

# Necessity is the mother of invention

The lottery loans of Holland during the War of the  
Spanish Succession

Matthijs Hoekstra

3006476

History: Cities, states and Citizenship

First reader: Oscar Gelderblom

Second reader: Joost Jonker

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## Introduction

At several moments in the 18<sup>th</sup> century Holland raised capital through lottery loans. This thesis examines what lottery loans are, why they were organized, and who invested in them. Lottery loans haven't received much attention in debates about the development of early modern public finance. In his history of the lotteries of the Low Countries Fokker wrote in 1862 that lotteries organized by the Estates were a sign of the moral decline of the Republic. Where first lotteries had been used to raise money for charity, now the Estates used lotteries for their own benefits.<sup>1</sup> In his seminal work *The Financial Revolution in England* Dickson wrote that an 'addiction of contemporaries to gambling on a massive scale' was a contradictory trend to the progress in finance made in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>2</sup> Murphy, on the other hand, claims the boundaries between gambling and investment remained indistinct in the late 17<sup>th</sup> century, and therefore connects the lotteries with the financial revolution.<sup>3</sup> Gelderblom and Jonker examined how market forces shaped Holland's issuing policy.<sup>4</sup> A group of wealth owners was capable of playing the market, looking for the best investment opportunities. From the 1670s onwards the Estates were forced to follow the movement of bond prices on the market when they sold new debt issues, and on occasion incentives had to be offered to investors.<sup>5</sup> The lottery loans were designed in such a way that they acted as incentive to invest. Studying the lottery loans thus can learn us more about the interaction between the market and the authorities, and the way the authorities tried to attract calculating investors.

### Why were lottery loans organized?

This thesis argues that the lottery loans were a part of the innovations made by states to fill the public coffers. Between 1689 and 1713 the Republic was involved in almost continuous warfare, causing Holland's debt to increase from 160 million to almost 300 million in 1713.<sup>6</sup> To raise the large amounts of capital required, incentives had to be offered to the investors. Lottery loans offered these incentives. The thesis will show that the lottery loans were used in times of dire financial needs, when all other forms of raising capital were exhausted. The sources suggest that in 1711 the

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<sup>1</sup> G.A. Fokker, *Geschiedenis der loterijen in de Nederlanden* (Amsterdam: Muller, 1862) 120 onwards. Fokker had a political goal with his work, he hoped to convince the government to abolish the Dutch national lottery.

<sup>2</sup> P.G.M. Dickson, *The Financial Revolution in England, 1688-1756* (London: MacMillan, 1967) 45.

<sup>3</sup> A.L. Murphy, 'Lotteries in the 1690s: investment or gamble', *Financial History Review* 12 (2005) 228.

<sup>4</sup> O. Gelderblom and J. Jonker, 'A conditional miracle. The market forces that shaped Holland's public debt management, 1514-1713'. Working paper.

<sup>5</sup> Gelderblom and Jonker, 'A conditional miracle', 29.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*, 28.

Estates of Holland found themselves to be in a situation in which they couldn't raise the capital they needed against the usual conditions. Investors demanded higher returns than the returns on the ordinary securities of Holland. The ordinary bonds of Holland paid 4% interest, but due to the *100e* and *200e penning* this was reduced to 2.5%. In response to this demand the lottery loans were organized, which were in two ways interesting for the investors. First, the lottery loans gave investors the chance of winning large prizes. And second, the blank tickets were more profitable than ordinary obligations of Holland. Because the small prize obligations were exempted from the *100e* and *200e penning*, they paid 4% interest instead of the 2.5% of other obligations.

### **What are lottery loans**

Lottery loans differ from traditional lotteries. In traditional lotteries most players lose their money, while a few players win large prizes. In a lottery there are also prizes to be won. But the difference with traditional lotteries is that the holders of blank tickets also get their money back. The tickets were converted in interest bearing obligations, to be redeemed within a certain period varying between 1 and 32 years. This means two things: first, the total cost of the lottery is higher than the amount raised. For example, the first lottery of Holland raised 6 million guilders, but the province promised to repay over 9 million guilders to the investors. 7 Million guilders to the holders of the 58,651 blank tickets, who were promised f. 120 in return for their f. 100 ticket, and 2 million guilders to the owners of the 1349 large prize tickets. Second, since all investors get repaid within a number of years, they become creditors to the state for a long period. For all reasons investors could wanted to get rid of their obligations. So another feature of the lottery loan is that there was a secondary market in lottery tickets for investors who wanted to get rid of their tickets.

### **Sources**

Archival records play an important role in this thesis. The archives of the Estates of Holland and the *Gecommitteerde Raden*, the daily government of Holland, will be used to examine the motives for organizing a lottery, and the way the lottery was organized. The prize ledgers of the Finance Office of Holland were a crucial source. These ledgers contain information on who owned the tickets and when the tickets were redeemed. Only a small part of the prize ledgers survived. For the first lottery loan of Holland information can be found on the small prize obligations of class 24-30 (25% of all small prize obligations) and the large prize obligations of class 3-30 (97% of all large prize

obligations). Of class 25-30 of the small prize tickets I have entered all ticket holders in one file. The result is a list of 6371 different ID numbers, owning a total of 16,323 of the 58,651 small prize tickets (27,83%). The large prize ledger contains all large prize holders of class 3-30. Put together in a file, the result is a list of 1778 ID numbers with a value of f. 1,973,900, 98,7% of the large prize money. The ledgers makes it possible to study the investors: who were they and what were their motives for investing in the lottery? The ledgers also make it possible to study the distribution of the tickets over the investors. For other lotteries no prize ledgers are available. That is why this thesis will focus on the first lottery loan of Holland of July 1711. Since the conditions of the following lotteries in 1712 and 1713 were almost the same as this lottery, I think it is safe to say that they attracted the same kind of investors as the first lottery.

## **Outline**

In the first chapter we will look at the lottery loans of England and the Estates-General. We will see that after the successful ' Million Adventure' of 1694 and the failed Malt lottery of 1697 the lottery loan became regularly used tool of the English state from 1710 onwards. The first chapter will also discuss the lottery loans issued by the Estates-General between 1709 and 1713. The second chapter tells the story of the first lottery loan of Holland. It will discuss the motives to organize the lottery, the design of the lottery, and how it was organized. The third and fourth chapter will take a closer look at the investors. The third chapter deals with the investors of the lottery. How many people invested in the lotteries, how much did they invest and what was the share of the tickets owned by women and institutions? The fourth chapter takes a closer look at some of the largest investors and explores their motives to invest in the lottery. We will see that many the large investors were closely tied to the regime and that some even played a role in the organisation of the lotteries. The last chapter focuses on the redemption of the lottery. The tickets of the first lottery were not redeemed according to the schedule. Why they were not redeemed and what happened instead will be discussed in this chapter.

# 1. The first lottery loans: England and the Estates-General

Gambling played an important role in the early modern world. It was ‘an age of wagers on the lives of the lives of private and public men, the chances of war, and the occurrence of natural events, as well as the issue of a horse-race, the fall of dice, the turn of a card.’<sup>7</sup> Lotteries were an important part of the world of gambling. The origins of the lottery in the Low Countries lay in 15<sup>th</sup> century Bruges.<sup>8</sup> It was a tradition to appoint someone to the office of *scroderie* through a lottery under the male citizens.<sup>9</sup> For unknown reasons other prizes were made available in the early 1440s, and inhabitants from other cities became allowed to participate in the lottery. This can be seen as the start of the lottery in the Low Countries. From Bruges the lottery quickly spread to other cities in the Southern and Northern Netherlands. For example, in 1446 the city of Utrecht organized a lottery in order to avoid bankruptcy.<sup>10</sup> Around the turn of the century the first lotteries were organized in Holland. The first lottery in England would not be organized until the 1560s.<sup>11</sup> This lottery wasn’t a great success. Although some lotteries were organized, the popularity of the lottery in England didn’t start before the 1660s. Lotteries were organized by multiple institutions with multiple motives. However, from the late 16<sup>th</sup> century lotteries organized for charity became dominant. From the proceedings new institutions for the sick and the elder were built, to fill up the gap left by the disappearance of the catholic church in the Northern Netherlands.<sup>12</sup> Although some efforts were made by the Calvinist clergy to forbid the lottery, it remained popular throughout the century.<sup>13</sup>

The Burgundian dukes profited from the lotteries by selling permissions to organize lotteries, but no efforts were made to organize central lotteries. In the 1560s Phillips II attempted to organize two lotteries, one to expand the fortification of border towns, and one to pay overdue wages to his

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<sup>7</sup> Dickson, *The Financial Revolution*, 45.

<sup>8</sup> It is not clear whether the lottery was invented in Bruges, or that it came to Bruges through commercial ties with Italian cities.

<sup>9</sup> The *scroder* was responsible for the collection of the duties on the transportation of heavy goods through the city. It was a well-paid position. See L. Giliodts-Van Severen, ‘La loterie a Bruges’ in: *La Flandre 2* (1868-1869) 461.

<sup>10</sup> K. Burman, *Utrechtse Jaarboeken (1750-1754)* 2, 50-52.

<sup>11</sup> For a history of the English lotteries, see J. Ashton, *The history of English lotteries* (London, Leadenhall Press: 1893), and C.L. Ewen, *Lotteries and Sweepstakes, an Historical, Legal and Ethical Survey of their Introduction, Suppression and Re-establishment in the British Isles* (London, 1932).

<sup>12</sup> A. Huisman and J. Koppenol, *Daer compt de lotery met trommels en trompetten* (Hilversum, Verloren 1991) 50.

<sup>13</sup> S. Schama sees the lotteries as a brilliant and typically Dutch invention, because greed stimulated for charitable goals. *Overvloed en Onbehagen, De Nederlandse Cultuur in de Gouden Eeuw* (Amsterdam: Contact, 1988) 312-315.

soldiers.<sup>14</sup> However, both projects failed. Around 1600, the Estates of Holland toyed with the idea of organizing lotteries, but no decisions were made. It was not until 1711 that Holland organized a lottery.

### ***The Million Adventure***

The entry of England into the Nine Years' War in 1689 drastically increased the yearly expenses of England.<sup>15</sup> Of the total of 73 million pounds spent between 1689 and 1702, £ 6.9 million pound was raised by long-term borrowing, with an average interest percentage of 8,3%.<sup>16</sup> Compared to short-term borrowing and tax income, only a small amount was raised by long-term borrowing. The £ 6,9 million was raised in 8 different projects, of which 2 were lotteries. In the 1690s lotteries were very popular in England. Murphy goes as far as calling it a 'lottery craze', In these lotteries both cash and goods were available as prizes. For example, James Moxon organized a lottery in 1698 to dispose of his stock of globes, spheres, map and mathematical books.<sup>17</sup> Because of the large number of lotteries the organizers had to promote their ventures in order to find enough participants. In this climate the cost of the tickets (between 20 shilling and 1 pence) , the kind of prizes and the reliability of the scheme were very important. It seems that the proceedings of the lottery mostly went to the organizers, and not to any form of charity. In December 1699 lotteries were forbidden, because of fraud and dishonesty that was supposed to be the ruin of many participants.

The popularity of the lottery at the time explains why the state used the lotteries to raise funds. In 1693 Thomas Neale, Groom Porter of the royal family, organized a successful lottery based on an earlier held Venetian lottery. In 1694 he was asked by the state to organize a lottery for the benefit of the public coffers. The lottery Neal designed aimed to raise a million pounds. In his 'Million Adventure' 100,000 tickets of £ 10 each were available. The tickets were widely available, also for the 'low-born and foreign investors'.<sup>18</sup> At £ 10 each, the tickets were much cheaper than the other forms of British government debt. Furthermore tickets were bought up and dividend into small parts, enabling risk sharing, but also making at least a share of a ticket affordable for even more investors. In this way the Million Adventure let a far great share of the population lend to the government than any other form of government debt. The investors were obviously interested in the 2500 prizes: term

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<sup>14</sup> Fokker, *Geschiedenis der loterijen*, 45-61.

<sup>15</sup> Dickson, *The Financial Revolution*, 46. Before 1688 public expenditure had been under £. 2 million a year, between 169 and 1702 it was between 5 million and 6 million pounds a year.

<sup>16</sup> Ibidem, 46-50.

<sup>17</sup> D.J. Bryden, 'Capital in the London publishing trade: James Moxon's stock disposal of 1698, a 'mathematical lottery'', *Library* 19, 293-350.

<sup>18</sup> In the Knuttel pamphlet collection a Dutch translation of the official English announcement can be found, nr. 13984, pag. 1: 'dat elk en een yder, t zij lageboorne of uyttheemse... soo veel numbers sal mogen betalen als begeert

annuities varying between £ 1000 and £ 10 a year, for a period of 16 years. All 2500 prizes together had a value of £40,000 per year.<sup>19</sup> However, it was also stipulated that the holders of 97,500 blank tickets would be paid 1 pound per ticket per year for a period for 16 years. So not only would they receive their money back, the blank ticket holders would also make a profit. This made the lottery even more interesting. In total the English state had to pay £ 140,000 a year until 1710. This would be paid from a special fund, consisting of the tax income of imported salt, beer, ale, cider and other liquors.<sup>20</sup> However, already in 1695 the state was unable to make its yearly payments. By 1697 the state had a payment deficit of £ 240,000.<sup>21</sup> The end of the war in 1697 enabled the state to resume payments. Investors who wanted to get rid of their tickets could do so on the secondary market. The prices of the tickets, published in Houghton's *Collection for Improvement of Husbandry and Trade* between 1694 and 1702, show an active market in blank tickets.<sup>22</sup> In 1697 the state attempted to set up a second lottery loan, the Malt lottery. However, this effort failed miserably for several reasons. First, there were fewer and smaller prizes available. Second, the payment problems of the Million Adventure discouraged investors. Third, the state was very unpopular at the time, after the popular queen Mary had died. In the end, only 1763 tickets were sold. The next attempt at organizing a lottery took place in 1710.

### ***The 18<sup>th</sup> century: rise, decline and fall of the English lottery loans***

The lottery loan returned to the fore during the War of Spanish Succession. In January 1710 Sidney Godolphin reintroduced the lottery loan. In 1709 the Estates-General began organizing lottery loans, and this could have inspired Godolphin to reintroduce the lottery loan. The lottery consisted of 150,000 £ 10 tickets, raising £ 1.5 million. The blank ticket holders received 14 shilling per year, for a period of 32 years, and the large prize winners received in total £ 30,000 per year. In total the state had to pay £ 135,000 or 9% a year.<sup>23</sup> In the following two years 4 lottery loans were organized. The schemes of the lotteries of 1711-1712 were so drafted that a liability was incurred greater than the sums lent.<sup>24</sup> For example, in the lottery of March 1711 £ 1.5 million was raised. But the state promised to repay a total of £ 1,928,570 within 32 years, paying in the meantime 6% interest on the total sum, or 7,8% over the borrowed £ 1,5 million. In total £ 7,100,000 was raised through lottery loans. The state promised to repay a total of £ 9,214,500. The proceedings of several customs and

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<sup>19</sup> Knuttel pamphlet 13984,

<sup>20</sup> Dickson, *The Financial Revolution*, 48, Knuttel 13984 page 1.

<sup>21</sup> Murphy, 'Lotteries in the 1690s', 231.

<sup>22</sup> Ibidem, 232.

<sup>23</sup> Dickson, *The Financial Revolution*, 63.

<sup>24</sup> Ibidem, 74.

excises were reserved for the repayment of the bond holders (see table 1).

The terms of the last 3 lotteries were the same as the first lottery. The lotteries showed to be very popular with the British people, which considering the profitable terms is not unimaginable. The lottery of march 1711 was even oversubscribed by 29,000 tickets.<sup>25</sup> Who invested in the 4 lottery loans? As stated above, the Million Adventure was supposed to attract a large group of investors because of the low ticket prize and the opportunity of buying shares of tickets. However, in 2 of the 4 lotteries, each ticket costs £ 100. Such a high ticket price must have surely limited the share of the population that could enter those lotteries. Why the English state opted to organize 2 lotteries with £ 10 tickets and 2 lotteries with £ 100 tickets is not clear. Perhaps the costs and efforts of administration and paying interest to 100,000 tickets per lottery were too high for the state.

**Table 1: Government lottery loans 1711-1712<sup>26</sup>**

no.	date of royal assent	sum raised, £	total liability, £	funding of repayments
1	6 March 1711	1,500,000	1,928,570	customs duties, coal duties
2	12 June 1711	2,000,000	2,602,200	duties on chairs, parchment and paper
3	22 May 1712	1,800,000	2,341,740	customs and excises on linens, soap, silk
4	21 June 1712	1,800,000	2,341,740	duties on coffee, tea, insurance policies

The end of the war in 1713 reduced the need for further lottery loans. However, 2 new lotteries were organized in 1713 and 1714, raising £ 500,000 and £ 1.4 million. The raised money was used to reduce deficit payments. The War of Spanish Succession increased the English debt with 34.9 million pound. Lotteries played an important role in the increase of the debt raising a total of £ 11.7 million. After the war the state was confronted with high interest payments: over 2,5 million pounds per year.<sup>27</sup> This was a heavy burden for the state. To reduce the interest payments three conversion Acts were announced in 1717 by Walpole, of which the first dealt with the lottery loans of 1711 and 1712. Under the Act, the lottery tickets were to be converted into 5% stock managed by the Bank of England.<sup>28</sup> The ticketholders got the choice between the repayment of their principal or a reduction to 5%. Accepting the conversion meant that the principal would not be redeemed after 32 years. But as long as there was an active secondary market, this problem could be overcome. Unfortunately,

<sup>25</sup> Ibidem, 74, citing a report to the Treasury by Nathaniel Gould, deputy governor of the Bank of England.

<sup>26</sup> Ibidem, 72-73, table 6.

<sup>27</sup> Ibidem, 80.

<sup>28</sup> Ibidem, 85. The total sum involved was £ 8,875,703.

Dickson gives no figures about the percentage of investors accepting the conversion and the percentage of investors opting for repayment.

The thorniest problem however, was the interest payments on the annuities with a term of 99 years. Before anything could be done about this, the annuitants would have to be persuaded to exchange their annuities for redeemable stock.<sup>29</sup> To achieve this in 1719 a pilot project was organized in which the ticketholders of the 1710 lottery (which ran for a period of 32 years) were given the choice between repayment and conversion into South Sea Company stock. Around 2/3 of tickets was converted into stock. It seems that many ticket holders were interested in the stock, because it not only entitled the ticket holders to interest payments, but also had the potential of high dividend payments. The success of the conversion led to a much larger operation of the same kind the following year. This operation resulted in the South Sea Bubble.<sup>30</sup>

For the rest of the century the lottery played an important role in English wartime finance. In the War of Austrian succession (1740-1748) almost £ 10 million, in the Seven Year's war (1756-1763) £ 35 million, and during the American War of Independence (1776-1783) more than £ 70 million was raised through lottery loans.<sup>31</sup> In 1762 Thomas Mortimer wrote that under the population the lottery loan was the most popular. After 1785 the structure of the lotteries changed. Instead of lottery loans now ordinary lotteries were organized, with the proceedings going directly to the state. This form had the advantage of delivering money fast and without interest payments. Prime minister Pitt was a great proponent of this form of lotteries, which was basically the same as the form forbidden in the 1690s.<sup>32</sup> However, it had great consequences for the English state lotteries. The traditional form of lotteries was considered by many as a form of gambling. Where the lottery loans eventually repaid all investors with a profit, this wasn't the case in the new lotteries. The lottery became a part of the debate on gambling, vice and poverty. In 1826 the last state lottery was drawn. The lotteries weren't only abolished because of moral protests. They also had lost their economic function. The new lottery form contributed much less to state income than the lottery loans had done.<sup>33</sup> From 1785 onwards the profit of the yearly lottery was less than 3% of total state income, and from 1810 onwards less than 2%. The total profit of all lotteries between 1785 and 1823 was only £ 12 million. The profit of the lotteries was further reduced by higher administrative costs and larger prizes. Between 1810 and 1820 68% of the money was used for prizes. In 1823 this was already 86%.

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<sup>29</sup> Ibidem, 88.

<sup>30</sup> Ibidem, 89.

<sup>31</sup> J. Cohen, 'The Element of Lottery in British Government Debt', *Economica* 20 (1953) 242.

<sup>32</sup> J. Raven, 'The Abolition of English State Lotteries', *Historical Journal* 34 (1991) 379.

<sup>33</sup> Raven, 'The Abolition' 380-382.

### ***The lottery loans of the Estates-General***

Just as for England, the Nine Years' War and the War of Spanish succession were a heavy financial burden for the Estates-General. Between 1691 and 1715 the debt increased with over 30 million guilders.<sup>34</sup> To answer the increased spending the Estates-General first used life annuities. In 1709 the Estates-General decided to organize a 'negotiatie by forme van loterye'. It was most likely inspired by the English Million Adventure of 1694. Between 1709 and 1713 the Estates-General organized several lotteries. How much was raised with the lotteries is not entirely clear. Fokker and Dormans give two different accounts of the lottery loans of the Estates-General.

Fokker gives the following chronology:<sup>35</sup> In 1709 a lottery was organized consisting 8,000 tickets of f.250 guilders each. The 8000 tickets sold out very quick. The *Ontfanger-Generaal* van Hogendorp and the *Raad van State* advised to increase the lottery with another 4000 tickets, but instead the Estates-General decide to organise a second lottery of 2 million guilders in August 1709. In this lottery the prize money was significant lower than in the first lottery. At the final selling date only half of the tickets was sold, so it was decided to split the lottery in half. The sold tickets were drawn in a lottery of one million, the unsold tickets became a separate lottery of one million guilders. Again only half of the tickets was sold. It was decided to raise the lottery with one million and raise the interest on the blanks from 6% to 7%. This lottery was scheduled to be drawn in April. At the end of May it was decided to organize a fourth lottery of 1.5 million guilders. According to Fokker this lottery also wasn't a great success. In 1712 and 1713 two lotteries raised six and three million guilders. So according to Fokker 15.5 million guilders was raised in the period between 1709 and 1713.

Dormans tells the story slightly different:<sup>36</sup> The first lottery was a success and was raised with one million guilders. The second lottery of two million was also a success. A third lottery of one million was less successful and therefore raised with one million, making it a success. The lottery of 1.5 million of 1710 and the lotteries of 1712 and 1713 he describes in the same way as Fokker. In total 17,5 million guilders was raised according to Dormans, the difference with Fokker laying in the added one million of the first lottery and the successful second lottery of two million guilders. Which author is correct is not clear to me.

For the rest of the 18<sup>th</sup> century the Estates-General didn't borrow much. Only once, in 1749,

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<sup>34</sup> E.H.M. Dormans, *Het tekort. Staatsschuld in de tijd der Republiek* (Amsterdam: Neha, 1991) 145-147.

<sup>35</sup> Fokker, *Geschiedenis der loterijen*, 120 onwards.

<sup>36</sup> Dormans, *Het tekort*, 147.

did they issue another lottery loan.<sup>37</sup> But from 1726 onwards they started an annual traditional lottery, with the proceedings going directly to the Estates-general.<sup>38</sup>

### ***The cost of the lottery loans***

Why did the Estates-General only issued lottery loans between 1709 and 1713? Lotteries had been a familiar sight in the Netherlands for a long time, and the example of the Million Adventure had been available since 1694. Furthermore, it was not uncommon that financial experts and hobbyist sent their plans for new methods of borrowing, like lottery projects, to the Estates-General.<sup>39</sup> Both Dormans and Fokker state that for a long time the government had strong moral objections to the use of lotteries, since it was a form of gambling.<sup>40</sup> Only when all other means were exhausted they turned to the lotteries. However, it is doubtful that the lottery loans were considered to be gambling. Some investors would profit heavily, but all the other players would also benefit. In other words, there were no losers. So the moral argument against lottery loans is not very strong. It is more likely that the Estates-General only resorted to lottery loans in times of desperate financial need, because it was an expensive way of borrowing.

This can be examined by looking at the annual cost of the lotteries. I will do this for three lotteries: the first lottery loan of 1709 of 2 million guilders, the third lottery loan of 2 million guilders and the fourth lottery loan of 1.5 million guilders, both held in 1710. The results can be seen in table 2 on the following page. In the first lottery, consisting of 8000 tickets of f. 250, 1300 life annuities were available as prizes, with a total value of f. 79,000 per year. Also, the 6700 blank tickets would receive annual payments of f. 15, or 6% of their invested capital, per year. A yearly payment of f. 179,500 equals an annual interest payment of 8,975%. Since the large prizes and blanks were life annuities the total payments must have declined over the years. But at what pace this would happen is not clear to me.

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<sup>37</sup> *Europische Mercurius* 60 (1749) 2<sup>nd</sup> half 64-65. Against the raised f. 7.5 million raised in tickets of f. 1000 stood f. 8 million of obligations paying 3,5%. The annual cost of the lottery was f. 280,000, 3,75% of the gained capital of 7.5 million guilders.

<sup>38</sup> This is the direct forefather of the *Staatsloterij* dat is still in operation today.

<sup>39</sup> See chapter on the lottery loan of Holland.

<sup>40</sup> Dormans, *Het tekort* 145, Fokker, *Geschiedenis der loterijen*, 121: 'Tot eer der landsvaderen moet gezegd worden dat zij gedurende zeer langen tijd weerstand boden aan de verzoeking om zich van dit middel te bedienen tot stijging hunner meestal te kort schietende geldmiddelen.'

<b>Table 2: the cost of the lottery loans of the Estates-General</b>			
	<b>First lottery of, 1.5 million guilders, 1709</b>	<b>Third lottery loan of 2 million guilders, 1710</b>	<b>Fourth lottery of 1.5 million guilders, 1710</b>
<b>Prize annuities</b>	f. 79,000	f. 78,700	f. 52,400
<b>Blank tickets<sup>41</sup></b>	f. 100,500	f. 117,250	f. 94,325
<b>Prizes first and last ticket drawn</b>	f. 400	f. 400	f. 400
<b>Total</b>	f. 179,900	f. 196,350	f. 147,125
<b>Interest percentage</b>	8,975%	9,8%	9,8%

The *Europische Mercurius* provides us with information on the cost of the two lotteries of 1710 of 1.5 and 2 million guilders.<sup>42</sup> On November the 28th 1709 the subscription of the third lottery of one million guilders started. This was the second half of the second lottery of 2 million guilders, which was split in half. There were 650 life annuities between f. 4000 and f. 30 to win, the 3350 blank tickets would receive f. 15 annuities.<sup>43</sup> The drawing was supposed to take place February the 3<sup>rd</sup> 1710, but was postponed until April because of a lack of sold tickets. To boost sales the lottery was raised with one million, the number of prizes was doubled and the interest on the blanks was increased to 7%. In the terms of the lottery it was stated that all participants were allowed to convert their annuities in obligations. The prize winners could convert their annuities in obligations valued at 9 times the value of one year payment of the life annuities. So the winner of the first prize annuity of f. 4000 could convert it in obligations worth f. 36,000 with an interest of 4%. The holders of the blank tickets could convert their annuities in obligations worth 11 times the yearly payment of the annuity.<sup>44</sup> All annuities and obligation were exempted from the *100e* and *200e penning*. The total costs per year would be f. 196,350. This equals an interest percentage of 9.8%.

In May 1710 the fourth lottery of 1,5 million guilders (6000 tickets of f. 250) was opened for subscription.<sup>45</sup> There were 610 price annuities available ranging from f. 3000 to f. 50 guilders, the 5390 blanks again paid a yearly dividend of 7%. The terms and conditions of this lottery were the same as the prior one, except for the fact that the prizes and blanks were annuities with a term of 20 years instead of life annuities, and the opportunity for both the price winners and the

<sup>41</sup> 6% for the first lottery, 7% for the third and fourth lottery.

<sup>42</sup> *Europische Mercurius* 21, 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> half (1710).

<sup>43</sup> *Europische Mercurius* 21, 1<sup>st</sup> half 241 and onwards

<sup>44</sup> However, all obligations had to be at least f. 1000, so one needed several blank tickets to do this.

<sup>45</sup> *Europische Mercurius* 21 2<sup>e</sup> half 152 onwards.

bank tickets to convert their annuities into obligations at a rate of 10 times the yearly payment of the annuities. The annual cost of the lottery would be f. 147,125. This again meant an yearly payment of 9,8% on the received 1,5 million guilders.

## 2. The first lottery loan of Holland

The first lottery loan of Holland didn't come out of the blue. In 1598 the Estates of Holland thought about the idea of leasing the monopoly on lotteries. The terms and conditions were spread in the province, which led to protests from Amsterdam and Delft who recently had been given permission to organize a lottery.<sup>46</sup> Due to their protests the leasing of the monopoly was cancelled. In 1604 plans were made by the Estates of Holland to organize their own lottery, but these plans were also never realised. In the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century several designs of lotteries were sent to the Estates of Holland. For example, in 1703 a plan for a lottery loan was sent to the Estates by Johan van der Burch, a member of the regent elite of Dordrecht. The design was examined by the *Gecommitteerde Raden*, the daily government of Holland. They judged it to be an interesting plan, but rejected it because they thought it wasn't the right time for new debt issues.<sup>47</sup> It was however decided, that the plan should be re-examined in better, more peaceful times. In 1705 the possibility of a lottery was again discussed. The *Gecommitteerde Raden* wanted to sell a number of domains through a lottery, because the war had caused prizes to drop.<sup>48</sup> After a great deal of debate the plan, which was basically a traditional lottery, was finally approved and executed in 1706. Some years later the Estates of Holland lend an ear to Johan Fornenberg, who had designed a plan for a lottery in which all investors would receive their capital back.<sup>49</sup> But because of the lottery designs of the Estates-General the plan of Fornenberg was abandoned.

In June 1711 the Estates of Holland finally decided to organize a lottery loan. Why did they wait until June 1711? To answer this question we will take a closer look at the financial situation of Holland in the first months of the year 1711. We will do this by studying the correspondence of Anthonie Heinsius, Grand Pensionary of Holland between 1689 and 1720 with Willem Buys, pensionary of Amsterdam, and Bruno van der Dussen, pensionary of Gouda. This will show that the lottery was organized to answer the great financial needs of the Estates of Holland, caused by the War of Spanish Succession.

In the first months of the year 1711 Balthasar Scott, the receiver of Amsterdam, tried to raise

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<sup>46</sup> J.M. Koppenol and A. Huisman, *Daer komt de loterye met trommels en trompetten. Loterijen in de Nederlanden tot 1726* (Hilversum: Verloren, 1991) 87-89.

<sup>47</sup> J. van der Burch, *Request aan haar ed. gr. mog., de heeren staaten van Holland en Westfriesland. (1711-1712)* 76-77. Citing the resolutions of the state of Holland of Januari 18th: 'de gecommiteerden het plan hebben geexamineerd, dat de verscheyde saken haar reflexien wel meriteerende, maar dat het behelsde nieuwe negotiatien. Dewelke in zoo swaere conjuncturen van tijden, waar onder men tegenwoordig is, qualijk zijn te onderneemen nog uyttevoeren.' This undermines the idea that it was John Law who brought the lottery loans under the attention of the states of Holland.

<sup>48</sup> N.A. 3.01.04.01 archief van de Staten van Holland en West-Friesland, 1572-1795, 138: resoluties 2 jan-31 dec 1705, meeting March 20th 1705.

<sup>49</sup> Inventory of the archive of the Finance Office of Holland, 79-80.

1 million guilders in a *negotiatie* on the admiralty of Amsterdam. It seems there were a lot of problems in raising the required one million guilders. On January 11 Buys wrote to Heinsius that only 40,000 guilders had been raised by Scott.<sup>50</sup> On the 28<sup>th</sup> of January the amount raised had increased to 150,000 guilders. Two months later still only f. 230,000 had been raised. This caused Heinsius to admit to Buys that the *negotiatie*, although well prepared, isn't going according to plan (*dat die laeste negotiatie die met soo goeden overlegh is gearresteert, die voortganch niet heeft als men wel wenste*)<sup>51</sup> The financial situation was so dire, that Buys wrote that there was a serious risk of the admiralty of Amsterdam being unable to dispatch warships, bringing disgrace to the city.<sup>52</sup> On April 6 Heinsius wrote to Buys that he is 'extremely sad that the receiver Scott hasn't been able to collect more than 230,000 guilders.'<sup>53</sup> This because he had planned to use the 1 million guilders in April to pay for soldiers wages.

It is clear that something had to be done to combat the financial situation. Heinsius therefore asks Buys to 'think about the seriousness of this matter, and about how the credit of the province could be increased, and how capital could be raised more easily.'<sup>54</sup> He points out that England can raise capital through the lotteries, and that the Estates-general can raise capital when they pay 10% interest. Heinsius wonders whether other ways of raising capital are also possible. This question can only be studied in Amsterdam, because 'money has become a trade'.<sup>55</sup> This letter is crucial for understanding why a lottery was organized, because it shows that the great financial problems forced the Estates of Holland to look at other forms of raising capital.

What happens in the following weeks is not completely clear, but it is very likely that Buys and the *vroedschap* of Amsterdam were in favour of organizing a lottery. On April 30 Bruno van der Dussen wrote to Heinsius that he met Buys and the burgomasters Corver and Pancras in Amsterdam. Apparently Corver and Pancras were debating the design of a lottery, both being in favour of a lottery.<sup>56</sup> For the *Gecommitteerde Raden* the debate on the financial problems wasn't going fast enough. In a letter from to the Estates of Holland, dating the 5<sup>th</sup> of May 1711, the *Gecommitteerde*

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<sup>50</sup> A.J. Veenendaal (ed.), *De briefwisseling van Anthonie Heinsius 1702-1720* XI: 1 augustus 1710- 30 april 1711 (Den Haag: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1992) 492: 'de negotiatie door den hre Scott gaat (tot mijn groot leedwezen) zeer lanksaam voort, hebbende ontrent maar 40.000 gld tot noch toe bekomen.'

<sup>51</sup> Veenendaal, *De briefwisseling* IX, 675. Heinsius to Buys, 29-3 1711.

<sup>52</sup> Ibidem, 673, Buys to Heinsius 28-3 1711.

<sup>53</sup> Ibidem, 708, Heinsius to Buys 6-4 1711: 'ten uyerst bedroeft te sien dat d'heer ontfanger Scott niet verder tot noch toe heeft kunnen avanceren in sijn negotie als 230.000 gld.'

<sup>54</sup> Ibidem

<sup>55</sup> Ibidem. The original letter says: ' ick versoeck dat u w.e.g. de gewichticheit van de sake in ernstig overlegh wilt neemen ende met de meeste menagement die doenlijck is onderstaen op wat wijse men het credyt van de provintie soude konnen verbeeteren ende de penningen facylder bekomen. U w.e.g. soude sulx konnen doen, evenals off het raecte de generaliteit. In England hebben sij het ten volle door de loterij, ter generaliteit door de tien ten hondert. De vraegh soude wesen offer niet iets anders noch te bedencken was, maer dat kan nergens met effect ondersogt werden als tot Amsterdam, want gelt is een commercie geworden.'

<sup>56</sup> Ibidem, 773, van der Dussen to Heinsius, 3-4 1711. 'tot een loterije sijn haar ed. beyde seer genegen.

*Raden* urge the Estates to make a decision on a number of plans dealing with the financial problems of the state.<sup>57</sup> However, on May 11 the lottery design is still being discussed. For example, in the Hague Buys discussed the plan with a certain mister Bode, 'a rich young man, who having nothing to do, invested in most lotteries and therefore became a specialist on the subject.'<sup>58</sup>

On the 23th of May 1711 the Estates of Holland met at the Hague. In their meeting they discussed the design for a lottery of 6 million guilders. The plan was introduced to the members of the Estates of Holland by Grand Pensionary Heinsius.<sup>59</sup> His personal notes of the meeting mention the lottery, but not the name of the inventor of the plan. But in a letter from Heinsius to Buys, dated June 2, he writes that the Messrs. van der Dussen, Caillaud and Bologner have completed the plan for the lottery loan.<sup>60</sup> This makes it very likely that they were the designers of the lottery. There is a good chance that Caillaud and Bologner were also responsible for the design of the second lottery of Holland in 1712.<sup>61</sup> The scheme of the lottery was added to the minutes of the meeting, it is almost exactly like the final version of the lottery.

It was decided that the plan should be sent to the *Gecommitteerde Raden*, in order to examine it more thorough. On the 28<sup>th</sup> of May Jacob de la Bassecourt sent a letter to Heinsius.<sup>62</sup> The letter stated that the plan had been examined by 'Makreel, Trepsak, La Blonnière and others'.<sup>63</sup> Bassecour writes that a few minor changes were made to the plan. Also, they made sure that the lottery lived up to certain conditions made by the Estates of Holland. The most important condition was that the Estates didn't want to pay more than 9,5% a year for 20 year terms, or 7,9375% on 30 year terms. Makreel and Blonnière calculated that the plan would cost 7,75% a year, and gave therefore their consent to the plan. The records show clearly that both the Estates of Holland and the *Gecommitteerde Raden* knew what the total costs of the lottery over 30 years would be. Part of the

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<sup>57</sup> NA 3.01.04.01 723: registers van de gewone en geheime resoluties van de staten van Holland, 13 mei 20 juni 1711, fol 1: 'de verminderingh die in des gemeyne landes financiën ende inkomsten werdt versoorjaect, heeft ons gepermoveert....op het alderserieust te versoecken ende te recommanderen, dat de heren hare gedeputeerden.... gelieven te authoriseren ende te qualiferen, omme op advisen, die tot redres van voors. verval al voor eenen geruymen tyd zyn uytgebracht....conclusie te konnen helpen formeren.

<sup>58</sup> Veenendaal, *De briefwisseling* XII, 34. Buys to Heinsius 11-5 1711: zijnde een jongman van zeer groot middelen en die, niets te doen hebbende, eenigen tijd herwaarts genoegzaam in de meeste loterijen geld heeft ingelegd, en daardoor het werk van de loterijen door en door verstaat.'

<sup>59</sup> NA 3.01.04.01 145: resoluties 14 jan- 19 dec 1711, fol 263: 'De raedt-pensionaris heeft ter vergaderinge gecommuniceert een project van een loterye van ses millioenen guldens, bestaende in sestigh duysent loten, tot hondert guldens yeder lot, hem raedt-pensionaris ter handen gestelt.'

<sup>60</sup> A.J. Veenendaal (ed.), *De briefwisseling van Anthonie Heinsius 1702-1720* XII: 1 mei 1711- 31 januari 1712 (Den Haag: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1992) letter 166, 2-6 1711: 'D'heer van der Dussen gisteren hier geweest zijnde, heeft deselve nevens mess. De Bologner ende Callau de laeste hant aen het project van loterie gelegd.'

<sup>61</sup> See footnote 83.

<sup>62</sup> Veenendaal, *De briefwisseling* XII, letter 140, 28-5 1712.

<sup>63</sup> In 1714 Gratian de Trepsac wrote a letter to Heinsius with more ideas about how to make lottery loans more profitable.

discussed plan was a 'tafel van jaerlijcks beloop', showing that over 30 years the total costs would be f 9,038,120 in redemption- and f, 4,833,456 in interest payments: a total of f. 13,781,576.<sup>64</sup> On June the 2<sup>nd</sup> Heinsius and the *Gecommiterde Raden* discussed the plan, and answered to the Estates of Holland that the lottery should be executed as fast as possible.<sup>65</sup>

However, some members of the Estates of Holland still had their doubts. The *kommies* Surendonck asked whether it wouldn't be cheaper to borrow 6 million against 10%. Another delegate questioned whether it was possible to raise 6 million guilders against 5%, redeeming f. 200,000 guilders a year.<sup>66</sup> On June 7 Bruno van der Dussen wrote to Heinsius what had been replied to their questions. It was answered to the first question that he might have been right that the costs over 20 years would be lower than the cost over 30 years, but that the lottery would cost f. 135,000 per year less: f 465,000 instead of f. 600,000. The answer to the second question was that it wasn't possible in the current situation to borrow against 5%. This could only be done in a situation in which 'our neighbours do not force us through profitable conditions of issues and lotteries to abandon our ordinary interest percentage of 4%.<sup>67</sup> Van der Dussen also thinks that issuing 5% obligations will have a negative effect on the course of 4% obligations, weakening the credit of the state even further.<sup>68</sup>

On the next meeting of the Estates of Holland on June 17<sup>th</sup> the plan was finally approved. However, some minor changes in the terms and conditions were made. The drawing of the lottery was transferred from Amsterdam to the Hague, the dates were changed, and some phrases were reformulated. The stipulation that only prizes obligations above 5000 guilders could be split into smaller obligations was dropped. All large prizes could be split, as long as each obligation had at least a value of f. 2000. Also there were some aesthetic changes made to the pamphlet.<sup>69</sup>

The correspondence of Heinsius clearly showed that financial problems were the primary reason to organize the first lottery loan of Holland. The same reason is mentioned by Johan van der Burch in a pamphlet dated 1711/1712, in which he promoted 3 new lottery forms. He writes that Holland was forced by a *pressante noodzaakelykheid van Penningen*, an urgent need for capital, to

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<sup>64</sup> An example of the 'tafel van jaerlyk beloop' can be found in NA 3.01.04.01, 145 fol. 263.

<sup>65</sup> NA 3.01.04.01, 145, fol 275: 'hebben wy de punten ende articulen...aendachtelyk geexamineert, ende souden van advise sijn, dat de voors. punten ende articulen, by haer edele groot mog. gearresteert, ende ten spoedigsthen werckstelligh gemaect soude behooren te werden.' And also: 'soo mogen wij ons niet dispensereren U.E., ende de verdere leden van de hoogh-gemelde vergaderingh, op het alderserieust te versoecken, dat de selve door de heeren gedeputeerden op het aenstaende reces gelieven te autoriseren, ende the qualificeren, omme met den aenbeginnen van het selve in de voortgangh van de meer gemelde loterye te mogen bewilligen.

<sup>66</sup> Veenendaal, *De briefwisseling* XII, 122, 129-130.

<sup>67</sup> Ibidem, 129-130: 'hetzelve kan wegens den staat werkstellig gemaakt worden... wanneer onze nabuuren door beter conditiën van negotiatien of van loterijen ons niet necessiteeren om af te gaan van de proportie van de ordinaris interesten van 4%.'

<sup>68</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>69</sup> For instance, the name of the lottery was changed from 'loterye' to 'Loterye voor de provintie van Holland', and finally into 'Hollandse loterye', also the coat of arms of Holland was added. See 3.01.04.01 723 june 17<sup>th</sup>.

organize a lottery with such advantageous conditions for the investors.<sup>70</sup> The financial problems seem to be so large, that the Northern quarter wasn't able to participate in the lottery. How can we otherwise explain the fact that the 60,000 tickets were only distributed over the *ontfanger-generael* and the receivers in the Southern quarter.<sup>71</sup>

**Table 3: Distribution of lottery tickets over the receivers of the Southern quarter**

City	No. of tickets
<b>The Hague (office of <i>ontfanger-generael</i>)</b>	14,900
<b>Amsterdam</b>	10,700
<b>Dordrecht</b>	6000
<b>Haarlem</b>	6000
<b>Delft</b>	6000
<b>Leiden</b>	6000
<b>Gouda</b>	3700
<b>Rottterdam</b>	3700
<b>Gorinchem</b>	1500
<b>Brielle</b>	1500

In the meeting of the Estates of Holland of June 17<sup>th</sup> it was also decided that the *Gecommitteerde Raden* of the Southern quarter were allowed to donate a part of the income from the lottery to the *Gecommitteerde Raden* of the Northern quarter, to help with the most urgent needs of war.<sup>72</sup> However, this will only be done when the Northern quarter guarantees to pay for the redemption and interest for the sum they receive. It looks like the Northern Quarter was also unable to afford to pay both interest and redemption of a small part of the lottery. Because in a later letter of the

<sup>70</sup> Van der Burch, *Request*, 79, He also writes: 'Het word ook by my vertrouwd dat de Opstelder van die loterye van Holland geoordeeld zal hebben, dat zeder den jaare 1709 en 1710, zoo considerable verandering gekomen is ontrent de furnissemerten van gelden, boven de ordinaire en extraordinaire heffinge van gelden noodig zijnde, dat hat niet apparent was dat op min advantageuse Conditions voor de inleggers een loterye van een somme van zs millioenen zoude volkomen, en dat t zelve ook zoo by haar ed. groot mog. zal begreepen zijn geworden.'

<sup>71</sup> NA 3.01.04.01 1428 *uitgaande missives 1711*, fol. 296 'Lyste van de verdeelingh der Nombres van de Looten, toegesonden aen den Ontfanger-Generael over Hollandt en West-Vrieslandt, en aen de respective ontfangers van de gemeene Middelen in de Zuyder Quartiere.'

<sup>72</sup> NA 3.01.04.01, 145, fol 306: '[U]yt de penningen van de loterye...van tydt tot tydt eenige penningen te verstrecken, tot voldoening van de meest pressante ende noodtsackelyke lasten van den oorlog, ende dat onder soodanige precaution ende versekeringen omtrent de jaerlyksche betalinge, soo in voldoeningh van het capitael als de interesssen.'

*Gecommitteerde Raden* of the Southern quarter it is stated that the *Gecommitteerde Raden* of the Northern quarter will receive the sum of f. 600,000, paying only 1,75% interest.<sup>73</sup> Of the redemption payments nothing is mentioned in the letter.

The actual organisation of the lottery was a task of the *Gecommitteerde Raden*. To prepare the lottery a committee was formed, consisting of the Messrs. van Sterrenburgh, vanden Honert, and Graswinckel. The subscription to the first lottery of 6 million guilders opened the first of July 1711. The final report of the committee on Thursday the 3th of September gives a list of all the things that were prepared.<sup>74</sup> The drawing would take place on Monday September 7<sup>th</sup> on a wooden scaffold at the *Binnenhof*.<sup>75</sup> Two clerks, one of the office of the *finantie* and one from the *secretarie* would be present to oversee the drawing, relieving each other every time a class was finished. Before the drawing the lottery tickets and prize papers were mixed, in the presence of the members of the Estates of Holland.<sup>76</sup> The drawing would be executed by two children from the poor house in the Hague, and two servants of the Estates of Holland would announce the numbers and prizes to the listening audience. The boxes containing the tickets were guarded, and each night they were sealed and brought inside.<sup>77</sup> All the drawn numbers and prizes were written into a register by Martin Copius and Gabriel Spaan. There was also a ledger being made by Albert van Wingerden, containing for all the numbers on which day and in which class it was drawn, and what prize was won. Johan Waesteijn was responsible for making the list of large prize winners that would be printed by Scheltius. Waesteijn and Copius were also responsible for the collection of all the registers and lists each evening.

The lottery design also contained detailed information on what would happen after the drawing. Afterwards the *ontfanger-generael* and the receivers in the other cities of the southern quarter would convert the lottery tickets into *recepissen*. The *recepissen* were then converted into obligations. There were 60,000 tickets available of f 100 each. Against the tickets stood 1349 large prizes, the largest 2 prizes being f. 100,000, the smallest 525 prizes f. 300.<sup>78</sup> Furthermore, all 58,651

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<sup>73</sup> NA 3.01.04.01 1428 *uitgaande missives 1711*, fol 297: 'dat aan de heeren gecomm. raden...de sommen van 600.000 zal werden betaalt, midts dat hij bij dezelve alvorens zal moeten weden gepasseert acted daar bij dezelve zullen beloven dieswegen jaarlijks den voors tijd van 30 jaren.... t zullen betalen den voorn. interest van 1,75 ten hondert zonder omme eenige oorzaake van belet ofte anderzints, die betalingen van de voors. interessen te dilayeren ofte te verschuijven.'

<sup>74</sup> NA 3.01.05 inventaris van de archieven van de *Gecommitteerde Raden* der staten van Holland en West-Friesland, 3061, *register van resoluties*, fol. 368.

<sup>75</sup> 3061, fol. 369: 'dat tot het trecken van de voorn. loterye soude werden gestelt een bequame ende verheveene houtte stallagie op de groote saal vant hoff.'

<sup>76</sup> 3061 fol 370: 'dat de vermening van de billeten daar op de nummers, namen ende prijzen gesteldt sijn, gedaen werden ende geschieden souden ten bijweesen ende ten overstaen van de haar. ed. grot. mog. zelfs.'


<sup>77</sup> 3061 fol 369: 'dat de gemelde bussen alle avonden in het portael van de vergaderplaets vande heeren raaden end meesters van de reeckeningen over de domijnen van haer ed. groot. mog gebragt ende bewaart soude werden.'

<sup>78</sup> 1<sup>e</sup> loterye van ses millioenen, 1.

blank tickets would receive a prize of f. 120. So against the raised capital of 6 million guilders stood a total of f. 9,038,120 in prize money to be paid to the investors.

How would this be paid to the participants? First the tickets were converted into obligations of the province of Holland, payable by the *ontfanger-generael* in the Hague. The obligations were divided into 30 classes, which each year 1 class being repaid.<sup>79</sup> The first class would be paid in 1712, the last in 1741. Until the repayment by the *ontfanger-generael* all obligations were to receive interest payments. The 1349 large prizes would receive 2% a year. The 58,651 small prize obligations, on the other hand, were to be paid 4% of their invested capital of f. 100 a ticket. It was promised that the obligations would be exempted from the 100<sup>th</sup> and 200<sup>th</sup> *penning*, any special taxes and the 40<sup>th</sup> *penning* on the sale of obligations.<sup>80</sup>

*Redemption scheme lottery of 1711*



All 30 classes contained a number of small and large prizes. The 2 large prizes of f. 100,000, for example, were to be repaid in the 15<sup>th</sup> class in 1726 and the 16<sup>th</sup> class in 1727. The redemption scheme was designed in such a way that the annual total costs of the redemption of obligations and the payment of interest would be constant around f. 464,000 a year. Only in 1741 the state would

<sup>79</sup> 1<sup>e</sup> loterye van ses millioenen, 1-4.  
<sup>80</sup> Ibidem, 3.

pay much less: f. 388,164. Over 30 years the total sum to be paid was f. 9,038,120 in redemption payments and f. 4,833,456 interest: a total of f. 13,871,576. This equals an interest payment of almost 7,75% for a period of 30 years. The repayment began in July 1712. On June 9 Cornelis van Aerssen van Hoogerheide wrote to Heinsius that he needed money to pay for the interest and redemption of class 1.<sup>81</sup> The letter doesn't mention any special income earmarked to finance the payments. Van Aerssen also made clear the severity of his job and the great efforts his men had put in the lottery of 1711.

The second lottery loan closely resembled the first. That does not mean that they weren't looking for other ways of organizing the lottery in a more profitable way. In a letter from Heinsius to Buys, he asked him to study the English lottery loans to see if the Dutch lottery loans can be improved.<sup>82</sup> He also states that 'monsieur Caillaud and his partner' claim to have invented even better lotteries one of 6 million and one of 12 million guilders, but he is not sure whether that is the case.<sup>83</sup> There seems to have been a discussion about how much should be borrowed. Buys was in favour of a lottery of 9 million guilders.<sup>84</sup> Pancras and Corver thought that many investors were expecting a new lottery, and that many were willing to invest in them.<sup>85</sup> Therefore they pleaded for a lottery of 12 million guilders. Bruno van der Dussen wrote to Heinsius that money isn't scarce, but that investors demand higher interest payments than usual.<sup>86</sup> A lottery gave the investors the higher interest payments they desired. Therefore van der Dussen also desired a large lottery. A letter from J.W. Ripperda to Heinsius proves that Pancras, Corver and van der Dussen were right. Ripperda, apparently in financial need, wrote that he is unable to obtain money because half of the people uses their capital to buy the blank tickets, while the other half waits for an expected new lottery.<sup>87</sup> This clearly shows that the authorities looked at what happened on the market, and acted accordingly.

Finally it was decided to organize the lottery of 12 million guilders, double the amount of the last lottery. The lottery of 1712 was divided in 60,000 tickets of f. 200 each. There were 4616 large

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<sup>81</sup> Veenendaal, *De briefwisseling* XIII 1 februari-31 augustus 1712, letter 647, 9-6 1712.

<sup>82</sup> Ibidem, XII letter 896, 27-11 1711: 'Ick versoeck U wel edel gestrenge advys gedient te weesen, ingevalle de state weer tot een loterij mochte resolveren, off men uyt de exemplen in Englant iets tot verbeetering soo van de loterie als de method soude konnen erlangen.'

<sup>83</sup> Ibidem, letter 897: 'Monsieur Caillaud en sijn medeconfrater pretenderen noch beetere uytgevonden te hebben als de laeste ende oock profitabelder voor de Staet, maer off daerop staet te maken is weet ick niet.'

<sup>84</sup> Ibidem, letter 1026, 27-12 1711.

<sup>85</sup> Ibidem, letter 1031: 'dat men niet anders can bespeuren als een generale inclinatie onder veele om op die manier van haar geld te disponeren.'

<sup>86</sup> Ibidem: 'Na alle de informatien die ik heb connen nemen, is het geld in sig selfs wel niet schaars, maar yder pretendeert te bedingen veel hooger interessens als ordinaris.'

<sup>87</sup> Ibidem, letter 769, 28-5 1712: 'daer niet mogelijk is het geldt te bekomen, alsoo de menschen voor hun contanten die nieten van de loterij opkooopen, en andere het niet willen uitgeven omdat tegemoet sien date en tweede loterij sal worden getrocken.'

prizes available with a total value of f. 4,332,000, and all 55,385 blank tickets would receive small prizes with a value between f. 210 and f. 290, for a total of f. 13,764,760. This meant that against the 12 million guilders raised, f. 18,096,760 had to be repaid. The second lottery loan of Holland in 1712 had a redemption scheme almost similar to the one of the previous lottery.<sup>88</sup> Just like the lottery of 1711, the prize obligations were to be repaid in 30 years, paying in the meantime an interest of 2% on the large prizes and 4% of f. 200 on the small prize tickets. Each year an amount around f. 900,000 had to be paid by Holland, making a total of f. 26,972,242 over 30 years.<sup>89</sup>

The third lottery of 6 million seems to have been less successful. Balthasar Scott writes in April 1714 that investors are not very keen of investing in the lottery.<sup>90</sup> In October D. Lestevenon writes that in his opinion, everything must be done to sell all lottery tickets.<sup>91</sup> He suggests advertising in the *couranten* and a temporary suspension of all other lotteries. In November the situation hasn't improved. Again Balthasar Scott writes to Heinsius that the sale of tickets is going slow. The lack of enthusiasm for the third lottery was probably caused by doubts about the credit worthiness of Holland. At the time the Estates-General suffered from great financial problems. In 1714 they were 3.6 million guilders behind in interest payments and the following year the Estates-General even had to suspend all interest payments on the total debt of f. 60 million.<sup>92</sup> Holland also experienced financial problems after the war, the main problem being that the annual expenses of Holland were 7.2 million guilders higher than before the war.<sup>93</sup> It is likely that in this climate investors weren't very keen to invest in the third lottery. For the third lottery loan of 1713 no information on the redemption scheme is available. It is however likely that the payment structure was similar to the first 2 lotteries. This suggests an annual payment of around the f. 464,000. So if you add the costs of all 3 lotteries up, it would cost Holland f. 1,828,000 a year for a period of 30 year: an interest percentage of 7,6%.

This chapter clearly shows that the lottery loans were the answer to a problem. Around 1711 the province was unable to raise new debt under the normal conditions because investors demanded higher interest payments. Holland was forced to listen to the market and raise the payments made on new debt issues. The lottery loans were specifically designed as lucrative investments opportunities. The first lottery was a success, and apparently enough wealth owners were willing to

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<sup>88</sup> All information and Redemption scheme lottery taken from *Europische Mercurius* 23 (1712) 1<sup>st</sup> part, 87 onwards

<sup>89</sup> Redemption prize money f. 18,096,760 and f. 8,875,482 interest payments.

<sup>90</sup> Veenendaal, *De briefwisseling* XV 1 mei 1713-30 april 1714, letter 1038: 'dan den toeloop na proportie van vorige weken gansch niet wackkert. De negotiatie gaat van gelijken seer langzaam voort, zijnde de beleggers niet gerust van selfs een jaar vrij te sullen trecken.'

<sup>91</sup> *Ibidem*, XVI 1 mei 1714-30 april 1715, letter 488, 21-10-1714: 'men moet alles practiseren wat mogelijk is om deese loterij te completeren.'

<sup>92</sup> Dormans, *Het tekort*, 147.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibidem*, 82.

invest in a lottery that a second lottery loan of 12 million guilder also was fully subscribed. The third lottery loan proved more problematic, because the financial difficulties after the war made investors weary.

### 3. The prize ledgers

We have seen that the demand of higher interest payments by investors forced the Estates of Holland to organize the lottery loans. In the next two chapters we will take a closer look at the investors. First we will look at who invested in the lottery, and in the next chapter we will examine the motives to invest. We can learn more about the investors of the lottery through the administration kept by the Finance Office of Holland. Of class 25-30 of the small prize tickets I have entered all ticket holders in one file. The result is a list of 6371 different ID numbers, owning a total of 16,323 of the 58,651 small prize tickets (27,83%). The large prize ledger contains all large prize holders of class 3-30. Put together in a file, the result was a list of 1778 ID numbers with a value of f. 1,973,900, 98,7% of the large prize money

The Finance Office was the heart of the provinces financial administration, performing many of the fiscal tasks of the *Gecommitteerde Raden*, the executive board of the Estates of Holland, which prepared and executed decisions of the Estates of Holland.<sup>94</sup> Created around 1624, the Finance office was responsible for the registration of forthcoming payments and the monitoring of all income of Holland. This meant that the Finance Office did the bookkeeping for the term- and life-annuities, obligations, loans etc. issued by Holland. Since the audit chambers were notoriously lax in their duties, the Finance Office was also important for the preparation of fiscal policy.<sup>95</sup> In 1711 between 15 and 20 clerks and bookkeepers were working at the Finance Office.<sup>96</sup> Furthermore, the *thesaurier-generaal* and the *advocaat-fiscaal* were in close touch with the Finance Office, holding a watchful eye on it.<sup>97</sup>

The Finance Office was also responsible for the administration of the lotteries of 1711, 1712 and 1713. Most of that administration is lost, but luckily 2 ledgers of the first lottery of July 1711 can be found in the archive of the Finance Office: one containing the small prize ticket winners of class 24-30, and one containing the large prize holders of class 3-30. In the ledgers the names of the participants are mentioned, often including information on when the obligation was redeemed. The ledgers give us the opportunity to study the investors more closely: who where they, how much did they invest in the lottery, and when where their tickets finally redeemed?

In this chapter several topics will be treated. First we will look at the percentage of tickets of which we do not know the owner and the motives for not entering a name in the prize ledgers. Second, we will study the distribution of the tickets over the players through the use of a Lorenz

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<sup>94</sup> W. Fritschy, 'The Efficiency of Taxation in Holland', in: Gelderblom (ed.) *The Political Economy of the Dutch Republic* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009) 59.


<sup>95</sup> Fritschy, 'The Efficiency of Taxation in Holland', 60.

<sup>96</sup> Ibidem, 63. In 1680 the Office employed 15 persons, in 1750 20.


<sup>97</sup> Inventaris Archief financie 36.

curve. In the third section the gender distribution of the tickets will be examined. How many women participated in the lottery and how large was the share of tickets they owned? We will also look at the institutions that invested in the lottery.

**Circle graph 1: known and unknown tickets**



**Circle graph 2: tickets without a known owner**



## The tickets without known owner

The first question we need to answer is of how many investors we know the name. The 6371 ID-numbers have a total value of f. 1,958,760, 27% of the total value of the tickets.<sup>98</sup> This equals 16,323 small prize tickets. Of the 16,323 small prize tickets, we know the owners of 11,282 tickets (69,12%). This means that of 5041 tickets (30,88%) we do not know the owner (see graph 1 & 2 on page 26). The tickets without identifiable owners can be further divided into several categories. For most of tickets without known owners 'N.N.' is written in the ledger, standing for *nomen nescio*. Of 20,5% of the tickets only initials are written down in the ledger. By 12,5% nothing at all is written, and by 7,8% of the tickets 'toonder' or 'toonder deses' is written down. The 5041 tickets without known owner have a total value of f. 604,920.

The question is why for 30% of the tickets no owner is written down in the ledger. For this question there are two possible answers. The first is that the tickets were bought by mutual funds. From 1670 onwards capital tontines bound groups of investors together.<sup>99</sup> The participants in a tontine would buy shares in a block of securities. Over time, some of the investors would die, resulting in the other participants receiving a larger share of interest and dividend. A specified number of the survivors eventually obtained the securities.<sup>100</sup> Tontines existed in all forms and shapes, varying between 10 and over a 100 participants. The lottery was probably an interesting investment opportunity for tontines. Not only did it promise high returns, but the chance of winning a large prize also increased if participants pooled their resource through a tontine. The participation of tontines and investment groups can also perhaps explain the use of initials like M.A.E.V.L. and A.V.N: it could be names of the tontine groups.<sup>101</sup>

For the second possibility we must return to the letter J.W. Ripperda wrote to Heinsius. Ripperda wrote that he cannot borrow any money because people are using it to buy the blank tickets of the last held lottery. The most logical answer to why people would do that, is that there was a group of investors who were interested in purchasing a lottery ticket with the hope of winning a large prize, but had no intention of becoming a long time-creditor to the state. This were likely the smaller investors who didn't want to put any efforts in the yearly collection of interest payments, and preferred cash over securities. On the other hand there must have been a group of investors who, aware of the fact that the obligations were exempt from the *100e* and *200e penning*, were

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<sup>98</sup> Total value of small tickets: 58,651x f. 120= f. 7,038,120.

<sup>99</sup> O. Gelderblom and J. Jonker, 'With a view to hold: The emergence of institutional investors on the Amsterdam securities market during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries', in: J. Atack and L. Neal (eds.) *The Origins and Development of Financial Markets and Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 91, The name derives from Lorenzo Tonti, who proposed this kind of plans to cardinal Mazarin in the 1650s.

<sup>100</sup> Gelderblom and Jonker, 'With a view to hold', 91.

<sup>101</sup> Another possibility is that it stood for certain phrase, like the *prosen* of the traditional lotteries.

interested in buying these small prize obligations. The fact that all prize obligations were also exempted from the *40e penning* when sold or mortgaged, suggests that the Estates of Holland stimulated a secondary market in prize obligations. Making the obligations to bearer or N.N. made it easier to sell them on the secondary market. It is possible that the *recepissen* were bought by larger investors. When the *recepissen* were converted the new owners, in possession of large amounts of tickets, weren't willing to go down to the receivers office to register under their own name and therefore chose to register under N.N. Another possibility is that this was already done by the first owners. What the exact difference is between N.N., *toonder deses* and simply writing nothing is not entirely clear. The difference is likely only very minor, with all three variants making it possible to sell easy.<sup>102</sup>

### **The distribution of tickets over the investors**


The 11,282 small prize obligations of who we know the possessor, were owned by 2248 different investors. In this section we will take a look at the how the tickets were distributed over the 2248 investors. In the next section we will look at the gender division of the obligations. The 2248 owners can be divided into the following categories: men, women, a man and woman together, groups and institutions. The majority of the investors are men: almost 72%. Women make up 25,7% of the investors. The groups and institutions are definitely small fry, together making up just 3% of the 2248 known investors. The fact that 2248 investors owned 11,282 small prize tickets, gives an average of 5 tickets per person. The distribution of the tickets over the investors was however much more uneven. The data shows that there was a small group of investors that possessed a large share of the tickets. Over half of the 2248 investors owned just 1 or 2 tickets, 14% of the 11,282 tickets with known owners. On the other end of the spectre, the 5 investors with more than a 100 tickets (0.2% of the 2248 investors) together owned 604 tickets, 5.4% of 'known' tickets.

When we put this results in a Lorenz curve we can take a closer look at the distribution of the tickets over the investors. The curve shows us exactly the percentage of total tickets hold by a percentage of the investors. The 'perfect equality line' shows the situation in which all investors possessed the same amount of tickets: 10% of the investors owns 10% of the obligations, 20% of the investors own 20% of the obligations, etc. The other lines show the real distribution of the tickets for the men and women separately, and for all 2248 investors. It clearly shows that the distribution was very unequal. 50% Of the investors own only 14% of the tickets, the 80% of investors with 6 or less tickets own 37% of the obligations, and the 91% of investors with 10 or less tickets own 55% of all obligations with a known owner. This means that there is a small group of 198 investors possessing

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<sup>102</sup> On the other hand, in the prize ledger N.N and *toonder deses* are used directly following each other.

5002 tickets. When we split this small group even further, we see that just 92 investors (4,1%) own 3526 obligations (31,25%). The line in the graph that includes the unknown tickets is calculated from the situation in which all owners of unknown tickets were small investors owning 2 tickets.



	investors	Percentage investors	no. of tickets	Percentage all tickets
<b>Men</b>	16177	71,93%	8278	73,37%
<b>Women</b>	577	25,67%	2665	23,62%
<b>Groups</b>	26	1,16%	206	1,83%
<b>Male &amp; female together</b>	18	0,80%	74	0,66%
<b>Institutions</b>	10	0,44%	59	0,52%
<b>Total</b>	2248	100,00%	11,282	100,00%

An interesting aspect to the distribution of tickets over the investors is that the percentages of tickets all groups hold closely resemble their percentage of total investors: the 72% male investors held 73.4% of the tickets, the women held 23,5% of the tickets and the other groups owned 3%. So the average men holds 5,1 tickets and the average woman 4,6. This is not a very large difference. Furthermore, the Lorenz curve of the men and women also look alike, meaning that the distribution of the small prize tickets among the investors also are very similar. However, the Lorenz curve of the men is a bit closer to the perfect equality line than the Lorenz curve of the women, meaning that the distribution of lottery tickets is more uneven among the women. This shows best in the top of the Lorenz curve, where the top 1.5% of the men owns around 20% of the male tickets, the top 1,25% females own 21% of the female tickets

The uneven distribution can tell us something about for whom the lottery was intended. For the first English lottery loans it has been argued that, since the lottery tickets were much cheaper than other forms of government debt, it attracted a larger part of the population.<sup>103</sup> The habit of splitting tickets into several shares even increased the number of people that could afford at least a part of a lottery ticket and thus participate in the English public debt. Thomas Neale clearly stated that his goal was to allow the 'many Thousands who only have small sums, and cannot now bring them into the Publick, to engage themselves in this fund.'<sup>104</sup> Murphy thinks he succeeded in his ambition, attracting 'tens of thousands of adventurers.'<sup>105</sup>

For the Dutch lottery loans the situation could be different. First there is the question of the costs of the tickets. In the first lottery loans of Holland and the Estates-general the tickets cost between f.100 and f. 250. Since the wage of an artisan was around the f. 300 at the time it is not likely that they could easily invest in tickets. But through tontines this problem could be overcome, making it possible for a larger group to invest in the lotteries than in other forms of government debt. However, in the later lottery loans the tickets cost around f. 1000 each, often (partially) payable in other forms of government debt. This means that investors already had to possess other forms of debt in order to invest in the new lotteries, making it less likely that small investors participated. Also, there is the fact of the uneven distribution with 20% of the investors in the lottery of 1711 owning 2/3 of the tickets. All this suggests that the lotteries were aimed at the well-to-do who already possessed obligations.


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<sup>103</sup> Murphy, lotteries 1690s, 231.


<sup>104</sup> Neal, *A profitable adventure*, quoted in Murphy 231.

<sup>105</sup> Murphy 231. However, in 1711 and 1712 the English state organized lottery loans with tickets of L 100. It is unlikely they could be afforded by anybody but the rich. See Dickson 72-73

**Circle graph 3: division**



**Circle graph 4: division per number of tickets**



## **Gender division**

Mortimer wrote in his *Every Man His Own Broker*, that stock dealing was an activity 'suitable for patriotic and prudent gentlemen, but ill advised and dangerous for women', whose 'ignorance, joined to a propensity for gaming' made them fit to invest only with male relatives serving as a medium.<sup>106</sup> Visual and written representations of the South Sea Bubble even portrayed the traders as feminised men guided by the fickle goddess Fortuna.<sup>107</sup> However, women did possess stocks and bond and were active on the secondary market, both in England and the Dutch Republic. But the question is whether the women were active participants or mere names used by male relatives. This question cannot be answered easily, however I think that it is safe to say that at least a part of the women (especially widows and spinsters) were active as individuals. To compare the share of female ownership in the lottery of 1711 we will look at the work by Neal, Carlos and Maguire on women investors in the Bank of England and the Royal African Company during the South Sea Bubble, and van den Heuvel's study on female entrepreneurship in the Northern Netherlands.

For the Bank of England Neal and Carlos used the transfer books, which shows all sales and purchases, and four 'alphabet ledgers', which lists all share owners at a point in time, for the period between 1720 and 1725.<sup>108</sup> In 1720 6844 transactions took place with an average value of £ 871. Of the 2233 different sellers, 406 were women (18%), and of the 2304 buyers 366 were women (16,3%).<sup>109</sup> Because the average transaction was almost £ 200 lower than the average value of all transactions, women comprised of only 13% of the total market value of the transactions. However, it is very likely that women were less active in the secondary market than men, because of certain restrictions women suffered in everyday-live. That is why it is more important to look at the percentage of shares owned by women rather than the trade in shares by women. The stock ledgers show that of the 7924 individuals that owned shares of the Bank of England between September 1720 and September 1725, 21% was female. In 1720 there were 640 women out of a total 3163 shareholders (20%), holding £ 602,483, 10.8% of the total capital stock.<sup>110</sup> By 1725 a same percentage of women owned 14,5% of the total capital stock, which in the mean time had increased from £ 5.5 to almost £ 9 million.<sup>111</sup> For the Royal African Company the situation was different. Founded in 1672, it had paid dividend for the last time in 1707, and since there were in 1720 no

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<sup>106</sup> Thomas Mortimer, *Every Man His Own Broker*, quoted in: Freeman, M., R. Pearson and J. Taylor, 'A doe in the city: Women shareholders in eighteenth-and early nineteenth-century Britain,' *Accounting, Business & Financial History* 16 (2006) 281.

<sup>107</sup> Freeman, 'A doe in the city', 280.

<sup>108</sup> Carlos, A.M., and L. Neal, 'Women investors in early capital markets, 1720-1725', *Financial History Review* 11 (2004) 209.

<sup>109</sup> Carlos, 'Women investors', 209.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibidem*, 220.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibidem* 220.

expectations of new payments, all trade in shares of the Company during the South Sea Bubble must have been with speculative gains in mind.<sup>112</sup> In 1720 84 women were involved in 119 of a total of 1100 transactions with company stock (10,2%), with a value of 6% of the total transactions.<sup>113</sup> This is clearly much less than the activity of women in the Bank of England. This suggests that women were, contrary to the beliefs in those days, more conservative than male investors. Freeman, Pearson and Taylor have made a list showing women as a proportion of total shareholders for 86 stock companies between 1705 and 1886. They found out that of a total of 41,450 shareholders, 4385 (10.6%) were women, holding 5,4% of the total subscribed capital.<sup>114</sup> This means that the relative importance of female stock owners measured in total stock value was much lower than measured per caput.<sup>115</sup> In other words, female investors owned on average less shares than male investors.

But how about female investors in the Netherlands? The Amsterdam tax register of 1742 shows that 475 women were recorded as trader, out of a total of 4542.<sup>116</sup> The files of the *Wisselbank* for the same year show that 13% of the accountholders were women, with 64% calling themselves *rentier*, and 30% trader. The share of woman accountholders had steadily risen from 5% in 1646 and 10% in 1706 to 13% in 1742. How active were these *rentier* women on the market? After 1700 more and more merchant bankers start operating. According to van der Heuvel this was a role suited for women.<sup>117</sup> As these women were active in the money lending business, it is very likely that they were also active in the bond market.

So compared to the share of female investors in other undertakings, the share of female participation in the first lottery was quite high, with 26% of the investors holding 23% of the tickets. Carlos and Neal conclude that women appear to be somewhat more conservative than men.<sup>118</sup> If this would also hold for Dutch investors, the high share of female investors could signify, that the lottery was considered a lucrative yet relative safe investment.

## Institutions

Through the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century, charitable institutions, guilds and churches possessed portfolios with real estate and securities. After 1700 the focus of the portfolios shifts from real estate into securities like VOC shares and obligations of Holland.<sup>119</sup> Gelderblom and Jonker show that at the end

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<sup>112</sup> Carlos, A.M., K. Maguire and L. Neal, 'Financial acumen, women speculators, and the Royal African company during the South Sea bubble', *Accounting, Business & Financial History* 16 (2006) 221.

<sup>113</sup> Carlos, 'Financial acumen', 228.

<sup>114</sup> Freeman, 'A doe in the city', 268-273.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibidem*, 273.

<sup>116</sup> D. van den Heuvel, *Women and entrepreneurship. Female traders in the Northern Netherlands c. 1580-1815* (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2007) 231.

<sup>117</sup> Van den Heuvel, *Women and entrepreneurship*, 240.

<sup>118</sup><sup>118</sup> Carlos, 'Women investors', 217.

<sup>119</sup> Gelderblom and Jonker, 'With a view to hold', 75-76.

of the 18<sup>th</sup> century Amsterdam's civic welfare institutions possessed substantial investment portfolios, worth 4,3 million guilders at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>120</sup> The emergency funds of guilds also possessed securities. Since the lotteries were profitable investment opportunities, it seem likely that institutions also invested them. However, of the 16,323 small prize tickets in the ledger, only 59 were owned by what we could label institutions (0.66%). Also, no tickets owned by the *Burgerweeshuis*, who owned by far the most securities of Amsterdam's' civic institutions, can be found. Of the institutions we do find, some are charitable institutions, like the orphanage of Zaendijck and Koogh, the Portuguese orphanage in Amsterdam, and the regents of the st.Jorisgasthuijs in Delft.<sup>121</sup> Other institutional investors were guilds, like the Haarlem guild of skippers and the labour guilds or *arbeijders* gilden. The latter won a large prize of f.1000. Why the parnasim, or leaders of the Jewish community of Amsterdam and the university of Leiden invested in the lottery is not clear. Most of the institutions invested only small sums, except for the administrators over the goods of the Frisian remonstrant poor. They owned 37 small prize obligations with a value of f. 4440. Churches were also active in the lottery of 1711. The Remonstrant churches of Utrecht and Hoorn, and the Walloon church of Rotterdam all invested in the lottery.<sup>122</sup>

Why can we find only such a small amount of tickets belonging to the institutions? One possibility is that other institutions chose to register their tickets to bearer or N.N. This would give the institutions the advantage of a selling the obligations more easily on the secondary market. It is also possible that other institutions, like the *Burgerweeshuis*, simply did not invest in the lottery. This looks strange, because the lottery was more profitable than the ordinary obligations of Holland at the time. But this can be explained by the fact that the *Burgweeshuis* was exempt from paying the *100e* and *200e penning*.<sup>123</sup> This means that the orphanage received 4% interest on the ordinary bonds of Holland, the same percentage as the small prize obligations. This made the small prize obligations a less interesting form of investment.

### Religious investors

In the 17<sup>th</sup> century lotteries were attacked by Calvinist synods. In the first half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century Calvinist synods spoke out against the lotteries. For example, the local synod of South Holland of 1623 held a debate about the question whether lotteries should exist, and how they could be

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<sup>120</sup> Ibidem, 82.

<sup>121</sup> Both orphanages owned 1 ticket, the st.Jorisgasthuijs owned 3 tickets.

<sup>122</sup> The Utrecht church owned 5 tickets, the Hoorn church 3 and the Walloon church in Rotterdam owned 4.

<sup>123</sup> Gelderblom and Jonker, 'With a view to hold', 76.

banished.<sup>124</sup> It was decided that lotteries should be abolished. In 1641 the synod of Utrecht expressed the same thought about lotteries. But the ideas of the synod were not followed by the Estates of Holland and Utrecht. Only in Zeeland the provincial Estates decided to abolish lotteries. The influence of Calvinism limited the organization of lotteries until the 1650s. But from the second half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century more lotteries and more lotteries were organized. The synods also didn't discuss lotteries anymore. So religious doubts seemed to wane after 1650. However, both Fokker and Dormans believed that because of religious doubts lotteries were not organized until 1709 by the Estates-General.

The prize ledgers show that around 1711 lotteries were not only tolerated by the church, but that ministers even invested in the first lottery loan of Holland. As we have seen in the previous section on institutions, the remonstrant churches of Utrecht and Hoorn, and the Walloon church of Rotterdam owned small prize obligations. Furthermore, 13 ministers possessed a total of 66 small prize tickets. 3 Ministers also owned large prize obligations.<sup>125</sup> Most ministers owned between 1 and 5 small prize tickets. Bernardus Sandijck however, owned 29 small prize obligations. Why Bernardus Sandijck, who worked in the Hague at the time, owned so much tickets is not clear. There is also not much information available on the other ministers. Of Arnoldus Verweij it is clear that he served as minister in Noortwijck, and of Abraham Boddens we know that he was a minister of the Walloon church of Rotterdam. It is also likely that the 2 French ministers, David Brunier and Isaac Senebier were Huguenots. But of the other ministers we do not know where they came from and what their precise denomination was. Since two of the churches that invested in the lottery were Remonstrant churches, it is possible that a number of ministers were members of the Remonstrant church, which is less strict than other Calvinist groups. But we don't know this for sure. However, the fact that ministers actively invested in the lottery does suggest that religious doubts about lottery didn't play a large part in the decision by the Estates-general and Estates of Holland not to organize lottery loans until 1709.

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<sup>124</sup> Inventory Financie van Holland, 78: 'off loterijen opreghden wel mag bestaan ende soo niet, hoe die geweert werden'.

<sup>125</sup> Petrus Bosch owned an obligation of f.500 in class 21, fol 14 no 91, Johannes Menso onwed an obligation of f.1000 in class 19 fol 2 no 9, and Bernardus Sandijck owned an obligation of f. 1000 in class 27 fol 6 no 38.

<b>Table 5: small prize obligations owned by religious institutions and men</b>		
<b>Name</b>	<b>Tickets</b>	<b>Amount</b>
<b>Sandijck, dominee Bernardus</b>	29	3480
<b>Couwenburgh, dominee Petrus van</b>	6	720
<b>De remonstrante kerk binnen Utrecht</b>	5	600
<b>Boddens, Dominee Abraham, predikant in de walse gemeente tot Amsterdam</b>	5	600
<b>Brunier, David, ministre Francoijs</b>	5	600
<b>Senebier, Isaac, ministre de Geneve</b>	5	600
<b>De Walsche diaconie van Rotterdam</b>	4	480
<b>De remonstrante kerk tot Hoorn</b>	3	360
<b>Cla, dominee du</b>	3	360
<b>Pama, dominee Petrus</b>	3	360
<b>Bosch, dominee Petrus</b>	2	240
<b>Menso, dominee Johannes</b>	2	240
<b>Verweij, Arnoldus, predikant tot Noortwijk</b>	2	240
<b>Visschers, dominee Adam</b>	2	240
<b>Bosch, dominee Cornelis</b>	1	120
<b>Swartendijck, dominee</b>	1	120

## 4. The investors of the lottery

The high ticket price of later lotteries and the fact that they had to be partially paid in securities, suggest that the lottery loans were aimed at the well-to-do who were already active in the market for bonds. For the first lottery loan the situation could have been different because the tickets were only f. 100 a piece. But an investigation of the ticket owners of the first lottery loan of 1711 shows that a small group of investors owned a large share of the tickets. For example, the 25 largest known small prize ticket holders owned a total of 1804 tickets, 11,1% of all tickets in classes 25-30 and 16% of all tickets hold by known investors. This suggest that the first lottery loan also targeted the well-to-do already possessing obligations. In this chapter we will take a closer look at the investors: who where they, what was their place in society, and what were their motives to invest in the lottery?

It would be a Sisyphean task to identify all 2248 participants, especially in the limited space of a master thesis. That is why I will focus on only a number of individuals and families, all coming from the group of large investors in the lottery. In this way I am neglecting the large majority of investors, but it is important to realise that the 100 largest investors, less than 5% of the 2248 owners, possess 23,19% of all tickets and even 33,55% of the tickets hold by identifiable owners. So even though only a small number of investors are discussed, together they own a large share of the prize obligations.

Some of the investors written down in the ledger are still known now-a-days. For example, Anthony van Leeuwenhoek, often called the father of microbiology, owned a small prize ticket.<sup>126</sup> Another famous person, at least among economic historians, that we find in the ledgers is John Law, the man responsible for the Mississippi Bubble.<sup>127</sup> He won a large prize of f. 500 in class 28.

We will see that many of the biggest investors were a part of the *regent* elite of the Dutch Republic, and more specifically the elite of Amsterdam. Some of the largest investors were actively involved in the development of the first lottery. Other large investors held no public office, but were closely connected to the regime through family ties. It is possible that they bought large numbers of tickets to support the regime. Of course, there were also a number of large investors who invested in the lottery because they saw it as a profitable investment.

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<sup>126</sup> Small prize ledger, class 26 fol. 36 no. 342.

<sup>127</sup> Large prize ledger class 28 fol. 7 no. 50. Law lived in the Republic in the first decade of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. See J. Hamilton, 'John Law of Lauriston: Banker, Gamester, Merchant, Chief?' *The American Economic Review* 57 (1967) 273-282.

<b>Table 6: top-25 investors of the lottery of 1711<sup>128</sup></b>			
	<i>Name</i>	<i>Small prize tickets</i>	<i>total value in f.</i>
<b>1</b>	Pancras, dhr. Burgemeester Gerbrant, Michielsz.	141	16,920
<b>2</b>	Normandie, Johan Anthonij de	138	16,560
<b>3</b>	Flines, Christina de, weduwe Jacob Leeuw	120	14,400
<b>4</b>	Bontekoningh, Floris	105	12,600
<b>5</b>	Borghees, de vrouwe van	100	12,000
<b>6</b>	Zuasso, den baron	88	10,560
<b>7</b>	Taerlinck, Jan van	87	10,440
<b>8</b>	Coninck, vrouwe Helena, weduwe Pieter de Wit	78	9360
<b>9</b>	Eijghels, dhr. Pieter	77	9240
<b>10</b>	Wijbrants, vrouwe Helena, weduwe van Simon Veneman	75	9000
<b>11</b>	Meer, Jeremias van den	73	8760
<b>12</b>	Repelaer, Margareta	66	7920
<b>13</b>	Trip, vrouwe Margareta, Samuels	61	7320
<b>14</b>	Victor, de voogden over de onmondige kinderen van Louis	60	7200
<b>15</b>	Tiellens, vrouwe Elisabeth, weduwe van de heer Benjamin Poulle	57	6840
<b>16</b>	Bicker van Swieten, dhr Gerard, de jonge	54	6480
<b>17</b>	Vicq, dhr Francoijs de	52	6240
<b>18</b>	Corver, Jan, de jonge	50	6000
<b>19</b>	E.N.	50	6000
<b>20</b>	Wright, Joseph	50	6000
<b>21</b>	Parmentier, dhr. Carel	49	5880
<b>22</b>	Schuijlenburgh, dhr Willem Hendrick van	49	5880
<b>23</b>	Graeff, dhr Cornelis de	46	5520
<b>24</b>	Tonneman, Geronimo	45	5400
<b>25</b>	Verhamme, Abraham	42	5040

<sup>128</sup> Source: NA 01.03.29 432 small prize winners class 25-30. In Appendix A biographies can be found of a selection of large investors.

The largest investor in classes 25-30 was burgomaster Gerbrand Michielsz. Pancras. He owned a total of 141 tickets with a value of f. 16,920. Furthermore, he won 9 large prizes with a total value of f. 15,900. This makes a total of 150 tickets. This largest prize was worth f.10,000, divided over 5 obligations.<sup>129</sup> He probably also invested in other classes, as he won large prizes in classes 7,17, 19, 21 and 22.<sup>130</sup> In class 25 Pancras owned 20 tickets, 40 in class 26, 31 in class 27 (including the large prize), 36 in class 28, only the 2 large prizes in class 29 and finally 15 in class 30. If we assume that he invested in all 30 classes, and we use the average amount of tickets for the classes 25-30, he would have owned a 705 small prize obligations with a total value of f. 84,600. However, it is likely that investors like Pancras preferred the obligations of the later classes because they paid interest for the longest periods. This makes it difficult to make a reliable estimation of the total of tickets he owned.

The Pancras family was a prominent regent family. Both the grandfather and the uncle of Gerbrand served as burgomaster of Amsterdam. Gerbrand himself also had a long career in city government. He was a member of the *vroedschap* between 1692 and his death in 1721, he served as *schepen* and *hoofdschout*, and he was 12 times burgomaster between 1702 and 1721.<sup>131</sup> As burgomaster he was actively involved in the organization of the first lotteries. In chapter 2 we saw that he was present at the meeting of the Estates of Holland in which the lottery of 1711 was first discussed, and that he was also active in the discussion about the size of the lottery of 1712.

When we look at the other Amsterdam delegates present at the meetings of the Estates-general in the summer of 1711, we see that almost all invested in the first lottery.<sup>132</sup> For example, Joan de Graeff (1673-1714), lord of Zuid-Polsbroek, possessed 32 small prize obligations with a value of f. 3840, and 4 large prizes with a total value of f. 1900. He served the city of Amsterdam as alderman and member of the *vroedschap*. Relatives of Joan de Graeff also invested in the lottery. His older brother Cornelis de Graeff, lord of Purmerland and Ilpendam, owned 46 small prize obligations with a value of f. 5400. Cornelis suffered from a mental illness, and spent most of his days in ward in his castle in Ilpenstein. This makes it likely that it was his brother Joan who decided to invest in the lottery on behalf of his brother. His sister Agneta de Graeff possessed 13 small prize obligations.

Another example is Jan Six II (1678-1750). As a member of the *vroedschap* he was also present at the meetings of the Estates of Holland deciding on the organisation of the lottery of 1711. Between 1719 and 1748 he was 15 times burgomaster of Amsterdam. He was married to the sister of Lieve Geelvinck, lord of Castricum and 12 times burgomaster of Amsterdam between 1720 and 1743.

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<sup>129</sup> Large prize ledger class 27 fol. 1 no. 4-8.

<sup>130</sup> Large prize ledger, f. 2000 class 7, fol. 3 no. 12, f. 300 in class 17 fol. 6 no 43, f. 500 in class 19 fol. 2 no. 10, f. 100 and f. 300, combined in class 21 fol. 1 no. 2 and f. 1000 in class 22 fol. 1 no. 2.

<sup>131</sup> J.E. Elias, *De vroedschap van Amsterdam 1578-1795* II (Haarlem: Loosjes, 1905) 627.

<sup>132</sup> The delegates were Balthasar Scott, Gerbrand Pancras, Jan Six II, Jacob de la Bassecourt, Nicolaes van Bambeek, Joan de Graeff, Jacob van der Dusen and Willem Buys.

This shows that Jan Six was very much embedded in the centre of power of Amsterdam. Jan Six possessed 35 small prize tickets divided over 2 classes: 20 in class 29 and 15 in class 30.<sup>133</sup> His brother-in-law Lieve Geelvinck also owned 12 small prize obligations.

Another man present at the meetings of the Estates of Holland was Balthasar Scott. Between 1707 and 1735 he held the position of receiver in Amsterdam. Through this function he was actively involved in the financial policy of Holland. He was also responsible for the sale of the lottery tickets in Amsterdam. He owned 10 small prize tickets in class 29, but also won a large prize of f. 50,000 in class 13.<sup>134</sup> His brother Everard and sister Cornelia Eliana also invested in the lottery.<sup>135</sup> The other delegates of Amsterdam were also active in the lottery, but owned only small numbers of tickets in class 25-30.<sup>136</sup> However, some of their direct relatives did own large numbers of tickets. For example, the grand son of Joan Corver possessed 50 tickets.<sup>137</sup> Only Willem Buys can't be found in the prize ledgers. Since he departed to England before the lottery was held it is possible that he didn't had the opportunity to buy tickets.

The above makes clear that many of the men closely involved in the development of the lottery invested large amounts of capital in the lottery. It is likely that they had two motives for their investments. The first motive is that they knew how precarious the financial situation of Holland was. By the purchase of large numbers of tickets the regents supported the political regime of which they were a part. The second motive for investing in the lottery is that it was a lucrative investment opportunity. Because of their involvement they knew the conditions of the lottery. Therefore they must have been able to precisely calculate the yield on their investments.

Other regents also participated in the lottery of 1711. We already saw that Lieve Geelvinck, brother-in-law of Jan Six II and 12 times burgomaster of Amsterdam between 1720 and 1743, owned several tickets. He was not the only burgomaster to invest in the lottery. Nicolaes Witsen owned 9 tickets, divided over 4 classes and a large prize of f. 2000 in class 30.<sup>138</sup> Between 1682 ad 1705 he acted in 13 years as burgomaster of Amsterdam. Furthermore, he was a director of the VOC and a member of the Royal Society in London.<sup>139</sup> Gerrit Hooft (1649-1717) served 5 times as burgomaster between 1708 and 1717. The Hooft's were one of the most prominent regent families, with several members of the family serving as burgomaster of Amsterdam. Gerrit Hooft owned 22 small prize tickets in the lottery with a total value of f. 2640: 6 ticket in class 25, 2 in class 26, 5 in class 27, 3 in

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<sup>133</sup> Small prize ledger class 29 fol. 65 no. 616 and class 30 fol. 58 no. 541.

<sup>134</sup> Large prize ledger class 13 fol. 3-5 no. 11-35, the prize was divided in obligations of f. 2000 each.

<sup>135</sup> Everard Scott, first laywer of the VOC owned 18 tickets, Cornelia possessed 2 small prize tickets.

<sup>136</sup> It is however possible that they owned large amounts of tickets in other classes.

<sup>137</sup> 30 Small prize obligations in class 27, and 10 in class 25 and 26.

<sup>138</sup> Grand prize ledger, class 30 fol. 11 no. 80.

<sup>139</sup> Zandvliet, *De 250 rijksten*, 40.

class 28, 4 in class 29 and 2 in class 30.<sup>140</sup>

Regents living in other cities also invested in the lottery . For example, Simon van Slingelandt was secretary of the Raad van State between 1690 and 1735, thesaurier-generaal of the union between 1725-1727 and Grand Pensionary of Holland between 1727 and 1736.<sup>141</sup> According to the *Nieuw Nederlands Biografisch woordenboek* he was one of the ablest leaders of the Republic.<sup>142</sup> He owned 20 tickets in class 28.<sup>143</sup> He also won one large prize of f. 1000 in class 22, so he probably also owned tickets in that class.<sup>144</sup> Other examples are Hercules de Vries, Raad and burgomaster of Hoorn, and Anthony Eelbo, burgomaster of Dordrecht. The first possessed 12 small prize obligations, and the second 25 small prize obligations. This are just a few examples, it is likely that regents of other cities also invested in the lottery.

There were also large investors in the lottery who on first sight were less active in the lottery. However, when we look more closely, we see that they were often connected to the regime, often through family ties. For example, Francoijs de Vicq (1679-1738) possessed 52 small prize obligations with a value of f. 6240.<sup>145</sup> Although he held no public office in his life, he was a part of the regent elite of Amsterdam through family ties. His cousin Francois de Vic junior was three times burgomaster of Amsterdam. He was married to the daughter of burgomaster Nicolaes Pancras. His daughter Petronella was married to Balthasar Scott, the receiver of Amsterdam. Another example is Gerard Bicker van Swieten the younger, lord of Swieten, Vrijbaanderheer, the barony and fief of Kessel, and Heien Boecop (1687-1753) His father Gerard Bicker van Swieten (1632-1716) was a member of the *Generaliteitsrekenkamer*, the audit-office of Holland and served as *rekenmeester* of the domains of Holland.

For some large investors with no family connections with the regime, it is still possible that they invested large amounts in the lottery to support the regime. Johan Anthony de Normandie (1658-1730) was born in Geneva , but later moved to the Hague. He possessed 138 small prize tickets in class 25-30 with a value of f.16,560. Apart from working as a merchant he acted as an agent of the duke of Savoy. In the War of Spanish Succession the duchy Savoy fought on the Republic's side. It is therefore possible that he bought the tickets in support of the regime. Baron Antonio Suasso owned 88 tickets with a total value of f. 10,560 in the classes 25 to 30. The Suasso family was a part of the circle of Jewish bankers in Amsterdam and the Hague. Although no members the Suasso family held

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<sup>140</sup> Small prize ledger class 25 fol. 11 no. 105, class 26 fol. 11 no. 101, class 27 fol. 10 no. 5, class 28 fol. 11 no. 105, class 29, fol. 12 no. 110 and class 30 fol. 10 no. 90.

<sup>141</sup> Ibidem, 749-750.

<sup>142</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>143</sup> Small prize ledger class 28 fol. 73 no. 700.

<sup>144</sup> Large prize ledger class 22 fol. 10 no. 62.

<sup>145</sup> Small prize ledger class 25 fol. 83 no. 795-797, class 27 fol. 84 no. 798, class 29 fol. 87 no. 830 and class 30 fol. 77 no. 721.

a public office, the father of Antonio Suasso supported William III. According to legend, he lend 2 million guilders to William to finance his invasion of England.<sup>146</sup> So it is possible that he invested out of loyalty to the regime.

Finally, there were also a number of large investors who weren't connected with the regime. Floris Bontekoningh, for example, was a merchant in Baltic wood. His business was successful, and in 1718 he built several warehouses on the Rapenburgergracht. He also bought the estate Landlust near Amsterdam.<sup>147</sup> Bontekoningh possessed 105 small prize obligations with a value of f. 12,600. Another example is Pieter Eijghels (1642-1720). Together with his brother Gabriël, Pieter traded in cloth, Italian silk and thread under the name Gabriël & Pieter Eijghels.<sup>148</sup> Because both his brothers died unmarried, he inherited their fortunes. Pieter Eijghels owned a total of 77 small prize tickets. He also possessed a large prize obligation of f. 300.<sup>149</sup> It is likely that they were mainly interested in the lottery as a profitable investment.

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<sup>146</sup> K. Zandvliet, *De 250 rijksten van de Gouden Eeuw* (Amsterdam: Nieuw Amsterdam, 2006) 36.

<sup>147</sup> Genealogie familie Wesseling.

<http://www.uwpassieonline.nl/passie/sites/index.php?mid=226179&kid=3842&pagina=tekstpagina>

<sup>148</sup> Zandvliet, *De 250 rijksten*, 86.

<sup>149</sup> Ledger large prizes class 24 fol. 5 no. 33.

## 5. The redemption of the lottery of 1711

After the War of Spanish Succession the Republic was crippled by financial problems. In 1715 the Estates-General wasn't able to pay interest on the debt of 60 million guilders. Holland also experienced financial difficulties after the war. The problem of Holland was that the annual expenses were 7.2 million guilders higher than before the war. The bulk of this amount, 5.5 million guilders, came from interest payments on debt raised during the war.<sup>150</sup> For the redemption and interest payments of the three lotteries over f. 1.8 million had to be paid each year. The Estates of Holland tried to finance the higher expenses with special taxes, but still there was an estimated deficit of 0.5-1 million guilders per year.<sup>151</sup> This forced Holland to cut in the expenses. In January 1716 the decision was made to convert the prize obligations of the three lotteries into ordinary obligations paying 4%. This would lower the annual payment of the lotteries to f. 935,000 a year.<sup>152</sup>

According to the original redemption schedule all prize obligations would be repaid within 30 years. In the mean time the small prize obligations received f. 4,- a year, and the large prize obligations 2%. For the total lottery the costs over 30 years would be f. 13,871,576.<sup>153</sup> The classes 25-30 were scheduled to be redeemed between 1736 and 1748. For the 16,337 small prize tickets the costs would be a total of f. 3,757,640. However, the ledger of class 25-30 has a total of only 16,323 small prize obligations. Why 14 prize obligations are missing is not clear. When we deduct the 14 tickets from the total of 16,337, the total sum to be paid over 30 years was f. 3,754,420, assuming the 14 obligations were from class 30.<sup>154</sup> This equals an interest percentage of 6,39% over 30 years.

Class	Year of redemption	Redemption	Tickets	Interest per year	total interest payments until redemption
25	1736	324,000	2700	10,800	270,000
26	1737	305,280	2544	10,176	264,576
27	1738	327,480	2729	10,916	294,732
28	1739	360,120	3001	12,004	336,112
29	1740	353,400	2945	11,780	341,620
30	1741	290,160	2418	9672	290,160
		1,960,440	16,337	65,348	1,797,200

<sup>150</sup> Dormans, *Het tekort*, 82.

<sup>151</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>152</sup> Ibidem, citing ARA FH 797. This means the total payments for the 3 lotteries were almost halved: from 1,815,000 to 935,000

<sup>153</sup> This equals 231% of the raised 6 million guilders.

<sup>154</sup> In class 30 the interest payments are higher than in the other classes. So the real cost could be higher, but not lower

Two questions must be answered. The first is whether the conversion was really cheaper for Holland in the long run. This question will be answered later. The second question is why the bondholders were willing to accept this conversion. Did they prefer the ordinary obligations over the prize obligations or were investors afraid that there was a danger of Holland defaulting, leaving the investors empty-handed? For the bondholders a difference can be made between the small and large prize obligations. The small prize obligations would not be redeemed within 30 years, and the interest effectively declined to 3% of the invested f. 100. So the small prize bond holders were worse off. For the large prize obligation holders the situation was more bright. The conversion of the 2% prize obligations into 4% *ordinaris* obligations meant an effective increase in interest payments of 1%. It also looks like the large prize obligations would still be redeemed. According to the large prize ledger classes 5-15 were redeemed between 1716 and 1726. Classes 5-10 were redeemed following the resolution of the Estates of Holland of January 22 1716. Between 1722 and 1726 the classes 11 to 15 were redeemed.<sup>155</sup> But from that moment on the redemption of the large prize obligations per class stopped. Dormans writes that in the 1720s Holland experienced financial difficulties, and was even forced to sell domains to pay for the interest on the lotteries.<sup>156</sup> This could explain why the redemption of large prize obligations stopped after 1726.

For Holland the yearly costs for the first lottery declined from around f. 464,000 to f. 270,000 per year: around f. 220,000 for the interest on all obligations, and around f. 50,000 to redeem the large prize obligations. Because of the redemption of classes 5-15 the annual interest payments declined to around f. 210,000 per year. Between 1736 and 1746 the augmentation of f. 20 on the small prize obligations of classes 25-30 were repaid, for a total of f. 324,640. For all small prize obligations the total cost would be 1.4 million guilders.<sup>157</sup> When this was done for the other classes, and why this was done is not clear. It is a possibility that this was decided when the obligations were converted in 1716, which each year a number of obligations being redeemed. Another possibility is that pressure from the market forced Holland to pay the augmentation to the bondholders. The *Europische Mercurius* wrote in 1747 that the value of the prize obligations has dropped, since 'the obligations haven't be redeemed at the designated time, and the interest paid on them is low'.<sup>158</sup> Perhaps investors felt misled by Holland: the obligations weren't redeemed as promised, the interest payments were lower, and the drop in market value made it not worthwhile to sell the obligations on the secondary market. The payment of the augmentation of f. 20 could then be seen as an act to

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<sup>155</sup> Na 430, large prize ledger. For example, class 11 on February 11 1722, class 13 on May 11 1724 and class 15 on January 26 1726.

<sup>156</sup> Dormans, *Het Tekort*, 87

<sup>157</sup> This is the total amount for classes 5-30, because the first 4 classes were already redeemed before 1716.

<sup>158</sup> Mercurius 1747, 123: 'In consideratie dat d'Obligatien, gesproten uit de grote prijzen van de Loteryen 1711, 1712 en 1713 op de gestipuleerde tijden niet hebben kunnen afgelost worden, en daar door, vermits de lage interessen, die van dezelve betaald werd, zeer aanmerkelyk in de presente waarde gedaalt zyn.'

appease the bondholders. Throughout the 18<sup>th</sup> century the bond holders also got several opportunities to convert their prize obligations into other forms of Holland debt. According to the *Europische Mercurius* this was done to give to owners of the prize obligations the opportunity to convert their obligations.<sup>159</sup> Holland was willing to accept the obligations against the nominal value. Since the market value was lower the conversion gave bondholders an extra premium. Of course this was also in the interest of Holland, because the lucrative extra premium served as an incentive to invest in the new debt issue.

Throughout the 18<sup>th</sup> century the bondholders got several opportunities to convert their prize obligations into other forms of Holland debt. The prize ledgers of the lottery of 1711 tell us when the obligations of classes 25-30 were converted. Of 8570 of the 16,323 small prize tickets information is given about the conversion (52,5%). The latest conversion date given in the small prize ledger is in the year 1800. This makes it likely that the 7763 other prize obligations were not converted before 1800. Most small prize tickets were converted in 1749 and 1785. In the lottery of 1749 1855 obligations were converted. In the conversion of 1785 1792 obligations were converted. Over 53% of the converted obligations were converted between 1749 and 1753.<sup>160</sup>

For the large prize obligations classes 1-15 were already redeemed. The other large prize obligations could, like the small prize obligations, be converted on several occasions throughout the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Almost all large prize obligations of classes 16 to 30 were converted. Of the 1275 obligations with a total value of 1,230,700, 1225 obligations with a total value of 1,197,900 were converted. This equals 96% of the obligations and 97% of the total value of the bonds. 4% Of the bonds was not converted. Over 96% of the converted bonds was converted in 5 different years: 1747, 1750, 1752, 1784 and 1784. The data shows a large difference between the percentage of converted small prize tickets and the percentage of converted large prize tickets. Perhaps the large prize obligation holders were more willing to convert because the conversion premium on large prizes was higher than the premium on small prize obligations.

<b>Table 8: conversion of the prize obligations 1726-1800</b>					
	Converted	% con- verted	Not converted	% Not converted	Total
<b>Small prize obligations</b>	8570	52.5%	7763	47.5%	16,323
<b>Large prize obligations</b>	1225	96%	50	4%	1275

<sup>159</sup> Ibidem, ' wordt voorgesteld, de houders der voorschreve obligatien occasie te geven om d' aflossing dier grote pryzen te bekomen tot het volle capitaal, en zulks by een negotiatie op alle comptoiren van Holland en Westvriesland in lyfrenten en in annuïteiten of jaargelden.'

<sup>160</sup> NA 431. A total of 4566: 1855 in 1749, 558 in 1750, 772 in 1751, 1182 in 1752 and 199 in 1753.

The first large conversion took place in 1747. In February 1747 the Estates of Holland issued several million guilders in term- and life annuities.<sup>161</sup> In this issue investors were given the possibility to convert the large prize obligations into new term and life annuities. 75% Of each annuity must be paid in cash, but 25% can be paid in the prize obligations. Since the large prize obligations could be worth several thousand guilders, it was possible to convert only a part of the large prize obligation into the new annuities. For example, a large prize obligation of f. 1000 originally held by Nicolaes Dierkens was split in 1747: f. 700 was converted in that year, the remaining f. 300 was converted in 1784.<sup>162</sup> Another example is the large prize obligation of f. 600 originally owned by Johan Segvelt. f. 300 Of the obligation was converted in 1747, f. 200 in 1750 and the final f. 100 in 1752.<sup>163</sup>

In the lotteries organized between 1749 and 1752 the small and large prize holders also got a chance to convert their tickets. Over half of the converted small prize obligations were converted in this period. Also, f. 310,500 worth of large prize obligations were converted in this period. In the lotteries of the early 1750s part of the tickets had to be paid with obligations. For instance, in the lottery of 8 million of 1749, halve of the ticket must be paid in obligations.<sup>164</sup> In the lottery of 6 million of 1751 f. 300 of each f. 1000 ticket was paid with prize obligations of the lotteries of 1711, 1712 and 1713. In the two lotteries of 8 million organized in 1752 each ticket had to be paid halve in cash. F. 300 had to be paid in small prize obligations and f. 200 in large prize obligations. According to the *Europische Mercurius* the lotteries of 1749 an 1751 were great successes, as both were oversubscribed.<sup>165</sup> Perhaps this was caused by the enthusiasm of the ticket holders to get rid of the bonds. An interesting detail is that it is stated in the conditions of the lotteries of 1748 to 1752 that the Estates of Holland will guarantee that the interest payments of the obligations will be free of any taxes. Furthermore, the redemption will also take place according to the original plan, without delay or changes to the scheme.<sup>166</sup> Perhaps this was done to assure investors, because they knew what happened to the obligations of the previous lotteries. But again Holland didn't live up to its promises.

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<sup>161</sup> *Europische Mercurius* 58 part 1(1747) 123-124. 'eene nieuwe negotiatie van eenige millioenen... bestaande in lyfrenten en annuiteiten of jaarrenten.'

<sup>162</sup> N.A. 430, large prize ledger class 24 fol 1 no 5.


<sup>163</sup> *Ibidem*, class 24 fol 14 no. 95.

<sup>164</sup> *Europische Mercurius* 60 part 1 (1749) 224: bestaande ieder lot in 1000 gls, te fourneren de helft in Geld en de wederhelft in Obligatien.'

<sup>165</sup> *Europische Mercurius* 60 part 1 (1749) 305: [de Hollandsche Obligatie loterye] was op den 9<sup>e</sup> [ juli] dezer, den bestemden dag der inschryvingen, meer als vol gekomen, zo dat een goed getal loten afgezet moesten werden.' *Europische Mercurius* 62 part 1 (1752) 218: *den 27 passato een Obligatie-Loterye geareesteerd, van 6 milioenen, welker Plan van veelen zoo voordelig wierd aangezien, dat er tot dezelve, den 15 dezer, reeds meer dat de gedagte somme ingeschreven was.'*

<sup>166</sup> *Europische Mercurius* 60 part 1 (1749) 225: 'dat haar ed. groot mogende, in t bestier der Finantien voor een vaste grondregel en maxime onwrikbaar vastgesteld hebben, dat voortaan de jaarlyckse intressen van de voorsz. en volgende negotiatien zuiver en zonder eenige belasting, in diervoege als die beloofd zyn, voldaan en betaald, mitsgaders d'aflossingen der capitalen zo die toegezegd zyn, richtig en zonder eenig uitstel of verandering gedaan zullen worden.'

To combat the debt payments, which had risen because of the War of Austrian Succession, the lotteries of 1748, 1749 and 1750 were converted or redeemed between 1752 and 1754. In 1784 and 1785 a large amount of prize obligations was converted into ordinary obligations. In 1784 prize obligations with a total value of f. 302,861 were converted.<sup>167</sup> In 1785 the total value of converted prize obligations was f. 650,140.<sup>168</sup> Small amounts of prize obligations were also used in the *ambtsgeld* loans. In *ambtsgeld* loans officials of the state of Holland were forced to donate half of their annual salary in to the province. In return they received an obligation with the same value. At his resignation the sum would be returned to him. The first *ambtsgeld* loan was organized in 1717.<sup>169</sup> From 1750 onwards it seems that it was allowed to use small prize obligations in the payment of the *ambtsgeld*. Between 1750 and 1794 194 small prize tickets with a value of f. 23,280 were converted in this way.




<sup>167</sup> F. 247,541 in large prizes and f. 55,320 in small prizes.


<sup>168</sup> F. 435,100 in large prizes and f. 215,040 in small prizes.


<sup>169</sup> Dormans, *Het Tekort*, 83.

**Circle graph 5: Conversion of small prize obligations**



**Graph 2: conversions large prize obligations**






#### The real total costs of the lottery

The initial conversion of 1716 reduced the annual payments for Holland for the first lottery with almost f. 200,000. But under the original all payments would be done after 30 years. The conversion in ordinary obligations forced Holland to pay interest over a much longer period. It is therefore probable that in the long run Holland spent more on the lottery than originally planned. The data we have on the small and large prize obligations makes it possible to calculate the real cost of the lottery in the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

In the original plan the Estates of Holland would have to pay almost 14 million guilders in interest and redemption costs. For the small prize obligations of classes 25-30 the Estates of Holland would pay in 30 years f. 3,754,420 for the raised sum of f. 1,633,700.<sup>170</sup> After the conversion into ordinary obligations liable to the *100e penning*, the small prize obligations paid gave 3% interest. For the 16,323 obligations this would mean that Holland paid f. 48,969 per year. For the period between 1716 and 1800 the total cost would be f. 4,113,396. But as we have seen, throughout the 18<sup>th</sup> century investors got the chance to convert their prize obligations into other bonds of Holland. In classes 25-30 8570 (52,5%) prize obligations were converted into other bonds. Furthermore, the augmentations of f. 20 were per obligation were repaid between 1736 and 1746. When we add everything up, the total payments between 1716 and 1800 were f. 3,623,616. This was less than

<sup>170</sup> 16,337Xf.100. This were the most expensive classes to redeem, because the interest payments were for the longest periods.

originally had to be paid. But although after 1800 no more conversions took place, the bondholders were still entitled to interest payments. So in the long run Holland still paid more than according to the original plan.



These figures only apply to a part of the small prize tickets. When we look at all small prize tickets the total raised capital was f. 5,865,100 and the total sum to be paid by Holland following the redemption scheme was f. 11,168,776. Before 1716 Holland paid f. 654,000 to redeem classes 1-4 and f. 1,118,708 in interest payments for all small prize obligations. After 1716 90.7% of the small prize obligations were converted into ordinary obligations. When we take the conversion data of class 25-30 to be representative for all classes, 52.5% of the small prize obligations were converted over the century. When we include the cost of paying the augmentations of f.20, the sum paid by Holland between 1716 and 1800 was f. 12,172,666. Together with the payments of the first 4 years Holland paid a total of f. 13,945,374 for the small prizes.

The last step is that we need to add the payments for the large prize obligations. According to the original scheme, Holland had to pay 2 million guilders to redeem the prizes, and f. 702,800 in interest payments. In redemption and interest payments f. 299,792 had been paid before the conversion of 1716. For the redemption of classes 5-15 between 1716 and 1726 f. 789,632 was paid. The total interest payments between 1716 and 1800 were f. 2,050,253. So for the large prizes

Holland paid a total of f. 3,139,677.

This means that in total Holland paid between 1711 and 1800 f. 13,945,374 for the small prizes and f. 3,139,677 for the large prizes: a total of 17,085,051. This equals 285% of the raised 6 millions and 23% more than the f. 13,871,576 of the redemption plan. This shows that it would have been cheaper for Holland to follow the original redemption scheme.

<b>Table 9: Total payments lottery of 1711</b>		
	Real payments	original scheme
<b>Small prizes</b>		
redemption 1-4	654,000	
interest before 1716	1,118,708	
interest & augmentation 1716-1800	12,172,666	
subtotal	13,945,374	11,168,776
<b>Large prizes</b>		
before 1716	299,792	
conversion 5-15	789,632	
interest 1716-1800	2,050,253	
subtotal	3,139,677	2,702,800
<b>Total</b>	<b>17,085,051</b>	<b>13,871,576</b>

## Conclusion

Lottery loans were a creation of war. In the almost continuous warfare of the period 1689-1713 states were in need of large quantities of capital. In the War of Spanish Succession Holland came in the position that the market wasn't willing to buy new debt issues at the ordinary conditions. Shrewd investors demanded a higher yield on new issues. The lottery loans were the response to this demand. They did more than only appeal to the popularity of gambling by offering high prizes. Because the obligations couldn't be charged with the *100e* and *200e penning* the small prize obligations paid more interest than the ordinary obligations. The exempt status from the *40e penning* stimulated trade in the lottery obligations.

An analysis of the investors show that a large share of the tickets was in the possession of an elite of wealth owners. For some of the large investors it is likely that more was at stake than a profitable investment opportunity. Many of the large investors played an important role in the political regime, some were even involved in the development of the lottery. They must have known how precarious the financial situation of Holland was. Their investment can therefore also be seen as a support for the political regime.

Financial difficulties after the war forced Holland to convert the prize obligations into ordinary obligations. This reduced the annual cost, but over the whole 18<sup>th</sup> century almost 25% more was paid than the 13,8 million guilders of the original redemption scheme. Over the century bondholders got several opportunities to convert their prize bond into new obligations. A partial motivation for this by Holland could be the pressure from the prize obligation holders. Holland hadn't live up to the original plan and the market value of the obligations had declined. Through conversion the holders got the opportunity to invest in something more profitable.

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- nr. 1292c 1292c Rapporten van particulieren om pogingen te doen tot herstel van de financiën van Holland, voornamelijk door middel van loterijen en het heffen van nieuwe belastingen, 1697, 1728, 1734, 1735, 1738, 1743-1750.
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-inventaris van het archief

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- nr. 430 legger van de prijzen ten lasten van het kantoor-generaal uit de eerste loterij van zes miljoen, omfattende de derde tot de dertigste klasse.
- nr. 431 legger van de kleine prijzen ten laste van het kantoor-generaal uit de eerst loterij van zes miljoen, 24<sup>e</sup> tot 30<sup>e</sup> klasse.

*Europische Mercurius* 1694-1751. These can be searched through google books.

## Appendix : The investors of the lottery of July 1711

### *The top-25 investors*

Of the top-25 investors, 16 are male and 7 female. 1 investor is recorded in the small and large prize ledgers as 'the guardians over the children of Louis Victor'. Finally, one investor is only known by the initials E.N. Of the 7 females 3 were widows at the time of the lottery. Most of the investors were from Amsterdam, although some also spent time, or even lived for longer periods, on their countryside eEstates. The 11 participants of the top-25 that I describe, were chosen on the basis of the available information. On most of the other participants I do have some information, that suggests they had a similar background as the other top-25 investors.

### *Burgomaster Gerbrand Michielsz. Pancras*

The Pancras family supplied several burgomasters to the city of Amsterdam. Members of the Pancras family were married with the prominent families of the city. Gerbrand Claesz. Pancras (1591-1649) was burgomaster 8 of the 10 years between 1639 and his death in 1649. Nicolaes Pancras (1622-1678) was burgomaster 5 times between 1667 and 1675. Michiel Pancras (1623-1660), *schepen* of Amsterdam, was married to Geertruijt Hooft. Their son Gerbrand Michielsz. Pancras (1658-1721), lord of Westerdijkshorn, had a long career in the city government. He was a member of the *vroedschap* between 1692 and his death in 1721, he served as *schepen* and *hoofdschout*, and he was 12 times burgomaster between 1702 and 1721.<sup>171</sup> As we have seen in chapter 3, Pancras was actively involved in the organization of the lotteries. As burgomaster of Amsterdam he was present at the meeting of the Estates of Holland in which the lottery of 1711 was first discussed. He was also active in the discussion about the size of the lottery of 1712.

He was the largest investor in classes 25-30, with a total of 141 tickets with a value of f. 16,920. Furthermore, he won 9 large prizes with a total value of f. 15,900. This makes a total of 150 tickets. This largest prize was worth f.10,000, divided over 5 obligations.<sup>172</sup> He probably also invested in other classes, as he won large prizes in classes 7,17, 19, 21 and 22.<sup>173</sup> In class 25 Pancras had 20 tickets, 40 in class 26, 31 in class 27 (including the large prize), 36 in class 28, only the 2 large prizes in

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<sup>171</sup> J.E. Elias, *De vroedschap van Amsterdam 1578-1795 II* (Haarlem: Loosjes, 1905) 627.

<sup>172</sup> Large prize ledger class 27 fol. 1 no. 4-8.

<sup>173</sup> Large prize ledger, f. 2000 class 7, fol. 3 no. 12, f. 300 in class 17 fol. 6 no 43, f. 500 in class 19 fol. 2 no. 10, f. 100 and f. 300, combined in class 21 fol. 1 no. 2 and f. 1000 in class 22 fol. 1 no. 2.

class 29 and finally 15 in class 30. If we assume that he invested in all 30 classes, and we use the average amount of tickets for the classes 25-30, he would have owned a 705 small prize obligations with a total value of f. 84,600. However, it is likely that investors like Pancras preferred the obligations of the later classes because they paid interest for the longest periods. This makes it difficult to make a reliable estimation on the total of tickets he owned.

#### *Johan Anthony de Normandie*

Johan Anthony de Normandie (1658-1730) was born in Geneva, where his father was a magistrate. As a merchant Johan Anthony moved to the Hague. Apart from working as a merchant he acted as an agent of the duke of Savoye. In 1694 he bought the estate Hoeckvliet for f. 6300, which he again sold in 1713. In 1712 he bought another estate, Haagwijk, for a sum of f. 15.000<sup>174</sup> He married three times: in 1682 with Maria de Puttter, daughter of a cloth merchant and magistrate of the Hage, in 1689 with Catharina de Greeff, and in 1720 with Magdalena van Neck, daughter of Johan van Neck, solliciteur-militair in the Hague.<sup>175</sup> His younger brother Gabriel de Normandie lived as a merchant in Amsterdam. In the lottery Johan won f. 6800 in grand prizes: 6 prizes of f. 300, 2 prizes of f. 500 and f. 1000 and 1 prize of f. 2000. 4 Of those prizes came from class 25 to 30, so this meant that Johan Anthony also invested in other classes. Of the 138 other tickets, the most (33) were held in class 28, the amount of tickets in the other classes varied between 15 and 26.

#### *Christina de Flines, widow of Jacob Leeuw*

The Mennonite de Flines family moved from Antwerp to Amsterdam in 1584. The family was active in the silk industry. The business proved very successful and the family spread its activities into other trades and insurance.<sup>176</sup> Christina de Flines (1647-1725) was the daughter of Gilbert de Flines and Rebecca de Wolff. The de Wolff family was also active in the silk trade and were among the richest families in Amsterdam. On April 11<sup>th</sup> 1666 the 18-year old Christina married Jacob Leeuw (1636-1704), who was also part of the Mennonite community of the city. The famous writer and playwright Joost van den Vondel, to who Christina was related, wrote two poems for the occasion.<sup>177</sup> She left a fortune of f. 750,000 to her children.<sup>178</sup> In classes 28, 29 and 30 Christina de Flines bought a total of

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<sup>174</sup> O. Schutte, *Repertorium der buitenlandse vertegenwoordigers, residerende in Nederland 1585-1810* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983) 640.

<sup>175</sup> Schutte, *Repertorium*, 641.

<sup>176</sup> Archief van de familie De Flines,

<https://stadsarchief.amsterdam.nl/archieven/archiefbank/overzicht/1303.nl.html#>.

<sup>177</sup> L. Simons, C.R. de Klerk et al, *De werken van Vondel 10 1663-1674* (Amsterdam: de Maatschappij voor goede en goedkoope lectuur, 1937) 202-203.

<sup>178</sup> Archief van de familie Brants en aanverwante families.

bron<https://stadsarchief.amsterdam.nl/archieven/archiefbank/overzicht/88.nl.html>.

120 tickets for a total value of f. 14,400. 89 Of her 120 tickets were from class 29, 27 from class 30 and only 4 from class 28.<sup>179</sup> Jacob Leeuw was a brother of David Leeuw, a merchant mostly active in the trade with Muscovy. His daughter Maria Leeuw owned 30 small prize tickets with a value of f. 3600: 11 in class 25, 10 in class 26, and 9 in class 27.<sup>180</sup> Her sister Wijntje Leeuw was married to Aernout van Lennep (1658-1728), a merchant in silk. He owned 17 small prize tickets, divided over classes 25 to 30. He also won 2 large prizes of f. 500 and f. 1000.<sup>181</sup>

### *Floris Bontekoningh*

Floris Bontes was a merchant in Baltic wood. When he moved to Amsterdam in 1685, he changed his name into Bontekoningh, after the ship his father was captain of.<sup>182</sup> He had three sons with his first wife who died in 1697. Later he remarried with Hester de Weer. Business was profitable and in 1715 he acts with wine merchant Gerrit Colonius as co-owner of a merchant ship. In 1718 he built several warehouses on the Rapenburgergracht. He also bought the estate Landlust near Amsterdam.<sup>183</sup> His sons Johannes and Dirk were active as brokers. First as individuals and from 1710 onwards as partners. Dirk was also active in the lottery of 1711 with 9 tickets.<sup>184</sup> There is also a Jan Bontekoningh with 10 tickets. This is probably also a relative of Floris Bontekoningh. Floris was active in all classes. The distribution of the tickets between the classes is quite uneven: 9 and 10 tickets in class 25 and 26, 20 and 16 tickets in class 27 and 28, and 27 and 23 tickets in class 29 and 30.

### *The baron Suasso*

The Suasso family was a part of the circle of Jewish bankers in Amsterdam and the Hague. Antonio Lopes Susasso (1614-1685) was a successful businessman. Apart from his entrepreneurial enterprises, he served as a diplomat for the Spanish Crown. For his efforts he was made baron of Avernas-le-Gras in 1676. The Suasso family specialized in jewels, luxury goods from the East Indies and banking. In 1674 his fortune was estimated at a total of f. 231.000.<sup>185</sup> his son Fransisco (1657-1710) specialized in banking. According to legend, he lend 2 million guilders to William III to finance his invasion of England.<sup>186</sup> He also supported the Spanish king Carlos II in his struggle against Louis XIV. In 1682 he married with Judith Teixeira, daughter of banker Manuel Teixeira. In 1689 she died

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<sup>179</sup> Ledger small prizes: class 28 fol. 88 no. 833, class 29 fol. 84 no 796-799 and class 30 fol. 74 no. 694.

<sup>180</sup> Small prize ledger class 25 fol. 81 no. 770, class 26 fol. 78 no. 740, and class 27 fol. 81 no 768.

<sup>181</sup> Large prize ledger class 20 fol. 1 no. 4 and class 28 fol. 3 no. 24.

<sup>182</sup> Genealogie familie Wesseling.

<http://www.uwpassieonline.nl/passie/sites/index.php?mid=226179&kid=3842&pagina=tekstpagina>

<sup>183</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>184</sup> Ledger small prizes class 28 fol. 83 no. 784.

<sup>185</sup> A.M. Vaz Dias, 'Over den vermogenstoestand der Amsterdamsche joden in de 17e en 18e eeuw', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 51 (1936) 157-176, 170. This made him the richest Jewish merchant in Amsterdam.

<sup>186</sup> K. Zandvliet, *De 250 rijksten van de Gouden Eeuw* (Amsterdam: Nieuw Amsterdam, 2006) 36.

childless. Three years later, in 1692 Fransisco remarried with Rachel da Costa. In 1695 Antiono was born, the first of their 10 children. In 1710 Fransisco died at the age of 50. His wealth at the time was estimated at f. 1 million guilders.<sup>187</sup> The baron Suasso mentioned in the ledger is probably his oldest son, who was 16 years at the time. The baron Suasso owned 88 tickets with a total value of f. 10,560 in the classes 25 to 30. The lowest amount of tickets was in class 30 with 9 tickets, and the highest in class 29 with 19 tickets<sup>188</sup>. In the other classes he owned 13, 15, 16 and 16 tickets. He wasn't a very lucky player, since his name does not appear in the list of grand prize winners. The fact that he is active in all 6 classes raises the question if he was active in all classes. If that was the case, and we take the average amount of 14.5 tickets per class, he would have owned 435 tickets with a total value of f. 52.200. But as with Pancras, it is not clear how reliable these estimates are.

*dhr. Pieter Eijghels*

The merchant Jan Eijghels (1610-1649) had three sons Jan (1638-1712), Gabriël (1640-1706) and Pieter (1642-1720). The oldest, Jan Eijghels junior, traded in Smyrna and was in 1689 appointed as director of the *Levantschen Handel*.<sup>189</sup> Gabriël and Pieter trade together in cloth, Italian silk and thread under the name Gabriël & Pieter Eijghels.<sup>190</sup> In 1678 Pieter married Jacoba de Witt. The couple had three daughters, who all married men from propertied families. Because both his brothers died unmarried, he inherited their fortunes. At his death in 1720 he left a fortune of f 418.000. In the classes 25-30 Pieter Eijghels had a total of 77 tickets. Furthermore, in class 24 he had a great prize obligation of f. 300.<sup>191</sup> The number of tickets in classes 25-30 ranged between 7 tickets in class 26 and 18 in class 29. The fact that he won a large prize in class 24 suggests that he owned more tickets than the 77 in classes 25-30.

*Vrouwe Elisabeth Tiellens, widow of Benjamin Poulle*<sup>192</sup>

Elisabeth Tiellens (1652-1724) was one of the richest women of the time. Her father Michiel Tiellens was a cloth merchant and city magistrate of Amsterdam. She married Benjamin Poulle (1646-1711), a successful merchant and ship owner trading in England, Spain, Italy and the Levant. Together they bought a large estate at Berkenrode, while they also inherited the estate Gunterstein from the sister of Benjamin Poulle. At the time of the lottery of 1711 she recently had been widowed. Two years later she remarried with mr. Jan Trip, city magistrate and VOC director. After her death in 1724 she

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<sup>187</sup> Zandvliet, *De 250 rijksten*, 37.

<sup>188</sup> Ledger small prizes: class 30 fol. 75 no. 697, class 29 fol. 84 no. 802.

<sup>189</sup> Zandvliet, *De 250 rijksten*, 86.

<sup>190</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>191</sup> Ledger large prizes class 24 fol. 5 no. 33.

<sup>192</sup> All information on Elisabeth Tiellens is taken from Zandvliet, *De 250 rijksten*, 11.

left the fortune of f. 1,900,000. In the classes 25 to 30 she owned a total of 57 tickets. She also won 3 large prizes: f. 300 in class 27, f. 500 in class 3 and f. 1000 in class 7.<sup>193</sup> The latter two prizes suggests that Elisabeth Tiellens also owned a number of tickets in other classes. In each class she possessed between 7 and 14 tickets.

### *Francoijs de Vicq*

Guillaume de Vicq senior and Francois de Vicq were sons of a cloth merchant. The son of Guillaume, the medical doctor Guillaume junior (1629-1687) married to Judith Adriana Velters in 1667. She was the daughter of the rich merchant Abraham Velters.<sup>194</sup> The wealth of the family is visible in the fact that their granddaughter Helena Jacoba de Vicq brought into her wedding a fortune of f. 640.000.<sup>195</sup>

Francois de Vicq (1697-1738), the third child of Guillaume junior, bought a large number of tickets in the lottery of 1711. In class 25 he purchased 30 tickets, in class 27 10 and in class 29 and 30 only 1.<sup>196</sup> Why the distribution was so uneven is not clear to me. He also won 1 large prize of f. 300 in class 21.

Francois de Vicq (1610-1678), the younger brother of Guillaume de Vicq and uncle of the Francois de Vicq who invested in the lottery, was married to Aerlant Verhoutert, a daughter of Gerrit Willemsz. Pauw.<sup>197</sup> Their only son Francois de Vicq junior (1646-1707) married in 1670 with Aletta Pancras, daughter of burgomaster Nicolaes Pancras. Both Francois senior and junior were active in city government. Francois senior was inspector of the Collegium medicum and member of the *vroedschap*.<sup>198</sup> Francois junior was also member of the *vroedschap*, *schout* and burgomaster of Amsterdam in 1697, 1700 and 1706. He was also director of the WIC and the *Societeit van Suriname*. Francois and Aletta had 4 children. Daughter Petronella de Vicq married with Balthasar Scott.<sup>199</sup> Nicolaes was the youngest son. He was active as merchant, and was in 1696 installed as regent of the civil orphanage. His widow Maria Jacob Riedt was active in the lottery of 1711. She owned 13 small prize tickets divided between class 25, 26, 27 and 30, and one large prize of f. 1000 in class 30. The distribution of the tickets was as follows: 5 in class 25, 4 in class 26, 3 in class 27 and 2 in class 30.

The name de Vicq appears 2 more times in the ledgers: Helena de Vicq with 4 tickets and

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<sup>193</sup> Large prizes ledger class 3 fol. 2 no. 6, class 7 fol. 2 no. 6 and class 27 fol. 6 no. 43.

<sup>194</sup> See the families Velters and Looten, page .....

<sup>195</sup> Zandvliet, *De 250 rijksten*, 315, she married with Diederik Jacob Tuyl van Serooskerken, one of their children was the famous writer Belle van Zuylen.

<sup>196</sup> Small prize ledger class 25 fol. 83 no. 795-797, class 27 fol. 84 no. 798, class 29 fol. 87 no. 830 and class 30 fol. 77 no. 721.

<sup>197</sup> Zandvliet, *De 250 rijksten*, 314.

<sup>198</sup> Ibidem, 315.

<sup>199</sup> See the Scott family, page 45

Aletta Margareta and Francois de Vicq. Who those persons are is not clear. It is likely that they are grandchildren of Guillaume de Vicq junior or Francois de Vicq junior.

#### *Gerard Bicker van Swieten the younger*

The Bickers were one of the most influential families of the Golden century. They were closely aligned through multiple marriages to the de Graeff family. Gerrit Bicker (1554-1604) was a successful man. He was one of the first to invest in the VOC, and served as VOC director and burgomaster in 1603.<sup>200</sup> His four sons exceeded their father in wealth and power. The oldest son, Andries Bicker (1586-1652) was active in the fur trade with Muscovy. Between 1627 and 1649 he was 10 times burgomaster. Jacob Bicker (1588-1647), lord of Engelenburg, was active in the Baltic trade. He was married to his 20 years younger niece Christina de Graeff. In 1631 his total wealth was estimated at f. 220,000.<sup>201</sup> The third son, Jan Bicker (1591-1653), was active in the Mediterranean trade. He was among the first members of the directors of the *Levantschen handel*.<sup>202</sup> He was married to Agneta de Graeff. In 1647 he served as schepen and in 1653 he served as burgomaster. He died the same year, leaving a fortune of f. 727,000.<sup>203</sup> The youngest son, Cornelis Bicker (1592-1654), lord of Swieten, was a director of the WIC and of the Wisselbank. He was burgomaster of Amsterdam in 1646, 1650 and 1654. He bought the manor Swieten near Leiden and added 'van Swieten' to his name. He had five children, his youngest child and only son Gerard Bicker van Swieten (1632-1716) was a member of the *Generaliteitsrekenkamer*, the audit-office of Holland and served as *rekenmeester* of the domains of Holland. This function required him to live in the Hague. His son Gerard Bicker van Swieten (1687-1753), lord of Swieten, Vrijbaanderheer, the barony and fief of Kessel, and Heien Boecop was married three times. In 1740, at the age of 53, he married 17 year old Sebastiana Kien. When he died 13 years later he left her f. 400,000.<sup>204</sup> Gerard Bicker van Swieten the younger invested in the lottery with 54 tickets, for a total of f. 6480. In class 25 he had 13 tickets, in class 28 10 tickets and in class 30 9 tickets. In class 29 he had 9 small prizes and 1 large prize of f. 300.<sup>205</sup> The other large prize was in class 10, suggesting that he was active in other classes.

#### *Jan Corver the younger*

His grandfather Joan Corver (1628-1716) was not only a successful merchant, but also 19 times burgomaster of Amsterdam 1681 and 1716. Because of his excellent relation with William III he was

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<sup>200</sup> J.E. Elias, *De vroedschap van Amsterdam 1578-1795 I* (Haarlem: Loosjes, 1903) 174.

<sup>201</sup> Zandvliet, *De 250 rijksten*, 74.

<sup>202</sup> Ibidem, 75.

<sup>203</sup> Ibidem, 73-75.

<sup>204</sup> J. Bicker Raye, *Het dagboek van Jacob Bicker Raye 1732-1772* (eds. F. Beijerinck and M.G. de Boer) (Amsterdam: H.J. Paris, 1935) 221.

<sup>205</sup> Large prize ledger class 29, fol. 2 no. 15.

able to marginalize his political opponents.<sup>206</sup> His son Nicolaas, father of Jan Corver the younger, was also immensely rich. Jan Corver the younger (1688-1719) married twice: with Johanna Trip, and after her death in 1710 with Sara Maria Trip. After his untimely death in 1719 he left a fortune of f. 630.000.<sup>207</sup> Because of his early death he never held an important public office. But because of his grandfather the family was a prominent part of the ruling elite of the Dutch Republic. In the second chapter, for example, we saw that Joan Corver played a role in the discussion of the lottery of 1712. In the lottery of 1711 Jan Corver de jonge won 3 large prizes: one of f. 300 and 2 of f. 1000. The other 50 tickets were divided between class 25, 26 and 27, with 30 tickets in class 27 and 10 in the two other classes. The fact that he won his large prizes in other classes suggest that he also had tickets in other classes.

### *Cornelis de Graeff*

The de Graeff family was a prominent regent family. The grandfather and great-grandfather of Cornelis de Graeff (1671-1719) were both burgomasters of Amsterdam. His father Pieter de Graeff married in 1662 with his niece Jacoba Bicker. Through this marriage he was related with grand pensionary Johan de Witt, who amused the guests on Pieter de Graeff's wedding with witty speeches.<sup>208</sup> Also, the playwright Joost van den Vondel wrote a poem about the wedding.<sup>209</sup> Pieter and his brother Jacob served as city magistrates, but were both removed in 1672 when William III came to power. Furthermore, Pieter was active in cattle breeding and served as VOC director. Pieter de Graeff received multiple fortunes through inheritance. In 1678 he inherited f. 200.000 from Maria Overlander, widow of Frans Banning Cocq, the central figure in Rembrandt's *Nightwatch*. His brother Jacob had no children, so Pieter received also most of his fortune. Pieter de Graeff and Jacoba Bicker had three children: Cornelis, Johan and Agneta. All three invested in the lottery of 1711.

The eldest son Cornelis de Graeff, lord of Purmerland and Ilpendam, studied at the university of Leiden. Suffering from a mental illness he spent most of his days in his castle in Ilpenstein. After the death of his father he was put in ward, his guardian was Jacobus de Fremeri.<sup>210</sup> Cornelis died insane in 1719, he left a fortune of f. 677.000.<sup>211</sup> Cornelis de Graeff had 56 tickets with a total value of f. 6720. Furthermore, he won f. 2800 in grand prizes. He had tickets in all 6 classes. The tickets

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<sup>206</sup> Zandvliet, *De 250 rijksten*, 159.

<sup>207</sup> Ibidem, 160.

<sup>208</sup> P.C. Molhuysen and P.J. Blok (eds.), *Nieuw Nederlandsch biografisch woordenboek* 2. (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1912) 503.

<sup>209</sup> *Ter bruiloft van den weledelen heer Peter de Graef, Jongkheer van Zuitpolsbroek en de weledele mejoffer Jakoba Bikker*, L. Simons, C.R. de Klerk et al., *De werken van Vondel* 9 1660-1663 (Amsterdam: de maatschappij voor goede en goedkoope lectuur, 1936) 660-662.

<sup>210</sup> Molhuysen, *Biografisch woordenboek* 2 503.

<sup>211</sup> Zandvliet, *De 250 rijksten*, 93.

were very evenly distributed over the classes. 10 Tickets in each, only in class 30 he had 11 and in class 26 he had 6 tickets. The fact that he won large prizes in class 4 and 6 suggests that he, or more likely his guardian, also had tickets in other classes.<sup>212</sup>

His brother Johan or Jan de Graeff (1673-1714) also studied law at Leiden. After the death of his father he inherited the fief of Zuid-Polsbroek. Johan served the city of Amsterdam as alderman and member of the vroedschap. He was married to Johanna Hooft. As a member of the vroedschap he was present at the meetings in which it was decided to organize the lottery of 1711.

Jan de Graeff owned 32 tickets with a value of f. 3840, and 4 large prizes with a value of 1900. In classes 25-30 he bought between the 3 and 8 tickets per class. The large prizes he won in classes 15, 23, 24 and 26, suggesting that he was also active in other classes.<sup>213</sup> Agneta de Graeff was married to Jan Baptiste de Hochepped, who was 6 years younger than her. The marriage was childless. Her husband became a member of the audit-office of the republic. She had 13 small prize tickets with a value of f. 1560 and 1 large prize with a value of f. 500. Agneta de Graeff had 2 tickets in 3 classes, 3 tickets in class 29 and 4 in class 27. In class 26 she had no tickets. Again, the large prize, won in class 11, suggest that she was also active in other classes.

### **Smaller investors**

#### *Mr. Aernout van Aelst*

His father Johan van Aelst amassed a fortune of at least f. 300,000.<sup>214</sup> His father-in-law Dirk Abbas, *commies-generaal der convoijen en licenten*, probably played a role in the collection of his fortune. His sister Maria van Aelst was married to a burgomaster of Utrecht. Anna Abbas and Johan van Aelst had 5 children, but only Aernout and Anna survived childhood. Anna Abbas died in 1671 and was buried in the Dom Church in Utrecht. In 1678 Johan van Aelst became a member of the vroedschap. His son mr. Aernout van Aelst (1665-1724) was a lawyer at the Court of Holland. He died unmarried and insane in Amsterdam, leaving a fortune of f. 323,500.<sup>215</sup> Most of this went to his sister Anna, whose fortune at the time of her death was estimated at f. 768.500.<sup>216</sup> Mr. Aernout van Aelst owned

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<sup>212</sup> Large prize ledger class 4 fol. 7 no. 31 and class 6 fol. 7 no. 38.

<sup>213</sup> Large prize ledger f. 300 in class 15, fol.9 no. 59, f. 1000 in class 23, fol. 13 no. 85, f. 300 in class 24, fol. 10 no. 62, and f.300 in class 26 fol. 12 no. 84.

<sup>214</sup> Zandvliet, *De 250 rijksten*, 270.

<sup>215</sup> ,Elias, *De vroedschap I*, 290.

<sup>216</sup> Ibidem, 292.

10 tickets in classes 25, 26 and 29 and 12 in class 30, in class 28 he owned 4 tickets.<sup>217</sup> He also won a large prize of f. 500 in class 21.

*Vrouwe Cornelia Paauw, widow of Coenraedt van Heemskerck*

Cornelia Paauw (1648-1725), lady of Achttienhoven and Den Bosch, was the granddaughter of the merchant Michiel Paauw, director of the VOC and ambassador at the French court.<sup>218</sup> His son Isaac Paauw (1619-1690) was mostly active as magistrate in Amsterdam and Enkuizen, and served as deputy in the audit-office of the Republic.<sup>219</sup> In 1648 he married the 10 year younger Barbara van den Hoven. In 1656 he accused her of adultery with count van der Hoorn. Armed with a rifle Isaac paid a visit to the count van der Hoorn, causing the frightened servant of the count to jump out of a window.<sup>220</sup> Isaac wanted a divorce, but in the end the couple remained married. He left a fortune of f. 390,000.<sup>221</sup>

Cornelia Paauw was their only child. In 1676 she married Coenraedt van Heemskerck (1646-1702). He was the son of Mr. Jan van Heemskerck, schepen and rekenmeester of Amsterdam, and Alida van Beuningen.<sup>222</sup> Coenraedt led an adventurous life. He volunteered to fight in the Anglo-Dutch conflict of 1672, served as pensionary of Amsterdam between 1673 and 1687. He was sent as envoy and ambassador to the courts of Denmark, Austria, Spain, France and the Ottoman empire.<sup>223</sup> In December 1701 he returned tot the republic, where he died in July 1702. Cornelia owned 14 tickets in class 26 and 21 in class 27.<sup>224</sup> She won also one large prize of f. 500 in class 12, suggesting that she also had tickets in other classes. Its is interesting that she didn't spread the tickets over more classes. Why she did this is not known.

*Jan Six II*

The fortune of the Six family derives from the cloth-and silk factory founded by the great grandfather of Jan Six II. The firm was continued by his sons. The grandmother of Jan Six II, Anna Wijmer, left after her death a fortune of f. 343.000 to her sons Jan and Pieter.<sup>225</sup> Jan Six (1618-1700) withdrew from the family business in 1652, to indulge in his art and antiquities collection, and to act as

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<sup>217</sup> Small prize ledger class 25 fol. 108 no. 1040, class 26 fol. 105 no. 1008, class 28 fol. 122 no. 1157, class 29 fol. 114 no. 1096 and class 30 fol. 98 no. 923.

<sup>218</sup> Zandvliet, *De 250 rijksten*, 190.

<sup>219</sup> Ibidem, he served in Amsterdam as *schepen* in 1647 and captain of the civic militia in 1650. In Enkuizen he acted as pensionary between 1653 and 1659.

<sup>220</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>221</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>222</sup> Schutte, *Repertorium*, 26.

<sup>223</sup> Ibidem, 25-26.

<sup>224</sup> Small prize ledger class 26 fol. 15 no. 141 and class 27 fol. 14 no. 136.

<sup>225</sup> Elias, *De vroedschap I*, 458.

Maecenas for artists like Rembrandt.<sup>226</sup> In 1667 he became *schepen* and in 1691 he served as burgomaster. He was married to Margaretha Tulp, daughter of burgomaster Nicolaes Tulp. In 1672 his fortune was estimated at f. 270,000, but after his death in 1700 his widow had to auction a part of the art collection to repay certain debts.<sup>227</sup> The couple had 11 children, but only 3 survived childhood: Nicolaas, Jan and Maria.

Jan Six II (1678-1750), lord of Hillegom and Vromade, was very active in politics. Between 1719 and 1748 he was 15 times burgomaster of Amsterdam. As a member of the *vroedschap* he was present at the meetings of the Estates of Holland deciding on the organisation of the lottery of 1711. He was married to the sister of Lieve Geelvinck, lord of Castricum and 12 times burgomaster of Amsterdam between 1720 and 1743. Lieve Geelvinck was also active in the lottery with 12 tickets.<sup>228</sup> His son Pieter Six served also five times as burgomaster of Amsterdam. The 35 small prizes were divided over 2 classes: 10 in class 29 and 15 in class 30.<sup>229</sup> He won also 2 large prizes: one of f. 300 in class 23 and one of f.500 in class 25.<sup>230</sup>

#### *The Velters and Looten families.*

Abraham Velters (1603-1690) was one of the richest merchants of his time. He was active in trade with Spain, France and the assurance business. He and his wife Helena de Haze, daughter of the merchant Jeronimus de Haze, lord of Stabroek, left a fortune of f. 750,000.<sup>231</sup> The couple had 9 children, two of them were active in the lottery of 1711, together with the husband of one of Abraham's daughters. Alexander Velters, member of the *vroedschap* between 1702 and 1719, surpassed his father in wealth. His total fortune at the time of his death was estimated at 1 million guilders.<sup>232</sup> In the lottery of 1711 he owned 10 tickets in class 25, 27 and 28, with a total value of f. 3600, and one grand prize of f. 500.<sup>233</sup> The large prize was won in class 24, suggesting that he had tickets in other classes. Constantia Velters also owned 30 small prize tickets in the same three classes, and a grand prize of f. 1000.<sup>234</sup> Again the fact that the large prize was won in class 23, suggest that she possessed other tickets. Anna Velters was married with Abraham Looten. His father Jean Looten (1612-1676) was merchant from Amsterdam. He worked together with his father Charles in

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<sup>226</sup> Zandvliet, *De 250 rijksten*, 292

<sup>227</sup> Elias, *De vroedschap I*, 581 en Zandvliet, *De 250 rijksten*, 294.

<sup>228</sup> Small prize ledger, The 12 tickets were divided over all classes, 4 in class 26 fol. 8 no. 70, 2 in class 25 fol. 7 no. 66, and 1 ticket in the other classes.

<sup>229</sup> Small prize ledger class 29 fol. 65 no. 616 and class 30 fol. 58 no. 541.

<sup>230</sup> Large prize ledger class 23 fol. 8 no. 46 and class 25 fol. 8 no. 46.

<sup>231</sup> Elias, *De vroedschap II*, 669.

<sup>232</sup> Zandvliet, *De 250 rijksten*, 66.

<sup>233</sup> Small prize ledger class 25 fol. 83 no. 798, class 27 fol. 84 no. 799 and class 28 fol. 92 no. 871, large prize ledger class 24 fol. 11 no. 73.

<sup>234</sup> Small prize ledger class 25 fol. 84 no. 799, class 27 fol. 84 no. 800 and class 28 fol. 92 no. 871, large prize ledger class 23 fol. 14 no. 94.

the firm ' Charles en Jean Loten en Jacob Quina', and continued to do this after his fathers dead in 1652. In 1672 his fortune was estimated at f. 400,000.<sup>235</sup> In 1642 he married Apollonia Selijns, daughter of cloth merchant Willem Selijns.<sup>236</sup> The couple had six children, of which 2 were active in the 1711 lottery: Jacob Looten and Abraham Looten. Jacob owned 4 tickets in class 25 and two large prizes of f. 300 in classes 20 and 23, and Abraham Looten owned 20 small prize tickets and a grand prize of f. 300. In all classes Abraham had bought tickets, ranging between 2 and 5 per class. This differs from the Velters, who had more tickets in less classes. The large prize was won in class 10, suggesting the ownership of more tickets.<sup>237</sup>

### *The Scott family*

Everard Scott (1616-1679) was a merchant and banker. He founded the successful firm 'Everard Scott & Soons. In his will he left f. 290.000 to his three children.<sup>238</sup> His son Everard Scott (1639-1682) became a member of the *vroedschap* of Amsterdam in 1674. He married Joanna Cornelia Coymans, daughter of Joan Coymans and Sophia Trip. In the 1711 lottery Joanna Cornelia had 4 tickets in class 27.<sup>239</sup> Their son Everard, in service of the VOC, had 17 tickets for a value of f. 2040 and one grand prize of f. 300. His 18 tickets were divided between class 27, 29 and 30.<sup>240</sup> Balthasar Scott (1672-1741), another son of Everard and Joanna Cornelia, was a successful man. Besides from a merchant and banker, he acted as *schout* of Amsterdam in 1700, *ontfanger van de gemenelandsmiddelen* between 1707-1735, and burgomaster of Amsterdam in 1735. In 1697 he married Petronella de Vicq, daughter of the wealthy Francois de Vicq junior. After her dead he remarried in 1716 with Constantia Coymans. As his widow, she left in 1744 a fortune of 1,6 million guilders, although rumours had it that her real fortune was 2,2 million guilders.<sup>241</sup> Just like Pancras, Six and de Graeff, Balthasar Scott was present when the Estates of Holland decided to organize the lottery. For the third lottery loan of 1713 he was even responsible for the sale of tickets in Amsterdam.

Balthasar Scott owned 10 small prize tickets, all in class 29. He must have owned more tickets, because the large prize ledger shows that Balthasar won a large prize in class 13.<sup>242</sup> His grand prize was one of the 3 prizes of f. 50,000. A sister of Balthasar and Everard Scott, Cornelia Eliana Scott, also

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<sup>235</sup> Zandvliet, *De 250 rijksten*, 176

<sup>236</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>237</sup> Grand prize ledger, class 10 fol. 4 no. 22.

<sup>238</sup> Zandvliet, *De 250 rijksten*, 283.

<sup>239</sup> Small prize ledger class 27 fol 43 no 416.

<sup>240</sup> 9 tickets in class 27 fol. 13 no. 123, 6 in class 29 fol. 16 no. 151 and 3 in 30: 2 small prizes under fol. 13 no. 121 and 1 large prize class 30 fol. 2 no. 15

<sup>241</sup> Zandvliet, *De 250 rijksten* 283.

<sup>242</sup> Large prize ledger class 13 fol. 3-5 no. 11-35.

participated with 2 small prize tickets and a large prize of f.1000. The ledger also shows the participation of a Jacobus Elias Scott, with 5 tickets: 2 in class 25 and 3 in class 29.<sup>243</sup>

### *The Ockersse family*

Four to five members of the Ockersse family were active in the lottery of 1711. Daniël Ockersse (1621-1680) was married with Catharina van der Have. Between 1658 and 1665 he was schepen of Zierikzee and from 1663 to his death he was a member of the Admiralty of the *Noorderkwartier*. Daniël and his younger brother Cornelis Ockersse, burgomaster of Zierikzee, possessed large tracts of land valued at f. 110,000.<sup>244</sup> Two sons of Daniël owned tickets in the lottery of 1711. Cornelis Danielsz. Ockersse had 5 tickets in class 25 and 9 in class 30, for a total of f. 1680.<sup>245</sup> Also, he won 5 large prizes with a total value of f. 2100. The large prizes were won in five different classes.<sup>246</sup> Jan Danielsz. Ockersse owned 5 tickets, 2 in class 26 and 1 in class 27,29 and 30. Cornelis Cornelisz. Ockersse was a cousin of Cornelis Danielsz. and Jan Danielsz., and like his father Cornelis and grandfather Adriaan he was burgomaster of Zierikzee. He owned 5 tickets, 2 in class 28 and 3 in class 29. Two members of the Ockersse family I was unable to identify. The first is simply called dhr. Ockersse. He owned 4 tickets 1 in both class 26 and 27 and 2 in class 28.<sup>247</sup> The second is dhr. Willem Ockersse. He owned 6 tickets: 3 in class 25, 1 in class 29 and 2 in class 30. In total the family Ockersse owned 34 small prize tickets with a value of f. 4080 and 5 large prizes with a value of f. 2100.

### *Secretaris Cornelis Hop*

The Hops were a family of regents. Cornelis Hop senior (1620-1704) was captain of the civic militia, pensionary of Amsterdam between 1666 and 1675, and a member of the *Hoge Raed of Holland and Zeeland* between 1675 and 1704.<sup>248</sup> His son Cornelis Hop (1658-1716) was secretary of the orphanage chamber. His brother Jacob Hop was a prominent diplomat, serving in England, Austria, Prussia and several German principalities.<sup>249</sup> Between 1699 and 1725 he was also the *thesaurier-generaal* of the Republic. His son Cornelis (1685-1762), nephew of secretary Cornelis Hop, also had an outstanding career as director of both the VOC and WIC, as well as of the *Societiet van Suriname*.<sup>250</sup> He was also ambassador at the French royal court and a member of the *Raad van State*.

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<sup>243</sup> Small prize ledger class 25 fol. 23 no. 301 and class 29 fol. 34 no. 317.

<sup>244</sup> *Zandvliet, De 250 rijksten*, 142.

<sup>245</sup> Small prize ledger class 25 fol. 5 no. 37, class 30 fol. 4 no. 28.

<sup>246</sup> Large prizes won in class 6, 15, 23, 25 and 26.

<sup>247</sup> Small prize ledger class 26 fol. 31 no. 291, class 27 fol. 32 no. 303 and class 28 fol. 35 no. 333.

<sup>248</sup> Schutte, *Repertorium*, 137

<sup>249</sup> *Ibidem*, 135-138. For his efforts he was knighted by William III in 1689 and made a baron by the Austrian emperor in 1699.

<sup>250</sup> Elias, *Vroedschap II*, 739.

Cornelis Hop had a less prominent career, but was also successful in life. In 1681 he married with Constantia Loten, youngest daughter of Jean Loten and sister of Jacob and Abraham Looten.<sup>251</sup> Most of their children died at a young age, but their youngest daughter Constantia (1690-1748) lived and married mr. Joan Ort (1685-1740), owner of castle Nijenrode near Breukelen. Cornelis Hop had 16 small prize tickets with a value of f. 1920, all in class 29.<sup>252</sup> He also owned 4 large prizes with a total value of f. 3100: two of f. 300 in class 11 and 21, one of f. 500 in class 22, and one of f. 2000 in class 5.

### *The Hooft family*

The Hooft family is one of most famous regent families of the republic. Henrick Hooft (1617-1678) was a merchant, member of the *vroedschap*, *schepen* and 5 times burgomaster of Amsterdam between 1662 and 1674. His grand-uncle was burgomaster Cornelis Hooft, father of poet Pieter Cornelisz. Hooft.<sup>253</sup> Henrick was married with Aegje Hasselaer, with who he had 8 children. He left a fortune of f. 440,000.<sup>254</sup> His oldest son was Henrick Henricksz. Hooft, *advocaat-fiscaal* of the Asterdam admiralty. He is most famous for his affair with Adriana Verburch, wife of Gerard Putmans. When he returned from a voyage in 1692 he found Henrick and his wife '*ongekleedt in sijn nachttabbert sittende, en sij meede heel ontkleedt sijnde.*'<sup>255</sup> The couple divorced and Henrick married with Adriana Verburch.

Gerrit Hooft (1649-1717), another son of Henrick Hooft, followed the footsteps of his father. He became a member of the *vroedschap* in 1679, was *schepen* in 1679, 1678 and 1679, and served 5 times as burgomaster between 1708 and 1717. He was also a director of the VOC. He was married with Elisabeth Geel van Spanbroek, with who he had 4 children. He owned 22 small prize tickets in the lottery with a total value of : 6 in class 25, 2 in class 26, 5 in class 27, 3 in class 28, 4 in classe 29 and 2 in class 30.<sup>256</sup>

His son Gerrit Gerritsz. Hooft (1687-1767) also had a successful career. He was director of the WIC and *societeit van Suriname*, a member of the Amsterdam admiralty and seven times burgomaster between 1752-1767. He was married to Hester Hinlopen. His names appears once in the ledger, a small prize in class 28.<sup>257</sup>

4 More members of the Hooft family are mentioned in the ledger. Dhr. Daniel Hooft is

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<sup>251</sup> See the the family Velters and Looten.

<sup>252</sup> Small prize ledger class 29 fol. 48 no. 464.

<sup>253</sup> Zandvliet, *De 250 rijksten*, 154.

<sup>254</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>255</sup> Ibidem, 57.

<sup>256</sup> Small prize ledger class 25 fol. 11 no. 105, class 26 fol. 11 no. 101, class 27 fol. 10 no. 5, class 28 fol. 11 no. 105, class 29, fol. 12 no. 110 and class 30 fol. 10 no. 90.

<sup>257</sup> Small prize ledger class 28, fol. 11 no. 106.

probably a son of Gerrit Henricks Hooft, who was burgomaster of Amsterdam in 1737, 1740 and 1743. He owned 9 tickets in class 25-30, and one large prize of f. 500 in class 18.<sup>258</sup> Bregje Hooft owned 3 small prize tickets and a large prize of f. 1000 in class 28.<sup>259</sup> A 'widow Hooft' owned 2 tickets and a 'dhr. Hooft' owned 4, but I don't know their identities.

#### Simon van Slingelandt

Simon van Slingelandt (1664-1736) was of noble blood. His father Govert van Slingelandt (1620-1690) was a friend of Johan de Witt. He served as a diplomat in Prussia, Sweden, Poland and Denmark, and became a member of the *Raad van State* in 1664.<sup>260</sup> His son Simon was secretary of the Raad van State between 1690 and 1735, thesaurier-generaal of the union between 1725-1727 and grand pensionary of Holland between 1727 and 1736.<sup>261</sup> According to the *Nieuw Nederlands Biografisch woordenboek* he was one of the ablest leaders of the Republic.<sup>262</sup> In 1690 he married Susanna de Wildt, daughter of the secretary of the admiralty in Amsterdam, with whom he had 6 children. 4 years after her death in 1722 Simon, at the time gouty and increasingly infirm, remarried with his housemaid Johanna van Coesveld.<sup>263</sup> Simon van Slingelandt owned 20 tickets in class 28.<sup>264</sup> He also won one large prize of f. 1000 in class 22, so he probably also owned tickets in that class.<sup>265</sup>

#### Nicolaes Witsen

According to Zandvliet, Nicolaes Witsen (1641-1717) was Amsterdam's miracle child of the 17th century.<sup>266</sup> In his younger years he studied Arabic languages at the university in Leiden, and travelled to Russia and several other countries.<sup>267</sup> After his father died in 1670 he was appointed to the vroedschap. Between 1682 and 1705 he was 13 times burgomaster of Amsterdam and from 1693 onwards he was a director of the VOC. Nicolaes was a member of the Royal Society in London, and collected plants, among them the first coffee plants in Europe.<sup>268</sup> His fortune at the time of his death

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<sup>258</sup> Large prize ledger class 18 fol. 7 no. 41.

<sup>259</sup> Large prize ledger class 28 fol. 2 no. 10.

<sup>260</sup> Molhuysen, *Biografisch woordenboek* 2,747-748.

<sup>261</sup> *Ibidem*, 749-750.

<sup>262</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>263</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>264</sup> Small prize ledger class 28 fol. 73 no. 700.

<sup>265</sup> Large prize ledger class 22 fol. 10 no. 62.

<sup>266</sup> Zandvliet, *De 250 rijksten*, 39.

<sup>267</sup> His notes on the Russian country and people were published in 1692 under the name *Noord en Oost Tartaryen*.

<sup>268</sup> Zandvliet, *De 250 rijksten*, 40.

was at least 1 million guilders. He owned 9 tickets, divided over 4 classes and a large prize of f. 2000 in class 30.<sup>269</sup>

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<sup>269</sup> Grand prize ledger, class 30 fol. 11 no. 80.

