



HIT AND RUN

Liquid Warfare in the International Military Interventions of
the Gulf (1990-1991) and Kosovo (1999)

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Abstract

In recent years Western state-led military operations have shifted towards remote forms of military interventions. Max Mutschler, Jolle Demmers and Lauren Gould explain this transformation of warfare in their introduced concept of ‘liquid warfare’, which they describe as the moment in military interventions that the conventional ties between war, space and time have become undone. In an attempt to influence the existing debates on the ‘key moment’ from which on military interventions became more ‘liquid’, this research presents evidence for the appearance of ‘liquid warfare’ in the Gulf War (1990-1991) and the Kosovo War (1999). The central question of this research is to what extent ‘liquid warfare’ occurred in the pre-9/11 military interventions in the Gulf and Kosovo. To answer this question in a structured and organized matter, this research established a comprehensive definition of ‘liquid warfare’, which is used as an analytical tool throughout this research. ‘Liquid warfare’ is explained as a combination of (1) a form of military interventionism that has transformed from boots on the ground deployments towards light-footprint military interventions, which can also be described as the use of remote warfare techniques. (2) The vision that remote warfare techniques are used to shun the direct control of territory, focusing instead on the destruction of enemy forces and/or infrastructure, copying certain characteristics of guerrilla warfare, integrating risk-transfer strategies and avoiding order-building and order-maintaining responsibilities.

KEYWORDS

Remote Warfare, Liquid Warfare, Risk–Transfer Warfare, War on Terrorism, Military Interventionism

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INTRODUCTION

*No matter how many instances of white swans we may have observed, this does not justify the conclusion that all swans are white.*¹

- **Karl Popper**

In recent years, the use of airstrikes, drone strikes, unmanned military weapons, and autonomous weapon systems in Western state-led military interventions have been heavily debated amongst scholars in the field of international security studies. Concepts such as ‘remote warfare’ and ‘liquid warfare’ have been introduced with the intention of explaining trends in military interventions in the post-Cold War era.² Remote warfare highlights the vision that there is a transformation within military interventions from boots on the ground towards a light-footprint or more distant type of warfare.³

Liquid warfare, a concept introduced in 2016 by the political scientist Max Mutschler and based on Zygmunt Bauman’s concept of liquid modernity elaborates on the concept of remote warfare and explains how the ‘conventional ties between war, space and time have become undone.’⁴ In their 2018 article, Jolle Demmers and Lauren Gould explain liquid warfare as ‘a form of military interventionism that shuns direct control of territory and populations and its cumbersome order-building and order-maintaining responsibilities, focusing instead on ‘shaping’ the international security environment through remote technology, flexible operations and M2M [military-to-military] partnerships.’⁵ In other words, they argue that there is a shift towards a more remote type of warfare that contributes to the blurred lines of responsibility during assembled military interventions in the post-Cold War era. They see the 9/11 attacks in New York as a key moment for this shift in military interventions since the ‘War against Terrorism’ irreversibly changed the Western state-led military strategies.⁶ The deeper layers of

¹ Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (Routledge: London and New York, 2002), 4.

² Tom Watts and Rubrick Biegon, ‘Defining Remote Warfare: Security Cooperation’, *Remote Control* (2017) <https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/pages/category/conceptual-series-defining-remotewarfare>.

³ Watts and Biegon, ‘Defining Remote Warfare: Security Cooperation’.

⁴ Jolle Demmers and Lauren Gould, ‘An assemblage approach to liquid warfare: AFRICOM and the ‘hunt’ for Joseph Kony’, *Security Dialogue*, vol. 49(5) (2018), 364-381; Max Mutschler, ‘On the road to liquid warfare? Revisiting Zygmunt Bauman's thoughts on liquid modernity in the context of the "new Western way of war"’ (Bonn, 2016), 1-21.

⁵ Demmers and Gould, ‘An assemblage approach to liquid warfare: AFRICOM and the ‘hunt’ for Joseph Kony’, 367.

⁶ *Ibidem.*, 369.

remote warfare and liquid warfare will be further discussed in the chapter 1 of this research paper.

Karl Popper explains that the theory ‘all swans are white’ is true until one black swan has been discovered.⁷ Popper’s vision is that all scientific observations are to refute existing theories rather than to try to confirm them.⁸ In this light, the purpose of this research is to critically observe the introduced concept of liquid warfare, by analysing its ideology from a historical perspective. The research question is: *To what extent can the pre-9/11 Western state-led military interventions in the Persian Gulf (’90-’91) and in Kosovo (’99) be defined as forms of Liquid Warfare with the aim of establishing the historical novelty of this concept in practice and thereby its relevance.*

The ‘mobile turn’ in warfare

Multiple academics in the field of international relations and security studies observe a shift from boots on the ground towards a more light-footprint type of warfare within military interventions. Although, it is generally accepted that this ‘mobile turn’ is a process that has evaluated over time the ‘key moment’ from which on this ‘shift’ started is debated amongst scholars.

Based on Jean Baudrillard’s theory of ‘virtual wars’ and John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt’s concept of the ‘netwar’, Martin Shaw introduced the theory of the ‘new Western way of war’ in his book *The New Western Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and its Crisis in Iraq*.⁹ Shaw explains how recent wars are mainly focused on reducing risks in war situations. He sees the Vietnam War (1955-1975) as a kick-off for this new low-risk type of warfare, which has been optimized in later military interventions such as The Gulf War (1991), the Kosovo War (1999) and the Global War on Terror from Afghanistan (2001) to Iraq (2003).¹⁰ The transformation from boots on the ground into a light-footprint type of warfare is regarded as a positive evolution of war.

Michael Ignatieff vision is to a certain degree in line with Martin Shaw’s vision in suggesting that the war in Kosovo was a key moment from which on wars have become more

⁷ Michiel Leezenberg and Gerard de Vries, *Wetenschapsfilosofie voor geesteswetenschappen* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2012), 81.

⁸ Thomas Trzyna, *Series in the Philosophy of Karl R. Popper and Critical Rationalism* (Leiden Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2017).

⁹ Martin Shaw, *The New Western Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and its Crisis in Iraq* (Cambridge: Polity Press: July, 2005).

¹⁰ Shaw, *The New Western Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and its Crisis in Iraq*, 1.

remote.¹¹ In his work *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond*, Ignatieff argues the war in Kosovo was a virtual war for the NATO Allied Powers, since they fought the war from a distance and viewed its developments on television.¹² Ignatieff sees the war in Kosovo as starting point for risk-transfer wars and the use of new technologies to create distance in warfare.¹³

Based on Foucault's suggestion that 'war has become the pervasive matrix within which social life is constituted',¹⁴ Derek Gregory describes warfare and military interventions since the 9/11 as 'the everywhere war'.¹⁵ In a comparative analysis, he explains the pre- and post-9/11 situation in Afghanistan-Pakistan and US-Mexico. Gregory argues that power 'has been transformed into an unconditional imperative since 9/11 and that this involves an intensifying triangulation of the planet by legality, security and war.'¹⁶ Gregory sees the War on Terror as a key moment from which on the question of legality in warfare has faded away and warfare strategies have changed.¹⁷ Jolle Demmers and Lauren Gould elaborate on Derek Gregory's concept of the everywhere war and Max Mutschler's theory of liquid warfare in their article 'An assemblage approach to liquid warfare: AFRICOM and the 'hunt' for Joseph Kony'.¹⁸ Demmers and Gould introduce their definition of liquid warfare and in line with Gregory, they also explain the events of 9/11 as a turning point for the 'liquidization' of military interventions.¹⁹ They argue that since 9/11 military operations had accelerated, became more flexible and overall lighter.²⁰

Frank Sauer and Niklas Schörnig explain a more futuristic vision when arguing that we are now on the brink of a 'neo-interventionist era'.²¹ According to them military interventions in the future will become smaller, more precise and with a bigger role for new unmanned military technologies.²² These new low 'war-risk' techniques will prevent big wars, but will not

¹¹ Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond* (London, 2000), 3-4.

¹² Ignatieff, *Virtual war: Kosovo and Beyond*, 3-4.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁴ Derek Gregory, 'The everywhere war', *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 177, No. 3 (September 2011), 239.

¹⁵ Gregory, 'The everywhere war', 238.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 247.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 238.

¹⁸ Demmers and Gould, 'An assemblage approach to liquid warfare: AFRICOM and the 'hunt' for Joseph Kony', 365.

Mutschler, 'On the road to liquid warfare? Revisiting Zygmunt Bauman's thoughts on liquid modernity in the context of the "new Western way of war"', 2.

¹⁹ Demmers and Gould, 'An assemblage approach to liquid warfare: AFRICOM and the 'hunt' for Joseph Kony', 369.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 369-370.

²¹ Niklas Schörnig, 'Unmanned Warfare: Towards a Neo-Interventionist Era?', In: B. Giegerich and G. Kümmel (ed.), *The Armed Forces: Towards a Post-Interventionist Era?* (Potsdam: Springer, 2013) 221-236, 223.

²² Frank Sauer and Niklas Schörnig, 'Killer Drones: The Silver Bullet' of Democratic Warfare?', *Security Dialogue* 43, no. 4 (2012), 363-380.

stop the rise of smaller and bloodier -guerrilla like- wars.²³ A vision on which the scholars Bastian Giegerich and Gerhard Kümmel elaborate in their book *The End of the World as We Know It*.²⁴ According to them, the shift towards a light-footprint type of warfare will not lead to fewer military interventions or to peace.²⁵ From now on Western-led military interventions will be more selective and more focused on new technologies to prevent boots on the ground.²⁶

This research agrees with the vision that a shift towards a risk evading light-footprint type of warfare has developed over time. In line with Shaw and Ignatieff, it is argued that in pre-9/11 military interventions already signs can be found for this mobile turn. This research does not deny the impact of 9/11 and recent technological developments on modern warfare, but in contrast to Gregory, Demmers, and Gould, it is argued that liquid warfare occurred in The Gulf War (1990-1991) and the Kosovo War (1999). Chapter 1 will elaborate on the theoretical foundations of liquid warfare.

Methodology

The methodology used is an analysis of two pre-9/11 case studies of the international military interventions in the Gulf (1990-1991) and in Kosovo (1999). These specific post-Cold War cases are chosen because these interventions mark the start and end of the decade that occurred prior to the events of 9/11 and the War on Terror.²⁷

During the United States-led military intervention in the Gulf, heavy airpower was used to force the Iraqi army out of Kuwait.²⁸ Although a victory was claimed by the United States and its allies, the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein stayed in power until 2003. This research investigates whether liquid warfare during this Western state-led military intervention, by analysing academic literature, oral history interviews, newspaper articles, political statements and treaties. In addition, photos and cartoons are used to indicate the presence of liquid warfare in the Gulf.

²³ Schörnig, 'Unmanned Warfare: Towards a Neo-Interventionist Era?', 221-222.

²⁴ Giegerich and Gerhard Kümmel, "'The End of the World as We Know it'!? On Interventionist Overstretch, Post-Interventionism and Neo-Interventionism: An Essayist Introduction', 11-16.

²⁵ Ibid., 11-16.

²⁶ Ibid., 12-13.

²⁷ History, 'A Timeline of the U.S.-Led War on Terror', in: History.com Editors (1 February 2019) <https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/war-on-terror-timeline> (11 June 2020).

²⁸ Michael T. Klare, 'Arms Transfer to Iran and Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 and the Origins of the Gulf War', in: Andrew J. Bacevich, and Efraim Inbar (ed.), *The Gulf War of 1991 Reconsidered* (Taylor and Francis Group, 2002).

The 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo is known as an ‘air war’.²⁹ NATO used airpower to stop Serbian atrocities against Albanian Kosovars. The NATO intervention in Kosovo is analysed to evaluating whether liquid warfare tactics were used. This military intervention is reconstructed by analysing primary and secondary sources. The United Nations Charter and The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Treaty are two important sources that indicate the difficult power constellations during this intervention. Thereafter, news articles, political statements and photos are used to explain whether remote warfare techniques were used and to what extent the use of these techniques led to the avoidance of order-building and order-maintaining responsibilities.

Chapter 1 elaborates on the theoretical background of liquid warfare and a clear definition of liquid warfare is established.

Chapter 2 starts with the historical background previous to the war in the Gulf (1990-1999). It is discussed how the consequences of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) led to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Then, evidence on the use of remote warfare techniques during United States-led operations Desert Storm and Desert Sabre is presented. Furthermore, it is shown how these remote warfare techniques were used to shun direct territory control and minimize casualty risks in warfare. Thereafter, the intervention is linked to the concept of liquid warfare.

Chapter 3 starts with an explanation of how deep-rooted the issues between ethnic Orthodox Christian Serbs and the ethnic Muslim Albanians were. Thereafter, it will be explained how the NATO Operation Allied Force almost exclusively used remote warfare techniques. It will be concluded why the military intervention in Kosovo can be explained as liquid warfare.

In the conclusion it is argued that the pre-9/11 military interventions in the Gulf and Kosovo are examples of military interventions in which liquid warfare occurred. It is also suggested that more research is needed to establish the ‘key moment’ from which military interventions have become more ‘liquidized’.

²⁹ Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s AirWar for Kosovo. A Strategic and Operational Assessment (Prepared for the United States Air Force. Project AIR FORCE. RAND, 2001).

CHAPTER 1

THE ROAD TO LIQUID WARFARE

In order to fully understand the concept of liquid warfare, it is important to return first to the foundations on which this concept has been built. The concept of liquid warfare is based on Zygmunt Bauman's concept of liquid modernity. Bauman's concept of liquid modernity is difficult to fully understand. However, this research tries to explain its core ideology as clearly as possible. The goal is to create a clear understanding of the concept of liquid modernity, so we can, later on, re-evaluate the concept of liquid warfare and come to understandable conclusions.

First, Bauman's changing vision over time and his concept of liquid modernity are explained. Second, the concept of liquid modernity will be linked to the concept of liquid warfare and a clear and workable definition of liquid warfare will be established.

1.1 The concept of liquid modernity

Zygmunt Bauman (1925-2017) was a Polish-British sociologist and philosopher.³⁰ Inspired by the Marxist thinker, Julian Hochfeld, Bauman started his career critically analysing bureaucratic systems and capitalistic global structures.³¹ In his early career, Bauman was a devoted modernist whose work fitted within the framework of the Frankfurt School.³² From 1980 onwards, Bauman's vision on society started to shift towards a turn against modernity.³³ Inspired by the work of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean Baudrillard, and Jean-François Lyotard, he became an advocate of post-modernity. He described the post-modern society as a world in which people try to survive and create meaning by drawing on whatever resources they happen to have.³⁴ In his final publications -from 1999 onwards- Bauman's vision of the post-modern world changed again when he focused on the balance between the solid and the liquid.³⁵ He wrote:

³⁰ Dennis Smith, 'Zygmunt Bauman: Morality, Monsters, Metaphors and Marx', *The Beijing News Book Review* (14th January 2017), 1.

³¹ Dennis Smith, 'The Fateful Adventures of the Good Soldier Bauman. An Appreciation of Zygmunt Bauman (1925–2017)', *Historická sociologie* (January 2017), 11.

³² Smith, 'Zygmunt Bauman: Morality, Monsters, Metaphors and Marx', 2.

³³ *Ibid.*, 3.

³⁴ Dennis Smit, *Zygmunt Bauman - Prophet of Postmodernity* (Cambridge, 1999), 17.

³⁵ Dennis Smith, 'The Fateful Adventures of the Good Soldier Bauman. An Appreciation of Zygmunt Bauman (1925–2017)', *Historická sociologie* (January 2017), 11.

*Fluidity' is the quality of liquids and gases. What distinguishes both of them from solids, as the Encyclopaedia Britannica authoritatively informs us, is that they 'cannot sustain a tangential, or shearing, force when at rest' and so undergo 'a continuous change in shape when subjected to such a stress.'*³⁶

Inspired by the writings of Karl Marx and Friederich Engels, who wrote 'all that is solid melts into air'³⁷, Bauman introduced the concept of 'liquid modernity', which can shortly be explained as our current state of uncertainty.³⁸

In liquid modernity, it is important to understand that modernity –at this moment– is only liquid up to a certain degree, but not fully liquid yet.³⁹ In Bauman's vision, a full modern society is completely liquid. Full liquidity, is something we have not reached yet. All that is not liquid is solid. Solid refers to the existing structures of power that we know, on which we rely, and on which we have built our current societies. Liquidity refers to the process of how we are changing these structures and rebuild them with 'new' modern structures. Bauman describes the period we are in today, as the 'interregnum' which means that we are in a period of transition.⁴⁰ According to Bauman, we know that our current structures no longer work and we are not sure how to change these structures. Structures for the future have not been invented yet and, therefore, we are in a state of uncertainty: a period of liquid modernity.

1.2 Defining liquid warfare

The political scientist Max Mutschler introduced the concept of liquid warfare in 2016.⁴¹ His explanation of liquid warfare is based on Zygmunt Bauman's concept of liquid modernity and is an alternative for Martin Shaw's concept of the new Western way of war.⁴² Mutschler defines liquid warfare as:

³⁶ Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Modernity* (Malden 2000), 1.

³⁷ Karl Marx and Friederich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (Minneapolis: Lerner Publisher Group, Inc., 2018), 4.

³⁸ Zygmunt Bauman, (online lecture) *Liquid Modernity revisited* (8 July 2015), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4QVSisK440w> (4 April 2020).

³⁹ Bauman, *Liquid Modernity revisited*.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Mutschler, 'On the road to liquid warfare? Revisiting Zygmunt Bauman's thoughts on liquid modernity in the context of the "new Western way of war"', 2-19.

⁴² Ibid., 11.

*a way of war that shuns the direct control of territory, focussing instead on the destruction of enemy forces and/or infrastructure, copying certain characteristics of guerrilla warfare.*⁴³

Mutschler explains liquid warfare as a combination of remote warfare tactics and the idea that these tactics are mainly focused on the growth, power, and control of modern democratic states, without them taking responsibility for their actions.⁴⁴ Remote warfare can be explained as ‘a strategy of countering threats at a distance, without the deployment of large military force.’⁴⁵ He sees hit-and-run tactics as a guerrilla-like warfare strategy in which the attacker runs away from its order-building and order-maintaining responsibilities in combat.⁴⁶ During liquid warfare, states use hit-and-run tactics with the goal of stepping away from their responsibilities since they have found more efficient ways to do so.⁴⁷ Mutschler argues that precision-strike warfare has hit-and-run characteristics and can, therefore, be explained as a form of liquid warfare.⁴⁸

Elaborating on Mutschler, Jolle Demmers and Lauren Gould explain that liquid warfare highlights the complicated ties ‘between war, space and time.’⁴⁹ Demmers and Gould define liquid warfare as:

*a form of military interventionism that shuns direct control of territory and populations and its cumbersome order-building and order-maintaining responsibilities, focusing instead on ‘shaping’ the international security environment through remote technology, flexible operations and M2M [military-to-military] partnerships.*⁵⁰

In other words, Demmers and Gould argue that the shift towards remote warfare contributes to growing hit-and-run tactics and the blurred lines of responsibility during military interventions in the post-Cold War era.

⁴³ Ibid., 2.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 11.

⁴⁵ Watts and Biegon, ‘Defining Remote Warfare: Security Cooperation’, 1.

⁴⁶ Mutschler, ‘On the road to liquid warfare? Revisiting Zygmunt Bauman's thoughts on liquid modernity in the context of the "new Western way of war"’, 3.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 8-10.

⁴⁸ Mutschler, ‘On the road to liquid warfare? Revisiting Zygmunt Bauman's thoughts on liquid modernity in the context of the "new Western way of war"’, 2.

⁴⁹ Demmers and Gould, ‘An assemblage approach to liquid warfare: AFRICOM and the ‘hunt’ for Joseph Kony’, 366.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 367.

The definitions as presented by Mutschler, Demmers and Gould are closely linked to one another. This research combines these definitions complemented with Martin Shaw's concept of 'risk-transfer warfare'.⁵¹ According to Shaw, post-Cold War military interventions are focused on reducing 'risk' and 'casualties' to create a pro-war public opinion.⁵² Risk-transfer warfare is added to the definition since this strategy has led to the creation of more distance and remote warfare tactics during military interventions in the post-Cold War era. The presented definition will be used as a guideline throughout this research. Based on existing literature, this research defines liquid warfare as a combination of the following two elements:

- (1) A form of military interventionism that has transformed from boots on the ground deployments towards light-footprint military interventions. This phenomenon can also be described as remote warfare and includes the use of airstrikes, drone strikes, precision-strikes, unmanned military weapons, autonomous weapon systems, special forces, private contractors, military-to-military (M2M) training operations on the ground.
- (2) The vision that these remote warfare techniques are used during military interventions to shun the direct control of territory, focussing instead on the destruction of enemy forces and/or infrastructure, copying certain characteristics of guerrilla warfare, integrating risk-transfer strategies and avoiding order-building and order-maintaining responsibilities.

The established definition is a comprehensive and workable definition that can be used as a starting point for further research. In order to conclude whether liquid warfare occurred during a certain military intervention, both pillars (1) + (2) need to be checked. In referring back to Bauman's vision that liquidity is the process of changing the existing structures, this research contributes to the existing debates by searching for liquidity in warfare. Therefore, in the continuation of this research it will be investigated to what extent pillar (1) + (2) of the established definition on liquid warfare occurred during the pre-9/11 military interventions in the Gulf (1990-1991) and in Kosovo (1999).

⁵¹ Martin Shaw, 'Risk-Transfer Militarism, Small Massacres and the Historic Legitimacy of War', *Department of International Relations* (London, 2002), 343.

⁵² Shaw, 'Risk-Transfer Militarism, Small Massacres and the Historic Legitimacy of War', 343.

CHAPTER 2

THE GULF WAR, 1990-1991



Figure 1
Map of the Persian Gulf region.⁵³

⁵³ ResearchGate, 'Map of the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea and Neighboring Countries'
https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Map-of-the-Persian-Gulf-the-Caspian-Sea-and-Neighboring-Countries-The-Courtesy-of_fig1_228406886 (10 May 2020).

2.1 Historical context of The Gulf War

This chapter lays out the historical context of the events that led up to the 1990-1991 Gulf War. First, the historical context is explained. Second, The Gulf War and the Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Desert Sabre are discussed. Third, it is investigated to what extent pillar (1) + (2) occur during the military intervention in the Gulf.

The Iran-Iraq War and its consequences 1980-1988

In the late 1980s, the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein feared for an Iranian Shia revolution in the Sunni Arab states.⁵⁴ To protect the Arab states, Hussein started a war against the Iranian revolutionists.⁵⁵ According to professor of peace and security studies Michael Klare, Iraq was successful in this war since it was able to import three times more weapons than Iran.⁵⁶ Suppliers heavily influenced the course of this war and Iraq's biggest suppliers were the Soviet Union (USSR), the United States (US) and France. That the USSR and the US stood on the same side, was unique in the Cold War period. The reason for this was that both the USSR and the US feared the revolutionary Iranians.⁵⁷ The US contributed to the Iraqi army by selling them trucks and helicopters, and in 1983 Operation Staunch was launched. This operation promoted the weapon sale to Iraq and attempted to stop the weapon flow to Iran.⁵⁸ Israel and North Korea kept supporting the Iranian revolutionists.⁵⁹

By the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq came out as victor since it had the strongest weaponry. In total, 367,000 people died and over 700,000 were wounded during this war.⁶⁰ To achieve its victory, Iraq had borrowed about US\$50 billion from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.⁶¹ Kuwait and Saudi Arabia agreed to lend this massive sum, since Iraq was protecting the lower Gulf state against the Shia revolutionaries from Teheran. When Iraq won the war, Hussein believed that the Iraqi billion-dollar loans that were used to buy military equipment would be remitted as a reward for fighting the war against Iran and protecting the Arabic states.⁶²

⁵⁴ Anthony Tucker-Jones, *The Gulf War: Operation Desert Storm 1990-1991* (2014), 14.

⁵⁵ Tucker-Jones, *The Gulf War: Operation Desert Storm 1990-1991*, 14.

⁵⁶ Michael T. Klare, 'Arms Transfer to Iran and Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 and the Origins of the Gulf War', in: Andrew J. Bacevich, and Efraim Inbar (ed.), *The Gulf War of 1991 Reconsidered* (Taylor and Francis Group, 2002), 4.

⁵⁷ Klare, 'Arms Transfer to Iran and Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 and the Origins of the Gulf War', 7.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁵⁹ Douglas Little, 'George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War, "Beyond Containment" in the Middle East', in: Douglas Little (ed.), *US versus Them: The United States, Radical Islam, and the Rise of the Green Threat* (University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 54.

⁶⁰ Klare, 'Arms Transfer to Iran and Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 and the Origins of the Gulf War', 6.

⁶¹ Tucker-Jones, *The Gulf War: Operation Desert Storm 1990-1991*, 14.

⁶² Klare, 'Arms Transfer to Iran and Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 and the Origins of the Gulf War', 5.

Unfortunately for Hussein, this was not the case. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait demanded their money back.

For Iraq, the economic consequences of the Iran-Iraq war were enormous and Saddam Hussein blamed Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Kuwait for these consequences.⁶³ In 1990, Hussein said: ‘Let the Gulf regimes know that if they do not give this money to me, I will know how to get it.’⁶⁴ He also threatened Israel by saying that he would ‘burn half of Israel with chemical weapons’.⁶⁵ Shortly before Iraq invaded Kuwait, Hussein charged the Kuwaitis with crimes against the Iraqi people.⁶⁶ According to Hussein, the Kuwaitis had consistently exceeded their Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) production quotas, which had led to a drop in the oil prices globally and had an enormous impact on the Iraqi oil export.⁶⁷ Hussein accused the Kuwaitis of systematically stealing oil from Iraqi territory.⁶⁸ And most importantly, it was a sin that the Kuwaitis would not convert their loans into a gift since Iraq had protected Kuwait.⁶⁹

Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Desert Sabre

In October 1989, the president of the United States, George H. W. Bush, signed a National Security Directive (NSD-26) that called for closer relations between the US and Iraq.⁷⁰ Saddam Hussein thought that he was on good terms with the US and that, therefore, he could continue his aggressive acts.⁷¹ On 2 August 1990, 140,000 Iraqi soldiers and 1,800 Iraqi tanks crossed the Kuwaiti border.⁷² The Kuwaiti army could only resist the Iraqi army for a couple of hours.⁷³ The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reacted immediately and resolution 660, demanding that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait and start diplomatic negotiations, was adopted with 14 votes in favour and one abstention.⁷⁴ Iraq did not respond to the UNSC and on 28 August

⁶³ Tucker-Jones, *The Gulf War: Operation Desert Storm 1990-1991*, 13.

⁶⁴ Klare, ‘Arms Transfer to Iran and Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 and the Origins of the Gulf War’, 15.

⁶⁵ Andrew J. Bacevich, and Efraim Inbar (ed.), *The Gulf War of 1991 Reconsidered* (Taylor and Francis Group, 2002), 67.

⁶⁶ Klare, ‘Arms Transfer to Iran and Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 and the Origins of the Gulf War’, 14.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁶⁸ Andere Tijden, ‘De Golfoorlog. Het conflict dat nooit ophield’ (19 April 2017)

<https://www.anderetijden.nl/artikel/341/De-Golfoorlog> (23 May 2020).

⁶⁹ Klare, ‘Arms Transfer to Iran and Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 and the Origins of the Gulf War’, 14.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 20

⁷² Tucker-Jones, *The Gulf War: Operation Desert Storm 1990-1991*, 14.

⁷³ Andere Tijden, ‘De Golfoorlog. Het conflict dat nooit ophield’ (19 April 2017)

<https://www.anderetijden.nl/artikel/341/De-Golfoorlog> (23 May 2020).

⁷⁴ UNSCR, ‘Resolution 660: Iraq-Kuwait’ (2 August 1990), <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/660> (5 June 2020).

1990 Kuwait was officially annexed and announced an Iraqi province.⁷⁵ Although Hussein was on good terms with the US, Saudi Arabia's security continued to be a top priority for the West since it had has one of the largest oil reserves in the world.⁷⁶

During diplomatic peace talks, Iraq stated that it would only leave Kuwait if Syria left Lebanon and Israel, the Gaza strip.⁷⁷ Worried by a possible security threat to Saudi Arabia, on 7 August 1990 the US-led Operation Desert Shield was started as an international military coalition with the main goal of protecting the Saudi border from a possible Iraqi invasion.⁷⁸ The operation was led by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf and 34 countries contributed to it, of which the largest contributing allies were the United Kingdom, France, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Qatar, and Syria.⁷⁹ UNSC resolution 678, which was passed on 29 November 1990, set the ultimatum that Iraq had to leave Kuwait before 15 January 1991.⁸⁰ The UNSC asked repeatedly for an Iraqi withdrawal, but when Hussein refused to leave Kuwait the Allied Operations Desert Storm and Desert Sabre were launched.⁸¹

2.2 Liquid Warfare in the Gulf

This paragraph analyses to what extent pillars (1) + (2) of the established definition of liquid warfare occurred in the 1990-1991 military intervention in the Gulf.

First, it is investigated whether the operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Desert Sabre were light-footprint military interventions by using remote warfare tactics. Thereafter, it will be laid out how remote warfare techniques were used to shun the direct control of territory, focused instead on the destruction of enemy forces and/or infrastructure, copying certain characteristics of guerrilla warfare, integrating risk-transfer strategies and avoiding order-building and order-maintaining responsibilities.

Pillar 1: the use of remote warfare techniques in the Gulf

Iraq's annexation of Kuwait and the threat of an invasion of Saudi Arabia –with its valuable oilfields– was intolerable for the West.⁸² On 7 August 1990, Operation Desert Shield was

⁷⁵ Tucker-Jones, *The Gulf War: Operation Desert Storm 1990-1991*, 14.

⁷⁶ Tucker-Jones, *The Gulf War: Operation Desert Storm 1990-1991*, 14.

⁷⁷ Andere Tijden, 'De Golfoorlog. Het conflict dat nooit ophield' (19 April 2017) <https://www.anderetijden.nl/artikel/341/De-Golfoorlog> (23 May 2020).

⁷⁸ Tucker-Jones, *The Gulf War: Operation Desert Storm 1990-1991*, 16-17

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 16-17.

⁸⁰ UNSCR, 'Resolution 678: Iraq-Kuwait' (29 November 1990), <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/678> (5 June 2020).

⁸¹ Tucker-Jones, *The Gulf War: Operation Desert Storm 1990-1991*, 17.

⁸² Shaw, 'Chapter 1: The New Western Way from Vietnam to Iraq' 42.

launched as a massive multi-national effort to defend the Saudi border.⁸³ The United States, France, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria and Egypt contributed troops, weaponry, and aircraft to the operation.⁸⁴ On the Iraqi side, Hussein prepared for a ground war which he called the Kuwaiti Theatre of Operations (KTO).⁸⁵ According to estimations of the Allied Forces, KTO consisted of 540,000 men, 4,000 tanks, 2,700 armoured carriers and 300,000 pieces of artillery.⁸⁶ Desert Shield was an operation that would protect the Saudi border and threaten the Iraqi army so they would leave Kuwait. In returning back to the question whether remote warfare techniques were used during this operation, it has to be acknowledged that in Operation Desert Shield no remote warfare techniques were used. Like the name reveals, Desert Shield was an operation to shield Saudi Arabia.

When Iraq had no intention of leaving Kuwait, the operation transferred into the massive air war of Operation Desert Storm. Operation Desert Storm was, and still is, the biggest air war that Western states have fought since the Vietnam War.⁸⁷ The historian Anthony Tucker-Jones argues that Hussein did not feel threatened by an air war since he had faith in the Iraqi air force that had withstood eight years of fighting in the Iran-Iraq war.⁸⁸ Tucker-Jones explains that Iraq had a modern air defence system that consisting of 700 aircraft excluding military helicopters.⁸⁹ When Operation Desert Storm started, the Allied Forces almost exclusively used airpower against the Iraqi troops.⁹⁰ Major Kenneth Rizer, who was an Air Force fighter pilot and commander during the war in the Gulf, gives a clear description of what types of weapons were used during Operation Desert Storm.⁹¹

*The combination of stealth technology, PGMs [precision-guided missiles], and satellite-aided navigation allowed precision attack as never before. Despite dropping 88,000 tons of bombs in the 43-day air campaign, only 3,000 civilians died directly as a result of the attacks, the lowest number of deaths from a major bombing campaign in the history of warfare.*⁹²

⁸³ Tucker-Jones, *The Gulf War: Operation Desert Storm 1990-1991*, 15.

⁸⁴ Little, 'George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War, "Beyond Containment" in the Middle East', 76.

⁸⁵ Tucker-Jones, *The Gulf War: Operation Desert Storm 1990-1991*, 27.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁸⁷ Shaw, 'Chapter 1: The New Western Way from Vietnam to Iraq', 14.

⁸⁸ Tucker-Jones, *The Gulf War: Operation Desert Storm 1990-1991*, 39.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 39.

⁹⁰ Shaw, 'Chapter 1: The New Western Way from Vietnam to Iraq', 15.

⁹¹ Kenneth Rizer, 'Bombing Dual-Use Targets: Legal, Ethical, and Doctrinal Perspectives', in: *Air and Space Power Chronicles* (2001) <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Chronicles/Rizer.pdf> (30 May 2020).

⁹² Rizer, 'Bombing Dual-Use Targets: Legal, Ethical, and Doctrinal Perspectives'.

During the operation, the US-air force launched 62 B-52 bombers; these extreme violent bombs were used in the Vietnam War and ‘were responsible for 30 percent of the tonnage dropped’ in the Gulf.⁹³ The Iraqi air defence system was ‘quickly and efficiently smashed into pieces’.⁹⁴ In no time ‘vital air superiority over Kuwait and Iraq was achieved within just twenty-four hours of the first attacks. The Iraqi Air Force was shot out of the sky, destroyed on the ground or fled’.⁹⁵ In the six weeks that followed, approximately 35,000 Allied sorties were launched through airstrikes, precision bombings and large-scale use of smart weapons and cruise missiles.⁹⁶ Kenneth Rizer’s description of the use of stealth technology, airstrikes and precision strikes during Operation Desert Storm combined with other evidence that shows the extensive use of airstrikes and smart bombs, it can be said that this operation was almost exclusively fought from a distance. When comparing the presented evidence to the description of pillar (1), this research argues that remote warfare techniques were used during Operation Desert Storm.

When Iraqi forces started to systematically wreck the Kuwaiti oil fields, General Schwarzkopf initiated a fast war to protect the Kuwaiti vital oilfields which is known as Operation Desert Sabre.⁹⁷ On 24 February 1991, the operation was launched as a combined air, ground, and sea assault that overwhelmed Hussein’s army within 100 hours.⁹⁸ On 26 February Iraq announced that it accepted UNSC resolution 660 and that the Iraqi army would retreat from Kuwait City to the Iraqi city of Barga.⁹⁹ Iraq’s acceptance of resolution 660 was not enough for the Allied forces, who decided to drop cluster bombs and hundreds of sorties on the retreating Iraqi convoy.¹⁰⁰ The incident was widely published in the media and became known as the Highway of Death.¹⁰¹ Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the impact of Allied air attacks on the retreating Iraqi troops– the Highway of Death.

⁹³ Tucker-Jones, *The Gulf War: Operation Desert Storm 1990-1991*, 42.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁹⁶ Shaw, ‘Chapter 1: The New Western Way from Vietnam to Iraq’, 15.

⁹⁷ Tucker-Jones, *The Gulf War: Operation Desert Storm 1990-1991*, 78.

⁹⁸ Rare Historical Photos, ‘The Death of an Iraqi soldier, Highway of Death, 1991’

<https://rarehistoricalphotos.com/dont-photograph-people-like-mom-will-think-war-see-tv-gulf-war-1991/> (2 June 2020).

⁹⁹ Shaw, ‘Chapter 1: The New Western Way from Vietnam to Iraq’, 16.

¹⁰⁰ Rick Atkinson, ‘A MERCIFUL CLEMENCY’: SCENES OF ENEMY SLAUGHTERED IN RETREAT PERSUADED POWELL TO PUT BRAKES ON WAR’ in: *The Washington Post* (5 October 1993)

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/10/05/a-merciful-clemency-scenes-of-enemy-slaughtered-in-retreat-persuaded-powell-to-put-brakes-on-war/c2f7bb5b-8d0d-45dd-8fa3-60fd13ddabe2/> (25 May 2020).

¹⁰¹ Atkinson, ‘A MERCIFUL CLEMENCY’: SCENES OF ENEMY SLAUGHTERED IN RETREAT PERSUADED POWELL TO PUT BRAKES ON WAR’.



Figure 2
The result of Allied air bombing on retreating Iraqi troops, Kuwait 1991.¹⁰²




Figure 3
Death of an Iraqi soldier on the Highway of Death, 1991.¹⁰³

¹⁰² Rare Historical Photos, 'Highway of Death, the result of American forces bombing retreating Iraqi forces, Kuwait, 1991', <https://rarehistoricalphotos.com/highway-death-in-pictures-1991/> (2 June 2020).

¹⁰³ Rare Historical Photos, 'The Death of an Iraqi soldier, Highway of Death, 1991' <https://rarehistoricalphotos.com/dont-photograph-people-like-mom-will-think-war-see-tv-gulf-war-1991/> (2 June 2020).

Early in the morning on 27 February 1991, Joint Chief of Staff Chairman General Colin Powell and other Pentagon officials officiated a crisis meeting concerning the war in the Gulf.¹⁰⁴ In an interview, Colin Powell reacted to the incident.

*'We also were starting to see some scenes that were unpleasant. The 'highway of death'...it may be a horrible name to give it and sort of gives it an emotional contact, but that's what the press was calling it. At the so-called "highway of death" where people were just being slaughtered as our planes went up and down.'*¹⁰⁵

The same day at 9 p.m., President Bush declared the cessation of hostilities and said: 'Kuwait is liberated. Iraq's army is defeated. Our military objectives are met.'¹⁰⁶ Operation Desert Sabre was initially a combined air, sea, and ground assault, but in the end it were the Allied air attacks on the retreating Iraqi troops that led to a change of mind and a reconsideration of the war strategy amongst its decision-makers. To repeat a sentence from Powell's statement above: 'people were just being slaughtered as our planes went up and down.'¹⁰⁷ In this short operation that only lasted 100 hours, it were these airstrikes that changed the course of the war. The remote warfare techniques used in Desert Sabre changed the media reports on the war and as a consequence the public support for an Allied intervention in the Gulf dropped.¹⁰⁸ Within a day, the Bush administration and its allies changed their mind and swiftly searched for an exit strategy.¹⁰⁹

Pillar 2: remote warfare and power constellations in the Gulf

In August 1990, in a reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, President H. W. Bush spoke the words: 'If history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it will destroy our

¹⁰⁴ Atkinson, 'A MERCIFUL CLEMENCY': SCENES OF ENEMY SLAUGHTERED IN RETREAT PERSUADED POWELL TO PUT BRAKES ON WAR'.

¹⁰⁵ PBS, 'Frontline oral history: Colin Powell', <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/powell/1.html> (26 May 2020).

¹⁰⁶ Atkinson, 'A MERCIFUL CLEMENCY': SCENES OF ENEMY SLAUGHTERED IN RETREAT PERSUADED POWELL TO PUT BRAKES ON WAR'.

¹⁰⁷ PBS, 'Frontline oral history: Colin Powell'.

¹⁰⁸ Marvin Kalb, 'A View from the Press', in: W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz (ed.), *Taken by Storm* (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1994).

¹⁰⁹ Atkinson, 'A MERCIFUL CLEMENCY': SCENES OF ENEMY SLAUGHTERED IN RETREAT PERSUADED POWELL TO PUT BRAKES ON WAR'.

freedoms.¹¹⁰ The Bush administration started a campaign to convince the public that an international military intervention in Kuwait was necessary.¹¹¹ In line with this campaign, the Congressional Human Rights Caucus organized a hearing off the first-hand witnesses to the Iraqi invasion in Kuwait. The most compelling testimony came from an anonymous 15-year-old girl. ‘While I was there, I saw the Iraqi soldiers come into the hospital with guns. They took the babies out of the incubators, took the incubators and left the children to die on the cold floor!’¹¹² Chair of the commission John Porter responded: ‘We have never heard in all this time, in all circumstances, a record of inhumanity and brutality and sadism as the ones that the witnesses have given us today.’¹¹³ In the weeks that followed, President Bush repeated the testimonies and said: ‘We’re dealing with Hitler revisited, a totalitarianism and a brutality that is naked and unprecedented in modern times! And that must not stand!’¹¹⁴ In this campaign that had the goal of convincing the public to support a military intervention in the Gulf, Saddam Hussein was completely demonized.¹¹⁵ Demonizing the Iraqi enemy was a smart move according to *Washington Post* journalist Marjorie Williams.¹¹⁶ She remarked that ‘The administration and the American media have done a brilliant job, as the image-makers might say, of driving up his negatives.’¹¹⁷ In referring to pillar (2) of the definition of liquid warfare, it is clear that on the outside the military operation in the Gulf was not to gain direct territory control. The mission was presented as a humanitarian intervention to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi enemy and to stop the Iraqi crimes against humanity.

Only later it was discovered that the anonymous witness in the Human Right Caucus hearing was the daughter of the Kuwaiti Ambassador in the US and that she could not have actually witnessed the horrific events she had described.¹¹⁸ In this light, the US interest in

¹¹⁰ Speech George H. W. Bush, ‘IF HISTORY TEACHES US ANYTHING, IT IS THAT WE MUST RESIST AGGRESSION’, in *The Washington Post* (8 August 1990) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/08/09/if-history-teaches-us-anything-it-is-that-we-must-resist-aggression/0921e68f-ee48-4860-a05e-b9cdf2bb4d89/> (6 June 2020).

¹¹¹ Eamonn Matthews, ‘The Gulf War (1990 1991)’ *FRONTLINE documentary* (1996-1997) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NsClgHBFs10> (15 May 2020).

¹¹² Witness in: PBS ‘Frontline transcript documentary’ https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/script_a.html (25 May 2020).

¹¹³ John Porter in: PBS ‘Frontline transcript documentary’ https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/script_a.html (25 May 2020).

¹¹⁴ George H. W. Bush in: PBS ‘Frontline transcript documentary’ https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/script_a.html (25 May 2020).

¹¹⁵ William A. Dorman and Steven Livingston, ‘News and Historical Content. The Establishing Phase of the Persian Gulf Policy Debate’, in: w. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz (ed.), *Taken by Storm* (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1994).

¹¹⁶ Dorman and Livingston, ‘News and Historical Content’, 72.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 72.

¹¹⁸ PBS ‘Frontline transcript documentary’ https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/script_a.html (25 May 2020).

‘liberating’ Kuwait could not only be motivated out of moral justice, disgust for dictators, or to establish a free and democratic Kuwait. Why did the US and its European and Middle Eastern allies wanted to intervene in the Gulf? The presence of oil in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia is a frequently presented vision, but according to Professor William Dorman and Professor Steve Livingston it is not logic that a ‘near-bankrupt Iraq, whose only source of revenue is oil, seek to cut off tis supply to its most lucrative customer, the West?’¹¹⁹ According to them, Bush seemed set on the option of a war from the beginning.¹²⁰ The political scientist John Mueller agrees with this vision and argues that the most plausible reason for this war was that the Bush administration wanted to kick-out the Vietnam syndrome.¹²¹ After the Vietnam War, the media and the public developed a cynicism towards politicians and wars in general.¹²² Bush was keen to change this cynical attitude.¹²³ On the surface the pro-war campaigning had reached its goal of gaining public support for a ‘liberation’ of Kuwait. Below the surface, underlying power structures and secret secondary goals had a major contribution to the run-up of this war.

When Operation Desert Storm started, the Allied Forces targeted all Iraqi command and control posts, to destroy all lines of communication and to ‘hunt down every piece of Iraqi military equipment they could find’.¹²⁴ This massive use of airpower is evidence that the intervention in the Gulf was focussed on the complete destruction of the Iraqi army, its military centres and infrastructure. By almost exclusively using remote warfare techniques, the Allied forces used a risk-transfer war strategy to minimize casualties on the Allied side. Within just 24 hours the Allied Forces had crushed the Iraqi air defence system.¹²⁵ The question remains why the Allied Forces continued this war for six more weeks. John Mueller explains that the war took so long due to power constellations and framing.¹²⁶ The war in the Gulf was a perfect war, since ‘the Americans gave a war and no one showed up’.¹²⁷ Mueller explains that the Iraqi army never really wanted to fight and that Iraqi army numbers had been exaggerated to create

¹¹⁹ Dorman and Livingston, ‘News and Historical Content’, 75

¹²⁰ Ibid., 75.

¹²¹ Shaw, ‘Chapter 1: The New Western Way from Vietnam to Iraq’, 13.

¹²² Robert M. Entman and Benjamin I. Page, ‘The News before the Storm. The Iraq War Debate and the Limits to Media Independence’, in: W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz (ed.), *Taken by Storm* (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1994), 83.

¹²³ Entman and Page, ‘The News before the Storm’, 83.

¹²⁴ Tucker-Jones, *The Gulf War: Operation Desert Storm 1990-1991*, 17.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 41.

¹²⁶ John Mueller, ‘The Perfect Enemy: Assessing the Gulf War’, in: *SECURITY STUDIES* 5, no. 1 (1995), 106.

¹²⁷ Mueller, ‘The Perfect Enemy: Assessing the Gulf War’, 106.

the perfect war and victory.¹²⁸ BBC reporter in Iraq John Simpson confirms that the Iraqi people were not willing to fight.¹²⁹

*'The population of Iraq as a whole had no interest in Saddam's holy war and simply wanted to be left alone to get on with their lives in peace.' Most people, he concludes, 'wanted to say exactly the same thing: how they hated the system in Iraq and the man who had created it, how wrong they felt the invasion of Kuwait had been, how crazy they thought the decision to oppose the West was.' During the nearly five months he spent in Baghdad, 'not a single Iraqi had defended Saddam Hussein to me in private, with the exception of two or three ministers and officials whose fate was closely bound up with Saddam's own.' In result, Hussein took 'an almost entirely unwilling country into war.'*¹³⁰

The Iraqi people did not want to fight and still, the war was being fought. And despite the extensive bombardments, large troop concentrations and, the loss of over a hundred-thousand Iraqi lives, the war still remained popular in Western countries.¹³¹

A reason for this popularity can be found in the pro-war media that constantly broadcasted the events of the war as if it was a theatre.¹³² In 1991 the sociologist Jean Baudrillard wrote *La Guerre du Golfe n'a pas eu lieu* (The Gulf War Did Not Take Place).¹³³ Baudrillard argues that The Gulf War was not a 'normal' war in the sense that the war was a battle between two equal adversaries that would result in a change.¹³⁴ Instead, he argues, this war was a media spectacle that suddenly stopped out of fear for Vietnam scenarios.¹³⁵ Although the media reported that the Allied Powers had won the war, Hussein remained in power.¹³⁶ The Allied powers planned an operation to liberate Kuwait, but did not think about an exit strategy and/or a post-war settlement.¹³⁷ It can be said that the Allied forces used a disproportional guerrilla-like warfare strategy in the Gulf and when the public opinion suddenly chanced, its

¹²⁸ Mueller, 'The Perfect Enemy: Assessing the Gulf War', 108.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 108-109.

¹³⁰ John Simpson's quoted in: James Carroll, *House of War: The Pentagon and the Disastrous Rise of American Power* (Boston-New York, June 2006), 182.

¹³¹ Shaw, 'Chapter 1: The New Western Way from Vietnam to Iraq', 18.

¹³² Jean Baudrillard, *La Guerre du Golfe n'a pas eu lieu* (1991).

¹³³ Ole Berthelsen, 'The Gulf War Did Not Take Place by Jean Baudrillard', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 35, no. 3. Special Issue on Environmental Conflict (May, 1998), 402

¹³⁴ Berthelsen, 'The Gulf War Did Not Take Place by Jean Baudrillard', 402.

¹³⁵ Shaw, 'Chapter 1: The New Western Way from Vietnam to Iraq', 14.

¹³⁶ Stephen Pfohl, 'The Gulf War Did Not Take Place. By Jean Baudrillard and Paul Patton', *Contemporary Sociology*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (March, 1997), 138-140.

¹³⁷ Thomas G. Mahnken, 'A squandered Opportunity? The Decision to End the Gulf War', in: Andrew J. Bacevich, and Efraim Inbar (ed.), *The Gulf War of 1991 Reconsidered* (Taylor and Francis Group, 2002), 121.

decision-makers ran away from their order-building and order- maintaining responsibilities. ‘It was an unnecessary war that had been motivated solely by the high ideas to which its promoters appealed, then it would simply have been a terrible and tragic mistake for which its planners and promoters might nevertheless be excused or forgiven. It was not a mistake, but a crime.’¹³⁸

2.3 Conclusion

In the operations of Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Desert Sabre the Allied forces almost exclusively used air power against the Iraqi ground forces. During the Gulf War, the Allied forces launched 35,000 sorties in airstrikes, precision airstrikes, stealth technology, precision-guided missiles, satellite aided navigation.¹³⁹ And although Operation Desert Sabre was a short combined air, ground and sea assault, it were the air attacks that decided the course of the war. The war in the Gulf was a light-footprint intervention that can also be described as a remote warfare operation.

Prior to the war, the Bush administration demonized their enemy and actively promoted the war. The use of false testimonies, and the pro-war media all helped to create a ‘perfect’ war situation, which would mean that the war was almost impossible to lose and that it would erase the shameful memories of the Vietnam War once and for all. This research proved that in the Gulf War remote warfare techniques were used to shun the direct control of territory and that the mission was focussed instead on the total destruction of the Iraqi army and the Iraqi infrastructure. Guerrilla warfare and risk-transfer war strategies were used with the goal of avoiding order-building and order-maintaining responsibilities. When the public opinion on the war changed, the US and its allies were fast in finding an exit strategy.

This research has shown evidence of both pillars (1) + (2) of the definition of liquid warfare in the Gulf War. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 1990-1991 military intervention in the Gulf is an example of liquid warfare.

¹³⁸ Jeff McMahan and Robert McKim, ‘The Just War and the Gulf War’, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* Vol. 23, No. 4 (1993), 541.

¹³⁹ Rizer, ‘Bombing Dual-Use Targets: Legal, Ethical, and Doctrinal Perspectives’.

CHAPTER 3

THE KOSOVO WAR, 1998-1999



Figure 4
Map of Kosovo.¹⁴⁰

¹⁴⁰ Benjamin S. Lambeth, *NATO's AirWar for Kosovo. A Strategic and Operational Assessment* (Prepared for the United States Air Force. Project AIR FORCE. RAND, 2001), 1.

3.1 Historical context of the Kosovo War

Before diving into Operation Allied Force, which was executed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Kosovo in 1999, this research lays out the historical context of the deep-rooted issues between the ethnic Orthodox Christian Serbs and the ethnic Muslim Albanians. Different interpretations of historical events and rising nationalism around the Balkan region led to the 1998 Kosovo crisis, in which both Serbs and Albanians claimed the right to rule over the Kosovo region.¹⁴¹

First, the historical context will be explained. Second, the events of the Kosovo War and Operation Allied Force will be discussed. Third, the military intervention in Kosovo will be linked to pillars (1) + (2) of the definition of liquid warfare.

A deep-rooted problem: Kosovo or Kosova

The Serbs claim that the land of Kosovo-Methoija is the spiritual centre and living heart of the Orthodox Christian Serbian state which was founded in the late 12th century.¹⁴² They argue that when their ancestors arrived in the region, only small ethnic groups without any forms of meaningful organization lived in the area.¹⁴³ During the 1389 Battle of Kosovo, the Serbs lost their holy land to the Ottoman Turks, which they considered an extremely painful loss.¹⁴⁴ Only after the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), were the Serbs able to take back the area they regarded as their cultural birth place and the cradle of their civilization.¹⁴⁵

The Muslim Albanians, on the other hand, argue that they traditionally have the right to rule over the land that they call Kosova, since their ancestors were the first people who lived on the land.¹⁴⁶ They claim to be related to the Paleo-Balkan population of the Illyrians, who had settled in the Kosova region around the sixth century.¹⁴⁷ The Albanians lived peacefully on the land until the Serbs started to oppress, colonize and kill the indigenous people living there.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴¹ Carole Rogel, 'Kosovo: Where It All Began', in: *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2003), 168-169.

¹⁴² Zidas Daskalovski, 'Claims to Kosovo: Nationalism and Self-Determination', in: Florian Bieber, Zidas Daskalovski (ed.), *UNDERSTANDING the WAR in KOSOVO* (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005), 12-13.

¹⁴³ Daskalovski, 'Claims to Kosovo: Nationalism and Self-Determination', 20.

¹⁴⁴ Rogel, 'Kosovo: Where It All Began', 169.

¹⁴⁵ Ved P. Nanda, 'Legal Implications of NATO's Armed Intervention in Kosovo', in: Michael N. Schmitt (ed.), *International Law Studies*, Vol. 75: International Law Across the Spectrum of Conflict (2000), 314.

¹⁴⁶ Dejan Guzin, 'Kosovo or Kosova – Could It Be Both? The Case of Interlocking Serbians and Albanian Nationalism', in: Florian Bieber, Zidas Daskalovski (ed.), *UNDERSTANDING the WAR in KOSOVO* (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005), 29-30.

¹⁴⁷ Daskalovski, 'Claims to Kosovo: Nationalism and Self-Determination', 20.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 20.

Serbia does not agree with the Albanian version of history and argues that there is no existing link between the Illyrians and the Albanians.¹⁴⁹

The line between history and myths is thin. The Serbs and Albanians both turned their interpretations of history into a nationalistic claim to the right to rule Kosovo.¹⁵⁰ This twin claim on the land of Kosovo explains how deeply rooted the problems were during the 1998-1999 Kosovo War.

The Kosovo War and Operation Allied Force

In 1946, the Communist leader Marshal Josip Broz Tito established the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, which in 1963 was renamed the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).¹⁵¹ The SFRY consisted of the six states of Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia. The Serbian province of Kosovo was given the status of autonomous region within Serbia.¹⁵² In 1974, the Serbian nationalist president Slobodan Milosevic started to withdraw Kosovo's self-governing rights and after Marshal Tito's death in 1980, Milosevic considered Kosovo as part of Serbia.¹⁵³

In the late 1980s, the tension between the ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo region rose and nationalist feelings returned.¹⁵⁴ Kosovo had a population of two million people and, 90 per cent of them had Albanian roots.¹⁵⁵ In the year 1995, a civil war started when ethnic violence had spreader across the entire former Yugoslavia.¹⁵⁶ It was in this period that the Albanian Kosovar Liberation Army (KLA) grew in popularity and planned attacks against the Kosovar Serbs.¹⁵⁷

In February 1998, the Serbian army stemmed a wave of violence engineered by the KLA.¹⁵⁸ But the violence intensified and the Serbs continued attacking the ethnic Albanians and terrorized the region. Over 400,000 Kosovar ethnic Albanians were forced to flee the country leading to a European refugee crisis.¹⁵⁹ The violence gained international attention and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted resolution 1199. The UNSC announced

¹⁴⁹ Daskalovski, 'Claims to Kosovo: Nationalism and Self-Determination', 20.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 22.

¹⁵¹ Rogel, 'Kosovo: Where It All Began', 170.

¹⁵² Ibid., 171.

¹⁵³ Lambeth, *NATO's AirWar for Kosovo*, 6.

¹⁵⁴ Rogel, 'Kosovo: Where It All Began', 167.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 168-169.

¹⁵⁶ Lambeth, *NATO's AirWar for Kosovo*, 6.

¹⁵⁷ Rogel, 'Kosovo: Where It All Began', 176

¹⁵⁸ Nanda, 'Legal Implications of NATO's Armed Intervention in Kosovo', 314.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 314.

a ‘warning for an impending humanitarian catastrophe’ and called ‘for a halt of the violence and start of diplomatic negotiations.’¹⁶⁰

Both sides ignored the UNSC resolution and the NATO began discussing the optional threat of air strikes.¹⁶¹ In January 1999, the killing of 45 Kosovar Albanian civilians by Serbian troops in the village of Racak was a trigger moment for the NATO.¹⁶² Under the US leadership, a plan was set up to summon the Serbian and KLA representatives to a meeting in chateau Rambouillet for final peace talks.¹⁶³ The Serbs did not take this initiative seriously and no agreement was reached.¹⁶⁴ On March 24, 1999, Bill Clinton made a public announcement that US led NATO mission, Operation Allied Force would start an air war against Serbia with the goal of protecting the ethnic Albanians against human rights abuse in Kosovo.¹⁶⁵ The mission lasted 78 days until June 10, 1999. Thereafter, UNSC resolution 1244 was adopted with the aim of reaching a post-war settlement for the area.¹⁶⁶ International military presence would provide security and would oversee the return of refugees to the Kosovo region. A political process begun to determine the future status of Kosovo.¹⁶⁷

3.2 Operation Allied Force and liquid warfare

This paragraph analyses to what extent pillars (1) + (2) of the established definition of liquid warfare occurred in the 1999 military intervention in Kosovo.

First, it is investigated whether the operation Allied Force was a light-footprint military interventions that used remote warfare techniques. Second, it will be laid out how remote warfare techniques were used to shun the direct control of territory, focused instead on the destruction of enemy forces and/or infrastructure, copying certain characteristics of guerrilla warfare, integrating risk-transfer strategies and avoiding order-building and order-maintaining responsibilities.

¹⁶⁰ Lambeth, *NATO's AirWar for Kosovo*, 6.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁶⁴ Rogel, ‘Kosovo: Where It All Began’, 178

¹⁶⁵ Lambeth, *NATO's AirWar for Kosovo*, 1.

¹⁶⁶ United Nations, ‘Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) on the situation relating Kosovo’, in: United Nations Peacemaker (5 May 2020) <https://peacemaker.un.org/kosovo-resolution1244> (10 June 1999).

¹⁶⁷ United Nations, ‘Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) on the situation relating Kosovo’, in: United Nations Peacemaker (5 May 2020) <https://peacemaker.un.org/kosovo-resolution1244> (10 June 1999).

Pillar 1: NATO and the use of remote warfare techniques

Operation Allied Force against Serbia began on March 24, minutes after President Clinton's televised announcement to that effect.¹⁶⁸ Political scientist Benjamin Lambeth explains how NATO's Operation Allied Force started as a 'three-phase-plan' in order to inflict enough pain to cause a Serbian capitulation.¹⁶⁹ Phase I consisted of air attacks aimed at Serbian military targets, in which no civilians would be killed. Phase II included air attacks in the south of Serbia. Phase III was to see air attacks specifically targeted at military locations and bombings closer to Serbia's capital Belgrade. The plan was to use '250 committed US aircraft, 10 reconnaissance aircraft, 10 combat search and rescue aircraft, 3 airborne command and control centre aircraft, and around 40 tankers.'¹⁷⁰ NATO instructed all Allied pilots to fly above the altitude floor of 15,000 ft. to keep clear of the Serbian *surface-to-air* missiles (SAMs) which were able to reach only an altitude of 10,000 ft.¹⁷¹ From the very start, it was evident that NATO intended to fight this war from a distance. NATO's tactic was an offensive and defensive air combat exiting out of satellite-guided missiles, smart bombs, and aircrafts like B-52's and B-2's.¹⁷² It is clear that the operation was built on the use of remote warfare techniques.

23rd–25th of April 1999 marked NATO's 50th anniversary which was overshadowed by the military intervention in Kosovo as Serbia would not back down. US security adviser to the Clinton administration, Samuel Berger, had this to say: 'We will not lose, we will not lose. Whatever it takes, we will not lose.'¹⁷³ The US seemed determined that NATO was not going to fail and at one point it was suggested that air power alone would not be enough to stop Milosevic.¹⁷⁴ Benjamin Lambeth explains that by the end of May 'NATO had yielded to the inevitable and embraced in principle the need for a ground invasion.'¹⁷⁵ Associate Professor in National Security Affairs, Andrew Stigler, does not agree with Lambeth's observation and argues that the role of ground forces to end the war in Kosovo was never a real option.¹⁷⁶ According to him, there were too many obstacles to conduct a ground operation, such as the lack of support amongst NATO allies and the long and costly preparation that would be

¹⁶⁸ Lambeth, *NATO's AirWar for Kosovo*, 19.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 13-14.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 20.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 22.

¹⁷² Nanda, 'Legal Implications of NATO's Armed Intervention in Kosovo', 318.

¹⁷³ Doyle McManus, 'Clinton's Massive Ground Invasion That Almost Was', in: *Los Angeles Times* (June 9, 2000).

¹⁷⁴ John F. Harris, 'Clinton Saw No Alternative to Airstrikes', in: *Washington Post* (1 April 1999).

¹⁷⁵ Lambeth, *NATO's AirWar for Kosovo*, 76.

¹⁷⁶ Andrew L. Stigler, 'A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO's Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo', *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (2002-2003), 124.

necessary to conduct a ground operation.¹⁷⁷ Stigler's view is backed by the words of President Clinton to nine Republic members of Congress: 'I can assure you the United States would not support [ground] options.'¹⁷⁸ Also NATO's chief spokesman Jamie Shea's statement on May 27 made it clear that there was no intention of shifting the war towards the ground. Shea said:

But having said that, it is SACEUR's view, and it is the view of all NATO governments, that the air campaign is working, it is increasingly effective, and provided it is maintained with the same intensity, with the same unity, it will produce the results that we want with the Yugoslav forces being forced to withdraw. And as I have said, the whole focus of our planning at the moment is not on an invasion force but on a Peace Implementation Force, and there we are moving ahead expeditiously. So nobody is asking for any change of strategy. The whole view of the Alliance is that the present strategy, providing we stick with it, is going to do the job. We haven't gone into any other scenarios.¹⁷⁹

These sources indicate that Operation Allied Force had no intention of becoming a ground deployment and that the Operation stayed a light-footprint military intervention. The war in Kosovo was fought from a distance and NATO had no intentions of moving the mission towards a ground operation. Michael Ignatieff refers to Operation Allied Force as a *virtual war*.¹⁸⁰ Virtual for all citizens of NATO countries, who were the spectators of this war. 'The events in question were as remote from their essential concerns as a football game, and even though the game was in deadly earnest, the deaths were mostly hidden, and above all, they were someone else's.'¹⁸¹ In comparing NATO's war in Kosovo to pillar (1) of the definition of liquid warfare, it can be concluded that this operation is an example of a light-footprint intervention.

Pillar 2: remote warfare and power constellations in Kosovo

Although *The Responsibility To Protect* treaty was formulated in 2001 as a political commitment to stop extreme forms of violence, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, genocide and crimes against humanity, US President Bill Clinton's reasons to start a war in Kosovo in 1999

¹⁷⁷ Stigler, 'A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO's Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo', 125.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 127.

¹⁷⁹ Jamie Shea, NATO Press Conference (Brussels, 27 May 1999) <https://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990527a.htm> (28 March 2020).

¹⁸⁰ Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond*, 3-7.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 3.

sounded quite similar.¹⁸² Clinton gave three reasons why NATO needed to intervene in Kosovo.¹⁸³ First, ‘we act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting military offensive.’¹⁸⁴ Second, ‘we act to prevent a wider war, to defuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe, that has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results.’¹⁸⁵ Third, ‘we act to stand united with our allies for peace. By acting now, we are upholding our values, protecting our interests, and advancing the cause of peace.’¹⁸⁶ He continues by explaining that ‘For years, Kosovar's struggled peacefully to get their rights back. When President Milosevic sent his troops and police to crush them, the struggle grew violent.’¹⁸⁷ When Clinton’s reasons are compared to pillar (2) of liquid warfare’s definition, it is clear that Clinton did not intent to gain direct territory control with this mission. Clinton was looking for public support to start a NATO mission that would stop Serbian crimes against Kosovar Albanians.

In 1945, after World War II, the United Nations (UN) was formed in order to ‘maintain international peace and security’, according to UN Charter article 1.¹⁸⁸ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in 1949 as an international security organization that would protect its members against threats and external aggression.¹⁸⁹ The difference is that NATO members protect one another when they are attacked, whereas the UN is an international organization that can intervene to establish peace in violent regions. In the NATO treaty, its members agreed:

An armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently ... if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it

¹⁸² ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect: report of the international commission on intervention and state sovereignty* (5 May 2020) <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf> (December 2001).

¹⁸³ Speech Bill Clinton, ‘CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS; In the President’s Words: ‘We Act to Prevent a Wider War’, in: *The New York Times* (27 March 2020) <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/25/world/conflict-in-the-balkans-in-the-president-s-words-we-act-to-prevent-a-wider-war.html> (25 March 1999).

¹⁸⁴ Speech Bill Clinton, ‘CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS; In the President’s Words: ‘We Act to Prevent a Wider War’.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ United Nations Charter (full text) (2 May 2020) <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/>.

¹⁸⁹ Nanda, ‘Legal Implications of NATO’s Armed Intervention in Kosovo’, 313.

*deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.*¹⁹⁰

The treaty clearly states that its members will rush to the aid when one or more of their partners are under attack. Kosovo was not a NATO member. So why did NATO conduct a military operation in its interest in the first place? The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was not convinced that a war was the best solution for the atrocities in Kosovo and suggested that the peace talks be continued.¹⁹¹ The Clinton administration on the other side, had the opinion that there was a certain responsibility to protect and that the international system had to act now to protect Albanian Kosovars from crimes against humanity.¹⁹² The NATO-members knew that Russia and China would veto the mission within the UNSC and therefore they bypassed the UNSC and started their mission on March 24, 1999.¹⁹³ In a reaction on NATO's airstrikes of March 24, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said he regretted that Serbian authorities rejected a political settlement and that it was tragic that diplomacy did not work.¹⁹⁴ He continued:

*There are times when the use of force may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace. In helping maintain international peace and security, Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter assigns an important role to regional organizations. But as secretary-general, I have many times pointed out, not just in relation to Kosovo, that under the Charter, the Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, and this is explicitly acknowledged in the North Atlantic Treaty. Therefore, the Council should be involved in any decision to resort to force.*¹⁹⁵

When Annan said that the 'Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security', it is clear that he did not agree with NATO's air war.¹⁹⁶ NATO

¹⁹⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The North Atlantic Treaty* (26 May 2020) https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm (Washington D. C., 4 April 1949).

¹⁹¹ Nanda, 'Legal Implications of NATO's Armed Intervention in Kosovo', 314.

¹⁹² Speech Bill Clinton, 'CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS; In the President's Words: 'We Act to Prevent a Wider War'.

¹⁹³ Lambeth, *NATO's AirWar for Kosovo*, 14.

¹⁹⁴ Kofi Annan, 'Statement by U. N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan regarding NATO airstrikes of Serbian Military Targets', *reliefweb* (4 May 2020) <https://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/statement-un-secretary-general-kofi-annan-regarding-nato-airstrikes-serbian-military> (24 March 1999), quoted in: Judith Miller, 'The Secretary General Offers Implicit Endorsement of Raids', *The New York Times* (25 March 1999).

¹⁹⁵ Annan, 'Statement by U. N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan regarding NATO airstrikes of Serbian Military Targets'.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

crossed the agreements made in its own treaty and acted without UN approval. Therefore, we can question the legality of NATO Operation Allied Force and wonder what power equations came into play during the war in Kosovo.

Professor of Law Ved Nanda argues that Operation Allied Force became a US showpiece and that NATO's mission was 'flamed from the outset.'¹⁹⁷ NATO thought that the threat of an air war would be enough to make Milosevic back down. The contrary happened. From the moment the NATO mission started, Milosevic intensified the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.¹⁹⁸ Infrastructure was destroyed, villages were burned, thousands of Kosovars were murdered and over 800.000 Albanians fled Kosovo, which led to a refugee crisis in Europe.¹⁹⁹ NATO had to continue its air war and figures 5 and 6 are photos of destroyed infrastructure caused by NATO attacks against Serbia.



Figure 5

Damaged bridge in Serbia after a NATO attack.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁷ Nanda, 'Legal Implications of NATO's Armed Intervention in Kosovo', 327.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 328

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 327.

²⁰⁰ Lambeth, *NATO's AirWar for Kosovo*, 65.




Figure 6

Before and after photo of the Danube River near Novi Sad in Serbia. Bridge was hit by a bombing in day 9, during phase III.²⁰¹

On April 28, NATO carried out multiple air strikes, among which was the CBU-104(V)2/B cluster bomb that would shut down Belgrade's power sources due to the carbon-graphite threads that were part of these cluster bombs.²⁰² NATO's satellite-guided missiles, smart bombs and airstrikes all had the goal of destroying the Serbian air defence system, the Serbian military centres and the Serbian infrastructure.²⁰³ Serbian civilians were now seriously affected by NATO's air war.²⁰⁴ On April 28, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called the human costs of the war in Kosovo 'unacceptably high.'²⁰⁵ In a press statement Annan he said:

*The civilian death toll is rising, as is the number of displaced. There is increasing devastation to the country's infrastructure, and huge damage to [Yugoslavia's] economy. For example, Mr. Sommaruga [the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross who recently visited there] told me that the destruction of the three bridges in Novi Sad also cut off the fresh water supply to half of that city's population of 90,000 people.*²⁰⁶

²⁰¹ Lambeth, *NATO's AirWar for Kosovo*, 66.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, 39-40.

²⁰³ Nanda, 'Legal Implications of NATO's Armed Intervention in Kosovo', 318.


²⁰⁴ Lambeth, *NATO's AirWar for Kosovo*, 42.

²⁰⁵ Kofi Annan, 'Statement by Secretary-General Kofi Annan on Kosovo Crisis', *Global Policy Forum Press Release SG/SM/ 6972* (28 April 1999).

²⁰⁶ Annan, 'Statement by Secretary-General Kofi Annan on Kosovo Crisis'.

On May 7, NATO accidentally attacked the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. During this attack three people were killed and more than 20 injured.²⁰⁷ China said that NATO, in bypassing the UN, had created ‘the largest humanitarian disaster since the Second World War.’²⁰⁸

In bypassing the UNSC and using a disproportional amount of airpower, NATO’s mission in Kosovo was focused on its personal power position in the world and staying in control. When referring to Martin Shaw’s concept of the new Western way of war, it can be said that Operation Allied Force was focused on reducing their own ‘risk’ and minimizing ‘casualties’ to keep public support for the war.²⁰⁹ The cartoon in figure 7 illustrates a NATO’s war room in which it was, according to the artist, priority to make sure that no one got hurt.²¹⁰



"World War III? Hmm. O.K., but, remember, nobody gets hurt."

Figure 7
NATO’s War Room.²¹¹

²⁰⁷ United Nations, ‘Security Council Calls for Access for UN and Other Humanitarian Personnel Operating in Kosovo and Other Parts of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, United Nations Security Council Press Release SC/6677 (14 May 1999).

²⁰⁸ United Nations, ‘Security Council Calls for Access for UN and Other Humanitarian Personnel Operating in Kosovo and Other Parts of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’.

²⁰⁹ Shaw, ‘Risk-Transfer Militarism, Small massacres and the Historic Legitimacy of War’, 343.

²¹⁰ Robert Weber, ‘War Room’, in: *The New Yorker Collection/ The Cartoon Bank* (27 March 2020) Cartoonbank.com (8 March 1999).

²¹¹ Robert Weber, ‘War Room’, in: *The New Yorker Collection/ The Cartoon Bank* (27 March 2020) Cartoonbank.com (8 March 1999).

This risk-transfer war strategy led to a guerrilla type of warfare in which NATO was mostly concerned about its own global position and less so in the order-building and order-maintaining responsibilities that come along with a humanitarian intervention.

3.3 Conclusion

The Serbs and Albanians had different interpretations of history which led to a twin-claim of the right to rule over Kosovo. These different interpretations laid the basis for ethnic violence in the Kosovo region, where after an international political process started to determine the future status of Kosovo. NATO's Operation Allied Force consisted of air operations that were all above the altitude floor of 15,000 ft. to keep a safe distance from the Serbian air defence systems. The operation was designed to minimize Allied casualties by only using remote warfare techniques.

NATO's Operation Allied Force affected both Serbian and Albanian civilians. For the public eye, the mission was instigated not to gain territory, but to stop violence, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanities. Underneath the surface, the intervention in Kosovo was focused on a victory without sustaining casualties on the Allied side. Serbian military centres, bridges and infrastructure were destroyed and risk-transfer war strategies were used to avoid order-building and order-maintaining responsibilities.

This research presents evidence of pillars (1) + (2) of liquid warfare's definition during Operation Allied Force. It can be concluded that liquid warfare occurred during the 1999 military intervention in Kosovo.

THE CONCLUSION

Referring back to Popper's vision that all scientific observations are to refute existing theories rather than to try to confirm them, this research critically observes the by Max Mutschler, Jolle Demmers and Lauren Gould introduced concept of liquid warfare. Based on Zygmunt Bauman's concept of liquid modernity and Martin Shaw's vision of the new Western way of war, Mutschler first introduced the concept of liquid warfare in 2016.²¹² Elaborating on Mutschler, Demmers and Gould explain how in liquid warfare the 'conventional ties between war, space and time have become undone'.²¹³ According to them, liquid warfare marks a shift towards a more remote type of warfare that contributes to the blurred lines of responsibility during assembled military interventions in the post-Cold War era.²¹⁴ Although it is generally accepted that the 'liquidization' of warfare is a process that has evaluated over time, Derek Gregory, Demmers and Gould see 9/11 as a key moment for this 'shift' from boots on the ground towards a more light-footprint type of warfare within military interventions. Since the War on Terror, they argue, military operations have become more flexible and lighter.²¹⁵

In order to investigate 'liquidization' in warfare, this research defined liquid warfare as a combination of (1) remote warfare techniques that are used to (2) shun direct control of territory, instead focussing on the destruction of enemy forces and/or infrastructure, following the characteristics of hit-and-run warfare, integrating risk-transfer strategies and avoiding order-building as well as order-maintaining responsibilities. The established definition is used as an analytical tool to investigate to what extent military interventions in the Gulf and Kosovo can be explained as liquid warfare. In critically analysing the suggested key moment for the 'liquidization' of warfare, this research follows a line of argumentation proffered by Martin Shaw and Michael Ignatieff. Although Shaw and Ignatieff do not investigate liquid warfare, they do describe a 'mobile turn' in the Vietnam War (1955-1975), Gulf War (1990-1991) and the Kosovo War (1999).²¹⁶

When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, the US, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait started a campaign to prevent an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia and started a war to push back the Iraqi army. The operations in the Gulf were almost exclusively fought remotely to destroy the Iraqi

²¹² Mutschler, 'On the road to liquid warfare? Revisiting Zygmunt Bauman's thoughts on liquid modernity in the context of the "new Western way of war"'.
²¹³ Demmers and Gould, 'An assemblage approach to liquid warfare: AFRICOM and the 'hunt' for Joseph Kony'.

²¹⁴ Ibid., Kony', 367.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 369-370.

²¹⁶ Shaw, *The New Western Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and its Crisis in Iraq*; Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond*.

enemy and infrastructure. The goal of garnering public support for the war led to hit-and-run warfare tactics to minimize casualties on the allied side. When public support dwindled, the Bush administration did everything in its power to prevent a war exit like in the Vietnam War. In finding a swift exit strategy, the US and its allies avoid their order-building and order-maintaining responsibilities.

The war in Kosovo, which was initiated by NATO to stop the ethnic violence between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians, was almost exclusively fought from the air. NATO's military strategy was to prove its air supremacy by using air attacks and precision strikes from a distance and destroy Serbian military centres and infrastructure. The goal was not to annex territory, but to prevent human suffering. This research presents evidence that while this war was fought to stop ethnic cleansing between Serbs and Albanians, it also showed how NATO misused its treaty and started an illegal and disproportional war in Kosovo, with the goal of showing its air supremacy and minimizing Allied casualties. This risk-transfer war strategy led to a guerrilla-like warfare in which order-building and order-maintaining responsibilities were avoided.

Returning to the question as to what extent the pre-9/11 Western state-led military interventions in the Persian Gulf ('90-'91) and in Kosovo ('99) can be explained as examples of liquid wars, this research provides evidence of pillars (1) + (2) in both case studies. For that reason, it can be concluded that the military interventions in the Gulf and Kosovo are examples of liquid warfare. By concluding this, this research contributes to the historical quest of finding the key moment from when military interventions can be explained as liquid warfare, although no specific key moment can be marked yet. The presented definition of liquid warfare can be used as an analytical tool from which more research on the 'liquidization' of warfare can derive. More research on the appearance of liquid warfare in pre-9/11 military interventions is necessary to bring us closer to a historical explanation of the key moment from when military interventions started transforming from the solid to the liquid.

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APPENDIX



Universiteit Utrecht

Faculty of Humanities
Version September 2014

PLAGIARISM RULES AWARENESS STATEMENT

Fraud and Plagiarism

Scientific integrity is the foundation of academic life. Utrecht University considers any form of scientific deception to be an extremely serious infraction. Utrecht University therefore expects every student to be aware of, and to abide by, the norms and values regarding scientific integrity.

The most important forms of deception that affect this integrity are fraud and plagiarism. Plagiarism is the copying of another person's work without proper acknowledgement, and it is a form of fraud. The following is a detailed explanation of what is considered to be fraud and plagiarism, with a few concrete examples. Please note that this is not a comprehensive list!

If fraud or plagiarism is detected, the study programme's Examination Committee may decide to impose sanctions. The most serious sanction that the committee can impose is to submit a request to the Executive Board of the University to expel the student from the study programme.

Plagiarism

Plagiarism is the copying of another person's documents, ideas or lines of thought and presenting it as one's own work. You must always accurately indicate from whom you obtained ideas and insights, and you must constantly be aware of the difference between citing, paraphrasing and plagiarising. Students and staff must be very careful in citing sources; this concerns not only printed sources, but also information obtained from the Internet.

The following issues will always be considered to be plagiarism:


- cutting and pasting text from digital sources, such as an encyclopaedia or digital periodicals, without quotation marks and footnotes;
- cutting and pasting text from the Internet without quotation marks and footnotes;
- copying printed materials, such as books, magazines or encyclopaedias, without quotation marks or footnotes;
- including a translation of one of the sources named above without quotation marks or footnotes;
- paraphrasing (parts of) the texts listed above without proper references: paraphrasing must be marked as such, by expressly mentioning the original author in the text or in a footnote, so that you do not give the impression that it is your own idea;
- copying sound, video or test materials from others without references, and presenting it as one's own work;
- submitting work done previously by the student without reference to the original paper, and presenting it as original work done in the context of the course, without the express permission of the course lecturer;
- copying the work of another student and presenting it as one's own work. If this is done with the consent of the other student, then he or she is also complicit in the plagiarism;
- when one of the authors of a group paper commits plagiarism, then the other co-authors are also complicit in plagiarism if they could or should have known that the

- person was committing plagiarism;
- submitting papers acquired from a commercial institution, such as an Internet site with summaries or papers, that were written by another person, whether or not that other person received payment for the work.

The rules for plagiarism also apply to rough drafts of papers or (parts of) theses sent to a lecturer for feedback, to the extent that submitting rough drafts for feedback is mentioned in the course handbook or the thesis regulations.

The Education and Examination Regulations (Article 5.15) describe the formal procedure in case of suspicion of fraud and/or plagiarism, and the sanctions that can be imposed.

Ignorance of these rules is not an excuse. Each individual is responsible for their own behaviour. Utrecht University assumes that each student or staff member knows what fraud and plagiarism entail. For its part, Utrecht University works to ensure that students are informed of the principles of scientific practice, which are taught as early as possible in the curriculum, and that students are informed of the institution's criteria for fraud and plagiarism, so that every student knows which norms they must abide by.

I hereby declare that I have read and understood the above.	
Name:	Loes van Bergen
Student number:	4148738
Date and signature:	20 June 2020 

Submit this form to your supervisor when you begin writing your Bachelor's final paper or your Master's thesis.

Failure to submit or sign this form does not mean that no sanctions can be imposed if it appears that plagiarism has been committed in the paper.