Cultural and class voting: a theoretical and statistical revision

A contribution to the debate about the impact of social divisions on political choices using Flanders and Wallonia as case study

Bachelor thesis
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Abstract

This study claims for a revision of the concepts cultural and class voting. We construct and test a model that integrates the determinants of cultural and class voting instead of making a rigid distinction between explaining a vote for an economic or cultural related party. We introduce the concepts: old-left and new-left voting to indicate the probability to vote for these parties compared to the likelihood to vote for another party. Flanders and Wallonia are used as case study and we use Multinomial Logistic Regression to test the hypotheses. The data is from the European Social Survey Round 4 (2008). The results give strong support for our theoretical approach. In both Flanders and Wallonia we see that economic and cultural determinants are not either linked to cultural or economic oriented parties. Instead of that it is also for instance indicated that traditional economic characteristics distinguish voters from an old- and new-left party. Moreover in Flanders the class related factors (income and social-class) do not have relevance for explaining voting behaviour. To determine the probability to vote for Groen! (new-left voting) or SP.A (old-left voting) in Flanders, neither income nor social-class has explanatory value. In Wallonia on the contrary the differences in social divisions are reflected in the choice of voting. This study also contributes to the 'social-class debate' by showing that in Wallonia income might be a better concept for analysing voting for an economic party compared to social-class.

Keywords: cultural voting, class voting, postmaterialism, dealignment, Belgium, social divisions, social-class debate, voting behaviour

1.0   Introduction

For a long time, there was broad scientific consensus on the association between social-class and political affiliation in Western Democracies (e.g. Anderson and Davidson, 1943; Clark and Lipset, 1991; Esping-Anderson, 1994; Korpi, 1983; Lipset, 1981; Nieuwbeerta, 1995). Because of the strong emphasis on economic issues in the nineteenth century, the working-class traditionally voted for a socialist left-wing party, because of their appeal for income redistribution. The higher classes on the contrary, voted on a right-wing, conservative political party for economic beneficial reasons. Because of these economic class interests people voted for the *"natural party of their class"* (Heath et al., 1995: 564).

However, political sociologists claim that after the second World War the traditional association between social-class and political preference decreased significantly (e.g. Clark and Lipset, 1991; Nieuwbeerta, 1995). According to them, the increasing welfare and the consequences of the post-industrialisation have made postmaterialistic issues and authoritarian feelings salient (e.g. Barone, 2007; Buyse, 2002; Inglehart, 1977, 1990; Ignazi, 2003; Kitschelt, 1995; Kriesi, 1989; Lubbers, 2001; Mudde, 2000; Van der Waal, 2005). Therefore, scholars rejected the traditional assumption that people vote according to the class position. In fact, cultural issues became important and this value domain does not have a relation with class position. New-left and new-right parties arose which especially focus on this cultural issues.

Currently, studies show that class voting still exists. However, due to the increasing importance of the cultural value domain, it cannot be taken for granted anymore that voting is only driven by class interests (Van der Waal et al., 2007). There has to be made a distinction between class

and cultural voting: that is respectively voting as a result of economic and cultural opinions. Indeed, research of Van der Waal et al. (2007) shows that cultural and class voting are based on different mechanisms. Cultural voting is based on cultural capital and class voting is related to social-class. These different determinants affect attitudes to the cultural and economic value domain and subsequently political affiliation. That is for cultural voting, voting for a new-right/left (authoritarian/libertarian) party and for class voting it is about voting for an old-left (e.g. socialist) or old-right party (economic conservative).

This research gives a contribution to the current debate about cultural and class voting, since we come up with a new theoretical approach and revise the concepts cultural and class voting. Previous research ignored the idea that eventually people have to choose for one party (e.g. Achterberg and Houtman, 2003; Van der Waal et al. 2007). We have the assumption that voters may take both economic and cultural issues into account when choosing a party during elections. This is the reason why we have constructed a model that integrates the determinants of cultural and class voting instead of segregating them. This model does not explain the chance to vote for a new-right/left political *or* an economic oriented old-right/left party. However, we come up with a model that makes a link between the determinants of cultural and class voting to the chance to vote for a cultural or economic oriented party instead of *any* another party. Thus in contrast to previous research, we do not make a rigid distinction between explaining a vote for an economic or cultural related parties but we mix them. This means that we will also for instance analyse the probability to vote for a new-left party instead of an old-left party or the chance to vote for an old-right party rather than a new-left party. Since we reject the assumption that cultural and class voting are phenomena which are linked to either economic or cultural parties we introduce the definitions: 'old-left' and 'new-left' voting as a substitute for class an cultural voting[1]. This is thus about the chance to vote for an old-left (or new-left) instead of another party based on cultural and economic related determinants.

We will apply this new theoretical model to the two regions of Belgium: Flanders and Wallonia. Especially, this country is interesting to use as case study since the two regions differ in economic progressivity and have their own federal government. In general, the people in Wallonia are less prosperous compared to Flanders (Coffé, 2005b). Moreover, in Flanders feelings of chauvinism and nationalism are popular. These differences in economic and cultural perspective might have influence on the extent of old-left and new-left voting. In Wallonia economic values might be more important compared to Flanders and therefore old-left voting could be more salient in Wallonia. On the contrary, in Flanders there is more prosperity and therefore there might be more new-left/right voting. Thus, in this research we want to investigate if the differences in economic and cultural perspective in Flanders and Wallonia imply deviations in the chance and in the reasons to vote for a cultural or class related party. Therefore, the research question is: *To what extent is there a difference in the salience of new-left and old-left voting in Flanders and Wallonia?*

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[1] We mention old/new-left instead of right since we use 'left' parties as reference category in the analyses and hypotheses.

In order to answer this research question we will first discuss theories that explain the basic mechanisms of cultural and class voting. This makes us able to advocate for our theoretical approach and to make specific hypotheses about voting in Flanders and Wallonia.

The determinants of cultural and class voting are respectively related to the cultural and economic value domain. In this study we use for the cultural value domain the following definition: *the degree to which someone favours protection of individual liberty, maintenance of social order and the extent to which aberration of traditional norms and values has to be rejected* (e.g. De Witte, 1990; Evans et al., 1996; Fleishman, 1988; Middendorp, 1991). In addition, the definition of the economic value domain is: *the extent to which one favours economic redistribution and influence of the government in general* (Houtman et al., 2003).

The scientific relevance of this study is that it comes up with a new theoretical approach. This approach argues that cultural and class voting are related to the entire political landscape and not only to libertarian/authoritarian or traditional socialist/conservative parties. We redefine the concepts cultural and class voting and test this approach with Multinomial Logistic Regression. In order words, this research investigates, in contrast to previous research, cultural and economic related voting in broader perspective and we use a statistical technique which is not used previously in this research tradition. Moreover, this study is scientifically relevant, since we use Flanders and Wallonia as case study. More specifically, we investigate and compare the mechanisms of voting in both regions which is not researched formerly.

The social relevance of this study is that it gives an answer to what extent economic and cultural issues are important in the political debates in Wallonia and Flanders. Furthermore, since we compare Wallonia and Flanders, this study can answer the question to what extent these regions differ in political opinion and behaviour. This is related to one of the main questions of sociology, namely the cohesion question. Indeed, differences in determinants of voting in Flanders and Wallonia partly indicate differences in political climate and attitudes. These differences decline the cohesion on the macro level: that is in Belgium.

The content of this research is as follows. In the theory section the main theories and research findings about cultural and class voting are discussed. Next, we will discuss the contribution of this study to the current state of art by considering the theoretical approach of this study. This approach claims for a revision of the concepts cultural and class voting. Differences between Wallonia and Flanders will also be discussed in this chapter. In chapter 4 testable hypotheses are pointed out. The last sections (5 and 6), discuss the data, method, analytical strategy and the results which are derived by Multinomial Logistic Regression analyses. Chapter 7 is a conclusion and discussion of the results.

2.0   Theoretical Background

Before we discuss the theoretical approach of this study, the origin of the concepts cultural and class voting is point of discussion. Since cultural and class voting are widely discussed phenomena we have divided the theoretical background in four sections in order to consolidate and clarify the arguments. In the first section, the traditional association between social-class and political preference will be discussed. In section two, the evolution to the cultural value domain and the paired change in the political landscape is the main topic. Section three and four consider the arguments presented in previous research to explain the cultural and economic value domains and political affiliation. More specifically, we will focus on the polemic between political sociologists and the current conclusions about cultural and class voting.

2.1   The traditional association between social-class and political preference

Marx and Engels were the first sociologists who emphasised the inequality between classes. According to these scholars, there was a difference in standard of living between the different social classes in society during the nineteenth century (Ultee et al., 2003). Indeed, there was an inequality problem, mainly between the proletariat and the people who were the owners of capital. Marx and Engels emphasised that the owners had more power. To make profit, the owners of the capital decreased the wages of the proletariat. As a result, the standard of living of the proletariat was declining, in contrast to the situation of the owners of the capital. This existed, because of a vicious circle of lower wages for the proletariat and increasing profit for the owners of capital (Ultee et al., 2003).

Marx and Engels have translated the situation discussed above, in the core of the historical materialism. They focused on the proletariat and the owners of capital, since they were roughly the two main classes in society in the nineteenth century. The historical materialism clearly indicates that during the nineteenth century there was no consensus in political terms between the social classes in general. It helps us to explain the strong correlation between class and voting. Due to the differences in social-economic position between the classes, two main ideologies have developed: liberalism and socialism (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). These ideologies are based upon the influence of the government and the market. Socialism and liberalism are economically "rational", because both ideologies claim for the improvement of the social-economic position of different social classes (Evans, 1999).The ideology of liberalism is a representation of higher class interests: it claims that the free market and more individual liberty will lead to more welfare in general (Barone et al., 2007). More economic liberty will maintain the good economic position of the higher classes, since the free-market makes it able to put more pressure on the economic situation of the proletariat (Evans, 1999). Since the high social classes have the highest income, liberalism is sceptical to the economic redistribution and influence of the government in general. The ideology of socialism is a

representation or consequence of lower class interests. As illustrated by Marx and Engels, lower class people have a worse economic position compared to the higher classes. Therefore, they will profit if a part of the income of the people will be redistributed, since they have a relatively low income. That is the reason why lower class people want that the government defends people with a weak economic position and guarantees social security for every citizen (Barone et al., 2007).

In summary, socialism and liberalism are traditionally referred to as 'left' and 'right' or as: economic progressive and economic conservative. Since the political debate was focused on economic, materialistic issues, people traditionally voted upon the party which would improve the economic position of their class. Therefore political sociologists observed a trend in which the working-class voted for leftist / socialist parties and the higher classes for rightist / conservative parties (e.g. Anderson and Davidson, 1943; Clark and Lipset, 1991; Esping-Anderson, 1994; Korpi, 1983; Lipset, 1981,1960; Nieuwbeerta, 1995). Indeed, they observed *"an expression of the democratic class struggle in the nineteenth century"* (Nieuwbeerta (1995: 1); Lipset (1960: 220).

2.2   *Cultural values and the change in the political landscape*

After the second World War the economy of European countries evolved from an industrial to a post-industrial economy (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). An important difference between industrial and post-industrial economic systems is that in industrial societies, as indicated by Marx and Engels, capital and power are the most important resources, whereas in post-industrial societies knowledge and information are the most important factors (Lenski, 1966). In a post-industrial economy there is need for employees with a good education instead of people with a high productivity in manual labour. As a result of this shift to more non-manual work, a new labour sector arose: the service-sector. This new sector contains non-manual jobs in which information plays an important role. Examples of these jobs are teachers and administrative workers who belong to a new social-class: the middle-class.

Due to this new class, the importance of the economic value domain changed. Indeed, people working in the service sector have a fixed wage. Therefore, they do not have economic class interests (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Moreover and maybe more important, the middle-class does not have as much affiliation with socialism and liberalism as the working-class and owners had in industrial societies. They have a better economic position and they put more weight to postmaterialistic values. This is one of the reason why scholars argue that after the second World War there was a process of dealignment: the decreasing importance of social-class for political preference (Manza et al., 1995). Middle-class people are more focused on postmaterialism. Thus, the postmaterialistic orientation of the middle-class is a consequence of their economic position. Inglehart (1977) emphasises the link between prosperity and postmaterialism.

The Silent-Revolution theory of Inglehart (1977) focuses on the cultural (r)evolution encouraged by the new generation born after the second World War. According to Inglehart (1977), the assumption of the historical materialism that the disagreement between the classes about economic

issues would become more tremendous did not take place because of the increasing welfare. Indeed, Inglehart (1977) claims that the economic redistribution issue between the classes has been replaced by a struggle between generations about political values like democratisation. In the sixties, young people protested for a renewal of values. Inglehart (1977) compared this with the situation of the proletariat in the nineteenth century. He concluded that not the proletariat, but young people (a new generation) protested in a time of high prosperity. However, a more important observation was that this cultural "revolution" was not economic, but more cultural orientated (Inglehart, 1977). Indeed, young people established associations with the intention to reduce the minority position of women, homosexuals and ethnical minorities, thus they were concerned with issues that were not based upon the traditional economic class interests, but postmaterialistic (Kriesi, 1989). The main reason for this transition from materialistic to more postmaterialistic issues in the sixties was that people born after 1945 were socialized in times of high welfare. If there is more welfare, people are more and more focused on cultural/postmaterialistic issues compared to the situation described by Marx and Engels in which people were materialists. This trend towards more postmaterialistic values since the sixties, can also be explained by the theory of Maslow. He claims that when people can more easily satisfy their primary needs, people will hanker for more secondary needs like improvement of environment and self-development which are postmaterialistic (Barone, et al., 2007). Thus, Inglehart (1977) suggests that postmaterialistic, cultural values became important, because of the high prosperity since the sixties. The new generation made cultural issues salient in the political debate.

Yet, the Silent-Revolution theory of Inglehart (1977) has led to criticism. Klatch (1999) and Lyons (1996) claim that also cultural conservative values became important since the sixties. They claim that Inglehart's theory only emphasised the progressive values like democratisation and self-development. However, according to Klatch (1999) and Lyons (1996) cultural conservative associations became also popular in the sixties, but these associations were in contrast to the left-progressive associations less visible in society. Ignazi (2003) agrees with Klatch and Lyons, but claims that the arsing of cultural progressive and conservative associations was not simultaneous, but sequential. He argues that the rightist cultural conservative associations arose at the end of the seventies as a counter-reaction of the leftist cultural progressive associations. Although, these conservative associations remained "silent", because of *"...a lack of interpreters, contrary to what happened on the left side, they propelled a form of Silent Counter- Revolution in attitudes"* (Ignazi, 2003: 201). Thus, Klatch (1999), Lyons (1996) and Ignazi (2003) emphasise that the evolution to cultural values has led to both cultural progressivism as well as cultural conservatism. An alternative terminology for this, but with the same definition, is the contrast between libertarianism and authoritarianism (Houtman, 2000).

Thus, libertarianism and authoritarianism differ in political values. However, they are both caused by the economic and cultural evolution. In fact, due to post-industrialism the welfare increased and that has contributed to postmaterialism. Moreover, many people from the new generation worked

in the service-sector and were thus members of the middle-class. They were often cultural progressive which means that people reject the traditional norms and emphasise the importance of environment, personal growth and democratisation (e.g. Barone 2007; Inglehart 1977, 1990; Kriesi 1989; Van der Waal, 2005). The authoritarian feelings arose by the process of globalisation which is strengthened by post-industrialisation. This change in international relations has affected political values (Mudde, 2000).

Globalisation is a process of economic and cultural integration which means that the economy becomes more international oriented and migration is a more common phenomenon (Went, 1996). This process has a major effect on the labour position and job-security, since there is more competition on the labour market. Moreover, due to migration people are confronted with other (non-Western) cultures. In fact, the process of globalisation has contributed to an international orientated economy and a 'melting-pot' of cultures. Especially, the confrontation with new cultures has been increased feelings of nationalism and ethnocentrism which are cultural and authoritarian (Achterberg et al., 2003; Reid, 1977). Furthermore, because of the globalisation processes the power of the state and authorities in the national and international fields has been decreased (Middendorp, 1991). For instance since the establishment of the European Union the power of the national government has been declined. Moreover, the process of migration has contributed to feelings of threat (Reid, 1977). Some people have the opinion that new cultures are responsible for the vanishing of the ordered, homogeneous and safe society (Kitschelt, 1995). Also the process of individualisation has made people hankering to the traditional values of institutions as the family, religion and the nation (Buyse 2002; Ignazi, 2003; Kitschelt, 1995; Lubbers, 2001; Mudde, 2000). In general, this cultural conservatism/authoritarianism can be defined as a hankering to traditional norms and values and putting high weight to the maintenance of social order and ethnocentrism (e.g. De Witte, 1990; Evans et al., 1996; Fleishman, 1988; Middendorp, 1991). It has indeed arisen by social changes.

One of the most important research about cultural conservatism is *The Authoritarian Personality* from Adorno et al. in 1950. They have constructed a scale to measure background characteristics for anti-Semitism. An important conclusion of their study is that people with an anti-attitude to other cultures also have anxiety for non-traditional, progressive issues in general (Adorno et al., 1950). They observe social changes as intimidating. Thus, the general rejection of progressive values by authoritarian/cultural conservative people is stimulated by their feelings of threat to other cultures.

The cultural value domain and thus cultural progressive/libertarian and conservative/authoritarian values have affected the political landscape. Due to the fact that the traditional liberal and socialist parties do not represent cultural issues, new parties arose which are focused on cultural conservatism/authoritarianism and progressivism/libertarianism (Hoffman-Martinot, 1991; Inglehart, 1990). Therefore, there are since the sixties *"Two lefts and Two rights"* (Achterberg et al., 2003: 10). The group of traditional leftist parties informed by the traditional

socialist parties are mainly focused on the traditional economic value domain. They represent economic progressive values. The second group of leftists parties consists parties that are cultural progressive/libertarian. They focus on issues like individual liberty, environment and democratisation. For example, most European countries have a "Green" party.

The same difference can be observed with the two "Rights". The group of traditional rightist parties are the traditional economic conservative parties. They are sceptical towards income redistribution and favour the free-market- principle (e.g. Barone et al., 2007). The second group of rightist parties consists the cultural conservative parties. These parties are the so-called extreme-right parties which represent the hankering to the traditional norms, the idea to maintenance social order and the negative attitudes to immigrants. Thus, the political landscape changed from a two-dimensional to a four-dimensional spectrum.

2.3   Polemic: social-class and cultural capital as concepts for explaining the new political culture

As a result of these new Left and Right parties the question arose by political sociologists how social-class, as traditional determinant, is related to these new Left and Right parties. In their article *Are social classes Dying*, Clark and Lipset (1991) showed that class voting decreased in many European countries. They came to the conclusion that there was a trend of lower class people with a preference for a right-wing party. Clark and Lipset (1991) indeed observed a decline in the traditional class voting behaviour. An important cross-national research of Nieuwbeerta (1995) *The democratic class struggle in twenty countries* came to the same conclusion. Both Nieuwbeerta (1995) and Clark and Lipset (1991) rejected therefore the assumption that people always vote for *'the natural party of their class'* (Heath et al.,1995: 564). As a result of these studies, scholars tried to find arguments for explaining the decrease of the traditional class voting correlation. Roughly, there are two points of view about the sustainability of social-class.

The first one claims that the relation between class and political preference has changed by a 'realignment' of the traditional economic class interests. According to this first group there is no process of dealignment: they argue that social-class is still directly related to voting. Indeed, according to Heath (1995) Reid (1977) and Weakliem (1994) the working-class votes more and more for a right-wing party, because they have the assumption that a 'right' policy will lead to advantages on the long run. Thus, they explain the change in voting behaviour by broadening the traditional economic, class interest. Similarly, Brint (1984) Bruce-Briggs (1979), and De Graaf and Steijn (1997) argue that the decrease of the traditional class voting correlation is a result of class 'realignment'. They explain the preference of the new middle-class for a left-wing party by referring to their work sector. Members of the middle-class will benefit if there is more government influence since a majority of the middle-class people works for the government. Thus, they broaden the concept of social-class to argue that it is still

a good predictor. Remarkably, they do not question the explanatory power of social-class in explaining political preference in general. Indeed, they only realign the class interests.

The second group on the contrary, questions the social-class concept. They claim that social-class as a concept has declined substantially since the end of the second World War (Goldthorpe and Marshall, 1992; Pakulski and Waters, 1996). They argue that social-class is a dead concept, because it has no relevance for voting behaviour anymore. Other sociologists have nuanced this assumption. For example, Evans (2000) claims that the declining relation between social-class and voting is a 'trendless fluctuation'. Moreover and more important, Stonecash (2000) demonstrates that class voting has not become weaker as Nieuwbeerta (1995) shows in his research. He uses another class measure, namely income. As a result, a discussion arose about the measurement of social-class. For instance, Hout et al. (1993) criticize Clark and Lipset (1991), because they use the manual/non-manual class distinction. Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf (1999) compare the different measures of social-class and come to the important conclusion that it does not matter which measures of social-class is used. The different social-class measures do not differ in their conclusions about the ranking of countries in the extent of class voting. The conclusion of this second group that social-class as concept has declined substantially, thus has most support from scholars. A consensus has arisen that social-class is a 'dead' determinant for political preference.

Also for the cultural value domain there was discussion about the relation between social-class and cultural values. Due to the fact that after the second World War cultural issues became more salient, sociologists tried in the first place to relate this evolution to the traditional social-class concept. Thus, also for the cultural value domain scholars expected in the first place a relation with social-class. However, this was before the discussion about the concept of social-class. Lipset (1959) was the first sociologist who related social class to the cultural value domain. In his work: *Democracy and Working-Class Authoritarianism* (1959) he claims that the trend of working-class people with a right-wing political preference can be explained by non-economic issues. The working-class does still have economic, progressive values, however they are also cultural conservative/authoritarian. Lipset (1959) indicates that the social situation of the lower classes "*predisposes them to view politics in simplistic and chiliastic terms of black and white, good and evil*" (Lipset, 1959: 483). Therefore, according to Lipset (1959) lower class people are often culturally conservative. This is the reason why the working-class votes on a party which is *"the unnatural party of their class"* (Lipset, 1960: 39). Kohn (1977) agrees with Lipset (1959) that the working-class has cultural conservative values. However, he explains this position on the cultural value domain by the extent of occupational self-direction. Due to the fact that the work of the proletariat is more characterized with conformism, routine, adaption and compliance working-class members are authoritarian. Members of the middle-class have jobs with individual liberty and autonomy. Therefore they do not have authoritarian values, but more libertarian values such as improvement of environment and individual liberty. Thus, both Kohn (1977) and Lipset

(1959) explain positions on the cultural value domain by referring to the authoritarianism of the working-class.

Their research had an important influence within political sociology since they related class to the new cultural value domain. However, and as partly observed by Kohn (1977), since the seventies/eighties sociologists have discovered that the authoritarianism of the working-class was mainly the authoritarianism of the low-educated (e.g. Dekker and Ester, 1987; Grabb, 1979; Lamont, 1987). Thus, sociologists have come to the conclusion that it is not related to social-class but rather to education as indicator for the amount of cultural capital (De Graaf and Kalmijn, 2001). Moreover, the relation between cultural capital and cultural progressivism seems to be positive. For instance, Gabennesch (1972) argues that higher education influences the social horizon, since education positively affects knowledge and conception of norms and values of other cultures. Research of Tiano (1986) shows that education is positively related to cognitive complexity and this leads to more cultural progressive values. These two interpretations imply that cultural capital deeply influences someone's world view: it makes people more "open" about cultural issues. Bourdieu (1984) consolidates this assumption. He claims that people with a high education often have more knowledge about other cultures and politics, since higher educated people are more likely to read and visit cultural events which declines the bondage with traditional values and norms. More recent research by Van der Waal (2005) shows that people with a high education put more weight to postmaterialistic issues and therefore they are more culturally progressive.

Scholars have tried to find a link between the economic and cultural value domain. However, they discovered that the cultural value domain is not related to the economic value domain or vice versa. This means that you cannot predict for instance someone's attitude to freedom of speech (cultural value domain) as a result of his/her attitude to the influence of the government (economic value domain) or vice versa (e.g. Mitchell, 1966; Kelly and Chambliss, 1966; Fleishman, 1988; Middendorp, 1991;Scheepers et al., 1992; Olson and Carroll, 1992; Heath et al., 1994; Evans et al., 1996; Houtman,2003; Weakliem 1991). Thus, attitudes to cultural and economic issues are not directly related to one another. Therefore the two value domains have to be split.

2.4   *The current state of art: an explanatory model for class and cultural voting*

In the previous section we discussed the final consensus about the relation between social-class and the economic value domain and the correlation between cultural capital and the cultural value domain. The core is that the cultural value domain has to be explained by cultural capital, not by social-class. Moreover, the different class measures indicate that the traditional class voting, referring to the working-class voting for a left-wing party and the higher classes on a right-wing party - decreases significantly.

A recent study of Van der Waal, Achterberg and Houtman (2007) investigates the validity of social-class as a concept for explaining attitudes on the economic value domain in more detail. They

argue that there is a significant difference between measuring social-class as occupational class or as income. According to Van der Waal et al. (2007) the EGP-class measure is invalid, because an occupation is both related to cultural and economic capital. Indeed, in post-industrial societies with a middle-class, cultural capital is an important factor within occupations. For that reason, the traditional EGP-class measure is not appropriately, since it is both related to cultural and economic capital. Therefore Van der Waal et al. (2007) use income as operationalisation for social-class: *"Income categories, unlike occupational categories, are after all not susceptible to the problem of mixing up class voting and cultural voting, because no relation exists between income and social conservatism/liberalism"* (Van der Waal et al., 2007: 409). They have used this operationalisation for social-class in their analyses and they came to the remarkable conclusion that class voting has become stronger in the period after the second World War. This is in line with the conclusion of Stonecash (2000) who also used income as social-class measure. Thus, if social-class is operationalised by income, social-class is *not* dying, but it is still an important concept.

However, Van der Waal et al. (2007) emphasise that cultural and class voting are driven by different mechanisms. Not social-class, but cultural capital explains affiliation for a new-left or new-right party. That is the reason why there has been observed an erosion of the trend of working-class with leftist-voting and rightist voting for the higher classes. Due to the increasing importance of the cultural value domain, it cannot be taken for granted anymore that voting is driven by class interests (Van der Waal et al., 2007).

The explanatory model of Van der Waal et al. (2007) which is discussed in their article: "*Class is not dead-it has been buried alive*" will be used as starting-point of this research. The mechanisms of cultural and class voting can be seen in Figure 1 and 2.

Figure 1 Class voting

Van der Waal et al. (2007)

Figure 2 Cultural voting

Van der Waal et al. (2007)

As can be seen in Figure 1, class voting means that a higher social-class will lead to more economic conservative values. That is the traditional class struggle. More economic conservative values will result to a preference for an old-right / conservative party in contrast to economic progressive values which lead to an old-left / socialist affiliation. For cultural voting (Figure 2), more cultural capital implies cultural progressive values. Cultural progressive values result to preference for a new-left / libertarian party. Reversely, cultural conservative values lead to an affiliation for an new-right / authoritarian party.

3.0   The contribution of this study: a new theoretical approach and Wallonia and Flanders as case study

In the theoretical background we have systematically discussed the evolution to an explanatory model for cultural and class voting. This will be used as starting-point of this study.

Now we will discuss our contribution to the current state of art. More specifically, we appeal for a new theoretical approach and for a revision of cultural and class voting. Moreover, Flanders and Wallonia as case study will be reviewed in this section.

3.1   The theoretical approach of this study

One of the major findings of Van der Waal et al. (2007) is that cultural and class voting are independent of one another and that class voting is still present. However, this traditional class- party connection has declined by the salience of cultural voting. We disagree with Van der Waal et al. (2007) that class and cultural voting have to be disentangled. In reality people vote for one party. Therefore we need a model that integrates cultural and class voting.

Eventually, people may take both economic and cultural value domains into account when choosing a party during elections. Therefore, it has to be researched to what extent cultural and economic values are important for voting behaviour in general. Indeed, in previous research of Achterberg and Houtman (2003), but also in the study of Van der Waal et al. (2007), the fact that every party takes both cultural and economic issues into account has been ignored. An old-left or old-right party also has an opinion about abortion or environment in their party program. The same for new-left and new-right parties, they also have an opinion about income redistribution, but these economic issues are probably less prominent in political debates. This is the reason why we introduce a new approach for cultural and class voting.

In this approach we argue that political parties can be seen as 'suppliers' of political attitudes and ideologies, since they represent certain feelings. Moreover, voters representing the 'demand' side of political attitudes, because they indicate the most important issues. For instance, when there is an economic recession, voters might discuss the role of the government in stimulating the economic productivity since that could be the most important problem. Political parties will anticipate on this in

putting recent problems on the political agenda. They do this, because they want to get power and therefore they focus on this 'demand' of voters. Thus, economic values are important for *every* political party in for instance a country with economic problems. On the contrary, in a society with a flourishing economy we might see the opposite mechanism: cultural issues become in general more salient for political parties. Therefore, we redefine the concepts cultural and class voting in a way that we reject the assumption that there has to be made a rigid distinction between cultural and economic related determinants. Instead of that we integrate and combine the determinants of cultural and class voting in order to explain the chance to vote for a new-right/left political *or* an economic oriented old-right/left party instead of any another party. Thus we mix cultural and class voting instead of segregating them. This means that we will also for instance analyse the probability to vote for a new-left party instead of an old-left party or the chance to vote for an old-right party rather than a new-left party given the independent variables. Since we do not separate cultural and economic parties, but also compare new, cultural and traditional, economic parties we introduce the definitions: 'old-left' and 'new-left' voting as a substitute for class an cultural voting[2].

In Figure 3 we illustrate this theoretical approach. In order to make hypotheses, this model has to be applied to a certain country, because voting for an old-left/right or new-left/right party is affected by the cultural and economic circumstances. Thus, this model (Figure 3) makes no general assumptions about voting behaviour.

As can be seen, we take the basic mechanisms of cultural and class voting into account. This is the 'demand' side and is based on Figure 1 and 2. However, the direction of the relation between the value domains and political parties is not defined (supply side), because, as discussed, we assume that this association depends on the cultural and economic situation. Thus, we link the value domains to every political party. The strength of these relations is determined by the cultural and economic circumstances.

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[2] We mention old/new-left instead of right since we use 'left' parties as reference category in the analyses and hypotheses.

Figure 3 The theoretical approach of this study

Demand   **Supply**

Social Class →(+)→ Economic conservative values

Cultural Capital →(+)→ Cultural progressive values

1. Socialist
2. Conservative
3. Libertarian
4. Authoritarian

3.2   Wallonia and Flanders as case study

As discussed in 3.1, our theoretical model (Figure 3) has to be applied to a certain country in order to make hypotheses. In this study, Belgium will be used as case study. We will use a 'most similar strategy' since we compare two different regions within one context: Belgium. The two regions: Wallonia and Flanders differ in many perspectives. For instance, both regions have their own language and communication circuit. Due to this divergence in cultural life both Wallonia and Flanders have their own party system since 1970s (Billiet, et al.,2006). This means that Wallonia and Flanders have their own political parties and thus a federal government.

Beside the existence of two party systems, the deviation in progressivity of the economic system between Wallonia and Flanders is characteristic. In general, people in Wallonia are less prosperous compared to Flanders. For instance, in Wallonia the unemployment rate is higher than in Flanders. Moreover, the contribution to the gross national product was for Flanders 57.2% and for Wallonia 23.7% in 2002 (Coffé, 2005a). The less flourishing economy of Wallonia is a result of the economic crisis in the thirties of the last century. This crisis had influenced Wallonia more significantly than Flanders. Therefore, Wallonia has a more industrial, whereas Flanders has a more post-industrial economy (Mckinsey and Company, 2005). Thus, in Wallonia the economy is less developed than in Flanders and therefore Flanders is compared to Wallonia more prosperous (Billiet et al., 2006). Therefore Belgium is an interesting case for our theoretical approach.

The relatively flourishing situation of Flanders has led to feelings of superiority against Wallonia. In Flanders, feelings of nationalism and chauvinism are popular. Moreover there is little

solidarity with Wallonia (Van Dam, 1996). Therefore there is in cultural, economic and political point of view a divergence between Flanders and Wallonia. Indeed, if we compare the political parties in both Wallonia and Flanders, we see in Wallonia that parties are more focused on economic problems in general.

This is related to the theoretical approach of our study as illustrated in Figure 3. Parties might anticipate on the economic situation in Wallonia. This will have an effect on the extent of voting for an old-left/right party in Wallonia. Moreover, as indicated by Inglehart (1977), the prosperity within a context explains the extent people have postmaterialistic values. Therefore, people might put less weight to cultural issues in Wallonia and therefore the political debates are more about economic issues compared to Flanders.

Coffé (2005b) has observed in her study about the electoral success of two Belgian extreme right parties, that the economic value domain is more important for explaining political preference in Wallonia compared to Flanders. Moreover, in Flanders the cultural value domain correlates stronger with party affiliation. If we compare party support in both regions than we observe that the traditional socialist party in Wallonia: PS has more electoral support (36.9% of the votes in 2004) compared with SP.A in Flanders (26.1% of votes in 2004) (Coffé, 2005b).

Thus, parties (supply side) might be more focused on economic issues in general and therefore old-left/right voting could be more salient in Wallonia. However, in Flanders cultural issues might be more important for political parties and therefore new-left voting might be stronger compared to Wallonia. These assumptions will be discussed in the hypotheses part in more detail.

4.0   Hypotheses

The goal of this study is to test a model which does not make a rigid distinction between economic and cultural related parties but integrates the determinants of cultural and class voting to the complete political landscape. This is in order to explain the chance to vote for a new-left or an old-left instead of any another party. We apply this to Wallonia and Flanders. We will make a difference between general hypotheses about new-left and old-left voting and specific hypotheses about differences in voting in Flanders and Wallonia.

4.1   General hypotheses about new-left and old-left voting

As discussed, we redefine the concepts cultural and class voting to new-left and old-left voting since we analyse the chance to vote for cultural or economic oriented parties, compared to the chance to vote for another party. In other words, instead of a rigid distinction between cultural and economic related parties, we integrate the determinants of cultural (education and cultural values) and class (social-class/income and economic values) voting. Since we use the 'left' parties as reference category, we have to assume which factors explain the probability to vote for an old-left or new-left party. The related factors are based on the theoretical framework of Van der Waal et al. (2007) about cultural and class voting.

New-left voting

- The level of cultural capital is positively related to cultural progressive values. Thus, cultural capital explains positions on the cultural value domain.
- The position on the cultural value domain is related to the chance to vote for an authoritarian or libertarian party instead of any other party.
- The more cultural progressive values the higher the chance to vote for a new-left/libertarian party rather than another party.

General hypothesis 1:
1. *The higher the level of cultural capital the higher the chance to hold cultural progressive values and the more likely to vote for a new-left party instead of any other party.*

Old-left voting

- Social-class and income are related to certain economic interests.
- Social-class and income are negatively related to economic progressive values. Thus, social-class and income explain positions on the economic value domain.
- The position on the economic value domain affects the probability to vote for a traditional socialist or economic conservative party instead of any other party.
- The more economic progressive values the higher the chance to vote for a traditional old-left/socialist instead of any other party.

General hypothesis 2:

2. *The lower the social-class and/or income the higher the chance to hold economic progressive values and the more likely to vote for an old-left/socialist party rather than any other political party.*

4.2 *Hypotheses about differences in old-left and new-left voting in Wallonia and Flanders*

In this study we argue the strength of old-left and new-left voting depends on economic and cultural circumstances. Political parties respond to the public opinion and vice versa. When voters are more concerned with cultural issues; new-left voting will be stronger in general. That is that cultural related determinants significantly and strongly explain the likelihood to vote for a new-left rather than another party.

We have reason to argue that in Wallonia parties are more focused on the economic value domain compared to Flanders, since the economic situation in Wallonia is less flourishing (Billiet et al., 2006). Moreover, in Flanders political parties will be more focused on cultural issues, because there is more prosperity and feelings of chauvinism are more salient (Van Dam, 1996). More specifically, if economic issues are in general more important in Wallonia, new-left and new-right parties are forced to put also weight on economic issues, because cultural issues become less important. In Flanders, old-left and old-right parties are expected to focus relatively more on cultural issues, with the result that voting because of economic issues will be weaker compared to Wallonia.

Using the 'most similar strategy' we can expect that differences are indeed a result of these conditions. Obviously, also for these hypotheses we redefine the concepts of cultural and class voting in old-left and new-left voting. Thus we integrate the determinants of cultural (education and cultural values) and class (social-class/income and economic values) voting in order to explain the chance to vote for a new-right/left political *or* an economic oriented old-right/left party instead of any another party.

Hypothesis 3:

3a. *New-left voting is in general more salient in Flanders compared to Wallonia*

Thus,

In Flanders, the cultural value domain, related to cultural capital, has more explanatory power for voting behaviour compared to Wallonia

3b. *Old-left voting is in general more salient in Wallonia compared to Flanders*

Thus,

In Wallonia, the economic value domain, related to social-class, has more explanatory power for voting behaviour compared to Flanders.

5.0 Data and Measurement

In this section the data and the operationalisation of the determinants concerned with new-left and old-left voting will be presented. Since we have imputed the missing values, multiple imputation will also be a point of discussion. The last part of this section concerns the analytical strategy. More specifically, the statistical method, the construction of the models and the link with our theoretical approach will be explained.

5.1   Data

The data for the analyses is from the *European Social Survey Round 4*. We use the Belgian version (N = 1760) which is conducted between November 2008 and March 2009. The sample is representative for the Belgium population older than 18 years old. This survey is relevant for our research since it contains several questions about cultural and economic issues. The sampling is stratified with a two stage probability sampling. The ten provinces and Brussels were used for regional stratification. The response rate was 58.9 per cent (www.europeansocialsurvey.org).

5.2   Operationalisation of the variables

We divide this section in three parts in order to distinguish (in)dependent and control variables. In every part we will precisely explain the construction of the different variables which will be used in the statistical analyses. Descriptive statistics for all explanatory and dependent variables are provided in the Appendix.

5.2.1   Dependent variable: Party Preference

To operationalise party preference, we use the party on which the respondents voted in last national elections in Belgium (June 2007). Since Flanders and Wallonia have their own party system we constructed a separate dependent variable for each region. Voting for a Dutch or French political party is used as method to distinguish the two regions (and also to allocate the respondents living in Brussels) [3].

For Flanders we construct a variable with the following parties: Groen! (cultural-progressive/libertarian, green signature); CD&V and N-VA (which was a cartel of the Christian-democrats and the Flemish nationalists); SP.A and Spirit (which was a cartel between the socialist party and a small party progressive of Flemish nationalists until 2009); Vlaams Belang (radical right nationalist party) and Open VLD (economic conservative party). For Wallonia the variable for party preference contains the following political parties: Ecolo (cultural-progressive/libertarian, green ideology); CDH (Christen-Democrats); PS (socialist party) and MR (economic conservative party).

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[3] We realise that in this way, language (French or Dutch) is implicitly the indicator to distinguish the region Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. However, the results do not significantly differ if the respondents living in Brussels are deleted. Thus the results are not misrepresented due to this distinction.

5.2.2 Independent variables: social-class, income and education

The basic determinants of cultural and class voting which we use in this study are: social-class, cultural capital and income (Van der Waal et al., 2007). As discussed in the theoretical section, there is since a long time a polemic about social-class and income as concepts for explaining class voting. In 2007, research of Van der Waal et al. emphasised that the EGP-class measure is not appropriate to measure class voting, since it is both related to cultural and economic capital. They argued that in post-industrial societies, where a large middle-class is present, cultural capital is an important factor within occupations. Hence, income is considered to be a better concept to measure class voting since it might not have an implicit relation with cultural capital (Van der Waal et al., 2007). In the analyses below, we will use both the EGP-class measure as well as income in our analyses. Moreover, we will do analyses without income as independent variable. This is in order to check if we also come to the conclusion that income is more important and valid for class (voting) than social-class and to what extent the effect differs between Flanders and Wallonia [4]. As such this study will also contribute to the 'social-class debate'.

To operationalise _income_ we use the Household's total net income. A higher value means a higher net household income. We operationalise social-class by using the EGP- class division. The _EGP-class_ schema was developed by Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (Erikson et al., 1979). It is based on occupational title, self-employed status and number of employees supervised (Erikson et al., 1979; Goldthorpe, 1980). Since we use the study of Van der Waal et al. (2007) as starting-point we transformed the ISCO88 division which is included in the ESS 2008 to the EGP-class schema. Using insights from Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996), we operationalised the following 4 EGP-categories: Higher Service; Lower Service; Routine Clerical/Sales; Skilled Manual and Semi- and Unskilled Manual. Due to a small amount of respondents (N = 42) we have added the Farm Worker/Managers to the Semi- and Unskilled Manual category. Following Kalmijn (1994), De Graaf and Kalmijn (2001) and Achterberg and Houtman (2003) we operationalise _cultural capital_ as years of education. It is a continuous variable with higher values referring to more years of education and thus more cultural capital.

5.2.3 Independent variables: cultural and economic values

Besides socioeconomic characteristics, we also consider economic and cultural attitudes as key explanatory variables. We include both a scale which indicates opinions about cultural issues and a scale which measures opinions about economic issues. Both are based on several items and are linked to the cultural and economic value domain as indicated by Van der Waal et al. (2007). The cultural value domain is constructed with the help of factor analysis[5]. The scale is measured with 3 Likert-type items. Each item contains 11 answer-categories (ranging from e.g. 'unification go too far' to

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[4] These additional analyses can be found in the Appendix

[5] We use Principal Axis Factoring as extraction method, because we assume that the selected items are for theoretical assumptions intended to measure the same construct. For rotation we do Promax.

'unification go further') : *"European unification go further or have gone too far"*; *"Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants"* and *"Immigrants make country worse or better place to live"*. We constructed a sum scale and took the mean of the 3 items. The reliability of the scale is .638 (Cronbach's Alpha). A higher value on the scale implies a more cultural progressive attitude.

As discussed, the _economic value domain_ is linked to class voting (Van der Waal et al., 2007). With this domain we want to measure _economic values_. The scale is measured with 3 Likert-type items (5 answer-categories) all ranging from 'Agree strongly' to 'Disagree strongly'[6] : *"The government should reduce differences in income levels"*; *"Large differences in income are acceptable to reward talents and efforts"* and *"For a fair society, difference in standard of living should be small"*. We take the mean of the three items. The reliability of the scale is .562 (Cronbach's Alpha). A higher value on the scale means a more economic progressive attitude.

5.2.4 Control variables

In general control variables help to prevent spurious relations between variables (Agresti et al., 2008). In this research we use: gender, age, religiosity, membership of trade union and participation in a social association as controls in the analyses.

Gender is a dummy-variable with value 0 for female and value 1 for male. _Age_ is a continuous variable. The variable _religious denomination_ is also included as control variable in our analyses. Since 85 per cent of the respondents are Catholic and thus only 15 per cent of the respondents belongs to another denomination or to no denomination, we measure religious denomination as a dichotomous variable with value 1 for belonging to a denomination and value 0 for not belonging to a religious denomination. With regard to the variable _Membership of a trade union_, in the dataset there is originally a variable with three categories: (1) currently member of trade union; (2) previously member of trade union and (3) not a member of trade union. This variable is recoded into a dummy-variable with value 1 for currently member and value 0 for previously/no member of trade union. Finally, we control for _membership of a non-political social organisation_. It is a dummy-variable with value 0 for no participation in a non-political organisation and value 1 for participation in a non-political organisation currently.

5.3 Multiple Imputation

Missing values for the independent variables were estimated through multiple imputation using the Multiple Imputation Command of SPSS version 17.0 taking all independent variables as predictors when the information was available.[7] This technique of multiple imputation generates multiple

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[6] Also for this scale we use Principal Axis Factoring as extraction method, because we assume that the selected items are for theoretical assumptions intended to measure the same construct. For rotation we do Promax.

[7] The variables for imputation are: income, economic progressivism (scale), cultural progressivism (scale), religiosity, membership of social association, membership of labour union, age, years of education (cultural capital), gender and the dummies for the EGP-schema: Semi- and Unskilled Manual, Skilled Manual, Routine Clerical Sales, Lower Service and Higher Service

datasets. We generated five imputations, each of which replaced cases with missing information with plausible values based on their predictive distributions[8]. We will use the pooled imputations in the statistical methods.

According to Little et al. (1987) there are different reasons why respondents do not answer certain questions. It could be an accident (Missing Completely at Random) or there might be a specific reason for the missingness (Missing not at Random). If we analyse the coefficients and the p-values of the original data with the pooled results, we discover some differences in results [9].This could imply that the missing values of the variables are not Missing Completely at Random (Little et al., 1987).

5.4   Analytical Strategy

One of the aims of this research is to analyse party preference by using a statistical model that integrates determinants concerned with both cultural and class voting. We assume that voters may take both economic and cultural issues into account when choosing a party during elections since every party is forced to have an opinion about both cultural and class related issues. Even though they may have a different level of salience for both traditionally economic and cultural political parties. We redefine the concepts cultural and class voting in a way that we reject the assumption that there has to be made a rigid distinction between cultural and economic related parties and determinants. Instead of that we integrate the determinants of cultural and class voting in order to explain the chance to vote for a new-right/left political *or* an economic oriented old-right/left party instead of any another party. Thus, this model separately explains, given cultural and class related determinants, the probability to vote for a cultural or economic oriented party instead of another party. As a result, this model also for instance analyses the probability to vote for a new-left party instead of an old-left party or the chance to vote for an old-right party rather than a new-left party given the independent variables. This enables us to analyse the relative importance of cultural and class voting. As mentioned, since we do not separate cultural and economic parties, but also compare new cultural and traditional economic parties we introduce the definitions: 'old-left' and 'new-left' voting as a substitute for the concepts class an cultural voting.

The second aim of this study is to find out if the strength of new-left and old-left voting depends on socioeconomic and cultural circumstances. The assumptions are linked to the situation in Flanders and Wallonia. In short, we expect that cultural determinants like education and cultural values might be more salient for explaining political affiliation in Flanders compared to Wallonia, whereas class related factors and economic values are anticipated to be more important in Wallonia compared to Flanders.

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[8] For Flanders the amount of respondents increased to 770 respondents for both model 1 and 2 after multiple imputation (N = 676 [model 1] and N = 662 [model 2] before multiple imputation). For Wallonia the amount of respondents increased to 470 respondents for both model 1 and 2 (N = 399 [model 1] and N = 390 [model 2] before multiple imputation).

[9] Some significant coefficients for social-class are disappeared after multiple imputation. Moreover the scale for measuring economic values seems to be insignifiant for Vlaams Belang (cultural voting) in the 'original' dataset.

To test our hypotheses, we use Multinomial Logistic Regression as statistical method. This technique can be used to analyse the effect of independent variables on a dependent variable with a nominal level of measurement. Multinomial Logistic Regression makes us able to investigate the effects of cultural and class related determinants on the probability (which is determined by the Odds values) to vote for a party which is selected as reference category. As indicated by Van der Waal et al. (2007), the core of class voting is to explain a preference for an old-right / conservative party versus old-left / socialist party by analysing social-class, income and the economic value domain as independent variables. Furthermore to analyse cultural voting the aim is to explain an affiliation for a new-left / libertarian or new-right/ authoritarian party with cultural capital and the cultural value domain as most important independent determinants. As mentioned, we will also use these independent determinants but redefine the concepts of cultural and class voting to old-left and new-left voting in order to indicate that we also for example explain the probability to vote for a traditional socialist instead of an authoritarian party. Thus, this revision of the concept has the aim to reject the rigid assumption that it is either explaining voting for cultural parties (new-left/new-right) or investigating economic voting (voting for old-right/left parties).

Considering these relations, we will both run a model with a traditional socialist party (old-left) as well as a model with a libertarian (new-left) party as reference category in order to analyse differences in effects between parties. This is the reason why Multinomial Logistic Regression is chosen as statistical technique. We consider Groen! as new-left/libertarian and SP.A as old-left/socialist party in Flanders. For Wallonia we regard Ecolo as new-left/libertarian and PS as old-right/socialist party. Those parties will thus be used as reference categories in the analyses presented below in order to investigate new-left and old-left voting in Flanders and Wallonia.

As indicated in the hypotheses part, we expect that there are both direct and indirect relations. In our theoretical model we pointed out that for new-left and old-left voting respectively the cultural and economic value domain are intervening variables. This means that it is expected that for example the effect of education on voting for a new-left party will decrease after controlling for the cultural value domain (Agresti et al., 2008). Moreover, it is expected in the hypotheses that social-class negatively affects economic progressive values and that cultural capital positively affects cultural progressive values. Since these assumptions are part of Hypotheses 1 and 2 and due to the fact that we precisely want to know what the mutual relations could be, we have decided to divide the results section in different parts.

For each region and type of voting (new-left or old-left voting) the first results part contains a model in which social-class, income and education are the main explanatory variables. It is about the effect of these explanatory variables on the chance to vote for a certain party. Thus this is the analysis that does not take the economic and cultural values into account. This is the first step to see if the value domains are intervening variables. In the second part, the variables social-class, income and

education are linked to either the cultural or the economic progressive values (dependent variables) [10]. As mentioned in Hypotheses 1 and 2 we expect that the class and cultural related characteristics influence the position on the cultural and economic value domains. With this analysis we are able to reject or confirm the underlying assumptions behind Hypotheses 1 and 2. Thirdly, for each region (Wallonia or Flanders) and type of voting (new-left or old-left) models are presented which have the cultural and economic progressive values (scales) as main independent variables and the parties as dependent variable. This has the aim to investigate the importance of economic and cultural values on the probability to vote for an old-left or new-left party rather than the other parties. As assumed in Hypotheses 1 and 2, the cultural and economic value domains determine the probability to vote for a certain party. More specifically, cultural progressive values might increase the chance to vote for a new-left party, whereas economic progressive values might increase the chance to vote for an old-left party. In the last part of each results section the complete model will be presented containing both social-class, income, education and the cultural and economic values. This enables us to analyse the relative importance of new-left and old-left voting and to investigate the mediating effect of the value domains in broader perspective.

As mentioned in the theoretical background, this study will contribute to the 'social-class debate' by investigating the relevance of income instead of social-class. Income is considered to be a better concept to measure the chance to vote for an economic party since it might not have, in contrast to social-class, an implicit relation with cultural capital (Van der Waal et al., 2007). To test this, we will do the general analyses twice: one with both income and social-class and analyses without income[11]. The differences in significance might tell us something about the importance of both concepts for voting.

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[10] Since the cultural and economic scales are of interval level, we will use multiple linear regression as statistical method for this results part.
[11] These additional analyses can be found in the Appendix

6.0   Results[12]

This part focuses on the statistical results. As mentioned in 5.4 we systematically divide the results in different separate sections. Moreover, the results will be discussed for each region and type of voting separately. Thus there are four sections (that is 2 regions x 2 types of voting: old-left and new-left) with all the same order. For each section the first part is about the model which contains social-class, income and education as the main explanatory variables. It is about the effect of these explanatory variables on the chance to vote for an old-left or new-left party. In the second part, the variables social-class, income and education are linked to the cultural and economic progressive values (dependent variables). Thirdly for each region and type of voting models are presented which have the cultural and economic progressive values (scales) as main independent variables and the parties as dependent variable. In each last section the complete model will be presented. This contains both social-class, income, education and the cultural and economic values in order to analyse the probability to vote for an old-left or new-left party rather than any other. In 6.5 a comparison between Flanders and Wallonia will be made in order to test Hypotheses 3a and 3b.

6.1   New-left voting in Flanders

6.1.1   New-left voting in Flanders: direct effects (Model 1)

As discussed, we first specify our focus to Model 1. This model contains social-class, income and education as main explanatory variables in order to analyse the probability to vote for a new-left party rather than another party. We consider Groen! as reference category.

As can be seen in Table 1 the coefficients are illustrated for each party and for both Model 1 and 2. However, in 6.1.1 we only focus on the direct effects of social-class, income and education before we can discuss the complete model (Model 2). Thus, in this first results section, Model 1 in Table 1 is the point of discussion.

As indicated above we consider Groen! as the reference category for new-left voting in Flanders. This means that we analyse the probability to vote for this party instead of the other parties. In Model 1 we observe several significant effects. In general, the analysis shows that there is a highly significant effect between years of education and voting for Groen! instead of another party even when class related characteristics are controlled for. As expected in Hypothesis 1 we observe negative effects between years of education and the chance to vote for any other party than Groen! Years of education increase the chance to vote for Groen! rather than any other party. This implies that people who vote for a new-left party are likely to be high educated.

Based on the results in Model 1 we can conclude that the class related factors do not significantly affect the preference for a new-left party. Thus in contrast to social-class and income the

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[12] For all statistical analyses we did a multicollinearity analysis. With VIF values < 2 and Tolerance values > .5 we can conclude that there is no multicollinearity between the variables: education, social-class (EGP) and income in all models.

results indicate that years of education, as basic determinant for cultural voting, is the most important factor to analyse the probability to vote for a new-left party rather than another party. Thus traditional, class related factors like social-class and income do not have effect for the probability to vote for Groen! above other parties in Flanders.

In the last section we will discuss Model 2 which also contains the cultural and economic values as independent variables. But first we will investigate the relation between social-class, income, education and the positions on the economic and cultural value domain.

Table 1 *New-left voting in Flanders with Groen! as Reference category Multinomial Logistic Regression Model 1 and Model 2 B-coefficients (standard error) (N= 770)*

Independent	CD&V (Model 1)	CD&V (Model 2)	SP.A (Model 1)	SP.A (Model 2)	VLD (Model 1)	VLD (Model 2)	VB (Model 1)	VB (Model 2)
Main effects								
Social Class (EGP)								
Higher Service	1.154 (.673)	1.032 (.689)	.502 (.667)	.382 (.676)	1.109 (.689)	.939 (.710)	.758 (.775)	.759 (.839)
Lower Service	.667 (.509)	.750 (.516)	.174 (.513)	.217 (.525)	.488 (.522)	.548 (.532)	.123 (.571)	.282 (.603)
Routine Clerical/Sales	.542 (.555)	.536 (.563)	.120 (.563)	.088 (.569)	.540 (.569)	.527 (.578)	.834 (.606)	.880 (.649)
Skilled Manual	.345 (.741)	.184 (.736)	.148 (.722)	-.002 (.716)	.329 (.735)	.174 (.731)	.856 (.742)	.715 (.754)
Years of Education	-.285*** (.068)	-.246*** (.072)	-.235*** (.072)	-.219** (.074)	-.242*** (.071)	-.226*** (.075)	-.276*** (.079)	-.211** (.084)
Income	.082 (.087)	.122 (.090)	.083 (.090)	.105 (.092)	.048 (.090)	.073 (.093)	.002 (.093)	.057 (.100)
Attitudes (Scales)								
Economic Progressivism		-.665** (.248)		-.344 (.253)		-.882*** (.256)		-.694** (.282)
Cultural Progressivism		-.486*** (.129)		-.198 (.132)		-.314* (.132)		-.844*** (.141)
Controls								
Member of Trade Union	-.791* (.353)	-.792* (.364)	-.486 (.367)	-.507 (.371)	-1.008** (.369)	-.978** (.378)	-.512 (.394)	-.607 (.416)
Member of Social Association	-.159 (.351)	-.036 (.362)	-.211 (.369)	-.158 (.374)	-.702 (.375)	-.606 (.385)	-.852* (.415)	-.668 (.438)
Religious	1.453*** (.361)	1.293*** (.370)	-.116 (.386)	-.260 (.390)	.314 (.379)	.146 (.387)	.340 (.409)	.287 (.424)
Age	-.004 (.012)	-.002 (.012)	-.004 (.012)	-.002 (.013)	-.008 (.012)	-.005 (.013)	-.018 (.013)	-.019 (.014)
Male	.492 (.358)	.501 (.370)	.280 (.373)	.230 (.379)	.584 (.371)	.521 (.382)	1.228** (.406)	1.350** (.430)
Constant	4.325*** (1.317)	8.509*** (1.705)	3.977** (1.386)	6.043*** (1.744)	4.442*** (1.373)	8.784*** (1.765)	4.648** (1.483)	10.213*** (1.946)

Source: ESS2008_Belgium   *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001   Semi- and Unskilled Manual (EGP) = reference category

6.1.2 The effect of social-class, income and education on cultural progressive values in Flanders

In Hypothesis 1 it is stated that the higher the level of cultural capital the higher the chance to hold cultural progressive values and the more likely to vote for a new-left party instead of any other party. In 6.1.1 we have discussed the direct effects of social-class, income and education on political preference. Since it is explicitly assumed in Hypothesis 1 that education positively affects cultural progressive values, we first have to discuss Table 2 in which this is pointed out. Thus this table helps us to test the underlying assumption of Hypothesis 1 that years of education positively affects cultural progressive values.

Looking at Table 2, we find that both income and years of education are positively and significantly related to these values. This means that the more income and years of education the more cultural progressive values. Moreover, it is indicated that the lower service people are more cultural progressive, but the skilled manual workers seems to be more cultural conservative compared to the semi- and unskilled manual workers. Thus, both cultural (education) and class related (social-class and income) characteristics explain cultural progressive values in Flanders.

Thus indeed more education leads to more cultural progressive values. However, class related characteristics also affect cultural progressive values.

Table 2   The effect of social-class, income and education on cultural progressive values, Multiple linear regression, unstandardized coefficients (standard error), N = 770

Independent	Cultural progressive values
Main effects	
Social Class (EGP)	
Higher Service	.125
	(.189)
Lower Service	**.148***
	(.069)
Routine Clerical/Sales	-.112
	(.074)
Skilled Manual	**-.161***
	(.081)
Years of Education	**.111***
	(.010)
Income	**.073***
	(.013)
Controls	
Member of Trade Union	-.050
	(.052)
Member of Social Association	**.259***
	(.053)
Religious	-.070
	(.050)
Age	.000
	(.002)
Male	**.158**
	(.051)
Constant	**3.294***
	(.189)

Source: ESS2008_Belgium   *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001   Semi- and Unskilled Manual (EGP) = reference category

6.1.3 The effect of cultural and economic progressive values on the probability to vote for Groen! rather than another party in Flanders

The second underlying assumption of Hypothesis 1 is that the cultural progressive values have a direct and positive effect on the chance to vote for a new-left party compared to the other parties. Thus the more cultural progressive values the higher the probability to vote for Groen! compared to another party. Before we go to our complete model, we will first test this assumption for Flanders.

As can be seen in Table 3 we have to confirm the assumption that the cultural progressive values positively and significantly explain the probability to vote for a new-left party instead of another. For the party Vlaams Belang for instance one may expect that only the cultural issues will explain the probability to vote for this party instead of Groen!, since Vlaams Belang is a new-right party and thus concerned with cultural voting. However, the negative and significant coefficient for economic progressivism indicates that Vlaams Belang voters are more economic conservative than Groen! voters. The variable cultural progressivism is also negative, but more significant than the economic progressive values, indicating that, as expected, cultural conservative values increase the chance to vote for Vlaams Belang instead of Groen! For the party VLD both the cultural and economic value domain show significant effects. Here we thus compare a cultural and economic related party with one another. The results indicate that both economic and cultural values explain the probability to vote for Groen! instead of VLD. This is the same for CD&V. Based on Table 3 we can conclude that both economic progressive and cultural progressive values increase the probability to vote for Groen! compared to the chance to vote for the other parties in Flanders.

Table 3   The effect of cultural and economic progressive values on the probability to vote for Groen! (reference category), Multinomial Logistic Regression, B-coefficients (standard error) (N= 770)

Independent	CD&V	SP.A	VLD	VB
Main effects				
Attitudes (Scales)				
Economic Progressivism	-.648**	-.317	-.860***	-.640*
	(.246)	(.251)	(.253)	(.278)
Cultural Progressivism	-.545***	-.273*	-.383**	-.917***
	(.120)	(.123)	(.124)	(.133)
Controls				
Member of Trade Union	-.664	-.287	-.827**	-.387
	(.345)	(.353)	(.360)	(.395)
Member of Social Association	-.085	-.252	-.668	-.723
	(.350)	(.362)	(.374)	(.423)
Religious	1.229***	-.296	.086	.206
	(.361)	(.382)	(.379)	(.415)
Age	.008	.008	.007	-.006
	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)	(.013)
Male	.482	.264	.496	1.300***
	(.346)	(.356)	(.359)	(.400)
Constant	6.425***	3.791**	6.450***	7.883***
	(1.277)	(1.307)	(1.313)	(1.407)

Source: ESS2008_Belgium   *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001   Semi- and Unskilled Manual (EGP)= reference category

6.1.4 The complete model: new-left voting in Flanders (Model 2)

In 6.1.1-6.1.3 we have discussed different analyses in order to get more grip on the mediating and direct effects. Now we will discuss the complete model. That is a model containing both social-class, income, education and the economic, cultural values. We do this final model for new-left voting in Flanders to get a general view of the effects. The results can be seen in Model 2 also illustrated in Table 1.

In the second (complete) model (Table 1), we add the cultural and economic values to the model. Compared to Model 1, which only contained social-class, income and education, we see that even after controlling for cultural and economic opinions, education continues to play a highly significant role in explaining a vote for Groen! (new-left party) compared to the probability to vote for another party. This indicates a direct positive effect of years of education on voting for a new-left party. However, the effect of education slightly decreases for Vlaams Belang and SP.A if the attitudes are added in the model indicating that the probability to vote for these parties rather than Groen! is partly explained by cultural and economic values.

If we look at the cultural and economic values in more detail, we see some significant effects. For CD&V and VLD we see negative and significant effects for cultural and economic issues. This means that a more progressive attitude towards cultural and economic issues leads to a higher chance to vote for Groen! For Vlaams Belang we also see negative effects for the cultural and economic value domain. Hence, whereas we had expected that in particular cultural values would influence the choice between Groen! and Vlaams Belang, economic values also seem to increase the preference for Groen! above Vlaams Belang.

In 6.1.2 we saw that both education and the class related characteristics significantly explain cultural progressive values. In 6.1.3 we observed that both the economic and cultural value domain are important to explain a vote for Groen! instead of another party. In the complete model (Table 1, model 2) we see that unlike education, the class-related factors do not significantly affect the preference for a new-left party. Thus the general conclusion is that education has a positive direct effect on cultural progressive values and to the chance to vote for Groen! instead of another party. The probability to vote for a new-left party rather than another party is directly explained by education. However, both cultural and economic values explain the chance to vote for Groen! rather than other parties in Flanders. Thus we can partly confirm Hypothesis 1.

6.2   Old-left voting in Flanders

6.2.1   Old-left voting in Flanders: direct effects (Model 1)

The same as we did in 6.1, we firstly specify our focus to Model 1 as first step to test Hypothesis 2 for Flanders. This Model 1 (provided in Table 4) contains social-class, income and education as main explanatory variables in order to analyse the probability to vote for an old-left party rather than another party. We consider SP.A as reference category. Model 2 will be discussed in the final section of 6.2. Since we already illustrated the relation between Groen! and SP.A in Table 1, Groen! is not presented in Table 4.

In Model 1 (Table 4) we do not find any significant effect of education and the class related characteristics in the first model. This implies that social-class, income and years of education do not seem relevant when explaining a preference for SP.A above the other parties in Flanders. In spite of the fact that SP.A is a economic progressive, old-left party the class related aspects cannot explain the probability to vote for SP.A instead of another party.

In the last section we will discuss Model 2 which also contains the cultural and economic values as independent variables. With that model we can see if the cultural and economic values have more importance to explain the chance to vote for SP.A and thus old-left voting. But first we will investigate the relation between social-class, income, education and the positions on the economic and cultural value domain in order to get more grip on the underlying mechanisms. Moreover, this helps us to test Hypothesis 2 more appropriately for Flanders and to investigate Model 2 which is also provided in Table 4.

Table 4   _Old-left voting in Flanders with SP.A as Reference category Multinomial Logistic Regression Model 1 and Model 2_
B-coefficients (standard error) (N= 770)

Independent	CD&V (Model 1)	CD&V (Model 2)	VLD (Model 1)	VLD (Model 2)	VB (Model 1)	VB (Model 2)
Main effects						
Social Class (EGP)1						
Higher Service	.652 (.434)	.650 (.436)	.607 (.452)	.558 (.460)	.256 (.571)	.378 (.630)
Lower Service	.493 (.352)	.533 (.352)	.313 (.363)	.331 (.368)	-.051 (.446)	.066 (.474)
Routine Clerical/Sales	.422 (.381)	.448 (.379)	.420 (.397)	.439 (.398)	.715 (.432)	.791 (.460)
Skilled Manual	.197 (.434)	.186 (.439)	.181 (.443)	.177 (.447)	.708 (.464)	.718 (.495)
Years of Education	-.050 (.045)	-.027 (.047)	-.007 (.050)	-.007 (.052)	-.041 (.059)	.008 (.063)
Income	-.001 (.059)	.018 (.060)	-.035 (.063)	-.032 (.064)	-.081 (.069)	-.048 (.073)
Attitudes (Scales)						
Economic Progressivism		**-.321*** (.156)		**-.538*** (.167)		-.350 (.202)
Cultural Progressivism		**-.288*** (.074)		-.116 (.081)		**-.645*** (.093)
Controls						
Member of Trade Union	-.305 (.231)	-.285 (.235)	**-.522*** (.254)	-.471 (.256)	-.026 (.286)	-.100 (.304)
Member of Social Association	.052 (.233)	.122 (.237)	-.491 (.268)	-.448 (.271)	**-.641*** (.320)	-.509 (.338)
Religious	**1.569*** (.230)	**1.552*** (.234)	.430 (.258)	.406 (.261)	.456 (.298)	.547 (.311)
Age	.000 (.008)	.000 (.008)	-.005 (.008)	-.002 (.008)	-.014 (.010)	-.017 (.011)
Male	.212 (.230)	.270 (.235)	.304 (.250)	.291 (.253)	**.948*** (.296)	**1.120*** (.315)
Constant	.348 (.864)	**2.466*** (1.073)	.465 (.935)	**2.742*** (1.153)	.671 (1.093)	**4.170*** (1.401)

Source: ESS2008_Belgium   *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001   1 Semi- and Unskilled Manual = reference category

6.2.2 The effect of social-class, income and education on economic progressive values in Flanders

In Hypothesis 2 it is stated that the higher the social-class or income the higher the chance to hold economic progressive values and the more likely to vote for an old-left party instead of any other party. In 6.2.1 we have discussed the direct effects of social-class, income and education on political preference. Since it is explicitly assumed in Hypothesis 2 that the class related characteristics positively affect economic progressive values, we discuss this relation. The results are provided in Table 5.

As can be seen in Table 5 there is a significant, negative relation between years of education and economic progressive values in Flanders. This means that the more education the more a person has economic conservative values. Secondly, there is a significant, negative link between the higher service people and economic progressive values. In other words, as expected, the higher service people are more economic conservative then the semi- and unskilled manual workers (reference category).

In Hypothesis 2 we assume that class related factors explain economic values. However, the strong, negative effect of education on economic progressive values implies that cultural factors are also important for someone's position on the economic value domain. This indicates that class related and cultural determinants might be interrelated.

Table 5   The effect of social-class, income and education on economic progressive values, Multiple linear regression, unstandardized coefficients (standard error), N = 770

Independent	Economic progressive values
Main effects	
Social Class (EGP)	
Higher Service	-.186***
	(.038)
Lower Service	-.017
	(.031)
Routine Clerical/Sales	.036
	(.033)
Skilled Manual	.044
	(.036)
Years of Education	-.025***
	(.004)
Income	-.005
	(.006)
Controls	
Member of Trade Union	.120***
	(.023)
Member of Social Association	.051*
	(.024)
Religious	-.041
	(.022)
Age	.005***
	(.001)
Male	-.095***
	(.023)
Constant	3.416***
	(.084)

Source: ESS2008_Belgium   *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001   Semi- and Unskilled Manual (EGP) = reference category

6.2.3 The effect of cultural and economic progressive values on the probability to vote for SP.A rather than another party in Flanders

The second underlying assumption of Hypothesis 2 is that the economic progressive values have a direct and positive effect on the chance to vote for an old-left party compared to the other parties. Thus the more economic progressive values the higher the probability to vote for SP.A compared to another party. Before we go to our complete model, we will first test this assumption for Flanders in order to precisely test Hypothesis 2 about old-left voting for Flanders.

In Table 6 we see that people with more economic progressive values have a higher chance to vote for SP.A instead of VLD. The cultural values do not explain this chance. This is in line with the underlying assumption of Hypothesis 2 that economic values explain the probability to vote for an economic oriented party rather than cultural values. For the parties CD&V and Vlaams Belang, however we see that cultural values explain the probability to vote for SP.A. For these parties cultural progressive values increase the chance to vote for SP.A.

Table 6 *The effect of cultural and economic progressive values on the probability to vote for SP.A (reference category), Multinomial Logistic Regression, B-coefficients (standard error) (N= 770)*

Independent	CD&V	VLD	VB
Main effects			
Attitudes (Scales)			
Economic Progressivism	-.331*	-.543***	-.323
	(.153)	(.164)	(.197)
Cultural Progressivism	-.273***	-.110	-.645***
	(.071)	(.077)	(.089)
Controls			
Member of Trade Union	-.376	-.539*	-.099
	(.227)	(.249)	(.292)
Member of Social Association	.167	-.416	-.471
	(.233)	(.267)	(.330)
Religious	1.526***	.382	.502
	(.231)	(.258)	(.305)
Age	.000	-.001	-.015
	(.007)	(.007)	(.009)
Male	.218	.232	1.037***
	(.220)	(.239)	(.294)
Constant	2.634***	2.658***	2.658***
	(.752)	(.808)	(.808)

Source: ESS2008_Belgium   *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001   Semi- and Unskilled Manual (EGP)= reference category

6.2.4 The complete model: old-left voting in Flanders (Model 2)

Now we will discuss the complete model. That is a model containing both social-class, income, education and the economic, cultural values. We do this final model for old-left voting in Flanders to get a general view of the effects. The results can be seen in Model 2 also illustrated in Table 4.

Looking at Model 2 in Table 4, we find a negative significant relation between economic progressive values and voting for VLD. This means that SP.A voters are significantly more economic progressive than VLD voters. Or in other words, more economic progressive values increases the chance to vote for SP.A rather than VLD. This is also indicated in Table 6. For CD&V we again find significant and negative effects for both the cultural and economic values indicating that people who vote for SP.A have more progressive values in a cultural and economic point of view compared to CD&V voters. Holding culturally progressive values also significantly decreases the likelihood to choose Vlaams Belang above SP.A.

If we compare the analyses made in Table 6, 5 and 4 we come to the conclusion that old-left voting in Flanders is mainly explained by opinions about cultural and economic issues, rather than traditional, class related factors. Thus the cultural and economic values seem to be the main driving force to prefer SP.A rather than any other party in Flanders. Moreover, the position on these value domains is partly explained by a cultural characteristic (education), but not by income and only partly by social-class. This brings us to the conclusion that Hypothesis 2 can be partly confirmed in Flanders. For the probability to vote for an old-right instead of an old-left party indeed economic progressive values are the most important factors. However, in the complete model class related characteristics (social-class and income) do not give significant effects.

6.3   New-left voting in Wallonia

6.3.1   New-left voting in Wallonia: direct effects (Model 1)

Also for Wallonia we will first discuss the model with the direct effects (Model 1) before we go deeper to the intern relations and the complete model (Model 2). Model 1 contains social-class, income and education as main explanatory variables in order to analyse the probability to vote for a new-left party rather than another party. We consider Ecolo as reference category. This means that we explain the probability to vote for Ecolo compared to the chance to vote for another party in Wallonia. The results are presented in Table 7. Model 2, which is also presented in Table 7, will be discussed in the final section of 6.3.

In Model 1 (Table 7), we see that the variable years of education has minimal explanatory power for a vote for a new-left party in Wallonia in Model 1. We see that there is a negative significant relation between years of education and voting for PS and MR. Thus, people who vote for a new-left party have higher education compared to voters from the old-left and old-right parties. We see that income is negatively and significantly related to voting for PS which indicates that voters with

lower incomes are more likely to vote for the PS rather than Ecolo. This gives evidence for the assumption that traditional economic characteristics distinguish voters from an old- and new-left party. For MR there is also a significant effect of a class related determinant. Higher service people have a significantly higher chance to vote for MR instead of Ecolo compared to the semi- and unskilled manual people in Model 1. This also confirms the idea that class related determinants are able to explain the chance to vote for a cultural rather than a traditional economic political party. We performed the same analysis but without income to investigate the relative importance of social-class [13]. This analysis showed that the significant relation of the higher service is still present in Model 1. Moreover, for PS the lower service category becomes significant in Model 1 after deleting income from the analysis. This implies that income might be a more valid indicator than social-class.

Based on the results in Model 1 (Table 7), we can conclude that traditional economic characteristics distinguish voters from an old-left/right and new-left wing party. Thus in contrast with Hypothesis 1 education seems to have minimal explanatory power to explain a vote for a new-left party in Wallonia.

Table 7 *New-left voting in Wallonia with Ecolo as Reference category Multinomial Logistic Regression Model 1 and Model 2 B-coefficients (standard error) (N= 470)*

Independent	CDH (Model 1)	CDH (Model 2)	PS (Model 1)	PS (Model 2)	MR (Model 1)	MR (Model 2)
Main effects						
Social Class (EGP) 1						
Higher Service	.810 (.695)	.811 (.720)	.532 (.634)	.649 (.655)	**1.234*** (.600)	**1.326*** (.626)
Lower Service	-.694 (.533)	-.748 (.542)	-.915 (.486)	-.889 (.507)	-.182 (.468)	-.145 (.488)
Routine Clerical/Sales	.683 (.638)	.776 (.640)	.737 (.572)	.813 (.585)	.447 (.558)	.566 (.575)
Skilled Manual	.528 (.956)	.425 (.971)	.606 (.733)	.504 (.743)	.601 (.757)	.495 (.7720
Years of Education	-.107 (.055)	-.101 (.056)	**-.127**** (.050)	**-.107*** (.051)	**-.103*** (.049)	.047 (.089)
Income	-.103 (.088)	-.133 (.090)	**-.221**** (.079)	**-.245**** (.081)	.076 (.087)	.047 (.089)
Attitudes (Scales)						
Economic Progressivism		**-.580*** (.272)		**-.603*** (.250)		**-.745**** (.250)
Cultural Progressivism		-.004 (.112)		-.184 (.101)		**-.198*** (.102)
Controls						
Member of Trade Union	.724 (.409)	.792 (.418)	**1.176***** (.360)	**1.276***** (.370)	.496 (.367)	.616 (.379)
Member of Social Association	.724 (.409)	-1.048 (.562)	-.901 (.489)	-.761 (.501)	**-.966*** (.467)	-.828 (.483)
Religious	**1.745***** (.403)	**1.690***** (.406)	.478 (.371)	.409 (.377)	**1.204***** (.364)	**1.124**** (.371)
Age	**.035**** (.012)	**.035**** (.012)	**.033**** (.011)	**.031**** (.011)	.020 (.011)	.018 (.011)
Male	-.197 (.385)	-.204 (.388)	.015 (.336)	.044 (.341)	.370 (.335)	.407 (.343)
Constant	.177 (1.244)	2.386 (1.662)	**2.531*** (1.052)	**5.599***** (1.489)	-.222 (1.123)	**3.420*** (1.545)

Source: ESS2008_Belgium   *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001   1 Semi- and Unskilled Manual=reference category

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[13] This additional analysis can be found in the Appendix

6.3.2 The effect of social-class, income and education on cultural progressive values in Wallonia

In Hypothesis 1 it is stated that the higher the education the higher the chance to hold cultural progressive values and the more likely to vote for a new-left party instead of any other party. In 6.3.1 we have seen that education does not play an overall role in explaining a vote for Ecolo rather than another party. In this section we will deeply analyse the effect of education and the class related factors on cultural progressive values. This helps us to test Hypothesis 1 more appropriately. The results are presented in Table 8.

In Table 8 we see that education positively explains cultural progressive values. This is in line with what we expect in Hypothesis 1. However, people belonging to the higher and lower service social-class have more cultural progressive compared to the semi- and unskilled manual workers. Thus in this analysis we see that both cultural and class related characteristics explain positions on the cultural value domain.

Table 8 The effect of social-class, income and education on cultural progressive values, Multiple linear regression, unstandardized coefficients (standard error), N = 470

Independent	Cultural progressive values
Main effects	
Social Class (EGP)	
Higher Service	.530***
	(.114)
Lower Service	.515***
	(.097)
Routine Clerical/Sales	-.104
	(.103)
Skilled Manual	-.207
	(.124)
Years of Education	.103***
	(.010)
Income	.005
	(.015)
Controls	
Member of Trade Union	-.021
	(.073)
Member of Social Association	.625***
	(.112)
Religious	.001
	(.070)
Age	-.009***
	(.002)
Male	.165*
	(.072)
Constant	4.006***
	(.211)

Source: ESS2008_Belgium   *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001   Semi- and Unskilled Manual (EGP) = reference category

6.3.3 The effect of cultural and economic progressive values on the probability to vote for Ecolo rather than another party in Wallonia

We assume in Hypothesis 1 that the cultural progressive values have a direct and positive on the chance to vote for an new-left party compared to the other parties. Before we go to our complete model, we will first test this assumption for Wallonia.

In Table 9 the results are presented of this analysis. We see that the probability to vote for Ecolo instead of PS is explained by cultural progressive values. More precisely, people with more cultural progressive values have a higher chance to vote for Ecolo rather than PS. This is in line with the assumption of Hypothesis 1. For MR we also see a significant effect of cultural progressive values. However, the economic progressive values are also significant. This indicates that also traditional economic characteristics distinguish voters from an old-left/right and new-left wing party.

Table 9   The effect of cultural and economic progressive values on the probability to vote for Ecolo (reference category), Multinomial Logistic Regression, B-coefficients (standard error) (N= 470)

Independent	CDH	PS	MR
Main effects			
Attitudes (Scales)			
Economic Progressivism	-.374	-.320	**-.716****
	(.250)	(.223)	(.231)
Cultural Progressivism	-.099	**-.301*****	**-.229***
	(.102)	(.090)	(.094)
Controls			
Member of Trade Union	.697	**1.135*****	.502
	(.401)	(.346)	(.367)
Member of Social	**-1.251***	**-1.072***	-.884
Association	(.525)	(.446)	(.456)
Religious	**1.571*****	.324	**1.044****
	(.383)	(.348)	(.355)
Age	**.036****	**.034*****	.017
	(.011)	(.010)	(.010)
Male	-.213	.011	.504
	(.363)	(.313)	(.327)
Constant	-.133	1.987	**3.074****
	(1.197)	(1.044)	(1.079)

Source: ESS2008_Belgium   *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001   Semi- and Unskilled Manual (EGP) = reference category

6.3.4 The complete model: new-left voting in Wallonia (Model 2)

Now we will discuss the complete model containing beside social-class, income and education the cultural and economic values. This complete model is also presented in Table 7.

Turning to this second model, we still find higher service people to be more likely to vote for the MR compared to Ecolo. In other words, there is a direct effect of this social-class category. For MR we see in Model 2 significant negative relations for the economic and cultural values. This was also observed in Table 9. This means that people voting for MR are economically and culturally more conservative than people voting for Ecolo. More interesting is that the chance to vote for Ecolo (new-right) instead of PS (old-left) is explained by both education, income and economic progressive values. In Table 8 it was also observed that cultural values are explained by both cultural and class

related factors. However, in the complete model (Model 2, Table 7) where all the independent variables are present, the effect education is explained by the values. In order words, we can confirm that education positively affects cultural progressive values, however in the complete model education has almost no relevant influence for new-left voting in Wallonia. Moreover, based on Tables 7 and 9 we see that both cultural and class related characteristics explain the probability to vote for Ecolo compared to another party. Therefore, we can in some extent conclude that education and cultural progressive values explain the probability to vote for a new-left party instead of another party. Thus, Hypothesis 1 can be partly confirmed in Wallonia.

6.4   Old-left voting in Wallonia

6.4.1   Old-left voting in Wallonia: direct effects (Model 1)

We will first discuss the model with the direct effects (Model 1) before we go deeper to the intern relations and the complete model (Model 2). Model 1 contains social-class, income and education as main explanatory variables in order to analyse the probability to vote for an old-left party rather than another party. We consider PS as reference category. This means that we explain the probability to vote for an old-left party compared to the chance to vote for another party in Wallonia. The results are presented in Table 10. Model 2, which is also presented in Table 10, will be discussed in the final section of 6.4. The relation between Ecolo and PS is already discussed in Table 7. Hence Ecolo is not added in Table 10.

In Model 1 there is only a significant positive effect of income on voting for MR. This means – in line with Hypothesis 2 – that the higher the income the higher the chance to vote MR instead of PS.   Also in this analysis we ran the same model without income (see Appendix). In contrast to the results in which income was included, social-class gets significant relevance. Thus the higher and lower service social-class give positive significant effects for MR. This means that people working in the service sector have a higher chance to vote for MR than PS. This is in line with the assumption of Hypothesis 2 that people from higher social classes are tended to vote for an economic conservative party. Moreover, for PS the lower service category also becomes significant after removing income. These observations give support for the idea that income might be a more valid concept than social-class.

Table 10 _Old-left voting in Wallonia with PS as Reference category, Multinomial Logistic Regression Model 1 and Model 2 B-coefficients (standard error) (N= 470)_

Independent	CDH (Model 1)	CDH (Model 2)	MR (Model 1)	MR (Model 2)
Main effects				
Social Class (EGP)1				
Higher Service	.278 (.515)	.162 (.512)	.702 (.448)	.677 (.453)
Lower Service	.221 (.433)	.141 (.444)	.732 (.406)	.744 (.410)
Routine Clerical/Sales	-.054 (.473)	-.037 (.489)	-.290 (.428)	-.246 (.432)
Skilled Manual	-.078 (.650)	-.079 (.658)	-.005 (.473)	-.009 (.477)
Years of Education	.019 (.040)	.006 (.040)	.024 (.036)	.023 (.038)
Income	.118 (.066)	.113 (.068)	**.296*** (.065)	**.292*** (.066)
Attitudes (Scales)				
Economic Progressivism		.024 (.198)		-.141 (.178)
Cultural Progressivism		**.180*** (.080)		-.014 (.071)
Controls				
Member of Trade Union	-.452 (.309)	-.484 (.312)	**-.680*** (.271)	**-.660*** (.275)
Member of Social Association	-.168 (.502)	-.287 (.507)	-.065 (.446)	-.066 (.449)
Religious	**1.267*** (.291)	**1.281*** (.294)	**.726*** (.264)	**.715*** (.267)
Age	.002 (.009)	.004 (.009)	-.013 (.008)	-.013 (.008)
Male	-.211 (.306)	-.248 (.308)	.355 (.268)	.363 (.270)
Constant	**-2.354*** (.913)	**-3.213*** (1.195)	**-.2754*** (.827)	**-2.179*** (1.087)

Source: ESS2008_Belgium   *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001   1 Semi- and Unskilled Manual = reference category

6.4.2 The effect of social-class, income and education on economic progressive values in Wallonia

We assume in Hypothesis 2 that the economic progressive values have a direct and positive effect on the chance to vote for an old-left party compared to the other parties. In Table 11 the results of this analysis are presented.

Unlike years of education, income and social-class significantly and negatively explains economic progressive values. This means that a higher income leads to more economic conservative values. We also observe that the higher service people have significantly more economic conservative values than the semi- and unskilled manual workers. Reversely, the routine clerical sales are respectively more economic progressive compared to the semi- and unskilled manual workers this reference category. This is in line with the assumption of Hypothesis 2 that only class related characteristics explain economic values.

Table 11 *The effect of social-class, income and education on economic progressive values, Multiple linear regression, unstandardized coefficients (standard error), N = 470*

Independent	Economic progressive values
Main effects	
Social Class (EGP)	
Higher Service	**-.135****
	(.046)
Lower Service	-.056
	(.039)
Routine Clerical/Sales	**.224*****
	(.042)
Skilled Manual	.039
	(.050)
Years of Education	.001
	(.004)
Income	**-.040*****
	(.006)
Controls	
Member of Trade Union	**.150*****
	(.029)
Member of Social Association	.051
	(.045)
Religious	**-.124*****
	(.028)
Age	-.001
	(.001)
Male	-.024
	(.029)
Constant	**3.732*****
	(.085)

Source: ESS2008_Belgium   *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001   Semi- and Unskilled Manual (EGP) = reference category

6.4.3 The effect of cultural and economic progressive values on the probability to vote for PS rather than another party in Wallonia

We assume in Hypothesis 2 that the economic progressive values have a direct and positive on the chance to vote for an old-left party compared to the other parties. Before we go to our complete model, we will first test this assumption for Wallonia.

In Table 12 we see that for the chance to vote for PS instead of MR is not explained by economic values. This is in contrast with Hypothesis 2 in which it is stated that economic progressive values increase the chance to vote for PS instead of another party. Moreover, since MR and PS are both traditional economic parties it is unexpected that the economic values do not explain the chance to vote for these parties.

Table 12 *The effect of cultural and economic progressive values on the probability to vote for PS (reference category), Multinomial Logistic Regression, B-coefficients (standard error) (N= 470)*

Independent	CDH	MR
Main effects		
Attitudes (Scales)		
Economic Progressivism	.001	-.247
	(.194)	(.173)
Cultural Progressivism	**.197****	.043
	(.077)	(.067)
Controls		
Member of Trade Union	-.468	**-.670***
	(.309)	(.270)
Member of Social	-.307	-.079
Association	(.493)	(.429)
Religious	**1.281***	.787****
	(.289)	(.261)
Age	.004	-.011
	(.009)	(.008)
Male	-.239	.423
	(.289)	(.252)
Constant	**-3.126***	-1.932
	(1.091)	(1.008)

Source: ESS2008_Belgium   *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001   Semi- and Unskilled Manual (EGP)= reference category

6.4.4 The complete model: old-left voting in Wallonia (Model 2)

Now we will discuss the complete model containing beside social-class, income and education the cultural and economic values. This complete model is also presented in Table 10.

The results of Model 2 (Table 10) indicate that the class related determinants are important for explaining old-left voting in Wallonia. A high social-class position and income-level indeed lead to a higher chance to vote for an economic conservative party.However, the economic and cultural values (scales) only have weak significant effects. This was also seen in Table 12. Income and social-class have a direct effect on the probability to vote for PS instead of another party [14]. This is in conflict with Hypothesis 2 in which is pointed out that the income and class effect would diminish after economic and cultural values had been controlled. We have seen in 6.4.2 that income and social-class affect economic progressive and also have a direct effect on political affiliation in contrast to the values. Thus in Wallonia, the traditional class characteristics explain the vote for PS instead of another party. Because of that we can partly confirm Hypothesis 2 in which is stated that *both* economic progressive values, income and social-class increase the chance to vote for PS (old-left) in Wallonia.

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[14] The significance of social-class occurs if income is deleted from the analysis. See Appendix.

6.5   A comparison between Flanders and Wallonia

The aim of this section is to make a comparison in results between Flanders and Wallonia. This is important since Hypotheses 3a and 3b assume differences in new-left and old-left voting between the two regions. More specifically there is assumed that new-left voting is in general more salient in Flanders compared to Wallonia and that old-left voting is in general more salient in Wallonia than in Flanders.

In Flanders we have seen that education is the most important factor to explain the chance to vote for Groen! instead of another party (new-left voting). After controlling for cultural and economic values, this significance still exists. In Wallonia on the contrary we see the opposite: income and social-class seem to have the most important influence for explaining the probability to vote for Ecolo rather than any other party (new-left voting). In Flanders, cultural and economic values are more important in explaining new-left voting compared to Wallonia. Although we see that both economic and cultural values have significant effects. This is in line with our claim that voters may take both economic and cultural issues into account and therefore cultural and economic determinants have to be integrated instead of segregated in statistical models.

We had anticipated (Hypothesis 3a) that in Wallonia new-left and new-right parties focus more on economic issues compared to Flemish new- left and new-right parties, with the result that the influence of cultural capital and values might be weaker compared to Flanders. In Flanders the class related factors (income and social-class) do not have relevance for explaining voting behaviour. Thus, in Flanders political preference cannot be explained by class related social divisions. Or in other words, to determine the probability to vote for Groen! (new-left voting) or SP.A (old-left voting), neither income nor social-class has explanatory value. Moreover, economic values seem to be less important than the cultural issues. Hence, cultural related factors seem to be more salient for voting in Flanders.

In Wallonia on the contrary class related factors such as social-class and income give for both the probability to vote for PS and the chance to vote for Ecolo (instead of another party) voting significant effects. This means that both social-class and income explain the probability to vote for cultural and economic oriented parties. This means that in Wallonia the differences in social divisions are reflected in the choice of voting. Moreover, we also see that class related characteristics explain a vote for cultural oriented parties. Another conclusion is that in Wallonia in general the cultural and economic values are less important for voting compared to Flanders. If there is significance the economic issues are stronger related to political affiliation compared to the cultural value domain.

Since we have seen that unlike Flanders, in Wallonia political preference is significantly and strongly linked to class and income related factors and in Flanders voting behaviour is more strongly linked to cultural issues, we have enough reason to confirm Hypotheses 3a and 3b.

7.0   Conclusion and Discussion

This study has claimed for a revision of the concepts cultural and class voting. Previous research ignored the idea that eventually people have to choose for one party (e.g. Achterberg and Houtman, 2003; Van der Waal et al. 2007). We assumed that voters may take both economic and cultural issues into account. There has to be constructed and tested a model that integrates the determinants of cultural and class voting instead of making a rigid distinction between explaining a vote for an economic or cultural related party. We have introduced in this study the concepts: old-left and new-left voting to indicate the probability to vote for these parties compared to the likelihood to vote for another party. We applied it to Flanders and Wallonia (Belgium).

The results give strong support for this new theoretical approach. Thus in both Flanders and Wallonia we see that economic and cultural determinants are not either linked to cultural or economic oriented parties. Instead of that it is also for instance indicated that traditional economic characteristics distinguish voters from an old- and new-left party. Thus indeed there has not to be made a rigid distinction between cultural and economic related determinants. Apparently it is indeed true that voters take both economic and cultural issues into account when choosing for an economic or cultural oriented party.

We had anticipated that in Wallonia new-left and new-right parties focus more on economic issues compared to Flemish new- left and new-right parties, with the result that the influence of cultural capital and cultural values might be weaker compared to Flanders. Our results have indicated that In Flanders the class related factors (income and social-class) do not have relevance for explaining voting behaviour. To determine the probability to vote for Groen! (new-left voting) or SP.A (old-left voting), neither income nor social-class has explanatory value. In Wallonia on the contrary, class related factors such as social-class and income give for both the probability to vote for PS and the chance to vote for Ecolo (instead of another party) voting significant effects. This means that both social-class and income explain the probability to vote for cultural and economic oriented parties. In Wallonia the differences in social divisions are reflected in the choice of voting.

This study contributes to the 'social-class debate' since we have investigated the relevance of income instead of social-class for voting in both Flanders and Wallonia. For Flanders income and social-class do not explain voting behaviour in general. In Wallonia on the contrary, the results indicate that income might be a better concept for explaining voting behaviour compared to social-class. The variable social-class solely gives significant effects if income is deleted from the analyses.

As indicated, since years there is debate about the impact of social divisions on political choices. Some scholars claim that this impact is on the wane. However, in this research it is has been shown that differences in cultural and economic characteristics still imply deviations in political choices, but this relation depends on the cultural and economic circumstances. Indeed our results strongly indicate that in a region with a less flourishing economy the social divisions play a more

important role for voting behaviour. We saw that in Wallonia the traditional class struggle is to some extent still salient in contrast to Flanders. Thus, based on the results, we want to add to the debate that the impact of social divisions depends on the country's (economic) circumstances. It has to be linked to the public discourse.

Recently there were elections in Belgium. The Flemish nationalist party N-VA has been increased his amount of seats from 8 to 27 seats. In Wallonia on the contrary, the socialist party PS was the electoral winner (from 20 to 26 seats). This again underlines the idea that in Wallonia the importance of social-class and political affiliation and thus old-left voting is more salient compared to Flanders.

Beside this study there are recently other articles published which discuss the impact of social divisions on voting. An article of Elff (2009) for example indicates that if positions of political parties are taken into account, the impact of social divisions on voting behaviour still exists. Parties become more similar in their political position, but ideologically social divisions still differ in their affiliation (Elff, 2009). Also in a recent edition of the West European Politics (33:3) several studies are discussed who emphasis the still important influence of traditional socioeconomic characteristics for political affiliation (e.g. Bornschier, 2010; Henjak, 2010; Stubager, 2010). In other words, beside this study, some other recent papers have also emphasized the impact of social divisions on political choices.

This study might be unique since we have revised the terms cultural and class voting and claiming for a less rigid distinction between class and cultural driven mechanisms. However a weakness of this study could be that we used a statistical technique (Multinomial Logistic Regression) which compares categories with relatively low N's (amount of respondents). Since we used party preference as dependent variable and we compared the parties mutually, the electoral support of the parties was reflected in the amount of respondents for each analysis. This might have influenced the results. A future refinement of the this study's approach might can solve this problem by using discrete choice models as technique.

8.0   References

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9.0 Appendix

Table 1 Descriptive statistics of all dependent and explanatory variables

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Income	1567	1	10	7,46	2,367
Economic Progressivism	1760	1	5	3,3047	,75391
Cultural Progressivism	1758	0	10	5,3622	1,72929
Religious	1753	0	1	,4370	,49615
Member of Social Association	1760	0	1	,2114	,40839
Semi- and Unskilled Manual (EGP)	1527	0	1	,2574	,43733
Skilled Manual (EGP)	1527	0	1	,1139	,31785
Routine Clerical Sales (EGP)	1527	0	1	,2004	,40043
Lower Service (EGP)	1527	0	1	,2764	,44734
Higher Service (EGP)	1527	0	1	,1519	,35907
Age	1760	18	105	46,0307	18,73832
Male	1760	0	1	,4909	,50006
Member of Trade Union	1759	0	1	,34	,474
Years of Education	1759	0	30	12,67	3,658
Political Preference (Wallonia)	470	1	5	3,5681	1,54487
Political Preference (Vlaanderen)	770	1	6	3,5545	1,68841

Analyses without income as explanatory variable [15]

Table 2   *Old-left voting in Wallonia with PS as Reference category (without income as independent variable), Multinomial Logistic Regression Model 1 and Model 2, B-coefficients (standard error) (N= 470)*

Independent	CDH (Model 1)	CDH (Model 2)	MR (Model 1)	MR (Model 2)
Main effects				
Social Class (EGP)1				
Higher Service	.357 (.514)	.241 (.512)	**.926*** (.417)	**.895*** (.421)
Lower Service	.295 (.426)	.194 (.436)	**.906*** (.385)	**.893*** (.389)
Routine Clerical/Sales	.023 (.465)	.043 (.482)	-.165 (.408)	-.098 (.413)
Skilled Manual	-.050 (.629)	-.053 (.638)	-.014 (.460)	-.014 (.463)
Years of Education	.035 (.039)	.021 (.039)	.059 (.034)	.059 (.036)
Attitudes (Scales)				
Economic Progressivism		-.026 (.196)		-.251 (.171)
Cultural Progressivism		**.175*** (.079)		-.014 (.069)
Controls				
Member of Trade Union	-.430 (.306)	-.448 (.309)	**-.661*** (.264)	**-.607*** (.267)
Member of Social Association	-.107 (.496)	-.228 (.501)	.067 (.434)	.050 (.437)
Religious	**1.244***** (.288)	**1.251***** (.290)	**.688**** (.254)	**.658**** (.069)
Age	.001 (.009)	.003 (.009)	**-.016*** (.008)	**-.016*** (.008)
Male	-.177 (.303)	-.216 (.305)	.457 (.258)	.452 (.260)
Constant	**-1.765*** (.822)	**-2.468*** (1.099)	-1.029 (.689)	-.120 (.938)

Source: ESS2008_Belgium   *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001   1 Semi- and Unskilled Manual=reference category

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[15] Only the tables are provided in which the coefficients of the variable social-class (EGP) had been changed significantly after deleting income.

Table 3   *New-left voting in Wallonia with Ecolo as Reference category (without income as independent variable), Multinomial Logistic Regression Model 1 and Model 2 B-coefficients (standard error) (N= 470)*

Independent	CDH (Model 1)	CDH (Model 2)	PS (Model 1)	PS (Model 2)	MR (Model 1)	MR (Model 2)
Main effects						
Social Class (EGP) 1						
Lower Service	.744 (.692)	.770 (.713)	.387 (.620)	.529 (.637)	**1.314*** (.593)	**1.424*** (.617)
Lower Service	-.744 (.535)	-.792 (.542)	**-1.039*** (.482)	**-.986*** (.495)	-.133 (.456)	-.093 (.475)
Routine Clerical/Sales	.663 (.645)	.754 (.646)	.641 (.567)	.712 (.576)	.475 (.555)	.613 (.571)
Skilled Manual	.531 (.980)	.437 (1.001)	.51 (.744)	.489 (.754)	.567 (.762)	.475 (.778)
Years of Education	**-.118*** (.054)	**-.112*** (.055)	**-.153**** (.048)	**-.133**** (.050)	-.093 (.048)	-.074 (.050)
Attitudes (Scales)						
Economic Progressivism		-.519 (.268)		**-.494*** (.242)		**-.745**** (.246)
Cultural Progressivism		-.015 (.111)		-.191 (.100)		**-.204*** (.102)
Controls						
Member of Trade Union	.770 (.409)	**.845*** (.419)	**1.199**** (.356)	**1.293***** (.367)	.538 (.366)	.685 (.379)
Member of Social Association	**-1.122*** (.546)	**-1.119*** (.557)	**-1.015*** (.480)	-.891 (.488)	**-.947*** (.465)	-.841 (.482)
Religious	**1.753***** (.402)	**1.701***** (.404)	.509 (.366)	.450 (.371)	**1.197**** (.363)	**1.108**** (.371)
Age	**.036**** (.012)	**.035**** (.012)	**.033***** (.011)	**.033**** (.011)	.019 (.010)	.017 (.011)
Male	-.217 (.382)	-.216 (.386)	-.040 (.331)	.000 (.336)	.417 (.333)	.462 (.342)
Constant	-.487 (1.103)	1.347 (1.495)	1.278 (.925)	**3.815*** (1.320)	.249 (.937)	**3.695*** (1.341)

Source: ESS2008_Belgium   *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001   1 Semi- and Unskilled Manual=reference category