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Negotiation succes of European Memberstates

Bachelor thesis Sociology

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Backgrounds to the research problem

When speaking about the European Union (EU), one speaks about the still developing collaboration between several member states of Europe. This collaboration has a special type of structure that can not fall into any traditional legal category. Its political system is historically unique and has been constantly evolving over more than 50 years. Although it started as the European Economic Community (EEC) with six countries, by now the number of the EU members has grown to 27 states. As the size of the collaboration has been growing, so has the intensity. While the EEC was only collaborating on the fields of agricultural, transport and economical policy, by now the EU is involved in almost all the political decisions made in all the 27 member states (Dinan, 1999). Although there is a lot of cooperation in many fields, there are also great differences between the EU member-states. Because of the fact that all the member states are different in for instance size, economical power and political convictions, they all have different demands and desires. This makes the cooperation next to very extensive, also very difficult. Still the Union is build with the idea that member states will try to work the differences out and aim for more cooperation between them all. These different demands and desires can not all be implemented and accepted. To regulate the cooperation and to come to mutual accepted agreements, many arrangements are made and decision-making processes are held.

The EU structure consists of tree main bodies. The laws and EU policies in general are the result of decisions taken by the institutional triangle of the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission.

The Council of the European Union is the main decision-making body. The Council represents the individual member states. Every member state takes its turn to hold the Council Presidency for a six-month period. Every Council meeting is attended by a minister from each country. The European Parliament is the elected body that represents the citizens of the union. It shares legislative power equally with the Council of the European Union. This means it is empowered to adopt European laws. It can accept, amend or reject the content of European legislation. The European Commission acts in the interest of the Union and it consists of one representative of each member state. The Commission has the exclusive right to propose new legislation on some subjects. On other subjects they share this right with the member states. When there is an official proposal, the Council decides sometimes in combination with the parliament and the commission, about accepting the proposal (Dinan, 1999).

Problem formulation

Given this extensive regulation, it can be interesting to examine which factors can play significant roles in the outcomes of decision-making.

As been said before, all the countries involved have different preferences and desires. Because the aim of the EU is to make an overall policy which every member state is satisfied with, the member states always have to work for outcomes that everybody will accept. For this reason the EU policy is almost always a compromise (Stockman, 2004). As always with compromising, nobody can get exactly what they want and everybody has to adjust their demands to achieve a satisfying outcome for everyone. In these negotiations some countries will be better in getting as they prefer than others.

This study will investigate which member states manage to draw the outcomes of the negotiations closer towards their preferences than others. The descriptive question in this is which member states can influence the outcome of the negotiations best.

The explanatory question will be which factors influence the distance between the preferred outcome of a member state and the actual outcome of a proposal.

Societal & Scientific Relevance

In the European Union these days a lot of collective decisions are being made for al the member states. And so a lot of legislation for member states nowadays is made at the European level. This influences life in all the member states, and thereby the life of its 495 million citizens. This research project will try to find out which hallmarks of member states influence the difference between the preferred outcome of a member state on a commission proposal and the actual outcome. With the results of this research we will have more information on the influence of for instance GDP and the length of the membership of a state on the outcome of commission proposals. This information is useful because the influence of the European policy on the local policy is growing every day. It is an important investigation for citizens of the whole union because it will give more transparency on the division of power.

Theory

Negotiation may be characterized as 'a process of potentially opportunistic interaction by which two or more parties, with some apparent conflict, seek to do better through jointly decided action than they could otherwise' (Lax and Sebenius 1986).

In the European Union al decisions are made in a process which involves negotiation. Trough negotiation the member states try to solve the problems that they meet when trying to make European policy. Negotiation itself is a process of cooperation and conflict. By cooperation we try to achieve a collective accepted outcome and by the conflict part everybody tries to conquer the biggest advantage in this outcome (Bui and Shakun, 1996). An important factor in negotiations is the bargaining position of a member state. Lax et al found out that the strength of ones bargaining position has a positive influence on the outcome. Some parties will have better bargaining positions than others. Therefore we will look at factors that can influence this bargaining position and thereby affect the outcome of negotiations.

The first factor that will be discussed as a potential important factor that can influence the outcome of negotiations on a proposal is economic power. Previous studies have already pointed out that a substantial share in the EU economic market leads to a larger say in negotiations (Bailer, 2007). They state that the more economical power a country has, the more power it will have in negotiations. This should be the case because countries with a lot of economical power have more economic resources and more economic resources means more institutional power (Ansolabehere, S & Snyder, J., 1998). The reason for this is that economic resources are necessary for a lot of plans and goals, so the member states that have more economic resources will have more influence on how it is spend and for which goals and plans it is being used. In this way they will have more power in negotiations, because they are speaking about their own resources. For this reason the first hypotheses will be that countries with more economic power will be better capable to get the outcome of a commission proposal close to their preference than others.
H 1 - The more economic power a state has, the higher its success in negotiations will be.

Another factor that can influence the success in negotiations could be the duration of the membership of the countries. The countries that have found the European Union will, because of their long membership, probably know a lot more about the way negotiations work in the Union because they have many experiences with it. Steinel et al. (2007) investigated the influence of experience and advice on success in negotiations. They found that experience has an extensive influence on success in negotiations. Experience can be build by the repetition of negotiations. Because of the fact that a member state has been a member for many years, it has already gained experience and by this knowledge on how the bargaining process works. For this reason they will know better which actions lead to which outcomes and trough this they will know better which actions they should take to achieve their goals. The difference in

knowledge and expertise between a country like Bulgaria who joined the EU in 2007 and for instance the United Kingdom who joined in 1973 can be of great difference and could therefore influence the outcome of the negotiation process as well. Our following hypotheses will be.

H 2 - The more experience a member state has in the European Union, the higher its success in negotiations will be.

By now we have looked at the economic power and the experience of a member state which can influence the outcome of negotiations. Stokman (2004) speaks of three essential variables that are assumed to form the main futures of any decision making situation: the position of an actor on the policy, the capabilities a member state has to exert influence and the level of salience a country attaches to the outcome. The economic power a country has is an example of the capabilities of a country and the position of the actor is captured in the dataset. In the next part we will therefore look at the salience a member state attaches to a subject. Issue-specific power is about the fact that countries have differing preferences and power about different subjects (Tallberg, 2008). For instance, the Northern European countries will sooner ask for measurements to protect their employed citizens against the cold while Southern states will sooner ask for protection against the sun. Also the Netherlands as a transit land with its extensive dock area is more interested and knowing in legislation about this than for instance Austria. Because different countries have different preferences, there are also variations between the efforts they want to make about these subjects (Bailer, 2004). If a member state has more interest in a subject than they will also attach more importance to it. And if a member state attaches great importance to a subject, they will make more effort to achieve an outcome close to their preferences. The more effort a country wants to make to achieve the outcome they prefer, the more salience they attach to this subject. So if a country attaches more salience to a proposal, the higher the chance is that the outcome of a commission proposal will be close to their preference. Therefore the next hypothesis will be: H 3 - The more salience a country attaches to a subject, the higher its success in negotiations will be.

Next to the economic power that member states can use to be more effective in negotiating, there are also other capabilities they can use to be more powerful. A possible active way to achieve success in negotiations can be the strategy of taking an extreme position. Schneider and Cederman (1994) have shown that to take an extreme position in negotiations can help a country to achieve its goals. This voting strategy if mostly used when member states want the outcome of negotiations to be very close to its original

status. The Commission uses two ways to vote on proposals, unanimously and by qualified majority voting. Unanimously, logically means that all parties have to be in favor of the proposal. Qualified majority voting means that 255 votes out of a total of 345 have to be in favor of the proposal which represents a majority of all the Member States (EU, 2007). By taking an extreme position in unanimously voting, a member state can effectively block a proposal. However on QMV the other member states can still achieve a majority of votes and accept the proposal. Bailer on the contrary states that this extreme voting also works with qualified majority voting. This would be because the Council still tends to accommodate all interests and tries to find an outcome which all member states agree on. In this way a country can still influence negotiations and arrange the outcome of a Commission proposal to be very close to the original status, and exactly what the member state prefers (Bailer, 2004). Therefore the following hypotheses will be:

H 4 - If a member state chooses an extreme position, the chances of being successful in the negotiations are higher.

Stokman (2004) shows that no member state has a position which is consistently close to that of the commission. The position of member states defers on the subject negotiations are about. The commission has the exclusive right to propose new legislation. The commission however has only few employees comparing to the size of its work and therefore they almost never initiate proposals themselves (Stokman, 2004). Van Schendelen (2004) writes that if member states or lobby groups effectively have subjects they want regulation on, the council takes this in consideration. And to simply the work for the commission, who because of its capacity cannot effectively do this, member states and lobby groups actually already initiate the whole plan the commission should propose. Trough this mode of operation, member states have the opportunity to perform influence in the draft phase of new legislation.

H 5 - The closer the position of a country is to that of the commission, the higher its success in the outcome will be.

Research Design

To examine the factors that will influence the difference between the preference of a member state and the actual outcome of a commission proposal, the Decision making in the European Union (DEU) dataset which is collected by Robert Thomson and Frans Stokman will be used.

The dataset consists of information on 174 controversial issues from 70 Commission proposals in fifteen member states. Of these, there is information on decision outcomes on 162 issues from 66 Commission proposals. The outcome of the other four proposals was made after the period of collecting the data, so these outcomes are not included in the dataset. The dataset we are using in our research contains information about the estimates of EU decision maker's most favored positions on controversial issues, and how much they valued their positions. It also includes information on the outcomes of decisions on those issues, and indicators of actor's relative power.

The 174 controversial issues were pending in the Council of Ministers in 1999 and/or 2000 and are collected trough interviews with policy area experts supplemented with content analysis of Council documentation. The issues considered were part of legislative proposals adopted by the European Commission that were subject to either the consultation procedure or the co-decision procedure.

Interviews with policy area experts

Forty key informants were interviewed on the preferences of the actors on the twenty-four directives concerning the controversial issues. The interviews lasted on average 100 minutes each. Each informant was well known with the decision making processes on the directives on which they had to provide information. From these informants, twenty-nine where desk officers from the permanent representations of the member states, the others were Commission officials. To examine the validity and the reliability of the judgment of the informants, their reactions were compared with information from Council documentation and judgments from different informants.

Additionally thirty-one point estimates from the key informants were compared with estimates from informants in the European Parliament. Thirty of these match perfectly or almost perfectly (Stokman, 2004).

Selection of the commission proposals

To select the commission proposals of the dataset, three criteria were adopted. The first criterion was that the Commission proposals included could not have changed their legislative

procedure since the Amsterdam Treaty came into effect on May 1999. They also had to be subject to either the consultation or the co-decision procedure, because these are the most important procedures in EU legislative decision making. The second criterion was that the selected proposals had to be discussed in the Council in the period of January 1999 till December 2000. The time period used had to be recent because the decisions still had to be fresh in the minds of the key informants that were interviewed about the proposals. This was also important for the measurements of controversy in relation to each directive. At last the selected directives had to raise some minimum level of discord. Before the inclusion of a Commission proposal in the selection, it had to have been mentioned in *Agence Europe*, the most important independent daily news service on EU affairs. In this way they were sure to avoid the selection of very technical Commission proposals that were not very politically important (Thomson, Torenvlied & Arregui, 2007).

In the first part of the interviews, experts were asked to identify the discussion on a proposal. In this they had to identify a few issues that in their view capture the main elements of the discussions on this proposal. In figure 1, two of the five issues of the discussion about cigarette packs are shown. The proposed directive in this figure (COD/1999/244) is about the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products. The discussion is about standard decisions aimed to harmonize certain requirements that packaging of cigarettes produced in the EU must meet.

Figure 1.1

Issue 1: Should EU rules on maximum yield levels for tobacco products apply to products intended for export outside the EU?

DE, EL, AT, LU, ES		Outcome	COM, BE, FR, FI, IT, IE, DK, EP, NL, PT, SE, UK
Position 0: No, only to EU market	Position 50: Only when importing countries have no legislation	Position 90: Yes, but with transition period	Position 100: Yes, same rules

Issue 2: How strong should the health warning be on tobacco products?

| AT, DE, LU	EL	UK, COM, ES, FI, IT, IE, BE, FR, SE, NL, PT, DK	Outcome	EP
Position 0: 4-8% of packaging with current health warnings	Position 25: 15-20% with current health warnings	Position 50: 25% of packaging with somewhat stronger warnings	Position 95: with very strong warnings, but some stronger wording proposed by EP dropped	Position 100: more than 30% of package with very strong health warnings

Figure 1.1: The tobacco products directive (COD/1999/244): two of the issues specified by informants
AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, COM = Commission, DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, EL = Greece, EP = European Parliament, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = France, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, LU = Luxembourg, NL = The Netherlands, PT = Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom (Thomson, Torenvlied & Arregui, 2007).

These two issues contain the main criteria an issue specification must meet. The first is that each of the issue continua is uni-dimensional; this means that actors can be placed on a simple scale from 0 to 100. Their place on the scale represents their preferred outcome of the proposal. The two extreme positions 0 and 100 on each issue continuum represent the most extreme positions considered in the negotiations. Intermediate positions represent more moderate positions and also possible compromise outcomes. The further the preferred outcome of a country lies from the actual outcome, the lower the score on success of a country will be.

As shown in figure 1, Germany, Greece, Spain, Luxembourg and Austria were initially against issue 1 while the others were in favor. The score on negotiations failure of each member state is based on the distance between a state's initial preference and the final decision outcome.

Measurements: Dependent variable

The measurements for the dataset are based on the extent to which a member state disagrees with the contents of each directive. This means that the distance between the member states most preferred outcome and the adopted outcome of the decision is measured. So the more a country disagrees with the outcome of a proposal, the higher it's score on negotiation failure for this proposal will be in the measurement of the dependent variable. These measurements are based on the policy preferences of member states on a directive, when it was a proposal.

The dependent variable in this research will be the failure that the several member states can have in a negotiation. We used the variables preference and outcome which are already in the dataset. We measured the dependent variable as preference minus outcome. For this we used the absolute numbers. The dependent variable 'negotiation failure' is exactly the opposite of success. For the variable 'negotiation failure' we measured the least success that every member state has on different proposals. By making the variable failure we also declared all the missings. We did this by recoding all the missings to be equal to 999. The next step was to compute the variables 'negotiation failure' for each member state. By doing this we got 15 different variables of negotiation failure for each member state. For a better overview of the negotiation failure we transformed these 15 variables into cases. We had to do this for the regression analysis. In this analysis we must have one dependent variable that includes the negotiation failure of all member states instead of 15 different variables for each member state. To achieve this we used the restructure command.

Independent variable

For a better overview of all the independent variables we transformed the 15 variables of the member states into cases. This was necessary for the regression analysis and by doing so we made one variable of: economic power, salience, experience, extreme position and distance from the Commission. This was better than 15 different variables for each independent one. To achieve this we used the restructure command.

H1: Economic power

To measure the economic power, we used the GDP of all the member states. Because all data in the Data-set is collected in 1999, 2000 and 2001, we used the average of the GDP of the member states of these three years. The numbers in the table are in millions of US dollars. Our information is from the World Bank Indicators database, which we assumed to be most reliable (World Bank 2000).

Table 2.1 - GDP Member States

Member state	1999	2000	2001	Average
Austria	208.949	189.039	188.546	**195.508**
Belgium	245.706	226.648	229.610	**233.988**
Denmark	174.363	162.343	161.542	**166.083**
Finland	126.130	121.466	120.855	**122.817**
France	1.410.262	1.294.246	1.309.807	**1.338.105**
Germany	2.081.202	1.872.992	1.846.069	**1.933.421**
Greece	123.934	112.646	117.169	**117.916**
Ireland	84.861	93.865	103.298	**94.008**
Italy	1.149.958	1.073.960	1.088.754	**1.104.224**
Luxembourg	17.561	18.892	18.540	**18.331**
Netherlands	384.766	364.766	380.137	**376.556**
Portugal	107.716	105.054	109.803	**107.524**
Spain	562.245	558.558	581.823	**567.542**
Sweden	226.388	227.319	209.814	**221.173**
UK	1.373.612	1.414.557	1.424.094	**1.404.087**

Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 8/2/2000, 2001, and 2002

H2 : Salience

The salience means the value that a member state attaches to a proposal. Salience is a value between 0 en 100. The higher the number is, the more salience an actor attaches to a subject. A value of 0 means that the actor attaches no salience to a subject, and a value of 100 means that a lot of salience is attached to this subject. A score of 50 on salience indicates that the issue has an average level of priority for the stakeholder concerned, and that it is willing to use arguments but not power politics to convince opponents. Note that it is also possible for a stakeholder to attach a high level of salience to an issue on which it takes a moderate position, and a low level of salience to an issue on which it takes an extreme position (Stokman, 2004).

<u>H3 : experience</u>   In the
third hypothesis, the independent variable is experience. For measuring experience we used
the duration of the membership of a country of the European Union. Because the longer a
country is a member state of the EU, the more experience it will have in negotiations.

Table 2.2 - Experience member states.

Year of joining EU	Member states	Experience
1951	Belgium, West-Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands	**49**
1973	Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom	**27**
1981	Greece	**20**
1986	Spain, Portugal	**14**
1995	Austria, Finland, Sweden	**8**

(Source : Dinan, 1999)

Table 2.2 shows the duration of their European membership for al member states. The
experience of every member state is measured by the year they joined the EU. An important
note is that in 1951 the EU was only an economic agreement. The reason why we used this as
experience in the EU, is because the member states already had an agreement with each other.
This means that those member states already have experience on negotiation with each other
on the European level since 1951. Another important note is that we valued Germany with the
experience of West-Germany. West-Germany joined the EU in 1951, while East-Germany did
this in 1990. Because West-Germany probably shared its experiences with the Eastern part,
we used the year West-Germany joined the EU for Germany.

<u>H4: extreme position</u>   To
measure the extreme position of a member state, we first will have to explain what an extreme
position is. In some decisions a member state will take an extreme position to influence
negotiations. By doing so they will try to force the other member states to change their point
of view. This can work because all the member states want a collectively accepted outcome,
otherwise there will be no outcome at all. We have chosen that only the values 0 and 100 will

represent an extreme position. If a member states takes a position of 0 or 100, this is the lowest or the highest score possible, which is very extreme. By doing this a member state wants to make an issue of this proposal. By using recode, we recoded the variables into dummy variables. The values 0 and 100 are operationalized as extreme position, we gave them the value 1. All the other values with a normal position have a value of 0. This is the dummy variable we made.

H5: distance from the Commission

To measure the distance from a member state to the Commission we use the same method we used by making the dependent variable. First we computed the absolute distance for every member state from the Commission. By doing this we got 15 different variables for the distance of the Commission. Using restructure we made one variable of these 15 variables which makes it possible to make an analysis later.

Analyses & methods

To check the influence of the independent variables on the dependent variable, we will use an Anova-test and a regression-analysis.

ANOVA-Test

First we will do an ANOVA-Test. The ANOVA-test is for the analysis between a nominal and an interval variable. The ANOVA-test is useful because it provides a systematic and theoretically valid way of answering questions on for example the difference between groups and the significance of this difference.

We will test if there is a significant difference between groups, and if there is a significant difference between member states. The ANOVA-Test will help us by answering the descriptive question: What are the differences between member states in terms of success in negotiations? The ANOVA-test is also useful for comparing means and variances. An ANOVA-test provides a simple conceptual connection between the t-test and the regression (de Vocht, 2006).

The conditions for using the ANAVO-test are:

- The perceptions come from an independent, random samples from normally divided populations
- The variables are measured on interval or ratio level.
- The variances in the different groups are equal to each other (de Vocht,2006).

Because the proposals are selected under the conditions of three criteria, our perceptions are not independent, random samples from normally divided populations. In our case we have different proposals that are measured for every member state. The proposals are measured at ratio level. The variances of different member states are equal to each other because they are all member states of the European Union.

Linear Regression Analysis.

In a linear regression analysis there is the assumption that there will be a causal relation between a dependent variable and a independent variable. This means there should be a causal relation between negotiation failure and economic power, salience, experience, extreme position and distance from the Commission. The independent variables influence the dependent variable. Because we have several independent variables we have a multiple regression. The dependent variable is always interval/ratio. Independent variables are always

interval/ratio(de Vocht, 2006). In a linear regression analysis it is necessary that the independent variables in the regression measure the same thing.

We will use the regression analysis for answering our second and explanatory question: What are the factors that influence the differences between member states?

Results

In this part we will do the analysis, and describe the results.
We first used an ANOVA-test.

Table 3.1 - ANOVA

Success	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Austria	135	30.800	32.49312	2.79656	25.2689	36.3311
Belgium	152	35.5921	33.70624	2.73394	30.1904	40.9938
Denmark	148	30.3649	30.67764	2.52169	25.3814	35.3483
Finland	148	27.4865	29.22013	2.40188	22.7398	32.2332
France	158	38.5063	33.34471	2.65276	33.2666	43.7460
Germany	158	34.2975	32.44486	2.58117	29.1992	39.3958
Greece	142	35.4718	33.32745	2.79678	29.9428	41.0009
Ireland	146	30.8082	30.56148	2.52929	25.8092	35.8073
Italy	151	36.3775	34.34040	2.79458	30.8557	41.8993
Luxembourg	132	31.9773	32.27138	2.80886	26.4207	37.5339
Netherlands	154	37.1494	32.26499	2.59999	32.0128	42.2859
Portugal	150	34.6800	32.63944	2.66500	29.4139	39.9461
Spain	158	35.6772	33.44932	2.66108	30.4211	40.9334
Sweden	152	27.8026	29.77510	2.41508	23.0309	32.5743
UK	156	32.0256	30.67477	2.45595	27.1742	36.8771
Total	**2240**	**33.3321**	**32.18532**	**.68004**	**31.9986**	**34.6657**

Table 3.1 shows us the numbers of the Anova-Test for negotiation failure of the member states. The score on negotiation failure lies between 0 and 100. a score of 0 means no failure and total success and a score of 100 means total negotiation failure. The N in the table shows on how many decisions the outcome is measured for this country. Table 3.1 shows us that Finland and Sweden are the closest to success, there failure is 27.5 and 27.8 points. After that are Austria, Denmark and Ireland the ones closest to success, there scores are 30.8, 30.4 and 30.8. The United Kingdom and Luxembourg are the member states that stand in the middle with the scores of 32 and 31.9. After them, Belgium, Greece, Germany, Portugal and Spain have the highest score on negotiation failure: 35.6, 35.5, 34.3, 34.7 and 35.7. France, Italy and the Netherlands are the member states that have the highest score on failure: 38.5, 36.4 and 37.1. The medium distance between lower bound & upper bound is always 9, 10 or 11 so there are no big differences.

In our case this means that Finland and Sweden have the lowest score on negotiation failure and therefore are most successful countries in negotiations. France, Italy and the Netherlands are the countries with the least success.

Table 3.2 - Anova

Success	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between groups	23901.640	14	1707.260	1.655	**0.059**
Within Groups	2295467.245	2225	1031.671		
Total	**2319368.886**	**2239**			

The F statistics is 1.655 and the Significance is .059 his means that this ANOVA is not significant. Because .059 > 0.05. So our findings in table 3.1 are not significant. But because the Anova-test is near significance, and Table 3.1 gives us a lot of information it is still important to show this table.

In this part we will discuss the results of the regression analysis.

Table 3.3 Regression model summery

Model	R	R. Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.291	0.085	.083	30.94148

The independent variables in this regression are: Salience, Experience, Extreme position, Distance and GDP. The dependent variable is negotiation failure. In table 3.3 we can see the R. The R square is the correlation-coefficient of the dependent variable with all the independent variables together. The determination- coefficient R-square means that 8,5 % of the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables. This means there is a small relation. The Adjusted R-square is not of any importance because there is a large number of variables N= 174. The Adjusted R-Square and the regular R-Square do not differ much, therefore we used the regular R-Square.

Table 3.4 Anova

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	193776.420	5	38755.284	40.481	.000
Residual	2090907.079	2184	957.375		
Total	2284683.500	2189			

Table 3.4 contains a variance-analysis which means that we review if the whole model is significant. The df of the regression is equal to the number of independent variables 5. And the df of the residual is equal to the number of proposals minus one. We can see that the whole model is significant because Sig = .000 ≤ .05. This means the whole test is significant.

Table 3.5 Coefficients of the regression analysis.

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
Constant	11.777	2.261		5.208	**.000**
GDP	-7.869E-7	.000	-.014	-.609	**.542**
Salience	.079	.029	.057	2.717	**.007**
Experience	.119	.043	.065	2.786	**.005**
Extreme	13.195	1.395	.197	9.457	**.000**
Distance	**.124**	**.017**	**.155**	**7.389**	**.000**

Table 3.5 shows the regression- analysis. The B shows the partial regression analysis of the independent variables. The first independent variable in the table is GDP. This variable is not significant because .542 ≤ .05. This means that the first hypothesis can not be supported. The variable GDP is not significant. The reason for this could be that GDP is not measured correct. It could have been better to measure GDP per capita, or the size of the state.

The second variable in table 3.5 is salience, this variable is significant because .007 ≤ .05. Notice that there is a small positive relation between salience and negotiation failure because B is 0.079. This means that the second hypothesis can not be supported. A reason for this could be that the more important a member state finds an issue, the more willing this member state will be to accept a compromise far away form its own opinion. If a member state is not willing to compromise there is a change that the whole proposal will be rejected. This could mean that salience is measured in wrong.

The third variable is experience, in table 3.5 can we see that this variable is significant because .005 ≤ .05. We can also see that the B .119 is positive, 'so there is a positive relation

of .119 between experience and negotiation failure. This means that our third hypothesis is not supported because the more experience a member states has, the more failure and the less success a member states has. We are not surprised that the third hypothesis is not supported, because in the ANOVA-test we already saw that Finland and Sweden have the most success in negotiations, and these member states have the less experience in the EU. Experience only shows us the years of joining the EU, and this is a rough measurement. To measure the influence of experience on negotiation failure better we should use other factors than years of membership only.

The fourth variable is extreme position, this variable is significant because .000 ≤ .05. There is a positive relation of 13.195 between extreme position and negotiation failure. This means that taking an extreme position has a positive effect on negotiation failure and therefor we can reject our fourth hypothesis. Why the fourth hypothesis is not supported is clear. If a member states takes an extreme position, its position lies far away from the average of the member states. The outcome is often a compromise between points of view between the member states which is often close to the average opinion. If a member states has an extreme position, this position lies far from the average and therefore scores high on failure points. This is the reason why the fourth hypothesis can not be supported.

The last variable is distance from the Commission. The Table 3.5 shows us that this variable is significant because .000 ≤ .05. The table shows us also that there is a positive relation between distance from the Commission and negotiation failure. This means that a member state that stands closer to the Commission has more success. Thus our last hypothesis will be confirmed.

Control variables

In this part we will discuss the results of the regression analysis with the control variables concluded. Control variables are variables that are not changed throughout the research. Because we did not expected these variables to be significant better in the negotiations, we did not use them in our hypotheses. The outcome shows that they are a significantly better in the decision making process and therefore we made them the control variables. The control variables are extraneous factors which maybe do effect our hypotheses.

In this part we will check if there are constant variables that have an influence on the outcome of the regression analysis. In our Anova-Test we saw that the Nordic member states: Finland, Sweden and Denmark have a low score on negotiation failure and therefore are the most successful ones.

We also make a control variable for the bigger member states of the EU: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. There are many theories on the fact that bigger member states will have more influence in EU decision-making (Mattilla, 2004). We only used the three bigger member states, and not included Spain of Italy because like Theresa Kuchler describes in her article "Italy is not one of the four great member states. Spain is trying to replace Italy, but it is not successful (Mattilla, 2004). The other control variables will be on the size of the member state. France, Germany and UK are the biggest member states. In Table 4.1 we show the number of inhabitants of every member state. Here we can see that Spain and Italy follow the big member states very closely. We will put hem in the control variable called medium member states. The next member states in line are Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal. This will be our control variable called small member states. At last we have the member states with the least inhabitants these are Austria, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden. This will be the last control variable. For these control variables for size of member state will need one reference variable, this will be the small member states.

Table 4.1 Inhabitants of member states.

Member state	Inhabitants of member states (in millions)	Member state	Inhabitants of member states (in millions)
Austria	8.210	**Italy**	58.126
Belgium	10.4	**Luxembourg**	.492
Denmark	5.5	**Netherlands**	16.716
Finland	5.2	**Portugal**	10.708
France	62.6	**Spain**	40.525
Germany	82.3	**Sweden**	9.0
Greece	10.7	**UK**	61.113
Ireland	4.203		

Source:*www.europa-nu.nl*

Regression Analysis included control variable Nordic Member states

Table 4.2 Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	**.295**	**.087**	**.084**	**30.92266**

In Table 4.2 the independent variables in this regression are: Salience, Experience, Extreme position, Distance and GDP. The control variable is North and the dependent variable is negotiation failure. The determination- coefficient R-square means that 8, 8 % of the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables. This means there is a small relation.

Table 4.3 Anova

Model	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	198230.723	7	28318.675	29.616	**.000**
Residual	2086452.776	2182	956.211		
Total	**2284683.500**	**2189**			

Table 4.3 contains a variance-analysis which means that it shows if the whole model is significant. The df of the regression is equal to the number of independent variables 9. We can see that the whole model is significance because Sig= .000 ≤ .05. This means the test is significant.

Table 4.4 Coefficients

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
Constant	14.046	2.546		5.517	**.000**
GDP	-4.516E-7	.000	-.008	-.177	**.859**
Salience	.078	.029	.056	2.678	**.007**
Experience	.079	.046	.043	1.695	**.090**
Extreme	13.090	1.395	.195	9.383	**.000**
Distance	.125	.017	.155	7.429	**.000**
North	**-4.036**	**1.911**	**-.050**	**-2.112**	**.035**

Table 4.4 shows the regression- analysis with the control variable North included. It is interesting that the variable Experience is not Significant anymore in comparing with table 3.3 because .09 > .05. Maybe this is because of the control variable. Our control variable is significant because .035 < .05. This was our expectation based on what we saw in the Anova-test. The Nordic member states have a smaller score on negotiation failure, and therefore more success in negotiations.

Table 4.5 Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.296	.088	.084	30.91281

Table 4.5 shows we the independent variables in this regression: Salience, Experience, Extreme position, Distance and GDP. The control variables are North, Big, Medium and Very Small. The dependent variable is negotiation failure. The determination- coefficient R-square means that 8, 8 % of the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables. This means there is a small relation.

Table 4.6 Anova

Model	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	201252.847	8	22361.427	23.298	.000
Residual	2083430.652	2181	955.702		
Total	2284683.500	2189			

Table 4.6 contains a variance-analysis which means that it reviews if the whole model is significant. The df of the regression is equal to the number of independent variables 9. We can see that the whole model is significance because Sig= .000 ≤ .05. This means the test is significant.

Table 4.7 Coefficients

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	15.565	2.764		5.630	.000
GDP	-2.981E-6	.000	-.054	-.729	.466
salience	.074	.029	.053	2.527	.012
experience	.091	.047	.050	1.953	.051
extreme	13.067	1.395	.195	9.369	.000
distance	.124	.017	.155	7.400	.000
Big	1.028	5.710	.013	.180	.857
Medium	1.075	3.403	.011	.316	.752
Tiny	-4.222	1.767	-.064	-2.389	.017

(* Reference framework are small member states)

Table 4.4 shows the regression- analysis with the control variables included. It is interesting that the variable Experience is not Significant anymore because .113 > .05. Maybe this is because of the control variables. The control variables of bigger, medium and very small member states are all not significant because .911 > .05, .810 > .05 and .096 > 0.05.

Conclusion

In this paper we investigated which member state manage to draw the outcomes of the negotiations closer towards their preferences than others and which member states can influence the outcome of the negotiations the best. Our first question was what the differences between member states in terms of success in negotiations are. We saw that the Nordic member states have the highest score on negotiation success.

The explanatory question was: which factors influence the distance between the preferred outcome of a member state and the actual outcome of a proposal? Although a lot of theories support our hypotheses most of them are not accepted. The first hypotheses was that *the more economic power a state has, the higher its success in negotiations will be.* This hypothesis is not supported. The variable GDP is not significant. The reason for this could be that it is measured wrong. GDP is a very limited criterion because it only shows the gross domestic product of a whole member state which not even the number of inhabitants a country has. Our second hypothesis *the more salience a country attaches to a subject, the higher its success in negotiations will be* is not supported. A reason for finding no support on the second hypothesis can be that the more important a member state find an issue, this member states will prefer a compromise. This is better than the fact that a proposal will totally be rejected. The more salience a member state attaches to an issue maybe means that a member state is more willing to negotiate compromise. The third hypothesis *the longer one member state is part of the European Union, the higher its success in negotiations will be* is also not supported. We already saw that Finland and Sweden in our dataset have the most success in negotiation, and these member states have the less experience in the EU. The fourth hypothesis is that *if a member state chooses an extreme position, the chances of being successful in the negotiations are higher*. This hypothesis is not supported. The reason for this is clear, when a member states takes an extreme position, it position lies far away from the average of the member states. The outcome is often a compromise between points of view between the member states which is near in the middle. A member states that has an extreme position, is logically far from the average and therefore scores high on failure. Our last hypothesis :*the closer the position of a country is to that of the commission, the higher its success in the outcome will be* is confirmed.

Critical Points/ Discussion

Although a lot of previous investment supported our hypotheses, most of them were rejected. In this part we will look at how our research can be improved.

The Decisions in the European Union dataset we used was a very good dataset. To measure the distance between the initial preference according to experts and the final outcome of the commission proposal is a useful way of measuring. .

The first critical point of the dataset however will be on salience. Our measurements show that the hypothesis on salience can not be supported. The reason that this is the outcome of our measurements, can be the way salience is measured. The fact that the more salience a member state attaches to a subject, the higher it success in negotiations will be can still be true. If a member states attach a lot of salience to a proposal they will be more willing to accept any outcome although it is far away form their own preferences because otherwise they will have the chance that the proposal will not be adopted at all. In this way they still have success, but the measurements show different.

Our second critical point is that our variable GDP is limited. The hypothesis we wanted to test was on economic power. GDP however is not the same as economical power. GDP shows the economic status of a member states measured by the World Bank. The GDP for example doesn't take a look at the inhabitants of each member state and other important influences on economical power. It was maybe better to measure economical power by using GDP per capita, or the size of the state, or from other sources than the World Bank

Our third critical point is that the variable experience is not measured very well. In the hypothesis we first wanted to measure the influence of knowledge of success in negotiations. Knowledge would be about the way negotiations progress in the European Union. Because we were not able to measure knowledge, we decided to use experience as a variable. The duration of the membership of the countries did not mean they knew more about negotiations and therefore would have more success.

It could have been better to measure the experience of ministers and presidents of each member states on negotiations separately. Personal qualities of EU leaders like: authority, respect and trust can have influence on negotiations (Bailer, 2004).

Another critical point is on the extreme position. If a member states takes an extreme position it can have two reasons for this. The first reason can be that the member state does not agree on the proposal at all and has an extreme opinion on it. However, a member state can also take an extreme position with the plan to force the other member states to compromise. This is not measured in our dataset. Another point on extreme position is that taking an extreme position on a proposal that will be accepted will always end up in high negotiation failure.

This measurement is not very reliable because is possible that the member state did achieved a difference trough negotiations but still have a high score on negotiation failure.

Proposal for further research

During negotiations there are a lot of variables which can influence the outcome of the negotiation. A lot has already happened before the proposal is submitted to the Commission. Bargaining is very important in this process. Including the bargaining process would be necessary in further research. The control variable for the Nordic states shows us that Nordic member states have the highest score on negotiation success. In further research it will be interesting to have a look at why the Nordic member states have such a high score. It could also be interesting to have a look at personal qualities on negotiation of the presidents and ministers of the member states. Which persons have the most power, and why? Because of authority, respect and trust or networks of the ministers can also be of influence on the decision making process.

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