which provided biographical retrospective migration histories of immigrants and migrants in the country, which allowed to characterize return migration from The Ivory Coast to Burkina Faso during the 2000s. And the other one is a qualitative research paper carried out by means of interviews and direct observations, which was needed to study and identify returnees' livelihoods after resettlement.

This research leads to believe that the large influx of returning migrants from the Ivory Coast, contributed to the current situation of land saturation in the Comoè region

due to the increased population pressure on the already scarce environmental resources. It also aims to demonstrate the important role of return preparedness to reconstruct people's livelihood strategy in new places.

- **Literature search and review**

The information collected has been obtained following in-depth research of the already existing statistical and documentary data relating to both migration and land regime in Burkina Faso. The aim was to understand: the historical perspectives of migration dynamics and the factors motivating the return to their country of origin; the socio-economic characteristics of migrants and land legislation.

These documents included population census, books, reports, articles and websites on the internet. The main documentation centres has been the library of Université de Ouagadougou and ISSP – Institut Supérieur des Sciences de la Population.

- **Data analyses**

The data surveys I consulted are: the UERD report – CLAIMS 2005 (European project CLAIMS- Change in Land Access, Institutions and Markets- carried on in Burkina Faso by IIED and UERD), RGPH 2006, and FSP migration 2007.

The only information collected at the arrival of people conveyed formally and those identified by COPROSUR- Comités provinciaux de secours d'urgence et de réhabilitation- in hosting provinces, provide no reliable statistics measuring the actual number of returnees and therefore no measure of their socio economic status at their arrival in Burkina Faso either. Furthermore, because of the sudden growth of returning migrants in the country much of the statistical data is missing due to the fact that the Government were scarcely prepared for the phenomenon and data lacks. Data collection suffered two main limits: the limited period of time of CONASUR's data collection (only 15 months) and the unknown number of people who did not passed official borders, or went to register in transit centre.

- **The choice of place of study**

The qualitative part of my research was conducted in May 2010 and contributed to identify the Comoè province (Cascades region) with respect to migrant settlements, the

Figure 3.2. The Comoé province.
Source: own modifications based on en.wikipedia.com

main problems faced by migrants regarding the land situation in the site of Comoè and at the same time how local people perceive the arrival of migrants.

Even though the land issue is generally significant across the country, some areas, taking into account their position and their potentiality are facing fast transformations mainly due to demographic factors. Burkinabè are used to internal migration caused by their seeking arable land. These first migratory waves at the beginning of the 1980s directed towards what is today called the cotton area, which includes the Mouhoun loop and a part of the Houet Province. Today, the main destination of migrants is indeed the Comoé province which is called the new Pioneer front. These migrants come from the old cotton area, where the land is saturated and from the Ivory Coast as well, from which they were forced to move because of political and economic problems in the Ivory Coast. Comoé is a very fertile area, which is suitable for agriculture and it has represented a strong front of pioneer and intense agricultural settlement over the past

years. Furthermore, it is geographically close to the Ivory Coast, which makes this area a very important stage for most of the massive flows of migrants who have recently arrived from The Ivory Coast. Population pressure on land in this region led to rapid social transformations and increasing resources' access rivalry. In this context, this area is of some interest to the study of land transactions. We also chose sites to study in this region.

In the Comoè, I decided to focus on three villages: Boko, Mitieridougou (commune of Niangoloko) end Derégoué (commune of Sideradougou).

Province	Department	Village
Comoé	Niangoloko	Mitieridougou
		Boko
	Sidéradougou	Dèréguè

Table 3.1: Focus on the villages. Province, Departments and villages.
Source: own modification

In particular, these villages were chosen for the following reasons:

• The strong presence of migrants who have recently settled in the area;

• The eviction of some migrant farmers from "their land" reflecting the situation of land saturation;

• The increase in land disputes between herders and farmers.

• **Interviews**

For the collection of primary data, an interview programme was implemented. Interviews have been addressed to returning migrants, local people, and local authorities. The in-depth, semi- structured interviews addressed to returning migrants were focused on their migration experience and land situation, while those addressed to locals aimed at understanding what changed after the arrival of returnees and investigated their difficulties and worries about the local land situation. Semi-structured in-depth interviews aimed to investigate how social and economical dynamics in the

villages evolved after (and because) return migrants arrival.

Interviews turn to locals, in order to identify historical path in the village's population, and the arrival of migrants. In relation to land, questions aim at understanding what the actual arrangement of access to land in the villages is, possible conflicts and ways of resolving them. In particular interviews to local authorities (Chef de Village, Chef des Terres, représentant CVGT) aimed to understand the institutional changes, either traditional and legal, of land management, before and after migrants arrived. Their contribution was essential to assess the kind and frequency of modes of access to land.

Interviews turn to migrants, focused first on the migration experience in order to analyze socio economical status of the returnee, the way to access land once in Burkina, their current method of securing their tenure.

Most of the interviews took place with the help of an interpreter. This person was a Burkinabe who spoke French, Mooré and Dioulà.

Other interviews were addressed to national representatives of Ministere de l'action social (Cecile Ouedraogo) and Ministere de l'agriculture (Amadou Sawadogo), and local administration in the two commune studies, the prefect of Niangoloko (Abraham Soulama) and the prefect of Sideradougou (Ouattara Bamaory). Those interviews aimed to focus on national and local policies adopted in the studied area, and official data which was not available in Ouagadougou.

- **The sample**

It consists of thirty migrants and thirty local people selected randomly in three different villages. Most interviews were conducted at the respondent's home, which gave the interviews an informal character and also provided insight into the living conditions of the respondents. The sample consists mainly of men as only seven respondents are female. Furthermore four ethnic groups can be identified within the sample: Mossi, Bobo (local of the south west of Burkina), Peul (nomad group of herders) and Lobi.

For research purpose more focused was given to Chef de Terre, because they are primarily responsible for the land management. They install migrants and allocate land to those who request it. They also are involved in the regulation of land disputes

Rural Actors Interviewed		
Actor	**Status**	**Interviewed (n.)**
Locals	Traditional Chef	6
	Farmers	16
	Shepered	5
	Women	3
Migrants	Farmers	15
	Shepered	11
	Women	4
total		60

Table 3.2 Respondents
Own modification

Among migrants the majority is composed of returnees. Initial objective was to interview only returnees, however, fieldwork revealed that interview internal migrants could help making a comparison.

Migrants	**30**
Internal migrants	5
Returnees	21
Rapatriés (Bayiri)	4

Table 3.3 Respondents according to migratory status
Source: own modification

Finally, the majority of migrants arrived in the aftermath of the coup d'etat, however some of them already arrived in the earlier period.

Migrants Respondents, according to the year of arrive				
Year of arrive	Mitieridougou	Boko	Dérégué	Total
Before 1999	1	-	5	6
1999 – 2001	4	2	4	10
2002 - 2006	5	8	1	14
Total	10	10	10	30

Table 3.4 Migrants respondents, according to the year of arrival
Source: own modification

In each village, permission was sought from the chief, elders and community representatives before interviews commenced. The intention was to gain the support and cooperation of members of the communities through these opinion leaders.

Because this research paper is based on a small sample, the research cannot be used to make generalisations that are immediately applicable to a wider population.

- **Direct observation**

The interviews were complemented by informal conversations and observations made prior to, during and after the interviews to see how returnees live, and go about their daily lives. Direct observation helped me very much: field visits, walking through the villages, watching landscapes and observing where people lived and what they did daily, made it easier to understand people. It also helped me to gain familiarity with local populations. Along with this, it helped me to understand more on the structures, hierarchy and social relationships within the village.

- **Difficulties and limitations**

Main problem encountered was that we went to the villages at the beginning of the wet season, thus most of the people were in the fields working all day and not available for interviews, and the villages were sometimes very difficult to reach because of the impassable tracks. In order to reach respondents we managed to get to the village during market day arranged appointments. Sometimes respondents kept information because of the increase in land disputes, and the consequent tense situation among local and returning migrants which included eviction to land which aroused fear in the area.

Moreover there is lack of reliable statistics which give the actual number of "returnees" from The Ivory Coast in that period. That's because on the one hand, there has been a lack of coordination and harmonization in the procedures and recording tools and on the other, the unofficial form of most of the migration flows.

Furthermore, interview part was carried out in the south west area of Burkina Faso, thus this research is biased on rural areas, the situation in rural areas and urban areas deviates greatly and the outcomes of the research should be considered with this in mind. Furthermore, children, returnees who have re-emigrated and other immigrants (Togolese or Mali) are not included in the interview sample. Finally I will focus on access to land as one important means of resettlement for returning migrants.

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK IN BURKINA FASO

Mobility in and out of Burkina Faso, such as within the ECOWAS zone has always been very important. Despite many efforts made to regulate migratory flows, the region is still experiencing enormous irregular flux. As for migration policy, Burkina Faso's government has tried to enforce a land policy, which is however widely ineffective in rural areas.

In this unregulated scenario, Burkinabè returnees are in a position of great vulnerability, which is handed over to their resettlement's possibilities.

This forth chapter presents migration policy and agreements, at regional and national level, followed by land legislation in Burkina Faso and a brief description of the so-called operation Bayiri.

4.1 Migration policy and agreements

The situation regarding Burkinabè returnees from the Ivory Coast is an optimum starting point to illustrate the regional -ECOWAS- , and national migratory policy. Despite its importance, necessity, and the various attempts made at both levels, the region lacks any strong and effective migratory policy to support and protect migrants.

The freedom to migrate is recognized in Burkina Faso's Constitution[22] it also guarantees the protection of the rights and freedoms of all workers living on the Burkina Faso territory, including both nationals and foreigners, however immigration policy is more problematic. After independence, intervention to regulate migration was limited and ineffective.

On 9th March 1960 Burkina Faso signed an agreement with the Ivory Coast to

---

[22] "*la libre circulation des personnes et des biens, le libre choix de la résidence et des droits d'asile sont garantis dans le cadre des lois et règlements en vigueur*" (Constitution de Burkina Faso 1991)

manage workers migration. Indeed, hard working condition of workers in countries of destination led the country to sign this agreement to humanize working conditions and better monitor migrant flows. The agreements provided for the social protection of migrants, and the creation of recruitment and transit centres financed by the countries of destination. However, the convention was suspended on June 30, 1974 due to disappointing results, as Burkinabè refused to migrate within the official framework, and the main clauses were not respected by Ivorian farmers (Konseiga 2005).

As presented in chapter 1, while in the'70s the Ivory Coast's immigration policy was really open to immigrants, because of the workforce needed, its attitude toward immigration flow subsequently changed radically due to the economic crisis. Not only did the Ivory Coast change its stance, so did all historical countries of destination (Ghana and Nigeria), and this was to be reflected in the regional policy. Actually, in all West Africa, during economic crisis' periods, governments tend to implement protectionism policies, in favour of national work force. The Ivory Coast, having sustained immigration flows in support of plantation economy, implemented, in the early '80s, a restriction policy in favour of the *"ivorisation"* of paid jobs and a limitation of land access for foreigners (Ouedraogo 1994). They enforced a resident permit in 1991 in order to control immigration flows more effectively. In that period the government of Burkina, as it feared massive expulsion of its nationals, tried to decrease emigration flows (that had historically been very high) through the promotion of rural development projects. Again, this attempt was quite a failure (Ouedraogo 1994).

From the mid-70s, bilateral instruments of migration management were abandoned and the countries of West Africa, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire included, chose the way of multilateral agreements, in the context of regional integration organizations such as Economic Community of West African States – ECOWAS[23] which is the major organization of regional integration in West Africa. ECOWAS includes two distinct economic groups, eight countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA – Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine) forming a monetary and custom union and seven non-UEMOA, with its independent currency. Both organizations, from the beginning had sustained the objectives of free movement

---

[23] This organization established by the signing of the Treaty of Lagos in May 28, 1975. It currently includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Conakry, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Togo .

of persons, goods and capitals within member countries.

In 1975, the Treaty (Article 3 Paragraph 2) provides the abolition among the member states of all obstacles to free movement of persons, goods, services and capital and the rights of residence and establishment for nationals of ECOWAS' country. The first protocol provided that each ECOWAS' citizen had the right to entry in to other member countries and stay for a maximum period of 90 days[24].

This general principle was expected to enter into force through the ratification of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment in 1979. Through this, member countries took a period of fifteen years to put this principle into practice at the national level.

ECOWAS protocol have made considerable legal headway in establishing freedom of movement and residency between ECOWAS member states, however, full freedom of movement is limited by the independent laws and restrictions, administrative harassment, and extortion from member nations. Despite all the protocol measures, travelling within the ECOWAS sub-region is extremely difficult, because of the increasing number of illegal barriers and roadblocks, and the extortion of money from travellers at every checkpoint[25] (UNHCR 2007).

The ECOWAS protocol also provided for two additional steps toward regional integration: right of residence and establishment, however, only the first stage was actually completed, specifically, the entitlement to travel without a visa among member countries for up to 90 days. Differently, the right of residence and the right of establishment are still not applied and member states had perpetually violated its provisions (Adepoju and al 2007). It is possible to deduce from this, that both at the national and regional level implementation of migration law is very weak, indeed migrants can easily move in and out the country illegally and stay longer than the time allowed in host countries.

Moreover there is a profound lack of access to migration statistics which is neither centralized in an ECOWAS database nor readily available at the national level. This

---

[24] Despite the extent, attention and the importance paid to the free movements of citizens, the region did not have a legal framework to fight against massive expulsion. Nigeria did not hesitate from expelling foreigners (mostly Ghanaians) in 1983 and 1985, and Cote d'Ivoire from doing the same in 1986, showing how regional principles were far from being accepted at the national level.

[25] In the same report, UNHCR, congratulates with Burkina Faso, for being the only ECOWAS member which recently reduced the number of checkpoints considerably.

consequence to a situation in which immigration officials in member states are unaware that ECOWAS nationals holding valid documents, such as passports or travel certificates, can enter their country freely (Adepoju and al 2007).

The only attempt made by Burkina Faso's government to regulate out migration, was in 1981[26] when the government established a pass for travel outside Burkina Faso. The year after, the text fell into disuse and was repealed. Along with national intervention, after independence, the country developed also bilateral instruments on migration management.

Burkina Faso has harmonized regional legislation on this issue and the text applicable to exit the country states that any Burkinabé individual who wants to emigrate must have a valid passport and an international health certificate and they shall enter the territory of any Member State through the official entry point free of visa requirements. Furthermore immigration movement are regulated by Burkina's national legislation which, according to the regional framework, provides a residence visa for a period of maximum three months. All foreigners who want to stay in the country for a longer period, have to regularize their position and apply for a *carnet de séjour »*[27]. The criteria for obtaining that document are defined (A/DEC.2/7/85) by specifying restrictions on age (minimum 15 years old) place where the request must be made (with the appropriate authority in the country of origin) and duration validity of the document (two years) and the regional approach was to emphasize the responsibility of the governments to ensure that nationals leave the country with travel documents and valid identity papers and should also provide adequate services to provide migrants all information necessary and likely to enable them to enter the territory of these States regular ly (i.e. through official channels)(Article 2).

However the regularization of migrant status in foreign countries created many problems. Overall, because of non-awareness of the laws, lack of documents, and most importantly the high costs of the procedures, this formalisation did not work in most of the countries (Broekhuis 2008). The difficulties of legalizing children's status in host country (Thus second generation Burkinabè) are the same: lack of parents' identity papers and high costs. Back to Burkina they were unable to show their actual

---

[26]by order No. 11 81-008/PRES/CMRPN March 1981
[27]article 5 of Ordinance 84-049 of 4 August 1984.

nationality, hence their legal status became immigrants (and not returnees), in their country of origin.

Interestingly, migrants move within the West African region usually through informal channels. As demonstrated by Pizarro (2006) most migrants enter or leave Burkina Faso without proper papers, becoming *de jure et de facto* illegal migrants. Many of them did not enter via official border offices, they did not register their presence in the country because of the high cost of formalities and the corruption of customs officers. Nevertheless most of migrants within ECOWAS area, entered immigration countries before the protocol was signed (1979). For this reason is not easy to evaluate the real nature of migration flows within the region, since most of them occur outside the framework of regional agreements on the movement of labour and many migrants do not cross official border posts, and do not possess official papers being de facto irregular migrants.

This informal framework within migrant moves in and out of their country increase their situation of vulnerability: in case of political unrest, their position is weak, both in the country of destination, but also in the home country, once they return. They usually do not receive much protection or support in working and living conditions as immigrants, but also, as in the case of Burkinabè returnee from the Ivory Coast, they could not prove their identity and sometimes were even classified as immigrants in their own country (in fact Burkinabé forced to return to their country after being expelled from the Ivory Coast did not receive the legal status of refugees).

At the moment returnees entered the country, who could prove their Burkina national identity was registered officially as a return migrant, however for all the reasons indicated above many of them (such as second generation returnees, illegal migrants...) were indeed registered as immigrants. The phenomenon of returnees from the Ivory Coast highlighted the infringement of certain fundamental rights, such as socio-economic rights related to employment, social security, health, housing, food and education. This can either be related to their status as migrants in general (because of the lack of a strong migration policy, under all aspects: regulation, control and assistance) or either to the fact they are returnees (the Government did not view a massive return positively). In both cases, returnees were faced with conditions of extreme poverty, and high vulnerability.

On a political level, the crisis in the Ivory Coast, contributed to making Burkinabè authorities' realize there was an absolute need to formulate an effective migration policy. It was consequent to this that the government of Burkina created in 2003, the CSBE - Conseil Supérieur des Burkinabé à l'Etranger in supporting migrants. This organisation had the duty of assisting Burkinabè nationals abroad, and through its initiative, the Burkina- MIDA[28] was implemented, whose aim is to sustain return migration of highly qualified nationals. However the Government had not yet undertaken any policy to fight violence against their nationals abroad, to provide for their protection, and help them out in difficult working conditions.

Most of the bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements signed, turned out to be dead letters without harmonization of national legislation (Broekhuis 2008). In fact Burkina Faso, as well as all ECOWAS region, pushed by international pressure (especially from Europe) was trying to implement ECOWAS' migration legislation, and manage migration flows more strictly, however the general approach to migration, despite its size and importance at the social and economic level, was anything but regulated, and it was hence described as laissez-faire (Broekhuis 2008).

In conclusion, Burkina Faso is in absolute need of an effective migration policy, to support and protect its nationals abroad, and in the moment of their return, when their condition was particularly difficult; in order to do so, a first step might be the implementation, ratification and respect of international, and regional (ECOWAS) conventions to protect migrants rights, guarantee their freedom of movement, residence and settlement. Another important step forward should be the vote allowed to all Burkinabé abroad, and combating illegal migration.

4.2 Land policy

As for immigration flows, the government tried to regulate land management as well, however it was (and still is) faced with several problems. The land situation in West Africa was characterized by the coexistence of two main different norm systems:

---

[28] MIDA is the 'Migrations pour le développement en Afrique' project, launched in 2001 by twenty African countries.

state law and a strong customary land tenure system, none of which was completely predominant (Chauveau and al 2006).

Traditionally, land in rural areas was an inalienable collective heritage and it was an integral part of social relationships (ibid). In general, initial rights to land were established through clearing of the bush and first occupation. The person and his descendants who first cleared the land retained a pre-eminent right over it and could thenceforth grant more or less extended and more or less temporary rights to others. At the village level, collective rights on land were managed by the Chef de Village, who had a religious and symbolic role and was also a guarantor.

Land was accessed through permanent use rights on land and resources and either ensured through lineage or family provided by the older boys. Although the exclusive ownership of land by lineage, the community philosophy over land relations was based on the prohibition of refusing land access to those who really needed it. Once assigned, the temporary right could not be challenged for personal benefits since the site had been regularly assigned and exploited, and this lead to a paradox insofar as ultimately the right of ownership ended up being subordinate to the right of use (Chauveau and al 2006). Customary actors, because of their primacy of settlement, used to hold customary rights on land. They are those who granted to immigrants permanent rights to use the land.

In contraposition, the government legislation, operated from 1960, had undertaken a process to suppress the customary system, whose respective interests were conflicting. The recent developments in rural area shave tended to undermine the principle of collective control, leading to the marginalization of the chef de terre and especially the fragmentation of lineage landholdings.

In 1984, the Revolutionary Government of the president Sankarà, promulgated a legal code on agrarian and land tenure organisation (RAF - Réorganisation agraire et foncière) which established the State's ownership of all land in the country (through the Domain Foncier National – DFN) and any previous land property or customary right was formally abolished. This situation put the vast majority of the rural population in a situation of de facto illegality. This situation nevertheless created an anarchy in the management of land, which was overlapped by customary rules that *de facto* managed to gain access to land (Lavigne Delville 2000). In practice, the government let

traditional local leaders manage land attributing them rights of use, as long as the land was not needed for some other purpose (such as the gold mines) (Mathieu P. and al 2003).

The creation of the *Domain Foncier National* resulted, throughout the territory (but more in areas of high immigration), in challenging customary rights. Indeed local customary authorities were hostile to the RAF because it was viewed (and actually was) as an attempt to undermine their legitimate customary power, and was appointed as an institution which was to provide insecure land tenure. Customary authorities accused the government of depriving them of land, in favour of migrants.

The texts of the RAF, which state that *"the land belongs to those who cultivate it or to whoever uses it"*[29] and that the State owns the DFN[30] and non-recognition of customary law[31] influence perceptions that the peasants have on land. In effect, the RAF has been also positively welcomed by all those vulnerable groups (migrants, shepherds and women) which have been victims of inequality and insecurity resulting from the previous system. However, some migrants, based on the land legislation, adopted practices against prohibitions dictated by locals on the pretext that "the land belongs to everyone". Thus migrants settled on lands that they had not been allocated, or planted trees without the consent of the land chef. This created fear for locals with regard to the future of their hold on the land. As they themselves said, many migrants did not respect customary principles, and when they wanted to punish them, they were summoned to the administrative authorities (interview with N. Z. Chef des Vieux in Mitieridougou).

In effect, each vulnerable group tried to get protection from the RAF to get support for their own personal interests of land use. As a result the interpretation of land laws of the State was different for each category of rural actors, which was ,for example, shepherd communities that had heavily relied on the state of the land property to hope to improve their access to land, and similarly, migrants felt that if the land belonged to the state, it is belonged to all citizens of Burkina Faso. To increase their resources access security, shepherds spread their activities into agriculture, thereby, they were forced to settled down in order to get the protection of the RAF, which recognized the rights to

---

[29]*« la terre appartient à celui qui la cultive ou celui qui la met en valeur »*
[30]*« l'Etat propriétaire de la DFN »*
[31]*« la non-reconnaissance du droit coutumier »*

those who effectively exploited the land[32]. Farmers' Rights, that were easier to establish, were better recognized by the Administrative authorities (prefecture, justice, etc.) in cases of disputes with shepherds. On this, transhumance shepherds were more vulnerable if they were nomads because of the legislation that did not protect or respect their rights.

This law actually resulted in giving migrants the same status of local people in rural villages, releasing immigrants from their obligations to their former hosts but destroying social customs in the villages. Many migrants seized the opportunity either to call for permanent use rights, or to challenge existing contracts under which land had to be abandoned if the customary rights holder requested it.

Nonetheless, in the context of coexistence of the RAF and the customary system, migrants got together and selected security strategies according from which they could obtain more benefits.

The RAF led to an increasing number of conflicts between indigenous and migrant communities, for instance in the west area of the country, at the increasing requests for land, local immigrants responded by taking more and more land back (Chauveau 2006). Rather than providing greater security for producers, the RAF actually increased the number of conflicts in many places. In cases of land conflicts, judge could not apply RAF because it was not the reference text when the original agreement was transacted. In some regions (Sahel and central Plateau) courts were not even consulted in resolving land conflict.

Afterwards, the review process of RAF brought to successive versions followed in 1991 and 1996, which, at the instance of the World Bank, introduced the notion of "private property", effectively removing the "revolutionary" content of the Sankara era during which it was elaborated in 1984, and recognised existing customary rights in not managed areas. Thus the government tolerated customary claims, as long as they did not compromise the state's own development plans (Mathieu, 2003). The reform of 1996 began the process of decentralisation, created the *Commissions villageoises de gestion des terroirs – CVGT* which were responsible for decentralised resource management – and therefore land tenure issues – at the lowest decision-making level; moreover in 1996 the ***procès verbal de palabre (PVP)*** was reintroduced. Although it had already been

---

[32]Art. 716 RAF

approved in 1960[33], in 1996 it had achieved its current importance, as the document most commonly used in the countryside for recording a land tenure transaction. Despite its wide spread use legally the PVP did not establish proof of ownership, but rather constituted an administrative document. The RAF's intention was to enable all Burkinabè citizens to gain access to agricultural land, regardless of their ethnicity, while also breaking the power of traditional customary chef, with the establishment of an elected village committee to administer land (CVGT). In theory, RAF was supposed to promote private economic investment in the agricultural sector by land allocation from the government.

If close to urban areas the RAF's enforcement was acceptable, in rural areas it had not been able to be imposed, and was still managed by customary Chef. Moreover, if the RAF was enacted to ensure tenure security of farmers and to ensure a rational management of natural resources, it was far from having achieved its objectives in rural areas, particularly in the Comoé province. Field investigations have revealed that the texts was largely ignored by rural peasants; and, even if they were aware of the existence of these texts, their interpretations and opinions differed from one actor to another, including indigenous migrants.

Despite its critics, the RAF was the reference frame for debate on land issues within the context of Burkinabè returnee from the Ivory Coast.

The successive attempt, the national land security policy in rural areas (PNSFMR), whose objective was to provide an effective and sustainable response to the problem of land security, taking into account the decentralization and its processes was introduced in 2007, followed by its applicative law in June 2009.

---

[33]Law no. 77-60/AN of 12 July 1960

> *The **Loi portant Regime Foncier Rural** (n. 034-2009/AN) was adopted on June 16, 2009 and was part of the land reform process announced by PNSFMR. The main purpose of this law was to strengthen rural actors security and promote investments. In opposition to RAF the PNSFMR opens the way for the recognition, of land area's to private ownership of individual . This law, actually established rights for the vulnerable and weak, like women, shepherds and migrants. But it does not arrange any restrictive measure to effectively protect them and in this group of "the vulnerable", there are some who are more vulnerable than others. If for example, women farmers are likely, because of their descent, to claim land ownership, the populations of shepherds at the end of this act, may not ever obtain land because to be qualified two conditions that are difficult to meet are required. First, the shepherds must have held rural land in question for at least 30 years uninterruptedly and must then get the act of transfer of rural land ownership. This law protects two interests: the customs through the first occupants and that of the agricultural investor, that through the lease of land and other loans, are covered for well-defined periods.*

In conclusion, land has an unquestionable importance in rural Burkina Faso, both as a tangible asset which allowed the population to escape vulnerability, ensure food security and construct livelihood strategies, and a social capital, which contributed to the dichotomy (and inequalities) local/migrants. However is still largely managed by customary authorities, while national law still remain largely ineffective.

4.3 Operation Bayiri – Homecoming[34]

After the declaration of rebellion, in September 2002 Burkinabè started escaping from the Ivory Coast after the "opération de nettoyage" (cleaning operation) of shanty town in Abidjan, supposed to be the rebels' lair. In view of the seriousness of the situation, the Government of Burkina Faso[35], in collaboration with IOM – international Organisation for Migration organised the repatriation of voluntary candidates, the so called operation Bayiri.

This operation, which in the Mooré language was supposed to give a fraternal connotation to the operation, aimed at repatriating 125,000 Burkinabé by the end of

---

[34] Bayiri is a Mooré term which mean parents' land
[35] The operation was conducted jointly by the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Régionale and Ministére de l'áction Social et Solidarité Sociale

2002, through organized car convoys from Abidjan to Burkina Faso (Ministère de l'action sociale 2003).

In the reception system planned by the government, returnees were transported to their village of origin, where their family would have supported their resettlement, especially through the central plateau (zone de Mossi). Once the returnees had arrived in Burkina, the Government provided them with food assistance and emergency health. In order to do so, the technical committee SP / CONASUR was created which was responsible for facilitating the monitoring of the implementation of the plan (it was created following the events of Tabou in 1999, and reactivated in October 2002 to address a possible mass return after the destruction of thousands of homes in Burkina Faso).

Officially, the Burkina Faso Government set up two main corridors

• Corridor Abidjan – Po – Ouagadougou (through Ghana). This corridor was used to transport 7172 people with 7 trains and 62 coaches. The first convoy arrived in Ouagadougou on 14 November 2002 and the last 7 January 2003.

• Corridor South West by crossing points possible - Banfora Batié, Goua and Leo – toward Bobo Dioulasso. By the second passage 1678 people were repatriated under the auspices of the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

After the repatriation process, reception, assistance, identification and transfer were the main objectives. Main reception site, where returnee could receive the government and its international partners' aid[36], were: Po, Ouagadougou, Bobo, Banfora and Gaoua. In each of them returnees could receive health assistance, food and received a shelter[37]. Returnees were allowed to stay in reception centres for just a few hours (CONASUR) and fearing the formation of ghettos or refugee camps[38] the burkinabè government provided only for a quick passage of up to 72 hours to transfer centre.

---

[36] Unicef, WFP, OMS, Red Cross.

[37]The returnees received hot and cold meals and 10,589 were vaccinated against meningitis, tetanus and measles and 1673 children vaccinated against polio. From November 2002 to January 2003, 1,607 returnees benefited from health support on the site of Ouagadougou.

[38]Concerning refugee camp, it is interesting to note the destruction of the village Nimpouy which was located seventy kilometers west of Ouagadougou, and hosted returnees who had not found any other place to settle. Officially It was destroyed because administrative planning procedures were not followed (as had happened everywhere in rural areas though). Some think it was rather the desire not to see too many refugees grouped together, capable of establishing a centre of protest.

According to the *Ministere de l'action Social (2003)* no Burkinabe from the Ivory Coast was to remain in Ouagadougou. Actually, main goal of this operation was to brought returnees back to their village of origin, far from the centres where they could get help, where they were entrusted de facto to their family's solidarity. Indeed, the Government did not, under any circumstance, want people stopped in the capital. The reception mechanism designed by the Government funded return exclusively to rural areas, regardless of whether the villages were that of origin or not (Interview Ministere de l'Action Sociale). Also, those who had chosen to stay in the city and especially in the capital were forced to find themselves a way of integrating into the economic and social urban context. In fact, as explained in the further chapter, the government limited its intervention to rural areas, and had no plans to support income-generating activities in urban, nor did it intend to exempt taxes or even support new entrepreneurs.

Overall, results were less then those expected. The operation Bayiri started quite late, only under international pressure, and it took two months after the start of the crisis, November 2002 and stopped early in January 2003. Furthermore, operation Bayiri touched only a tiny minority of Burkinabè nationals fleeing from Côte d'Ivoire: 8 850 people out of more than 150,000 total returnees in the same period (CONASUR). In fact, repatriated returned by other convoys and their own means constituted the vast majority (95% of total official returnees). The Bayiri operation mainly involved women and children conveyed to Ouagadougou after experiencing violence in Abidjan's shanty town or in rural areas of the Ivory Coast.

The organization of Bayiri was really chaotic, and characterized by huge waste of money[39]. Procedures were complicated: candidates had to be known to the diplomatic authorities in Abidjan, and had to wait for hypothetical convoys, because from 14th November 2002, the route had been interrupted. Officially, to improve the organization of freight transport. In reality, the returnees never received their luggage which was supposed to follow with other convoys and which was clearly diverted to some level of

---

[39] The Bayiri operation cost more than five billion CFA and was supposed to be financed up to 90% by international humanitarian organizations. It seems that the Government did not actually receive any of the promised financial support and had to revise its ambitions: only one site of reception (Po) and transit (Ouagadougou) (CONASUR, August 2003). However, in an interview granted to *l'intelligent* (9-16 February 2003), the Prime Minister announced that the funds (which amounted to 8 billion CFA francs) were available and that donors had given 90% support. These figures seemed completely bewildering, because the actual repatriations costs' amounted to 400 million CFA francs (according to the Secretary of CONASUR). (S. Bredeloup 2006)

the Bayiri operation (Blot 2003). Racketeering, operated in the convoys Bayiri by agents of the State of Burkina Faso that were supposed to protect the people and unscrupulous chauffeurs, quickly persuaded returnees to prefer avoiding Bayiri convoys. Baggage was to be transported by truck-trailers pre-empting the convoys. In reality, a large number of passengers returned to Burkina leaving their baggage in Abidjan. Additionally, the general attitude of the government toward Bayiri was less than altruistic, for instance transport business was granted to businessman who were close to the authorities, whose capacity to respond to the people's influx, and prices imposed[40] were not the most suitable for returnees, to say the least of the scarce sense of solidarity.

Despite its emergency, the Government used the traumatized Burkinabè nationals by the terrible sufferings and problems experienced by their compatriots in Cote d'Ivoire, to exploit the Bayiri operation to its benefit. Indeed, through a wide use of media, the Government asserted that Bayiri involved all returnees from the Ivory Coast, creating confusion also among returnees themselves, who for the majority returned through their own means[41]. To satisfy public opinion, the operation was widely publicized in a daily propaganda on national television and in newspapers.

In conclusion, if initially the Burkina government did not even consider the possibility of a repatriation tool and was forced by external pressure to adopt one. Once undertaken, this operation became complex for a state, whose interest on migration had historically been very low. It would be very interesting to question the sincerity and humanitarian purpose of this action because the much publicized solidarity was not followed by an effective warm hospitality neither by the government, nor generally by local people.

---

[40]The trip from Abidjan to Ouagadougou route never decreased under 25,000 CFA. (Interviewes).

[41]In March 2003, during a speech on the situation of the nation, maintaining ambiguity, Prime Minister reminded that 118 000 people had returned to Burkina Faso in the framework of the Bayiri operation. Based on these figures, the international press explained in turn: *"Depuis septembre, le nombre d'immigrés a dépassé 200 000. La moitié d'entre eux environ ont bénéficié de la campagne officielle de rapatriement menée par le gouvernement du Burkina, l'opération Bayiri "*. From this media propaganda, it was not surprising that many of Burkinabè were convinced that the great majority of returnees to the country were organized and financed by their Government.

RETURN DYNAMICS IN BURKINA FASO
(Data analysis)

The Ivorian conflict has uprooted thousands of people. The CONASUR estimated that the official figure for the number of people who returned to Burkina Faso between 19 September 2002, when the crisis erupted, and 31 December 2003 stood at 365 979. This large-scale return of Burkina Faso nationals, driven out of their host country by waves of xenophobia in the name of "ivoirité", led to a humanitarian crisis of major proportions for Burkina Faso, to the detriment of the socio-economic conditions for resettlement.

This chapter presents a general overview on returnee numbers, their motivation and paths. Along with national census (RGPH 2006) and emergency data (CONASUR) this chapter presents qualitative data collected during fieldwork, mainly regarding personal returning experience. If the government's intervention was inadequate and arrived too late, how did returnees adapt once they arrived in Burkina? And how did they enhance their livelihood strategies? What have been the factors which sustained and what did not sustain the returnee's livelihood in rural areas?

2.2 Migratory Path from the Ivory Coast

During the last decade, two key events have marked the massive return movement of people between the Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso: first the events of Tabou (1999) and the armed conflict initiated in 2002 in the Ivory Coast. As explained in the first chapter, towards the end of 1999, and following the rise of xenophobia in the Ivory Coast, local people in Tabou (Extreme South-West of the Ivory Coast) triggered a movement that aimed to put the foreigners, who had lived there for years or even more

than a decade, out of their region. The immigrants were forced to abandon their possessions and flee. Victims were mainly Burkinabè, since they provided for the majority of the labour on plantations of coffee, cocoa, oil palm, rubber, etc... In the following years, the living conditions of Burkinabè nationals, along with all other foreigners, deteriorated rapidly.

A second wave of returnees followed the Ivorian political crisis of 2002, when foreigners were confronted with harassment, beatings, murders, robberies in the absence of relief and appeals. The armed crisis, which started on 19th September 2002 experienced several jerks from that date on, during that time many Burkinabè tried to escape the rising violence in the country. Some of them went towards urban centres, while others undertook a trip toward the country of origin. The Ivorian authorities' accusations to the Burkina Faso's Government of supporting rebels and being behind the various attempts to destabilize the Ivory Coast have fuelled xenophobia against Burkina Faso nationals. In this violent scenario, Burkinabè communities were not only exposed to the dangers of military conflict, but also to humiliation, deadly assaults and destruction of property by Ivorian nationals (Interviews).

Between 1999 and 2004 hundreds of thousands of Burkinabè men, women and children were expelled from the Ivory Coast and forced to return to Burkina Faso. Official SP/CONASUR data, counted that between September 2002 and December 2003, about 365,979 Burkinabè nationals officially entered the country. Of those:

- 7,172 Burkinabè with the help of operation Bayiri;
- 6,604 people with a convoy organised by IOM;
- 3,784 people through private convoys;
- 348,419 people through spontaneous convoys.

Official census carried out in 2006 (RGPH), counted 689,055 national Burkinabè who returned to Burkina Faso from the Ivory Coast between 1996 and 2006 and at the time of the collection of data were residing in Burkina Faso. This number, however, includes all categories of migrants, from The Ivory Coast returnees escaping violence and temporary labour migrants and excludes second generation returnees.

However the data seems to be underestimating the real size of the massive return movements of Burkinabè from the Ivory Coast. First, while CONASUR data was

collected in a limited period (from September 2002 to December 2003), RGPH registered only those who in 2006 were still in Burkina Faso, and did not include those who had already left to the Ivory Coast. Secondly, it would have been very hard to measure the real entity of the return movement because of the importance of irregular return migration (all those people who had returned through unofficial borders and who did not register in the main transit centre). In fact taking into account that at the beginning of the '90s Burkinabè were the largest foreign community in the Ivory Coast accounting for more than 3,5 million people[42] (which represented 14.56% of the total population) (Zongo 2003) it is easy to understand that official data has greatly underestimated the factual size of this return flow. Indeed some estimates (Les Tocsin 2004, confirmed by l'Observateur Paalga 2008) mentioned higher numbers of around 1,000,000 Burkinabè people who had fled the Ivory Coast without knowing the exact number of second generation, and those who had stayed and those who had already left. Available statistics do not mention presence of Ivorian refugees, while they do exist (Pizarro 2005), and much second generation Burkinabè.

During the breakout of the Ivorian political crisis Burkina received not only Burkinabè nationals but also Nigerians, Malians, Niger people. Of those 610,805 who had officially entered and fleeing the combat zones and seeking shelter in Burkina Faso, 91.4 per cent were Burkina Faso nationals, other nationalities are represented in descending order of Nigeria nationals, Malians, Niger nationals, etc... (RGPH 2006).

As the graph below describes, return flows reached their peak in 2002 after a steady increase from 1999. After 2002 there was a slight decline until 2006. Clearly the explosion in the number of immigrants from the Ivory Coast in 2002 was due to the breakout of the crisis, and the flight of several thousands of people.

---

[42] Counted for 2,163,644 in official census, Burkinabè irregular migrants are likely to be much more and reach 3,5 million people (Albert Ouédraogo les Tocsin)

Figure 5.1 – Immigrants in Burkina Faso
Source: RGPH 2006

The table below shows that for the first time in a long time, in period 2002-2006 movement between Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast had a positive net migration balance (+141,777), which means that more people arrived from the Ivory Coast than those who left (RGPH 2006). This new trend remained constant until 2006, when the emigration towards the Ivory Coast had been more abundant than immigration from that country.

Table 5.1 Population exchanges between Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast			
Year	Immigrants	Emigrants	Migratory Balance
2006	26,521	49,448	-22927
2005	28,324	53,455	15869
2004	80,308	54,064	27244
2003	95,474	42,101	53373
2002	100,841	32,623	68218
Total	371,468	229,691	141,777

Source: RPGH 2006

The number of returning migrants from the Ivory Coast fell between 2002 and 2006, from 100,841 immigrants in 2002 to 26,521 immigrants in 2006. This impressive decline in immigration between 2005 and 2006 is possibly explained by the hopes for peace in the Ivory Coast with the signing of peace agreements between the two

conflicting parties.

Figure 5.2 Emigration from the Ivory Coast compared to Immigration to the Ivory Coast (2002-2006)
    Source: RGPH 2006

In particular, emigration toward the Ivory Coast overtook immigration only in the mid 2005, two years before the official Ouagadougou peace agreement. It should also be noted that migratory flows to the Ivory Coast never stopped[43], and irregular movement might have restarted already in early 2003 (Pizarro 2006). Easily noticeable circular migration between the two countries never stopped definitively, despite the official closure of the borders and the political crisis in The Ivory Coast. RGPH data also proved that the slowdown in emigration rate to the Ivory Coast in 2005 and 2006 could be explained by the change of destination in particular intercontinental destination, such as the Mediterranean countries (Broekhuis 2007).

Reasons for leaving the Ivory Coast have been diverse: beside those who escaped violence, there were those who returned for economic reasons, for an unsuccessful migratory experience. From the graph below it is possible to deduce that, with the

---

[43]   Many respondents testify this trend: according to C.D. Head household migrant in Boko, two coaches already left at the beginning of 2004 through Niangololo, but then were blocked by rebels forces in Korhogo (Cote D'Ivoire) then had to turned back. This border was still to dangerous to pass. He explained that the first motive why they tried to leave Burkina was the scarce support received by the government and their will to ensure the well-being of their parents living in Burkina Faso.

exception of 2002, the main reason for the return of Burkinabè from the Ivory Coast between 1996 and 2006, was voluntary. Which means that overall, people, not touched directly by violence, chose to leave voluntarily, many other labour migrants would have already planned to return anyway because of their migratory objectives.

Figure 5.3 : Main reason for returning
Source: RGPH 2006

Socio-political reason for return increased dramatically between 2001 and 2003. However, it should be recognized that, as suggested in chapter 2, in times of social and armed conflict, the voluntary return could hide deeper reasons related to social climate. Voluntary return may hide deeper motives such as the impossibility to conduct any livelihood activity in the country, because of the political and social imposition.

In the "hot period" of the crisis, when people fled from violence in terrible situations, people used all means of transport, all routes possible to escape death and were quick to reach Burkina Faso. Populations mostly came back alone with their own

means[44,] in buses at their own expense, or sometimes even walking for days if they failed to negotiate their travel by bus. Returnees who arrived with private coaches sometimes had to pay from 5,000 or 10,000 CFA for the journey.

Most of these flows were totally uncontrolled and arrived in Burkina Faso via several gateways:

- SOUTH: Po, from the province of Nahouri via Ghana;
- SOUTH-WEST: Gaoua in the province of Poni, and Batié in the province of Noumbiel, provinces bordering the Ivory Coast, Niangoloko and Banfora in the Comoé Province border with the Ivory Coast;
- WEST: Bobo Dioulasso in the Houet via Mali, Kader Bougou, ringed Léraba province bordering the Ivory Coast.

The boundaries of Ghana and Mali were often considered less dangerous, because these nationalities were less stigmatized[45]. Their journey home for many Burkinabè was anything but easy: they suffered abuses, violence, they were robbed and threatened. The atrocities, also documented by human rights groups (MBDH), followed the recapture of Daloa from the insurgents, who had occupied it briefly, but were also witnessed in many other parts of the country.

---

[44] As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the government repatriation, called Bayiri, regarded only 5% of the total registered returnees (Ministere de l'Action Social)

[45] The choice of these unusual and tortuous return path to Burkina Faso to has lengthened the duration of the trip but had the advantage of sow doubts to the enemy: it is sometimes difficult to distinguish Burkinabé, Mali or Ghana nationals.

Figure 5.4 Return path from the Ivory Coast
Own Modifications

Interestingly, CONASUR data show that returning migrants, settled primarily in areas or provinces different to their village of origin[46]. Estimated at nearly 400,000 by the CONASUR, returnees chose the Houet (24%), Poni (10%), Comoé (4%) or Noumbiel (2%) while they mainly originated from Bulkiemdé (11.7%), Sanmatenga (5, 1%), Yatenga (4.8%), Passoré (4.6%),which represented the Mossi plateau, where strong pressure on land offered less prospects of rehabilitation in rural areas. Land degradation, hard environmental conditions, land pressure were some of the factors which actually discouraged returnees native of northern areas to return to their village of origin. Aware of the high saturation on the Central plateau and potential conflicts that could generate their presence there, returning migrants preferred to settle in new areas. Most either no

---

[46] This surprisingly, since, studies on migration in Sub-Saharan Africa have shown that usually the village of origin has always been a privileged place of return, whether temporarily or permanently (Esoh, 2003; Guimapi, 2003; Gubry et al. 1996).

longer had family ties with the Mossi plateau[47], indeed, most of the Burkinabè born in the Ivory Coast did not have any influence in their parents' country of origin where integration remained very problematic because of the cultural discrepancy. Others did not want to settle in rural areas because of the time spent in urban centres (Abidjan) as second generation Burkinabè returnees. Indeed, many returnees settled, despite the Government's disagreement, in urban areas, especially Ouagadougou and Bobo Dioulasso. Ouagadougou was a special place, as a main destination for students.

According to RGPH 2006 registered returning migrants were mainly male (55,5%), and the majority were young people, with 33.8% under 15 years old. This might be explained by the fact that among all returnees in the period 1999-2006 a strong part was occupied by young unmarried men. Overall more than two thirds of total returnees were younger than 30. People of working age (15 – 60 years) represent 65% of total returnees, while at the national level this category represents only 49.7%.

Figure 5.5 - Repartition of Burkinabè returnees according to sex and age.
Source: RGPH 2006

---

[47] Burkinabè migrants have generally little invested in their country of origin, limiting to maintain economic support to parents stayed behind. Just few returnees have built houses in their origin villages, and their difficulties and poverty they have lived in The Ivory Coast for decades, is now more emphasized by their difficult return (Zongo 2004).

78

Although not all CONASUR data was available, within the Bayiri operation the majority of returnees were women and children, because as explained in many cases of women's interviews, men stayed behind to save their jobs, belongings and property. Among those returnees who in 2006 were residing in Burkina Faso, 35% were unemployed and 17% were students, this should have been a main concern in the government's reinsertion programmes (RGPH 2006). Among those who were employed, the majority were occupied in agriculture (84%), livestock farming and fishing. Once again this data did not present a really good picture of the situation just after the crisis, but only 4 years later when many people had already left the country.

In 2001 the total population of Burkina Faso was 12.3 million (INSD 2006), and the reception of about 1 million people obviously created many problems, especially in a landlocked predominantly rural country like Burkina Faso, where the massive immigration flows represented a significant burden.

While some returnees relied on both family of origin or customary hospitality in rural areas, those who tried to settle in urban areas were faced with a very difficult environment in which to integrate. More than being simply vulnerable because of their "migrant" status, most of returnees worsened their condition because they were deprived of their tangible (goods, belongings, property, money) and intangible (their personal integrity) resources. Each category of migrants (length spent abroad, time of arrival, region of origin, place of settlement) experienced a different level of vulnerability; even though for some return meant an increase in vulnerability, for others however it meant success in coping and managing livelihood strategies.

5.2 Returnees' categorises and analysis

Returnees came from a variety of backgrounds, they belonged to different ethnic groups, had pursued different migration objectives, spent more or less time abroad, were farmers, shepherds or traders. Moreover people returned in different periods of time and with diverse motivation.

In the return to Burkina what made the difference was their effective willingness to leave, the time they took to decide, and the mobilisation of enough resources. The

degree of willingness is very difficult to measure, however, its link with time could help to make a first clear distinction: while some had been threatened and forced to leave suddenly, especially after Tabou and the crisis eruption, others could, maybe because of those events or socio-economic factors, decide and manage their return. The crisis in the Ivory Coast began earlier than September 2002, thus the gradual worsening of the living conditions of foreigners in the Ivory Coast, lead some migrants to have time to prepare their return, gradually reorganizing their activities in Burkina while maintaining a seat on the Ivorian territory.

The introduction in 1991, of a compulsory residence permit for foreigners, even if citizen of ECOWAS, undoubtedly had negative effects on Burkinabè migrants in the Ivory Coast, leading some people already to return. The increase in costs of schooling in the Ivory Coast, and in particular in Abidjan, contributed to the return of children of Burkinabè living in the Ivory Coast, Moreover,from 1990 with the Ivorisation policy foreign students could not access scholarships in Abidjan.

The mobilisation of resources is another essential aspect in the livelihood of returnees. It regards both tangible (financial, personal belongings, possessions) and intangible capitals (contacts, relationships and personal skills). It mainly depends on the amount of resources a migrant had been able to put together during his/her experience, but also to the time spent abroad (length) and the objectives. Nevertheless, when people escaped from the Ivory Coast intangible capitals were taken to Burkina more easily, tangible assets were often robbed, or confiscated. Relationship and kinship, which are very important in the African context, were not always preserved, especially among second generation.

Linking this issue to what has been introduced in the theoretical part, it is important to analyse returnees, categorise them according to their level of preparedness at their arrival in Burkina Faso, taking into account time, willingness and resource mobilisation. Basing on interviews I could draw two main different profiles of returnees:

- There are people who arrived in Burkina Faso highly prepared. Those returnees are likely to have been in the Ivory Coast for a long time and decided to leave because of the hard situation in the Ivory Coast, however they were probably not

directly touched by violence and threatened and chose to leave "voluntarily". They probably left between 2000-2002, before the breakout of the crisis. Indeed, they had enough time to organise their journey and mobilise the resources needed to secure their return. Returnees were highly endowed with assets at their arrival in Burkina Faso, in fact, during their experience in the Ivory Coast they had accumulated enough financial (savings), social (contacts) and human (experience and skills) capital to sustain their livelihoods back in their home country (wealthy returnees, regular, long time migrants)

- Low prepared returnees did not spend enough time in the host country to accumulate enough assets and resources to mobilise at their return. This short experience was probably due to the rising violence and conflicts, economic crisis but also to their failed migratory experience. They left the country voluntarily, however they did not achieve their objectives in the Ivory Coast. On their return they did not have sufficient capital to mobilise, indeed, they had to rely on local resources or opportunities (Short time migrants, circular).

- Those who were forced to leave for safety reasons (after Tabou events, consequent to the breakout of conflict in the "hot zone" Abidjan and department of Daloa, Vavoua or Duekoué) were not prepared at all. They had to leave suddenly due to dangerous events, leaving everything behind: tangible and intangible capitals. These people were actually forced to leave, and represented the most vulnerable people, who reached the country in very bad shape[48] (Women alone, irregular, second generations).

Each of these categories, include a heterogeneity of people, which I tried to group together in order to simplify the line of reasoning. So, each category represented different livelihood strategies, those that had been adopted and returnees who had arrived in the country, dependent on factors represented above.

Highly prepared returnees proceeded by stages, removing first the women and children, and managing a plot of land to work and to build a house. They used their social capital (relationships and contacts) to decide where to settle, according to where

---

[48] women sometimes raped, with their children after, and in many cases with their husbands killed in The Ivory Coast. They usually arrived in a state of complete denutrition, often sick and traumatized by the treatments (extortion, rape, beatings, etc..) Or by what they saw as a horrific scenes.

they had this relationship. Thanks to their preparation at the moment of return, they could actually be safe. Using their capital achieved in the Ivory Coast, they were able to use both tangible and intangible assets and reconstruct livelihood strategies. Indeed, they were skilled farmers, with a sufficient financial capital which enabled them to have access to land in rural land, whereas monetisation of land transaction was spreading. Among the people interviewed, highly prepared returnees, mostly returned around 2000 and had better settling conditions with local people, because of the low immigration pressure in the area of the Comoé.

Those who arrived in the Ivory Coast after a short time had not had time to accumulate capital and preferred to limit risk and return rapidly across the country, especially toward their home village, where they could rely on kinship relations for support after their return. Those poorly prepared, failed to achieve enough assets in the Ivory Coast, and they could not even return to the Ivory Coast because they had nothing there, and had to be supported by their home community in order to reconstruct any livelihood strategy.

Those who had been involved in the violence, returned in the worst condition. As mentioned already they were the most vulnerable. Among those there are those who had waited until the last minute before leaving, women re-entered in awful conditions (with children, sometimes victims of abuse while their husbands were killed or beaten). There were men, but particularly women and children who were the most vulnerable, that had been deprived of all their belongings and also second generation returnees, who sometimes entered the country for the first time, and had no direct roots in Burkina Faso. Some of them settled in urban centres (Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso), others settled in the bordering region with the Ivory Coast in order to return again. Their return had different purposes: to collect the belongings left behind, to return to family members, or to continue their interrupted migratory experience. As confirmed by interviews many of those who had arrived in the worst condition in Burkina, especially after 2002 onward, stayed near frontier regions, such as Gaoua or Banfora and at the time of fieldwork they had already gone back to the Ivory Coast as soon as the violence in the country had ceased.

Returnees were mainly occupied in the agricultural sector in rural areas as they had been used to working in the plantations, but also in trade (Zongo 2003). Their

experience in the Ivory Coast had allowed them to enhance their skills, improve their know-how, and gain financial capital in farming and trade. The fact of having invested in agricultural and commercial activities had stimulated returnees to return to the Ivory Coast. Among those who left significant tangible assets in the Ivory Coast there are those who waited for a favourable moment to sell their business before reinvesting permanently in Burkina Faso, while other people, who were more optimistic hoped for a lull before resettling in the Ivory Coast.

At the moment of resettling in rural areas returnees needed to adopt new strategies for coping, if in some cases they had been supported by locals (many locals declared that they had given their land to returnees in order for them to be able to get the first harvest, they also hosted them in their houses, and fed their children), they also needed essential assets to reconstruct safe livelihoods. They first needed to have access to land, and all related resources (water and seeds), furthermore they used all their human capital (knowledge and experience they had gained in the Ivory Coast) to achieve concrete results in food safety and health.

5.3 Government intervention in assisting returning migrants

Obviously, this massive influx of people from the Ivory Coast, most of those who had arrived in very difficult conditions, needed a strong support programme to ensure a livelihood at least during the first year. While some had been helped by local people[49], the majority of the returnees expected government support which was unlikely to come. Indeed, already before the coup d'etat of 19th September 2002, the Burkinabè movement for human rights (MBDPH) denounced the government's inertia and also the the Solidarité Paalga's editor asked for the dissolution of the CSBE (Conseil Superieur des Brukinabè de l'Etranger) because of its incapability to defend Burkinabè in the Ivory Coast (L'Observateur Paalge 2002).

Nevertheless, after this initial stage of inactivity, during which the Government

---

[49]The local support evidently had not the same size all over the country. While in the study area (the comoé) all migrants and locals remarked the good welcome of locals, the Tocsin's president (association for reintegration of Burkinabè returnees) emphasized the indifference of locals in the reintegration process (Ouedraogo 2002).

tried to sustain Burkinabè to stay in the Ivory Coast[50], the government finally took action and implemented the emergency action -operation Bayiri- in November 2002 and afterwards in June 2003 started a reinsertion program. The plan of support for the economic reintegration of returnees, was committed to creating favourable conditions for social and economic reinsertion of returnees in their place of origin, especially targeted to 280,000 "needy and vulnerable" people (Ministere de l'Action Social 2003). In particular, main concern for the government was food security in rural areas, health, education (Ministre de l'Action Social et de la Solidarité nationale 2003) and agriculture. The programme was implemented according to the relevant minister for each sector. Thus it involved: Ministre de l'Action Social et de la Solidarité nationale; Ministre de l'Administration Territoriale et de la Décentralisation; Ministre des Finance et du Budget; Ministre de l'Economie et du Dévelopment; Ministre de l'Education and the Ministre de la Sante.

After the emergency phase, the Government supported only return to rural areas, whether on not area of origin. Because of the strong land pressure which some regions were facing, and in order to prevent tensions between returnees and locals, the government encouraged the returnees to settle in areas that were still to be exploited[51]. In the departments, the actions of the authorities were sometimes limited to the awareness of traditional authorities, in order for them to facilitate the reception of returnees in need of help. Some instructions have also been given to administrative authorities of principal reception areas to facilitate returnees' resettlement. These instructions passed from province's authorities, to the commune and village level, until reach traditional chef du village. In certain area (Comoé – Gaoua) returnees received from the Conasur improved seeds, agricultural tools, and some other have been installed in the area managed by the rice's irrigated culture.

Indeed, notably, most of the returnees used to work in the agricultural sector in the

---

[50] The Prime Minister in an interview to L'Observaeur Paalga (14 October 2002) affirmed that the Government did not intend to work on a mass repatriation, rather they were working in order to find, along with the international community, a solution to the problem of violence against Burkinabè nationals in The Ivory Coast. At that time, the Government did not want Burkinabè migrants back to the country, however, the negative perception of the phenomenon of return migration significantly affected the management of the operation.

[51] This has been common in the Government's policy: Also at the time of RAF, the main aim was to encourage wide scale immigration flows of Mossi farmers escaped the economic and ecological hardship of their home regions by moving into the land-abundant and agriculturally fertile regions of the south west. (Faure, 1995; Laurent and Mathieu)

Ivory Coast, and valued Ivory's forest areas, and once they arrived in Burkina they are landless peasants. In this context the Minister for agriculture implemented a rural project with the support of World Bank which was funded with 3 billion CFA. The idea was to take advantage of the experience and know-how of returnees from the Ivory Coast by funding micro-projects on agricultural, fishery and forestry production. To receive these funds, these returnees from the Ivory Coast had to integrate into farmers' organizations that were already recognized and implemented in villages where they settled. It supported 1,764 micro-projects and involved 12,000 returnees. Another project in the Dakolé, made by CSBE, aimed at supporting returnees' for a rural reinsertion. CSBE sustained qualified and experienced modern farmers and tried to prevent their return to the Ivory Coast, but it was actually a drop in the ocean. However, if this project was offered on a large scale to returnees, it would certainly create discontent among the many very poor non-migrants who were also in search of land. Similarly, the emergency project for agricultural assistance funded by FAO, in support of Burkina Faso's government enabled some three thousand families, or 12,731 returnees, to be supported in their initiatives. The already scarce Government intervention, was carried out by making pressure over local government and Chef de Terre, to facilitate returnees reintegration and access to land.

The Government was also involved in the work of the National Crisis with large institutions present in Ouagadougou including WFP, UNICEF, WHO, MSF Luxembourg, CRS - CATWEL the CARITAS, OXFAM - International. All these institutions in addition to their contribution to the plan of government had developed their own plans based on their specific areas of intervention. Upon the arrival of returnees in November 2002, in the field of education, for example, the Government provided instructions to facilitate the enrolment of students and students returning to primary, secondary and higher education throughout the territory. According to the Ministere de l'Action Sociale almost all children repatriated were able to continue their studies during the academic year 2002 to 2003 with the financial support of UNICEF[52].

Despite the enforcement of reintegration programme, results were barely

---

[52]The support of UNICEF in the amount of forty million (40,000,000) FCFA helped provide school kits for primary school students returned with a first instalment of twenty million (20,000,000) CFA francs. A formal request was sent to UNICEF for the use of the second instalment of twenty million (20,000,000) CFA to prepare for the next academic elementary year student returnees.

noticeable. Two years after the implementation of the reintegration plan, the balance produced by the CONASUR shows a level of performance that was very low and varied from programs highlighting strong disparities according to sectors of intervention (international support funds were very low in areas of basic education and in support for women) (SP/CONASUR). The general failure of the government to directly support returnees is on the one hand due to the Government's lack of financial means, and on the other the government did not want to favour returnees because it could have created problems in the hosting villages.

Overall, the international community on the one hand, omitted to send the necessary funds, as Ramato Diallo, acting head of Conasur affirmed in complaining Conasur's lack of capitals to reintegrate the returnees[53]. In compliance with the highly exploited strong welcome of local population, and the advertised Bayiri operation, international donors congratulated Burkina Faso for taking these people in the country (Georg Charpentier, the UN Resident Coordinator).

At the time of fieldwork, the majority of migrants had not yet obtained the aid of the Burkinabè government and already, many of them had decided to leave again and go back to the Ivory Coast and were willing to take risks and face dangers rather than wait for support which was not likely to come. If many Burkinabè had fled the Ivory Coast because of the terrible living conditions, some returned to there, because in Burkina Faso the situation was even worse. The fact is that almost nothing was done to allow those who returned to stay (Ouedraogo a. 2004).

The National Agency for Employment had not adopted any special measures for returning populations; In other words, there was no public policy of returnee's employment. Many returnees used to be businessmen or plantation owners in the Ivory Coast. But despite their spirit of initiative and the means available to undertake new economic activities in Bukina Faso, these people complained of the lack of support from the public authorities. According to the UN Special Reporter "The authorities had given preference to short-term activities at the expense of medium- and long-term plans".

Despite the fact that all sectors of the economy had benefitted from the spirit of

---

[53]"We need about 17 billion CFA (US$ 34 million) to allow us to reintegrate all those that have fled Cote d'Ivoire. There have been small projects here and there, but nothing that targets the problem as a whole" The money Diallo was claiming, considering that the United Nations has appealed to international donors for US$183 million to feed, clothe and shelter the 200,000 refugees from Darfur who reached eastern Chad and to help the locals living alongside them. (IRIN)

enterprise of returning migrants, including modernization of agriculture, improvement of housing and service's sector (FSP-migration), no   policies were undertaken to effectively use returnees capabilities, knowledge and skills to support the country's development.

Far from encouraging their nationals to return home, Burkinabé authorities relied on a double argument: on the one hand they   retained their usual attitude toward migrants that they had adopted for a long time, which did not protect migrants' rights and nor did it try to enhance them, with the excuse that they did not want to create envy among compatriots; on the other hand, they used the events to exploit the nationalistic vain in mediating a repatriation which only regarded few thousands of Burkinabè.

Bearing in mind these issues we can to some extent state that Burkina's Government did not handle this situation neither well nor promptly. It does go to be said however that many drawbacks are also due to the country's highly vulnerable situation due to external influences such as weather, the high volatility of world prices of raw materials; insufficient financial resources and the closure of UNHCR's office in Ouagadougou. In these circumstances it is understandable that in 2003 264,950 repatriated people (CONASUR 2004) who had already returned to the Ivory Coast, deciding to face danger rather than wait for support that was slow to come.

Chapter VI

CONSEQUENCES OF BURKINABE' RETURNEES IN THE PROVINCE OF COMOE' (BURKINA FASO)

During the last decade the Comoé province has experienced a rapid population growth driven by return migrants influx from the Ivory Coast. Situated just after the north-east border with the Ivory Coast this area underwent many changes.
It is the hub for all sorts of transformations not only on land property rights but also in community relations.
The villages studied, Mitieridougou, Boko and Dèréguè, will be presented highlighting the similarities and differences. With the help of interviews collected during fieldwork, I will conclude with main social and environmental development in the area.

6.1 Introduction to the province of Comoé : population developments and access to land

Located to the extreme south-west of the country, the Comoé province is part of the Cascades region, frontier area between Côte d'Ivoire and Mali. The province was created after the country was divided into 25 provinces, with Order No. 83-0012/CNR/PRES 15 September 1983.

The chief town, Banfora is also its administrative centre, where the industrial and commercial activities are concentrated and is located 450 km from the capital, Ouagadougou. The province has 9 departments: Banfora, Niangoloko, Sidéradougou, Tiefora, Ouo, Mangodara, Soubakaniedougou, Moussoudougou and Beredaogou.

Figure 6.1. The Comoé province and its departments
Source INSD

According to the last census (RGPH 2006), the Comoé province has a total population of 407,528 (respectively 201,453 men and 206,075 women), which in total represent 3.8% of the national population, and as the national trend, is mainly composed of young people. While in 1985 the Comoè numbered 177,750 people, in 1996 this figure rose to 241,376, and the last data count had reached a total population of 407,528. From 1985 to 1996, the population grew in the province at an average annual rate of 2.81%. In the decade after, 1996 – 2006, the population of the province grew significantly to 5.2%.

While, the Karaboro, relatives of the Senufo, are certainly the province's oldest group, who came from northern Ivory Coast during the 18th century, during the time many ethnic groups arrived and settled here blending with local people (Sihé 2009). The migration of shepherds from Peulh was not an exception, traditionally they used to move in from arid areas in search of better watered areas.

It was just from the mid '90s that the Comoè province became an important migration destination. While national immigrants had gradually already started to arrive

by the end of '70s, influx movements remained low until the mid '90s with migrant waves from the old cotton zone. The dynamics of a new settlement began in this bordering province with the Ivory Coast, particularly from 1999, after Tabou, and increased alongside the worsening living conditions of Burkinabè in the Ivory Coast in the following years.

Indeed population density more than doubled from 1985 to 2006, from 11 inhabitants per km2 to 26.5. This density appeared to be low compared to the national average (51.8 per km^2 hbts) and masked huge disparities between urban and rural areas: the number of inhabitants per km2 in urban areas was significantly higher than rural (44.2 inhabitants / km2 against 24.5 inhabitants per km2) (RGPH 2006).

Finally, among returnees from the Ivory Coast, SP/CONASUR data numbered 9,349 official répatriés, who arrived in the Comoé between September 2002 and December 2003 (CONASUR). However, as the national trend, this data might have underestimated greatly the real size of returnees in the area, which still is unknown (Prefecture de Niangoloko and Sideradougou. Of those, many took this region as a transit point to then move towards the main cities (Ouagadougou and Bobo Dioulasso), many others settled in the regional capital city, Banfora, however the majority, according to official administrative records in Niangoloko, settled in rural areas (departments of Niangoloko, Sideradougou, and Mangodara).

The pie chart below shows that among residents in 2006, immigrants came mainly from the Ivory Coast and the old Cotton zone (Boucle du Mouhouh and Hauts Bassins), which reflected the two most important waves to the region. Other immigrants came from the north of the plateau Mossi and the northern region where climate adverse conditions and high population density lead people to leave their places of origin. This means that in the Comoé region there were both national migrants and international migrants (the majority being return Burkinabè).

Newly arrived immigrants in the area, were for the majority from the Ivory Coast, where they worked as farmers, breeders and traders. The main reason for immigrants' attraction to the area has been climate favourable to intensification and diversification of agriculture, low human density and land availability (Ministére de l'Agriculture).

Immigrants in the Comoé,
according to their provenance

- Cote d'Ivoire
- Old Cotton Zone
- Plateau Mossi
- Other region
- Nord – Sahel

Figure 6.2. Immigrants in the Comoé according to their provenance. Source: RGPH 2006

Indeed, agriculture and livestock are the two main economic activities in the area, practised by locals, followed by fishing and trade which have recently achieved some importance as sources of income. Along with cotton, the production system is experiencing a gradual mechanization. Besides cotton, a wide range of cash crops is dominated by cereal production, Maize followed by sorghum and mil. These speculations are a substantial source of income for producers.

At the time returnees arrived to settle in the province, it was still strongly subjected to traditional organization directed by the Chefs du Village and Chef de Terre[54]. The Chef de Village is invested with political and customary power. He is responsible for social and political control of the village community and regulates disputes and social conflicts. He is the one who receives and accepts immigrants into the village. Land tenure system in the village is controlled by customary law arrangements managed by Chef de Terre. The Chef de Terre (there can be more than one, according to the size of the village) manages the land through traditional allocation. He helps migrants settle and allocates land to the people who request it. In addition, he officiates the rites in connection with the land and is involved in regulating localized land disputes

---

[54] While very weak, the modern political power is headed by the High Commissioner in the province, the Prefect in each Department and the RAV (Responsable Administrative Villageois).

in the occupants' respective territories. In practice he oversees and supervises everything that has to do with the land, including the bush, the farms and wildlife.

Diverse immigration flows pursued different goals. National migration waves, from the early '70s until the end of '90s, were due to environmental and social reasons (unfavourable climate condition, high human density) and started as a consequence of severe droughts (1973-1974 and 1983-1984) which affected the North, and the Plateau Mossi[55]. Two main groups dominated these flows, Mossi farmers and agro-shepherds Peulh who have left their regions of origin in central and northern Burkina seeking a better livelihood condition in the south. Subsequent immigration flows took place in the early '90s, and entailed migrants from the old cotton area (Houet, Mouhoun, Banwa, Tuy), where high population density lead to land scarcity and related problems were dramatically starting.

In the mid '90s return migrants already started to arrive in the Comoé region because of the growing uncertainty in the Ivory Coast. Most of the migrants interviewed had arrived in the Comoé region driven by the need to search for land, and thanks to social relationships achieved in the Ivory Coast or in Burkina Faso, they had arranged a plot before their settlement. They were mainly heads of households who owned plantation in the Ivory Coast, decided to invest part of their financial capital in the purchasing of land in their country of origin (Zongo 2006). At that time, households did not decide to return indefinitely, but gradually part of the group settled back in the village. This trend started to gain relevance after Tabou in 1999. Returning migrants continued to arrive until 2006, they were all, but to different degrees, escaping violence and conflict zone in the Ivory Coast and seeking for a shelter in Burkina Faso. Using categories illustrated in chapter five, I would argue that the majority of migrants interviewed belong to those who were well prepared for return. Other migrants, who were less prepared, reported their different experience and that their settling here was driven by social contacts which supported them.

While different levels of preparedness, and attainment of resources, free will is a factor which is absolutely arguable. Many arrived deprived of much of their financial capital, in villages where stress over resources, due to population growth was increasing and reception conditions were worsening. Moreover, I can hypothesize that all those

---

[55] Which inflicted significant losses in terms of crops and livestock to farmers (Ouedraogo, 2006).

people who already left the villages to return to the Ivory Coast, settled here because of their plans to return, because they had left significant belongings there or because they had no more connections in Burkina. Those who left were in the majority of the cases young people, who had left their family in the villages and had gone back to the Ivory Coast.

I am now going to present each village's situation, according to migrant arrivals and general changes in social arrangements and environmental conditions which they have brought.

6.2 Presentation of Villages: Mitieridougou, Boko and Dèréguè

In the Comoé region the villages most hit by the influx of migrants are located in the departments of Mangodara, Niangoloko and Sidèradougou. However, Mangodara played the role of area of transit to other destinations, namely Niangoloko and Sidéradougou.

In the past, the Niangoloko department (ANNEX n. 1), had been very important as a way station for transport to and from the Ivory Coast. Indeed it was the last place before reaching the border with the Ivory Coast, and since September 2002 it has constituted the most important custom office on the border. It is composed of 15 villages which hosted 7500 returnees of which, the majority settled in the villages of Boko, Mitieridougou and Folonzo. With the Ivory Coast's crisis, Niangoloko was initially considered by the Government as an area of transit, but it soon turned into a final destination (Zongo 2009).

Sidèradougou (ANNEX n. 2)is in the north part of the province, bordering with Hauts Bassins. It is composed of 44 villages which hosted, according to official COPROSUR data 4000 returnees which mainly settled in Bogoté, Yadé and Dèréguè.

During fieldwork I studied three villages of migrants in the Comoé provinces. All three villages had experienced a strong immigration flux, followed by land saturation.

• Mitieridougou[56] is situated in a large valley, close to the town of Niangoloko (18 km). According to oral tradition the first settlers were Gouins. Local people stayed in the

---

[56] (10°15'00 N and 4°53'00 W)

main district, while foreigners were given plots of land around it, delegating land rights. Foreigners were allowed to build their own units (some close to the main village, others further away), to cultivate, plant trees and settle new migrants, in accordance with the Chef du Village of Mitieridougou. Migrants in time claimed for more autonomy, and what for the first immigrants were delegated rights, are now increasingly demands for their property. Although earlier influx, the majority of migrants arrived from the Ivory Coast from the end of '90s;

- On the hillside, the village of Boko[57,] in the Niangoloko department, was founded by the Karaboro, who had settled in a bush area 45 km away from Mitieridougou. The first group settled in the area after they had been granted permission by the Chef de Terre of Mitieridougou and adopted slash and burn system to cultivate land and build their own village. Their permission was to have an indefinite length and asked for animal sacrifice, no money or other gift was requested. The area witnessed an impressive immigration flow only after 1999, when numerous returnees settled here. Nowadays, the village is composed of two main entities: one part where local people live, and one part all around it, in a massive settlement of foreigners.

- Dèréguè[58,] situated in the extreme north-west of the department, in a huge plateau, at 30 km from Sidéradougou. According to oral tradition, it appears that Tiéfo are the founders of the village of Dèréguè, as well as the local group in the department. After settling, the Tiéfo were followed by the Dioulà, with whom they are the actual local group. However, from the 1970s there had been waves of migration to the area of study whose primary objective was the pursuit of land and pasture. Early migrants here arrived in the early '70s coming from the north of the country, followed by the mid '90s with migrants from the old cotton zone and least return migrants. Migrants primarily settled in the bush where they were able to access the land, but as soon as land availability decreased, many people also settled in the main village, where they developed small businesses.

---

[57] (10°12'00 N and 4°48'00 W)

[58] (10°45'00 N and 4°05'00 W)

In all villages the economy is based on subsistence agriculture, horticulture, animal husbandry, wild plant foods. In the departments the majority of the population lives from farming, practiced with rudimentary equipment.

Estimated at 550 habitants in 1975, the population rose to 1141 in 1985 and 3689 in 1996 (INSD: RGPH 1975, 1985, 1996). Recently the number of people in Dèréguè reached a peek of 6066 censused people in 2006 (Préfecture de Sidéradougou/ recensement administrative de la population 2006). Mitieridougou, instead, grew slowly from 1975 when it had a total population of 1128, it grew to 1332 in 1996, the return migration impact made raised the population to 2474. Boko remained a low populated village, until the end of the '90s when it witnessed a boom in population, from about 300 people to 4200 (Préfecture de Niangoloko, recensement administrative de la population 2006).

Figure 6.3 Population growth in the villages of Boko, Mitieridougou and Dèréguè

Source: Prefecture of Niangoloko and Sideradougou (RGPH 1975,1985,1996,2006)

As the table above shows, in the villages studied, a part of Dèréguè, most of the people arrived in the last decade: between 1996-2006. In Boko the trend was particularly marked. The suddenness of arrival lead to an uncontrolled foreigners'

settlement path.

Despite the same situation of land saturation at the time, the three villages experienced different immigration paths. Dèréguè witnessed early immigration flows which grew steadily, The first immigrants were Karaboro, Bobo, Mossi and Peul, coming especially from the north of the country and the Mossi Plateau. Successive important waves, arrived from the old cotton zone in the mid '90s. This early wave produced population growth and land scarcity which, reduced its capacity to receive returnees. Differently Mitieridougou did not witness any massive influx of migrants from the early 2000, as well as Boko which could receive more returnees but they soon saturated their land. Thus the composition of the provenance of the migrants is different for each village, Dèréguè received more national migrants, while Mitieridougou and Boko received more returnees (According to Chef du Village Dèréguè).

6.3 Social and environmental changes after 2002

Due to this enormous demographical change, the Comoé area is characterized by extraordinary social and agricultural changes. In the past decades the population of the province grew exponentially, and the traditional relation which for centuries linked local people with their environment and resources has dramatically changed.

The last immigration waves of return migrants, in particular, put a strain on the already delicate balance between environment and men: in addition to the degradation of land and resources, the consequences of such a situation are likely to be the exacerbation of competition and the emergence of social conflicts.

The first evident change was the restructuring of the population, characterized by a redistribution of population in favour of migrants, which brought with them, their social, personal, financial capital, necessary to reconstruct a new safe livelihood in the new villages.

The composition of the village rapidly changed in favour of immigrants. While in the Niangoloko department, Guoin and Karaboro (local groups) counted for about 88% of the total population until 1996, their presence dropped to only 21% in 2006. In the three villages studied, Boko, Mitieridougou and Dèréguè immigrants now constitute 88% of total households in Boko, 79% in Dèrégouè and 77% in Mitieridougou

(Prefecture de Niangoloko).

In Dèréguè, nowadays the composition of the village witnessed the predominance of migrant Mossi representing 34.6% of households, overtaking local people (Tiéfo and Dioula) which only represent 20.6% of the total population, other ethnic groups are composed by 8% of Peulh, 5% Karaboro. The Samo, Marka, Lobi, Dagari, Gourounsi and Dogossiè, accounted together for 31% of households.

In Mitieridougou migrants passed from 2% in 1976 to 77% in 2006. Among migrants Mossi represented 40 per cent in 2006. While for Boko, the Chef de Village witnessed that until the end of 2000 there were only very few foreigners (only some herdsmen Peul), and now they constitute the majority in the village, among them, the Mossi account for 60%.

Figure 6.4: Repartition of people in the villages according to their status
Source : RGPH 2006 Prefecture of Niangoloko and Sideradougou

The predominance of Mossi lead to an increase, in terms of beliefs, to arise in Muslim communities, in opposition to local which are tied to animism. Migrants grouped together according to kinship or proximity to their village of origin and this trend reinforced migrants relationship and cultural conservation (Zongo 2009).

However it also contributed to decrease in social exchanges between the communities, because of the migrants' little permeability in the local culture.

This non will to conform with local culture and the absolute numerical majority, made social problems arise in the villages. While during the time of the crisis, because of nationalistic feeling locals welcomed and supported migrants, as soon as the emergency ended, the community relationship weakened.

Notably, migrants bring with them their migratory capital, which includes a range of knowledge, capitals and social relationships archived in the experience abroad. Their human, social and financial capital are the only opportunities they have to improve a successful livelihood strategy within a vulnerability and institutionalized context. During their settling, return migrants also face lack of access to natural (resources) and physical capital (farming tools, house). Despite this they were able to count on their financial and human capital which includes their experience and knowledge achieved in the Ivory Coast, both in agriculture and commerce issue, as an attempt to escape their vulnerable position

For the wealthier and more prepared return migrants the lack of natural assets (land) was easily managed through their financial and human capital which supported them in :

- access to land (coping with the increasing phenomenon of capitalising);
- purchase of cash inputs to agriculture (hired labour, disease control etc), resulting in better cultivation practices and higher yields;
- investment in education, resulting in better prospects for the next generation;
- investment in assets permitting local non-farm income to be generated (bicycle taxi, motorbike, milling machine, kiosk etc.)

Their migratory capital, both in financial cultural, organizational, and economic terms, sometimes contrasted with the practices of populations of host areas. Indeed, both nationally and locally, the arrival of migrants is sometimes seen as an opportunity for economy, through the introduction of structuring changes (introduction of new farming practices, diversification activities, improvement in technology, etc..). In all villages migrants were carriers of innovation in many fields: agricultural practises and tools, and also on new economic activities. Niangoloko department's economy, mainly sustained

by the railway and the customs house, was shut down after the first conflicts and the border closure, then its economy weakened progressively and witnessed a sharp halt, leading to the closing-down of many small stall traders (Zongo 2009). This town crisis, resulted in a rural reorganisation and the emergence of rural markets mainly due to return migrants' economic creativity and innovation (especially Mossi, well known for their commercial capacities), who were able to connect return migrants in rural areas with local people in urban and rural areas. Beside representing customers, many of them were traders in the Ivory Coast, stallholders, cereal traders, shops, livestock dealers, and could use their experience in these new areas (Zongo 2009). These markets had become very popular, particularly the one in Boko, which attracted people from nearby villages and even from the north of the Ivory Coast.

The survey conducted in 2007 in the department of Niangoloko (FSP migration), identified that the majority of elements of the economic infrastructure[59] were established between 1999 and 2007 (out of 288 economic infrastructures 25% of them were established before 1999 and 75% in the following period. Hence, the period of rapid development of these infrastructures corresponded to the period of high immigration in the zone. In the period 1999-2007, 77% of economic infrastructure was created by migrants against only 23% by local people (mostly services activities 88%). These statistics show the role of migrants in developing non-agricultural activities especially in rural areas. Thus between 1999 and 2007, large infrastructure were created there mostly by migrants (FSP-migration).

Between 2003 and 2006 this area increasing experienced insecurity (robbery...) which some people attributed to returnees. Moreover, as a consequence of the economic crisis, contraband developed, in order to purchase fuel, food and medicine, in the occupied zone in the Ivory Coast. On this regard, in Niangoloko' Prefecture local authorities blamed the highly risky context in the Ivory coast where there was no control by the government and the weapons circulated freely.

Both Chef town departments' of Niangoloko and Sidéradougou grew too fast and had, experienced lack of space in schools and colleges, clinics saturated soon, increased trafficking of children (Children are sent to work on plantations in CI) and the spread of

---

[59] Infrastructure are identified as bar / snack bars, shops, kiosks, telecentres, schools and health centers.

HIV / AIDS. This city is now experiencing many problems and tries to cope despite the lack of means.

Concerning the agricultural production level, return migrants introduced many changes: they appear to have been the promoters of the cashew culture as a new important cash crop . Another important cash crop introduced by immigrants is cotton [60] considered "the white gold" in Burkina Faso and groundnuts (RAV Mitieridougou Hema Koudiaba). The increasing production of Cotton, introduced by the second wave of migrants coming from the Hauts Bassins in Dèrégué mainly, less in Mitieridougou, has led to changes in local wealth. As a cash crop, cotton leads some farmers to become much wealthier, but this has also been accompanied by considerable uncertainty, due to the international unstable cotton price. Locally, cotton, while representing a potentially extremely lucrative venture, has been fairly risky[61].

Finally both early waves of internal migrants and return migrants have introduced cash crops culture, in which they are still dominant (FSP migration). Locals cultivate mainly food crops such as Sorghum and millet, commonly used as staple food all over Burkina Faso.

Return migrants prefer cultivation of maize, this trend is due to the fact that alternating it with cotton, they profit more from the use of fertilizer. Cashew achieved strong importance with the arrival of return migrants, tree planting is among the migrants as a way to create or consolidate permanent and transmittable rights (This trend will be better explained in the further chapter).

Moreover, livestock increased rapidly however, this growth hides problems experienced historically between farmers and breeders, which already caused violent conflicts, in Dèréguè and Mitieridougou as well (respectively RAV Hema Koundjaba and Konates Lassima). Indeed, according to M.S. Chef des Peulh in Dèréguè, livestock was declining in the area, because many breeders were migrating more and more to

---

[60] Cotton was not introduced by return migrants, but earlier wave of migrant from the old cotton zone. Indeed return migrants are very poorly represented in the cultivation of cotton, which actually is the main export product in Burkina Faso. This could be explained by the fact that the cultivation of cotton requires large land area and access to land becomes more difficult in this study area for migrants. Former migrants are certainly came at a time when population growth was smaller than the period 1999-2007, which would have yielded large areas for their fields.

[61] While some farmers became wealthier, other farmers have abandoned cotton completely because of indebtedness. Farmers obtain cotton seed, fertilizer and pesticides on credit before the planting season and pay the costs back after the harvest.

neighbouring countries, especially Ghana where they were welcomed and because there was more availability of grazing land. This is the consequence of the saturation of land in the area, resulting in the lack of pasture and cattle crossings, due to increased crop plots.

All the villages were witnessing strong deforestation under the effect of land clearing for agricultural production[62]. The case of Boko where migrant population shifted from 2 per cent in 1976 to 88 per cent of the total population in 2006 is a good example of the negative relationship between environment and population. Population growth was also linked to the decrease in area of dense forest and woodland, especially in the department of Niangoloko (Zongo 2009). This may show the important role played by the population in the deforestation process. In the absence of rural migration control, agricultural intensification or plantation of rapidly growing tree species for energy use, the current trend of increasing agricultural area as a result of human population growth is likely to continue. This eventually will contribute to environmental degradation and spread of desertification.

Studied in the area of Dèréguè indicated that migrants had relatively larger farmlands compared to those of the indigenous populations (Sihé 2009). The justification for this could be that the indigenous people have a solid relationship with the environment they live in, which had developed since the first settlements, a century ago (Howorth and O'Keefe, 1999). Therefore, despite the recent introduction of cash crop productions, local people had been flexible in adapting to their resource use patterns and survival strategies. On the contrary, migrants who came to work in a new environment aimed to secure their livelihood strategy through the increase of incomes and domestic food production, adapting to little availability of resources. To do so, migrants used improved technology (ploughs) compared to the indigenous population thus, cutting large forest areas to make space for agriculture.

Initially perceived as a way of increasing the political strength of what was then a very sparsely populated region, local people welcomed migrants and granted them land, however, this welcoming attitude shifted (as witnessed by many old migrants interviewed), when as a result of migration, land became scarce in many villages.

---

[62] Not only land in on danger, field observation show that water-points, predominantly used for human consumption, were polluted by more frequent livestock passages and put under pressure due to the population growth.

Indeed, what at the beginning was seen as a means of strengthening the village's power is now perceived as a cage, in which locals feel closed in (Chef du village Mitieridougou Hema Djekouna).

At the community level, the insertion and reception of migrants was regulated through the institution of *tutorat,* which defined the social role of guardian (locals) and guest (migrants). Nowadays insertion tools are changing in favour of more modern instruments which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Despite this apparent acceptance of migrants, in every village there are separated community for migrants[63]and locals, which are not always well integrated and do not share the same objectives. Many migrants, claimed difficulties and mistreatment from local people. In Boko migrants which are the absolute majority reported different treatment for locals and migrants, even for children, for access to water points, and prices at the market (interview with Diara Souleman). Main conflicts recorded were related to access to land, which increasingly discriminated against migrants[64].

Relations between migrants and locals can obviously be described as strained. Local farmers often blame migrants for much of the perceived environmental degradation; several villages have since few years ago refused new migrants from settling. Migrants, on the other hand, fear being forcibly removed from their land by the locals who have customary and ritual authority over the land.

Social transformations as well as the degradation in living conditions weakened traditional social structures and competition for control over resources became more intense. The intensity of conflicts is heightened by the appearance of arms smuggled from the Ivory Coast. The dry season is increasingly the moment during which most of social and resources related conflicts arise and are transformed into ethnic conflicts, locals against migrants, old migrants against recent ones, farmers against breeders. This social and land saturated situation worsened food security and vulnerability conditions in the area with dangerous consequences either at the social and environment level.

Growing land scarcity accelerated the competition for access to land and other resources and the control of agricultural space between the different categories of actors (farmers, shepherds, migrants) and between actors within the same category. Population pressure greatly affected the land productivity, through the overexploitation without

---

[63] Among migrants, they organise themselves according to ethnic group and province of origin.
[64] A part of land scarcity, the second most important problem is water.

possibility of lie fallow, and decrease its productivity. Various factors came together in a context of reduced land availability and social changes motivated by economic hardship and greater ecological vulnerability which are all contributing to the cleavage between migrants and locals over this *" nouveau front pionnier"* (Dabiré 2007).

Chapter VII

GENERAL CHANGES IN LAND ACCESS SYSTEM AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF MIGRANTS

Returnees, along with earlier migrants contributed to an increase in the pressure on land in the three villages. The land that was once abundant, had soon become scarce. However, Access to land is the primary goal of migrants, who must be able to satisfy this basic need. While early national waves of migrants could enjoy favourable conditions because of the availability of land and low demographic pressure, return migrants who had settled in the three villages induced radical changes in access to land mode, with a very rapid change from traditional mode of integration of migrants (tutoring) to the monetization of access to land.
This section presents the results of the fieldwork conducted in three villages: Mitieridougou, Boko and Dèréguè.

7.1 Traditional access to land

The majority of returnees have settled in rural areas where land is officially managed by the state. Since 1984 the adoption of the Agrarian and Land Reform (RAF), has made the land a property of the state. However in rural areas, as illustrated in chapter 4, this law has remained theoretical and ignored by the majority of rural actors, including state representatives. Therefore, the organization of access to land is subjected to customary rules.

Traditionally, land in rural areas was an inalienable collective heritage, non-community members could access only loan (usually permanent). Hence, the arrival of migrants was subjected to the locals' willingness and they were received and settled

according to traditional system: *Tutorat*[65]. It is an agrarian institutional device which regulates relationships between first-comers and late-comers and fits into a moral economy principle that considers that any individual or group has the right of access to the means of subsistence for himself and his family (Chauveau and al. 2006). Accepting migrants into the community is advantageous as it contributes to population growth. Indeed, according to Chef de Terre of Dèréguè: "la *terre est un bien collectif. Nous ne la refusons pas à quiconque voudrait l'exploiter pour subvenir à ces besoins de subsistance*" [66].

Access to land is open to migrants to meet their' livelihoods, however integration must nevertheless be controlled to meet the requirements of the community and ensure that it does not threaten the established social order (Chauveau and al. 2004). Tutorat denotes the whole of reciprocal social relations that arise from the reception of a stranger and his family, by a local in the village community for an indefinite period, including a intergenerational dimension. When the original *tuteur* dies, his heir takes over the deceased *tuteur*'s role.

The land dimension of tutorat, is inextricably linked to the socio-political dimension (Lavigne 2000). Indeed, in force of this social relationship access to land depends crucially on the tuteur (usually the first migrant settled), who allows the settling in of migrants and further migrants. Under the *Tutorat* the traditional method of gaining access to land for migrants was the long term loan and affected land that had already been cleared and taken over. Customary 'landowners', as first-comers, granted land rights to migrants, which included rights of use (right to cultivate), but also management rights (right to define others' rights, in order to be able to allocate use rights within the family, and to other incomers provided that this was authorized by the tuteur), without having permanent right on it. Security of tenure under traditional arrangement is embedded in the fulfilment of the socio-political obligations, it is thus highly dependent on social relationships.

Diverse kind of tutorat relationships might be found, according to different terms and clauses of agreement and according to the laws of each village. In general social clauses are related to various duties such as respect the local customs, to assist tutor, not

---

[65] The French term *Tuteur* is often used locally to refer to the customary rights holder has granted rights to a foreigner to the community.

[66] Land is a common good. We do not refuse anyone who wants to exploit it to meet his basic needs.

to interfere in political affairs of the village, and to some limitation (such as the prohibition of planting and lending to others, only in Mitieridougou cutting down other people's trees)[67]. According to the chef de terre of all three villages non respect entails withdrawal of the plot, and the expulsion from the village. In some villages, including Mitieridougou, the borrower is also required to hoe owner's field for free once a week. The owners also expected that borrowers help for some other jobs (construction of huts, granary, etc..). It's a way for them to further consolidate their relationship. Immigrants are also subjected to prohibition, which apart from planting trees, differ from village to village. Also clauses vary, in particular regarding withdrawal and inheritance. This kind of transaction has remained the main form of delegated rights in the studied areas since the arrival of important waves of immigrants (mid '90s in Dèréguè and 2000 in the other two villages) Of the returnees interviewed none could access land through this method, however some national early migrants used it.

The tuteur is a key figure in migrants settling, he is responsible for the process of migrant "socialization": he is responsible for intercession with locals, deals with procedures for obtaining land, and decides (along with locals) on the place where newcomers are to settle. Until the immigrant is unable to ensure for his and his family's livelihood the tuteur shall guarantee their basic needs. In this sense, his first step is to authorize access to his land so the immigrant can grow and move toward progressive autonomy. However, once acquired, this autonomy will allow the tuteur to require compensation of services rendered to date. The fee, usually symbolic (cereals, and small animals), intended more to show the dependency relationship to the landlord. Indeed, migrants have a moral duty of gratitude to the tuteur (*Chauveau 2006, Jacob, 2004).* The relationship with the local tuteur assumes a fundamental importance in the formation of the group and it is at the base of social relations.

The tutorat relationship, emerged in contexts where land was abundant and population density low, as a strategy to attract people to farm the land (Chaveau 2004). The gradual arrival of immigrants, presented in the former chapter, put a strain on, the already precarious, traditional system, leading to increasing population and resource

---

[67] Other restrictions are:
   - Do not work in the field Monday and Friday;
   - Do not plant some trees in the field: Shea, Nere, tamarind;
   - Ban on digging wells and boreholes;
   - Abstain from arguing in the field, etc..

pressure. Due to these changes, the customary systems, which were far from being static, were continually reinterpreted and re-adapted along with economic, social and environmental changes.

The arrival of returnees highlighted the complex relationship between government and traditional authorities. Excluded from the property by law, customary land holders saw the state as an illegitimate actor in rural areas. The reception of returnees highlighted the very strong influence of customary principles and the low bearing of the State in rural areas. Despite the importance of their flow, the returnees were able to settle and acquire land through local procedures.

Along with the failure of government action in rural areas, also the local systems were weakened. Changes in land transactions also showed the limits of local system, as those new land transactions were made against the local principles. According to Zongo (2009) the conflict potential of these developments lies less in their nature than in the absence of legal bodies and legitimate regulation. This situation, which threatens social peace, regards the state whose laws and texts are inapplicable because they do not reflect the sociological realities of rural areas.

7.2 Migrants access to land after the massive influx of migrants.

As described in the previous chapter, the area studied experienced profound changes in the human landscape marked by a diversification of the ethnic composition, that was accompanied by a very high population growth fuelled mainly by a large influx of immigrants from the densely populated provinces of the Central Plateau and Cote d'Ivoire. According to estimates, migrants constituted nearly three quarters of the population of sites (Dabiré and al 2005). There was also a very large spread of new techniques of production, including animal traction, and to a lesser extent the mechanical and the introduction of new crops including tree crops. All these changes resulted in increased pressure on land, which in turn lead to new land monetized and individual transactions methods. Once refereed collectively, the traditional system of tutorat in all three villages was subjected to a trend towards greater individualization of

relations, gradually becoming more dissociated from its socio-political aspects[68].

In the area studied only the first few returnees have obtained the land by traditional modalities (as mentioned in the chapter 6, in Mitieridougou and Boko until the late '90s, while in Dèrégué only before the migratory waves from the old cotton zone – mid '80s). However these traditional transactions that persist, have undergone profound changes. The arrival of first immigrants already led to the first changes. These changes were different from one site to another, however during interviews it was possible to draw its main changes:

- Shorten duration (sometimes seasonal or up to 2-5 years[69]);
- Decreased fields' size[70] (along with fences as delimitation of the allocated land);
- A tendency to request more services and benefits to migrants, in return for using land rights.

For the majority of interviews the process of land access, independently of the period of arrival, is the result of long and delicate negotiations with the customary leaders. The land was accessed either with traditional renegotiated loans or by purchase.

With the advent of monetization, the first returnees, who had acquired their land in the traditional manner, were forced to renegotiate their terms of loan. Fearful of losing their land, they were in some cases unilaterally rearranged into short-term loans, without migrants' consent. Rents tend to be similar within a village, but differ between villages, in Dèrégué, where monetary fee was asked in advance (price could vary from 7,000 CFA to 9,500 CFA) and at the end of the season a payment in kind was requested (from 1 to 2 sacks of the yield depending on the size of the plot). The agreements were informal, sometimes with witnesses. Renting a piece of land, was limiting for migrants who were seeking to construct livelihood strategies, because they could not make lasting investments (such as planting trees) and they were subjected to the local's will. However it might have been the only possibility to gain access to land, in a area where land was

---

[68] However, this had already happened before the arrival of returnees mainly in Dèrégué, where inflow important waves had already begun in the '80s.

[69] In Dèrégué, these practices were usual where young trees were planted on the landowner (local) fields. The loan ended when trees reached maturity. This maturity effectively prevent the land use.

[70] First returnees were advantaged of the resources availability, in fact, both in Mitieridougou and Dérègué, they obtained from chef de terre, plots of land up to 3-6 Ha , now they complain smaller fields which vary in size between 2 and 3 ha.

saturated and the immigrant (Return migrant) had failed to purchase plots where they could have enjoyed permanent rights to using the land. The most vulnerable returnees, were forced to accept precarious contracts, even if they had been allowed to exploit these lands for a limited period. These vulnerable returnees were the last arrived from Ivory Coast, mainly after 2002, and they had not enough financial capital to buy land.

Moreover traditional sacrifice to access land, gradually switched to monetary compensation (replaced by monetary equivalent). Indeed, locals and migrants usually talk of *prix de coutumes* which represent the counterpart of the gift in kind that migrants have to provide in order to gain access to land. It is also fixed regardless of the number of hectares allocated to migrants. It varies depending on the village, between 5,000 in Boko and 15,000 CFA in Dèrégué, while in Mitieridougou, during 2003, chicken was replaced by about 3,000 CFA and the goat to 7,000 CFA. These benefits are today one of the necessary conditions for maintaining good relationships whose result is the migrant's hope to continue to be able to exploit the land received.

The most important change in the area studied was the more recent appearance of money-based forms of access to land. It should be noted that the situations varied enormously, from region to region but also within the same department. Among the villages studied the main differences lay on the period of arrival of migrants, degree of local authorities' involvement, and availability of resources. In the Comoé, monetary transactions first appeared in the Mangodara in the late 1990s, with the arrival of migrants from the old cotton-growing zone (Dabiré and al. 2005). However return migrants certainly represented a factor of acceleration in the monetization process. According to interviews with local authorities, in Dèréguè and Boko returnees were the first asking to "buy" land, while other money based transactions were already introduced by former waves.

In Mitieridougou land was initially only purchased directly by the Chef de terre, however with the arrival of returnees it also involved purchases migrant to migrant. In Boko purchase only regards the chef de lignage, while in Dèrégué all actors are involved in monetised land transaction, without official regard to their status. Prices are different according to the use of the plot (cash crop/food crop) and according to the status of the buyer (migrant/local) and can vary from each village. In Mitieridougou the prices given to the chef du village is 15,000 CFA, however in the village, first migrants

who had purchased land gradually started to resell it to other migrants and the price rose to 30,000 CFA in 2009.

Despite diverse financial condition at their return, all returning migrants experienced more or less degrees of vulnerability. Indeed, in the villages studied, purchasing land represented an important livelihood strategy among returning migrants. Buying land is both a necessity for returning migrants who wanted to secure their access (becoming the only way migrants could access land) and a livelihood strategy for those migrants who wanted to settle definitely. Buying land meant securing their access and securing their livelihood strategies. However it did not always mean a secure tenure on land. These transactions, however, were enormously ambiguous (Mathieu, Bologo and Zongo 2004). Diverse actors, diverse land transaction methods lead to various rights related to land: using rights, control rights (deciding which crop to cultivate, letting the land fallow, prevent livestock grazing on it, planting trees, having the right to improve the land etc.) and transfer rights (for free, to bequeath, to rent it for cash, to sell it for cash.). While the rights allocated regarding loans are clear for all actors (only using rights, thus migrants are prohibited to make lasting investment[71]), for the majority of "purchaser" land rights allocated are often unclear and uncertain.

Whereas in Mitieridougou, where the land chief was the person who sold land rights, with allocation of clear property rights (using, control and transfer), successive land purchases made by locals or migrants increased the fuzziness in rights allocation. Another example is the village of Dèrégué where locals "sold" land to migrants but they want to remain traditional owner of land. "Purchase" gave the buyer ownership of the land, including the right to transfer and inherit it, thereby migrants felt free from obligations linked to the traditional landowner and the person acquiring the land could make long-term investments on it. However, respondents reported that the parties did not always clearly explain the various clauses of the transaction.

Moreover, there were differences due to the arrival period, those who arrived during the 1990s were able to borrow land of good quality and they had unlimited rights of use. As already mentioned, latecomers had to negotiate their rights in harder circumstances of increasingly scarce resources and land saturation. The rights of use of more recent migrants were more circumscribed. Generally, they could not put a field

---

[71]   And sometimes there are mixed transactions, migrants were thus requested to pay a seasonal fee in kind - 2 sacks of grain and 2 chickens claimed in Boko.

into fallow without the risk of having the original lender take it back. Because of lack of access to good quality land, more recent migrants claimed that they were poorer than their earlier counterparts and unable to improve their poor quality fields with fertilizer or other inputs. They were then doubly disadvantaged because the other route to fertility regeneration, fallow, was by and large unavailable to them because of the fact that the land was to be reclaimed if it was not being cultivated.

Overall, vague and poorly defined nature of land rights allocated made migrants feel insecure as they were unaware of the rights they had actually accessed.

In addition, the land management dualism share between state and customary arrangement made the land rights issue more and more unclear. Migrants made of the principle that "land belongs to the state" as an instrument for claiming land rights.Unclear Fostering individual rights it also promoted the dissociation in the integration process of the two dimensions of tutorat: land and socio-political. The result was that locals allocated land to migrants, and what were considered rights of use (for locals) were considered instead property rights by migrants. This spread the perception by returning migrants, that *prix de coutumes* and increased monetization of the land transactions could be assimilated to a proper "sale" and which was to relieve them of their moral and social obligations enforced by the tutorat.

Along with the development of monetized land transactions, actors developed written documents to attest the transaction. While the vast majority of lease arrangement does not need written proof because it is generally well respected, formalization of "sales" were increasingly requested. Local land transfer in Boko had been carried out without any written evidence[72], some way of formalization was needed in order to face this recent trend. In Mitieridougou, written instruments were very widespread even though the majority theoretically had no legal value (Dabiré et al 2005). And Dèrégué had already experienced diverse *PVP*. Fieldwork helped to identify the following main methods of land transaction formalization:

local receipts *(semi-formal);* This agreement was drawn up between the vendor and purchaser, but it had no formal rubber-stamp from the local government officer, thus even if informally accepted it was not legal; these documents typically mentioned the

---

[72] there is no formal registration or official administrative document in writing, The only evidence is oral and moral commitment of the parties and witnesses. In many cases it has been reinforced with planting trees, or any other lasting investment (traditionally sign of ownership).

names of the parties, area and location of the plot, the rights granted, the sum involved in the transaction, identity of witnesses, signatures of parties and witnesses and date. Even though those receipts were locally accepted and recognized even (informally) by administrative authorities as *de facto* illegal and a source of potential conflict. Indeed rights allocated, varied not only according to each village, but also to the purchaser himself. In Mitieridougou, disagreement in land rights' allocation was evident among locals (who presented themselves as legitimate land owners) and migrants (who assuming land purchase thought to have property rights on land)[73]. The *procès verbaux de palabre* (PVP). this is a legal document, which established the legal sale of a land parcel in the presence of the prefect recording the terms of the transfer, and it defined the rights and obligations of each actor, with the location, delimitation and amount of land transferred. involved determined by technical agricultural agents. Although, PVP is gaining more importance in all departments, the village of Dèréguè is where the majority of interviewees reported it.

Migrants coming from the neighbouring old-established farming areas, who had already experienced problems of land scarcity, tended to secure their access to land, through "purchase", as did those returning from Côte d'Ivoire who usually had substantial financial resources. Among returnees from the Ivory Coast, those who were well prepared could count on a good financial capital from their labour experience in the Ivory Coast. Their financial capital achieved there seemed to have been a determining factor in the reinsertion of returnees in rural areas. With that, returnees had easily been able to access land and, if granted had managed to make lasting investments on it and as a result had secured their livelihood.

Who did not have sufficient financial capital to purchase land, had to negotiate land through the traditional customary system, which during the time also witnessed an increase in monetisation. In these cases returnees had difficulties in making efforts to escape vulnerability, because of their scarce means. Many of them had already return to the Ivory Coast as soon as the violence had stopped (it must be said however that if,

---

[73] In Mitieridougou receipts evidence the act of sale, which is signed by both parties and the Chef de Village. The transaction lead the migrant to be the owner of land, he is allowed to plan trees and resell land when they leave. The transfer is final and the buyer can make investments on sustainable land gained.

some of them already knew that they would have returned to Ivory Coast, others were forced to return because their difficult condition in Burkina Faso).

In conclusion, interviews carried out in the study area revealed that immigrants (both internal migrants from the central region and returnees from the Ivory Coast) were bearers of monetized transactions[74]. Thus, migrants in the area were responsible for the land commoditisation (i.e.becoming a commodity). Curiously, during interviews respondents (especially locals) rarely referred to land as a "commodity" which had reached a price, this is mainly due the traditional system that did not approve of any form of land alienation[75]. However, bounderies between traditional and modern systems could not have been more blurred, because customary arrangements were becoming monetized and market transactions were nonetheless embedded in social relations.

7.3 How locals reacted to the massive return flows

It is undeniable that the customary authorities played an important role in receiving returnees. Initially it was usually the chef de village that immigrants asked for permission before moving in. When land was abundant, migrants were often sought to help populate a village and cultivate land. For customary chiefs more people in the village meant more people under their control as a source of socio-political and economic power.

However, with the arrival of several hundreds of migrants resources started to decrease, and many locals realized that much of their land, and particularly land of good quality, had been given away. Local people, fearing the possibility of losing power in their land, had increasingly tended to give rights of limited duration to migrants, or to make withdrawals[76] from older plots. Withdrawals of land had been mainly claimed by old migrants who had accessed land under the traditional method. In this case, the local,

---

[74] Returnees from the Ivory Coast were blamed by locals and earlier immigrants for believing to be able to buy anything with money (Interview in Boko, with. S.O. - Local)

[75] Indeed, even though land monetary transactions took place, this practice was not yet mentionable in public, because it broke with local customs.

[76] After this, the repossessed land, or a part of it was leased or sold to the former user, if he had the means available, or to other migrants. Because this behaviour was not traditionally acceptable, withdrawals were often covert with socially acceptable motives (failure on the tenant's part to respect *prix des coutummes* or non respect of term agreements) Contrary migrants claimed that it was the pursuit of profit that drove them to withdraw land and sell it again to the highest bidder.

or his descendants, unilaterally withdrew the right given to settlers. As a result there were differences in the fortunes of migrants depending on their date of migration. The local population challenged previous agreements and reaffirmed their land rights while receiving returnees. This trend was registered mainly in Boko, where the rapid population change and the growing tensions, within the customary systems had been put to the test. Customary authorities proved to be unable to control and regulate the settlement of incomers.

Overall, the perception of land as a commodity contributed to several changes in the area, which were better observable in the village of Dérègué. Where there was a generational exchange after the first arrival of returnees, and now younger generations (second generation of those locals who negotiated with first migrants) understood how advantageous it was for them to gain control over the land, they were increasingly challenging the agreements made by their parents, renegotiating new arrangements, thereby securing higher levels of rent for themselves.

In the past, village lands were split among local lineage groups, and land could only be given to migrants by the chiefs of these groups. Increasingly, family members were selling family lands without the knowledge of the elders, and even assigning land that did not belong to their family or selling the same plot to several actors.

The scarcity of land lead new generations of locals and migrants to intervene in land management, because of its importance. With the influx of migrants and the economic interest that arose in the land competition, traditional landowners allocated land without thinking of the future generation[77]. In some villages the uproar against migrants had been made by the young people, because, as locals they wanted to inherit their parents' land and continue to cultivate village lands, even if rights had been delegated to migrants. Nevertheless, young people increasingly, following the more recent economic developments, experienced land as a commodity, and for profits, they did not hesitate to withdraw the lands formerly lent to migrants by their parents. Local youth based their strategy on *the call i*nto question of land rights delegated to early immigrants by their elders. In addition, local youth were afraid of being dominated by one day migrants who were increasingly more numerous, and feared losing control of

---

[77]"*Il n'y a plus de terre, les chefs de terre ont tout attribué aux migrants, et il serait difficile de reprendre ces parcelles dans les années avenirs quand ils en auront besoins »* says S.M. a local youth whose comment highlight the youth's concern to the village's land access.

the land bequeathed by their ancestors.

In Boko and Dèrègnè, while existing, monetary based transactions were not approved of and seen negatively, and indeed, during interviews, despite the land transaction described, no local interviewee mentioned the words "sale, purchase, property". However all migrants clearly described their behaviour and all transactions in the area.

Nowadays, in all three villages, locals have closed the door to new migrants. Land is saturated. Some migrants can settle only if other migrants agree to redistribute land (where transmission land rights are accepted).

According to locals there is a peaceful climate in all three villages, however I did find migrants who did not agree with it. For locals it is important that habits and customs of local groups are respected by immigrants. It is also important for the customary local-migrant relationships to persist. This is the case of symbolic compensation for land transactions or *landa:* customary holiday during which migrants are responsible for donation (cereals, livestock, etc..) in participation of these rituals. In general, locals have been accepting easier agricultural and trader migrants than shepherds, this is because they share similar agricultural activities, same living spaces, etc. And the supposed priority of agriculture to sheep-farming (Zongo 2004).

However, migrants who have acquired the awareness of the their precarious status refuse to stay stuck in a this limiting role. At the village level it is easy to feel raising tension between migrants and locals, and as is already perceptible, it may get worse in the future, because of increasing intra-generational conflicts and the complete lack of the government intervention.

7.4 Rising land conflicts

The trend of land scarcity accelerates the exacerbation of competition for access to land and other resources and the control over agriculture space between the different categories of rural actors (farmers, shepherds, migrants) and between actors within the same category. This, has gradually lead to increasing conflict over land. But increasing competition over natural resources is not regulated so clearly nor accepted by all parties:

in case of conflict, which is the authority who arbitrates the disputes? Conflict resolution rarely happens once and for all because several institutions intervene simultaneously and mediation mechanisms are weak; Despite informal local land management, local government officials – the prefects - are increasingly called to resolve disputes over land and asked to provide judgement. In some cases, the decision of the préfet supports traditional leaders; in others, they are in favour of migrants. However, this issue is not resolved in practice because there is a coexistence of a legal texts on Agrarian and Land Reform (RAF in its Successive versions: 1984-1991-1996) and traditional practices under the custom.

Locals and foreigners admit the existence of conflict/disagreement related to land management, however in higher proportion migrants admitted its existence. The extent of conflict is important (mentioned in 27 migrants interviews, while only 4 with locals).

Perception of land conflict			
	Yes	no	do not know
Migrants	27	1	2
Locals	4	20	6

Table 7.1 Perception of land conflicts
Source: fieldwork 2010

Similarly, migrants declared that they have been scared of reporting these conflicts to the prefect, but increasingly they are now going to claim for the recognition of their rights. The village most affected among the three studied is the one of Dèrégué, mainly due to the earlier immigration flows.

Fieldwork revealed 4 main types of land conflicts in the area:

• **Conflicts among locals.** These conflicts are mostly inter-village, as witnessed in Boko (with the bordering village of Tondouta), and are caused by the non-respect of land's village boundaries. Indeed, due to rising land scarcity, chef du village of Boko attributed land to migrants beyond the boundaries of his land.

• **Conflicts between locals and migrants.** They are, according to respondents, the most recurrent and related to withdrawals of land (often without notice) that are sold to new migrants, reduction in areas of land already sold, migrant's refusal to pay the landa,

disputes in cases of land reclaimed by locals, etc...

- **Inter-generational conflicts.** These conflicts oppose young locals to migrants. These problems have been particularly perceptible in the village of Dèréguè. New generations are now heads of households and manage land. Old autochthons received migrants and let them settle, giving them much land and much power. In many cases, young people undertook several withdrawals of migrants' land. On the other hand new generations of migrants, are young people, born in Dèrégué, whose parents had concluded agreements with locals. They refuse to fall into the patron-client relationships of "*tutorat*" with locals. They are now increasingly claiming the right to be considered locals, and along with this, land autonomy;

- **Old - new migrants' conflicts.** The former have large areas obtained by the traditional methods, while the new ones are in search of land. Aware of the gradual saturation of the land, the old migrants disagree with reducing their land plots, or to letting them develop bush and undeveloped areas, because they intend to use them in the future. However, as explained above, returnees and new immigrants have started to offer better terms to landowners, who let them settle. As a reaction, former migrants started to expel newcomers.

- **Conflicts between farmers and herders.** Peulhs herders complained of land disputes in each village. Moreover, conflicts arose as the result of damaged fields and water access. Other reasons related to herders have been: the straying of animals (some let the animals graze for free without any *form of supervision), lack of stockyards, and the cultivation of livestock plots.* For the Chef de Terre of Boko[78], conflicts are mainly due to the lack of livestock grazing areas and especially to straying livestock.

Indeed, when it comes to attributing responsibilities for conflicts, interviewees blame:

land conflict's fault	
Immigrant farmers	15
Peul livestock keeper	8
Local farmers	5
Local livestock keeper	2

---

[78]« C'est l'animal qui se déplace et non le champ »

The RAF certainly contribute to stirring up conflicts between indigenous and migrant communities. Enforced by the Act, migrants feel legitimized to claim for land rights in rural areas, especially migrants who access land under traditional systems. Requests from the latter met increased resistance and hostility from the former, who responded by taking more and more land back. The fear of losing their rights of control and ownership took precedence over social relationships. In some villages, migrants were relegated to the least fertile land.

7.5 Land insecurity and local strategies for securing rights

Land tenure insecurity is a major constraint limiting possibilities to construct sustainable livelihood strategies in rural villages. Nevertheless at the national level it contributes to limiting the rural sector and the achievement of food security. Indeed, despite efforts deployed for the past two decades to establish a legislative framework of land management land tenure remains highly uncertain, particularly for most vulnerable people. Beyond those considerations land issue became a main concern locally but also at the high authority level because of the proliferation of conflicts over land. Indeed, increasingly farmers and livestock keepers clash in a competition over access to resources, which also involve new actors in the areas, such as migrants.

Tenure insecurity has diverse dimensions, and regards:
- **kind of right granted.** migrants (land user, tenant, purchaser) are unsure of the rights acquired. If not formalized, land rights allocation vary greatly for each transaction and locals can play on this ambiguity in order to perpetuate the sense of insecurity so as to ensure their power. Using right, control and transfer rights are allocated from the landowner and often masked by ambiguity. Whether under traditional system of land allocation rights were more clear at the village level, the increasing monetised forms of land transactions raised the chances of rights

allocation[79]. This disagreement is the result of different interpretation by which land rights can be claimed. Customary law, on the one hand, emphasizes the rights derived from first clearance of land, by which migrants will never accede to full rights over land. On the other hand, migrants claim using rights, granted by the Government (RAF) on the condition that the land be developed (*mise en valeur* - whereby rights are obtained from putting land into use for a certain period of time) according to which (RAF 1996) they are entitled to acquire full rights over land having cultivated a plot for a certain length of time.

- **Institutional pluralism.** Rural areas are characterized by the coexistence of competing institutions on land management: governmental administration and customary systems. This duality of legal and custom contradiction, and neither entirely authoritative, is a more significant factor in bringing about tenure insecurity.

- **non formalization of rights granted** When migrants have access to land through money, some of them try to seek written evidence of the transaction[80]. However often landowners prefer to conclude with migrants oral contracts, trying to take advantage of the hidden and informal character of engaging in these practices that put purchasers in situations of insecurity[81].

---

[79] It is a fact that whereas land rights are not defined, farmers migrants feel insecure about their future. Indeed, even if locals allow farmers to grow crops, in most of the cases the access to land does not allow them to guide their agricultural activities in the long term. Not surprisingly, however, when migrants accessed land with money they felt they owned the piece of land. However, some landowners want to preserve their rights on it. For local landowners the transaction is treated as a simple monetized loan which does not free migrants of their customary obligations related to tutoring. However for buyer-migrants, the transaction gives them the complete ownership of land, and consequently they are free of any social obligations linked to the tutorat; Migrants who paid for land, felt the right to exploit land forever, with the possibility of selling it when leaving. However, locals consider themselves as the legitimate owners of land, and migrants do not have any unlimited right, even when land is purchased.

[80] This especially regards returnees from the Ivory Coast, who already experienced monetary based land transaction in Cote d'IVoire (Dabiré).

[81] In fact the use of writing in transactions is seen as a perspective of challenge to their control over land areas for cultivation. The refusal of formalize written transaction allows landowners to ensure their hold on land in anticipation of all attempts to claim land by migrants. Most of returning migrants in Boko, agree that some land sellers take advantage of the covert, unofficial nature of the proceedings to engage in practices which put the purchaser in a position of heightened insecurity. Among local land-owners interviewed in the villages, they all show little enthusiasm for the formalization of land rights. Greater clarity and transparency in the land transactions would weaken their position in which they take maximum advantage of the existing ambiguity and the sense of uncertainty they can impose on

Land tenure insecurity, on all three aspects (rights ambiguity, institutional confusion and weak formalization) influence on the possibilities to invest on farming and non farming activities over land, which is of considerable importance for constructing livelihood. Precariousness is more likely to affect vulnerable groups (e.g. immigrants, women, the poor), and is a factor which can also raise vulnerability itself. For example, despite already disadvantaged for their status, return migrants who did not have enough financial money to "purchase" land, access land through sharecropping and tenancy arrangements, which actually do not permit them to completely escape the vulnerable status, nor probably achieve sustainable livelihood strategy.

Important to note that in conclusion, the fieldwork revealed that insecurity of tenure in the villages is real and widespread.

Because of the lack of improvement made by the Government in order to sustain land tenure security, rural actors area implemented various strategies in order to face land insecurity. They are taking prevention initiatives to consolidate their hold on the land they farm. These preventive measures are numerous and vary according to social status and financial means of farmers.

Migrants' strategies for securing land are dynamic and diversified: strengthening social ties with landowners, planting trees (with or without the agreement of the traditional owners), purchase and, finally, the signing of a written agreement. These strategies are not exclusive and are frequently pursued in sequence and combination. These strategies have been analysed on the basis of information gathered from interviews.

Securing social relations is the traditional method for strengthing somebody's status in the village, both for locals and migrants. As a securing strategy for migrants, they try to please the chef de terre by giving various services, such as providing workforce in their fields, and giving gifts, *salutation*[82], if tenants, or with the *prix des coutumes* if they want to "purchase" land. Social capital, is indeed essential for all migrants, especially the most vulnerable returnees who could not secure their position

---

migrants.

[82] Migrant pays the landowner a sum of money at the first visit to increase its chances of access to land and later periodically to reinforce their position. The amount paid by the migrant is not explicitly requested by the latter and change from each village. It is a form of courtesy that aims to strengthen social relationships.

through land purchase. Interestingly, immigrants' vulnerability decreases according to the length of time during which they settle and to their economic status. Thus, seniority and economic power become two parameters that allow migrants to be less vulnerable to insecure land tenure.

Customary arrangements used to prohibit migrants from planting trees because it constituted a sign of ownership[83]. Nowadays very often, trees are not only planted for economic needs, but also in order to prevent situations of instability of user rights on the land, and trying to consolidate land hold by planting trees. Indeed, when a farmer does not plant trees in his field, it means that land may be subject to withdrawal after each harvest. Interviewees reported that increasingly in some villages, emerged the practice of "sale" of the right to plant. Increasingly, migrants who can afford to pay, access to the right to plant. This, again, discriminates against the less fortunate who, for lack of resources, are unable to plant trees, or do it without local consent.

Frequent disputes around land rights gradually brought many rural people to secure their rights through formalization which certify the land transactions and provide proof of the existence of the transaction. PVP is legally recognized and officially secures land rights, however also local practice, *petit papier*, are recognized at the village level and to some extent secure tenure as well. However this security is discretional and if contested not supported administratively. Despite the widespread insecurity, quite surprisingly, the respondents reported that their informal securing strategies make them enjoy a day-to-day *de facto* tenure security and an impressive part of respondents did not express great anxiety about their long term future on the land. Indeed, these informal tools, despite not being recognized by law, work reasonably well.

Land tenure security refers to people's ability to control and manage a parcel of land, use it, and engage in transactions, including transfers (IFAD). According to the theoretical definition given in chapter 3 different aspects of land tenure security(Kind of

---

[83] *"Si tu donnes une parcelle à quelqu'un et s'il plante des arbres, cela veut dire que la terre ne t'appartient plus. C'est pourquoi on refuse la plantation d'arbre à certaines personnes »* D.O. In Boko

rights held[84], duration[85] and certainty[86]), fieldwork revealed different degree of insecurity:

- Low secure returnees have temporary rights of use on land, and they lack any exclusion or transfer right on it. Nonetheless their rights are not legally formalized.

- High secure returnees when rights granted are unlimited using, decision and transfer right on land (and its product). These rights are legally protected by the law.

---

[84] (using/transfer/exclusion). The more rights one has, and those correlated to other resources, the more migrants can benefit from their land and achieve their livelihoods;

[85] length of time during which the rights are valid. Despite possessions with no temporal limits let the owner to invest and fully enjoy land, in cases of temporally limited rights, those should be sufficiently long to enable the holder to recoup with confidence the full income stream generated by the investment;

[86] Land formalisation represent a security for the landowner whose rights are formally protected by the law. Formalization as we seen, undertook diverse forms, and security of rights vary according to the formalization's recognition at the village level (excluding moral hazard).

Conclusions

This final chapter brings us back to the research question. The aim of the research was to gain more insight into the reintegration path of Burkinabè return migrants from the Ivory Coast, by closely investigating what elements played a significant role in either fostering or weakening their status, and what policies the Government implemented in their support. The research also focuses on the relation between resettlement and the importance of land tenure security to construct livelihood strategies.

The research question was:

What is the context of Burkinabè returning migrants from the Ivory Coast who opted for a rural livelihood and what problems did they encounter after their resettlement regarding access to land?

Throughout the research paper the results have demonstrated that Burkina Faso is a remarkable case study concerning migration. In fact, Burkina Faso is a country where migration has been an inherent part of its past and recent history and will continue to be so in the future due to deep socio-economic and environmental factors. Burkina Faso is also remarkable for its deep relations with the Ivory Coast and the dynamics of return migration.

This thesis has clearly highlighted the fact that it is not possible to define return migration as a linear and simple process. Rather, return migration is a complex process shaped by very important factors that include political context in both area of departure and return, reasons for leaving, length of time spent abroad, and preparedness.

This research started from the hypothesis that substantial inflow of migrants, mostly from the Ivory Coast determined considerable changes in the socio-economic rural environment in Burkina Faso. As a country of migration, Burkina Faso has several million nationals living in the bordering country Cote d'Ivoire. After a period of economic crisis, which was switched to social and political crisis

many national Burkinabè returned to their home country. Their reintegration process has been shaped by their personal characteristics, degree of preparedness and conditions at the place of return. Grouping together all main variables, which in this research opinion helped to shape returnees reintegration (preparedness, livelihood capitals, tenure security) it has been possible to draw the following conceptual model.

	Preparedness degree	livelihood capitals	Kind of tenure	Level of security
Good reintegration	well prepared	available	monetised "purchase"	good/high
Weak reintegration	enough	low	sharecropping/ tenant	low
Failed reintegration	absent	not sufficient	None-remigrant	unexciting

Table 8 Reintegration framework

Clearly, this box does not have the pretension of illustrating an exhaustive framework for all returnees from the Ivory Coast. However it has been revealing in emphasizing the strong interrelations.

The reintegration process has been the result of the migration experience in the Ivory Coast, period of return and the willingness to leave (free or forced). All these factors have inevitably influenced:

- **the decision of migrants on where to resettle**. Fieldwork revealed that returnees in the village studied are not at all a heterogeneous group as was believed during the first hypothesis. The majority of them are long standing migrants in the Ivory Coast, who work in rural areas as farmers or in trade. They achieved a good financial status in the Ivory Coast and could better be sustained by their own means once back in Burkina[87]. Other categories of returnees (second generation, short standing migrants directed toward different areas according to their status, RGPH data (2006) show clearly how second generation migrants favoured urban areas as did those who left quite late;

---

[87] Aware of the fact that interviews were taken in 2010. At that time, certainly most of the returnees who settled in the area and could not access land or failed in constructing livelihood strategies, had already left. Some went back to Ivory Coast, while others moved to other areas of the country.

- **way to access land** (rights and tenure). Fieldwork revealed that financial capital has been a determining factor in enabling access to land, and the consequent influence on land rights allocation. This has been the consequence of increasing questioning of "tutorat" and land rights individualization, nonetheless driven by the general attitude of the Government. In a situation that has increasingly been affected by monetized relations and competition over resources, those who successfully reintegrated were mainly those who were well prepared to the process of leaving, arrived early in the area and through financial capital could easily access land and other rights;

- **strategies for constructing sustainable livelihoods.** Migrants in rural areas are now farmers and traders, in many cases better off than locals. However the primary asset needed after return, has been land. Once land tenure security was achieved, the benefits for rural actors could be: reduced vulnerability, more income (either monetary and non monetary), improved food security, increased health and well being, more sustainable use of natural resources.

The sustainability of return is influenced by returnees' financial, social and human capital. Nonetheless, those capitals may have the potential to impact on the development process of the countries. However in order to maximize this potential in a sustainable manner which could involve all actors, appropriate policies should be formulated by the Government. Indeed, the importance of human, financial and other capitals which returned brought to rural Burkina Faso is not an issue, moreover this has considerably been an important step to their resettlement process. However the same is seriously in jeopardy because of the insecurity of natural capital, and in particular access to land and correlated securing rights, which are essential to any sustainable livelihood strategy.

Land tenure security, the resolution of land disputes and the government recognition of customary land rights will certainly play a critical role in the future of sustainable livelihood strategies in the area, both for immigrants and locals.

REFERENCES

Adepoju, A., Boulton, A., Levin, M. (2007) "Promoting integration through mobility: free movement and the ECOWAS Protocol" New issues in Refugees Research. UNHCR Research Paper No. 150. Policy Development and Evaluation Service, Geneva.

Adepoju, A. (2005) **"**Migration in West Africa" A paper prepared for the Policy Analysis and Research Programme of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) Human Resources Development Centre Lagos, Nigeria.

Adepoju, A. (2002) "Fostering Free Movement of Persons in West Africa: Achievements, Constraints, and Prospects for Intra-Regional Migration", International Migration Vol. 40, No.2.

Adepoju, A. (1995) "Migration in Africa: an overview", in J. Baker and T.A. Aina (eds) *The Migration Experience in Africa.* The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala.

Akindes, F. (2004) "The Roots of the Military-Political Crises in Côte d'Ivoire" Research Report No. 128. The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala.

Amin, S. (1974) "Modern Migrations in Western Africa". Oxford University Press, London.

Amin, S. (1967) "Le développement du capitalisme en Côte d'Ivoire", Editions de Minuit, Paris.

Amin. S. (1995) "Migrations in contemporary Africa: a retrospective view", in J. Baker and T.A. Aina (eds) "The Migration Experience in Africa" The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala.

Annan-Yao , E. (1999). "Immigration et identités culturelles en Afrique de l'Ouest" in *"*La population africaine au 21 ème siècle", UEPA, Troisième Conférence sur la population, Durban.

Aube, T & C.I. Ndiaye (2005) "Mission FAO d'Evaluation des récoltes et des disponibilités alimentaires" Rapport Spécial
http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/j3973f/j3973f00.htm.
(Accessed on 15 november 2010)

Balac, R. (1997), "L'acheminement de l'économie de plantation ivoirien vers un blocage structurel: analyse d'une crise", in Contamin, B. and H. Memel Foté (eds), Le modèle ivoirien en questions. Crises, ajustements, recomposition. Karthala, Paris.

Beauchemin, Ch. (2006) "Urban outmigration, poverty and structural adjustment in Burkina Faso. An event history analysis 1980-1999".
http://paa2006/princeton.edu.download.aspx?submissionId=60914.
(Accessed on 15 July 2010)

Blion, R. and S. Bredeloup (1997), "La Côte d'Ivoire dans les stratégies migratoires des Burkinabés et des Sénégalais", in Contamin, B. and H. Memel Foté (eds), "Le modèle ivoirien en questions. Crises, ajustements, recomposition". Karthala-Orstom, Paris.

Blot, O. (2003), "Epiphénomènes Burkinabè de la Crise Ivoirienne" Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne D.E.A. Etudes Africaines Option Science Politique, Paris.

Boyd, M. (1989) "Family and Personal Networks in International Migration: Recent Development and New Agendas", International Migration Review Vol. 23 No.3:638-670.

Bredeloup, S., (1996) "Les Sénégalais de Côte d'Ivoire face aux redéfinitions de l'ivoirité", Vol. 33, No.121, Centre Studi Emigrazione, Rome.

Bredeloup, S. (2006) "Rapatriés Burkinabé de Côte d'Ivoire Réinstallations au pays et nouveaux projets migratoires" Chapter 7 in Migrants des Sud of Baby Collin, V. Cortes, G., Faret, L., Guetat-Bernard, H. IRD (Institut de recherche pour le développment) edition ,Objectifs Suds Marseille, 2009

Broekhuis, A. (2008) Experiences with international migration, new policy directions and viewpoints from Burkina Faso. In: A.Adepoju , T.van Naerssen and A. Zoomers eds: International Migration and National Development in subSaharan Africa , Viewpoints and Policy Initiatives in the Countries of Origin. Africa Studiecentre Series, Leiden No 10, pp. 70-90

Broekhuis, A. (2006) "International Migration and Development in Burkina Faso, Viewpoints and Policy Initiatives" Working papers Migration and Development series. Report No. 7. Nijmegen.

Bustamante, Jorge A. (2002). "Immigrants Vulnerability as Subjects of Human Rights." International Migration Review. Vol.36, No. 2 , Summer.

Cassarino, J.P. (2008) "The Conditions of Modern Return Migrants" International Journal on Multicultural Societies (IJMS) UNESCO, Vol. 10, No. 2: 3-13.

Cassarino, J.P. (2004) "Theorising return migration: the conceptual approach to return migrants revisited". International Journal on Multicultural Societies, UNESCO,

Vol 6, No 2: 253–79.

Cesare F. P (1974) "Expectations and reality: A case study of return Migration from the United States to the Southern Italy". In International Migration Review Vol 8, No. 2., pp. 245-262.

Chambers, R. and G.R. Conway. (1992). "Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: Practical Concepts for the 21st Century". Institute of Development Studies University of Sussex, Brighton.

Chauveau J.-P. (2002). "La loi ivoirienne de 1998 sur le domaine foncier rural et l'agriculture de plantation villageoise: une mise en perspective historique et sociologique" Réforme agraire 2002/1, FAO.

Chauveau, JP, Colin J. Ph, Jacob, JP, Lavigne Delville, P. et Lemeur, P-Y, (2006) "Modes d'accès à la terre, marchés fonciers, gouvernance et politiques foncières en Afrique de l'Ouest" Résultats du projet de recherche CLAIMS by IRD/IUED/GRET/IIED, Paris, Genève, Londres.

Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions - COHRE, (2007) "Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons".

Cordell D. D., Gregory J. W., Piché V., (1996) "Hoe and wage : a social history of a circular migration system in West Africa". Westview Press, Boulder, Colo.

Constant, A. and Massey, D. S. (2002) "Return migration by German guestworkers: neoclassical versus new economic theories". International Migration Vol. 40, No. 4 pp. 5–38.

Constitution of Burkina Faso (1991), accessed on: August 29, 2010.
available on:http://www.legiburkina.bf/codes/constitution_du_burkina_faso.htm
(Accessed on 8 september 2010)

de Haan, A., K. Brock and N. Coulibaly, (2002), "Migration, Livelihoods and Institutions: Contrasting Patterns of Migration in Mali", The Journal of Development Studies, Vol.38, No.5, pp.37-58.

Dabiré, B., Loyé A.S. (2007) "FSP- migration" - Chapitre I : Migrations, dynamiques économiques des régions des Cascades et du Sud-Ouest : descriptions des principales tendances" ISSP, Ouagadougou.

Dabiré, B., Zongo, M. (2005) "Rapport UERD-Claims" ISSP, Ouagadougou.

Deininger, K., and G. Feder (2000). "Land Institutions and Land Markets", in B. Gardner and G. Rausser (eds) Handbook of Agricultural Economics, North Holland: Amsterdam.

Drabo, I., Ilboudo, F., Tallet, B. (2003) "Dynamique des populations, disponibilites en terres et adaptation des regimes foncier: le Burkina Faso, une etude de cas" Institut National des Sciences des Sociétés (INSS) Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie (INSD) Ouagadougou.

Dustmann C. (2001), "Return migration, wage differential and the optimal migration duration", Discussion Paper No. 264. Institute for the study of Labor, Bonn.

Ellis, F. (2000), "Rural Livelihoods and Diversity in Developing Countries". Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Ellis, F (2003) "A Livelihoods Approach to Migration and Poverty Reduction" Paper Commissioned by the Department for International Development (DFID), London, UK.

Franqueville A., (1987), "Une Afrique entre le village et la ville: les migrations dans le sud du Cameroun". ORSTOM, Paris.

FAO (2008) "Western Africa ACP countries' Agriculture Sectors Background Information and Country Profiles" Prepared for the Western African Region Kick Off Workshop Dakar, Senegal, 27-29 May 2008.

Fawcett JT. (1989) "Networks, Linkages, and Migration Systems" International Migration Review Vol. 23, No. 3: 671-80

Gent, S and Black, R. (2005) "Defining, Measuring and Influencing Sustainable Return" Briefing No. 3., Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty, University of Sussex, Brighton

Ghosh, B. (2000) "Return migration: reshaping policy approaches", in B. Ghosh (ed.) Return Migration. Journey of Hope or Despair? IOM/UN, Geneva.

Gmelch, G. (1980). "Return Migration", Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol.9: 135-139. Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews

Hammond, L. (1999) "Examining the Discourse of Repatriation: Towards a More Proactive Theory of Return Migration", 227-244 in Black, R. and Koser, K. (eds.) The End of the Refugee Cycle? Refugee Repatriation and Reconstruction. Oxford, Berghahn.

Herzog, H. and Schottman, A. (1982), "Migration Information, Job Search and the Remigration Decision", Southern Economic Journal Vol.50, No. 1.

Gubry P., Lamlenn S. B., Ngwé E. (éd.), (1996), "Le Retour au village : une solution à la crise économique au Cameroun", Paris, L'Harmattan - IFORD – CEPED.

Guimapi C., (2003), "Les migrants de retour dans les villages du Cameroun de l'Ouest", in Populations et défis urbains, dir. par T. Eggerickx, C. Gourbin et al., Louvain-La-Neuve, Academia Bruylant – L'Harmattan, p. 237-256.

IIED (2006), "Modes d'accès à la terre,marchés fonciers, gouvernance et politiques foncières en Afrique de l'Ouest: Résultats du projet de recherche CLAIMS" Jean-Pierre Chauveau (IRD), Jean-Philippe Colin (IRD), Jean-Pierre Jacob (IUED), Philippe Lavigne Delville (GRET), Pierre-Yves Le Meur (GRET)

Institut National de la Statistique de Côte d'Ivoire (2001)"Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat (RGPH 1998)" Abidjan: Institut National de la Statistique.

Institut National de la Statistique et Demographie, Burkina Faso "Recensement général de la population et de l'habitation" 1985, 1996 et 2006 (RGPH 1985, 1996, 2006), INSD, Ouagadougou.

IOM-International Organisation for migration (2004) "Glossary on Migration" International Migration Law, Geneva.

Kilic, T. Carletto, G. Davis, B. and Zezza, A. (2007). "Investing Back Home: Return Migration and Business Ownership in Albania" Policy Research Working Paper No. 4366. Washington DC, World Bank.

King, R. (1986) "Return Migration and regional economic problems" Croom Helm, London

King, R. (2000). "Generalizations from the history of return migration." in Gosh, B. (ed): Return Migration: Journey of Hope or Despair? United Nations; Geneva, pp 1-30.

Kress B. (2006) "Burkina Faso: Testing the Tradition of Circular Migration" Information Source (http://www.migrationinformation.org), March.

Konseiga, A. (2005) "Household migration decisions as survival strategy: the case of Burkina Faso" Journal of African Economies, Oxford University Press, Vol. 16 No. 2,

pages 198-233, March.

Koser, K. and Black R. (1997), "The End of the Refugee Cycle? Refugee Repatriation & Reconstruction" Oxford: Berghahn.

Lavigne Delville, P. (2000) "Quelles politiques foncières pour l'Afrique rurale? Réconcilier pratiques, légitimité et légalité". Paris, Karthala & Coopération Française.

Mande, I. (1998) "Les migrants burkinabè en Côte d'Ivoire: une diaspora à l'épreuve des politiques nationales", SEDET, université Paris VII

Mande, I. (1992) "Les migrations de travail des voltaiques: Panacée pour l'Economie ivoirienne de 1919 à 1960" Paper presented at the "Conference on Memoires Voltaiques", Karthala, Paris.

Mangin E., (1981) "Les Mossi: essai sur les us et coutumes du peuple Mossi au Soudan occidentale" Challamel, Paris.

Mathieu P., avec Bologo E. et Zongo M., (2004). "Des transactions foncières ambigües et conflictuelles: les retraits de terre dans le sud-ouest du Burkina Faso." Document de travail. IED Louvain la Neuve.

Mathieu P., Lavigne-Delville P., Ouédraogo H., Paré L. & Zongo M., 2003. Sécuriser les transactions foncières dans l'ouest du Burkina Faso. Dossier no.117, Programme Zones Arides, IIED, Londres.

Matsuoka, A. and Soreson, J. (2001) "Ghosts and Shadows: Construction of Identity and Community in an African Diaspora" University of Toronto Press. Toronto.

Ministere de l'Action Social (2003) "Communication au CASEM 2003 du Ministère de l'Action sociale et de la Solidarité Nationale" Government du Burkina Faso. Available at:
http://www.action-sociale.gov.bf/SiteActionSociale/projets/bayiri.pdf

OECD 2008, "Burkina Faso, African Economic outlook" OECD Publishing / African Development Bank. Accessed on: May 29, 2010 Available at http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/west-africa/burkina-faso/
(Accessed on 15 july 2010)

Emery Albert Ouédraogo (2008) "Rapatriés burkinabè de Côte d'Ivoire: Vie de "bayirisé". L'observateur paalga 23 janvier 2008.

Ouedraogo D., (2002). "Migrations circulaires et enjeux identitaires en Afrique de

l'Ouest" les cahiers du Gres, Vol. 3, No. 1. UNDP,

Ouedraogo, D. (1994) "Migrations et intégration régionale en Afrique de l'Ouest" in E. Grenon et A. Vuillet (eds) Processus régionaux d'intégration en Afrique de l'Ouest: rapprochements institutionnels ou espaces spontanés?, Centre Sahel/Université Laval, Quebec: Université Laval.

Nafziger, E W., F. Stewart and R. Väyrynen (2000). "War, Hunger, and Displacement: The Origins of Humanitarian Emergencies", Vol. 1 and 2. Oxford. Oxford University Press,

Peek (1981) "A typology of migrants: some methodological aspects" ILO – International Labour Organization Sep. 1981 (WEP 10-6/WP.50).

Pizarro, R. (2005) "Specific groups and individuals: migrant workers in Burkina Faso" Report, United Nations commission on human rights Sixty-second session Item 14 (a) of the provisional agenda. Economic and Social
Council

Politique National de Securisation Foncier en Milieu Rural (2007), available on http://inter-reseaux.org/IMG/pdf_PNSFMR.pdf
(Accessed on 12 April 209)

Rogers, R. (1984) "Return Migration in comparative perspective", in D. Kubat (Ed) The politics of Return: International Return Migration in Europe, New York: Center for Migration Studies, 277-299.

Rogge, J.R. (1994) "Repatriation of Refugees",in Allen, Tim and Hubert Morsink (eds), "When Refugees Go Home", London, James Currey.

Schwartz, A. (1999) "Le conflit foncier entre Krou et Burkinabé de novembre 1999 : une lecture à la lumière de l'institution krouman" *Afrique contemporaine*, 193 : 56-66.

SP/CONASUR (2004) : Analyse des données sur les rapatriés de Côte d'Ivoire. UNICEF, PAM. Ouagadougou, septembre 2004.

Stefansson, A. (2004) "Homecomings to the future: from diasporic mythographies to social projects of return", in Markowitz, F. and Stefansson, H. (eds) Homecomings: unsettling paths of return. Oxford: Lexington Books.

Stark, Oded, (1996). "On the Microeconomics of Return Migration," in V. N. Balasubramanyam and D. Greenaway (eds.) Trade and Development: Essays in Honor

of Jagdish Bhawati, London: MacMillan Press Ltd.

Touré, M. et Fadayomi, T.O. (1992) "Migrations, Development and Ubanization Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa", Dakar: Codesria.

Traite modifié de l'UEMOA du 29 janvier 2003,
http://www.uemoa.int/documents/TraitReviseUEMOA.pdf
(accessed on 2 september 2010)

Traoré, S. and Bocquier, P. (1998). "Réseau Migrations et Urbanisation en Afrique de l'Ouest (REMUAO) Études et Travaux du CERPOD, Bamako.

UNDP, Burkina Faso Human Development Report 2010

Van Haute, M., de Koning M. (2008), "Towards a better embeddedness? Monitoring assistance to involuntary returning migrants from Western countries" CIDIN

Van Hear. N. (1998) "New diasporas: the mass exodus, dispersal and regrouping of migrant communities". London: University College Press.

World Bank (2009) "Burkina Faso: Overcoming the odds IDA at work" http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/IDA-BurkinaFaso.pdf
(Accessed 10 october 2010)

Yameogo, M. (2003) "Sort de Taylor et de Kaddafi : l'UNDD dénonce une logique d'absolution" , *L'Observateur Paalga*, Ouagadougou, 20 août 2003

Joseph A. Yaro (2008) "Migration in West Africa: Patterns, Issues and Challenges" Centre for Migration Studies University of Ghana, Legon

Zongo, M. (2003) "La diaspora Burkinabé en Côte d'Ivoire. Trajectoire historique, recomposition des dynamiques migratoires er rapport avec le pays d'origine" Revue Africaine de Sociologie, Vol.7, N.2: 113-126.

Zongo, M. (2009) "Niangoloko: a crossroads of migration in Northern Ivory Coast" Cité nationale de l'histoire de l immigration, Paris.

Annex 1

Annex 2

Annex 3 INTERVIEW GUIDE - MIGRANTS

General presentation of the study

Identification of status
Migrant (Name and surname, Household size, Region of origin, Date of settlement)
Socio professional status in the village (age, marital status, principal activity).
Non-farming activities

Identification of migratory experience
length of time spent in Ivory Coast
Kind of activities carried on in Ivory Coast
Reasons to return to Burkina
Path to return
Choice of where resettle

Resettlements dynamics
Time of arrival
Typology of modes of access to land (parties, clauses, sequence)
Evolution of Terms of the contract
Evolution of contract (sequence, reasons for change, parties involved, etc.)
Conflicts related to the contract.

Land tenure
Changes in the environment
Number of plots held and date they were obtained
Value of plot (area, production factors, amounts involved).
Crops grown and area cultivated

INTERVIEW GUIDE - LOCALS

General presentation of the study

Identification of status
Local (Name and surname, Household size)
Socio professional status in the village (age, marital status, principal activity).
Non-farming activities
First occupants in the area and local people
Immigration waves

Land tenure

Number of plots held and date they were obtained
Value of plot (area, production factors, amounts involved).
Traditional methods for access land

Actors involved in land transaction
Difficulties encountered in managing contracts and settling disputes
Elements leading to further change in nature of contracts
Actual methods of access to land
Land conflicts (Actors involved, causes and date)
Land insecurity (with migrants, with the Government...)
Perception of instability land access rights