# RE-IMAGINING THE CITIZEN-CONSCRIPT

EXAMINING THE  DYNAMICS AND EFFICACY OF CONSCRIPTION AS AN ARENA FOR CITIZENSHIP CONSTRUCTION IN ISRAEL AND TURKEY

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*'If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences'.*

William Isaac Thomas (1928:572)

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

# ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND TRANSLATIONS

## Israel

| | |
|---|---|
| Eretz Yisrael | Biblical land of Israel |
| IDF | Israel Defence Force |
| Hashba'ah | Swearing-in ceremony, IDF |
| Mamlachiyut | Statism |
| MK | Member of Knesset |
| Refusenik | Conscientious objector |
| Tironut | Basic training, IDF |
| Yeshivot | Jewish religious academies |

## Turkey

| | |
|---|---|
| Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi | Republican People's Party |
| Cumhuriyetçilik | Republicanism |
| Democrat Parti | Democratic Party |
| Malumat-i Vataniyye | Information about the Motherland |
| Tabiyet –i Osmaniye Kanunu | *Ottoman Citizenship Law* (1869) |
| TAF | Turkish Armed Forces |
| Yemin toreni | Swearing-in ceremony, TAF |
| Parti Karkerani Kurdistan (PKK) | Kurdistan Workers' Party |

# INTRODUCTION: CONSCRIPTION IN A CHANGING WORLD

States are defined at an elemental level by their ability to monopolise the legitimate use of force within a bounded territory (Weber, 1919), and a clear axiom of this is that militaries are vitally important in augmenting nascent states. They, after all, are the main instruments of violence. Less obvious is that the leviathan character of militaries has also allowed them to be influential in fashioning the civic cultures of the states they secure; particularly, they have been able to play a formative role in developing citizenship narratives (Giddens, 1985:233). The imperatives, activities and cultures of militaries help to shape and inform (re)conceptions of the 'citizen', which exist in a constant state of evolution or flux. The main interface between militaries and citizenship narratives is in the arena of compulsory military service – the practice of conscripting (or drafting) citizens to labour under the military's auspices and command. In republican societies, where the social contract between the individual and the state is manifested most strongly, military service is exhibited as a hallmark of citizenship *par excellence*. Clearly, military service is not just a matter of responding to straightforward security imperatives – it has civic sub-texts, and these are fertile ground for understanding how citizenship is continually constructed, performed and signified.

As the balance of duties and rights that citizenship connotes[1] is never static, but subject to constant renegotiation according to prevailing circumstances and political winds, neither is the mandate for military service. In the past century and a half, the expansion and contraction of conscription regimes has been particularly uneven (Giddens, 1985:229). The latter half of the twentieth century saw a steady decline in the number of countries conscripting their citizens into the military, a trend which is concomitant with liberalising patterns in conceptions of citizenship (Geva and Torpey, 2008). Republican versions of citizenship – where warriors make the state and the state makes warriors (Tilly, 1992) – have apparently fallen out of favour. They no longer resonate in societies that increasingly value individualism over communalism and where relatively stable security environments are taken for granted. The (predominantly Western) societies that have experienced these permutations in 'citizenship-military service' dynamics are moving into an era where neo-liberal values are gospel, and where institutions that previously operated independently of market dominion are slowly being commoditised. The military is no exception: the institutional military, whose purpose transcends individual interest and whose members are not primarily motivated by monetary compensation, is giving way to the occupational military[2], which is legitimated according to supply and demand, cost-effectiveness and competitive compensation (Moskos, 2005). Accordingly, the citizen-soldier model that impels conscription regimes and has thus far defined the modern era is also giving way to the all-volunteer force, which is contracted according to private sector principles.

Yet, today there remain many countries, either on the peripheries of the liberal West or within it, where the republican conception of citizenship not only survives, but thrives, and accordingly where military service is still considered an important civic duty. These countries have resisted abandoning conscription even where they long ago accepted the precepts of a liberalised economy, and sometimes where they have also experienced challenges to the republican supra-narrative of citizenship. In light of the wave of change that is sweeping through their neighbourhood, it is more exigent than ever to understand 'citizenship-military service' dynamics in these societies, as this may hold clues as to why they buck the trend. How, and how

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[1] For a full discussion see Janowitz (1980).
[2] Levy calls this the 'market army' (Levy, 2010).

effectively, does military service shape conscripts' perceptions of both their own citizenship status and the status of others, especially those who do not serve? This question is the *raison d'être* of this research, which approaches its task at the very fault lines of Western civilization by case-studying two societies that have long been on the fringes on liberalism: Israel[3] and Turkey[4].

The primary purpose of the research is to examine the dynamics (or processes) and efficacy (or degree of success) of military service as an agent of citizenship construction (an arena wherein conscripts internalise a particular depiction of the ideal citizen). This is achieved by operationalising several analytical frames from the social constructionist school of thought. The foci are two societies where the persistence of conscription is surprising, or at least out of step with associate societies, and the aim is to shed light upon how and why the system retains its salience. It is not the purpose of the research to argue that the military is the only institution where citizenship norms can be imparted, nor even to consider whether it is foremost among others. Nor it is the aim to pre-empt future developments. In fact, vast swathes of what follows testify to the senselessness of such an endeavour; critical historical events retain their transformative power expressly because they do not give notice of their arrival. The events of the past, or even the present, are a poor guide to the future.

## Configuration

The chapters that immediately follow this one are preparatory. The first explains the methodology of the research. It delineates the core research puzzle, rationalises the case study selection, briefly explains the processes of data collection and analysis, and sets out the limitations of the project. The second presents the conceptual and theoretical frames that inform the analysis. It begins by outlining the three major discourses of citizenship that, in combination, compose citizenship narratives: republicanism, liberalism, and ethno-nationalism. It then qualifies the conception of citizenship status that is used as a barometer of citizenship, explaining why focusing on the social dimension of citizenship is most revealing. A social approach to citizenship complements the methodological creed of the project, which focuses on analysing perceptions rather than looking for an elusive objective reality, and it also allows for a plethora of issues pertaining to citizenship construction and reification to be explored interpretively. Finally, the chapter outlines the constructionist premises that underpin the research and explains how they will be operationalised.

Intermediate chapters each pertain to a sub-question of the overall research puzzle. The first two are fact-finding in their nature: establishing how the citizenship narrative of both countries developed according to nation-building imperatives, and laying out the customs and practices associated with each conscription regime. They draw predominantly on existing academic literature and documentary evidence. The next stands slightly apart from the overall framework of the research, though it is certainly integral to it. By using the swearing-in ceremonies which initiate conscripts into both militaries as a vignette, it seeks to find evidence of militarised socialisation at work. The last two chapters can be taken in tandem: one looks at how military service affected the respondents' perceptions of their own citizenship status, and the other is concerned with how they perceive of the citizenship status of those who have not served. The final chapter concludes.

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[3] See Smooha (2005) for a full discussion on this point.
[4] See Dixon (2008) for a full discussion on this point.

# RESEARCH DESIGN

In seeking to understand the dynamics between military service and the construction of citizenship, the first thing to note is that conscripts themselves embody this relationship. This is because it is they that are intended to internalise norms of citizenship during service by referencing it as a civic sacrifice. Accordingly, the first step in designing the blueprint for research was an obvious one: the main point of access would be through interviewing decommissioned conscripts about their experiences in service and the imprint that it had left on their civic identities. Subsequent operational decisions were made according to their analytical fit with the research puzzle, and so it is here that the chapter begins. After then discussing the rationale behind the case study selection, the chapter goes on to briefly explain how the dataset was analysed and interpreted. Finally, attention is given to the limitations of the research.

## Objectives: delineating the puzzle and its constituent parts

Bearing in mind the overall aim of the project laid out in the introductory chapter – to understand the dynamics and efficacy of military service as an arena for citizenship construction – a research puzzle was designed as follows:

Primary question:

How has military service shaped perceptions of citizenship among ex-conscripts in Israel and Turkey; specifically, how do they reference their service in (a) constructing their own citizenship identities and (b) attributing social citizenship status to other social groups?

Supplementary questions:

- How have republican, liberal and ethno-nationalist citizenship discourses developed in Israel and Turkey, particularly in response to the sociohistorical process of nation-building, and what issues and debates are challenging, contesting and redefining the citizenship narrative today?
- How is the institution of compulsory military service currently organised in Israel and Turkey: specifically, what laws and practices govern the drafting of recruits, who is exempt from serving and for what reasons, and what aspects of conscription are the focus of national debate, either because they are newly emerging, contentious, or undergoing some form of transition?
- In what ways and to what extent do the respondents' observations of the swearing-in ceremony reflect that the occasion was seminal in their pursuit to acquire civic virtue, and how did the ceremony change, shape or reinforce their civic identity, their perceptions of their relationship with the state, and their understandings of their rights and duties as a citizen?
- How are the sacrifices that conscripts make in performing their military service framed by society as the fulfilment of an essential citizenship duty and how are ex-conscripts able to 'convert' their sacrifice into improved social citizenship status upon decommissioning?
- How do ex-conscripts perceive of the social citizenship status of fellow citizens who have not served and, assuming they make a distinction between different non-serving groups, what typology do they provide and why?

## Case selection

The introductory chapter noted that Israel and Turkey share some fundamental similarities: they are both partially Western and liberalised, and they both have a tradition of republicanism that goes hand in hand with militaristic social mores. Yet, these are not the only countries that share such characteristics, and it is worth briefly expounding upon the rationale behind choosing them specifically. The reasoning is threefold. Firstly, they are similarly positioned within the same neighbourhood[5] and so face similar regional challenges. Neither country is predominantly Arab, yet both find themselves in an almost exclusively Arab region[6]. According to Waxman (2004), they share a 'common antipathy toward most of their Middle-Eastern neighbours'. Both have institutionalised a degree of secularism and democracy uncommon in the region. Secondly, and concomitantly, they have historically been military and political allies, collaborating extensively on matters of security. Admittedly, their alliance has never been an easy one – both seek to be regional powers, and the Jewish nature of the Israeli state sometimes causes unrest amongst Turkey's predominantly Muslim population. Recently, diplomatic relations have been strained after Israel killed nine Turkish aid workers seeking to deliver aid to Gaza by ship[7] (Motlagh, 2010). However, military cooperation between the two countries thus far continues largely unhindered, and this testifies to the strength of the relationship (Hacaoglu and Fraser, 2010)[8]. Finally, the two countries have similar nation-building histories. Both acceded to sovereign statehood this century – Turkey in 1923 and Israel in 1948 – and pursued a similar statist agenda (see *building the nation* for a comprehensive analysis).

Of course, there is also a considerable amount of diversity between Israel and Turkey, and this has to be recognised as a potential limitation if attempts at direct comparison are to be made. Israel is a country with a population one tenth the size of Turkey's, and has achieved a level of development that far surpasses its counterpart (Waxman, 2004). Moreover, because of its unique history, Israel is often considered to be a stand-alone case and consequently omitted from comparative analysis[9] (Gutman, 1989). Yet, despite these differences, it is clear that there is still considerable oscillation between the two countries – some degree of comparison is certainly possible and endeavours towards this end often yield interesting results[10]. In this analysis, the researcher has decided to strike at the middle ground, providing a multiple case study that stops short of full comparative analysis. The aim is not to compare the cases with each other, but to compare them both with the central hypothesis.

## Data capture

Data capture took place during two months field work in four locations[11]: Istanbul and Diyarbakir in Turkey, and Jerusalem and Nahariyya in Israel. The two Turkish cities sit in fierce juxtaposition: Istanbul, the country's cultural capital[12], is widely known as the most liberal city

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[5] See appendix 1 for a visual portrayal.

[6] Turkey of course, also borders the Mediterranean, south-eastern Europe and the Caucasus region, although its Arabic neighbours include Syria, Iraq, and Iran.

[7] For an analysis of Turkish-Israeli relations prior to the June 2010 flotilla incident, see Turgut (2010).

[8] For instance, there has long been speculation that the Mossad were involved in the operation that led to the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan, the now imprisoned leader of the Kurdish separatist PKK, in 1999 (Marcus, 1999).

[9] Conversely, Shafir and Peled (2002:14) argue that 'Zionism and Israel are less uncommon that any view of 'Israeli exceptionalism' would entail'.

[10] Good examples include Waxman (2004) and Sarfati (2009).

[11] See appendix 1.

[12] The seat of the government is Ankara.

in Turkey, whereas Diyarbakir is the 'unofficial' capital of the Kurdish region in the south-east. It is culturally very conservative and, as it has a reputation for being the homestead of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), it has been particularly affected by anti-insurgency measures adopted by the government (Özkan, 2006:6). In the 1990s, the city was forced to subsume a huge influx of Kurds from outlying areas who were fleeing sectarian violence. Consequently, unemployment is now rife and Diyarbakir is one of the poorest cities in Turkey[13]. In Israel, the cities were also very different from one another. Jerusalem is infamous worldwide as a religious heartland often fraught with social and political tension. Nahariyya is at the northern-most tip of the country bordering Lebanon. Shells from the Lebanese side of the border occasionally land in the area and domestic defences, such as bomb shelters, are constantly maintained[14]. The population is almost entirely Jewish. When the research took place, both countries were reasonably calm[15].

To ensure a degree of standardisation in respondent selection, several qualifying criteria were set. Respondents had to have been released from military service within the past five years, and they had to have successfully completed at least their basic training. Given that enlisting de-commissioned conscripts prepared to talk about their experiences was difficult (see *limitations*), the researcher identified and recruited participants through a combination of non-probability opportunistic and snowball sampling. The hope was that future respondents would be more inclined to participate if they were introduced by someone they knew and trusted. Efforts were made to ensure a reasonable amount of geographic and socio-demographic diversity in each cohort. Where respondents did not speak English confidently, a translator of their choosing was commissioned. In Israel, where women are conscripted, no gender bias was applied, and the researcher interviewed roughly the same amount of female conscripts as male[16]. In all, a total of forty-five hours of in-depth interviews were conducted with twenty respondents (ten in each country). Interviews were loosely governed by a topic guide, but the researcher exercised considerable discretion in the sequencing and phraseology of questions. Generally, initial questions were designed to map out the context, eliciting basic information about the respondent and their terms of service. Later questions were chronological, allowing respondents to set out the full history of their service as they remembered it. Final questions were thematic, requiring respondents to draw upon their historiographical accounts in order to evidence opinions about particular topics.

## Data analysis and interpretation

Once the data was extracted, it was inventoried, indexed and codified. At this stage of the process, interview transcripts were supplemented with contact sheets summarising visits to various civil society organisations[17] and the researcher's miscellaneous field notes. Recurrent words and phrases were identified and adopted as codes to facilitate the retrieval and organisation of data. Information pertaining to the swearing-in ceremonies was abstracted and

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[13] The Turkish State Planning Organisation categorises Diyarbakir as 'underdeveloped', a category that indicates it is a priority area for assistance owing to severe social and economic disadvantage (UNDP, 2006).

[14] For an example of daily life in Nahariyya can be affected by shelling, see Selig (2009).

[15] In recent months the Turkish government has increased its anti-insurgency activities against the PKK and the security situation in the Kurdish south-east is becoming more precarious (The Economist, 2010).

[16] Four female, six male.

[17] Unfortunately, just as respondents must remain anonymous in this study, so must organisations. In Turkey especially, many of them operate unofficially as social clubs and stay under the radar of the government expressly because they do not openly involve themselves in contentious political affairs.

used to develop a vignette (see *sites of socialisation*). Basic correlations and interrelations were then inducted and theorised against the backdrop of the key hypothesis, which was developed accordingly. As firmer ideas began to take shape, data was integrated with existing empirical and conceptual literature. Ultimately, given the processes of analysis and synthesis that followed data capture, it is clear that the overall methodological approach of the research rests at the intersection of analytic induction and grounded theory.

## Limitations

The main limitation of the research stems from the respondent sample. Enlisting respondents proved to be extremely difficult, and the researcher was not able to conduct as many interviews as initially anticipated. In Turkey, many would-be respondents were frightened about the potential consequences of agreeing to an interview. They perceived a real danger in talking about politics[18] with a researcher and were only partially reassured by guarantees of anonymity. Given that Article 318 of the *Turkish Penal Code* (see appendix 2) outlaws discouragement of military service, their concerns were understandable. Kurdish respondents were also fearful of physical retribution. Several had already had encounters with Turkish authorities that were abusive. Perceptions of threat – both real and imagined – were high[19]. Respondents were also reluctant to come forward in Israel, although not to the same extent or for the same reasons. In this case, concerns hinged upon the researcher's political affiliations and the way in which their data would be presented, rather than legality or security. Because of the small sample, the research is not geographically or demographically representative. For instance, in the Israeli case study there are no Druze respondents. In Turkey, university students are over-represented, and this is significant because length of service is determined by levels of formal education. Also, despite trying to mitigate the problem of regional bias by conducting research in two different cities in each case, there are still huge areas of both countries not represented. Consequently, given that the study is by no means representative, any generalising comments in the findings must be taken as indicative, rather than conclusive.

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[18] Ethnicity, in particular, is a very sensitive issue in Turkey, and it clearly overlaps with the researcher's focus on identity construction (Koc *et al*, 2008).
[19] One respondent noted of Kurdistan: 'there are secret killings and people disappear sometimes. People are afraid to go out after 4pm. Children are stolen and killed for their organs'. Respondent number 2.4, interviewed 20th April 2010.

# CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMES

The notion of citizenship is central to the researcher's hypothesis and conceptualising it is essential in laying the foundations for thorough analysis. This is where the chapter begins. The remaining sections of the chapter then shift focus in order to expand upon the constructionist epistemological assumptions that theoretically inform the research.

## Citizenship

This chapter approaches citizenship in two ways. Firstly, it presents a brief overview of the three major discourses in citizenship studies: republicanism, liberalism and ethno-nationalism. Although they are dealt with separately to ensure maximum clarity, in reality they are never exclusive. Ordinarily two or more discourses each form part of a society's overall citizenship narrative (Shafir and Peled, 2002:6), and each discourse can gain or lose traction as the society changes and develops. Secondly, the chapter seeks to qualify how the idea of citizenship status has been approached in this study, drawing upon taxonomies provided by classical citizenship thinkers such as Marshall (1950) to differentiate between legal, political and social barometers.

### Discourses of citizenship: Republicanism; Liberalism; Ethno-nationalism

Republican ideals of citizenship are based upon the premise of a shared moral purpose within a community, which provides both the criteria for membership and the foundation for civic virtue (Geise, 1987). The discourse's theoretical antecedents lie as far back as antiquity with Aristotle's notion of the common good, can be clearly traced through Rousseau's (1762) *The Social Contract* in the 18th century, and remain in more contemporary works such as Arendt's (1958) *The Human Condition* and Oldfield's (1990) *Citizenship and Community* (O'Ferrall, 2000). Modern republicans, sometimes called communitarians, hold that citizens acquire civic virtue, and concomitantly citizenship status, by participating in the life of their political community and identifying with its purposes (Shafir and Peled, 2002:5). Given that active participation is the criterion that measures a citizen's share of the community's material and moral resources, it is hardly surprising to note that in republican societies, military service is considered an essential citizenship duty. Historically, republicans have considered the model of the citizen-soldier to be a fundamental mechanism for transferring sovereignty from the ruler to the people. It is no coincidence that the concept of a citizen-soldier originates from the hoplites of the ancient Greek city-states (Janowitz 1985:30), societies that were also legendary for pioneering republicanism as government. Nor is it coincidental that the civic cultures of the two countries under review here each tend to be cast as both republican and militaristic. Today, military service remains an important hallmark of citizenship in many societies, although challenges to the republican citizenship discourse in some countries have given rise to speculation that the prestige of service is declining.

By contrast, liberal ideals of citizenship focus on an individual's possession of rights rather than their duties to a community. In fact, liberalism does not embed an individual within a community at all – it focuses on the 'unencumbered self' as free from familial or communal ties (Sandel, 1984). Accordingly, the role of politics remains negative, limited to protecting citizens from interference by governments, and by one another, in the exercise of the rights they inalienably possess. In return for this protection, citizens undertake certain minimal political obligations – such as obeying the law, paying taxes and voting periodically (Shafir and Peled, 2002:4). As liberal states emphasise individualism and make few demands of their publics, military service is not common, especially if security threats are perceived to be low. Liberal

citizens do not 'perform' their citizenship in the way that republican citizens do, and instead tend to be passive bearers of status (Peled, 1992).

Standing slightly outside of this republican-liberal dichotomy is ethno-nationalism, otherwise known as the *Völkish* approach. Under an ethno-national framework, citizenship is solely determined through membership of a common descent group, it is not an expression of individual rights or ascribed according to one's contribution to the common good. Unlike liberalism and more so than republicanism, ethno-nationalist approaches explicitly integrate a cultural dimension into the concept of citizenship by defining a citizenry in terms of shared heritage. Consequently, ethno-nationalism is characterised by an essentialist and primordial logic that limits opportunities for integration, and this works 'against the project of universal citizenship' (Yitachel and Ghanem, 2004:656). Nations are inscribed into the identity of their members and there is little possibility of cultural assimilation (Shafir and Peled, 2002:6). The contraposition of this logic, of course, is that those born into the citizenry need not work to earn their citizenship status – it is theirs solely by virtue of their fortuitous birth. Consequently, ethno-nationalist approaches may not necessarily consider military service as a pre-requisite for acceptance as a citizen, although in the face of perceived existential threats it is still likely that willingness to defend the collective militarily would be considered virtuous.

**THE CITIZENSHIP NARRATIVE**

| REPUBLICANISM | LIBERALISM | ETHNO-NATIONALISM |
|---|---|---|
| Shared moral purpose | Unencumbered self; free from communal ties | Common descent group |
| Contingent – Active participation | Not contingent | Not contingent |
| Assimilationist | Inclusive | Exclusive |
| Military service is common | Military service not common | Military service not necessarily common |

**Qualifying 'citizenship status': legal, political and social barometers**

Like other broad brush socio-political concepts, citizenship is something of a definitional chimera; a quintessential example of an essentially contested concept. Generally, citizenship is considered to have emerged as an outcome of modernity, which prompted the transition from status to contract and from serf to citizen (İçduygu *et al*, 1999:188). Beyond this, little else is canonical – it is left to each researcher to chart their own path through the field. At its essence, any conception of citizenship concerns the relation that individuals in a political community have amongst each other and with the governing body (İçduygu *et al*, 1999:189). It almost always involves a negotiation over rights and duties (Janowitz, 1985). A good starting point for developing this further is Marshall's (1950) seminal article *Citizenship and Social Class.* Marshall divided citizenship into three parts – the civil, the political and the social – and gave a typology of civic duties, including paying taxes, educating one's family, military service and promoting the welfare of the community. Importantly, he recognised the fundamental role that institutions play in embedding, ensuring and dispensing citizenship rights (Shafir and Peled, 20002:10). A

more contemporary formulation along similar lines is Hammar's (1989) delineation of four interrelated types of citizenship: the *legal*; the *political*; the *social and cultural*; and the *psychological*.

It is the social dimension of citizenship identified by both Marshall (1950) and Hammar (1989) that is adopted as the focus of this research project. This is because it is customary to measure the civil (or legal) and political manifestations of citizenship empirically, for instance by analysing legal instruments or official communiqué, and this puts them slightly out of kilter with the methodological approach used here. One the other hand, adopting a social approach to citizenship complements the research project specifically because a deep analysis of this implies an interpretative approach, putting popular perceptions centre stage. In considering the contours of the social dimension of citizenship specifically, the first thing to note is that the idea finds its correspondent expression *de jure* in social rights. According to Marshall (1950), these rights include 'the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security [and] the right to share to the full in the social heritage'. However, this is not the barometer by which the researcher intends to measure social citizenship *per se.* A wholly legalistic or empirical analysis would be limiting and it would not sit well within a constructionist theoretical framework. Furthermore, Marshall (1950) himself recognised that social rights are not necessarily expressed through social policy, which makes using laws pertaining to social rights as proxies problematic. Instead, social citizenship is approached *de facto*, as status held by the bearers. This allows for a more holistic analysis. Instead of being limited to looking for statistical correlations between duties, rights and status, issues such as the attribution of status and the rationale behind it, the convertibility of virtue into reward and the salience of citizenship discourses can all be explored in an interpretive way.

## The social construction of identity

Rejecting arguments that emphasise the innate or primordial character of both societies collectively and social actors as individuals, the essence of social constructionism is that people are shaped by their interactions – a process known as socialisation. Through socialisation we internalise dominant norms and values, which we then reify through our actions. The constructionist turn in the social sciences has meant that it is widely recognised that identities are socially constructed and contingent, rather than essential and fixed. Consequently, in contemporary social science literature it is commonplace – almost banal – to start from the proposition that identities exist within the social imagination rather than the material world. The variety of phenomena that can come under a constructionist lens is limitless; however, it is the clusters of constructionist thought relating to the concepts of ethnicity and citizenship that are particularly important in theorising this project. Constructionist approaches to ethnicity stem from Barth's (1969) *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries,* a seminal piece of literature in ethnicity studies. Barth argues that the considerable cultural overlap between ethnic groups makes categorising them according to observable cultural attributes redundant. Instead, the crux of ethnicity should be sought in examining the social processes involved in maintaining boundaries that people themselves recognise as ethnic. Constructionist approaches to citizenship stem from the Chicago School of political science in the 1930s. After a series of groundbreaking studies on citizenship and civic education, the school concluded that 'citizenship training for a democratic society was not self-generating but had to be effectively constructed' (Janowitz, 1985:147). This premise continues to underpin analyses of citizenship even today.

## Militarised socialisation

Constructionist understandings of the concepts of ethnicity and citizenship undoubtedly have a sensitising effect on this research project, but each lacks the requisite specificity for application without some kind of intermediary analytical frame. This is where the concept of 'militarised socialisation' comes to the fore. Militarised socialisation is not a new idea, but recent paradigms advanced by sociologists such as Levy and Levy (2008) have given it renewed vigour. Arguably, it resurrects an earlier version of political socialisation which has now become unpopular, largely because of criticisms that it smacks of functionalist determinism. In essence, the term 'militarised socialisation' denotes the conviction that the military is able to socialise recruits in order to bring their *Weltanschauung* into accord with the norms of the institution and the state. According to Krebs (2001:110), this process of socialisation is facilitated by two factors: (a) the totality of military institutions, which isolates recruits from society at large; and (b) the general youthfulness of recruits, which accounts for their impressionability and malleability. When recruits leave the armed forces they spread their revised national visions through familial and civilian social networks. Overall therefore, the implication is that militaries have the ability to shape the societies that they are embedded within (Krebs, 2004:93).

The concept of militarised socialisation underlines most theoretical explorations into the relationship between citizenship and military service, although this may not always be explicitly acknowledged. However, according to Krebs (2004:90), expositions of and allusions to the conception of militarised socialisation are no more than 'articles of faith', unable to withstand theoretical and empirical scrutiny. Firstly, Krebs argues that the supposed totality of the military is overplayed. Contemporary recruits have unprecedented ability to keep in touch with their civilian lives, both because of improved media and communications networks and a more accommodating culture in many militaries. Secondly, even if exposure were to approximate totality, 'individuals' political attitudes and practices are likely the amalgam of numerous institutional and other influences, not the straightforward reflection of any one socializing agent'. Furthermore, what effects socialisation does have should be seen as limited and transient. Ultimately, individuals are capable of independent learning and the window for military indoctrination is short. Finally, the relative lack of empirical studies conducted on military socialisation means that evidence to support the thesis is weak.

Krebs' (2004) critique of militarised socialisation has a degree of substance; however, this does not negate the efficacy of adopting the paradigm herein. In fact, as one of Krebs' criticisms is that there little in the way of substantive research on the concept, it is possible to argue that this project actually becomes more salient. Some of Krebs' other criticisms have also been, or could feasibly be, addressed.  For instance, when Levy and Levy (2008) present their militarised socialisation paradigm, they acknowledge Klein's (2002:672) argument that militarised socialisation in Israel is a lifelong process. It begins before military service through mechanisms such as education system and continues long after it, both through reserve service and other cultural institutions (such as the media, for instance). Furthermore, the idea that militarised socialisation has to be total and all-consuming in order to be effective is short-sighted. Krebs' notes that identity is highly contextual; if every institution needed hegemonic reach to be worthy of study, then none would be subjected to it. Consequently, the researcher contends that a militarised socialisation approach remains the most appropriate and potentially revealing framework through which a social constructionist analysis of the 'citizenship-military service' dynamic can be conducted.

This begs the question of how, exactly, the concept of militarised socialisation can be operationalised. Unfortunately, doing this is not an easy task. A comprehensive analysis would imply an ethno-methodological approach, ideally incorporating observational techniques into a longitudinal study. Aspirations for this kind of in-depth analysis have to be balanced alongside time restrictions and the risk of intellectual overreach. However, at its essence the concept of militarised socialisation hinges upon the ability of recruits to internalise norms. Accordingly, the researcher has designed and incorporated a means of engaging with this premise, albeit in an abbreviated manner. By using the swearing-in ceremony common to both Israel and Turkish conscription experiences as a vignette, or a window into a wider phenomenon, it is possible to build an impressionistic account of the plausibility of militarised socialisation. The nature of the swearing-in ceremony is such that the values of the military and the nation-state come to the fore. In giving their accounts of the day's events, interviewees are able to discuss these narratives easily and artlessly, and their perceptions of what resonated with them gives us an indication of what they may have internalised during their basic training.

Finally, once the internalisation of norms has been evidenced, it is imperative to demonstrate whether and how the process of militarised socialisation is consequential in the ascription and performance of citizenship. This is the task of the final two chapters (*converting military sacrifice* and *who counts*?). To expound upon this, the researcher operationalises a second, supplementary analytical frame – Levy's (1998) convertibility thesis. The fundamental principle of Levy's (198) thesis is that resources or assets accrued in the military realm can be exchanged for assets in the civilian realm. As this supplementary frame is used quite discreetly at the end of the study in order to complement the overarching hypothesis of militarised socialisation, a theoretical discussion precedes immediately before analysis. For the moment, it is suffice to note that an additional frame emerges later.

# BUILDING THE NATION: FROM THE FOUNDING FATHERS TO 2010

*How have republican, liberal and ethno-nationalist citizenship discourses developed in Israel and Turkey, particularly in response to the sociohistorical process of nation-building, and what issues and debates are challenging, contesting and redefining the citizenship narrative today?*

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the terrain of citizenship as it exists today in Israel and Turkey, and to examine how current narratives have evolved in response to critical events in each country's nation-building project. It argues from a sociohistorical perspective that discourses of citizenship often compete with one another for dominance, each gaining or losing credence at different stages in the nation's development. In this way, the overall citizenship narrative adjusts itself symbiotically with the institutional context. The chapter limits itself to considering only the (trans)formative moments in each nation's history, as it is here that we can see narratives of citizenship readjusting most clearly. What emerges, therefore, by no means constitutes an exhaustive study on nation-building and citizenship dynamics, but a series of snapshots that when taken together bear out the point that changes in one are concomitant with changes in the other.

At first glance, the cases appear to stand vastly at odds with one another. Turkey traces its antecedents back to control over the vast Ottoman Empire, giving it an immense reservoir of memory to draw upon, whilst the Zionist movement that led to the creation of Israel was a nineteenth century undertaking. Furthermore, the Ottoman legacy is a proud one: the state was strong and patrimonial, with power centralised in the hands of the Sultan and his advisors (Ahmed, 1993:17). Absent is Israel's diaspora history of persecution and humiliation. Yet, a closer analysis throws up some remarkable similarities between the two countries. Like Israel, modern Turkey is the culmination of a national movement[20], only becoming the Republic of today after the overthrow of Sultan Mehmet VI Vahdettin in 1922. Furthermore, both countries immediately underwent a huge transition immediately after the proclamation of statehood – Turkey under the instruction of Mustapha Kemal Atatürk, the ex-army officer who founded the Republic and became its first President, and Israel under David Ben-Gurion, who also became his country's first Prime Minister. Both mean understood that their immediate task would be to build a sense of nationhood and, accordingly, both set about inscribing a new citizen identity.

## The case of Israel

The historical formation of the state in Israel certainly followed its own unique path. Whilst the Jewish Diaspora had long cherished hopes of a return to Zion[21], such a scenario remained little more than a pipedream for most of their two millennia in exile and it was only in the late nineteenth century that a credible nationalist movement, led by Herzl, began to take shape. However, whilst the impetus – and the rudimentary infrastructure – for a Jewish state in Palestine came from Herzl, it would be another forty-four years after his death before the state of Israel was proclaimed. The challenges that the fledgling state faced were enormous, but there to guide it was another paternalistic figure: Ben-Gurion. A closer analysis of these watershed moments in Israel's history – its conception, establishment, and subsequent survival in the face of extreme adversity – allows us to build a picture of how and why idiosyncrasies in Israeli citizenship have emerged.

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[20] Albeit one that was effected endogenously, unlike the primarily diaspora-led Zionist movement.
[21] The Biblical land of Israel

**'Next year in Jerusalem': Theodor Herzl and *Der Judenstaat*, 1896**

The old phrase 'next year in Jerusalem' is uniquely evocative in Jewish culture, and at its core lays an idea that Herzl was determined to realise. His famous work envisioning a dedicated Jewish state, *Der Judenstaat*[22], was published in 1896. It was received in literary circles the way that all classic works should be: with equal measures of ridicule and controversy[23]. Yet, amongst the Jewish rank and file it had an immediate effect; 'it brought Jews out of the ghettos and made them conscious of their origin and destiny' (Lipsky, 1988:13). Moreover, the book did more than just excite the nationalistic passions of world Jewry, it internationalised the 'Jewish question' (Friedman, 2004:69). In a way, Herzl was riding a wave that had already achieved some momentum, as the beginnings of the Jewish renaissance preceded the appearance of *Der Judenstaat* by some decades (Lipsky, 1988:13). Books and articles calling for a Jewish homeland had emerged as early as the 1840s[24], yet none of them achieved the same kind of attention as *Der Judenstaat*. The book's success partly stemmed from its accessibility and programmatic approach– 'The distinguishing feature of Herzl's presentment is the greater stress he lays upon the practical consummation of the plan as compared with that of his predecessors', noted Gottheil (1914:90) – but it also came from the fundamentally persuasive power of Herzl's ideas. His main idea, as he notes himself in the preface of *Der Judenstaat*, 'is a very old one: it is the restoration of the Jewish state'. Herzl's reworking of this old theme, especially his use of nationalism rather than religion as the guiding political rationale, meant that *Der Judenstaat* was epoch-making. It was the first serious consideration of Zionism[25] as a national movement, even sketching the contours of the future Jewish state.

Herzl does not explicitly refer to his plans as 'Zionist' in *Der Judenstaat*[26], although many of the essential components are there: the centrality of 'pioneering' spirit, love and cultivation of the land, and the need to live communally in the first instance. These were the fundamental principles that laid the foundations of both the Yishuv (the Jewish pre-state collective in Palestine) and the modern state. Given this continuity, it is surprising that Herzl's philosophy of the relationship between state and citizen is not also manifested in later times. Whilst the state of Israel has always been cast as strongly Republican, Herzl's portrayal of citizen-state relations resonated with the Lockean philosophical tradition[27]. Herzl's rejection of republicanism is an interesting one; at first seemingly paradoxical. However, the problem was that a republican approach would not have allowed for him to act on behalf of the Jewish diaspora, the future citizens of *Der Judenstaat*, without their collective consent. Republicanism is profoundly anti-dictatorial: it is a philosophy concerned with the proper dispersal and balance of power in government. The actions that Herzl was proposing in order to bring about a Jewish state required a measure of autocracy. For this reason, Herzl decided to utilise the legal principle of '*negotiorum gestio*' – a Latin term denoting a form of spontaneous agency in which an agent, the

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[22] The Jewish State

[23] *The Algemeine Zeitung* of Vienna said Zionism was 'a madness born of despair' (sic). *The Algemeine Zeitung* of Munich described it as 'a fantastic dream of a feuilletonist whose mind had been unhinged by Jewish enthusiasm' (Bein, 1988:41).

[24] Moses Hess' *Rome and Jerusalem,* for example, preceded *Der Judenstaat* by more than thirty years.

[25] Zionism was a term originally coined by Nathan Mirnbaum, but popularised by Herzl.

[26] At the first Zionist Congress, a year after publication, Herzl did begin to speak of 'Zionism' and provided definitional clarity regarding the term, arguing that was a movement that 'seeks to secure for the Jewish people a publicly recognized, legally secured home (or homeland) in Palestine (Bein, 1988:52).

[27] Blum (1995:5) notes that *Der Judenstaat* presents an 'implicit rejection of the concept of sovereignty as a legal right based on a social contract between parties'.

*gestor*, acts on behalf of and to the benefit of a principal. Although this action is without consent, it is later ratified. Herzl addresses the problem in his diaries thus:

> *Rousseau believed that there was such a thing as a contrat social. There is not. In the state there is only a negotiorum gestio. Thus I conduct the affairs of the Jews without their mandate, but I become responsible to them for what I do.*　　　(Herzl, 1960:41)

In sum, Herzl's lifelong work played a fundamental role in shaping the modern state of Israel, setting up many of the early structures of statehood. Herzl bequeathed the state much of its modern *raison d'être*, underpinning it with a philosophy of nationalism effected through Zionism. Yet, despite these successes, some of his predictions turned out to be off-course. His predictions about the citizen-state relationship constitute one such example. Given this, it is interesting to note another of his misguided prophecies: that Israel would only need a professional army. Indeed, it is interesting to wonder whether Herzl also recognised one of the theoretical premises of this thesis: that a conscripted army might feed into republican modes of citizenship.

## May 14th, 1948: Ben-Gurion and the foundation of the modern Israeli state

The impact that Herzl had in laying the foundations for future Israeli statehood was phenomenal, and it is therefore unsurprising that throughout the country's short history he has continued to be a figure of huge importance in the collective memory. At the declaration of statehood[28] on May 14th 1948, Ben-Gurion poignantly proclaimed the State of Israel underneath his portrait. The imagery was neat enough to have been symbolic, representing a handover from one founding father to another at a crucial moment in the country's history. Israel was entering a period of profound change; it was ascending from an idea, at most a beta-state, to full sovereign statehood.

Immediately, the fledgling new country faced some enormous and historically unprecedented challenges. One of these was the sheer scale of immigration into the country. Israel welcomed Jewish migrants for two reasons. Firstly, there were pragmatic imperatives; the country badly needed more Jews in order to build a viable state that was distinctly Jewish (rather than predominantly Arab). In 1948, the Jewish population in Israel stood at a mere 717,000 (Lipshitz, 1998:1). Secondly, Zionism presented Israel's leaders with a normative argument for welcoming Jews that they simply could not ignore; the state could not turn away Jews without undermining its own validity. However, regardless of this goodwill, early inflows of migrants were the source of many crises. Quantitatively, their sheer number was overwhelming: within three years of independence, the Jewish population in Israel doubled (DellaPergola, 1998:67). Consequently, the government could not leave the assimilation of migrants to market forces. Instead, it 'intervened directly and vigorously in all aspects of immigrant absorption', building new towns, rural settlements and factories to accommodate their needs (Lipshitz, 1998:1). Qualitatively, the diversity of the migrants presented challenges to the state's social cohesion. Israel was already lacking longevity in its effort to create a common national identity, and such a task was made immensely more complicated by the fact that many new citizens shared little other than common Jewish heritage. In the early days, the heterogeneity of the Jewish population was more a cause for concern than for celebration. Haunted survivors of the Holocaust rubbed shoulders

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[28] Officially 'The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel'; henceforth referred as the 'declaration of statehood'.

with *Mizrachim* from Arab countries, who had themselves been uprooted from traditional lifestyles and struggled to adjust to life in the modernist Israeli state (Drory, 2005:35).

The challenges that immigration presented to efforts at creating a common national identity were so significant that Ben-Gurion's very first speech in the Knesset addressed the need to build a sense of universal peoplehood (Ben-Gurion, 1942:233). Believing that the military would be the ideal conduit for constructing this (Drory, 2005:36), the Prime Minister prioritised the establishment of the IDF. He gave it an extensive mandate: not only should it defend the country militarily, it should also educate the population about the significance of the state and construct a sense of nationhood. An important component of this, alongside the tales of battle lore and the historico-religious teachings about Jewish heritage, was basic education about citizenship – the rights and duties that being a citizen of the new state of Israel would entail. Accordingly, the IDF set about mainstreaming citizenship awareness in all of its activities and set up a dedicated educational corps tasked with engendering a sense of patriotism in the army rank-and-file. Yigael Yadin, the IDF's Chief of Staff from 1949 - 1952, argued that the educational responsibilities that the IDF had were twofold: 'to turn every Israeli (old-timer and new-comer) into a combatant, and every Israeli soldier and combatant in the army into a citizen', which he went on to define as 'an active participant in the efforts of building and creation' (Yigael Yadin, 6 April 1950, in Drory, 2005:197). To summarise, the IDF were teaching recruits clear and unambiguous lessons about citizenship, and they were doing so at the behest of the civilian government. Moreover, they were incredibly successful in this undertaking. Israel has always required the vast majority of its citizens to do military service[29] which makes exposure to military dogmas near total. Yet, the question remains: what, exactly, were the military teaching people about the nature of citizenship and their relationship to the state?

The key thing to note about the conception of citizenship that prevailed post-statehood is that it was not a Herzlean triumph. Rather, huge demographic shifts in the population (the inward migration of Jews from the diaspora and outward migration of Arabs), resulted in the development of a new ethos referred to as *mamlachtiyut*[30]*.* According to Oren (2006:31), *mamlachiyut* is 'a neologism that eludes English equivalents'. Perhaps the nearest term in the English repository is statism, although this is not a perfect fit. An idea developed by Ben-Gurion himself, *mamlachiyut* emphasised the universal interest over the sectoral or the particular and prioritised universal and binding obligation over semi-voluntarism (which had predominated in the collectives of the Yishuv era). *Mamlachiyut* had important connotations for conceptions of citizenship. It implied that citizens should prioritise the interests of the state over other affiliations and be prepared to serve it when called upon. By eschewing the individual and emphasising the collective, and by making citizenship contingent upon sacrifice, *mamlachiyut* clearly articulated a notion of citizenship that was profoundly Republican[31].

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[29] The laws and policies regarding exemptions and their affects on perceptions of citizenship are discussed in a dedicated chapter further on, but loosely speaking exempted groups usually include Muslim Arabs, Ultra-Orthodox Jews, and other Jewish women with family responsibilities.

[30] In many ways, *mamlachiyut* was an extension of the earlier concept of *chalutziyut*, loosely translated as 'pioneering', which was a composite of two virtuous qualities: Jewish historical rights in Palestine and the redemptive activity of pioneers through labour, settlement and military service (Shafir and Peled, 2002).

[31] A rudimentary form of republicanism existed prior to statehood in the Yushuv period, where rights were also perceived as concomitant with duties, yet because the Yishuv only had patchwork coverage over territory, lacked authority and was a voluntaristic effort, full-bodied Republicanism only emerged post-statehood.

**The present day: challenges to the republican supra-narrative**

In the immediate post-statehood era, the IDF played a huge role in disseminating a sense of peoplehood and fleshing out the social contract. Today, the military is still held to be one of the key mediums through which civic virtue can be earned. However, it also appears from recent literature that republicanism is no longer as dominant as it used to be[32] (a position the researcher's own data partially supports). Explanations abound: republicanism is now less attractive because civic virtue is less well rewarded (Levy, Lomsker-Feder and Harel, 2007:130); economic liberalisation has weakened the republican discourse (Peled, 2008); even more demographic shifts in the population have altered the balance of power (in that natural growth in the ultra-orthodox community has given the ethno-nationalists a larger constituency, whilst the incorporation of nearly a million ex-Soviet Jews throughout the 1980s and 1990s[33] also gave the liberals an attentive audience[34]). Two other discourses have moved in over recent decades to challenge the republican ethos: liberalism and ethno-nationalism. Liberalism slowly acceded to the mainstream when Israel adopted a more free-market, individualist and consumerist approach in the 1980s, whilst ethno-nationalism has become increasingly central because of the growing influence of the Ultra-Orthodox in politics.

Of course, neither liberal nor ethno-nationalist discourses are entirely new in Israel. One of the earliest laws enacted by the Knesset, the *Law of Return[35]* (1950), was paradoxically both ethno-nationalist and liberalist in its agenda. Together with the *Nationality Law[36]* (1952) it granted citizenship to Jewish immigrants on arrival, allowing them to enjoy broader and more substantive rights than native Arabs. However, and again alongside the *Nationality Law* (1952), it also granted many native Arabs citizenship under a liberalist[37] framework. With a few minor amendments[38] The *Law of Return* continues to govern access to citizenship today: incoming Jewish migrants accede to citizenship purely on the basis of their ethno-national identity[39] and not as a result of their (real or potential) civic virtue. Taken together, the *Law of Return* and the *Nationality Law* are emblematic of the contradictory discourses that underpin Israeli citizenship. Whilst in the past they have always been latent, subsumed almost underneath a supra-narrative of republican virtue, recently there has been an obvious upward trend in their influence – and not without consequence.

The major implication of a decline in the relative importance of republican ideals of citizenship is that it has led to direct conflict emerging between proponents of ethno-nationalist discourses

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[32] See, for instance, Peled (1992), Shafir and Peled (2003) and Levy, Lomsky-Feder and Harel (2007).

[33] According to Dina Siegel (1998), from 1985 to 1994 alone more that 750,000 Jews arrived in Israel from Russia. By the mid-1990s, they constituted almost 30% of Israel's Jewish population.

[34] According to Shafir and Peled (2002) Israeli citizens who came from the Former Soviet Union are liberal on issues of statehood and religion, but ethno-nationalist on matters of the Israel-Palestine peace process.

[35] T*he Law of Return, 5710-1950* [Israel], 5 July 1950. Unofficial English translation courtesy of UNHCR available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b4ea1b.html.

[36] *Nationality Law, 5712-1952* [Israel], 14 July 1953. Unofficial English translation courtesy of UNHCR at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b4ec20.html.

[37] As Shafir and Peled (2002:111) note, admitting native Muslim Arabs to the body politic on an individualist (liberal) basis was facilitated by their mass exodus – they went from a 2:1 majority to a minority of circa 12.5%.

[38] The Law of Return has twice been amended: in 1954 to exclude persons 'likely to endanger public welfare' (Knesset, 1954); and in 1970 to extend citizenship to non-Jewish spouses and children of Jews (Knesset, 1970).

[39] Unsurprisingly, there is also a clear religious dimension to applying for Israeli citizenship (making '*Aliyah*'). However, as Lerner *et al* (2008) have demonstrated, Russian immigrants used 'ethnic scripts' rather than religious ones in framing their mass migration – implying that religiousness is not absolutely imperative.

and those supporting a liberalist agenda (Shafir and Peled, 2002:21). Particularly, the pitting of one discourse against another has plainly revealed the contradictory nature of what Shafir and Peled (2007:73) term the 'incorporation regime'[40]. According to their argument, Israel is best understood as having a 'multi-layered citizenship framework': *Ashkenazi* men, the warriors of the tribe, are granted comprehensive citizenship of a republican kind; *Mizrachim* and Jewish women, whose contribution is viewed as quantitative (building the population), have a kind of secondary status citizenship along ethno-nationalist lines; and finally, Muslim Arabs, as citizens who play no part in effecting the Zionist dream, are admitted to the citizenry as individuals only (in accord with liberal sensibilities). Their framework, the culmination of extensive research, is persuasive; particularly given the hypothesis of this paper that citizenship rights in republican societies are concomitant with contributions to the common good. It is no surprise then, given the structure of the incorporation regime and the resulting stratification of society, to note that even a small amount of disaffection with republicanism has meant the cleavages dividing Israeli society have become more pronounced, as for lower-status groups such as the *Mizrachim*, Jewish women and Muslim Arabs the stakes are high.

Partly because of the repositioning of the three major citizenship discourses, the overall citizenship narrative in Israel is now in an unprecedented state of flux. Both the ethno-nationalist and the liberal camps have made significant gains in recent years. The ethno-nationalists have been successful in passing a raft of legislation that tightens the link between 'Jewishness' and citizenship: the contested *Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law[41]*, which denies citizenship to residents of the West Bank or Gaza that marry citizens of Israel, is one such example. Originally passed in 2003 as a temporary measure, it received its ninth extension by the Knesset on July 31st, 2009[42]. Likewise, liberals appear to have scored their own victories, particularly in their efforts to extend social citizenship rights to Muslim Arabs citizens (Shafir and Peled, 2002:290). The Qaadan case[43] (2000) determined that ethno-national interests could not be allowed to override the principle of equality, even when it comes to the allocation of state land or land allocated by Jewish 'national institutions'. This was hailed by liberals as a major breakthrough (Rosen-Zvi, 2004). Yet, despite this progress, one must be careful not to oversing liberal gains – it is possible that some increase in rights, especially when they are gifted rather than acquired *quid pro quo,* may not necessarily have a profound effect on social citizenship status. Perceptions can be much harder to change than facts on the ground. In all, it is safe to say that both ethno-nationalist arguments and liberal counterarguments are becoming increasingly influential and are increasingly able to drive public policy.

In the final summation, it is clear to see that Israel started life with a strong republican supra-narrative of citizenship, which corresponded to Ben Gurion's vision of a state founded upon the principles of *mamlachiyut.* This was a departure from the original ideals of citizenship laid out by Herzl, but was designed to address the urgent challenges the state faced absorbing migrants from disparate communities and creating a common sense of nationhood. The main institution responsible for developing the republican ideal was the IDF, which not only defended the new

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[40] According to Ben-Eliezer (2004), Shafir and Peled (2007) borrow the idea of the 'incorporation regime' from earlier work by Stephen Krasner, John Meyer, and Yasmin Soysal. It refers to 'institutionalized modes whereby various social groups are incorporated [into society] through the differential allocation of rights and privileges'.
[41] *The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (temporary provision)* 5763 - 2003 [Israel]. Unofficial English translation courtesy of the Knesset website at: http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/citizenship_law.htm
[42] At the time of writing, the Supreme Court was still hearing petitions on the matter.
[43] Bagatz 6698/95, Qaadan vs. ILA, Katzir, and others.

state militarily but also taught recruits about their homeland, engendering a sense of national identity. For migrants particularly, military service was an important means of assimilation; for everyone who served, it was an opportunity to perform their citizenship and acquire virtue. However, over recent decades the republican super-narrative has declined; liberal and ethno-nationalist discourses, on the other hand, have gained traction.

## The case of Turkey

Just as it is possible to identify watershed moments in Israel's history that were formative in deciding new directions in the national citizenship narrative, so too has there been similar moments in Turkey's history. The first such moment, indeed the most formative, was the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey on October 29th, 1923. Although formal citizenship had already been instituted in the Ottoman State[44], the break with the past that the Republic represented was huge and Ottoman lineage should not be overplayed in explaining the national psyche (Ahmed, 1993:iv). The impact of the 1923 revolution on citizenship was profound: from the beginning, 'citizenship was officially taken to be one of the key elements of successful nation-building' (İçduygu *et al*, 1999:187), and just as Ben-Gurion rolled out *mamlachiyut* as a guiding philosophy in Israel, so Kemalism became the ideological norm in the new Turkish Republic. In 1950, the Republic evolved from being a one-party state to having a dual and then multi-party system, provoking a sea change in the country's direction and, correspondingly, renegotiations in the citizen-state relationship. Today, citizenship in Turkey is again being contested – the country is responding to the challenges of dual citizenship posed by greater numbers of its citizens living abroad, and also with ethnic and religious identities reasserting themselves at the expense of the civic identity that the state has carefully nurtured (Ibid, 1999).

### October 29th, 1923: Atatürk and the foundation of the modern Turkish state

How happy is the one who calls himself a Turk! (*Ne mutlu Türküm diyene!*)

Mustapha Kemal Atatürk

The Turks were the last people in the Ottoman Empire to adopt nationalism; unsurprisingly, as they had a vested interest in maintaining the status quo and promoting the cosmopolitanism of the system over which they ruled (Ahmed, 1993:77). Rather than emphasise national or ethnic facets of identity, the Ottoman state stressed the primacy of religion: it was the 'nation of Islam' (Akturk, 2009). However, this is not to say that the empire lacked a solid framework governing norms of, and access to, citizenship. Indeed, rather than transcending the issue, the multi-national and ethnic composition of the state necessitated some such foundation. Before the *Ottoman Citizenship Law (Tabiyet-i Osmaniye Kanunu)* of 1869, the state relied upon the 'millet' system, which defined identity and belonging through membership of in one of the three self-governing religious communities - Christian, Jewish and Muslim (Bauböck *et al*, 2007:13). This distanced the citizen from the state, making the relevant religious authority an intermediary. After 1869, the concept of citizenship was revised so that it was premised upon an individual's personal relationship with the state. This was the foundation upon which Ataturk later built, although little else from the Ottoman citizenship discourse survived his remodelling.

At the close of the Ottoman era, Atatürk capitalised on the momentum provided by the revolution and set about constructing a new sense of nationhood. The Kemalists had inherited a

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[44] The *Ottoman Citizenship Law* (*Tabiyet-i Osmaniye Kanunu*) of 1869 recognised all residents of the Ottoman Territories as nationals of the empire (Ahmed, 1993).

society in which the notion of a Turkish identity was almost totally non-existent (Ahmed, 1993:77). Integral to achieving this feat of social engineering was the military, which underwrote the authority of the civilian government in the new Republic. Officially, there was a demarcation between the military and civilian realms. Officers were forbidden from standing for election unless they first resigned their commissions. Not only was this considered good practice politically, it also allowed the military to stand above sectarianism and safeguarded its reputation in the face of political scandal or strife. In reality though, the relationship between the military and the civilian leadership in the first decades of the republic was stable precisely because the two bodies were intimately entwined. Many of the top political leaders had military backgrounds, including Ataturk and his successor, İsmet İnönü. Such was the intensity of the accord that the reform process in Turkey occurred 'for the most part under military aegis' (Rostow, 1964:352). Certainly, despite formal separation in civil-military relations, Atatürk had a solid guarantee of support from the military for his reform program.

The Atatürk era was a crucial period, involving both the (re)creation of national heritage and propagation of the new state's vision and agenda (Çağaptay, 2002). Although some of the changes are often written off as superficial and effectual only at surface level[45], considered cumulatively they were deeply transformative to the citizenship narrative. The ideological basis of the state that Atatürk was trying to create through his directives was modernist, resonating with Western traditions. 'Kemalism', named after its mentor, was a set of principles comprised of republicanism (*cumhuriyetçilik*), secularism (*laiklik*), nationalism (*milliyetçilik*), populism (*halkçilik*), statism (*devletçilik*) and revolutionism-reformism (*inkilapçilik*) (Karabelias, 2009:58). This full-scale remoulding of the state – from sultanate to republic, religious to secular, Eastern to Western – did not just result in greater emphasis on the importance of citizenship, but a whole new citizenship ideal. Affinity with the state was assumed in a Platonic fashion, and civic virtue could be accrued through willingness to defer rights until the point that duty to the state finishes, even though such finality would be perpetually illusive (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003:195). Thus, the narrative of citizenship, designed as it was to support the statist and elitist doctrine of Kemalism, was profoundly republican, encouraging citizens to consider themselves as active contributors. According to Keyman and İçduygu (2003:195):

> *The citizen is militantly active in the process of serving the making of modern Turkey, and is virtuous in their will to put the public good before individual interest, service for society before individual freedom, identity before difference, homogeneity before pluralism. However... the citizen is only active in terms of... duties to the state, [and] passive with respect to... will to carry the language of rights against state power.*

Efforts to bring the concept of nationhood and the corresponding idea of republican citizenship to fruition continued apace. Newly established holidays such as Victory Day and Republic Day[46] raised the profile of the state nationally and demonstrated its hegemonic influence over the citizenry (ibid, 1993:121). Citizenship classes were taught in schools *(Malumat-i Vataniyye)*[47] and children were taught to pass on their education to their parents at home (İçduygu *et al*,

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[45] For instance, new laws establishing dress codes. In November 1925, Ataturk passed the 'Hat Law', instructing men to wear a western-style hat rather than the traditional fez (Lenz *et al*, 2002).
[46] On 30th August and 29th October respectively.
[47] In 1927, this program was amended to become *Yurt Bilgisi* (also translated as Information about the Motherland) and from 1985 onwards has been known as *Vatandaşhk Bilgileri* (Information about Citizenship).

1999:187). Yet throughout the period that this sense of nationhood was being established, the heterogeneity of the population was diminishing, and this is a key factor in understanding how the citizenship narrative was manifesting itself in practice. Although the first constitution granted citizenship to all residents of the Republic regardless of race or religion, therefore drawing upon civic (or liberal) notions of citizenship, subsequent laws were far more ethno-nationalist in their approach, favouring ethnic Turks over others. Groups such as Armenians and Greek Orthodox who had left the country during the War of Independence and not returned were excluded from citizenship in 1927[48] (Kadirbeyoğlu, 2010:2). The *Turkish Citizenship Act*[49] (1928) allowed the government to withdraw the citizenship of many other ex-Ottoman citizens on feeble grounds, and in practice was applied mainly to non-Muslims and non-ethnic Turks (Çağaptay, 2003). The non-ethnic Turks that remained were required to adopt a Turkish identity and had to navigate their way through the state's web of discrimination[50]. Criteria for migrating to Turkey were circumscribed, with strong preference given to those demonstrating Turkish language skills and ethnic affiliation (Kirişci, 2000:3). In sum, there was a clear disjuncture between the formal definition of citizenship as laid out in the constitution (which emphasised inclusivity and played down communal difference) and actual state practice as determined by subsidiary laws (which favoured ethnic-Turks over all others).

**1950 – 1960: The reconfiguration of civil-military relations in the multiparty period**

In 1950, the stable military-political compact that had ruled Turkey since the revolution was brought to an end by the unexpected electoral triumph of the breakaway *Democrat Parti*[51] and a new epoch in Turkey's history began to take shape. With no military experience, the *Democrat Parti's* leadership could not rely on the kind of fraternal relationship with the generals that Atatürk and İnönü had cultivated (Karpat, 1970:1662). Furthermore, as the party drew its support from outside of the military elite, relying on rural and peripheral voters now that Turkey had democratised, it was less beholden than its predecessor (Tachau, 2000:131). As the new regime matured, civil-military relations underwent a reconfiguration, as did the overall socio-political landscape. According to Tachau (1984:65) the rise of the *Democrat Parti* marked, 'the rise of a wholly new socioeconomic group, and... the decline of the bureaucratic-military elite that had brought the republic into being. The new group consisted of ... the entrepreneurs, merchants, and traders who had found new opportunities in the aftermath of the development policies implemented by the Republican government in the 1930s and 1940s'.

Throughout the 1950's, Turkish politics settled down into a two-party affair[52], with the *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*[53] and the *Democrat Parti* capturing upwards of 90% of the votes and maintaining a 98% majority in parliament (Tachau, 2000:133). Initially, the *Democrat Parti* enjoyed a high degree of popularity amongst the electorate, presiding over the country's economic success. Its social policies, such as relaxing the restrictions on Islam, also found favour. By the end of the 1950s however, the party had lost its appeal. It was plagued by high levels of inflation[54] and public debt, became increasingly authoritarian (introducing new

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[48] Law No. 1040/1927, Exclusion of Ottoman Subjects from Turkish Citizenship Act.
[49] Law No. 1312/1928, Turkish Citizenship Act (Türk VatandaSliği Kanunu).
[50] For instance, the *Turkish Citizenship Act* (1928) excluded doctors who were non-Turks from practising medicine in Turkey (Kadirbeyoğlu, 2010:2).
[51] The Democratic Party
[52] Based on a plurality electoral system with votes cast for party lists in multimember districts (Zimbron, 2007).
[53] The Republican Party
[54] Cost of living in 1960 was about eleven times that in 1950-53 yet salaries barely doubled (Karpat,1970:1662).

censorship laws) and tried to use the military to suppress political rivals (Karpat, 1970). In 1960, the party was eventually deposed by the military through a bloodless coup in 1960.

The Committee of National Unity (CNU), the group of officers that led the country after the coup, quickly took action: they disbanded the *Democrat Parti*, reassured the population that civilian government would be restored and instructed a group of law professors to draft a new constitution[55] (Ahmed, 1993). However, although the CNU co-opted professionals from the civilian realm in its decision-making, it was far from being an impartial or technocratic agency whose agenda was limited to ending the prevailing political crisis. In fact, the committee was very clear about its plan and stressed that the restoration of civilian rule would be contingent upon it. Particularly, the CNU was pressing for 'a return to and reformulation of Kemalism', whereby economic and democratic reform would be top down initiatives and secularism would be reasserted (Karpat, 1970). Village committees were abolished due to the military's (and the intelligentsia's) belief that the commoner was unable to self-govern, needing the guidance of the 'enlightened' (Ibid:1677). Yet, whilst the CNU clearly aimed to oversee a return to state-centred Kemalism, the reality was that the new constitution completely reconfigured the party-political system, largely by virtue of its provision for proportional representation. Turkey finally became an authentic multi-party state. According to Karpat (1970:1681), the coup 'ended not by re-establishing the old order but with a new, modern constitutional regime based on a social and political balance between all major groups. It thus established, unwittingly perhaps, the legal and political bases of a participatory democratic society'.

What effect did the *Democrat Parti's* initial victory (triggering a two-party system) have on the narrative of citizenship? Similarly, what was the effect of the 1960 coup, which ended the traditional demarcation between the civilian and military realms and also introduced proportional representation (resulting in a multi-party system)? Combing the literature, it appears that rather than triggering change in the citizenship narrative, the *Democrat Parti's* rise to power was probably more symptomatic of it – coming as a result of the adoption of the direct voting system in 1950. It was İnönü's democratisation prior to the 1950 election, removing property and literacy qualifications from the voting criteria, which politically enfranchised the citizenry at the grassroots level and strengthened rights-based citizenship discourses (Karpat, 1970:1659). The 1960 coup and the new constitution were more invocative of change. As Karpat (1970) notes, the affect of the new constitution was twofold. Firstly, the switch to proportional representation resulted in multipartyism, which restrained the power of the majority party and saw small parties proliferate. Secondly, and concomitantly, the constitution also had a liberalising effect. Accordingly, the strong republican discourse that had previously underpinned the citizen-state relationship was moderated slightly. In sum, whereas citizenship in the Kemalist era was focused almost entirely upon duties and made willingness to ignore one's rights a form of virtue, the cumulative effects of the *Democrat Partisi's* victory in 1950, the 1960 coup and the subsequent re-drafting of the constitution were liberalising, and represent a subtle rebalancing of rights and duties in Turkey's citizenship narrative.

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[55] The military's radio broadcast of the morning of the coup stated that they had 'taken [over the administration of the country] for the purpose of extricating the parties from the irreconcilable situation into which they have fallen, …[and would hold] just and free elections as soon as possible under the supervision and arbitration of an above-party administration…' (Ahmed, 1993:126).

**The present day: liberalisation and the gradual erosion of the civil-military compact**

From the 1960's until the present day, Turkey has generally kept to this liberalising pattern. Several different factors have all worked to sustain this momentum. Firstly, a further military coup in the 1980s undermined the military's credibility relative to the government – the junta stayed in power for too long and tripped over its own ideology by implementing pro-Islamic and pro-free market reform that clashed with the tenets of traditional Kemalism (Ahmed, 1993). Political culture simultaneously matured and, instead of seeing the military as the vanguard of democracy, the intelligentsia began to perceive of it as a block to reform (Ibid: 214). This decline in the confidence of the military[56] indicates that it is no longer hegemonically situated in Turkish society, giving the civil society organisations that typically promote liberal conceptions of citizenship space to flourish. Other factors have little to do with the military, and according to Keyman and İçduygu (2003:194), include 'the simultaneous emergence of the increasing political and ideological dominance of the neoliberal restructuring of the Turkish economy; the revitalization of identity politics in the form of political Islam; the 'Kurdish question'; the rising geographical mobility of people beyond national borders; and civil-societal calls for democratization'.  Each of these has contributed to what they see as the overall trend in the citizenship narrative: the republican discourse of old with its 'duty first, rights after' logic is coming under increasing pressure. Meanwhile, an alternative conception of citizenship organised around 'the language of rights' (or, liberalism) is being pushed by civil society.

One way to identify liberalisation in the citizenship narrative is to trace its evolution through legal instruments and government communiqué (although this tells us far more about the official line than it does about social perceptions). One recent development is particularly noteworthy. On 29th May 2009, a new law was passed governing access to citizenship, ostensibly to harmonise Turkish law with the *European Convention on Nationality*[57] (Kadirbeyoğlu, 2010:14). Amongst other changes, it has eliminated the possibility of revoking citizenship either as a consequence of draft evasion or serving in the military of another country without informing the Turkish authorities[58]. By divorcing rights from duties, this challenges the republican discourse that has always officially underwritten the citizenship narrative. The new law also increases the waiting time for prospective citizens of Turkish origin to become citizens to five years, in line with other applicants[59]. This challenges the ethno-nationalism that has always implicitly underlined the discourse in reality. Both changes indicate growing liberalisation in the citizenship narrative (at least as reflected within the law).

In the final summation, it is clear to see that when Atatürk proclaimed the independent Republic of Turkey in 1923, he was standing at the cusp of profound change in Turkey's history.  Where previously there had been oriental despotism, he delivered a western, secular form of republicanism. This new ideology required a substantial reconsideration of what the proper role of the citizen ought to be; the cosmopolitan citizen of the Ottoman era, discouraged from thinking about differences in heritage, was nationalised – 'turkified' – and mobilised to support the state's nationalist agenda. This became the norm until the 1950's, when İnönü's

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[56] Interestingly enough, this decline is not borne out by data in the World Values Survey (see Appendix 3). However, there is an overwhelming body of evidence in the academic literature to support the claim.

[57] Council of Europe, *European Convention on Nationality*, 6 November 1997, ETS 166. Available courtesy of UNHCR at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36618.html.

[58] These changes were the most controversial discussed in the parliamentary debates (Kadirbeyoğlu, 2010:16)

[59] The status of citizens from the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has not changed, who still have the right to acquire Turkish citizenship without the requirements for regular naturalisation (Kadirbeyoğlu, 2010).

democratising reforms saw the *Democrat Parti* come to power for the first time and the *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi,* the legacy of Atatürk, go into loyal opposition. Although the *Democrat Parti* was removed ten years later in a military coup, the liberalisation that had been set in motion proved difficult to roll back: the post-coup constitution provided for proportional representation and Turkey entered a multiparty era that redefined the roll of the citizen.

# THE CONSCRIPTION REGIME: WHO SERVES, WHO DOESN'T, AND WHY?

*How is the institution of compulsory military service currently organised in Israel and Turkey: specifically, what laws and practices govern the drafting of recruits, who is exempt from serving and for what reasons, and what aspects of conscription are the focus of national debate, either because they are newly emerging, contentious, or undergoing some form of transition?*

Compulsory military service may have been a constant feature in Israel and Turkey throughout their respective histories, but in neither country have norms pertaining to conscription existed in a political vacuum. Rather, given that republican societies stress the intimacy between military service and citizenship virtue, the issue of conscription has always been a contentious one, constantly subjected to scrutiny and amendment according to prevailing political winds[60]. Consequently, practices governing the administration of the draft should not be characterised as static or autonomous, but instead as malleable and responsive to wider social change. The purpose of this chapter is threefold. Firstly, it briefly establishes how the conscription regime was first instituted in both countries. Secondly, it examines the state of play today, establishing which social groups are called upon to serve and which are not; this is in readiness for subsequent chapters, which examine how ex-conscripts perceive the social citizenship status of themselves and their non-conscript counterparts. Finally, it investigates recent changes in the conscription regime looking for clues as to the issues that are currently under debate and those that look set to emerge.

## Israel: the politics of *sherut hova* and *sherut leumi*[61]

In keeping with Ben-Gurion's assertion that only the IDF could fashion Israeli citizens out of disparate groups of migrants, Israel wasted no time instituting compulsory military service and quickly brought it within a suitable legal framework. *The Defence Service Law[62]*, which came into effect on 1st October, 1949[63], determined that the length of service for every young man and woman in Israel (including new immigrants up to the age of 26) would be two years. Interestingly, this initially included one year of agricultural training, which was designed to unite the disparate elements of Israeli society and build them into a nation, bonding them together by stirring within them a love of the homeland (Drory, 2005:83). However, whilst the *Defense Service Law* may have laid out the terms of service, it did not stipulate which social groups were eligible to serve and, equally, who was to receive exemptions[64]. The framework for regulating exemptions has instead been developed piecemeal, and it is governed both by statutory law and military policy. This complexity puts a full historical overview beyond reach and makes it is necessary to limit much of the following analysis to the situation as it now stands.

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[60] For an Israeli-specific reiteration of this, see Cohen (1995).

[61] Hebrew translation of military service and national service.

[62] *Defense Service Law*, 5709 – 1949 [Israel]. Unofficial English translation courtesy of the Israel Law Resource Centre at: http://www.israellawresourcecenter.org/israellaws/fulltext/defenceservicelaw.htm.

[63] It has since been amended many times: in 1950, 1951 (twice), 1952 (twice), 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958 (twice), 1959 (twice), 1961, 1963 (twice), 1964, 1967, 1970, 1971, 1973, 1974 (twice), 1975, 1976, 1978, 1983, 1984 (twice), 1987 and 1989.

[64] The Defense Service Law dealt with this only indirectly, investing power in the Minister of Defense to grant special exemptions as deemed necessary (Gal, 1994).

**Arab citizens of Israel**

With the exception Druze and Ciracessian men, Arab citizens of Israel[65] are administratively exempt from service. Nowhere is this proscribed in law; it is simply a matter of IDF policy (Shafir and Peled, 2002:126) justified on the basis that Arab citizens cannot be expected (or trusted) to fight their own brethren in the region (Gal, 1994:24). Arabs do occasionally volunteer – generally Christians or (Muslim) Bedouins – and the IDF reviews each case individually. Furthermore, whilst other non-serving groups have long been able to volunteer for an alternative (non-military) form of national service, historically the government has never seriously considered instituting such a system for non-serving Arabs. In recent years some efforts have been made to rectify this, but space on the new initiatives is severely limited with 50% of applicants refused places in 2009 (Stern, 2009).

The consequences of exemptions for Arabs are undoubtedly profound. It is commonplace to hear arguments in Israeli political discourse equating the community's lack of service with a lack of loyalty, and this premise is often used to justify circumscribing access to state institutions and social benefits that Jewish Israeli's take for granted. So prolific are such suggestions that it is only possible to give a few recent examples[66]. Firstly, in April 2009 Members of Knesset (MK) Avigdor Lieberman and David Rotem proposed amending the *Security Services Law[67]* (1986) to oblige individuals who do not perform military or national service to pay an additional 1% income tax until the age of forty-one[68]. As other non-conscripted groups can opt for national service more easily, this would affect the Arab community disproportionally. Another bill, introduced by MK Chaim Katz of the Likud, proposed amending the *Council for Higher Education Law[69]* (1958) to prohibit universities receiving state funding from admitting Israeli citizens under the age of twenty-one who have not done military or national service. Finally, and also in April 2009, MK David Rotem led a proposed new law entitled *Rights of Those who Serve in the Military or National Service* listing special financial, housing and educational benefits reserved for citizens who serve, including priority access to higher education and civil service employment. Similarly, as part of his 'no citizenship without loyalty' campaign, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman recently announced plans to limit the Foreign Ministry's cadet program to those who either served in the IDF or did national service.

Recent proposals demonstrate that the Israeli custom of tying social benefits to the performance of military or national service looks set to continue, to the detriment of the non-serving Arab minority. This is despite the fact that since an initiative to include Arab citizens within the national service framework was launched in 2007, Arab youth participation has 'skyrocketed'

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[65] Herein, 'Arab citizens of Israel' are citizens of Palestinian descent that have full rights to live, work and vote in the state of Israel. Generally, this means the survivors of the 63,000 Arabs that remained in Israel after the 1947-49 war and their descents, who were immediately granted citizenship, and others that successfully applied for citizenship under the 1952 *Nationality Law* (5712-1952). For a full discussion of the foundations and codification of Arab citizenship, see Peled (1992). Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories are excluded from analysis – they are considered *de jure* to be stateless persons (Shiblak, 2006).

[66] All come courtesy of a report by Norwich *et al* (2010) on behalf of the Mossawa Centre, an organisation seeking to improve the social, economic, legal and political status of Arab citizens in Israel.

[67] No English translation available - see footnote 66 above.

[68] The bill stipulated that the revenue generated should be used for the benefit of those who do perform some kind of military or national service. The law would only apply to those found fit to serve.

[69] No English translation available - see footnote 66 above.

(Stern, 2009)[70]. Moreover, it is clear that non-participation is used to legitimise unequal distribution of social services and benefits, although it does not necessarily follow that greater inclusivity and participation would reverse this. As Shafir and Peled (2002:126) note, 'the vacuity of the rationale tying... discrimination to the Palestinian's exemption from military service is evidence by the fact that it affects the Druze minority, who do serve, practically as much as it affects other Palestinian citizens'.

**Women**

It is well known that Israel is the only country in the world that drafts women into the military (Rubinstein, 2002). However, not all women are required to serve and the exemptions provided for women are much more extensive than those granted to men, warranting consideration. The standard term of service for women now stands at two years, having been extended and shortened on numerous occasions over the years (Izraeli, 2004). Exemptions from service are provided to all Arab women, other women who are married, pregnant or mothers, and those who declare that military service would violate their religious beliefs[71]. In 2007, over 40% of potential female enlistees were exempted from service, principally on religious grounds (Cohen, 2007). No parallel exemptions are granted to men except Yeshiva students. (Shafir and Peled, 2002:103). Furthermore, women are not called up for reserve duty once they are married, have children, or reach the age of twenty-four, whereas men generally serve in the reserves until they are in their late forties.

These generous exemptions have not been without consequence. Politically, women remain underrepresented in Israel, and Shafir and Peled (2002:102) make the case that this is because very few have the requisite military careers to achieve political success in Israel's militarist society, whilst those who do are still refused access to the 'old boy's network'[72]. Furthermore, the benefits that women who are drafted can expect to accrue from their service are vastly unequal with those of their male counterparts. Bordieu (1990) notes the several forms of 'capital' are acquired through military service, which men can more readily convert into financial and political assets. The capital that women accumulate provides significantly fewer advantages for them in the civilian realm. This may be because service for women is shorter, meaning that the military is reluctant to train them for highly skilled (and high status) jobs as the return on their investment is short-lived.

To clarify, whilst military service is officially considered a citizenship duty for Israeli women just as it is for Israeli men, the reality is that far fewer women are enlisted into the ranks of the IDF. Those that are drafted serve for less time and normally in supportive roles. If one accepts Bordieu's hypothesis that military service is a currency with which to buy social goods in the civilian realm, women have less of it to spend. This partly explains their unequal status in society, although it is far from inevitable that full equality in military service would a panacea given that the struggle for gender equality is globally ubiquitous. Nevertheless, the political debate in Israel does not seem geared towards instituting full gender equality in the draft any time soon; indeed, it tends to skirt the issue entirely by framing women's primary citizenship

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[70] A study conducted by the University of Haifa found that 75% of young Israeli Arabs supported voluntary national service (Haaretz Service, 2008).

[71] Women citing religious observance must appear before an exemption committee to prove their religiosity.

[72] However, they also argue that the most serious obstacle that women face in fully realizing citizenship rights stems from the fact that family law is administered by religious authorities and not the civil legal system.

contribution as maternal, especially in the 'battle of the cribs' with Palestinian women (Shafir and Peled: 2002,103).

## The *Charedim*

Ultra-orthodox men studying in Yeshivot[73] are granted deferments by the IDF for the duration of their studies. Given that they devote many years of their life to religious contemplation, this deferment effectively represents an exemption[74] (Shafir and Peled, 2002:143). The precedent for excusing Yeshiva students was set early on by Ben-Gurion, initially without too much controversy. However, the high birth rate[75] among the *Charedi* community has triggered exponential increases in the amount of exemptions granted (Cohen, 2007), causing huge resentment. Recognising this strain, Ehud Barak tasked the Tal Committee with reforming the exemption system in 1999. Their recommendations culminated in the *Tal Law* (2002), which aimed at increasing the participation of the *Charedim* in the military (for instance, by expanding the amount dedicated *Charedi* units). By 2005, the government had admitted that the law was largely ineffective in militarily enfranchising Yeshiva students. Paradoxically, in 2007 the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee extended the *Tal Law* until 2012, such is the nature of Israel's proportionally representative electoral system. Consequently, Yeshiva students now constitute the largest group of male non-draftees (Cohen, 2007) and there are no signs of a reversal in this trend. Even so, it is important to note that a small minority of *Charedi* men do perform their military service, normally serving in special units such as the *Netzah Yehuda* Battalion[76]. These units attend to their particular needs and help them to adapt to life outside of their closed communities.

The exemptions granted to the *Charedi* community have led to accusations that they are 'blatantly privileged' as citizens (Shafir and Peled, 2002:143). Indeed, the community appears to enjoy significant citizenship rights and privileges[77] whilst simultaneously shirking important duties such as performing military service and paying taxes[78]. Shafir and Peled (2002) argue that the privileged status accorded to Orthodox Jews stems from the crucial importance of the Jewish claim to *Eretz Yisrael* and the principle of Jewish historical continuity in legitimising the Zionist colonial project. This leads to the conclusion that citizenship for the *Charedim* is premised along ethno-nationalist rather than republican lines. Furthermore, this arrangement does not seem to have worked out to their disadvantage so far. Whilst the *Charedim* are not a wealthy community – in fact *Charedi* families live below the poverty line (Berman, 2000:916) – unlike their poor Arab neighbours, they cannot argue that this is because the rights/duties dynamic of citizenship weighs against them. Rather, the *Charedim*'s poverty is ideologically motivated, consciously chosen in accordance with religious conviction (Gonen, 2000).

In recent years, there have been suggestions that the traditional authority of the *Charedi* community is ebbing away, and anti-*Charedi* protests indicate that secularists are becoming

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[73] Jewish religious academies.

[74] Deferments officially become exemptions at forty-one (thirty-five with four children or more). The average Yeshiva leaving age in Israel is forty-two; in the USA it is twenty-five (Ilan, 2000:259-63, Gonen, 2000:16).

[75] In 2000, the total fertility rate in the Charedi community was 7.6 and rising (Berman, 2000).

[76] The Netzah Yehuda Battalion, a joint IDF-civil society initiative, has a useful website: www.nahalharedi.org.

[77] Politically, the community often holds the balance of power (Berman, 2000). Furthermore, because of their traditional religious authority, the Charedi also have some control over other people's rights; they take charge of family and dietary laws and ensure official observance of the Sabbath in public (Shafir and Peled, 2002).

[78] Because of the studies, Charedi men are rarely employed. They rely either on the earnings of their wives or, more commonly state subsidies for their livelihood (Shafir and Peled;, 2000:144).

increasingly less forgiving of their consumption of social goods without equivalent social sacrifice (Levy, 2009). As later chapters will show, the dataset for this research also confirm this: respondents appeared to reserve a special kind of contempt for the *Charedi*, consistently prioritising them in the typologies they were asked to give to delineate which social groups avoid military service. Furthermore, differences between the *Charedi* community and the mainstream (Jewish) citizenry seem to be crystallising around the issue of military service particularly, with Berman (2000:913) arguing that this is now the 'most controversial point of contact the Ultra-Orthodox and secular society in Israel'. Shafir and Peled (2002:152) argue that the 1990s were defined by efforts to reshape the nature of state-society relations. *Charedi* exemptions from service were a fulcrum of this - they violate both the liberal equality principle and the republican notion of civic virtue, and thus effectively mobilise popular opinion. All the evidence would suggest that the first decade of this century has seen little in the way of change, if anything the passing years have simply underscored the intractability of the debate.

**The *Refuseniks***

The term *refusenik* describes people who are eligible to serve in the IDF and yet refuse to, citing matters of individual conscience: internationally, they are known as 'conscientious objectors'. In recent years, social movements supporting conscientious objectors have proliferated. Some object to militarism in its entirety (*New Profile; Shministim*) whilst others exercise selective objection, protesting over the IDF's handling of particular conflict situations (*Breaking the Silence; Courage to Refuse; Yesh Gvul*). A few movements have been led from within the military itself (generally those advocating selective refusal, mainly in the Palestinian Territories), and others are led by leftist activists and high-school students (Zemlinskaya, 2008). Interestingly, *refuseniks* are also found among members of the religious right, who object to the state's occasional efforts at settlement eviction. It is difficult to establish whether these objectors organise themselves collectively: certainly, if there is a movement then it is nebulous. Overall, incidences of conscientious objection are rising in Israel and this has not gone unnoticed. Indeed, some argue that the issue may have turned into something of a moral panic, although the dataset does not support this idea (see *who counts*?).

In many ways, *refuseniks* stand apart from other groups of non-servers considered in this study. Firstly, membership is not ascribed, it is chosen. Secondly, the diversity of the *refuseniks,* drawn from a cross-section of Israeli society, limits the extent to which the state and society can treat them as a collective entity. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily proscribe looking for changes in their citizenship status at the group level. Indeed, the state does have some generic mechanisms for sanctioning *refuseniks* that impact upon the citizenship status of those who wear the label; imprisonment, for example, temporarily downgrades citizenship status by confiscating civil rights (Skykes, 2007:66). Furthermore, it seems that many *refuseniks* also have their social citizenship status derided on an individual basis within their own communities. Indeed, online video interviews[79] with young *shministim*[80] testify to this. However, in the final analysis it is important to remember that conscientious objection, although increasingly a matter of concern to the IDF, is still extremely rare in Israel (Cohen, 2007).

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[79] Available at http://december18th.org/. Accessed 12th July 2010.
[80] The Shministim (twelfth-graders) are an informal group of young Israelis who openly declare their refusal.

**The military backbone: non-*Charedi* Jewish men**

A full understanding of the conscription regime in Israel not only requires identifying those who are conspicuous by their absence in the military, it also begs the question: who are the inconspicuous serving majority? By process of elimination, it is clear that non-*Charedi* Jewish men bear most of the burden of service as few exemptions are available to them[81]. Whilst the researcher has decided to subsume this serving majority under the rubric of 'non-*Charedi* Jewish men' in order to emphasise their dichotomy with the major exemption-receiving groups discussed above, they can be sub-divided further according to their Jewish heritage. Roughly speaking, the group comprises of *Ashkenazim* (descendents of European Jewry), *Mizrahim*[82] (descendents of Middle-Eastern and North-African Jewry), *Sephardim* (descendents of Iberian Jewry) and ex-Soviet Jews.

The contribution that non-*Charedi* Jewish men make in defending the country does not go unrewarded, and it is fair to say that overall this group sits atop the hierarchy of citizenship. Although they are not explicitly prioritised by the state to receive additional benefits from military service, it stands to reason that because there is a much higher (almost universal) incidence of service within the group there is also a much higher incidence of reward. Some of these rewards are tangible (such as priority for subsidized mortgages), and some of them are intangible (such as the honour and respect that a republican society accords to those who attend to the common good). It is worth nothing that *Ashkenazi* men, in particular, have benefited from their service, as their traditional prevalence in combat roles means they are seen as the 'warriors' of the tribe. Indeed, their privileged citizenship status is reflected in the fact that the image of the republican citizen-soldier has come to be almost exclusively identified with *Ashkenazi* men (Levy and Levy, 2008:353).

Unpicking the conscription regime in Israel is no easy task, although this is hardly surprising given the stratified nature of Israeli society. Two communities are characterised by a complete lack of service – the Arabs and the *Charedim* – yet the ramifications of this are different for each of them. Arabs, who must resort to affirming their citizenship rights under a liberal framework, struggle to get equal access to the state and receive markedly fewer social benefits. By contrast, the *Charedim* frame their citizenship rights in ethno-nationalist terms, which not only legitimises their low civic contribution but also gives them access to a comprehensive system of social benefits that allows them to perpetuate their behaviour. There is then another group – women – whose partial service is reflected in their 'half-way' status, not as politically powerful or deserving as Jewish men, but more enfranchised and well-rewarded than completely non-serving communities. At the top of the citizenship tree are the non-*Charedi* Jewish men, particularly the *Ashkenazi* 'warriors' who epitomise the republican citizen-soldier model. Finally, there are the *refuseniks*, the only group that opt-in to their identity rather than having it ascribed. The *refuseniks* are more problematic to place on the citizenship scale, largely because they do not constitute an ideologically unified group, although they still appear to experience a renegotiation of their citizenship. In the final analysis, it is clear that in Israel military service is a citizenship duty *par excellence;* given that an aim of this paper is to understand how ex-conscripts perceive of the citizenship status of their non-serving counterparts, establishing this is *sin qua non.*

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[81] The IDF does have special procedures for only children and the siblings of fallen soldiers, but these rarely imply complete exemption. Of course, there is also the possibility of exemption on health grounds.

[82] Some Mizrahim are disqualified from service due to low educational attainment (Levy and Levy, 2008:354).

## Turkey: the declining orthodoxy of *vatani görev*[83]

Unlike Israel, which has consciously tailored its conscription regime in accordance with social and ethnic cleavages, Turkey claims to have an inclusive approach to the draft that resonates with the assimilationist agenda that it pursues with minority groups (Akyol, 2010). However, this does not mean that all Turks share the burden of military service equally. Women are not conscripted at all, and very few choose the military as a career path[84]. Moreover, whilst men have been obliged to serve since 1927 (Narli, 2005:246), length of service is determined according to levels of educational attainment. Finally, as conscientious objection is a ubiquitous phenomenon, Turkey also has a small group of citizens who fall foul of the law by refusing to serve at all. Clearly, the conscription regime in Turkey is not fully assimilationist; rather, stratification is limited to being gender and education dependent instead of being ethnically or religiously determined. Whilst it is important to recognise these strata early on, the second half of this chapter represents a departure from the first in that it does not aim to address each of them in turn. Instead, it proceeds thematically. This is partly because the conscription regime in Turkey is not quite as complicated as in Israel, but more importantly it is because many of the debates now shaping 'military service-citizenship' dynamics receive cross-sectional support. The following discussion addresses four such debates: (1) the socio-political effects of streaming recruits according to their educational attainment; (2) the ill-treatment of conscripts; (3) whether the tacit support that draft evaders and conscientious objectors receive indicates liberalisation; and (4) recent plans to gradually professionalise the military and phase out conscription.

### More than just a degree: streaming recruits according to educational attainment

The Turkish constitution[85] of 1982 enshrines military service as an essential duty for all male citizens of the republic. Specific procedures governing the process of recruitment are codified under the *Military Service Law*[86] (1927). The duration for which a recruit is required to serve is inversely related to their level of education, with the threshold fixed at university level. Whereas graduates serve either six months as a short-term private or twelve months as a reserve officer[87], non-graduates must serve for fifteen months as a private[88]. This provides for a considerable duration discrepancy of up to eleven months. Both graduates and non-graduates must be prepared to undertake reserve duties up to the age of forty. For Turkish citizens who have lived or worked abroad for at least three years, alternative procedures are in place. They can opt to pay a fee[89] absolving them of their duty to serve a full term (although they must still complete basic military training of three weeks).

The consequences of streaming recruits according to educational criteria are significant. An obvious effect is that more of the military burden is carried by the poorest echelons of society, as in these communities there are fewer resources available for schooling (or, alternatively,

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[83] 'Service to the motherland'

[84] Those who do must enlist at the officer level.

[85] The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 1982, article 72. Last amended 10th May 2007.

[86] Law No. 1111, Military Law [Turkey]. Last amended 1994. Unofficial English translation available courtesy of UNHCR at: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=printdoc&amp;docid=3ae6b4d020

[87] Approximately 30% of graduates are conscripted as reserve officers serving at the rank of third lieutenant. Recruits indicate a preference for this track but the decision lies with the military (Gencer and Sümer, 2007).

[88] Limited exemptions apply to graduates and non-graduates alike. Common reasons for exemption include health problems, having an older brother who has already died in service or the military having excess staff.

[89] *Approximately 5,100 Euros; must be paid in foreign currency (Orhan, 2010).*

migration). However, educational stratification not only solidifies economic and class cleavage, it may also indirectly deepen ethnic divides. This is because ethnicity is often a corollary of poverty. The issue has become particularly salient for the Kurdish minority. Their ethnic enclave in the south-east is easily the most impoverished region of Turkey, with much lower educational attainment (Şahin and Gülmez, 2000). Thus, Kurdish men are far more likely to serve for fifteen months than ethnically Turkish men (although there are, of course, plenty of the latter amongst them). Given that the issue of Kurdish nationalism is already heavily politicised, with the Turkish government frequently battling to contain a protracted insurgency led by the PKK, educational stratification takes on a new dimension. The perceived inequity in military service has become another bone of contention to add to the Kurdish people's ongoing grievances with the Turkish state (Tezcür, 2009). In fact, the researcher's field notes indicate a high level of politically-motivated draft avoidance amongst Kurds, both in the west of the country (Istanbul) and the south-east (Diyarbakir), although it is impossible to fully substantiate this observation in the absence of empirical data.

In recent years, the inequity of the conscription regime has become a rallying point for oppositionists. They argue that it evidences the disingenuousness of orthodox republican ideals, which legitimise military service by framing it as a vital citizenship duty. Interestingly, when the researcher raised the issue of inequity with interviewees their responses were sharply divided according to educational status. Those with degrees argued that the uneducated had the most to gain from service, including vital education and literacy skills and basic standards of personal health and hygiene[90]. However, those without degrees were almost unanimous in their indignation. They couched their responses in terms that clearly demonstrated their anger and feelings of exploitation. Furthermore, when the second group of respondents were asked to list some examples of citizenship duties none of them offered up military service. Instead they limited their answers to narrow, liberal duties such as 'not breaking the law', 'paying taxes' and 'getting a good job'. Whilst the degree-holding respondents were hardly effusive about military service, the majority of them did believe that it was somehow easier for the uneducated (despite their longer commitments) because they did not suffer intellectual frustration and might even find the experience stimulating. They did not seem to think that the system, which clearly works to their advantage, was unfair to others. Therefore, it appears that whilst educational stratification may be undermining the Republican discourse among uneducated conscripts, it is not having the same effect among the educated (although they may have other arguments that challenge the republican orthodoxy).

**Ill-treatment of recruits: the military's worst kept secret**
Conscripts in the Turkish military have always run the risk of being subject to abuse and incidents of violence are high. Indeed, the researcher encountered, both in formal interviews and casual conversation, a huge amount of anecdotal evidence confirming that the military operates a harsh regime. One respondent[91] waited two days to receive medical attention for a dislocated shoulder (incurred accidently) and recalled routinely seeing conscripts slapped and kicked by officers. Another[92], a university graduate, believed that physical abuse of conscripts was particularly directed at those serving a fifteen month term. He personally testified to having witnessed abuse; on this occasion it was directed at a short-term conscript whom had been

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[90] The stereotype of the uncouth and unclean village boy was pervasive amongst the educated middle classes.
[91] Respondent number 2, interviewed 11th March 2010, Istanbul.
[92] Respondent number 3, interviewed 13th March 2010, Istanbul.

mistakenly identified as a long-term one. Despite the pervasiveness of anecdotal evidence, documentary evidence is scarce (although this may be due to the culture of fear that the *Turkish Penal Code* inculcates regarding matters of state or military criticism). However, *Hürriyet Daily News* recently carried a story of a soldier who lived with a bullet in his head for five months because he feared repercussions from his major (Sayman, 2010). A situation report on conscription in Turkey, published by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2001:49), confirms that 'Non-commissioned officers and lieutenants in particular occasionally beat conscripts as a means of disciplining them. The use of insults – again by NCOs and lieutenants – to conscripts is a fairly regular occurrence'. The same report also noted[93] an increase in reports of conscripts dying in suspicious circumstances. Many were of Kurdish origin.

It is hard to know what effect the culture of abuse in the Turkish military has upon willingness to serve because it is not an issue that the Turkish literature can address without risking reprisal. Whilst there is an extensive body of research demonstrating that public confidence in the military remains high[94] (although perhaps not as high as it has been historically), the researcher's data presents a more mixed picture. Some respondents made positive comments about the military, such as noting that it is fairer and less politicised than other state institutions. However, all respondents (bar one) resented the treatment that they and others received, with some explicitly stating that their human rights had been transgressed. The respondents also (with the exception of the same individual) all believed that military service should be voluntary and refused to accept that it was an essential citizenship duty. Ultimately however, the question of whether there is a link between ill-treatment and denial of a 'military service-citizenship' dynamic that is causal, rather than simply correlational, is impossible to address without greater supporting evidence.

**The *asker kacagi* and *vicdani retci*[95] surge: liberal bellwethers?**
The Turkish military does not release any official figures confirming the amount of draft evaders or conscientious objectors, despite the fact that the administration of conscripts is strict (Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001:12). However, it is reasonable to suggest that incidences of draft evasion and conscientious objection are on the rise. Perhaps because the estimation of draft evasion is left to NGOs, figures vary wildly up to around 350,000 (ibid:30) and it is unclear which figures are annual and which are cumulative. Figures relating to conscientious objection are slightly firmer given that individual cases are rare enough to be newsworthy. The latest figures that the researcher can source come from a *Hürriyet Daily News* (2010) article dated 27th June, which reported that Şendoğan Yazıcı is now the one hundred and twenty-first Turk to refuse to serve as a matter of conscience. Given that the conscientious objection movement only began to take shape in the 1990s this number is more substantive than it seems, particularly as the organisations leading the movement – the *İzmir Savaş Karşıtları Derneği* (Izmir Anti-War Association, or ISKD) and the *Istanbul Antimilitarist Initiative* (İAMİ) – operate in a fiercely hostile political climate (Speck, 2006:2).

There is no legal recognition of conscientious objection in Turkey and no option of performing an alternative non-military service instead. The consequences of refusing to serve are profound and imprisonment is common. Even supporters of conscientious objectors or indeed anyone

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[93] The report identifies Amnesty International and the 'pro-PKK press' as sources.
[94] See appendix one.
[95] Turkish terms for draft evasion and conscientious objection, respectively.

who publically undermines the draft can fall foul of the law. As recently as 17th June 2010, four activists were convicted under Article 318 of the *Turkish Penal Code* for 'alienating the public from military service'. All received custodial sentences, though some were suspended (Amnesty International, 2010). Draft evasion is also punishable with imprisonment. Specific terms are dependent upon the seriousness of the evasion as defined by Article 63 of the *Turkish Penal Code*[96], but vary between one month and ten years. Aside from imprisonment, those that have avoided military service without a legitimate reason experience constant, low level disruption in their lives. They will not be issued with passports and cannot have existing passports renewed. Fulfilment of service is registered on Turkish passports with the entry '*yapmıştır*' (done) or '*yapmamiştır*' (not done), making foreign travel impossible for evaders, deserters and objectors. Men with drafts outstanding also live with the constant threat of arrest. Routine checks such as traffic control can expose them to the authorities, and the police and *gendarma* often conduct house searches in an effort to find absentees.

An interesting question is whether increasing incidences of draft evasion and conscientious objection indicate a decline in the salience of the republican citizenship discourse. At least a few Turkish men are now prepared to openly challenge the idea that military service is an essential civic duty, and it is reasonable to assume that there are many more avoiding service. However, evidence of a decline in the republican citizenship discourse sits uncomfortably with arguments made by researchers such as Varoglu and Bocaksiz (2005) that the draft in Turkey still receives near universal support. In the end, it remains to be seen how significant increasing incidences of draft evasion and conscientious objection will be in corroding the republican orthodoxy. For now, the concept of challenging military dogma remains novel, dangerous and taboo in Turkish society. However, what is clear is that the debate itself is on the way to achieving a critical mass whereby some kind of change in the status quo is inevitable. Understanding exactly what this change will entail and what kinds of renegotiations in the citizenship discourse will result seems likely to preoccupy Turkish citizenship theorists over the coming years.

**The prospect of professionalisation**

The trend towards professionalisation in the Turkish military took off in the 1990s and since then the ratio of career soldiers to conscripts has been increasing. Plans to professionalise are part of broader restructuring efforts earmarked for completion by 2020 (Gencer and Sümer, 2007). The impetus for reform was partly triggered by the Kurdish insurgency, as smaller numbers of highly skilled career soldiers are often more effective than masses of conscripts in anti-insurgency warfare (Enginsoy and Bekdil, 2008). Whilst the mainstreaming of career soldiers is something of a watershed, firm projections about the extent of professionalisation have yet to emerge. On 30th June 2010, *Hürriyet Daily News* reported Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül as stating that a study on recruiting a large number of career soldiers was ongoing and no specific number had yet been determined. However, regardless of how extensive professionalising reforms are going to be, it is not the intention for the model of the 'professional soldier' to replace that of the 'citizen-soldier' completely. Indeed, according to Moskos (2003) the shift to an all-volunteer force is unlikely specifically because it would sever the strong cultural bond between the public and the military.

Responses to plans for greater emphasis on professional soldiering have the power to tell us a lot about the cultural importance of the draft in Turkish society. According to conventional

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[96] See appendix 1.4.

wisdom, countries that phase out conscription run the risk that the military will become isolated from the citizenry (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; Moskos, 1977 and Clever, 2009). However, if there is a risk of this in Turkey, then it is not something the citizenry themselves seem to mind. In fact, promising to end conscription is a real vote winner. A story carried in the *Hürriyet Daily News* on 23rd April 2010, focused on Prime Minister Erdoğan's timely announcement to professionalise the military shortly before an election. It quoted retired Major General Kuloğlu, who stated that 'whether [Erdoğan] can pass this implementation or not, he will benefit from it'. Given that the article also estimates the total number of men avoiding the draft at around 550,000, it is not surprising that measures to end conscription receive broad-base support among the electorate. Of course, at the moment it remains unclear whether abolishing conscription really would be the nail in the coffin for the civil-military bond. Yet, regardless of the consequences, the interesting thing about the professionalisation debate is that it allows us to see the unpopularity of the draft clearly without the hindrance of censorship. This is important, because much of the academic literature spiels off age-old truths about the 'warrior nation' without actually taking the temperature of the citizenry. Consequently, of all the issues the military is grappling with it is the professionalisation of its forces that, in many ways, best indicates attitudes towards citizenship in contemporary Turkish society.

# SITES OF SOCIALISATION: THE RITUAL OF SWEARING-IN

*In what ways and to what extent do the respondents' observations of the swearing-in ceremony reflect that the occasion was seminal in their pursuit to acquire civic virtue, and how did the ceremony change, shape or reinforce their civic identity, their perception of their relationship with the state, and their understandings of their rights and duties as a citizen?*

By using the swearing-in ceremony common to both Israel and Turkish conscription experiences as a vignette, this chapter seeks to evidence the concept of militarised socialisation at work. The account given here is not intended to be – indeed could not be – considered definitive. However, given that empirical analyses of militarised socialisation are in their infancy, even an impressionistic account adds value to the existing body of knowledge. Also, as an extensive search has not turned up any ethnographic or sociological accounts of swearing-in ceremonies in either Israel or Turkey, the data that informs the analysis is significant in its own right. What follows is a brief outline of public event theory, which theoretically informs the researcher's analysis. Attention then turns to reflecting upon Israeli and Turkish ceremonies individually, which are reconstructed through the testimony of interviewees and scrutinised for evidence of militaristic and nationalistic norm diffusion.

## Deconstructing and interpreting public events

*'The theatre of performances is not in people's heads, it is in their public acts.'*

<div align="right">Brissett and Edgley (2006:37)</div>

According to Handelman (1990:3), public events are ritualistic occasions purposefully undertaken in the public domain in order for people 'to make more, less or other of themselves, than they usually do'. The aim of a public event is to communicate well-honed messages to those within its orbit. By this definition, the swearing-in ceremonies held by the Israeli and Turkish militaries, which mark the end of recruits' basic training and the beginning of fully fledged soldierhood, are classical examples of public events. They articulate key unifying messages about the bravery, loyalty and nobility of the citizenry in the service of the state, and they do so by design. National symbols are exploited to emphasise the importance of nationhood and citizen duty – national anthems, military uniforms and oaths of allegiance take centre stage.

Public events, particularly official state ceremonies, are designed to either 'model' or 'mirror' the societies that they are situated within (Handelman, 1990), making them reflective occasions that contain clues about the social and political culture of societies. However, adjudicating the explanatory power of public events is not straightforward, as extrapolating this information is wholly a matter of interpretation. The analyst is left to determine the meaning that the event has for participants by ascribing signification to aspects of the ritual and inferring consequence, typically by examining the use of communicative devices such as rhetoric, narrative, music, choreography and iconography. Clearly, the danger of misinterpretation is ever present. In the following analysis of swearing-in ceremonies, the researcher has attempted to mitigate this risk by drawing meaning from the responses of the participants themselves, instead of attempting to deconstruct the ceremonies by simply observing them. In each of the in-depth interviews carried out with ex-conscripts, respondents were asked to describe the events of the day. Where responses were short, supplementary questions were asked to acquire more detail. In both cohorts (Israel and Turkey), most respondents were very forthcoming, speaking freely and easily about timetabling, the meaning of particular activities, ceremonial climaxes and anticlimaxes and lasting memories. From their responses, the researcher has been able to

reconstruct the ceremonies and give an impressionistic account of the extent to which they indicate the internalisation of social norms by recruits.

## Israel: 'I cried like hell'

*"I swear and commit to pledge allegiance to the State of Israel, its laws, and authorities, to accept upon myself unconditionally the authority of the Israel Defense Force, obey all the orders and instructions given by authorized commanders, devote all my energies, and even sacrifice my life for the protection of the homeland and liberty of Israel."*

Oath taken by Israeli conscripts at their swearing-in ceremony.

After several weeks of basic training (*tironut*[97]), Israeli conscripts officially swear in to the military at a ceremony called the *Hashba'ah*[98]. This is the day when recruits are assigned to their respective units and exchange their general all-army khaki beret for their new corps beret. Well in advance of the event taking place, conscripts are made to rehearse the sequencing of the service that is the focus of the ceremony. On the day itself, this service is sometimes preceded by various activities (one respondent reported taking part in a scavenger hunt around the old city of Jerusalem before swearing in at the Western Wall[99]). As the amount of conscripts that can be sworn in at one time is very large – the researcher has heard reports that up to about one thousand conscripts can take part in a *Hashba'ah* – the scale of the event can be considerable. Perhaps because of this, the oath that is taken by recruits is administered communally[100] (for wording, see above). Generally, it appears that the oath is read out by a commander whilst recruits intermittently chant '*Ani Matchir'*, meaning 'I swear', in unison. Before taking the oath, recruits are provided with their guns, which they hold in one hand, and a copy of their holy book[101], which they hold in the other. Typically, family and friends of the conscripts are invited to attend, although occasionally if the location is insecure then this custom is foregone[102]. Finally, when the official events of the day have been completed the recruits get to spend some time with the families and friends that came to share the occasion with them.

Although some conventions appear to be routine across all ceremonies, some are not. Firstly, the location of the *Hashba'ah* often depends on the history of the unit. Some units choose to underline the significance of ceremonies by holding them at auspicious locations that have special meaning in the Israeli collective memory, such as the Western Wall in Jerusalem and the fortress of Masada. Others units hold their ceremonies on the conscripts' military bases. Secondly, it appears that *Hashba'ah* ceremonies do not routinely take place at a fixed time – they can be either in the afternoon or the evening. However, what is uniform across all ceremonies is that music reportedly plays an important atmospheric role; indeed, every respondent noted that a high point in the service was the singing of the Israeli national anthem, the *Hatiqva*[103]. Interestingly, one of the respondents reported that the music played at the ceremony was 'nationalistic' and 'affecting'[104]. This resonates with ethnomusicologists' observations about the importance of a musical culture known as *'shirei eretz Israel'* in constructing an authentic Israeli

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[97] Hebrew: טירונות
[98] Hebrew: השבעה
[99] Respondent number 2.7, interviewed 30th April 2010.
[100] Respondent number 2.7, interviewed 30th April 2010.
[101] Either the Old Testament, the New Testament or the Quran.
[102] Respondent number 2.2, interviewed 19th April 2010.
[103] Hebrew: הַתִּקְוָה. English: 'The Hope'.
[104] Respondent number 2.1, interviewed 19th April 2010.

identity. Music of this kind is typically regaled at public gatherings where everyone sings together in a manner known as '*shira be-zibur'* (Regev, 1996). Also common across all ceremonies for non-combat units was a process called 'distance-breaking', where the commanders that led the troops through their basic training ask to be addressed by their first names from that point onwards. In combat units, this 'distance-breaking' takes place after the advanced training stage (*imun mitkadem*).

In analysing the respondents' descriptive accounts of their *Hashba'ah,* what immediately becomes noticeable is the extent to which they emphasise the poignancy of the event. All but one[105] of the respondents recalled being emotionally moved by the experience, with some describing it as 'awesome', 'incredible[106]' and 'a big deal'[107], and a good number stated that they and their families all cried during the service. Most were keen to stress their sense of pride and achievement in taking the oath, and one noted that performing this in public increased the saliency of the undertaking and made him reflect upon the commitments that he was making to the state[108]. For some of the respondents, the audience appeared to take centre stage in their memories of the occasion. Interestingly, it was often the case that it was not the amount of people watching that affected them, but who. Having friends and family in the audience seemed to be especially important and it seems that it is not unusual to have people travel from overseas to attend *Hashba'ah*. Given Shafir and Peled's (2003:163) observation that military service represents 'the transition... from offspring to citizen', it is not surprising that parents and other family members see the *Hasba'ah* ceremony as such a crucial occasion, and no doubt recruits are aware of this.

Based on the respondents' observations, it seems fair to say that the *Hashba'ah* ceremonies had a profound and lasting effect on the participants. Many respondents spoke candidly about what the ceremony meant for them personally. In various ways, each of the respondents saw the ceremony as a recognition of their growth – either into adulthood (and especially manhood), soldierhood, citizenhood, or a combination of these. Although respondents tended to prioritise their transition to adulthood first of all, it is the proposition of a transition to soldier and citizen that is particularly interesting, especially as respondents used the terms interchangeably whereas in academia they are often presented as dichotomic. Many respondents were able to elaborate upon how the ceremony reinforced their civic identity, largely because it prompted them to seriously reflect upon the oath that they were taking. It was clear that the respondents recognised the oath as a pledge of duty to the state that they were required to give in order to demonstrate their allegiance as citizens. Thus, whilst there was little evidence to suggest that the respondents believed the ceremony substantively changed their relationship with the state, the relationship in its pre-existing form had been reinforced and strengthened. None offered up any criticisms of either the military or the state in describing the ceremony, and each appeared to see it as a climactic moment in their civic lives – an impression that was later borne out when respondents were asked to plot out their feelings of 'patriotism' and 'national pride' (on a scale of one to ten) as they remembered them before, during and after the ceremony.

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[105] This respondent attributed his despondency to being disappointed in his commission. Having hoped for a combat role, he was assigned a civilian role at The Bakum, the IDF headquarters in Tel Aviv.
[106] Respondent number 2.7, interviewed 30th April 2010.
[107] Respondent number 2.2, interviewed 19th April 2010.
[108] Respondent number 2.4, interviewed 20th April 2010.

## Turkey: 'I just wanted the day to finish'

*"I hereby take an oath on my honour:*
*-To serve my nation and republic in times of war and peace with integrity and affection, on land,*
*on the sea, and in the air,*
*-To abide by all rules and regulations and to obey my superiors,*
*-To value more than my life, the honour of service and the reputation of the Turkish Flag,*
*-And if necessary, to willingly give up my life in the name of duty, homeland, and republic."*

Oath taken by Turkish conscripts at their swearing-in ceremony.

Many elements of the Turkish swearing-in ceremony, known as the '*yemin toreni*', are similar to the Israeli *Hashba'ah*. The ceremony itself takes place after several weeks of basic training. It is choreographed and rehearsed by the conscripts in classes beforehand in order to ensure precision and uniformity of movement. The conscripts march together, with one arm on their neighbour's shoulder and the other holding their gun[109]. Generally, the service takes between two and three hours, although this varies according to how many recruits are being sworn in. In the Turkish military, ceremonies always take place in the morning on the relevant military bases[110]. Conscripts take their oaths to defend the nation communally (as above), although in this instance a commander reads the oath out line by line and then pauses in order for the conscripts to repeat it afterwards. Family and friends of the conscripts are usually invited to attend the event, although just as with Israeli swearing-in ceremonies if security risks are deemed to be too high this policy is revised. One respondent, who finished his service in early 2010, was sworn in without an audience because he was serving in a high-risk south-eastern province. Interestingly, this did not seem to affect his morale – he reported that the ceremony 'probably represented the high point of my national pride'[111].  Once the ceremony is completed conscripts spend time with their family and friends, a custom many of them appreciate because ordinarily the army permits soldiers to have very little contact with the civilian realm[112].

Respondents' observations of the oath-taking part of the ceremony, in particular, are revealing of their sense of civic identity. Some respondents were unequivocal in their rejection of the oath and maintained that they only repeated it under sufferance, although interestingly none of these respondents attributed their hostility to long held political beliefs about the legitimacy of the state or militarism *per se*[113]. Rather, their objections seemed to be circumstantial rather than principled. Some were resentful of the oath because of the mistreatment that they had been exposed to in their first few weeks of service, whilst others saw it as emblematic of a system of military service which had disrupted their lives, obliging them to leave their families and affecting their career. Amongst Kurdish respondents, there did appear to be a political dimension to rejecting the oath, but other arguments about the unpopularity of service still held true. Of those respondents who were comfortable taking the oath, many reported a dip in their enthusiasm for its principles afterwards. Speaking in similar terms to their opposite numbers, they attributed this decline to the treatment that they subsequently encountered[114]. Indeed, whilst the respondents' reflections were often inconsistent and contradictory of one another, it

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[109] Respondent number 1.8, interviewed 30th March 2010.

[110] Respondent number 1.9, interviewed 3rd May 2010.

[111] Respondent number 1.6, interviewed 30th March 2010.

[112] Conscripts only have a few hours off base each week and this is not sufficient to make visits. They are not allowed mobile telephones during service (Respondent number 1.6, interviewed 30th March 2010).

[113] Respondents numbered 1.5 and 1.7, interviewed 28th March 2010 and 30th March 2010 respectively.

[114] Respondents numbered 1.3 and 1.6, interviewed 13th March 2010 and 30th March 2010 respectively.

appeared that much of the collective disillusionment with the oath, either at the time or afterwards, stemmed from the way in which military service is administered rather than anything else. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to suggest at least tentatively that anger and frustration over the conditions of service may have had ramifications in terms of the way the respondents perceived their relationship with the state. The comments of one respondent are worth quoting at length[115]:

> There were some very bad surprises in the military. Before I went, I thought that the army was great and that they did everything in the right way. I thought that they treated people better than they did. Afterwards, I understood that actually not much is done in the right way and I was disappointed about it.

And later:

> I still appreciate the work of the military because it defends the republic but it needs to reform some of its practices. The government should make it improve but it doesn't. At the moment, I feel angry about how the military treats us when we do our service. We are giving the country our help and defending it, but they treat us badly.

For this respondent, a negative encounter with the military was unexpected. When it occurred, it not only prompted him to re-evaluate his opinions about the military specifically but also brought into question other assumptions about the efficacy of the state. Although there is no empirical evidence to suggest that this case is representative of a wider phenomenon, there is also no reason to think that it stands in isolation – particularly as the military and the state are closely entwined in the Turkish social imagination, with the military often being credited as the protectorate of the Kemalist principles upon which the state was founded.

Interestingly, even those respondents who were negative about the ceremony and military service in general were able to explain how their experiences were formative. Unanimously, respondents believed that serving in the military signified their transition from boyhood to manhood. One respondent explained that he would never have considered smoking in front of his father before his military service, yet afterwards his father would offer him cigarettes and they would smoke together[116]. The respondents' observations that military service is a kind of initiation into manhood and a marker of masculinity corresponds with Varoglu and Bocaksiz's (2005) hypothesis that service is a rite of passage for young males and a source of identity construction. However, whilst military service is clearly a maker of men in Turkey, there is little to suggest that respondents' perceive it as a maker of citizens. Very few respondents were prepared to accept that serving in the military made them think differently about their civic identity, and only one person was prepared to accept that there is even a link between military service and citizenship. In the words of one respondent, 'it's just an adventure!'[117] This discrepancy between the official (classically republican) understanding of military service as an essential civic duty and the perceptions of conscripts is surprising, and immediately begs for an explanation. A comprehensive analysis would require further research; however, the researcher contends that further exploration of the conscript's resentment at conditions of service and their partial disillusionment would be a good starting point.

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[115] Respondent number 1.8, interviewed 30th March 2010.
[116] Respondent number 1.1, interviewed 10th March 2010.
[117] Respondent number 1.8, interviewed 30th March 2010.

# CONVERTING MILITARY SACRIFICE INTO CITIZENSHIP STATUS

*How are the sacrifices that conscripts make in performing their military service framed by society as the fulfilment of an essential citizenship duty and how are ex-conscripts able to 'convert' their sacrifice into improved social citizenship status upon decommissioning?*

In order for republican societies to successfully frame citizenship rights as contingent upon the fulfilment of essential citizenship duties such as military service, there needs to exist some kind of exchange mechanism whereby duties can be kept in equitable correspondence with rights. Yagil Levy[118] defines this mechanism in terms of 'convertibility'. The basic premise of the convertibility thesis is that the acquisition of civic virtue in the military realm can be transferred to the civilian realm and used to procure valuable social resources. These resources then bolster an individual or group's social citizenship status. This chapter firstly addresses Levy's concept of convertibility in more detail, embedding it within wider academic debates about how marketisation and liberalisation are affecting the deep structure of modern militaries. Attention then turns to considering case-specific evidence supporting the idea of convertibility. Central to this analysis is an investigation of outcomes – what resources do conscripted social groups gain access to as a result of their service and how can we go about measuring them? Addressing these outcomes is approached subjectively, by drawing upon the perceptions of the respondents. Consequently, no attempt is made to provide an empirical account of stratified citizenship, for instance by looking for statistical correlations between duties, rights and status.

## Converting resources from the military to the civilian sphere

According to Levy's (1998) convertibility thesis, citizens who have performed military service, and hence have accumulated assets in the military sphere, can exchange these for resources or assets in the civilian social sphere (Levy *et al*, 2007:129). This exchange then serves to augment the social citizenship status of the bearer. Resources, or assets, can be either materialistic or symbolic (Levy, 2007), and so include the accrual of civic virtue. Unsurprisingly, high levels of convertibility are found in societies where militarism and republicanism go hand in hand (Levy *et al*, 2007:129). If the republican equation that underpins the convertibility thesis is 'violated' then the standard pattern of exchange is ruptured. Levy (2008) gives several examples of what might trigger this scenario. Firstly, dominant social groups may come to perceive the benefits of security provided under the military's auspices to have become prohibitively costly, either morally or materially. If they renege on their duties to serve then they may lose social rights and status as a result. Secondly, dominant groups may come to perceive an inequity between the fulfilment of service and the dispersal of social goods, which are distributed according to other criteria. In this case, they may consider the state to have already reneged on its obligations and the process void. As the process of conversion involves a constant renegotiation of the costs of serving the state and the benefits of citizenship, Levy refers to decision-making according to the convertibility principle as 'materialist militarism'.

The concept of convertibility is interesting in its own right, as it elucidates the idea that valuable social resources can accrue from military service which bolster the citizenship status of those who serve (both as individuals and in their collectives). However, it becomes even more salient when it is contextualised within wider debates about the growing marketisation and liberalisation of military structures. Again, Levy (2010) seems to be at the forefront of the latest

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research in this area. According to him, westernised societies are now entering the era of the 'market army', which has emerged as the successor to the 'citizen army', which itself succeeded the 'mercantile army' in order to become the hallmark of the modern era. Unlike the citizen army, the market army is characterised by the subordination of the military to market imperatives, which it emulates itself in order to adapt to 'modern, strategic, economic, political, and cultural constraints' (Levy, 2010:378). Importantly, the market army can also be identified by its efforts to commodify military service, which results in new contractual forms of bargaining between soldiers and the military. This is not without consequence for the conscription regime. In the ideal type of a market army oriented society, 'military service is no longer valued as a civic duty, and it does not establish the criteria for the allocation of social rights'. Where once there were conscripts, now there will be a 'combination of contracted soldiers and companies [that will have] supplanted the "citizen" as the fundamental building block of the military institution (ibid: 380). Levy (2007) predicts that this shift in recruitment practices will impact upon the kinds of rewards that soldiers will come to expect. There is an inverse relation between material and symbolic rewards, and so if the symbolic value of military service as a civic duty declines then the military will have to compensate for this by increasing material rewards.

In sum, Levy's work on 'convertibility', 'materialist militarism' and the 'market army' can be understood as interdependent. The ability to exchange resources accrued through military service for resources in the civilian realm affects decision-making, which can then become materialistic if republican discourses lose significance. Arguably, this is beginning to happen now, as Western societies and militaries alike are becoming increasingly market driven. However, as Ben-Porat and Turner (2008) note, Levy does recognise that 'the military remains an important institution for the achievement of social status and citizenship rights'. Just how important it remains in Israel and Turkey – particularly in the estimation of ex-conscripts – is the focus of the following analyses.

## Israel: a career prerequisite

Although Levy's convertibility thesis is designed to resonate with republican societies globally, it was actually abstracted from analyses of militaristic social mores in Israel. It is therefore unsurprising to discover that this is the country in which the theory finds its closest fit. Analyses of Israeli society often note that the *Ashkenazi* middle classes are socially dominant because of their historical affiliation with the military. In fact, such acknowledgments border on the tautological, as this ground has been extensively covered (Shafir and Peled, 2002; Levy and Levy, 2008). However, in recent times the involvement of *Ashkenazi* youth in the military is changing. Not only are there higher than ever rates of draft evasion and conscientious objection amongst this group, there is also a clear trend of them shying away from the combat roles that have traditionally been their preserve (Mayseless, 1992). The hegemony of the *Ashkenazi* in the military is slowly being eroded, and this has opened up opportunities for other social groups to capitalise upon. Moreover, the upward mobility of peripheral social groups in the military is concurrent with their increasing social mobility (Ben-Porat and Turner, 2008), and this is something that subscribers to the convertibility thesis would argue is causal. Despite this, the rise of liberalist and ethnonationalist discourses of citizenship in recent decades may slowly be having an effect on the potency of the convertibility thesis overall. According to Levy *et al* (2007), broad shifts in orientation have diluted the republican foundations of society. This, in turn, has had the effect of 'weakening the relationship whereby the acquisition of civil status is

conditional upon military service, thus eroding the social value of military service'. Consequently, military service is losing its 'quality of totality'.

Clearly, ideas of how the convertibility thesis plays out in Israel have already been formed, so much of the following analysis will seek to build on these foundations. Before it is possible to evaluate how the respondents' perceive social citizenship status to derive from military service, it is necessary to consider their perceptions of the normative framework that supports the arrangement. In other words, how did the respondents recognise that society framed military service as an essential citizenship duty? Several of the respondents raised the issue of circumscribed access to the job market for non-draftees, and the researcher contends that this is revealing of their awareness of society's expectations that young people should serve. One respondent recalled an episode at work:

> *A few days ago, a girl came into my cafe and asked to be a waitress. She was probably about nineteen. The manager told her that they don't take on people before they have done their service. She said she wasn't going to serve, but he had stopped listening to her and she didn't get the chance to explain anything. He just said that 'if you're not going to serve in the army, then I don't want you in my restaurant'.*

Another respondent, who had been prematurely released from her service because of health issues, explained that the first question she was always asked when she met someone new was 'why aren't you in the army?' She felt that her family were disappointed in her for not completing service in the standard manner. Also interesting is that when each of the respondents was asked if they had ever considered not serving in the military, none of them answered in the affirmative. Of course, it may be that they attached shame to confessing such a thought, but this in itself is indicative of a society that still attaches a great deal of significance to military service. It was very clear that each of the respondents were proud of their service, even if they disliked elements of it. This is significant, particularly considering that two women were discharged early (one for health reasons and another on a disciplinary matter) and two men were on the frontline for Operation Cast Lead in Gaza[119] (one was still dealing with trauma due to the kidnap of a friend, and both were keenly aware of the negative publicity the mission got in the media). Clearly, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the respondents' observations support the (already uncontroversial) idea that society plays an important role in legitimising service by framing it as an essential citizenship duty.

Given this societal framework, it is interesting to consider how respondents perceived their opportunities to exchange military sacrifice for improved social citizenship status (presumably manifested in their access to social resources). This is the fundamental tenet of the convertibility thesis. The first thing to note is that the small stipends the military give conscripts and the one-off payments at the end of service are not major motivators. When respondents were asked to think about what the benefits of service might be, many immediately began to talk about career prospects. The majority of them noted that military service was a firm requisite for a career in the security services (in the police, army or private security sector) or the civil service. One respondent believed that conscripts with combat service, especially in elite units, were especially highly sought after[120]. However, he also argued that non-draftees actually

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[119] January 2009
[120] Respondent number 2.4, interviewed 20th April 2010.

get a head start on building their career, although perhaps he would overtake them at some point because he took a more conventional path into employment. In the final analysis, when respondent's perceptions of draftees job prospects are considered alongside the difficulties non-draftees can face, it becomes clear that there is at least one social good – employment – that military service can be converted into in the civilian realm.

Almost certainly, employment is not the only social good that ex-conscripts gain access to, it was just the most obvious to the respondents. This is fortuitous, as employment normally manifests itself very clearly in terms of social status. It is widely accepted that a person's occupation constitutes a major facet of their identity (Warr, 1982). Given this, it is interesting that even those respondents that were most loquacious in describing the importance of military service for career building were reticent to infer that ex-conscripts enjoyed a significantly greater social status. Many respondents noted that a few generations ago people who had not served in the military were considered outcasts, or social pariahs, but this is not the case today. One respondent concluded that in the past ex-conscripts had enjoyed superior social standing, and even though this is still supposed to be how things are, it is not[121]. However, all of the respondents recognised that there is still a social stigma attached to not having served[122], and this corresponds with their reflections about how society frames service as an essential duty. Consequently, when the respondents' comments are aggregated they appear to imply that conventional understandings of military service as an arbiter of social citizenship status may be losing influence in relative terms (as compared to the past); however, in absolute terms conscription remains incredibility important in constructing civic identity.

## Turkey: 'We leave just as we arrived'

Had Levy used Turkish civil-military relations as his intellectual muse, he may never have come up with the convertibility thesis. Turkish respondents' did not consider themselves to have profited greatly from their military service in their civilian lives, nor did they consider their social citizenship status to have improved. In keeping with their observations about the *yemin toreni* ceremony, military service is presented as a burden, a disruption of real life and a relic of a bygone era. The question, of course, is what could account for this discrepancy. Firstly, it is necessary to examine how Turkish society frames and gives credence to the draft.

Proximately and emotionally, the closest social actors to Turkish ex-conscripts are likely to be their families. Indeed, the family is usually the primary socialising institution in all of our lives (Grusec and Hastings, 2007:285). This makes the respondents' perceptions of their families' attitudes towards military service revealing, particularly when it comes to respondents themselves being drafted. Whereas Israeli familial responses could be typified as 'nervous but proud', Turkish responses tended to be more along the lines of 'worried and sad'. If responses were positive, it was because postings were better than expected (postings in West of the country, for instance, are considered safer and easier[123]). Moreover, they still retained an element of apprehension. Whether these parental responses are reflective of disaffection with military service in wider society is another matter. Turkish society does not openly disregard the important of military service as an essential citizenship duty and there are some social practices that clearly promote service, even if they are fairly muted. Respondents noted that

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[121] Respondent number 2.4, interviewed 20th April 2010.
[122] An exception to this was made for non-draftees who were unable to serve on health grounds.
[123] Respondent number 1.7, interviewed 30th March 2010.

some parents are reluctant to allow their daughters to marry a man who has not yet performed his military service[124]. Companies also prefer to employ someone who has discharged his military obligations, although this seems to be more a pragmatic concern than a political one[125]. Consequently, the civilian framework surrounding military service in Turkey consists of both push and pull factors; arguments for and against. For these respondents at least, there seemed to be no clear doctrine in their civilian lives about the duty to serve.

How does the concept of convertibility play out in a country where civilian attitudes towards military sacrifice are characterised by contradiction? Materially, decommissioned conscripts can expect very little reward for their service. Aside from the fact that discharge freed the respondents to prospect for permanent employment, service had not helped them in their careers. University graduates attributed their success to education; military service was just a hurdle to overcome. Non-graduates tended to be caught in a cycle of low-wage, seasonal employment – if employed at all. Several worked alongside draft-evaders in similar roles. Suggestions that there might be intangible benefits of service, such as skills-building, were met with scepticism. One respondent strongly believed that military service does not offer additional opportunity, even for the poor and uneducated'[126]. Another respondent – an ethnic Turkmen who gave the most positive appraisal overall – believed that service imparts 'life lessons'[127], although he could not elaborate upon this. The only thing respondents unanimously felt they gained was manhood (as discussed); however, this is far from synonymous with citizenhood. Both connote maturation, but one relates to the personal self and the other the civic self. Clearly, there is little to gain from service that is perceptible; on the contrary, there is much to lose. Three respondents felt their personalities had been compromised: the first believed he had become less polite and less willing to criticise authority[128]; the second had lost confidence[129], becoming quieter and shy; the third had become defeatist and obedient[130].

In summary, there was little to incentivise respondents to obey the draft. Turkish society is divided over the issue of service, partly because of its negative reputation, meaning young men do not risk social isolation if they evade conscription. There is also little for them to gain from service, materially or symbolically. Ex-conscripts have few resources to 'convert' when they return to their civilian lives, and are unlikely to perceive a change in their citizenship status. The steadfastness of the respondents in maintaining that there is no link between citizenship and military service (discussed in *sites of socialisation*) testifies that this is the case. Clearly, whilst the convertibility thesis should resonate in Turkish society, it does not. Levy (2008) has given clues as to why this might be – he would argue that the republican equation underpinning Turkish society has been violated. Based upon the respondents' comments, there is plenty to suggest that this violation may stem from disequilibrium between rights and duties. Put simply, the duty of service does not seem to be rewarded with anything approximating social rights. Of course, this argument is little more than impressionistic, yet it is worthy of further research – particularly as Levy's convertibility thesis has yet to be borne out with illustrations.

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[124] Respondent number 1.1, interviewed 10th March 2010.

[125] Respondent number 1.3, interviewed 13th March 2010. Corroborated in informal interviews with draft evaders, who confirmed they could find seasonal work but not a permanent position.

[126] Respondent number 1.7, interviewed 30th March 2010.

[127] Respondent number 1.4, interviewed 13th March 2010.

[128] Respondent number 1.3, interviewed 13th March 2010.

[129] Respondent number 1.2, interviewed 11th March 2010.

[130] Respondent number 1.5, interviewed 28th March 2010.

# WHO COUNTS? PERCEPTIONS OF EX-CONSCRIPTS

*How do ex-conscripts perceive of the social citizenship status of fellow citizens who have not served and, assuming they make a distinction between different non-serving groups, what typology do they provide and why?*

In many ways, the following chapter is a natural successor to the last. Whilst the previous chapter focused on how the respondents perceived their own citizenship status, this chapter focuses on the parallel issue of how the respondents perceived the citizenship status of other social groups. The overarching hypothesis is that if respondents perceive a correlation between military service and high citizenship status, as borne out by their own experiences, then they may also perceive the status of citizens who do not serve in the military to be low. This is because citizenship is a relational concept as well as an absolute one; citizenship status is clearly adjudged hierarchically, otherwise it could not be stratified. In the analyses that follow, special attention has been given to considering how respondents themselves typologise social groupings in their respective societies. Not only does this better allow the research to consider the frames of reference that respondents use in their differentiations, it also stays faithful to the general ethos of the study by situating perceptions at the heart of analysis.

## Israel: 'They live on our backs'

*'In essence, one cannot be a real citizen in Israel without serving in the army'.*　　　　(Gal, 1994)

Taken cumulatively, the previous chapters piece together a narrative of Israeli citizenship which testifies to the fact that it's distinctly republican character developed according to the imperatives of nation building, and evidences how the normative regime underpinning it continues to function today. It is clear that Israeli society still places a premium upon military service and frames it as an essential citizenship duty. Conscripts are socialised into a militaristic culture, the saliency of which is reified through the conscription regime and its ancillary conventions (such as the Hashba'ah ceremony). One final question remains unanswered: if conscripts see themselves as the recipients of improved citizenship status, then what effect does this have on their attitudes towards non-conscripted citizens?

A comprehensive answer to this question must proceed in several stages. Firstly, it is necessary to establish who the respondents identify as non-serving social groups. Importantly, respondents were allowed to set their own definitional boundaries; this helped to preserve the authenticity of appraisals and ensure that they did not become contrived. The taxonomies that emerged were revealing. Uppermost in the minds of most respondents were the *Charedim.* Then came people with 'legitimate reasons', such as ill health. Arabs were also quickly identified as a non-serving group, and all respondents were at pains to differentiate between Muslim and Christian Arabs, who do not serve, and the Druze and Bedouin, who do. Conscientious objectors and draft evaders were – perhaps surprisingly – often mentioned latterly. Two respondents did not mention them at all[131], and when the researcher pursued this afterwards it transpired that they were not familiar with the concept. In addition, the fact that some groups participated in an alternative form of national service was scarcely mentioned. Where a few respondents did take note of it, two of them categorically denied that Arab citizens were eligible for these programs and maintained that it was only a possibility for Orthodox women, although this is not the case.

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[131] Respondents numbered 2.5 and 2.7, interviewed 23rd April 2010 and 29th April 2010 respectively.

Clearly, the taxonomies provided were characterised by a degree of misinformation and nescience, although given the complexity of the Israeli conscription regime this is not altogether surprising. Most confusing to the respondents were the Israeli Arabs. Only two respondents accurately described the group's position[132] (they are not legally forbidden to serve, but it is the IDF's policy not to call them up and so they must volunteer), and one of these was privy to this information through his job at The Bakum[133]. Attempts to theorise this confusion would be speculative, as the strategy of allowing respondents to provide their own nomenclature precluded the possibility of querying inaccuracies. Also problematic for the respondents was identifying who was eligible for national service. It is reasonable to assume that misinformation in this instance may stem from the low profile of national service in Israel, as it was not even on the radar of several respondents.

Having established who the respondents identified as non-serving social groups, it is possible to consider how they elaborated upon their classifications. How did respondents explain each group's lack of participation in military service, and what does this infer about their citizenship status? Generally, the *Charedim's* refusal of the draft was considered to be unacceptable, even though there has always been a precedent for it. One respondent[134] believed that they were 'spoiled', and that it was 'irrelevant if they liked their country or not'. Another spoke at length, arguing that:

> *They [the Charedim] don't want any part in our society. They don't serve in the military and go to different schools. They get a lot because they don't work. It's not fair – you live here, you have to make contributions, this is so. They could make their own units, I would prefer that. Some of the ultra-orthodox do but they are few. It's what the Bedouin and the Druze do... At the end of it all, all citizens are supposed to do military service. That is the bottom line.*

One respondent was sympathetic to the *Charedim*, seeking to expound the values of their religious contribution to the country[135]. His account corresponds with Stadler *et al*'s (2008) argument that the *Charedim* challenge the 'republican ideology of the state' by constructing their civic identity in other ways, for instance through charitable giving. However, even this respondent concluded that the Charedim should serve, arguing that 'they think you should either join the army or sit and learn, but we need both of these'. Although he still considered the *Charedim* to be citizens of Israel, others were less forthcoming, Most maintained that they did not consider the *Charedim* to be 'proper' citizens, even though they knew they were legally.

Initially, observations about the non-drafting of Arabs appear to have a lot in common with the observations made about the *Charedim*. A kind of intentional self-exclusion was inferred, and both the *Charedim* and Arabs alike were perceived as opting out of the republican social contact. Respondents repeatedly explained that Arabs often do not consider themselves to be Israelis, instead calling themselves Palestinians. In the words of one respondent:

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[132] Respondents numbered 2.6 and 2.7, interviewed 28th April 2010 and 29th April 2010 respectively.
[133] IDF headquarters in Tel Aviv.
[134] Respondent number 2.2, interviewed 19th April 2010.
[135] Respondent number 2.7, interviewed 19th April 2010.

*For them, the army is part of a country that they don't feel a member of. They also have different schools, with a different curriculum. They just have their own version of everything and have their own community[136].*

However, the exemption provided to Arabs was seen as broadly acceptable, and this is clearly where approaches towards them diverged from approaches towards *Charedim*. The grounds upon which respondents differentiated between the two groups were twofold. Firstly, respondents undoubtedly saw Arabs as a security risk; arguing that they 'have connections with terrorist organisations', and they 'look innocent when they are not[137]'. No such security risks were associated with the *Charedim*. Secondly, the non-drafting of Arabs was perceived to correspond with their lower status, both socio-economically and as citizens. In itself, such recognition does not automatically differentiate Arabs from the *Charedim*. Both groups are characterised by their economic poverty and are denigrated for their lack of civic participation. If respondents were assessing the two groups purely against republican criteria, it stands to reason that both groups would either be forgiven their lack of service, or not. Consequently, the researcher contends that respondents' perceptions of Arabs were at least partially ethno-nationalistically informed, even if they were not explicitly framed this way. This idea gains ground when the respondents' sceptical remarks about Arabs performing national service are taken into account. Not a single respondent was in favour of the idea. Several believed that these schemes were[138] 'too costly' and 'very controversial'. More importantly – and here lays the crux of the argument – the respondents were hostile to the idea because they considered that access to national service should be for Jewish citizens only. Arabs should not get access to national service 'because they're not Jewish, so we don't really see them as proper citizens'[139].

If respondents held the *Charedim* to account under a republican framework, and implicitly justified the position of the Israeli Arabs by referencing ethno-nationalist discourses, then it is interesting to note that their approaches to conscientious objectors verged on liberal. Over half of the respondents empathised with people who were 'genuinely pacifist', although they were still reticent to legitimise objection completely, arguing that even refusal as a matter of conscience contravened the principles of republicanism. One of the respondents rectified the possible contradiction between his inclination towards empathy and his overall philosophy by arguing that 'pacifists should consider a supportive role, which some do. They could drive an ambulance or something'[140]. Another noted that pacifists often go to prison because of their beliefs, and cautiously suggested that this might work towards restoring equilibrium[141]. Of the respondents that did not demonstrate any empathy towards objectors, none were fervent in their position. In fact, this group can be split into two camps: those that gave vague and evasive responses, avoiding making any judgemental statements whatsoever, and those that claimed they had not really come across the idea in any meaningful way.

Clearly, these responses are not classically liberal in an absolute sense, but they lean further towards liberalism than counterpart responses pertaining to other social groups. Understanding why this is the case requires a dedicated analysis. The researcher's initial

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[136] Respondent number 2.6, interviewed 28th April 2010.
[137] Respondent number 2.6, interviewed 28th April 2010.
[138] Respondents who were not aware that such schemes existed answered the question hypothetically.
[139] Respondent number 2.5, interviewed 23rd April 2010.
[140] Respondent number 2.4, interviewed 20th April 2010.
[141] Respondent number 2.6, interviewed 28th April 2010.

thoughts are that a demographic examination is warranted. It may be that the respondents have more of an affinity with conscientious objectors because they are similar to them in age and socio-economic status (by definition, conscientious objectors cannot be people who receive alternative exemptions, so they must come from the same cohort as the decommissioned conscripts that were interviewed). Another possible line of enquiry resides in the presentation of conscientious objectors in the media. The researcher's initial inclination is that the cultural construction of objectors is something akin to the antihero, a character that is fundamentally flawed but well-intentioned. Of course, this would need considerable substantiation.

In all, the respondents' perceptions generally supported the hypothesis that non-serving groups are considered to have a compromised citizenship status, which is consequently lower than those who are drafted. In their reflections, respondents tended to reference republican ideals most often. Many made clear and unequivocal statements that those who do not serve should not be considered 'proper' citizens of Israel, and the fact that these statements did not also advocate for the legal withdrawal of non-draftees' citizenship status suggests that they were discussing the concept in broader terms – as socially constructed, ascribed and meaningful[142]. However, the primacy of republicanism fell far short of hegemony, as the comparison between *Charedi* Jews and Israeli Arabs demonstrates. Whilst *Charedi* Jews are castigated under a republican framework for not fulfilling their citizenship duties, Israeli Arabs are not even considered to have citizenship duties because of their ethnic otherness. Finally, alongside the ethno-nationalist discourse differentiating between the *Charedi* and the Israeli Arabs, there was also a slight suggestion of liberalism that came to the fore when respondents were asked about conscientious objectors. Consequently, each of the three citizenship discourses that predominate in Israeli society can be identified in the respondents' reflections. In the final summation, Israeli citizenship continues to be governed according to a unique blend of republicanism, ethno-nationalism and liberalism, just as it always has been, and military service is far from redundant as an arena for citizenship stratification.

## Turkey: 'It's officers that don't deserve to be called Turkish'

Unlike their Israeli counterparts, Turkish respondents did not perceive of a substantive improvement in their citizenship status after their decommissioning[143], and it would therefore be reasonable to assume that the taxonomies of citizenship they provided were not stratified along draftee and non-draftee lines. The dataset supports this hypothesis: Turkish respondents routinely disregarded the idea that citizenship in is any way determined by participation in military service, and this premise applies to their perception of others just as it does to themselves. In the words of one respondent, military service does not fundamentally alter the citizenship status of conscripts, either compared with their pre-service selves or with other social groups, as 'it just reminds us all that we are second class citizens, really'[144]. Another respondent also suggested that women should serve expressly because they have the same status, ergo they should have the same responsibility[145]. Yet, if respondents were not stratifying citizenship according whether people had performed military service, then what alternative criteria were they using?

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[142] The fact that all respondents believed Jews from abroad who served in the IDF deserved to be citizens also supports the republican perspective.
[143] See the previous chapter.
[144] Respondent number 1.5, interviewed 28th March 2010.
[145] Respondent number 1.3, interviewed 13th March 2010.

The data presents two groups of citizens whose status was questioned by the respondents. Firstly, radical Islamists were considered by several respondents to be civic antagonists and, consequently, their status as citizens was vexing. Perceptions that Islamism poses a threat to the Kemalist *raison d'être* of the state are not novel in Turkey, and there has long been scepticism in academic circles about whether civic culture could prosper under an Islamic regimen (White, 1996). Secondly, a few respondents argued that some members of the military's officer corps did not deserve to call themselves citizens either, because of the way that they behave. Recently, the military has been mired in controversy; government-military relations appear to be at a low because of recent coup-plotting revelations and, perhaps as a consequence, reportage of misconduct in the military is becoming more common (Balci, 2010). Respondents also have their own personal memories of abusive officers during their service. However, there is nothing about the selection of these two groups that suggests an overarching, cogent rationale of citizenship. Neither group was excluded on ethno-national or republican grounds, for instance. In fact, it appears that the respondents were simply venting their frustrations, trying to hold miscreant groups to account for their civic or militaristic bad behaviour. If these groups are laid aside, it appears that Turkish respondents took a very inclusive, perhaps even liberal, approach to citizenship. There were no overbearing criteria to qualify as a citizen and no burdensome obligations to fulfil to maintain that status.

Ironically, the inclusive approach that the respondents have towards citizenship can be considered as both a success and a failure for the Turkish military. It is a success in that it pays testament to the assimilationist agenda that the Turkish government pursues in relation to its minorities, most notably the Kurds[146]. Given the antagonistic ethnic framing that currently underscores the ongoing insurgency with the PKK, engendering inclusivity in the citizenship narrative and eliminating difference can be seen as an achievement. It is what Krebs (2004) refers to as the 'contact hypothesis'. Respondents argued that they found a degree of tolerance and understanding with other ethnic groups in the military that they had not experienced beforehand[147]. One held that the military is actually 'much better at integration than the state' and that he, as a Kurd, appreciated this[148]. Another believed that the leaders of his station 'saw everyone the same'[149]. Yet another argued that 'service unites people, it integrates and mixes men from all over Turkey. This breaks down stereotypes'[150]. However, the respondents' inclusiveness is also a failure for the Turkish military, as it is clearly the culmination of antipathy towards republican mores. It is not that respondents considered everyone to have equal citizenship status because each social group fulfils an essential citizen duty; it is just that they believe they each have the same status because none of them should have to earn it.

In the final summation, it appears from the dataset that that military service in Turkey is not effective at building civic self-esteem, nor does it serve as an arbiter of citizenship status. Respondents simply do not subscribe to the fundamental tenets of republicanism that are the driving force behind military service in most countries. However, it does serve to unite people, whether accidently or by design. Because of these findings, it is hard to conclude that

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[146] For a full discussion on the assimilationist agenda in Turkey, see Tezcur (2009) and Saatci (2002).
[147] Alternatively, some scholars have argued that forced assimilation of Kurds has contributed to the construction of a radicalised Kurdish identity (a kind of 'blowback' thesis) (Saatchi, 2002).
[148] Respondent number 1.1, interviewed 10th March 2010.
[149] Respondent number 1.2, interviewed 11th March 2010.
[150] Respondent number 1.3, interviewed 13th March 2010.

decommissioned conscripts perceive of citizenship in anything other than liberal terms. To put it simply, respondents in Turkey just did not perceive there should be any stratification in citizenship status that derived from military service. Turks were citizens, Kurds were citizens, and both groups were citizens irrespective of their militaristic contributions. There was no ethno-nationalist fault line; there was no republican fault line. Indeed, the only fault line that existed was with citizens who were either perceived to be undermining the secularism of the state (the radical Islamists) or were considered to be breaking the law (the officer corps) – both of which are liberalist pretensions to their very core.

# CONCLUDING REMARKS

*How has military service shaped perceptions of citizenship among ex-conscripts in Israel and Turkey; specifically, how do they reference their service in (a) constructing their own citizenship identities and (b) attributing social citizenship status to other social groups?*

At first glance, Israel and Turkey appear to have taken a broadly similar approach towards citizenship. Both countries recognised the utility of military service in diffusing norms of citizenship and both harnessed this potential by instituting conscription. An initial historical overview illustrated that there are significant parallels in the development of the two countries' citizenship narratives, and the traditional alliance between them indicates continual and reciprocal acknowledgement of corresponding aims and perspectives. Yet, even if the *raison d'être* of military service is grounded in similar experiences, idiosyncrasies in the administration of the draft have resulted in different outcomes in terms of the construction of civic identity and ascription of citizenship status. In order to provide a full overview of these differences and consider what accounts for them, it is useful to briefly review each case in turn.

## Israel: the politics of exclusion[151]

The imperatives of nation-building in an emergent country comprising primarily of disparate migrant groups meant that Israel spent much of its early years fashioning a collective identity. A core component of this was building a universal citizenship narrative. The ideal citizen was framed as republican: an individual willing to defend the country from enemies and prepared to forego personal interest for the good of the collective. In the early years, the ethos of *mamlachtiyut* developed by Ben-Gurion helped to secure the status of republicanism as a hegemonic supra-narrative. In a society underpinned by statist and militarist principles, liberal and ethno-national discourses were secondary, reserved for application only when circumstances contrived to make them politically expedient. Yet, the hegemony of republicanism would not be indefinite; in fact, in the grand scheme of things it proved to be rather transient. Demographic shifts in the population and economic liberalisation eroded the supremacy of the republican discourse, allowing liberals and ethno-nationalists to canvass for greater support. With choice comes disorder: republican decline opened up a Pandora's Box of uncertainties in the citizenship narrative, which now fluctuates at the slightest provocation.

As the Israeli zeitgeist has opened up to liberalism, rights-based approaches to citizenship have gained traction. Arabs have made some headway in securing social rights and benefits equivalent to the Jewish population, and optimists argue that landmark cases such as the *Qaadan* case[152] are bellwethers for a more egalitarian future. At the same time, emphasis on civic duty has lessened slightly. In the republican era, citizenship was framed as strongly contingent upon sacrifice, and military service was sacrificial behaviour without equal. This appears to be less the case now than it used to be. Respondents noted that the prestige of service is declining slightly – being a non-draftee is not quite the source of shame that it once was. Yet still, none of them entertained the idea of avoiding service themselves, and many were moved – literally to tears – by the Hashba'ah ceremony. Undoubtedly, it was a climactic moment in their young lives, reinforcing the bond between citizen and state. Moreover, the respondents perceived non-serving social groups with varying degrees of disaffection. To suggest that

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[151] Latin: 'Actions not words'.
[152] Bagatz 6698/95, Qaadan vs. ILA, Katzir and others.

military service has lost its credibility or its salience in Israel would be overstating one's hand by a very long degree. In the final analysis, it appears that the citizen-soldier continues to loom large in the collective imagination.

## Turkey: *acta non verba*[153]

Just as Israel started life with a strong republican supra-narrative of citizenship, so too did Turkey. Building a sense of nationhood – 'turkifying' the country – was top of Atatürk's agenda. Accomplishing this would depend, at least in part, on successfully enfranchising the population. Passive Ottoman subjects had to be moulded into active Turkish citizens. Yet, the Kemalist Turk was active only in attending to the common good – in the Atatürk years, citizenship duty was absent of its natural coefficient: citizenship rights (Keyman and İçduygu (2003:195). As Turkey opened up to multiparty democracy in the 1950s, the citizenship discourse began to take on a more liberal hue. Over the last half-century, Turkey has undergone rapid and fundamental change. It now sits perched on the precipice of European Union membership, and liberalisation continues apace. Turkish lawmakers are increasingly seeking to harmonise national law with European law, and even the military is experiencing liberalising changes in its operational structure. The forces are slowly but steadily professionalising, moving ever closer to Levy's (2010) image of the 'market army' – although it is unclear how substantial this process will be in the end (Gencer and Sümer, 2007). Yet, what is certainly clear is that liberalisation – both generically and in the citizenship narrative specifically – will not be without consequence for the institution of military service. Already, draft evasion has been removed as grounds for the revocation of citizenship (Kadirbeyoğlu, 2010:14).

For all that the Turkish state may be liberalising fast, it appears that the citizenry are liberalising faster. It is here – *de facto*, on the streets of cities – that the effects of the liberalising agenda on military service can be seen most clearly. Incidences of draft evasion are nearing a critical mass and, whilst conscientious objection is still rare, it may become increasingly more common if the state loosens its claustrophobic grip on the citizenry. Even the political classes are aware that pledges to professionalise the military and reduce conscription win votes (*Hürriyet Daily News,* 2010). Yet, the question remains: is antipathy really the culmination of liberalising attitudes, or is it merely a reflection of collective resentment and revulsion at administrative practices that are far below par? A conclusive answer to this remains elusive; however, the respondents' observations present a strong case for arguing the middle ground. The legitimacy of military service is undermined by the nature of its execution, and republican discourses are also not strong enough to withstand the onslaught. Whilst the objections of respondents certainly appeared to stem from frustrations with the military system, it is likely that this also coincides with liberal depositions. Certainly, the fact that the respondents barely diverged from strict egalitarianism when they discussed the citizenship status of other groups indicates that liberal values do inform their analyses.

## Returning to the question

The original research question (as above) was structured in two parts, the first pertained to the respondents' perceptions of their own citizenship status as a consequence of military service, and the second pertained to the way they viewed the status of social other groups. Taking each facet in turn, it is possible to conclude that:

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[153] Latin: 'actions not words'.

*In Turkey, military service does not effectively construct individuals' social citizenship status, yet in Israel it does.* It has become increasingly obvious throughout the research that the administration of military service is vastly different in each country, and it is reasonable to conclude that this impacts upon how effectively conscripts internalise social norms. The *sites of socialisation* chapter demonstrated that attitudes to military service were widely divergent in each country – observations of the swearing-in ceremony clearly evidenced this. Moreover, the respondents' attitudes were clearly grounded in their own experiences during service. In Israel, where complaints about the day-to-day practices of the military were few, respondents generally found their service rewarding. In Turkey, where complaints about the military's practices were prolific and where many respondents had witnessed or experienced abusive behaviour, respondents perceived their service as a burden. More importantly, they thought it was unfair and illegitimate, and refused to reference it in constructing their citizen identities. Consequently, it is fair to conclude that where experiences of service were positive, the military was able to effectively inform perceptions of citizenship identity. The theoretical implication of this is that military service *is* an effective arena for the internalisation of norms, and the concept of militarised socialisation *does* hold weight, but only where institutions are perceived as broadly legitimate.

*In Turkey, military service does not stratify the population according to social citizenship status, yet in Israel it does.* The final chapters of the study operationalised Levy's (1998) convertibility thesis to explain an important correlation: where ex-conscripts perceived their own citizenship status to have improved by virtue of military service, they also perceived non-serving social groups to have a lower status. Thus, in societies where military service is effective at building civic esteem (like Israel), it is reasonable to assume that there will be stratification in social citizenship status – unless, of course, conscription is totally universal amongst the population. However, it is not necessarily concomitant to argue that in societies where there is no custom of military service, or where military service is not effective at building civic esteem (like Turkey), there is little stratification in social citizenship status. It would be more appropriate to acknowledge that any stratification that does exist is constructed independently of military service. In sum, it is clear that military service can construct citizenship identity, both at an individual and a collective level, but the efficacy of this process varies according to how positive conscripts perceive their experience to be.

## Horizons

The introductory chapter ended with a disclaimer: the aim of this research is not to pre-empt future developments. It is clear from the analysis herein that watershed events often happen unexpectedly and instantaneously, rendering projection little more than guesswork. This is especially the case in this project, as both countries are undergoing profound changes in the citizenship narrative. However, it is possible to offer up a few thoughts on future directions for research. Firstly, a detailed exploration of how significant the decline of republicanism (and the concomitant rise of liberalism) is in explaining Turkish antipathy towards military service could provide some interesting results, as this study had drawn no firm conclusions as to where resentment of service intersects with the citizenship discourse. Secondly, it would also be worthwhile to consider the cultural construction of conscientious objectors in Israel, as the empathy that the respondents exhibited towards them is surprising, especially given how they perceive of other social groups. Each of these questions has the ability to further develop the initials foundations laid out here.

# APPENDICES

## Appendix 1: Fieldwork locations



*From highest to lowest: Istanbul, Diyarbakir, Nahariyya, Jerusalem*

## Appendix 2: Article 318 of the *Turkish Penal Code*

Translated into English, the Code reads:

> *Persons who give incentives or make suggestions or spread propaganda which will have the effect of discouraging people from performing military service shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of six months to two years. If the act is committed through the medium of the press and media, the penalty shall be increased by half.*                                                              *(*Haraszti, 2005:4)

## Appendix 3: Confidence in the Turkish Armed Forces

Question V132: Researchers read out the following:

*'I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? The armed forces…'*



Source: Values Surveys Databank

# Appendix 4: Article 63 of the *Turkish Penal Code*

*Article 63, Paragraph 1 Section A of the Military Criminal Law Number 1632 of date 22.5.1930, which was amended by Law 4726 of 30.4.1945, has been amended as set out below:*

*A) Those who without an acceptable excuse are, during peacetime, absentee conscripts, draft evaders or unregistered [for military service] and of whom the first contingent of peers or friends with whom they have been processed have been sent off, and those reserve recruits who have been called up and [are absent] without excuse, and [in all the preceding cases] starting from the date of their peers being sent off...*
*- arrive within seven days shall be imprisoned for a term of up to one month;*
*- are arrested [within seven days] shall be imprisoned for a term of up to three months;*
*- arrive from between seven days to three months shall be imprisoned for a term ranging from three months to one year;*
*- are arrested from between seven days to three months shall be imprisoned for a term ranging from four months to one-and-a-half years;*
*- arrive after three months shall be imprisoned for a term ranging from four months to two years;*
*- are arrested after three months shall be punished with term of heavy imprisonment ranging from six months to three years.*

*Article 63 1-B) (Altered 4726- 30.4.1945):*

*Those recruits mentioned in section (A), who arrive or are arrested and then escape before arriving at the unit, shall be punished with a further term of imprisonment from between one month to one year.*
*2. During mobilization [for war], those persons mentioned in the first paragraph and those who are on leave who, from the day of transfer...*
*-arrive within seven days shall be liable to a term of imprisonment from between one month to one year, whilst those who are caught [shall face] a term of imprisonment from between four months to two years;*
*-arrive between seven days and three months shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of not less than two years, whilst those who are caught [shall face] a term of imprisonment of not less than three years,*
*-arrive of their own accord more than three months later shall be liable to a term of heavy imprisonment of not less than five years, while those who are caught shall be condemned to death. In less serious cases, the capital penalty may be commuted to life imprisonment or a heavy imprisonment term of not less than ten years, and in other cases the other penalties set out shall be reduced by half.*

Law on Absentee Conscripts, Draft Evaders, Persons Unregistered [For Military Service], and Deserters [Turkey], 22 May 1930 Unofficial English translation available courtesy of UNHCR at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b4d01c.html.

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