

# Reconciliation among Youth in a Divided Community:

The Burundian Challenge of Justice

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“On fait semblant d’avoir un paix, mais pas durable...il faut chercher la paix (...) pour gagner la paix il y a des sacrifices. ”

(24 years old man from Cibitoke)

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## Introduction

After several cycles of violence since its independence, and a devastating and destructive civil war starting in 1993 and lasting for more than a decade, Burundi finally seems to be on its way to peace.<sup>1</sup> The last rebel group joined the peace agreement with the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement in 2006, which effectively ended the civil war and marked the beginning of a relatively peaceful period. However, while it can be said that a 'negative peace', defined as the absence of violence, is established, the question still remains how to reach a 'positive peace', in which there is social justice and a capacity to deal with conflict non-violently (Galtung 2001:3).<sup>2</sup> As violence is still widespread and tensions linger, it is questionable whether the current peace is a durable one.

In the current era, there is an increasing emphasis on the need to deal with past violence through one of the main instruments of transitional justice, or a combination of these two, to effectively prevent future abuses and secure peace and reconciliation.<sup>3</sup> The call for an instrument of transitional justice, to be implemented in Burundi is evident in a statement from Neil Kritz:

Some observers would suggest that the best way to achieve reconciliation in a situation such as that present in Burundi is to leave the past in the past [...] If the goal, however, is something more than a tenuous, temporary pause in the violence, dealing in a clear and determined manner with past atrocities is essential [...] the parties should agree in principle that the subject of justice and impunity will be part of the agenda for negotiations.<sup>4</sup>

The UN advised the establishment of a process of transitional justice embodied in a Truth Commission and a Special Chamber to "consolidate peace and reconciliation", a measure that was already included in the Arusha peace agreements (UN 2005a). The implementation of these measures to deal with past mass atrocities however, still remains to be seen as up to this day none of this has been established.<sup>5</sup> While national consultations are now implemented to determine whether the people of Burundi support such a process, it seems that the overall majority of the population prefers to 'forget' the past and favours amnesties over trials.<sup>6</sup> In the same vein, the government of Burundi seems to give the priority to 'reconciliation' over trials and argues that 'the conclusions drawn from the consultation process should logically determine Burundi's

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<sup>1</sup> The cycles of violence in Burundi are characterized by a strong ethnic component as they were mainly comprised of uprisings of the Hutu majority against the rule of the Tutsi minority, eventually culminating in a civil war in 1993. The characteristics of the Burundian conflict will be elaborated further in the historical overview.

<sup>2</sup> However, while large-scale violence is practically absent, Human Rights Watch stated that in 2008 the country could not "neatly be classified as a 'conflict' or 'post-conflict' country [since] ceasefires were violated by both parties" (2009:17).

<sup>3</sup> As will become clear infra, these main instruments are (inter)national truth and reconciliation commissions and (inter)national criminal tribunals.

<sup>4</sup> These words were expressed by Neil Kritz at the conference 'Creating an Agenda for Peace in Burundi' by, USIP in Washington on the 10<sup>th</sup> of September, 1996 (Cited in Vandeginste 2009:1).

<sup>5</sup> This was already included in the Arusha Agreements, signed in 2000. However, the implementation of this process kept being postponed since not all rebel groups were incorporated in the agreement. For extensive information on the reasons and strategies related to the postponement of a process of transitional justice in Burundi, see Vandeginste, 2009.

<sup>6</sup> In a quantitative analysis of the opinions among Burundians in several areas of the country, Samii found that 69% of the population supported 'forgetting' and 95% of the population supported (conditional) amnesties (2009:6).

transitional justice policy', even if this entails conditional amnesties for the most serious crimes (Vandeginste 2009:418).<sup>7</sup>

Within this void of action and apparent controversy over the appropriate strategy to successfully foster a durable peace it is apparent that the concepts of transitional justice and reconciliation fulfil the main roles. This emphasis on reconciliation and transitional justice in the context of Burundi is congruent with current dominant thinking on peace building after mass violence, as these concepts have gained importance in this domain.

The emphasis on reconciliation, broadly understood as the renewal or restoration of relationships shattered by violent conflict, stems from the redirection of attention to the cultural and psychological dimensions and needs of post-conflict recovery. Current protracted conflicts are often accurately defined by their internal nature, as they are fought between groups within 'the defined boundaries of a state' (Lederach 1997: 11). The intranational character of contemporary conflicts results in conflicts that are mainly fought along communal or intercommunal lines, defined by ethnicity, religion or region, since "cohesion and identity tend to form within increasingly narrower lines than those that encompass national citizenship" (Lederach 1997:12). These conflicts are often characterized by a deep rooted distrust, fear and antagonisms between conflicting groups that causes the drivers of conflict to change from substantive issues to subjective experiences and fears. Moreover, "mass violence results in the breakdown of societal structures—social and economic institutions, and networks of familial and intimate relationships that provide the foundation for a functioning community" (Fletcher and Weinstein 2002:576). Cycles of violence may be sustained or repeated as a result of "long-standing animosities rooted in a perceived threat to identity and survival" since the emotional and psychological impact linger as both perpetrator and victim are compelled to live side by side in the post-conflict landscape, even after large-scale violence has ended (Lederach 1997:17). Therefore, the restoration and transformation of relationships based on antagonism and distrust is considered imperative to the establishment of a durable peace.

While the concept 'transitional justice' is often used to refer to the implementation of legal justice after past mass atrocities, the objectives of such a process have stretched to include peace and reconciliation.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, 'events of the last decade suggest that many diplomats and human rights activists conceive judicial and truth-telling mechanisms as the centrepiece of social repair' (Fletcher and Weinstein 2002:578).<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> These 'most serious crimes' refer to crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.

<sup>8</sup> The Nuremberg Trials are commonly perceived as the first instance of transitional justice, followed by the Tokyo Trials. These trials aimed at punishment alone. However, subsequent tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), explicitly include peace and reconciliation in their aims (Fletcher and Weinstein 2002:579, note 17).

<sup>9</sup> This is most evident in the statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) where it considers the prosecution of the most heinous crimes imperative to "peace, security and well-being of the world" and the prevention of these crimes. (ICC statute, preamble) Furthermore, the connection between international prosecutions and reconciliation is often apparent in statements by diplomats and human rights activists. Lloyd Axworthy, the former Canadian minister of Foreign Affairs, for example stated at the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court: "By isolating and stigmatizing those who commit war crimes or genocide, and removing them from the community, it will help to end cycles of impunity and retribution. Without justice, there is no reconciliation, and without reconciliation, no peace." (15 June 1998, available at <http://www.un.org/icc/speeches/615can.htm>) (for more statements on the assumed relation between

However, several scholars debate the effectiveness of the two main instruments of transitional justice, (inter)national truth commissions and (inter)national criminal tribunals or a combination of both, as is proposed in the case of Burundi. Recent studies challenge the assumed beneficial effects and suggest that these national instruments have generally failed to achieve national reconciliation and translate into “changes in lived experiences and perceptions” as many individuals are rendered unsatisfied by a national process (Ariazza and Roht- Arriaza 2008:152, Fletcher and Weinstein 2002).<sup>10</sup> This failure is often attributed to the tendency to treat countries as an “undifferentiated whole” and the absence of consultations with the population affected (Nagy 2008:275, Lambourne 2009:28). They therefore risk missing the “meaning if a conflict for people in distinct areas” and offer a “technocratic and decontextualised solution” (Ariazza and Roht- Arriaza 2008:153; Nagy 2008:275).

As Lambourne argues, it is of crucial importance to involve local citizens in the development of transitional justice mechanisms as they have to be consistent with “local customs, culture and needs (...) to ensure the local and personal relevance of such a mechanism” (2009: 46-47). However, surprisingly little is known “regarding the ways in which communities rebuild in the aftermath of mass violence” (Fletcher and Weinstein 2002:600). While both instruments of transitional justice claim to advance societal repair, there has barely been research on how processes of reconciliation in extremely divided societies actually evolve, what influences and methods would stimulate local processes of reconciliation, and what reconciliation actually signifies on a local level.<sup>11</sup> Assumed is that there is a need for a national process, without analysing the manner in which people deal with the aftermath of the conflict on a grassroots level and what methods positively influence a process of reconciliation. In the absence of such knowledge, little or none is (and can be) known about the assumed contributions of national level endeavours of justice and truth to these local processes. Therefore, there is a pressing need for research to investigate independent processes “arising from the local level as an integral part of the post-armed justice landscape”, to derive insights on the actual meaning of conflict and the way in which reconciliation can be promoted (Ariazza and Roht- Arriaza 2008:153). Without these insights, national level endeavours indeed risk missing local meanings, needs and expectations and will most likely fail to contribute to social repair.

This research aims to fill this gap by focussing on an urban communal level of youth in Bujumbura. As the implementation of a combination of the two main instruments of transitional justice is pending for Burundi, dynamics on a grassroots level can provide important insights regarding the desirability and feasibility of such a hybrid instrument. The exploration of grassroots processes of reconciliation and the methods and factors that positively affect this process illuminate the specific procedures through which legacies of mass

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(inter)national criminal justice and reconciliation, see Fletcher and Weinstein 2002: 578, note 16). Furthermore, (inter)national truth and reconciliation commissions are explicitly believed to foster societal repair. The usage of truth commissions is often promoted to ‘rebuild or transform relationships and to restore communities’ (Lambourne 2009:31).

<sup>10</sup> This became evident in recent studies on the truth commission in South Africa (see Gibson 2002), the hybrid court in Sierra Leone (see Shaw 2007), the Rwandan process of transitional justice (see Burnet 2008) and the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia (see Arzt 2008).

<sup>11</sup> Societal repair is another terminology used to refer to societal reconciliation. This will be explored further in the first chapter, as the term reconciliation as ‘system change’ will be elaborated upon.



violence are currently dealt with. Moreover, estimates on the current 'state' of reconciliation among urban youth can shed light on the effectiveness of these particular methods and processes. Local perceptions on factors that hinder this process enable the determination of certain caveats in the reconciliation process and disclose aspects that need to be addressed. Furthermore, next to the theoretical assumptions of the two main instruments of transitional justice, the local perceptions of youth on the desirability and feasibility of such an instrument will be analysed. The analysis of local practices on the one hand, and the assumptions and perspectives on the instruments of transitional justice on the other, enables a thorough analysis of the desirability of such a process to be implemented in Burundi. Therefore, this research will be guided by the following question:

*To what extent is a process of reconciliation taking place on a grassroots level of urban youth in Bujumbura, which local methods are currently being used to stimulate this process and would an international instrument of transitional justice, such as an (inter)national truth and reconciliation commission or an (inter) national criminal tribunal, be an effective measure to contribute to a sustainable peace in Burundi?*

As the aim of this research is twofold it will be divided in two separate parts. The first part of this research will be directed at the current practices and methods that are used to stimulate reconciliation among local youth and the extent to which these methods can be considered effective. However, in this part, factors that enhance or impede this process of social repair will also be determined to provide insights on current impediments and factors that can be stimulated further. The second part of this thesis will focus on the assumptions underlying the two main instruments of transitional justice and their expected contribution to societal repair and peace. Perspectives and expectations of local Burundian youth on the desirability of such a mechanism will be included to enable an analysis of the congruence of theoretical assumptions and local expectations. Finally, the concluding part of this thesis will analyse the concurrence of the particular instruments of transitional justice with local practices, needs and perspectives. In this part, a thorough analysis of the feasibility and expected effectiveness of the suggested national instruments to enhance peace will be provided.

Before moving to the main arguments of this thesis, some attention has to be paid to the methodology used. Furthermore, to grasp the arguments presented here, it is necessary to have a little knowledge of the history and context of the cycles of violence in Burundi. Therefore, this thesis will start off with a short review of the methodology used, followed by an overview of the historical evolution of the conflict. After this, the main body of this research will be presented.

## Methodology

In this part, I will first briefly introduce the reasons that underlie the decision to direct attention to urban youth before turning to the more practical aspects of this research

### *Youth*

In this thesis, youth will be defined as young men and women between the age of eighteen and thirty years old. While it was first decided not to include the age group of twenty-five to thirty, it quickly became clear that attitudes differed to some extent between young men above the age of twenty-five, and younger men. Therefore, it was decided to include them as well as the image that would be provided without including them would be only partially true. Several reasons underlie the decision to direct attention to youth.

Firstly, “a stunning 73 percent of the Burundian population consists of youth below thirty years of age” and over fifty per cent of the population in Bujumbura consists of youth (Uvin 2009:33; Watt 2008:131). Secondly, youth often, if not always, plays a significant role in internal wars, as rebel movements are often comprised of youth. Indeed, youth has played a firm role in the ongoing violence in Burundi since most riots in Bujumbura started with radical youth organisations and rebel groups where mainly comprised of young adolescents (Samii 2007:16). Furthermore, today’s youth has been born in a climate of ongoing ethnically tainted violence and are therefore suspected to carry a large emotional and habitual load of violent memories. Therefore, the reconciliation of youth belonging to different historically opposing groups can be seen as crucial in achieving peaceful coexistence, as they represent the group most vulnerable to recruitment by rebel groups and as they have aged in a culture of violence and antagonism. And lastly, I considered youth to be easier to reach and relate to, as I am in the same age group. I therefore expected youth to talk more openly and truthfully, as I could really establish a relationship with them.

In this thesis, I will often refer to ‘local youth’. When I use this terminology, I refer to the local youth that is the subject of this study; the youth in the Northern neighbourhoods in Bujumbura.

### *Location*

The decision to implement this research in Bujumbura is derived from practical as well as theoretical reasons. The practical concerns are mainly comprised of security considerations. The countryside in Burundi is still generally regarded as unsafe since violent robberies and attacks happen on a daily basis. Moreover, the capital was particularly attractive since a youth centre was located in the centre of the four Northern neighbourhoods, neighbourhoods that have suffered extensively from ethnic tainted violence.<sup>12</sup> These neighbourhoods, called Ngagara, Cibitoke, Kamenge and Kinama represented ethnically segregated areas during the latest war and comprised the main urban battlefield. This youth centre where I could reside for

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<sup>12</sup> This will be elaborated further in the historical overview of the cycles of violence in Burundi, on page 14.

more than two months, the Centre Jeunes Kamenge, provided me with a location in which I had direct contact with thousands of youngsters from different ethnic and social backgrounds on a daily basis.

Whether an analysis of Bujumbura can be used as a representative for the whole country is questionable, as the interior of the country displays a very different dynamic (Uvin 2009). However, as tensions have mostly started in Bujumbura, the city can be used as a sort of thermometer of the current climate, since intimate connections exist between the capital city and the countryside. The proximity of the two ethnic groups, the legacy of some of the greatest horrors of the latest war, the closeness to the political centre and the poor living conditions of the areas of research, render these parts of Burundi most vulnerable to tensions and violence. Therefore, the city can be seen and will be used as a micro level representation of the country, in which tensions tend to converse and precede violence in the interior of the country.

### *Interviews*

While this research has made extensive use of the existing literature on Burundi, the main source of information in this thesis is comprised of in-depth interviews with youth between the age of eighteen and thirty years old.

Most of these interviews were conducted with individuals. However, additional focus group discussions consisting of six youngsters or more, several informal conversations with groups comprised of three to six individuals and numerous individual informal conversations supplemented this data.

The selection of individuals for in-depth interviews depended on their age and residence. As defined above, respondents were required to be between the age of eighteen and thirty years old. As this research focused on the four Northern neighbourhoods of Bujumbura, it was tried to take an equal number of interviews from Ngagara, Cibitoke, Kinama and Kamenge. In the end, three in dept interviews where held with youth from Kinama, two with youth from Kamenge, and two with youth from Cibitoke and Ngagara. Since interviews were in depth, they all took more than one hour. Without exception, everyone who participated in the interviews had been victim of the latest war. They all had experienced either a loss of family members, relatives or friends or material losses and displacement.

The interviews taken were semi-structured, as they included topics of interest but did not consist of standardized questions. The decision to use this qualitative method is mainly derived from the possible drawbacks of survey-methods, as they “tend to propose a limited range of options, to which the respondents react [and may] preclude respondents from suggesting novel or otherwise unanticipated” perspectives (UN 2009: 8). In contrast, this method intends to “combine structure with flexibility” (Legard et al. 2003:141).<sup>13</sup>

The interviews were separated in two parts. The first part consisted of questions on the historical conflict, including questions on the causes, drivers, dynamic, evolution and end of the conflict. Furthermore, local youth was asked to express their perception on the meaning, influences and methods that were in place to promote reconciliation as well as questions that aimed to understand the current quality of relations between

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<sup>13</sup> Indeed, this methods enables the researcher to “explore fully all the factors that underpin the participants’ answer: reasons, feelings, opinions and beliefs” (Legard et al. 2003:141).

the two ethnic groups. As this could be a quite sensitive subject none of the respondents were blatantly asked to their ethnicity. However, this issue would always surface and in all cases, respondents revealed their ethnic background without being specifically asked.

The second part of the interviews also included questions on the desirability of one of the two instruments of transitional justice. They were asked to express their personal opinion towards (inter)national criminal tribunals and (inter)national truth commissions, the underlying arguments to that opinion and the way they thought it would affect their wider surroundings.

To protect the identity of the respondents, their surnames are not revealed: in the main text, only their age, neighbourhood, and sometimes, their ethnic background will be cited.

Besides interviews with youth, several interviews with local non-governmental organizations (NGO's) were conducted as the methods currently used by local NGO's comprise an integral part of this research. The choice of NGO's depended mainly on their expected influence on youth in the Northern neighbourhoods, combined with the strategy they used as the aim was to include as many strategies as possible. Next to interviews with employees of the Centre Jeunes Kamenge, interviews were conducted with Jamaa, Benevolencija, Centre d'Alerte et de Prévention des Conflits (CENAP), Coalition for Peace in Burundi (COPA), the Amahoro Youth Club and Association de Lutte Contre la Delinquance et la Pauvreté (ALDP). These interviews were also semi-structured and similar to the interviews as conducted with youth, but with a specific attention to their methods and objectives.

The interviews were all conducted in French and recorded. Six of these interviews are included in the annex to enhance the transparency of this thesis. Where possible, references to the original French text are included. However, due to time limitations and technical problems, not all interviews were transcribed. Voice recordings and field notes were, however, immediately and carefully summarized in English to guarantee the truthfulness of the transcription.

Next to this main data-collection method, other complementary methods were used. Data was gathered with the help of local newspapers, focus group discussions and through participant observation and observation. Focus groups provide the researcher with the chance to gather data from interaction, in which the social surroundings are specifically explicit. These settings enable participant observation, in which reactions to other responses can be observed.<sup>14</sup> Observation refers to the analysis of non-verbal behaviour of subjects. Observations were mainly gathered with the usage of field-notes.

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<sup>14</sup> This observational aspect of focus group setting makes it particularly attractive. In the context of Burundi, the strong social context that is present in these group discussions, sometimes results in the provocation of emotional responses or in contrast, can lead to the suppression of some subjects. In the last case, certain observations can be made on the social desirability and openness on some topics. As Finch and Lewis state, "It reflects the social constructions- normative influences, collective as well as individual self-identity, shared meanings- that are an important part of the way in which we perceive, experience and understand the world around us" (2003:172).

### *Possible Shortcomings*

As I resided in the youth centre and did not have knowledge from the Kirundi language, I was unable to contact youth unrelated to this centre. Therefore, a slight bias towards more educated and motivated youth can be expected. However, a comparison with other studies suggests that attitudes expressed by the local youth I spoke to are quite similar to other youngsters. Moreover, as a large amount of youngsters from the Northern neighbourhoods visits the centre, it is conceived that it did not negatively affect the representativeness of the results.<sup>15</sup>

The limited time span of my research also affected the possible depth of this research. As I was only able to conduct this research for a little more than nine weeks, the number of interviews stayed understandably limited. However, as I chose for qualitative research the number of respondents is not of crucial importance, but still, more data would always have been beneficial to the representativeness of this research as it would have augmented the foundation of the current analysis.

Another problem was the French language, as my understanding of French was reasonable but not thorough and a different Burundian dialect and pronunciation complicated this understanding further. As I anticipated this problem, I decided to record every conversation, as that would enable me to listen to the conversation when I would be more used to the French language. Moreover, certain individuals who have a very thorough understanding of French have supervised and corrected the transcription of almost all interviews to guarantee that the right translation would be used.

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<sup>15</sup> The number of members ranged around forty-thousand youngsters.

## Short Historical Overview

Since its independence in 1962, Burundi has been plagued by cycles of violence that are mostly ascribed to inter-ethnic tensions with a strong regional character (Schweiger 2006: 654). As the Security Council stated in an assessment mission of Burundi: “the long history of political turmoil in Burundi has been characterized by large-scale ethnic strife between the Hutu majority, comprising some 85 per cent of the population, and the Tutsi minority, traditionally holding most of the senior positions in the State administration, the army, education and business” (UN 1994: par.9).<sup>16</sup> Indeed from 1966 until 1993 the government, military, security forces and judiciary were mainly (if not exclusively) comprised of Tutsi and excluded the Hutu from participation and thus effectively prohibited Hutu’s from ‘economic, social or political success’ (Ndikumana 1998: 37). While the government denied the existence of different ethnicities with the claim that ‘they were all Burundian’, several extremely violent ‘events’ and massacres aimed at the different ethnic group emphasized the existence of ethnicity as a determining factor (Uvin 1999: 259).

While the historical account may differ among different narrators, the most important ‘incidents’ of violence are commonly known. Reports of the UN determined that the gravest massacres took place in 1965, 1972, 1988, 1991, and from 1993 on (UN, 2005b:9).<sup>17</sup> All these massacres were characterized by an ethnic component as they regularly started with a Hutu uprising and where subsequently followed by retaliatory attacks sparking a new cycle of violence.<sup>18</sup> The massacres in 1972 and 1993 are of special importance because these were the most violent and massive atrocities committed, and are therefore the most remembered ‘incidents’.<sup>19</sup> The massacres of 1993 marked the beginning of a lengthy civil war between the army and

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<sup>16</sup> While the main actors in the conflict are mostly described as the Hutu and Tutsi, or Bahutu and Batutsi, and other ethnic group exists in Burundi called the Twa or Batwa. In 1965 the country was composed of 85% Hutu, 14% Tutsi and 1% Twa (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000:372). However, next to these social groupings, another actor exists called the Baganwa or Ganwa. The Ganwa were what Lemarchand calls a ‘princely elite’ who stood at the very top of the political system since colonial times of who the Mwami (king) was ‘primus inter pares’ (Lemarchand 1997:10-15). So technically the Ganwa were considered to be neither Hutu, nor Tutsi and were obeyed (and to some extent respected) by both (Ntahombaye and Nduwayo 2007:243). Prince Louis Rwagasore was a direct descendent of the Mwami, but was killed shortly after independence as he had risen to be the head of Uprona, the political party that he founded and who won after independence. He was allegedly killed by the PDC, a party that had been created partly by the Belgians, as a countermove to the foundation of Uprona (Uvin 2009:9).

<sup>17</sup> This report is also known as the ‘Kalomoh Report’, and is hereinafter referred to as the Kalomoh Report.

<sup>18</sup> In 1965 an uprising of Hutu military officers attempting to overthrow the ruling Tutsi government resulted in retaliatory attacks, killing more than hundred Hutu military and political leaders (Vandeginste 2009:395). Other Hutu uprisings took place in 1988 and 1991, the former resulting in the death of an estimated 5.000 to 20.000 Tutsi (with no retaliation) and the latter resulting in the death of hundreds of Tutsi civilians and up to 3.000 Hutu (Vandeginste 2009:396).

<sup>19</sup> In 1972 a Hutu led uprising in the Southern part of the country resulted in the killing of thousands of Tutsi. As a response, all educated Hutu’s including teachers, priests, school children, civil servants, medical personnel, scholars and lawyers were targeted in what seemed to be a ‘systemic effort to exterminate all well educated Hutu’s’ (Kalomoh Report 2005:10). As Emerson cites: the list of victims included “the four Hutu members of the cabinet, all the Hutu officers and virtually all the Hutu soldiers in the armed forces; half of Burundi’s primary school teachers and thousands of civil servants, bank clerks, small businessmen, and domestic servants. At present (August) there is only one Hutu nurse left in the entire country, and only a thousand secondary school students survive” (1975:220). It has been said that over a period of four months, people have been slaughtered by a “rate of almost thousand a day” (Emerson 1975:219). Around 100.000 to 300.000 Hutu’s have been killed in this incident what has also been called a ‘selective genocide’ (Vandeginste 2009: 396).

The presidential and parliamentary elections of 1993 resulted in a victory of Frodebu, a Hutu dominated party, and subsequently in the first Hutu president in Burundi’s history: Melchior Ndadaye. But a (failed) coup of the Tutsi military resulted in the death of the president, and most of the political leadership of Frodebu, and as a response

several militant Hutu groups including Frodebu the CNDD-FDD, and the FNL.<sup>20</sup> It is estimated that over the course of this war over 300.000 people have been killed (Uvin 2009:15).

Bujumbura, the capital city, has been the site of countless mutual provocations between ethnic groups and proved an important “incubator of ethnic violence” (Lemarchand 1994:63). Major outbursts of violence reformed the capital city in an ethnically segregated area in 1993 (Uvin 2007:39). The Hutu population retreated mainly to the countryside in which they felt protected by the rebel groups, which left the urban areas dominated by the Tutsi population, as Lealy comments: “the capital came to be regarded as a well-protected ‘Tutsi-land’” (1997:695). Moreover, the Northern neighbourhoods of Bujumbura, notably Kamenge and Kinama, were left empty as the Hutu population fled as a result of organized attacks of Tutsi youth groups, known as ‘ville morte’, and campaigns of ethnic cleansing by the military (Watt2008:58). When the Hutu population started to return, the Northern neighbourhoods became a site of ethnic segregation as Kamenge and Kinama were inhabited by rebel forces and the ‘normal’ Hutu population, and Cibitoke and Ngagara were solely inhabited by the Tutsi, protected by the military and self defense groups like ‘sans échec’ and ‘sans défaite’. The army regularly attacked the Hutu areas, while the rebels and Hutu youth groups attacked the Tutsi side.

Partly because of effective international pressure, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement was signed on 28 August 2000 (Uvin 2009:16). In this agreement, it was, among other things, decided that future governments as well as public enterprises and parliaments should consist of 60% Hutu and 40% Tutsi. However, fighting continued as the FNL and the CNDD-FDD continued their armed struggle. The CNDD-FDD laid down arms with the signing of the Pretoria Protocol on Political Defense, and Security Power-sharing in Burundi in October 2003. The CNDD-FDD delivered the current president, Pierre Nkurunziza, who was elected in 2005. Finally, in 2006, the FNL agreed to join the peace through a similar agreement.

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retaliatory attacks where launched against Tutsi civilians. The number of casualties since 1993 has been estimated on 200.000, comprising both Hutu’s and Tutsi’s what led some to call the event a ‘double genocide with Tutsis and Hutus acting alternatively as victims and perpetrators’ (Akhavan 1997:344).

<sup>20</sup> Frodebu, a semi-clandestine Hutu party originated in 1990. The Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD) was established in 1994, when this party split from Frodebu as they claimed Frodebu had “ceded to much power to Uprona” (Uvin 2009:14). However, internal divisions caused this party to split again, and gave birth to the CNDD-FDD (Forces de Défense de la Démocratie) led by Pierre Nkurunziza who would become president in 2005 (Uvin 2009:15). The FNL (Front National de Libération) comprised the armed wing of the PALIPEHUTU (Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu), a radical organization that was established as early as 1972 and found its origin in Tanzanian refugee camps.

## Part I. The Effectiveness of Local Methods and Practices of Reconciliation

### *Introduction to Part One*

As displayed in the introduction, the importance of the concept 'reconciliation' is evident in the diplomatic and theoretical approaches to the establishment of a durable peace in the post-conflict context of Burundi. The recent focus on reconciliation is most apparent in the Peace and Reconciliation agreement in Arusha, which stated that the 'political conflict with important ethnic dimension' should be resolved by reconciling the profound Burundian crisis through the recasting of political efforts towards national reconciliation and unity and the creation of a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission'.<sup>21</sup>

The meaning of the concept reconciliation however, remains vague and unspecified. The concept, as used in the context of Burundi, seems to denote 'national reconciliation'. However, the meaning of 'national reconciliation' and how this reconciliation is to be achieved remains generally unclear. Indeed, little or no attention is being paid to the actual processes of reconciliation that are taking place on a grassroots level.<sup>22</sup> As argued in the introduction to this thesis, the attention of this first part is therefore directed at reconciliatory practices on a grassroots level of youth in the Northern neighbourhoods of Bujumbura. It seeks to understand what methods are currently being used to stimulate a process of reconciliation, what practices are in place and what factors enhance or impede this process. Furthermore, it will evaluate the effectiveness of the methods used by analyzing the quality of current relationships among local youth, and select caveats in the process of reconciliation that require further attention. However, to be able to effectively explore reconciliatory practices, it is first needed to shed light on the concept 'reconciliation' itself, as the concept is not an unequivocal one. Therefore, the first chapter will be dedicated to the clarification of the concept and illuminate the understanding of the concept by local youth. The methods used to promote a process of reconciliation, the local practices that are in place and the influences that affect this process, will be delineated in the second chapter. Lastly, the final chapter will assess the effectiveness of the current local methods and impact of selected factors on the process of reconciliation at the level of local youth in the Northern neighbourhoods of Bujumbura.

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<sup>21</sup> As stated in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (Accord d'Arusha Pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Burundi): "S'agit d'un conflit fondamentalement politique avec des dimensions ethniques extrêmement importantes" (Arusha 2000 : 16). Therefore, political parties should recast their efforts "vers les idéaux d'unité et de réconciliation nationales" and a "Il est créé une commission nationale dénommée Commission nationale pour la vérité et la réconciliation" to reconcile the "profound Burundian crisis" (Arusha 2000: 23).

<sup>22</sup> It is mostly implied that a national instrument of transitional justice would foster societal reconciliation. It remains however merely an assumption as it is not specified how this would actually work. Reconciliation has long been perceived as an interpersonal affair in which relationships are rebuilt. The term national reconciliation is being increasingly used to denote reconciliation in a society. However, as argued in the introduction to this research, while it is assumed that there is a need for a national process, the manner in which people deal with the aftermath of the conflict on a grassroots level and what methods positively influence this process are often unknown. In the absence of such knowledge, little can be known on the contributions of a national process to these local processes. This topic will be elaborated further in the second part of this thesis.



## 1. Reconciliation in Divided Communities

Confusion over the concept 'reconciliation' is very common as the definition and application of the concept has remained controversial.<sup>23</sup> The aim of this chapter is therefore to clarify the concept, as it will provide a framework through which current practices of reconciliation among youth can be analyzed. While the perceived importance of reconciliation in post-conflict societies will be illuminated, this chapter will illustrate the controversies connected to the concept. As will be seen, the concept can be used to denote a process or an end-state, can refer to different levels of society, and can comprise several different mechanisms ranging from apologies and forgiveness to punishment and restitutions. The last part of this chapter will include perspectives of youth on the meaning and importance of reconciliation, as the congruence of the concept with local interpretations is imperative to render this process meaningful to the ones affected.

### 1.1 Reconciliation: Multiple Approaches

Generally, reconciliation "connotes the coming together of things that once were united but have been torn asunder" (Sarkin and Daly 2003:665). In the post conflict context, this mainly points to the restoration of relations shattered by violence within a society and encompasses the question as to how a society divided by war can find a way to "return to some kind of normality when neighbors living side by side have endured and perpetrated against one another crimes of unimaginable horror" (Sarkin and Daly 2003:665). As Bloomfield et al. state, a process of reconciliation addresses "relations based on antagonism, distrust, disrespect [...] hurt and hatred" and aims to transform these "to engender a minimum level of trust so that there can be a degree of cooperation and reliance between them" (2003: 11). In a similar vein, reconciliation can be defined as "a process by which parties that have experienced an oppressive relationship or destructive conflict with each other move to attain or to restore a relationship that they believe to be minimally acceptable" (Kriesberg 2001:48). It therefore strives to "transform enemy relations and build integrated and mutually acceptable forms of coexistence" (Kriesberg 2001: 61).

The importance of the concept reconciliation became evident as traditional conflict resolution approaches increasingly failed to address the complex realities of post-conflict recovery of societies that had suffered from intrastate violence. As hinted at in the introduction to this research, the attention gradually shifted to the cultural and psychological dimensions and needs of post-conflict recovery as the lingering existence of antagonistic relations between different social groups caused renewed outbreaks of violence.<sup>24</sup> As Humphrey

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<sup>23</sup> As Galtung put it, "Reconciliation is a theme with deep psychological, sociological, theological, philosophical, and profoundly human roots – and nobody really knows how to successfully achieve it" (2001: 4).

<sup>24</sup> The insurgency of the concept as a 'panacea' of post-conflict recovery has arisen out of a severe discontent and a 'dismal track record' of existing approaches (Kaufman 2006:201). While the overall occurrence of active conflicts worldwide has been declining in the early '90's, several other conflicts have become active. Strikingly, out "of the 39 conflicts that became active in the last ten years, 31 were conflict recurrences – instances of resurgent, armed violence in societies where conflict had been largely dormant for at least a year" (Hewitt et al. 2010:1). Similarly, Kaufman finds that since the end of the Cold War only six ethnic wars have more or less successfully settled while around fifty-

states “when violence ends, [...] the traces of violence survive in its victims. Soldiers carry the wounds of war, torture victims the scars of brutal repression and the survivors of genocide the horrors of the threat of social extinction” (2000:7). Therefore, even in settings where a ‘negative peace’ has been established, attitudes and relations between groups may have suffered to a great extent and have hardened hostile attitudes which heightens the risk of renewed violence as diminished social trust, “diabolical images of the ‘other’, massive psychological wounds” and feelings of victimization can be used to justify “hatred, revenge, or preventive attacks motivated by fear” (Kaufman 2006:205; Wessells and Bretherton 2000:100). Therefore, the attention to the amelioration of these intergroup ties rose and national reconciliation became the repeated answer to post-conflict situations as several countries embarked on their transition to democracy while implementing legislature to promote reconciliation or implemented truth and reconciliation commissions.<sup>25</sup>

Indeed, the focus on national reconciliation as imperative to post-conflict recovery emerged with the rising influence of the restorative justice paradigm. Starting with the South-African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the division between restorative justice, aiming to achieve (national) reconciliation, and retributive justice, originally directed at the punishment of past abuses through criminal tribunals, became highly visible. The restorative paradigm attempts to stimulate societal reconciliation and peace through national truth seeking procedures and considers punishments as subordinate to this goal.<sup>26</sup> The retributive or punitive approach to justice however, used to adhere to a strict legal approach and considered the prosecution of perpetrators as the main embodiment of justice. In this sense, reconciliation was often juxtaposed to justice, as the threat of prosecutions could “increase tensions in a fledgling society” and could therefore be detrimental to social relations and peace (Sarkin and Daly 2003: 670).<sup>27</sup>

The perceived importance of justice to reconciliation thus differs as it can be perceived as a (possible) component of reconciliation, as a precondition to national reconciliation or as detrimental to reconciliation.<sup>28</sup> However, other components are often cited as equally or even more important to stimulate a process of

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nine ethnic ‘rebellions’ where still lingering in 1999 (2008:203).<sup>24</sup> The large percentage of recurrent conflicts has highlighted the need to deal with the root causes of conflicts and suggests that ‘international brokered settlements’ have become insufficient (Hewitt et al. 2010:2). As Lederach states, “relying solely on statist diplomacy and realpolitik have not demonstrated a capacity to control these conflicts, much less transform these toward constructive peaceful outcomes” (1997: 25).

<sup>25</sup> As Sarkin and Daly state ‘legislation has been implemented to promote reconciliation in South-Afrika, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Namibia and truth and reconciliation commissions have been, among others, implemented in Nigeria, Peru, East-Timor and Sierra Leone’ (2003:661).

<sup>26</sup> While the specific assumptions of this approach will be discussed in chapter five, a little clarification can be provided here: The foundations of this approach are mainly derived from theology and emphasize a communitarian vision of justice and conflict resolution. Punishments are established according to the desires of the community, and might not include punishment in the legal sense. The main goal of this approach is the determination of new shared values to achieve a sense of justice and secure future peaceful relations (Wenzel et al. 2008:379). It is assumed that through processes of communal deliberation, in which both the victim, the perpetrator and their communities are involved, values can be renegotiated and effectively implemented. This process would in turn, provide dignity to the victim and provide the perpetrator the chance to reintegrate into society.

<sup>27</sup> This division is often referred to as the ‘peace versus justice’ debate. Conversely, it is now often argued that the conviction of former perpetrators addresses retributive demands in a society and therefore stimulates reconciliation through the individualization of guilt and the acknowledgement of the dignity of its victims. The distinction will be elaborated further in the next part of this thesis as the two main instruments of transitional justice will be discussed in more detail. The restorative paradigm will be illuminated through a discussion of the main assumptions of (inter)national truth and reconciliation commissions, an overview of the assumptions underlying (inter)national criminal tribunals will illuminate the retributive approach to justice.

<sup>28</sup> Some scholars even contend that justice is indifferent to reconciliation (Sarkin and Daly 2003:669).

reconciliation. Moreover, the reconciliation that is referred to by these instruments comprises mostly societal reconciliation, while other levels of analysis are equally important.

While (inter)national criminal tribunals and (inter)national truth and reconciliation commissions are perceived to constitute two instruments through which reconciliation can be stimulated, several other components are often thought of as essential: cited are restitutions, reparations, economic development, education, contact, joint projects, mass media, healing, apologies, and forgiveness (Lederach 1997:30; Bloomfield 2006:12; Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004: 21-27). However, as a distinction can be made between the inter-personal level, the inter-communal level and the societal level, the mechanisms and methods used to stimulate reconciliation differ according to the level of society on which they are implemented or supposed to affect.<sup>29</sup> National level mechanisms include (inter)national truth and reconciliation commissions, (inter)national criminal tribunals, reparations, reforms of the economic- or political sector and judicial reforms (Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004: 17-18). On a communal level, mechanisms such as the improvement of health care, education, community restitutions and dialogue can stimulate a transformation of antagonistic relationships (Fletcher and Weinstein 2004:632). Similarly, the inter-personal level includes other methods to stimulate reconciliation and effectuate psychological changes, such as apologies, contact, joint projects and education (Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004:21-27).<sup>30</sup>

There is an intimate connection between these levels. National, structural reforms provide the climate in which reconciliation on a grassroots or community level can effectively take root as integrative structures and socio-economic equality created at a political level diminish the incentives for violent struggle and facilitate cooperative structures. Moreover, justice can provide dignity to victims on a communal or societal level and stimulate acceptance and foster non-violent conflict resolution. Vice versa, improved relations on a grassroots level can provide a foundation for political reconciliation or stimulate the development of a strong civil society that lobbies for peace (Bloomfield 2006:29).<sup>31</sup>

However, the different levels cannot be seen as a unified whole. Changes on a political level do not guarantee reconciliation at a grassroots level as psychological changes need to occur on this level to change adversary beliefs, attitudes and establish interpersonal trust and cooperation. Similarly, changes on an interpersonal level are not necessarily followed by changes in community structures or affect institutional change. More reasonable to assume is, since it is likely that every aspect of society has been touched or

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<sup>29</sup> Different terms may be used to refer to these different levels. Lederach (1997) for example refers to a 'top level', 'middle range' and 'grassroots level' which terms will also be used in this thesis. The term reconciliation applies to all these levels, as it is defined as a process addressing "relations based on antagonism, distrust, disrespect [...] hurt and hatred" and aims to transform these "to engender a minimum level of trust so that there can be a degree of cooperation and reliance between them" (Bloomfield et al. 2003: 11). Political reconciliation thus refers to the restoration of relations between politicians, belonging to different social (former) antagonistic groups. as they usually develop (or even incite) antagonistic and even violent relations. Similarly, community reconciliation refers to leaders on a community level. They too can stimulate or impose antagonistic relations and violence.

<sup>30</sup> However, this list is not meant to be exhaustive. Other methods, such as disarmament, demobilization, the writing of a common history, public apologies and national commemoration days are also mentioned in reference to the political or societal level (Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004). On a communal level, the excavation of mass graves, the creation of cultural monuments, libraries and micro-level development are, among others, mechanisms that could be included as well, and on the interpersonal level therapeutic counseling or the development of certain career generating skills could also benefit relationship on a grassroots level (Fletcher and Weinstein 2002: 631).

<sup>31</sup> If relations on a grassroots level are still hostile for example, new leaders may rise who exacerbate this hostility and either cause renewed violence, or force political leaders to take on a more radical stance.

influenced by violent conflict, that a change needs to occur at every level of society (Lederach 1997; Wessells and Bretherton 2000:102). As Lederach argues, reconciliation can better be seen as a process of 'system change', since the "legitimacy [and] interdependency [of] the needs and resources" of the different levels has to be accounted for (1997:60). To achieve an effective process of reconciliation, "changes need to occur at the official level – between leaders or elected officials-, among mid-level leaders and people of influence in the community – such as leaders of ethnic groups, religious leaders and intellectuals-, but also on the grassroots level – in members of the local communities and in patterns of belief and activity in schools, workplaces, neighbourhoods and villages-" (Wessells et al. 2000:102). Therefore, the different levels should be considered separately while maintaining attention to the interrelatedness thereof. In this research, this means that while attention is directed at reconciliation on a grassroots level, factors that influence this process can stem from a communal and societal level and should also be taken into account.

One last controversy that needs some clarification is the distinction between reconciliation as a process and reconciliation as an outcome. While the term is often used to refer to the process of reconciliation, the end-state to which the term sometimes hints refers to the attainment of positive and peaceful relations. Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma Bennink for example, acknowledge reconciliation as a process but also stress the importance of reconciliation as a goal that "...consists of mutual recognition and acceptance, invested interests and goals in developing peaceful relations, mutual trust, positive attitudes, as well as sensitivity and consideration for the other party's needs and interests" (2004:15). While this comprises quite a modest description of an end-state, reconciliation as a goal is often imagined to be a rather utopian goal and a barely definable end of a continuing spectrum. While a state of reconciliation can be measured to some degree, and indeed the *absence* of reconciliation is even more easily defined, the pure end state of reconciliation is mostly considered too idealistic. Moreover, the *existence* of an ending point is debatable. Relationships, in whatever form, require work and contact so there might never be a point after which relationships are characterized by 'mutual trust' and 'positive attitudes' and require no more real effort. At last, the definition of reconciliation as a goal might compel victims in a post-conflict society to resist or refuse a process of reconciliation since they might feel forced in a direction of harmony that they might not want to embark upon.<sup>32</sup>

However, it is possible to analyze to what extent a process of reconciliation is taking root in a particular society. Reconciliation can be defined, in line with the conviction of many other scholars, as a process that addresses "relations based on antagonism, distrust, disrespect [...] hurt and hatred" aiming to transform these to "engender a minimum level of trust so that there can be a degree of cooperation and reliance between them". However, an estimate can be made on the progress in this process (Chapman and Ball 2001:1; Wessells and Bretherton 2000:101; Lederach 1997:30; Bloomfield 2003: 11). The extent to which local youth presents a cooperative instead of a competitive mentality, control instead of fear of the other group, acceptance instead of anger, and trust instead of distrust is instructive for the analysis of the extent to which the process is

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<sup>32</sup> As Dwyer accurately notes: "Reconciliation is being urged upon people who have been bitter and murderous enemies, upon victims and perpetrators of terrible human rights abuses, upon groups and individuals whose very self-conceptions have been structured in terms of historical and often state-sanctioned relations of dominance and submission" (2002: 92).

reflected in their attitudes. Moreover, while non-violent coexistence between different societal groups can be seen as the minimum of reconciliation, the degree of cooperation, the absence of negative stereotypes on the other group, the degree of trust between them and the occurrence of sincere friendships mirrors a larger extent of reconciliation and reflects the described change in mentality (Bloomfield 2006:14).

## 1.2 Perceptions from Below

The above overview displays the complexity but also the perceived necessity of reconciliation in post-conflict situations. Reconciliation however, “may have different meanings and may involve different processes in various cultural contexts” (Wessells and Bretherton 2000:102). Therefore, before concluding this chapter, a short review of the local perceptions of youth on the concept will be offered.

The definition of reconciliation as provided above, as a process directed at the amelioration of relationships that can take place on different levels of society, resonated fairly well among local youth in Bujumbura. Indeed, several respondents of the youth I talked to emphasized the relational aspects of reconciliation and considered it to be an ongoing process. For the largest part of them, reconciliation meant the overcoming of divisions in society mostly through dialogue and contact.<sup>33</sup> While relations are mostly not explicitly mentioned, it was always considered to take place between groups or individuals. Therefore it seems safe to assume that relations constitute the main focus of reconciliation at a grassroots level.

Similarly, most youth considered reconciliation to be a multi-levelled process as they made a sharp distinction between reconciliation on a societal or political level and reconciliation at their ‘own’ level. This distinction mostly came up when asked at the quality of relations. Mostly, they considered relations on a grassroots level to be quite good, in contrast to the political level.

Reconciliation was always denoted to be something positive, something that was valued very highly. This is in line with the conclusion of Peter Uvin who found ‘good social relations’ to be perceived as a very important aspect of peace to average Burundians.<sup>34</sup> The local youth often connected reconciliation to the ethnic division within the Burundian society.<sup>35</sup> While it appears reasonable that the ethnic division is

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<sup>33</sup>As for example one interviewee stated: “*eh... pour moi la réconciliation, d’abord c’est se réconcilier. Se mettre ensemble, dialoguer.. c’est ça la réconciliation.. selon moi.*” (Twenty years old man from Kamenge). This is one example of many in which contact and dialogue, and therefore reconciliation as a process, were emphasized.

<sup>34</sup>In his study to the meaning of peace in Burundi, Peter Uvin found ‘safety’ to be the most frequent answer. ‘Basic needs’ came second, closely followed by ‘good social relations’ on the third place (Uvin 2009: 45). However, in Kamenge for example, ‘good social relations’ earned even a second place on this list. While the wording might be different, it corresponds closely with what is generally described as reconciliation and thus underscores the importance Burundians themselves attach to this aspect (Uvin 2007: 50).

<sup>35</sup>In this interview for example, reconciliation is perceived as the overcoming of stereotypes and prejudices that the ethnic segregation of different *quartiers* during the war generated. “*La réconciliation... pour moi la réconciliation... eh, c’est vrai qu’ici, surtout dans les quartiers nord... on a eu beaucoup de division. Des jeunes... des quartiers différents. Quand il y avait, ces différences, alors le centre il a pu trouver certaines activités, et le moyen d’avoir cette réconciliation. Et moi aussi, quand je suis arrivée, quand j’ai mis mon premier pied ici au centre, j’ai passé certaines activités, je voyais des gens et certaines de Tutsi, mais, à un certain moment je pu savoir que lui, je peux travailler avec lui et avec lui, parce-que, ce n’est pas la même personne que j’ai trouvé dans la rue. Si il y avait beaucoup des problèmes, la*

perceived as the main cleavage, another divide was also mentioned several times. As appears from an interview with a twenty-eight years old woman from Cibitoke:

*[reconciliation] I think it is good... to be on good terms with everyone. You talk with other people, and have no fear of vengeance... It is also solidarity... Not only between the two ethnicities... But also very much between rich and poor (...) The biggest question is between 'wealth' and 'poverty'.*

Besides the insights this provides on the perceived necessary locus of reconciliation, it also slightly reveals their perception on the current conflict. Not only relations along ethnic lines are perceived as fractured, but relations along economic lines are also considered very negative.<sup>36</sup> This cleavage however, was often accompanied by an ethnic dimension as wealth is often perceived to be connected to the historically privileged Tutsi. This is neither uncommon nor strange, as the Tutsi have historically been the most privileged group in society and 'history cannot suddenly change'.<sup>37</sup> However, the truthfulness of this assertion is questionable and will be elaborated further in chapter three.

The short overview of local perceptions as presented above reveals that the theoretical description of reconciliation is fairly congruent with local perceptions: it comprises multiple levels, is described as a process, and concerns relation between different social groups in society. It has been argued that reconciliation as an outcome is rather difficult to determine, and that a more pragmatic approach would consider reconciliation as a process. However, the progress made in this process can be estimated according to the character of the relationships that are established among local youth, which are minimally defined by peaceful coexistence and maximally by an increase in trust, cooperation and reliance between youth in Bujumbura. Therefore, the definition of reconciliation as a process that addresses "relations based on antagonism, distrust, disrespect [...] hurt and hatred" and aims to transform these "to engender a minimum level of trust so that there can be a degree of cooperation and reliance between them" will be used (Bloomfield 2003: 11). While local perceptions revealed that reconciliation was mostly connected to the ethnic division within society, it was also perceived to apply to the economic divisions in society.

Similarly, the theoretical description suggested that reconciliation could refer to different levels. It was argued that the different levels of society are extremely intertwined but cannot be seen as a unified whole. This also resonated among local youth as they considered the process important on different levels of society.

The theoretical framework offered in this chapter will provide the foundation for the analysis of current processes of reconciliation at a grassroots level of urban youth in Bujumbura. As this part of the research is directed at a grassroots level of youth in Bujumbura, and aims to analyze the effectiveness of the methods and

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*en Kamenge si tu étais tutsi tu ne passe pas par la bas. (C'était pendant la guerre ?) Oui, Mais si tu es arrivée ici, on habite hutu tutsi ensemble. C'était bien. Sais pas que lui il est un tutsi oui... peut-être quand nous arrivons ici, on fait semblant de ne pas rien voir. faisait semblant mais nous nous savons très bien que ici c'est bien. Est certaines gens pendant la guerre, ils avaient pris le refuge ici. Ni le tutsi ni les hutu, sont les ennemi ici' (Twenty years old man from Kinama).*

<sup>36</sup> This cleavage will be further illuminated in the third chapter, as the current relationships among local youth will be considered.

<sup>37</sup> As a twenty-one years old male from Ngagara stated: 'And you know the Tutsi, they love money (.....) Because the Tutsi have a lot of money. They have made a lot of money in the past, so they have a lot of money'. Indeed, as is explained by another respondent: 'il existe encore le sentiment qu'au niveau économique ce sont les Tutsi qui font le contrôle... l'histoire ne peut pas changer brusquement' (Centre Jeunes Kamenge, 12-04-2010).

mechanisms that are currently used to promote reconciliation, the focus of will be on the interpersonal level of reconciliation. It will therefore mainly address local level practices and mechanisms and will consider the extent to which reconciliation has taken root on a local level of youth. However, as the different layers of society are conceived as intertwined, the mechanisms and factors that stem from a national and community level will be discussed were needed. The focus of the next chapter will therefore be directed at methods used to promote reconciliation at a grassroots level, and factors that are perceived to affect this process.

## 2. Local Methods and Factors that Affect Grassroots Reconciliation

While an effort has been made to clarify the concept of reconciliation, this chapter aims to provide insights on the current local methods, practices and factors that stimulate or hinder a process of reconciliation among local youth. These insights will contribute to a further understanding on how local level processes evolve and how the aftermath of conflict is dealt with by local youth. As will be seen in the first section, the methods used mainly comprise education, the distribution of information and the facilitation of contact. Furthermore, some local practices will be defined such as apologies and the provisions of small restitutions. Lastly, this chapter will outline factors that are perceived to affect the process positively as well as factors that hinder this process, as will be discussed in the last section. Factors that enhance this process include the values of the 'bashingantahe' institution and religious values. In contrast, local youth considered the pervasive criminality, corruption, political violence and the legacy of looted goods to be affecting social relations negatively.

### 2.1 Local Methods

While taking interviews of different NGO's, it became clear that, as they perceive reconciliation as a process of healing broken relationships, most organizations put great emphasis on the actual face to face meeting of people from different ethnic backgrounds.<sup>38</sup> The importance of this first method, contact, is articulated in the contact hypothesis, which suggests that direct information "regarding the life styles, values, behaviours and experiences of other groups" are of crucial importance to achieve reconciliation (Ellison and Powers 1994: 385-86). While second hand information, distributed by the media or ethnic leaders, might be an inaccurate source of information and might disseminate negative perceptions of the other group, positive "first hand information might be generalized into [a] positive perception of the group as a whole" (Ellison and Powers 1994: 385-86).<sup>39</sup> Therefore, the Centre Jeunes de Kamenge,<sup>40</sup> for example, offers the possibility for youth from different backgrounds to play sports together, to follow classes together, to follow training programs

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<sup>38</sup> Since most NGO's adopted academic insights on reconciliation it is safe to say that they roughly use the concept in similar ways. This also appeared to be the case in the interviews taken with diverse NGO's; they all described reconciliation as a process in which the past needed to be dealt with and in which relations needed to be restored. All organizations considered the relation between the two different ethnic groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi, of primary concern. However, the cleavage between different economic groups also concerned some organizations (the Amahoro Youth Club and the Centre Jeunes Kamenge). Consistent with the clarification presented in the first chapter, most NGO's made sharp differences between reconciliation at (at least) two levels; the national level and the grassroots level (Benevolencija, COPA, Centre Jeunes Kamenge, Amahoro). This distinction mostly came up in the discussion on transitional justice, as will be covered in the second chapter of this thesis.

<sup>39</sup> However, as Gibson notes, several other factors are perceived as contributing to the effectiveness of contact as a tool of reconciliation (2004:203). Firstly, both parties need to enjoy an 'equal status', both in expectation as in perception of the other party. Secondly, a shared goal enhances the chances on successful reconciliation greatly as it creates cooperative structures instead of competitive ones. Lastly, support from "authorities, law, or custom" can encourage the process to a large extent (Gibson 2004:203).

<sup>40</sup> The Kamenge Youth Centre is created in 1993 with the aim to "habituer les jeunes des Quartiers Nord de la ville à vivre ensemble, en se respectant mutuellement" (Olivier-Gatabazi 2006:4).



ranging from discussion classes to informatics, and attend religious meetings (Olivier-Gatabazi 2006:4). Since the centre receives about two-thousand youngsters between sixteen and thirty years old a day and around forty-thousand people are enrolled in the centre, the centre can be considered as quite influential in the Northern neighbourhoods of Bujumbura. Furthermore, every year a 'camp de travail' is organized in which different people from the community, as well as international volunteers, work together to (re)construct houses in the neighbourhoods. According to the contact hypothesis, this is even more effective as communal work towards a shared objective promotes cooperative structures (Gibson 2004: 203). Moreover, the centre offers some material restitutions to young individuals as houses are reconstructed and sometimes notebooks and pencils are provided.

In this loose and informal environment, the youth is expected to establish friendships cutting across differences and develop a mutual respect and tolerance as youth that visits the centre comes from different neighbourhoods and are "different by their ethnic and religious origins, by their political orientation and their social extraction"(Olivier-Gatabazi 2006:4).<sup>41</sup> Indeed, young men from very different backgrounds engage in sports and discussions together.

Several other organizations focus on contact, albeit in different ways. Local NGO's such as Jamaa and the Amahoro Youth Club focus, next to some sports activities, specifically on the promotion of dialogue between the two groups, and organize brainstorm sessions or meetings to reduce stereotypes and promote cooperation. They firmly believe that dialogue is essential since mistrust and fears are perceived to be closely connected to the evolution of violence. As appeared from an interview with the Amahoro Youth Club:

*'Somebody would tell me, that a friend of mine is planning to kill me (...) but if you would approach the one...and you will ask, why are you planning to kill me? Then he will say... me? I have never planned to kill you! And then the dialogue begins. But if I stay in my circle, than you might believe it and kill the other. That is why we promote dialogue... a frank dialogue' (16-03-2010).*

Besides the reduction of fear and rumours, dialogue is meant to reduce the persistent stereotypes that linger in the Burundian society. To achieve this, some organizations work throughout the whole country to create forums in which such stereotypes are discussed.

*'In these meetings, we develop and discuss the following questions: How do the Tutsi perceive themselves? How do the Hutu perceive the Tutsi? After that we pose the question: what image would you like that the other- Hutu or Tutsi- have of you? We say for example: listen, here people say the Tutsi are killers and criminals... etc. but you, what do you want them to think of you? After listening to all the responses, we ask: what can we do together?'*<sup>42</sup>

(Coalition for Peace in Burundi, 23-03-2010)

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<sup>41</sup> Translated from the original French text : "différents par leurs origines ethniques et religieuses, par leurs orientations politiques et leur extraction sociale".

<sup>42</sup> Translated from the original French transcript of the interview: '*Nous développons et discutons dans ces rapprochements des communautés les questions suivantes: comment les Tutsi se perçoivent-ils? Comment les Hutu perçoivent les Tutsi ? Nous posons ensuite la question : quelle image aimerions-nous que les autres - Hutu ou Tutsi - aient de nous ? On dira par exemple : écoute, ici on dit que les Tutsi sont des assaillants, des tueurs, des criminels, etc., mais toi, que veux-tu qu'on pense de toi ? Après avoir écouté toutes les réponses, on pose la question : que pouvons nous faire ensemble ?'* (COPA, 23-03-2010).

Education is promoted in several ways. The first is, similar to the approach of the Centre Jeunes Kamenge, the direct provision of information through classes.<sup>43</sup> Education is considered crucial in the Northern neighbourhoods as it might provide an escape from poverty. It is valued highly by NGO's as a essential part of reconciliation since they consider poverty to create a population vulnerable to mobilization tactics and the education of former excluded groups enhances economic equality.

Education was also promoted by the dispersion of information through radio programs. As the media played a significant role in creating and maintaining ethnic divisions, it was considered one of the most important areas of reform (Hagos 2001: ii).<sup>44</sup> Besides the active role the news played in advancing their mutually macabre ideologies” and generating “mutual terror and distrust based on historical fears”, it was believed that more was needed than the sole cessation of this kind of media broadcasts. The distribution of independent and credible news could serve as an “antidote to the ethnic-laced propaganda from within and outside of Burundi”, since it would provide a foundation on which people could challenge these hate messages (Hagos 2001:7). Moreover, radio could provide a useful tool in the fight against ‘rumourmongering’ as rumours have been a significant source of violence. As a Tutsi journalist, who witnessed the 1993 massacre in Kamenge, explains:

*“In 1988, based on false rumour that the Tutsis were preparing to attack them, Hutus had taken their machetes and massacred their Tutsi neighbours in Burundi”. This was a replay of similar incidents on both sides of the ethnic divide during the previous cycles of massacres and retaliatory mass killings” (Sinduhije 1998: 5 cited in: Hagos, 2001:13).*

Initiatives such as radio Isanganiro,<sup>45</sup> an independent provider of news, studio Jjambo<sup>46</sup>, and radio Benevolencija were created. As radio is the main transmitter of news, these radio stations can have a significant impact on youth, empowering them to counter (ethnic) mobilization and manipulation.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> The ALDP (Association de Lutte Contre la Delinquance et la Pauvreté) that is based in Kinama, provides special education so that youth will be able to find a job after (conversation ALPD, 20-04-2010).

<sup>44</sup> Radio Candid and Radio Rutomoramingo, who was based in Congo, actively spread anti-Tutsi messages in 1994 in Burundi (Myers at al. 2000). Besides the radio, newspapers contributed to the ethnic division as there was one, *The Crossroads*, on the Tutsi side and one, *The Witness*, on the Hutu side, both in Kirundi’ (Hagos 2001: 6,7).

<sup>45</sup> Radio Isanganiro cooperates closely with studio Jjambo. Besides the provision of news, they broadcast debates, give the opportunity to people to demand pardon for their wrongdoings or express their gratitude to people who have done something good, and organise programs on the shortcoming of the youth today. For further information, see; <http://www.web-africa.org/isanganiro/page/index2.php?page=emissions>.

<sup>46</sup> Studio Jjambo was founded in 1995 to “use the airwaves for peace and reconciliation” (Hagos, 2001:8). It broadcasted reliable news and provided a forum in which people could utter their own experiences. For more information on studio Jjambo, see Hagos, 2001.

<sup>47</sup> Interesting is, that these radio stations also explicitly aim to stimulate processes of reconciliation. Radio Benevolencija for example, tries to achieve reconciliation through the emission of a soap that reflects the history of Burundi. Through the narration of this semi-fictional story, they transmit certain messages on how violence starts, how violence can be resolved, what the consequences of violence are in the sense of recurrent traumas and destruction and the importance of peace and respect. The organization tries to change the behaviour of people through their emotional identification with the (fictional) story and their compassion with the ‘other’ side of the conflict. This indeed happens as the organization receives positive responses from listeners who recognize parts of their own history in the fictional story. However, as none of the youth I spoke to mentioned these programs, I consider these programs to less influential to them. Therefore, I have excluded these specific programs from this study.

## 2.2 Local Practices and Factors that Enhance or Impede the Process of Grassroots Reconciliation

As Peter Uvin already remarked, cohabitation between the two ethnic groups seems to develop on a sort of ad-hoc basis (Uvin 2009:166). Indeed, there are no rituals, traditional processes or public procedures to facilitate the reintegration and reconciliation between former offenders and victims. However, one important practice, the practice of apologies, does take place on a local level.

Local youth described that former perpetrators had approached them to ask for an apology for past misdeeds. Indeed, this practice seemed quite influential and occurred frequently as former offenders often approached their victims to ask for pardon and sometimes offered a material restitution such as a drink or some food. According to Bar-Tal and Bennink, apologies between victim and offender constitute a stimulant to reconciliation as “past injustices and the grievances are acknowledged and addressed” through this practice (2002:22). Indeed, apologies and material restitutions were often, if not always, accepted by local youth and pardon was frequently granted.

However, these practices only embodied a demand for pardon, and people did not talk profoundly on what exactly had happened or the motivations behind the crime. In contrast, relationships between former offenders and victims seemed to be actually based on what Rosalind Shaw calls, the art of ‘forgetting’, in which personal memories are “contained in a form that would enable them to recover their lives” (2007:194). Indeed, this type of forgetting was practiced widely as pardon was granted after which youngsters tried to forget the past, as it would permit them to focus on the future.

Besides these practices on a grassroots level, the only traditional institution that is concerned with reconciliation is the institution of the *bashingantahe* (in singular; *mushingantahe*). This institution consisted of a selected group of men chosen by their community, and served to resolve local disputes, provide guidance and advice to the population, and suggest a judgment when necessary (Dexter and Ntahombaye 2005:12). The institution was not ethnically biased as both Hutu and Tutsi could become part of the *bashingantahe*, if they were perceived to possess the required qualities, such as “wisdom, impartiality, knowledge and wealth” (Uvin 2009:62). People could consult these ‘wise men’ free of charge as it was considered to be a job of honour. However, within time the perception and legitimacy of this institution has altered severely as from the colonial period on, several governments tried to control the institution.<sup>48</sup> As Uvin states, “eventually, in the 1980’s, all state and party officials came to be called by this appellation and the term came to mean little more the ‘sir’” (2009: 62). Indeed, the impact of this historically reconciliatory institution has decreased, as will be seen in the next chapter.

Furthermore, the communication of values through religion was also considered to be quite influential. As sixty-seven percent of the Burundian population is Christian, the church provides, especially in an urban

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<sup>48</sup> In the colonial period the Belgian administration limited the influence of the *bashingantahe* by controlling, and if considered necessary, adjusting or cancelling their verdicts. Under the one-party rule of Uprona, members of the *bashingantahe* were appointed from above what severely compromised the credibility of the institution. The institution was even prohibited during the rule of Bagaza, from 1976-1987 (Dexter and Ntahombaye 2005: 15).

setting, an important meeting point for people of different backgrounds and represents a significant source of influence (CIA 2010). Moreover the values that religion provides regarding the dignity of all human beings, the value of respect, solidarity, tranquillity and forgiveness can prove to be a meaningful source of reconciliatory values as they, as Uvin states, “seem to resonate in society and shield people from temptations such as drinking or womanizing” (2009:186).

However, local youth pointed to several factors that are believed to impede a process of reconciliation on a grassroots level. The main factors that were selected stem from the political or national level as widespread violence and with poverty were often cited to have a negative effect on social relations as it created a climate of insecurity. While the war has ended and the security situation has shown an overall improvement, violence is still pervasive as the city is rife with banditry and criminality and political violence was reported to be rising. In Cibitoke, Kamenge and Kinama, shootings occurred on a daily basis. Several causes underlie the widespread usage of violence.

The war has left many arms and even if the demobilization campaign implemented by the government should have confiscated most of them, every respondent assured me that most arms are still hidden in houses, and are being used to steal.<sup>49</sup> Next to ‘normal’ robbers, the ‘demobilized’ and the police were reported to steal the most. However, the reason people steal, out of poverty, is mostly understood and even sympathized with as the reason of this poverty is mostly believed to be caused by the current government; the salaries are too low, there are not enough jobs as a result of bad governance, corruption is pervasive and integration programs are absent for the demobilized.

Another reason most people reported is that both the demobilized and the police force are mainly comprised of former rebels and that they therefore are ‘used to take everything they can and are used to kill’. Violence is therefore frequently used. Moreover, violence is to a large extent institutionalized in the Burundian society. As Human Rights Watch argues, the “war has had a profound impact on the psycho-social health of Burundians, [and has] desensitized people to the use of violence as a means to resolve problems, including those related to land, property, or family disputes” (2010:35). Moreover, as the elections approached, political violence also became more common as several clashes between the youth wing of the ruling party and opposition parties, mainly from the FNL and Frodebu, were reported in the urban areas.<sup>50</sup>

A last factor that is believed to influence relations between both groups negatively is the legacy of looted goods. This manifests itself through conflicts over land for example, and while this is more common in the interior of the country, the legacy of the war left similar problems in Bujumbura as the crisis of 1972 has left

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<sup>49</sup> The wide availability of arms is confirmed by other research. As a report from the International Crisis group states: “As a result of the war years, arms are widely held among Burundi’s civilian population. (...) weapons are used ever more frequently in the attacks that are now a feature of life in the capital and other large towns in daytime as well as at night” (ICG 2010:17).

<sup>50</sup> The ruling party, the CNDD-FDD, seemed to fear that it would lose its majority in parliament, and therefore tried to cling to its privileged position through “militia violence and a large-scale intimidation campaign” (ICG 2010: i). The mobilization and manipulation of youth into these militias concerned many NGO’s, as the strategies of the CNDD-FDD were mainly comprised of an emphasis on ethnicity and the mobilization of support through unrealistic promises and intimidation. For more information, see the report of the International Crisis Group (ICG) 2010.

many houses occupied by the Tutsi, when most of the Hutu had fled the city.<sup>51</sup> The crisis of 1993 left similar problems, as looted goods are sometimes still found in the Tutsi neighbourhoods. The pillaging of houses, especially the houses belonging to the Hutu population as the majority fled during the latest war, left many goods circulating in different, mostly Tutsi neighbourhoods. The visibility of these goods can therefore exert a negative influence on local relations, as they serve as a constant negative 'reminder' of ethnic tensions.

In sum, local NGO's mainly try to stimulate the 'attainment' or 'restoration' of relationships between the two ethnic groups through contact, education and the distribution of information. Some specific societal practices and influences also seem to contribute to this process: the practice of apologies, the values of the *bashingantahe* and religious values appear to be particularly important in this respect.

However, local youth in Bujumbura also defined some factors that seem to impede this process. The pervasiveness of criminality, poverty, political violence and a legacy of looted goods were all perceived to cause instability and hinder a process of reconciliation. Besides the legacy of looted goods, these factors are mainly believed to stem from the societal or political level.

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<sup>51</sup> This is still perceived as causing tensions between the two groups, as it serves as an indefinite negative reminder of the slaughter of the educated class of Hutu's back then. As commented by one respondent: *'Until today. I will give the example of Bujumbura,..It is clear, because 93 didn't give any land problems... But 72, all the houses were occupied by the Tutsi... that is already directly an ethnic problem. Because they have taken the houses when the others fled. Give me back my house because you have taken it by force when I fled'* (Benevolencija, 07-04-2010).

### 3. The Effectiveness and Impact of Local Mechanisms and Factors on the Process of Reconciliation among Youth

The question now remains whether the methods used by NGO's and the practices and mechanisms that have been defined on a local level, are sufficiently able to stimulate the transformation of former antagonistic relationships into more positive ones. This final chapter of the first part of this research will therefore evaluate the impact of the current local methods that are used to promote reconciliation on a grassroots level. The evaluation of the extent to which reconciliation among local youth takes root, and the analysis of the relative impact of the methods, practices and factors that stimulate or impede this process provides insights in the processes or methods that can be stimulated further and reveal certain factors that undermine this process and require further attention or measures.

This chapter will first evaluate the current extent of reconciliation among local youth in the Northern neighbourhoods of Bujumbura. It will analyze the relations that have been established and consider the mechanisms that have positively contributed to this process. To achieve this aim, it will evaluate the psychological changes on this level and the extent to which adversary beliefs and attitudes have altered and interpersonal trust and cooperation are established. However, as displayed supra, some factors can be considered detrimental to this process. As several factors stem from the different levels in the Burundian society, the second part of this chapter will analyze the impact of the factors that stem from the different societal levels on the process of reconciliation among local youth. In other words, while focussing on a grassroots level of youth and by taking this level as a point of departure, the analysis distinguishing multiple levels and conceiving reconciliation as a process of 'system change', enables a concrete evaluation of the levels that need attention and select the factors that need to be addressed to (further) facilitate and reinforce a process of reconciliation among local youth.

#### 3.1 Post-conflict Relations among Local Youth

As contended in the theoretical overview of reconciliation, the process of reconciliation on a grassroots level constitutes a change in attitudes and beliefs between former adversaries to create a minimum level of trust, cooperation and reliance between them. At a minimum this would translate into non-violent coexistence, while the absence of stereotypes, negative attitudes towards the other group and sincere friendships and cooperation would signify a greater degree of reconciliation. Since the conflict divided mainly along ethnic lines, relationships among youth across the ethnic division are the main focus of reconciliation. However, as will be seen, economic divisions also run deep through local communities and affect social relations negatively.

To start with, violence between the two ethnic groups is practically absent as absolutely no incidents are being reported on violence between the two groups. Moreover, everybody assured me that there will never again be a war along ethnic lines.<sup>52</sup> While this is certainly a positive sign, perceptions on the extent to which reconciliation has taken root differed among different age groups.

A large part of the younger generation, beneath twenty-five years old, expressed a profound exhaustion of latest violence and a specific desire to move beyond ethnicity. Indeed, the youth beneath twenty-five years old seemed to have made a great leap beyond ethnicity by establishing sincere friendships with individuals across the ethnic divide. These changes of attitude and established friendships were mainly facilitated by 'contact' but religious values, practices of apologies, the values of the bashingantahe underlying these practices and education seemed to have had some beneficial effects as well.

Frequent contact seemed the most influential factor in the establishment of cooperative relations among youth from different ethnic backgrounds. Schools were often cited as an important 'meeting point', but the Centre Jeunes Kamenge was considered as most influential. Here they would take classes together, sport together, organise together and even drink a beer afterwards. As one respondent told me:

*'So the centre facilitates this (reconciliation) ... in what situation... for example, on all the terrains that are here, we all come to play together... me for example, here on the volleyball field, I play with soldiers... we manage to play together'*

(Twenty years old man from Kinama).<sup>53</sup>

Also, the centre offered some material compensation to local youth as houses were reconstructed or build during the 'camp de travail', and notebooks and pencils were sometimes distributed.<sup>54</sup> Moreover, the centre offered youth a place where they felt useful and valued. It was therefore often cited that if it wasn't for the centre, they would be living on the streets and would have joined a 'ligala'.<sup>55</sup>

Contact influenced their beliefs about past violence, as they came to consider ethnicity to be a false attribute that should never again provoke violence. Without exception, *all* the youth perceived politicians as guilty of past violence as they have manipulated or 'tricked' the population into believing that their ethnicity was worth fighting for. This shared 'truth' often displayed a uniting effect since it increased sympathy across ethnic lines as it was believed that they have all been deceived and suffer from the consequences.<sup>56</sup> Moreover,

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<sup>52</sup>As was for example stated by a twenty years old man from Kinama ; *'Ce n'est pas un problème, maintenant, il n'arrivera pas une guerre de Hutu et Tutsi, non il n'arrivera jamais. C'est une guerre de partis politiques'*. The main reason why this violence has halted is logically the conclusion of the war. On a grassroots level however, the methods and mechanisms accounting for the cessation of violence between the two ethnic groups are similar to the ones described below. As the improved relations minimally translate into the cessation of violence, the mechanisms and methods that foster trust between former enemies have also contributed to the termination of violence on a grassroots level.

<sup>53</sup> Translated from French: *'Alors la centre a fait cela (la réconciliation) dans quelle situation.. par exemple, tous les terrains qui sont ici, on arrive tous à jouer ensemble.. par exemple moi, ici dans le terrain de volleyball, je joue avec les soldats.. on arrive à jouer ensemble'* (Twenty years old man from Kinama)

<sup>54</sup> As a twenty-one years old man from Kinama stated: *'So we started living in a new city.. and find money to construct our house.. and thanks to the centre.. because we were listed, they helped us, and gave us bricks. We live in that house thanks to the centre. I started visiting the centre in 2005.. and I thank the centre always.. Because the life I am living now, is really thanks to the centre. Otherwise I could have been a child living on the streets'*.

<sup>55</sup> 'Ligala' refers to local youth gangs: groups of young man hanging out on the streets, drinking and smoking marihuana, and often involved in petty crimes. 'Ligalas' are often associated with violence in the beginning of the war, as "gangs of youth hanging out in 'ligalas' undertook many of the brutal killings" during those years (Uvin 2009:100).

<sup>56</sup> As a 24 years old man from Cibitoke argued: *'C'est la situation socio-économique.. il y a le peuple qui souffre. Il y des gents qui ont faim. Par exemple, les gents qui fréquent le centre, les gents qui étaient dans la rébellion, les démobilisés. Ils*

it facilitated contact and the acceptance of former offenders as they considered everyone to be a victim of this manipulation. Individuals who still hold on to ethnicity are perceived as extremists or politicians, and are therefore conceived to be outside the normal realm (Uvin 2009:172). And even more so, now that everybody knows they have been manipulated, they will refuse to be manipulated again (Uvin 2009:158).

Education also had a significant effect on the decrease of the use of violence among youth as education is perceived as their only way out of poverty. Local youth valued education very highly, displayed a strong motivation to 'belong to the system' and refused to risk the potential education offers by indulging in violence (Uvin, 2009:91).<sup>57</sup> This capacity to think critically is fortified by the distribution of independent news, and was visible as political manipulation was several times refuted as youth could see that the promises made could never be realized.<sup>58</sup>

The occurring practice of apology further stimulates reconciliation among youth as it encourages them to accept past acts of violence. This is actually one of the most characterizing features of the Burundian post-conflict culture and constitutes the main coping mechanism of Burundian youth. When former offenders approach a victim to offer apologies, pardon is almost always granted and small restitutions from former offenders acknowledge their guilt to some extent and therefore foster acceptance. This practice and acceptance is partly influenced by religion, as it distributes values of pardon and forgiveness,<sup>59</sup> and is partly influenced by the values of the *bashingantahe*, as it has institutionalized reconciliation as a process to restore relations.<sup>60</sup> However, this 'flexibility', understood as a capacity to compromise and maintain appearances, is

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*les avaient dit, allez combattre, allez combattre les Tutsi. Quand nous sommes au pouvoir, vous seriez des administrateurs. Vous serez des parlementaires. Et maintenant, vous ou ils sont. Ils sont rien. (...) et les gents qui ont dit 'allez combattre', ils ont des voitures, des enfants qui étudier a l'étranger, il est la au parlement il ne dit rien. Il fait construire les belles maisons partout, tu vois ? Ils ont profité. Mais c'est nous qui avait combattu pour ca. (...) et c'est la même avec les jeunes ici, des sans échec etc. il voit le gents qui disait qu'il fallait se protéger, qui fallait combattre... qu'est-ce que on a maintenant. On n'a rien. (...) On a menti, on a promis des choses (...) Ils n'ont rien.'*

<sup>57</sup> The value of education to youth can be illustrated with this quote of a young man; 'And when it is war, I take only my uniform and notebook with me, it is like that. Because I know that, there where we go, I will study. So we fled with the others' (Twenty-one years old man from Kinama).

<sup>58</sup> Indeed, a lack of education was often cited to cause a vulnerability to manipulation as 'they can lie to them with the help of means' (21 years old man from Kamenge). Therefore, they are often the ones that are convinced to join political youth militias through promises or a little money.

<sup>59</sup> These values can be found in the attitudes of many youngsters towards former perpetrators, as they often cited the bible or god as a reason they should forgive. As one respondent stated for example: 'Why would he give me anything? Because he killed my mother? No.. Because the bible says.. pardon the others' (twenty-one years old man from Kamenge). Religion also stimulated the capacity of local youth to move on. Moreover, the retrieval of one's religion is often seen as the cause of a change of mentality. As twenty-eight years old woman from Cibitoke explains the integration of former members of 'sans échec' in society: 'The biggest part of these guys has changed... They are born anew, and they have found pardon with Christ.'

<sup>60</sup> As described in the preceding chapter, the *bashingantahe* is the historical Burundian institution that resolved conflicts non-violently. However, the institution has corrupted to some extent as the acceptance of a 'case' became increasingly dependent on the provision of gifts by the conflicting parties, such as beer. Therefore, a large part of the population has lost faith in the institution and the importance of the *bashingantahe* has gradually diminished. Similarly, local youth reported that the institution is rarely consulted in their surroundings. The influence of the reconciliatory powers of the *bashingantahe* itself is therefore minimal on youth in Bujumbura. In contrast, the underlying values of the *bashingantahe* are to a large extent integrated in the Burundian society and still resonate fairly well among youth. As the director of the NGO Benevolencija argued: 'Traditionally, punitive justice is not integrated. Until today, punitive justice is not integrated in the Burundian mentality. Because the Burundians have always preferred, and that has always prevailed, reconciliatory justice... restorative... the *bashingantahe*. It was natural' (07-04-2010). This aspect of the Burundian culture will also be considered in the last chapter, in which attitudes towards justice will be examined.



sometimes cited as a particular Burundian trait.<sup>61</sup> Indeed, several respondents emphasized the need to pardon others, try to forget what has happened and move on. As one respondent stated:

*'We forget everything...we always say that we have to forget the things that have happened in the past, and we have to look and search for the future' (21 years old man from Kinama).*<sup>62</sup>

These factors, mechanisms and methods fostered cooperation among local youth. An accompanying change of attitude and beliefs can be observed among local youth, as stereotypes and distrust diminished through frequent contact.<sup>63</sup>

*'And I also, when I arrived, when I put my first step here at the centre, I participated in some activities, I saw people, and some of them were Tutsi, but, at a certain moment I knew that I could work with him, and with him.. because, it wasn't the same person that I would find on the streets... (...) when you arrive here, we live Hutu and Tutsi together' (twenty years old man from Kinama).*<sup>64</sup>

In sum, relationships across the ethnic divisions among youth younger than twenty-five years old seemed quite sincere and have benefitted from the methods used by local NGO's, such as contact and education. Moreover, local values and practices stimulate these social ties as they contribute to acceptance and stimulate a capacity to move on. Indeed, when you would ask youth on the 'quality' of relations between the two ethnic groups, they would mostly answer positively and say that there is absolutely no problem left between them.<sup>65</sup> However, while a high degree of cooperation characterizes these relations among the younger generation and therefore a minimal level of trust is present, reliance is discernable to a lesser extent as trust often appears not to be profound. As the cause of this applies also to the older generation, this will be discussed below.

While local youth older than twenty-five years was also exposed to these mechanisms and influences, ethnicity did seem to exert a lingering influence on their established relationships.<sup>66</sup> While relations were established and even gave an impression of sincerity, distrust and resentment towards the other ethnicity

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<sup>61</sup> It is sometimes perceived as a specific Burundian trait to conceal true feelings, as they have been described accordingly for a long time. Indeed, this was even stressed by the final report of the international commission of inquiry for Burundi as it is stated that "according to all sources, both national and foreign, it is a Burundian cultural trait to take pride in one's ability to hide one's thoughts and feelings. In general, openness is felt to be a weakness while deceit is socially accepted" (UN 1996: par.244). While a lot of youngsters indeed seemed to value the capacity to move on, it is however questionable if this can be seen as a specific trait as this is a rather essentialist conviction.

<sup>62</sup> Or as another respondent stated for example: *'We only pardon each other and we continue with other things.. let bygones be bygones.'* (twenty one years old man from Kamenge). The importance of 'forgetting' will be elaborated further in chapter 6.1.2. Here it suffices to say that local youth often perceived a profound evaluation of past crimes as an impediment to future progress, as people would linger in their old antagonistic sentiments.

<sup>63</sup> However, some stereotypes still linger among the younger generation as well. These relate mostly to the economic cleavage and will be discussed infra.

<sup>64</sup> Translated from French : *'Et moi aussi, quand je suis arrive, quand j'ai mis mon premier pied ici au centre, j'ai passe certaines activités, je voyais des gens et, certaines de Tutsi, mais, a un certain moment je pu savoir que lui, je peux travailler avec lui et avec lui, parce-que, ce n'est pas la même personne que j'ai trouvé dans la rue. (...) Mais si tu es arrivée ici, on habite Hutu et Tutsi ensemble'.* This change in beliefs and attitudes is also generally visible in the current open climate, in which youngsters talk and joke freely on the topic of ethnicity.

<sup>65</sup> As one randomly picked quotation illustrates: *'It is really fine at the moment. People are friends, we eat together.. we live well together'* (21 years old man from Kinama). This is also confirmed in the study of Peter Uvin (2009:163): with almost no exception, people stated that the relation between the two ethnic groups is good now. However, he also rightly observes that factually this might not be completely true but this is the image most Burundians would like to convey to outsiders.

<sup>66</sup> In the following text, I will often refer to them as the 'older' generation- older than twenty-five- and to youngsters below the age of twenty-five as the 'younger' generation.

were sometimes expressed by this age group. Beliefs that ascribe the beginning of the war to the other ethnic group, stereotypes on their cruelty and anger related to material and physical losses still linger beneath the surface.<sup>67</sup> Moreover, this distrust seemed to surface when tensions in society mounted and in these periods, distrust could be observed. As an employee of the Centre Jeunes Kamenge remarked in relation to social ties among 'older youth':

*'People would say that there is peace, that ethnicity is not visible anymore... but somebody would come in, who would have another ethnicity ... He would change discourse and would talk like there is a police officer or something... So there is something... that stays.'*<sup>68</sup>

Indeed, these relations seemed to be rather born out of necessity than trust and acceptance. It appears that this generation harbours more anger and distrust towards the other ethnic group as they have more consciously and directly experienced latest violence. This is however, not strange as the war has only ended recently and several negative reminders, such as material losses and looted goods, amplify the cognitive proximity of the latest violent clashes.<sup>69</sup> However, as 'flexibility' is valued highly, and relations are perceived as essential, relations *are* established. Relations are nurtured as part of their individual struggle for survival, and feelings of antagonism are therefore stored beneath the surface. In time, and when not interrupted by renewed violence, these relations could solidify as there is a genuine desire visible to move beyond ethnicity and obviate renewed violence. However, it seemed that these hidden aspects tend to surface when the overall security situation deteriorates and tensions rise, as was evident in the period before the elections.<sup>70</sup> It appears

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<sup>67</sup> Among the older generation, there is a slight tendency noticeable to elevate one's own ethnic group in contrast to the other. Sometimes, the other ethnic group is represented more cruel than one's own group as it is contended that the other side has killed all the people from the opposed ethnicity in their neighbourhood, while maintaining that their own ethnic group refrained from this. Moreover, some youngsters described the Tutsi as mean and deceitful while describing their own ethnic group as more honest or non-violent: *'There was really a lot of violence in Cibitoke. The Tutsi would kill the Hutu with a gun, or with knives or machetes. Or with car tires, they would tie up your arms, and put a car tire around your neck and then pour gasoline over you.. And set you on fire. You know, the Hutu are calm, soft people. They wouldn't respond to the violence at first.. But they started asking themselves; if somebody slaps you, should you stay like this (showing face turned) and do nothing? No, at one point they reacted and started using violence, and killing Tutsi'* (thirty-two years old man from Cibitoke).

<sup>68</sup> This is quoted from an interview, at the Centre Jeunes Kamenge, in which she explicitly referred to young man older than twenty-five. To cite the whole part: *'Well I can tell you that.. some who are good friends, tell me directly. But other situation which I have noticed... when be talking to somebody.. and somebody else would arrive, and the one I was talking to stops talking. When the other leaves, he starts talking again. And I didn't get it.. but after I started to understand that, he was from one ethnicity, and the other was from the other ethnicity. And we were talking about a bit delicate things.. About history or about elections. And that happened several times to me..'* (Centre Jeunes Kamenge, 22-04-2010).

<sup>69</sup> As a thirty two years old man from Cibitoke explains: *'..you know.. the ones that were my friends, Tutsi, they have pillaged my house? They have stolen everything.. they have stolen everything from us. Even now, you can see our old doors in Ngagara! They have our doors! And you cannot go and ask them back... Because they will say that they have bought them from someone, so you can do nothing'*.

<sup>70</sup> It appeared from many conversations, mainly with NGO's and researchers, that ethnic antagonisms and distrust became more visible in the current, pre-election period. This was believed to be not only due to the political situation, but also the economic situation. This seemed confirmed by an NGO worker as well. As she explained: *'But, I have seen often as well, in more calm periods, people have friendships and everything [is all right] between Hutu and Tutsi, but when there are changes when things get a bit more tense... on the political level (with the elections) with the elections now, there are those who change their direction a bit. And they say.. yes we are here, we talk. But I could never really be friend with him, I could never really trust him, because he has a different ethnicity'* (Centre Jeunes Kamenge, 22-04-2010).

that the increased insecurity pressures youth into old antagonistic sentiments as a fear to re-live past traumas rises.<sup>71</sup>

While relations among the 'older youth' seem less sincere, the 'younger' generation also displayed a lack of profound trust. Therefore, reliance upon relations across the ethnic division was visible to a lesser extent. It appears that at the same time that relations are established between the different ethnicities, a climate of fear, poverty and insecurity fosters a dynamic that unravels social ties and increases distrust and individualism. The economic cleavages within the society seem to deepen and violence is to a large extent institutionalized and has all but disappeared.

Widespread violence related to banditry, criminality and political violence made fear among local youth pervasive and contributed to a sense of insecurity. As one young man explains the current situation:

*'The majority are thieves (...) they throw a grenade, they kill you instantly. Like that, it is easy. Like a fly. Death here in Burundi.. it's nothing. There is a guy there, he said that we thank god that we are still alive, you see? It is a phrase that we use (because) you could die any moment. That is how we live in Burundi'* (twenty years old man from Kamenge).<sup>72</sup>

The insecurity and fear that develop then, generate an overall sense of helplessness. This is further fortified by a decline in solidarity that many youngsters emphasized. Many young people contended that solidarity was decreasing as people did not help each other anymore and one could therefore only depend on themselves.<sup>73</sup> While this was partly believed to be caused by the war and the subsequent rupture of relations, it is also perceived to be intertwined with the increase in poverty due to political corruption.

Furthermore, the deepening of economic cleavages in society is reflected in the pervasiveness of jealousy on a grassroots level. In combination with the institutionalization of violence, several youngsters contended that jealousy was a main cause of violence and killings. As a twenty-two years old man from Kinama describes:

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<sup>71</sup> This relapse into old sentiments when instability and insecurity increases seems to be a phenomenon that can be observed in different post-conflict situations as well. As Brandon Hamber argues in relation to the widespread violence in South-Africa: "if they are re-victimized, even if this is re-victimization is not political in nature and is purely criminal, their chances of reconciling themselves with the violence of the past remain slim" (1999:124). Therefore, re-victimization and fear seem to have an influence on the level of acceptance of past traumas and, as is observed among older youth in Burundi, can result in an increase in suspicion and distrust towards the other ethnic group, or makes existing distrust surface.

<sup>72</sup> Translated from French : *'la majorité se sont des voleurs.. (...)ils jettent une grenade, il te tue sur le champ. Comme ça, c'est facile. Comme une mouche. Le mort ici en Burundi.. c'est rien. Il y a un garçon là, il a dit que on remercie dieu que on est encore en vie.. tu vois, c'est une phrase qu'on utilise (...parce-que..) tous les moments tu peux mourir. C'est comme ça qu'on vie en Burundi'*.

<sup>73</sup> As a twenty- two years old man from Ngagara argued: *"here is no trust. And people do not help each other. You know, I will tell you a story. You know my house, and that there is another house connected to it. Well we rented it to a family, and one of the sons of the man was one of my good friends. The man was a baker, with 5 children. But he got into problems because the electricity was cut. There was electricity, but not in the morning. So he couldn't bake any bread anymore. And he was getting poorer and poorer..at one point they started selling their chairs. Everything, their furniture. And at one point they couldn't pay the rent anymore (...) But no, we helped them. But others, who were best friends of my friend, they turned their back. They did nothing. They pretended not to notice. So yes, you cannot trust people. (...) There is no love. No trust. I guess it is also about the war. I think ninety percent is because of the war.. It was always like this.. But now it is worse... It is because there is less money. Because you know, before 2005, with Frodebu.. It was fine.. But the CNDD, they took everything.. everything..'*

*' Yes it is only jealousy... Because when you see that your friend has a television, or a nice house... and he's doing fine and is in good health... you think that, why he is like that and you're not. There are even people who give the little thing, poison to kill their friends. (...) They give you poison so you leave your work... for example when you are the director of a company, and I am the vice director. If you are dead then I will get your job, it happens'.<sup>74</sup>*

The individualism that develops from this insecurity and instability is one in which youth perceived that they could only really rely on themselves, and therefore, that a profound trust could not exist.<sup>75</sup> These factors therefore counter the development of trust in general and even cause a retreat in ethnically tainted stereotypes and suspicion among 'older' youth. While reconciliation is taking place on a grassroots level and cooperation between the two ethnic groups is relatively good, profound trust lacks as the destabilizing factors named above contribute to individualism and distrust and fracture established relations in general. While some of it can be related to the legacy of war, as violence has become largely institutionalized and relations have ruptured during that period, they are heavily influenced by the other levels in society. Therefore, the next section will direct its attention to the dynamics between the different levels and analyze the factors that stem from the communal and societal level that have a large impact on the grassroots level.

### 3.2 The Challenge of Justice: the Communal and Political Level

#### *The Communal Level*

A characterizing factor of the community level is that relations that are established on an inter-personal level are hardly reproduced in the different neighbourhoods. While youth played sports together on the terrain of the youth centre, teams in the neighbourhood still seemed to reflect ethnic divisions, as there were teams that were for the large majority Hutu or Tutsi.<sup>76</sup> Similarly, divisions along ethnic line were also visible in public

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<sup>74</sup> A twenty-one years old man from Kinama, told me a similar story: he stated that his father was poisoned to death by a woman in his neighbourhood because she was jealous on his assets. Moreover, other stories, in which someone killed his friend because he stole his girlfriend, or between brothers because they refused to share the land they inherited, were also quite common. Wealth appeared to be the main reason for these killings.

<sup>75</sup> As a twenty- two years old man from Ngagara argued: *"here is no trust. And people do not help each other. You know, I will tell you a story. You know my house, and that there is another house connected to it. Well we rented it to a family, and one of the sons of the man was one of my good friends. The man was a baker, with 5 children. But he got into problems because the electricity was cut. There was electricity, but not in the morning. So he couldn't bake any bread anymore. And he was getting poorer and poorer..at one point they started selling their chairs. Everything, their furniture. And at one point they couldn't pay they rent anymore (...) But no, we helped them. But others, who were best friends of my friend, they turned their back. They did nothing. They pretended not to notice. So yes, you cannot trust people. (...) There is no love. No trust. I guess it is also about the war. I think ninety percent is because of the war.. It was always like this.. But now it is worse... It is because there is less money. Because you know, before 2005, with Frodebu.. It was fine.. But the CNDD, they took everything.. everything..'*

<sup>76</sup> As a twenty years old man from Kamenge entrusted me : *'...des ethnies seulement.. en fait tu peux le voir si.. par exemple, quand les équipes de football.. il y a des équipes de Tutsi seulement.. quand tu es Hutu tu ne peux pas jouer la bas. Les équipes de basketball.. tu ne peux pas jouer la bas parce-que tu es Tutsi et il y a seulement des Hutu .., dans le quartier. Par exemple nous, on a un autre équipe de football, je pense que tous les majoritaire sont de Hutu.. on a je pense deux ou trois Tutsi. Et la, c'est comme ca que ca marche. Il y a aussi un autre équipe de football la bas que se sont seulement des Tutsi (...) en Ngagara.. Aucun Hutu n'est dans leur équipe. Donc si tu vois les choses comme ca tu peux distinguer que les différentes ethnies existe encore.'* He continues: *'...Même dans un cabaret tu peux trouver.. vous êtes en tous entrain de boire une bière.. tu vois un groupe comme ca, qui boivent seulement c'est un groupe des Hutu.. tu ne peux pas aller rapprocher. S'ils a tes amis tu peux rapprocher et parler.. C'est comme ca, mais si tu es un Tutsi et tu viens dans*

venues such as bars and dancing's. Therefore, ethnic segregation seems to still characterize the communal reality.

Indeed, reconciliation on a community level seemed to be lacking as most youth argued that not everybody in their community could accept, since feelings of hurt lingered 'in their hearts' (21 years old man from Kamenge). Stereotypes on economic inequality are reproduced at a communal level as differences between the different 'quartiers' constitute a visible proof for many that economic inequality still exists between the two ethnic groups.<sup>77</sup> Moreover, the decline in solidarity as observed on a grassroots level originates mainly on the communal level as it is, besides the economic argument, a consequence of the rupture of relations in society:

*'it is a question of solidarity. (...) before the war, really there was solidarity. Now, after the war, relations are distorted and there is little solidarity left... Because, before the war we lived together. We lived, Hutu and Tutsi together'* (twenty-eight years old woman from Cibitoke).

While on an interpersonal level relations are established, the communal level does not reflect this change in attitudes, and distrust and segregation seem to linger.<sup>78</sup> This suggests that, while attitudes change and stereotypes diminish through dialogue and contact on a grassroots level, community structures and values are less flexible. Old antagonistic communal structures and fears at a minimum contain the degree of reconciliation among local youth, as relations are not reproduced at this level.

At a maximum however, lingering stereotypes and antagonism influence interpersonal relations. Indeed, it can very well be that these communal feelings are mirrored in the retreat to more averse attitudes among older youth in periods of insecurity. As Spinner-Halev argues: "In periods of group violence, it is difficult to retreat from communal feelings" (2003:57). While violence between the two ethnic groups is currently not the case, insecurity does seem to cause a 'retreat into communal feelings' of ethnic separation and suspicion. Therefore, it seems that the community level accounts for some of the aspects that destabilize the process of reconciliation that can be found among local youth.

However, as the different levels are interrelated, the grassroots level also affects the community level. This can be remarked, for example, in the extensive number of local civil society organizations that promote inter-ethnic dialogue and cooperation and spring from established inter-personal ties. As described in chapter two, these organizations promote reconciliation among the different communities and can therefore be seen as 'seeds' of community reconciliation. However, as an explicit focus on community reconciliation lacks since they are mainly directed at interpersonal reconciliation, they are not sufficiently able to directly facilitate

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*un cabaret, et tu vois dans cette table il y a des Hutus, ah moi je ne peux pas aller la, je vais la ou il y a des gents de mon ethnie.'*

<sup>77</sup> The perceived inequality between the two ethnic groups is often believed to be represented in the different 'quartiers'. The majority Tutsi neighbourhood, Ngagara, appears to be better off than the other neighbourhoods: the houses are nicer, a part of this neighbourhood is paved, and people have a little more money to spend. Youth coming from Ngagara perceived criminality as often directed at their neighbourhood, as they were often considered as wealthier, as a twenty-two years old man from Ngagara argued: *'They are mostly from Kamenge. Because it is close to Ngagara and they are poor, they are hungry. And they think there is a lot of money in Ngagara'*.

<sup>78</sup> Ethnic segregation is also still visible in the composition of the different neighbourhoods. Ngagara is still perceived to be a Tutsi neighbourhood. Similarly, Kamenge and Kinama are believed to be predominantly Hutu. However, this is not to say that they are exclusively composed of one ethnic group as some intermingling can be observed. Cibitoke is, as historically has been the case, still comprised of both ethnic groups.

communal reconciliation.<sup>79</sup> Indeed, as will be discussed below, factors that stem from the political or societal level seem to impede this process further.

### *The Political Level*

The societal or political level hinders reconciliation to a large extent. Indeed, most youngsters pointed at this level when analyzing the roots of the main problems in society. Moreover, some even explicitly added that reconciliation should mainly focus on this level.<sup>80</sup>

The main problems that stem from this level are related to political violence, the absence of the rule of law, widespread corruption and social inequality. Several reforms have been implemented, as a result of which power sharing is now a fact on the political level, the security sector has been extensively reformed, and several reforms have taken place on a social and economic level.<sup>81</sup> While some of these reforms have facilitated reconciliation on a grassroots level, as the war has halted, educational facilities have expanded and a climate of free speech has been more or less established, current governmental practices have considerable detrimental effects on the process of reconciliation among local youth.

Political violence constitutes one of the political driven factors that negatively affect a process of reconciliation among local youth. As youth from a Hutu background was almost continuously subjected to political harassment, fear within their community mounted and shattered social ties and trust.<sup>82</sup> It mainly divided the two predominantly Hutu neighbourhoods in Bujumbura, notably in Kamenge where there is a lot

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<sup>79</sup> This logically flows from the arguments as presented above: as interpersonal ties are generally not reproduced at a community level, the community appears to change little or not. However, the representation of interpersonal ties in civil society organizations can be seen as reflecting 'seeds' of change as some relations attempt to establish representation on a community level. To effectively change the community level, however, programs might be better designed to affect the community level, such as *communal* dialogues for example. Naturally, influences from and to the political level can also be discerned. While civil society organizations do try to influence the political level, the actual effects of these attempts seem meager at most. Therefore, I will not elaborate this link in detail.

<sup>80</sup> Focus group discussion on impunity (8-04-2010).

<sup>81</sup> The Arusha agreements brought several changes on the political level, including the power-sharing agreement in which was determined that in the executive branch of the government, at least forty percent of the ministerial post are reserved for Tutsis. This quota applied as well to the 'parliament, political parties, state-run businesses, and the security and armed forces' (Specker et al. 2010:17). As for social reforms, "free primary education and medical care for pregnant woman and children up to five" were important (Speck et al. 2010:14). On the economic level, several efforts have been taken to decrease corruption and reduce state intervention.

<sup>82</sup> The fear that currently exists on a grassroots level of youth is mostly comprised of fear among one ethnic group, the Hutu. The current 'war' that is going on, is a war between 'brothers' as they described it as a battle between political parties from an original Hutu background. As an employee from the Centre Jeunes Kamen described these harassments: *'for example a lot of people have a bird tattooed here (on arm) and that is the sign of the CNDD... As they, the CNDD, looks at you and you show your tattoo they leave you alone.. but when you hide it they think you might have changed sides and then they will harass you like.. you, you are FNL etc.. So harassments like this. And they ask you.. you you are Hutu, you are CNDD or FNL?'* (Centre Jeunes Kamenge, 22-04-2010). Sometimes I got the sense that this 'war' was far more confusing to them, especially the Hutu. The same was found by the 'Centre d'Alerte et de Prévention des Conflits' who quoted some respondents saying *"a war between the Hutu and Tutsi is better than between Hutu"* (CENAP, 2008:24). Moreover, it diminished their sense of self-worth as they often got the feeling that they have been misled and that 'their' political party does nothing but using violence for their own gain. Therefore they sometimes think of the Hutu, their own ethnicity, as worthless. As a twenty years old man from Kinama explains: *'Maintenant il y a des jeunes que se bagarre toujours parce que, son ami n'est pas dans un parti (...) Les tutsi sont vraiment des gents qui sont sérieux et qu'ont une grande intelligence. Une bonne intelligence. alors, demande toi, pourquoi en Ngagara, on ne se bagarre pas.. Pourquoi a Cibitoke on ne se bagarre pas ? Parce-que, en Kamenge et Kinama toujours.. Ok, demande toi, en Mutankura, jamais, a Kiriri on a vu jamais, a Kinindo, jamais, jamais jamais.. ici'*.

of support for the CNDD-FDD, and in Kinama where the majority supports the FNL. Youngsters displayed an increasing fear to express their party preference, as political killings were not uncommon.<sup>83</sup> Moreover, feelings of deception were explicitly strong among them as they felt abandoned by 'their' government.<sup>84</sup> Therefore, a sense of victimization, desperation and anger prevailed among youth from these neighbourhoods.

The widespread occurrence of violence combined with the absence of the rule of law contributes to the legitimacy of the usage of violence. The institutionalization of violence is also apparent in incidents of vigilantism or murders out of jealousy on a grassroots level. As twenty-eight years old woman from Cibitoke told me:

*'You know, last week in Ngagara, they have killed a police officer... People have killed a police officer. Because he had stolen something.'*

This kind of 'mob justice' does not seem incidental as many incidents were reported throughout the country.<sup>85</sup> These include the most horrific kinds of killings such as burning a person alive or the torturing and mutilation of people before they were finally killed (HRW 2010:2). Most people stated that they thought it was justified as a severe anger among the population on the corruption of the justice system and the police formed the main driver: most youth stated that they would often see a criminal released in less than three days or not being prosecuted at all.<sup>86</sup> Therefore, it was perceived as more efficient to immediately kill the thief.<sup>87</sup>

The absence of the rule of law and the continuing use of violence by politicians shatters mutual trust as fear and suspicion rise. These feelings of helplessness are further exacerbated by the economic situation. The widespread corruption and patronage that characterizes the current government are believed to cause the dire poverty most youth live in.<sup>88</sup> Indeed, especially vertical inequality is on the rise, as the new political elite exploits public resources for their own benefit.<sup>89</sup> This cleavage between rich and poor is most salient in the

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<sup>83</sup> As a twenty-one year old man from Kinama stated; *'the ones there, who are with the CNDD (...)they want the others to join the CNDD.. they ask you to join them and if you refuse.. or when you stay with another party, and they know that you are with the FNL.. If you speak badly about them..they will come and look for you in the night, and they will kill you'*.

<sup>84</sup> Insecurity about the future leaves many young man a bit desperate. As another young man explains: *'les rêves qu'il avait va devenir détruit. Alors la, oui, Par exemple, (...) moi j'ai un rêve de construire des maisons.. J'arrive à trouver de l'argent : quand je la construis, je commence par la fondation, je vais monter au moins vingt briques.. et ca tombe. (pourquoi ?) Eh, soit le vent, soit la celée, il y a des choses que tu touches, ce n'arrive pas. (...) Je pense que tu trouve, tu perds, tu trouve tu perds, ca te donne le désespérer. Et alors (...) les rêves que tu as fais vont être détruit. Donc je travaille pour l'argent que je gagne, la tu travailles sans espoir'* (Twenty years old man from Kinama).

<sup>85</sup> Human Rights Watch has documented 'at least 74 killings through vigilantism in Burundi in 2009, and at minimum another 59 (incidents) in which victims were injured' (HRW 2010:2).

<sup>86</sup> The corruption of the judicial system surfaced in several interviews, As appeared from a focus group discussion on impunity: *'Quand tu as une tante ou un frère bien placé, il peut convaincre le juge est il ferme le dossier. Ce n'est pas commande par le droit. (...) Quand tu as l'argent tu es privilégié par rapport à les pauvres'* (8-04-2010).

<sup>87</sup> However, one important addition is in place here. While killings of vengeance occurred during or immediately after the latest war, these kinds of killings are almost non-existent in the current situation. This means that killings as a result of grievances caused by the war do not occur anymore, and that local killings between the two ethnic groups are practically absent (focus group discussion on impunity- 8-04-2010).

<sup>88</sup> Indeed, as Specker at all. note, "the politization of economic policy can be witnessed in the ruling elites 'ambivalence towards broad-based and sustainable development (...) in present-day Burundi, questions are still being raised over emerging inequalities, worsening corruption and short-sighted political approaches to economic policy" (2010:11).

While the cycles of conflict in Burundi have logically caused a large share of the economy to collapse, current policies seem to further contribute to this economic breakdown (Specker et al, 2010:12).

<sup>89</sup> As Specker et al. explain: "public employment remains the only stable source of income, and political access the only means of obtaining a job in the public sector. So long as the prospects for prosperity and influence outside politics remains

capital as wealth from politicians is highly visible through the proximity of their luxurious villas surrounded with high wired fences. Therefore, especially in these areas, “resentment at the privileges enjoyed by the national elites is palpable” (Specker et al. 2010:13).<sup>90</sup>

Indeed, while stereotypes still exists, the factual cleavage appears not to be between the two ethnic groups, but between the political class and the bottom class.<sup>91</sup> However, it does reinforce old stereotypes as a large part of the Hutu population is unable to improve their living conditions as a result of political patronage.<sup>92</sup> Moreover, it creates a population that is very vulnerable to political manipulation as they perceive that there is no social justice, and that study and hard work will not necessarily improve their economic position. This is even more so in the Northern neighbourhoods, especially Kamenge, Kinama and Cibitoke, as they have suffered most from the war and are particularly neglected by economic programs, even though these neighbourhoods need them the most (CENAP 2008:55).

In sum, the societal level accounts for several problems that destabilize the process of reconciliation on a grassroots level. The political level facilitates and even stimulates violence on a grassroots level, as the rule of law is practically absent and political violence is encouraged. Moreover, economic cleavages are fortified through corruption and a lack of developmental programs and provide incentives for violence. While this violence and economic inequality is not specifically located between the different ethnic groups, it does touch upon the ethnic component as they reinforce historic stereotypes and cause a relapse into old antagonistic sentiments. The same effects of these factors can be discerned on a communal level, as political violence divides former more or less united communities and poverty contributes to a decline in solidarity among communities. Therefore, while deepening the economic cleavage, available ethnic antagonistic sentiments are reinforced on a communal level as it fuel a general increase in individualism and distrust.

Returning to the depiction of reconciliation as a process of ‘system’ change, it can be said that the communal and societal level still require extensive efforts to reconcile. This reality is effectively captured by the statement of an employee from the Centre Jeunes Kamenge:

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dismal (...) politicians will naturally do everything in their power to exploit the levers of the state for their own benefit, or even ‘capture’ the state” (2010: 15).

<sup>90</sup> Indeed, the exposure of such wealth and power by former rebels is sometimes believed to directly influence the process of grassroots reconciliation among youth. As an employee from the Centre Jeunes Kamenge stated : *‘il ne peut pas se sentir a l’aise si la plupart qui ont fait des bêtises dans les années passées ils sont encore au pouvoir, ils sont dans les beaux quartiers. La population ne peut pas se sentir réconcilier comme ça’* (22-04-2010).

<sup>91</sup> While some hint at the economic divide between the two social groups, many expressed the feeling that the current biggest economic divide is between the political class and the bottom. Indeed, the behaviour of the political elite was more than once heavily criticized as they perceived the government as extremely corrupt and selfish. It was emphasized several times that both the Hutu and the Tutsi suffered the same economic hardships as a result of ‘looting’ politicians.

<sup>92</sup> It was often contended by local youth that you needed to be a member of the ruling political party to get a job. While provision of education to all groups in society has slightly improved the position of the Hutu, both mentally and in reality, stereotypes on economic superiority of the Tutsi seem to endure. This has a strong historical component as the former exclusion of the Hutu from the educational system, and therefore from actually every economic position, has produced and reproduced Tutsi dominance for years, the most violent of which was the murder of all intellectual Hutu in 1972. However, the factual economic image of the two groups is more nuanced. The average income of both Hutu and Tutsi in the rural areas is roughly the same and it seems that the real difference lies between the top one percent of society and the rest (Uvin, 2009:85).



*'there is a real sentiment of change at the basis. But according to me, here in Burundi, it is not really the population who can decide the future of the country. Because, in theory it should be like that, but in reality it is not like that. Because I, I cannot change, I cannot take the future of the country in my own hands when I do not have faith, no means,... without a structure that helps them.'* (22-04-2010).

Both levels considerably influence the process of reconciliation among local youth as they exert a containing or destabilizing effect on this process. The locus where these three levels convert is therefore most problematic: as the political level exerts significant negative influences on the communal and grassroots level and the communal level, in turn, contains the extent of reconciliation on a grassroots level, the locus of interaction between these three levels fracture grassroots level processes of inter-personal reconciliation and decrease trust among local youth. The lack of social and economic justice, understood as the equal distribution of opportunities and resources, political justice, associated with the “government’s ability to provide basic services, a low degree of corruption and a commitment to good governance and responsible leadership”, and the absence of legal justice therefore comprise the main challenges to local processes of reconciliation among youth (Lambourne 2009: 41, 44).<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Socio-economic justice however, also comprises the “material compensation for past violations”(Lambourne, 2009:41). This will be elaborated further in chapter six.

## PART I- Partial Conclusions

Before moving on to the question if one of the main instruments of transitional justice could further contribute to peace, a short summary of the findings of this first part is in place.

In the first chapter, the concept of reconciliation was clarified to provide a framework through which the reconciliatory practices and methods on the level of youth in the Northern neighbourhoods of Bujumbura could be analyzed. Reconciliation was defined as a process, comprising multiple levels and consisting of multiple mechanisms. Indeed, this definition appeared to be roughly congruent with signification of reconciliation to local youth. Moreover, reconciliation, located between the two ethnicities and different economic classes, was valued very highly.

Several methods, practices and influences that positively affected reconciliation among youth were illuminated in the second chapter. The methods that were used mainly comprised contact, education and the distribution of impartial information. Practices of apologies and small restitutions between offenders and victims were highlighted and several influences such as religious values and the underlying values of the *bashingantahe* were selected. However, some negative influences appeared to affect the grassroots process as well such as (political) violence, the absence of the rule of law, corruption and poverty.

The third chapter analyzed the impact of these measures on the process of reconciliation among local youth. Contact, education, material compensation, religious values and practices of apologies appeared to be quite effective in stimulating cooperative relations and a minimum degree of trust, especially among the 'younger' youth. Furthermore, education and the distribution of impartial information combined with contact resulted in a reduction of stereotypes, and empowered youth to resist violence and political manipulation.

Indeed, it can be concluded that a process of reconciliation *is* taking place on a grassroots level, and that the methods used and the practices available are quite effective in the stimulation of this process among youth beneath twenty-five years old. While youth older than twenty-five years appears to be hindered to some extent as relations among them, across the ethnic division, are less based on acceptance and trust, relations *are* established and, if confidence is not again betrayed through renewed violence, are able to fortify and survive. Indeed, would this level have been disconnected to the different levels of society, it could have been said that current mechanisms and practices were sufficiently able to stimulate reconciliation among local youth.

Unfortunately, however, the grassroots level cannot be perceived as a separate entity: several practices and factors exerted by the communal and societal level affect these relations negatively and risk their disruption. Communal practices of ethnic segregation, politically stimulated violence and poverty all contribute to a climate of individualism and declining solidarity and trust, not only between ethnicities but also between economic classes. The resentment, anger and despair that can be felt among local youth in situations of increasing instability fuels a dynamic that is quite likely to dismantle social ties. Indeed, this is reflected in a rising jealousy, incidents of 'mob justice' and a retreat in antagonistic stereotypes. In the end, it appears that methods and practices used on a grassroots level cannot secure a process of reconciliation

among youth as political manipulation, violence and corruption continue unabated. To return to the depiction of reconciliation as a process of 'system' change, it can be said that the communal and particularly the societal level still need to change significantly to guard and fortify established relations on a grassroots level. Indeed, on the political level the challenge of different forms of justice appears to be greatest.

## PART II – The Expected Impact of Instruments of Transitional Justice

### *Introduction to Part Two.*

As already hinted at in the introduction to this thesis, a combination of the two main instruments of transitional justice is suggested to deal effectively with the legacy of mass violence in Burundi. This comprises a combination of an (inter)national criminal tribunal and an (inter) national truth and reconciliation commission. However, the supposed effectiveness of the two instruments is contested, as different instances in which these mechanisms have been implemented display mixed results.

While the first part of this thesis has analyzed the existing local methods and practices that are currently used to foster societal repair on a grassroots level of youth in Bujumbura, this part directs itself to the national level and aims to understand which academic and political arguments can be given to support the implementation of one of the two main mechanisms of transitional justice. While these instruments have not yet been established in Burundi, and therefore an analysis of their practical effectiveness is impossible, the suspected impact of such an instrument can be analyzed according to the academic and political arguments that are brought forward to support or discourage their implementation. These arguments can be drawn from preceding post-conflict situations in which the effects and impact of the implementation of a mechanism of transitional justice are more or less known.<sup>94</sup> Moreover, the congruency of the underlying assumptions of these instruments with the culture, customs and needs of local youth in Bujumbura can be evaluated. In the end, this will all contribute to a better understanding of the expected results of an instrument of transitional justice and its anticipated contribution to peace.

Before analyzing the assumed contribution of (inter)national criminal tribunals and (inter) national truth and reconciliation commissions to peace, it is necessary to develop a more accurate understanding of the meaning of 'transitional justice' as it is a contested concept. Therefore, the concept, as understood in the academic as well as in the political debate concerning the specific post-conflict context of Burundi, will be clarified in chapter four. Chapter five will continue with the academic debate on the assumed relation of the two main mechanisms with peace and reconciliation, and will present arguments derived from actual post-conflict cases. The final chapter of this part will analyze the perspectives of local youth on the two mechanisms after which conclusions will be drawn regarding the expected effects of these instruments to achieve a durable peace in Burundi.

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<sup>94</sup> There has been an array of studies to the effects of (inter) national criminal tribunals and (inter)national truth and reconciliation commissions. However, it is difficult to measure the impact of such a national endeavor, as it is often uncertain if the effects measured are produced only by a tribunal or commission or are influenced by the specific circumstances of the society in question. Therefore, the impact is still subject to continuing debate. For the effects of truth commissions on victims, peace and reconciliation, see for example; Hamber et al. 2000; Shaw 2007; Stevens 2005; and Van Zyl 1999. Studies on the effects of (inter)national criminal tribunals on peace and reconciliation include; Aukerman, 2002; Burnet 2008; Fletcher and Weinstein 2002; Meernik 2005; Goldstone 1995; and Lambourne 2009.

## 4. Transitional Justice

This chapter will focus on the clarification of the concept of transitional justice, as this concept is increasingly being called for in post-conflict situations. However, the concept is a little misleading as it comprises several theories and strategies. Moreover, the assumed contribution of a mechanism of transitional justice to peace is often contested. The first section of this chapter will therefore be dedicated to an introduction and clarification of the concept and its assumed contribution to peace, while the second section will highlight the specific political debate on the process of transitional justice in Burundi.

### 4.1 Transitional Justice: Multiple Definitions.

As Ruti Teitel argues, “transitional justice can be defined as the conception of justice associated with periods of political change” (2003:69). As the concept already hints at, it is concerned with a *transition* and comprises the question as to how the violations committed in the past should be dealt with. The need to remember and deal with the past now forms a global paradigm as “in the transitional justice discourse, revisiting the past is understood as the way to move forward” (Teitel 2003:86). While the concept used to refer to legal justice alone, the concept has expanded to include other mechanisms and conceptions of justice.

The concept emerged after the Second World War as the horrors of the Holocaust caused a large share of people to embrace the words ‘never again’ (Minow 1999:429). The Nuremberg trials marked the first instance of transitional justice in which past abuses were confronted “as part of [a] major political transformation” and which expressed the perceived need to deal with the past to assure the prevention of future abuses (Cole 2007:117).<sup>95</sup> The subsequent rise of countries embarking on a transition to democracy at the end of the Cold War increased the salience of the concept, as questions rose on the way the legacy of crimes and repression of the former regime should be dealt with to provide closure to the past and legitimacy to the future. However, while the Nuremberg trials were confined to a strict legal approach to justice, and aimed at punishment alone, the transitional justice discourse altered in this period and became to rely more on “diverse rule-of-law understandings tied to a particular political community and local conditions” (Teitel 2003:71). As governments in Latin America struggled with dominant national militaries, the former prevalent international legal approach was questioned and replaced by alternative mechanisms for “truth seeking and accountability” (Teitel 2003:77).<sup>96</sup> Moreover, the emphasis on punishment decreased and the goals and

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<sup>95</sup> These abuses mostly encompass the most heinous crimes including crimes against humanity, war crimes and acts of genocide. While explicit claims were made about the deterrent function of these trials, Teitel correctly notes that the “Nuremberg prosecution was primarily intended to justify and legitimate Allied intervention in the war” (2003:73).

<sup>96</sup> Indeed, at this point the apparent controversy between retributive and restorative justice, as referred to in chapter one, became visible. While some argued that a retributive approach, embodied in trials, were necessary to establish a durable peace, others preferred a restorative approach to justice and argued for the implementation of truth

pretensions of transitional justice mechanisms stretched to include not only the rule of law but also aspirations such as “legitimacy, liberalization, nation building, reconciliation, and conflict resolution” (Teitel 2005:2).

Currently, transitional justice comprises several methods and theories. As the United Nations defines the concept:

“The notion of transitional justice [...] comprises the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof” (UN, 2004:4).<sup>97</sup>

Similarly, Roht-Arriaza defines transitional justice as “that set of practices, mechanisms and concerns that arise following a period of conflict, civil strife or repression, and that are aimed directly at confronting and dealing with past violations of human rights and humanitarian law” (2006: 2). As the definition slowly expanded to also include ‘practices’ and ‘concerns’, the array of mechanisms available expanded as well. While the main mechanisms of transitional justice comprise (inter) national criminal tribunals and (inter) national truth commissions or a combination thereof, other mechanisms are often cited as well. These mechanisms include ‘reparations, institutional reform and long-term development, restitutions, public gestures of commemoration through the creation of monuments, memorials and holidays, as well as other educational and cultural activities, efforts towards reconciliation, and public deliberation’ (Cole 2007:117, Bickford 2004:1045).

The ‘transitional justice’ paradigm, thus relies solidly on the conviction that dealing with the past on a national level is imperative to founding a better future, as it is seen to provide insights on the ‘wrongfulness’ of past repression and violence and therefore provides a guarantee to prevent the history from repeating itself. The process itself is therefore inherently backward-looking, as it comprises an exploration of the past, but also forward- looking as it aims to secure a better future through its contribution to reconciliation and peace. Indeed, it is often believed that a process of transitional justice would contribute to peace and societal repair through the accountability the provide, the revelation of the truth, the acknowledgement it brings to victims, and the deterrence it fosters through the strengthening of the rule of law (Goldstone 1996:485; Orentlicher 2007:15). However, other scholars remain sceptical on the aspirations of such a process and claim that in some instances, taking the specific political and social dynamics of a society into account, some mechanisms of transitional justice can be even detrimental to the establishment of a durable peace (Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003:6). Before illuminating these perceptions on the effectiveness of the different instruments

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commissions to foster peace. The assumptions underlying these different instruments will be delineated in the following chapter.

<sup>97</sup> In this report of the United Nations Security Council, it is further stated that a durable peace cannot be reached without the rule of law: “Our experience in the past decade has demonstrated clearly that the consolidation of peace in the immediate post-conflict period, as well as the maintenance of peace in the long term, cannot be achieved unless the population is confident that redress for grievances can be obtained through legitimate structures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the fair administration of justice”. The strengthening of the rule of law would occur through the implementation of a mechanism of transitional justice (UN 2004:3).

of transitional justice, the political debate regarding the transitional justice process in Burundi will be briefly introduced.

#### 4.2. Transitional Justice in Burundi.

The introduction to this thesis already hinted at the hybrid mechanism of transitional justice that is envisaged for Burundi. The overall conviction was that when the past would not be dealt with “only a tenuous, temporary pause in the violence” would be achieved. Indeed, instruments of transitional justice were incorporated in the peace negotiations and explicit attention was given to these aspects of the planned transition in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of 2000.

As stated in the agreement, an international judicial commission of inquiry (ICJI) to investigate allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide should be enacted and subsequently, if the report of this commission would confirm the occurrence of these crimes, a request for the establishment of an international criminal tribunal would be issued by the government of Burundi (Arusha 2000:32). Furthermore, the agreement provided for the implementation of a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that would be charged with the clarification of history and the investigation, arbitration and reconciliation of former crimes (Arusha 2000: 22).<sup>98</sup> Other measures that can be related to the transitional justice paradigm were included in the agreement as well, such as reforms of the judicial, political, economic and security sector, the establishment of a national commemoration day and a national monument, and the provision of peace education to the population, especially to youth.<sup>99</sup>

The report of the UN assessment mission that was issued in 2005, argued that the mandate of the two mechanisms –the TRC and the IJCI- would overlap and it was therefore suggested to combine both mechanisms in a hybrid structure (Kalomoh report 2005:1). This structure would consist of single Truth Commission<sup>100</sup> combined with a “judicial accountability mechanism in the form of a Special Chamber within the court system of Burundi, composed of national and foreign judges” (Vandeginste 2009:407).

The objectives of this hybrid structure were expressed by the Security Council in resolution 1606. The implementation of these instruments were perceived essential to “consolidate peace and reconciliation in Burundi”, and to “establish the truth, investigate the crimes, and identify and bring to justice those bearing the greatest responsibility for crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Burundi since independence, to deter future crimes of this nature, and to bring an end to the climate of impunity, in Burundi and in the region of the Great Lakes of Africa as a whole” (UN 2005a).

The incorporation of mechanisms to deal with the past in the Arusha agreements, and the successive rounds of negotiation on the implementation of these mechanisms display the imminent focus on transitional justice

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<sup>98</sup> For more information on the different responsibilities and constraints of the judicial commission of inquiry and the national truth and reconciliation commission as envisaged in the Arusha agreements, see Stef Vandeginste 2009.

<sup>99</sup> See, 'Accord D'Arusha pour la Paix et la Reconciliation au Burundi'(28-08-2000), Chapitre II. art.6. par,3,7,8.

<sup>100</sup> The 'Commission Nationale pour la Vérité et la Réconciliation' (CNVR).

to establish a durable peace in Burundi.<sup>101</sup> Up to this day, however, none of these suggested instruments have been put into practice as severe disagreements exist as to which course has to be taken; while the United Nations retains their position that the most heinous crimes should not go unpunished, the government of Burundi seems to prioritize ‘reconciliation’ over trials and argues that ‘the conclusions drawn from the consultation process should logically determine Burundi’s transitional justice policy’, even if this entails conditional amnesties for the most serious crimes (Vandeginste 2009:22, note 58).<sup>102</sup> Next to these official positions, latest research suggests that the majority of the Burundian population actually prefers to ‘forgive and forget’ and a process of transitional justice, as originally envisaged, may therefore “have little purchase in Burundi” (Samii 2009:11; Uvin 2009:168).

These different positions on the issue of transitional justice in Burundi invoke questions on the nature and aspirations of a transitional justice process. As seen above, the process of transitional justice as designed for Burundi is considered essential to peace and reconciliation. However, while a common conviction exists that past mass atrocities should be dealt with to effectively achieve a transition to (a democratic) peace, opinions differ on the assumptions and capabilities of such a national process. The next chapter will examine the assumed contribution of the two main instruments of transitional justice to reconciliation and peace, and will illuminate the specific assumptions underlying the (inter)national criminal tribunals and (inter)national truth and reconciliation commissions. However, it will also review the arguments that challenge these assumptions.

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<sup>101</sup> After the assessment mission of the UN to determine the feasibility of an international judicial commission of inquiry, that resulted in the Kalomoh report, rounds of negotiation between the government of Burundi and the United Nations have taken place in 2006 and 2007. The negotiations have now been suspended as a process of national consultations was initiated by the Burundian government to determine the course of the transitional justice process (Vandeginste 2009:408).

<sup>102</sup> Again, these include crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. However, as the report on the national consultations, in which the opinion of the Burundian population on the preferred course of action should be expressed, is still pending, the stance of the government remains difficult to determine and the future trajectory of the country remains fairly vague.



## 5. The Two Main Instruments of Transitional Justice

The preceding chapter described that several instruments are covered by the concept transitional justice. The most commonly used and cited instruments are (international) criminal tribunals, truth and reconciliation commissions or a combination thereof, the so-called hybrid courts. However, an array of other, sometimes more modest, instruments can be included as well and as was revealed supra, such measures were indeed included in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation agreement.

This chapter will mainly be directed at the academic debate surrounding the perceived effectiveness of the two main instruments of transitional justice. Each section will therefore begin with an evaluation of the supportive arguments, followed by the main critiques. Where possible the arguments will be founded upon real cases, as these can function as examples through which the obstacles and constraints regarding the implementation of such an instrument in Burundi can be derived. Moreover, besides the expected effects of these instruments on a political level, the effects on relations on a grassroots level will be examined. As is seen in the preceding part of this thesis, several factors that hinder reconciliation on a grassroots level are located in the societal or political level. It is therefore important to also take this national level into account.

### 5.1 (Inter) National Criminal Tribunals

Several International criminal tribunals have been implemented to stimulate post-conflict recovery such as the international tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the international criminal tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and hybrid courts such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the ad-hoc Court for East Timor. These courts have been established specifically to enhance peace.<sup>103</sup>

The need for punitive or retributive justice in a transitional context is mainly derived from the “claimed ability [of international law] to both promote peace, security and justice because it deters, exacts retribution, gives victims dignity and effects reconciliation through (historical) truth-finding” (Brants 2007 :203).<sup>104</sup>

The punishment of those responsible for mass atrocities exerts a strong moral condemnation and effectuates the rule of law. Prosecutions set the example that ‘nobody can go unpunished’ and as Diane Orentlicher points out;

“the case for prosecutions turns on the consequences *of failing* to punish atrocious crimes committed by a prior regime on a sweeping scale. If law is unavailable to punish widespread brutality of the recent past, what lesson can be offered for the future? A complete failure of enforcement vitiates the authority of law itself, sapping its power to deter proscribed conduct” (1990:2542).

International criminal tribunals thus set an example for the future, and are believed to have a deterrent value as offenders relinquish their desire to commit a crime because of the imminent threat of punishment.

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<sup>103</sup> As, for example stated in Resolution 827, adopted by the security council on the 25<sup>th</sup> of May 1993 (S/RES/827): “*Convinced* that in the particular circumstances of the former Yugoslavia the establishment as an ad hoc measure by the council of an international tribunal and the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law would enable this aim to be achieved and would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace”.

<sup>104</sup> Also see Orentlicher (1990) arguing for the need to prosecute mass atrocities under international law.

The functions of deterrence are usually divided in general and individual deterrence. Individual deterrence refers to the establishment of penalties severe enough to ensure that offenders will not re-offend (Aukerman 2002:63). General deterrence implies that punishment prevents future crimes by inducing the public to refrain from committing crimes out of fear for the law, but also out of respect for the law and the acceptance of the moral value it exerts. The government of Rwanda emphasized exactly this point when arguing for the implementation of an international criminal tribunal as “the Rwandese representative emphasized that those “who were taught that it was acceptable to kill as long as the victim was from a different ethnic group or from an opposition party, cannot arrive at national reconciliation unless they learn new values” (Akhavan 1996:504-505).<sup>105</sup> This goal then, was to be achieved through the implementation of a tribunal that would “help national reconciliation and the construction of a new society based on social justice and respect for the fundamental rights of the human person” (Akhavan 1996:505). In other words, it would strengthen the rule of law.

Furthermore, the provision of the truth is considered an essential aspect in establishing peace. The ability of criminal tribunals to provide a factual and truthful account of the past is considered necessary to counter denial of atrocities and prohibit the growth of competing narratives (Shaw 2007: 190). Moreover, the accompanying guilt that is established through punishment diminishes the tendency to assign blame to whole communities or ethnic and religious groups, as guilt is firmly redirected towards accused individuals.<sup>106</sup>

Lastly, proponents of punishment after mass atrocities often cite the acknowledgment it brings to victims. Since those most responsible are punished, victims might feel that their suffering is recognized and find acceptance. In other words, it “channels the demands for vengeance” as personal retribution might follow when no action is taken to punish the culpable (Aukerman 2002:60).

However, as Snyder and Vinjamuri point out, the effects of trials on the political level can have a detrimental effect on peace. A national process of transitional justice focuses, caused by a limited capacity to prosecute all the crimes committed, mainly on the ones responsible for mass atrocities. It therefore risks targeting political opponents and subsequently heightens the chances on new military coups or insurrections (Siegel 1998:438). Moreover, the value and power of a national criminal process lies in the norms it diffuses towards the society as a whole. A process of transitional justice seeks to achieve conformity with a (international) norm through the “naming and shaming” of violators (Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003:9). However, some argue that it is exactly the other way around and that the “prevailing pattern of political power and institutions shapes behaviour in ways that are difficult to change simply through normative persuasion” (Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003:11). As Gray notes “an abusive regime is defined by social norms, a particular ontology, and a historical teleology that,

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<sup>105</sup> Other reasons that were mentioned by the Rwandan government include; the genocide in Rwanda was perceived as a crime against mankind and should therefore be of concern for the whole international community, the involvement of the international community was perceived as crucial to avoid accusations of partial justice, and lastly, an international criminal tribunal would facilitate the prosecution of perpetrators that had fled to other countries (Akhavan 1996: 504-505).

<sup>106</sup> As Goldstone notes, the accusation of whole groups is often a consequence of lingering interstate conflicts. He recalls: “during my visits to the former Yugoslavia, and particularly Belgrade, I was astounded at the manner in which Serbs I met were consumed by their historical hatred of Croats. (...) It was no different in Zagreb or Sarajevo where collective guilt was ascribed to Serbs or Muslims, as the case may be” (1995:488-489).

operating through official state agents, constructs a public face of law that sanctions and organizes violence perpetrated by institutional actors and private citizens” (2006:2623). While crimes are the exception to the norm in stable democratic states, ‘targeted abuse is the norm in an abusive regime’ and compliance with this norm becomes a normal code of conduct.<sup>107</sup> The institutionalization of violence by the previous ‘abusive regime’ cannot be curbed by the external diffusion of new moral norms by a criminal tribunal, but must be preceded by the support and acceptance of these norms by the “dominant political coalition in the social milieu in which they are to be applied” (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2003:13). In this perspective, ‘justice does not lead, but it follows’ as effective bargaining between political elites provides the basis of strong administrative institutions and political coalitions which can contain the power of the so-called ‘spoilers’ (Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003:6). Therefore, criminal trials will only garner positive effects if the countries institutions are sufficiently strong, the ruling political elite have a progressive mentality and spoilers are weak.<sup>108</sup> If not, such a process could only be detrimental to a durable peace as leaders might try to retain their influence through violence and resistance when threatened with prosecution and punishment.<sup>109</sup>

Besides the political oppositions trials can incite, recent examples suggest that the effects of trials on relationships on a local level are doubtful at most.<sup>110</sup> The failure of international criminal tribunals to positively affect local communities is often ascribed to the lack of resources, limited time span, distance of the

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<sup>107</sup> As Gray (2006:2632) argues, “institutions that organize abuse reflect a deeper social ethos”, and often present a historical narrative that portrays violence as necessary and rational. Examples include the Holocaust, which was preceded by a compelling narrative that “foretold a complete eradication of European Jews” and was subsequently institutionalized and enforced by “bureaucratic, executive and military agents” (Gray 2006:2633). Similarly, mass violence in Bosnia and Rwanda was incited by dehumanizing and historical narratives that incited and allowed neighbors to slaughter neighbors. An explicit expression of the power of historical narratives can be found in Rwanda where the dead bodies of Tutsi that washed up the shores of lake Kivu and Lake Victoria, were ‘send back’ to Ethiopia as they were believed to be coming from the North according to the ‘Hamitic myth’ (Gourevitch 1998:47-62; Gray 2006:2633).

<sup>108</sup> Indeed, As Snyder and Vinjamuri conclude, “trials are most effective in cases where legal institutions are already fairly well established, and therefore where the demonstration effect of trials is least needed. In a number of cases, for example, domestic trials have taken place well after rights-respecting democratic regimes were firmly installed (as in Germany and Poland in the 1990s, or in Greece after the fall of the junta in 1974)” (2003:25).

<sup>109</sup> Many commentators feared this kind of renewed violence in Uganda after the indictment of LRA leaders by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Some feared a renewal of violence since the indictment of the ICC would pressure the government of Uganda into a military offensive which would result in increased violence on the side of the LRA, which would mainly include the targeting of civilians. The Ugandan government was believed to resort to violence since the ICC does not have the means to enforce the arrest warrant and therefore relies on the cooperation of the specific state. This led Adam Branch to state that: “the execution of the arrest warrants would require a dramatic intensification of the government’s counterinsurgency in order to capture the LRA leaders” (2004:25). Others argued that the indictments effectively closed off every chance that the LRA would negotiate a solution to the conflict non-violently, as it would impede the LRA to return to the negotiation table (Branch, 2004:24).

<sup>110</sup> The transitional justice process in Rwanda is often described as partial and as victor’s justice, and the accompanying *Gacaca* process is even reported to have exacerbated conflict in local communities, as it resulted in “a culture of accusatory practices” among locals (Burnet 2008:173). As the judicial system was overburdened, it failed to identify false accusations, and “increasing numbers of people have brought false charges for their own interests” mostly at the *Gacaca* hearings (Des Forges 1999:754). However, the Rwandan government has also effectively coerced the international tribunal to refrain from prosecuting RPF members. For those reasons the transitional justice process in Rwanda has often been called ‘victor’s justice because only Hutu’s have been prosecuted (Waldorf 2006:62). Feeling of injustice linger and are even amplified by the process and causes cleavages between Hutu and Tutsi to deepen (Burnet 2008:188). The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia also receives mixed references, as some claim that it has effectively halted violence and established peace while others find ‘little evidence to support the notion that the ICTY had a positive impact on societal peace in Bosnia [as] in more instances the effect was the opposite of that intended [and] ethnic groups responded with increased hostility toward one another after an arrest or judgment’ (Meernik 2005:287).

population in question and the lack of trained personnel.<sup>111</sup> The post-conflict landscape is often characterized by institutional breakdown, a comprised or malfunctioning judiciary, extreme poverty and mass complicity in the crimes committed. Therefore trials are necessarily selective, as the prosecution of all perpetrators is practically impossible (Meernik 2005:277).

The individualization of guilt might therefore “contribute to a myth of collective innocence’ (Fletcher and Weinstein 2002:580).<sup>112</sup> Since mass atrocities are often characterised by the involvement of many ‘average’ citizens, a myth of collective innocence impedes the evaluation of own, individual roles. War crime trials may then be perceived as a confirmation of the victimization of one’s own group and results in contrasting interpretations of the factual truth<sup>113</sup> As Fletcher and Weinstein note regarding the case of the former Yugoslavia:

”Instead of being “convinced” that war crimes were perpetrated in their name by the opinions issued by the Tribunal, participants felt free to disregard any aspect of the judicial “record” that did not conform to their perspective on the “truth” of what happened during the war (...) the record is a useful foil in the hands of political propagandists to solidify a sense that their national group is a misunderstood or unacknowledged victim of the conflict” (2002:601).

The claim that the acknowledgement trials provide to victims would enable victims to accept their suffering and ‘heal’ is also often questioned. While some may experience short term benefits from trials, for others criminal accountability “may not be most significant for healing” as healing is a long-term process (Fletcher and Weinstein 2002: 594).<sup>114</sup> The extent to which it provides relief to victims is heavily dependent on culture and context as it determines perspectives on the cause and meaning of catastrophic events. Moreover, cultural practices and beliefs influence the perception on the desirability of punishment as visions of justice differ greatly between societies. While legal justice is provided by trials, other forms of justice, such as socioeconomic or political justice might be more relevant to a particular society.<sup>115</sup> In the case of Sierra Leone, for example, the material reconstruction of livelihoods was considered crucial in the context of healing

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<sup>111</sup> International criminal tribunals are often based in countries other than the affected society: the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is based in the Hague and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is based in Tanzania. These ad hoc tribunals have often been criticized “for having little or no impact on the local populations because of their distance from the affected societies” (Stensrud 2009:5).

<sup>112</sup> This is exactly what Fletcher and Weinstein found in their study of perspectives and attitudes in Bosnia, as “one of the most striking findings of the study was that universally individuals identified their national group as victims. (...) they looked to war crimes trials to reaffirm the victimization of their own national group. There was no evidence that respondents acknowledged that war crimes were committed in their name” (Fletcher and Weinstein 2002:580-581).

<sup>113</sup> This was the case in Bosnia. As a study to the attitudes and perception of judges and prosecutors in Bosnia revealed, Bosnians tended to perceive the trials as prove of their own victimization. For further information, see the study executed by the Human Rights Centre, 2000. Also see, Fletcher and Weinstein. 2002.

<sup>114</sup> The importance of testimony to healing is derived from the trauma literature that “suggests that victims who are able to recount the events of their victimization in the context of acknowledgment and support may be able to receive the benefits of closure” (Fletcher and Weinstein 2002:593). This argument is expressed by among others, Roth-Arriaza (1995) and Crocker (1999).

<sup>115</sup> As contended before, political justice, points at the ‘ability of a government to provide basic services to its population, the absence of large-scale corruption, and an apparent commitment to good governance and political leadership’ while socioeconomic justice incorporates the “various elements of justice that relate to financial or other material compensation, restitution or reparation for past violations or crimes (historical justice) and distributive or socioeconomic justice in the future (prospective justice)” (Lambourne 2009:41, 44).

since the war had left a legacy of poverty and diminished economic opportunities.<sup>116</sup> International criminal tribunals are often perceived as a waste of money as they are conceived as a theatre of wealth “with its international funding, its foreign Commissioners and consultants, its national media presence and its white, logo-bearing Land Cruisers” (Shaw 2007:197). Moreover, prison conditions and sentences are sometimes perceived as ‘luxurious’ in comparison with the domestic situation (Burnet 2008:175).<sup>117</sup> As little or none of this perceived wealth reaches the population and even worse, if the small amounts of punishments that are executed are considered too soft, this might rather be perceived as unjust.

Furthermore, as trials are necessary selective, several victims might not see their perpetrator convicted.<sup>118</sup> This ‘selectiveness’ makes trials highly sensitive to accusations of partiality. When mass atrocities that have taken place are the result of long standing animosities between groups and a perceived suffering on both sides, this sensibility becomes even more apparent. The prosecution of an offender might be perceived as radically unfair to one group, as they might have regarded their struggle as fair and legitimate because of past oppression and suffering. Perceived ‘victors’ justice might be the result. Alvarez notes that in Rwanda for example, “the majority of the thousands detained in Rwanda’s jail today report, and perhaps genuinely feel, that they have done nothing wrong and are being victimized because they were at the ‘wrong side’ of the war” (1999:468). The legitimacy, credibility and impartiality of trials may diminish greatly in local perceptions and therefore curb the positive ‘moral’ effects a trial could have on the population, and might even further cycles of violence since acts of vengeance might be provoked (Aukerman 2002:61).<sup>119</sup> The legitimacy of a tribunal, conceived as the “acceptance and support for the courts and their jurisdiction among the population in general and stakeholder groups”, is crucial as the internalization and acceptance of the norms exerted by the tribunal depend on it. If a tribunal is perceived as illegitimate, the actions of the tribunal are similarly considered deferrable and will barely have impact on local perceptions and relations.

The above overview entails specific consequences for societies wishing to pursue a process of transitional justice through trials. While (inter)national criminal tribunals can have a beneficial impact on peace and societal repair through the strong moral condemnation they exert, their deterrent value, the acknowledgement they provide to victims and the individual accountability they stimulate, their contribution

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<sup>116</sup> As Shaw notes however, “‘forgetting,’ healing and reconciliation (*kol at*) were built upon a foundation of material reconstruction” (2007:204). She recalls a conversation with a woman who had lived through horrific experiences in the Sierra Leonean war, and explains her motivations for testifying: “by participating in this national and international forum, she had hoped to become part of a circuit connecting her to the national and international resources that would help her rebuild her life and raise her children. *This*, rather than the reliving of her memories of mutilation and death, would bring about healing” (Shaw 2007:205). This argument is also presented by Wessels et al. who argue that “economic and physical reconstruction can help to build a sense of control and hope, both of which provide a bridge from a painful past to a more positive future” (2000:101).

<sup>117</sup> In Rwanda the tribunal was perceived as rather ‘unjust’ since the penalties provided by the ICTR and the comfortable prison conditions contrasted the situation in Rwanda in which the death penalty was still retained and were detainees faced “miserable living conditions and [a] lack of adequate food and water” (Burnet 2008:175).

<sup>118</sup> This is even more so with the so-called hybrid courts than the international criminal tribunals. Only ten persons have been on trial in the hybrid court in Sierra Leone while the ICTR indicted seventy-four individuals and the ICTY indicted hundred and sixty-one individuals (Stensrud 2009:9).

<sup>119</sup> As is seen in the case of Rwanda. Prosecutions in the aftermath of the genocide have often been called ‘victor’s justice because only Hutu’s have been prosecuted (Waldorf 2006:62). This easily invokes feeling of injustice and provides incentives for vengeance. This is not uncommon since only a few perpetrators can be tried and convicted.

to peace depends on the society in question. Firstly, the strength of the institutions and capacity of a particular society are of crucial importance to the ability of trials to enhance peace. When institutions are weak, extremists linger on both sides, and violence is institutionalized into society there is a large risk that trials contribute to a recurrence of violence. Secondly, the strength of an international tribunal depends highly on the expectations and perceptions of the wider population. It depends on the general conceptualization of justice, the specific cultural practices, needs and beliefs that exist in a post-conflict society.

## 5.2 (Inter) National Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

Truth commissions are national investigative bodies that create an overall account of a past period of time in which certain human rights violations have taken place.<sup>120</sup> In contrast to criminal tribunals that rely on a retributive approach to justice, truth commissions are founded on a restorative approach to justice. In these tribunals, victims and perpetrators of mass atrocities express their views, interests and emotions and are stimulated to restore their relationship. They are often accompanied by amnesties to secure fragile peace agreements, secure confessions and reveal the complete truth.<sup>121</sup> However these amnesties are often designed according to the South African model, in which amnesties are conditioned by certain criteria such as “the full disclosure of the crimes” committed (van Zyl 1999:651). If these criteria were not met, perpetrators could be prosecuted.

While proponents of punishment mostly consider them to be the ‘next best alternative’ if trials are practically impossible due to political constraints, several scholars emphasize their functionality and importance to peace, and sometimes consider them to be superior to trials (Kaye 1997:693; van Zyl 1999: 651-653).

Truth and reconciliation commissions are believed to contribute to peace through the contextual account of the past they provide, the accountability they promote, the restoration of the dignity of victims and through their contribution to deterrence and rehabilitation. The Truth and Reconciliation commission of South Africa marked the beginning of an era in which this instrument of transitional justice gained importance.<sup>122</sup> As stated in the South African Interim Constitution, the aim of the transition was to provide a:

“Secure foundation for the people of South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past which generated gross violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and the legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge. These can now be addressed on the basis that

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<sup>120</sup> This instrument of transitional justice has been frequently implemented. As Nagy states: “To date, there have been at least 21 truth commissions around the world, including in Argentina, Chile, Guatemala and South Africa. Truth commissions are being established in Nigeria and Sierra Leone [and] there is also growing courtship with the idea of truth and reconciliation for Rwanda, Bosnia, Ghana and Indonesia” (2002:323).

<sup>121</sup> One of the most cited examples of a Truth Commission is South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In this Commission, conditional amnesties were used to secure the disclosure of the truth. Perpetrators could only apply for amnesties if they would reveal a full account of the crimes committed (Van Zyl 1999).

<sup>122</sup> There are many different forms and types of Truth and Reconciliation commissions (see Hayner 1994). However, South Africa’s TRC is often taken as an example for other commissions.

there is a need for understanding, but not vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for *ubuntu* but not victimization” (1993, act 200).<sup>123</sup>

The need for restorative justice, which “shifts [...] the perception of a crime [to] violations against human beings”, instead of retributive justice, which perceives a crime as directed against the state, is emphasized in this instrument of transitional justice (South African TRC 1998). Truth commissions aim at the collective determination of a new shared moral through the revelation of the past, the definition of crimes and the illumination of the social environment that allowed or encouraged these violations. The exposure of the complete truth is believed to encourage the shared acceptance of a common history. This ‘shared memory’ would acknowledge the suffering of all the people in the nation, and would therefore contribute to a sense of unity and healing.<sup>124</sup>

However, it is not merely the public disclosure of the truth that is most important as it is the moral condemnation of past violence that represents the rupture with the past. The official acknowledgement of the occurrence of human rights abuses and, more important, ‘its wrongfulness’, “narrows the moral space that previously permitted their occurrence” (van Zyl 1999:658).

The national revelation of the truth is believed to have several beneficial effects. Firstly, a national truth telling process would restore the dignity of victims and stimulate their acceptance of past suffering. The ability of victims to recount their experiences in public and receive sympathy to their bearings is often thought of as a crucial element in their ‘healing’ process, as they feel their suffering is acknowledged (Crocker 2000:6; van Zyl 1999:659). The explicit inclusion of both perpetrators and victims in the process to display the differing perspectives on both sides, allows the victim to understand why an offense is committed and thus provides insights in the context of the crime and might partly restore an ‘image of humanity’ of the perpetrator. Moreover, former disappearance and murders can be illuminated through the provision of the truth and permits victims to find closure.

Secondly, the public nature of the truth telling process would promote accountability of the perpetrators, as their wrongful acts are revealed on a national level. It therefore includes a sort of retributive element since the national display of one’s crimes results in ‘public shaming’.<sup>125</sup> It is believed that the confrontation with the harm done to victims and ‘public shaming’ have a deterrent effect on former perpetrators as they are

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<sup>123</sup> Postamble of the South African Interim Constitution. “Ubuntu” means “humanity” and expresses a sense of inclusion of all people (Villa-Vicencio 2000:219, note 67).

<sup>124</sup> As Desmond Tutu emphasized at the start of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission: “We are meant to be a part of the process of the healing of our nation, of our people, all of us, since every South African has to some extent or other been traumatised. We are a wounded people...We all stand in need of healing” (December 16, 1995).

<sup>125</sup> As Crocker states: “In Argentina, those named by that country’s truth commission report, *Nunca Mas* [Never Again], have been subject to social stigmatization. Fellow citizens shun former military leaders and publicly express opprobrium by public cursing and spitting. In South Africa perpetrators from many walks of life – including doctors and scientists as well as police and military personnel – have to face their own families who, prior to truth commission hearings, may have had no idea that their spouses or parents were complicitous in horrendous acts” (2000:8).

stimulated to accept and recognize their guilt.<sup>126</sup> However, the culpability that is promoted is far broader than 'the narrow legalistic definitions of guilt' (van Zyl 1999:667). While guilt is partly individualized since offenders are required to confess, guilt is also directed at passive bystanders and supporters as the whole socializing logic behind the violence is revealed. It therefore stimulates everyone to evaluate their roles.<sup>127</sup> Moreover, myths of collective guilt are refuted since acts of heroism and opposition to the logic of violence are revealed.<sup>128</sup> The reduction of possibilities to direct blame towards a whole group or community stimulates a reduction of stereotypes and fears between groups, and might therefore contribute to reconciliation.

Lastly, (inter) national truth and reconciliation commissions are particularly capable of identifying areas of reform as they are directed at "discerning overall patterns, institutional context, and, to a lesser extent, the general causes and consequences of atrocities" (Crocker 2000:4). The determination of the social and economic causes of the eruption of mass violence enables truth commissions to recommend reforms of these sectors to prevent future violence. The Timor Leste commission for example, "dedicated a whole chapter of its final report to economic and social rights violations, stressing that the impact of the conditions in which the people of East Timor lived, while often less remarked on, was equally damaging and possibly more long lasting than violations of their physical integrity and civil and political rights" (Arbour 2007:14). Therefore, truth commissions have concluded with recommendations "covering military and police reform, the strengthening of democratic institutions, measures to promote national reconciliation, reparation to victims of the violence, or reforms of the judicial system" (Hayner 1994:609). These recommendations of reform are capable of transforming existing inequalities and further social justice, an element that is crucial for post conflict reconstruction (Arbour 2007:20).

The importance of reparations and restitutions are increasingly emphasized in post-conflict transitions as they are believed to stimulate acceptance among victims. While reparations, compensations or restitutions where usually bound to legal conceptions, mostly understood as 'corrective justice', "the framework of corrective justice 'strains' and is unable to achieve its goal in situations of mass violence, as it aims primarily at the correction of the wrong done to a victim while many "serious harms and injustices, (...) create losses that are not literally compensable at all" (Walker 2006:384). The restorative paradigm, however, views reparations and restitutions as symbolic and instrumental means to reconciliation, and therefore de-emphasizes the required proportionality of the compensation. Besides individual economic compensation reparations can include "community-wide reparations, symbolic reparations (e.g. public gestures, acts of recognition, memorials etc.), reparations in the form of services like health and education [and the] restitution

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<sup>126</sup> Morris argues that there is extensive evidence that recidivism rates diminish after a restorative justice process, even more than after 'normal' criminal procedures (2002:606).

<sup>127</sup> The South African Truth and reconciliation commission exerted this aim as they emphasized the need of "a moral and spiritual renaissance capable of transforming moral indifference, denial, paralyzing guilt and unacknowledged shame into personal and social responsibility"(1998:592).

<sup>128</sup> As Crocker notes: "Unlike judicial efforts to determine legal guilt or innocence, official investigatory bodies also can profile examples of moral heroism in the face of barbarism. Proponents of a truth commission for Bosnia, for example, emphasize the role of such a body in profiling Serbs that aided their Muslim neighbors (and vice versa)" (2000:4). The reduction of collective guilt is in this case, in contrast to trials, founded on the innocence or even heroism of some individuals belonging to a community. It therefore does not entail a 'collective innocence' as described in the former paragraph, as individuals are still stimulated to evaluate their own roles.



of citizen rights” (Laplante and Theidon 2007:234).<sup>129</sup> Besides the material and economic function of reparations, reparations in the context of truth commissions are believed provide a powerful symbol and therefore stimulate acceptance and hope (Laplante and Theidon 2007:234).<sup>130</sup> As Laplante and Theidon argue in relation to Peru, “reparations play a central role in satisfying victims-survivors’ expectations of justice and redressing the serious harm caused them by structural injustices and political violence” (2007:234).

Regarding the elements described above, some scholars argue that (inter)national truth and reconciliation commissions serve peace more than trials do. Indeed, they stimulate a society-wide acceptance of past suffering and have an explicit forward-looking component as they are capable to determine necessary structural reforms. However, the reviews of this instrument are not undisputed and display a mixed record of success.

Since truth commissions often include amnesties, the risk of provoking political opposition and renewed violence is fairly small. However truth commissions are even more susceptible to political manipulation than (inter) national criminal tribunals, as the truth that is produced is not the result of a judicial impartial fact finding process.<sup>131</sup> The truth that is produced relies on multiple differing perceptions of past abuses and includes multiple truths, each of them susceptible to opposition. Therefore, different narratives can still be used to incite opposition or strengthen feelings of victimization among certain groups within society.<sup>132</sup> Moreover, since truth commissions are directed at the exposure of past abuses, “it is easy for a new government to justify not being subject to the investigations of the commission and any current abuses are therefore conveniently overlooked” (Hayner 1994: 608). Truth commissions then function to provide legitimacy to a new (possibly abusive) regime without necessarily reflecting a real desire for change. The usage of a truth commission as a political tool is “particularly likely when a government is under international pressure to improve its human rights record”, as was the case in Uganda and Chad where brutal rule continued after truth commissions had finished their work (Hayner 1994: 608).<sup>133</sup> Therefore, truth commissions do not

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<sup>129</sup> The Program of Integral Reparations (PIR), as designed by the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, has been the largest up till now. This program included all the forms of reparations as cited above.

<sup>130</sup> Reparations have been recommended for example, by the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

<sup>131</sup> As Crocker notes, “truth commissions usually lack the power of trials to subpoena and cross-examine witnesses, search and seize evidence, and independently corroborate witness testimony” (2000:5).

<sup>132</sup> As is the case in Guatemala as “a variety of different memories of *la violencia*” exist today, despite (or even because) the efforts of the truth and reconciliation commission (Hatcher 2005:76). As Hatcher states: “the Reports, by labelling Guatemalans as both victims and perpetrators, have in the end legitimized contradictory versions of the past. They made it so that the PACs can demand to be paid for the atrocities they committed and that their demands will be heard and addressed. They had enabled official denial of the Reports’ conclusions regarding genocide. They have made genuine change much harder to accomplish. They have made it so that anyone can claim almost anything about the past, can interpret the past in a wide variety of different ways, and are almost certain to find others who share their beliefs. The Reports have not led to any sort of basic, common understanding of the war as they were meant to do. Rather, they have made this understanding all the more difficult to achieve” (2005:76-77).

<sup>133</sup> International human rights organizations in Uganda pressured Idi Amin to implement a truth commission in 1974. However, Idi Amin ignored the report of the truth commission and continued violating human rights on a massive scale. Similarly, the Commission of Inquiry in Chad (Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes and Misappropriations Committed by Ex-President Habré, His Accomplices and/or Accessories) failed to halt atrocities committed by the government that had issued the commission and led several human rights observers to believe that “the commission was set up to improve the new president’s image”(Hayner 1994:625).

necessarily have a deterrent function on future abuses, especially when the institutional context remains unaffected.<sup>134</sup>

Besides the 'political mask' international truth commission can provide to secure amnesties and legitimize an abusive regime, truth commissions have often failed to translate into lived perceptions on a local level (Arriaza and Roht-Arriaza 2008:152). Several limitations of truth commissions account for this failure.

Firstly, the assumption that a public truth-telling process provides dignity to victims and promotes accountability among perpetrators does not necessarily hold true. Victims might not benefit from public truth telling as they might re-traumatize.<sup>135</sup> Moreover, this might be in drastic contrast to some cultural practices in which forgetting might be more appropriate than speaking out. As Rosalind Shaw argues, the art of forgetting was widely practiced in Sierra Leone:<sup>136</sup>

"Where a TRC is initiated, it will be more effective if it builds upon established practices of healing and reconciliation. In Sierra Leone, the TRC set itself in opposition to widespread local practices of social reconstruction as forgetting by valorizing verbally discursive remembering as the only road to reconciliation and peace" (2005:12).

In this sense, forgetting does not mean "the erasure of personal memories, but their containment in a form that would enable them to recover their lives" (Shaw, 2007:194). A process of national truth telling therefore can be directly opposed to local practices and can cause victims to experience strong feelings of shame, fear for retaliation and re-living past traumas (Shaw 2007:193).<sup>137</sup>

Secondly, the benefits victims receive from a truth in reconciliation commission in relation to certain disappearances and killings might not be fulfilled as certain victims will never receive the truth about their

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<sup>134</sup> Indeed, as Ignatieff (1996) argued when referring to the effects of truth commissions in Latin America: "The record of the truth commissions in Latin America has disillusioned many of those who believed that shared truth was a precondition of social reconciliation. The military and police apparatus survived the inquisition with their legitimacy undermined but their power intact. The societies in question used the truth commissions to indulge in the illusion that they had put the past behind them".

<sup>135</sup> As a study of Hamber et al. (2000) points out, half of the respondents who testified publicly for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa were disappointed and spoke negatively about it. As one respondent said: "I regret it so badly. Since then I'm even scared to walk out in the street because people swear at me, saying that I want to make money from my children's death. I didn't mean it like that. It's just that people decided to believe what they wanted to and I have become so miserable because of my testimony" (cited in Hamber 2000). Similarly, Rosalind Shaw (2007:194) cites that "according to the Trauma Centre for Victims of Violence and Torture in Cape Town, between 50 and 60 percent of those who testified experienced difficulties afterwards, and many regretted testifying". Indeed, the dominant assumption that the verbal recounting of painful memories is beneficial to the victim and that 'forgetting is not an option' is rarely questioned. The importance of this verbal recounting is mainly derived from the "20th century growth of psychoanalysis and psychiatry in which a connection developed between pain [...] and its treatment by verbal processing, which entails the painful narrative recapitulation of traumatic events from the past, [...] as a prerequisite for personal healing" (Shaw 2007:92).

<sup>136</sup> As Shaw explains the desirability of forgetting: "the work of memory is not primarily to store and retrieve information but to create a relationship between oneself and a remembered event or person: the verbal recollection of violent events (especially in public) is undesirable because it makes that violence present and connects it to the person remembering" (2007: 195).

<sup>137</sup> Similarly, cases like post-Franco Spain and Mozambique seem to demonstrate that a process of national truth telling is no prerequisite for peace as both countries have followed the course of what some term official "amnesia" (Mendeloff 2004:367). Public truth telling might not be most important to healing as other factors are considered more important for particular societies. Regarding post-conflict reconstruction in Mozambique for example, Sarah Gibbs (2005:227) argues that the population perceived 'healing' as more closely connected to "the actual physical work of reconstruction following return-such as the building of homes and the planting of fields-[then to] discussions with individuals on or about the traumas of war".

loved ones.<sup>138</sup> Moreover, the restoration of victims' dignity is mainly derived from the acknowledgement of their suffering and thus dependent on the accountability that is taken for past violence. Regarding the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, there was very little evidence of the expected effect of 'public shaming' and the acceptance of accountability on behalf of the perpetrators. As Nagy (2002:332) notes:

"perpetrators justified their actions with reference to the "total onslaught" or "following orders. (...) public shaming presupposes a moral reference group that most perpetrators avoid by isolating themselves happily in their own ethnoracial enclave with similar beliefs" (Adam 1999:146).

Furthermore, a large part of the white South-Africans perceived the TRC to be 'prejudiced against whites and persecutory' and therefore diminished the acceptance of responsibility among them (Duncan 2005:17).<sup>139</sup> Therefore, many white Africans deny or distort the perceptions of violence committed by the Apartheid regime by stating that was 'simply an ill-conceived political system that had gone wrong' (Duncan 2005:18). As Duncan states, this denial "allows for the perpetuation of the deep divisions in South African society" and indeed, racism has all but disappeared (2005:18).

Third, the truth that is presented is necessarily a confined one. Testimonies may be taken from "people who are less affected by the violence, who are more articulate or who are members of organized groups" (Arriaza and Roht-Arriaza 2008:158). The presented truth might therefore not resonate with the lived experiences of locals, as was the case Guatemala and partially in South Africa.<sup>140</sup> As Stevens notes in relation to the process in South Africa:

"What began as an exercise in the establishment of a collective memory also partially translated into distortions of personal memories or personal forgetting. Where the establishment of a collective memory was resisted, those who maintained the integrity of their identity and memories risked incomprehension in the new array of social relationships. The meta-communication embedded within the TRC implied a new form of social marginalization because one either had to *become a member of the new South Africa, or remain alienated within it*" (van der Walt et al. 2003, cited in Stevens 2005:31).

As described above, the imposition of a shared discourse forces individuals into positions they might not prefer or might not be beneficial to their own 'healing' process. Truth commissions risk the redirection of many different individual truths to fit into a "coherent collective history" and a dominant discourse on political violence and reconciliation. This however, effectively 'silences' narratives on continuing horizontal violence and on the socio-economic ramifications of abusive regimes and therefore crucial aspects of own lived experiences.

Since national truth commissions mainly focus on vertical or political violence, horizontal violence, which refers to violence within communities, is therefore often neglected while it constitutes an essential part of the

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<sup>138</sup> Also, this kind of truth might be unnecessary for many post-conflict societies in which violence was particularly visible as in Rwanda or Sierra Leone. In these cases, in which neighbors killed neighbors, the truth about the faith of loved ones is generally known.

<sup>139</sup> As a study by Theissen and Hamber found, the majority of the white South-Africans "are unconvinced that they played a role in apartheid abuses. [...] over 40% of those surveyed think apartheid was a good idea, badly executed" (1998:1).

<sup>140</sup> As Arriaza and Roht-Arriaza argue in the case of Guatemala, reports of truth commissions are necessarily selective and pick cases that might not be representative for the experiences of the wider population. "In Guatemala, the worst violations took place in the early 1980's, yet because of protracted peace negotiations and funding issues, the truth commission did not begin work until a decade later and presented its findings only in 1998" (2008:157).

post conflict landscape.<sup>141</sup> Violence becomes institutionalized as it is internalized by the people who have lived through violence on a daily basis and has become “part of the process of their social and moral world” (Humphrey 2000:22).<sup>142</sup> Horizontal violence therefore, often continues, as in South Africa where violent crime flourishes in the post-apartheid era (Hamber 1999:117).<sup>143</sup> Moreover, the ones that suffered from political violence in the past have the highest risk to be victimised in the current situation as “they were victimised not only because of their political affiliation and activities, but because of their structural circumstances including their gender, poverty, race and general social marginalisation” (Hamber and Kibble 1999). As the structural circumstances have not changed significantly “their social marginalisation remains the primary risk factor for them being victims of violent crime in the current context” (Hamber 1999:124). The reality lived by most people is therefore severely disconnected with the dominant discourse of the TRC “that place(s) the origins of violence and trauma in the past of apartheid” (Humphrey 2000:24).

Moreover, the economic realities of post-conflict societies are often neglected in this common historical narrative. Duncan for example, argues in relation to South Africa that the “imperatives of addressing the socio-politically entrenched oppression of apartheid were subordinated to those of producing a unifying national archive” (2005:32). After the commission ended, the prevalent attitude of ‘let’s get on with our lives’ effectively concealed the continuing legacy of apartheid. As Humphrey argues, “this perspective of the privileged allowed a new social amnesia about race to surface- that race had been the basis of privilege and continued to be with only minor adjustments” (2000:21) .

Indeed, while truth commissions are capable and authorized to recommend areas of economic and social reform, very few commissions have actually resulted in such reforms. Social and economic injustices often linger, as is the case in South Africa and El Salvador<sup>144</sup> in which former conditions of domination are reproduced albeit in a different ways (Uvin 2009:85). Furthermore, severe economic deprivation and social injustice remains a fact in Peru, Guatemala, and East Timor (Laplante and Theidon 2007; Arbour 2007:13).<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> Vertical violence comprises violence between the ‘state and the citizenry’ while horizontal violence refers to violence within a community or, as Arriaza and Roht-Arriaza state ‘neighbor/neighbor’ violence (2008:156).

<sup>142</sup> As in Peru for example, the truth and reconciliation commission found that :’ [a] pervasive fear and distrust (...) continues to debilitate Peruvian communities most affected by the violence, undermining the civic and social participation of its members” (Comisión de Verdad y Reconciliación 2003:160-161) Furthermore, “ (...) the TRC detected the disintegration of community and family bonds and a weakening of social trust, creating a sense of vulnerability and insecurity that affects all levels of functioning. These findings prompted the TRC to conclude that psychosocial disorders “weigh like a serious mortgage on our future and decisively affect the construction of a national community of free and equal citizens in a plural democracy on the path to development and equity” (Laplante and Theidon 2007:234).

<sup>143</sup> Hamber proposes several reasons for the continuity of violence in South Africa including “social inequality and enormous deprivation caused by the apartheid system; a patriarchal society where women and children are devalued and vulnerable; the historical development of a culture of violence where violence was seen by all significant political parties as a legitimate means to achieve their goals; the deregulation of state control during the negotiations period; an ineffective criminal justice system and the perception that there will be no serious consequences for criminal activity” (1999:118).

<sup>144</sup> In both countries a truth commission was established as a result of political negotiations. Subsequently, the dominant group lost its political power but their economic power remained largely intact (Uvin 2009:85). Moreover, as Humphrey (2000:21) notes, in relation to South Africa, “the racialisation of comfort based on the market has allowed new forms of spatial separation and invisibility to emerge. Now segregation is not based on collective fear and official racism but on individualised fear and the unacknowledged racism of advantage”.

<sup>145</sup> As Arbour notes, the Timor Leste commission produced a thorough account of violations of social and economic rights. However, as the commission considered it not to be feasible, victims of these violations did not qualify for reparations in contrast to victims who’s social and political rights were violated (Arbour 2007:13).

These injustices however, often comprise the foundation of grievances as the “systematic discrimination and inequality in access to resources, land, work, and housing have led to conflict or exacerbated the social tensions behind it” (Arbour 2007:8). In Sierra Leone and Peru for example, disillusion with the truth commission rose as economic measures and benefits lacked. While in Peru, in contrast to the truth commission in Sierra Leone, a comprehensive reparation program was designed, the delay of the implementation of this programme has rendered many victims disappointed. Similarly, in “South Africa (...) the government’s failure to pay or institute timely and adequate reparation to victims has created renewed political tensions that threaten to undermine the work of the truth commission and even demean its credibility and beneficial effects” (Laplante and Theidon 2007:241). The value of testimonies and acknowledgement is rendered meaningless if the actual situation does not change and victimization and suffering continue on a daily basis.

As is reviewed above, truth telling mechanisms have certain advantages as they can provide a total and contextual account of past crimes, exert recommendations for reform, can lead to personal and societal healing through ‘public shaming’, and can result the creation of a new shared moral and deter future abuses. However, similar to international criminal trials, certain risks can be identified. Firstly, truth commissions are to a large extent dependent on the genuine political support in a society, as a lack thereof has often resulted in a failure to actually implement socio-economic reforms and have served to conceal the continuity of dominance of a particular group in post-conflict societies. Moreover, it has sometimes produced a discourse that comprised an artificial rupture with the past in which current horizontal violence remained unaddressed. Secondly, the value of truth telling is dependent on the society in question. The value and acceptance of such a national procedure is founded on the practices and expectations of the population. Truth telling procedures may oppose existing practices of forgetting and re-traumatize victims instead of ‘healing’ them and negative perceptions of the commission may diminish the acceptance of accountability it is supposed to promote and impede the deterrent effect. Furthermore, other aspects, such as economic reconstruction might be more meaningful to individual healing in a particular society.<sup>146</sup>

In sum, both instruments suffer from certain deficiencies. Therefore, scepticism on the unequivocal relation between transitional justice and peace and reconciliation is certainly in order, as the specific dynamics and context of the society in question determine the success or failure of such a national instrument. Besides the political, institutional and socioeconomic situation of a post-conflict society, cultural practices and beliefs heavily influence the acceptance and therefore the outcome of a nationally initiated transition. The unique experiences and cultural practices of a country can directly oppose assumptions underlying the process of transitional justice. If a large share of the population does not support a process of transitional justice, it has a very limited chance to succeed, as the effects largely depend on the extent to

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<sup>146</sup> Indeed, as Laplante and Theidon argue, if expectations are first raised by the implementation of such a commission, and then left unmet “the truth telling process could actually cause harm since victim-survivors could feel a deeper sense of deception and neglect” (2007:240-241).

which the population internalizes the normative values it diffuses. Therefore, local structures and dynamics must explicitly be taken into account if such a process is meant to be effective. Moreover, other measures related to the transitional justice paradigm, such as 'reforms of the judiciary, the police and the army, reparations, development, the commemoration of past violence through monuments, museum's or memorial days, or even the promotion of (history) education' should be considered as complementary or even subsidiary instruments (Cole 2007:118; Crocker 1999:60). Indeed, the combination of these two instruments of transitional justice in a hybrid structure, as is suggested in the post-conflict situation of Burundi, is by no means guaranteed to contribute to (societal) peace.

## 6. Perspectives from Below and Expected Impact of the Main Instruments of Transitional Justice

The expected impact of an instrument of transitional justice is highly dependent on the expectations, needs and practices that exist among the wider population of a particular society. While the practices that are in place to deal with the legacy of conflict on a grassroots level have been illuminated in the second chapter, the relating perceptions on the desirability and feasibility of an instrument of transitional justice are crucial to enable a more thorough understanding of the expected effectiveness of an instrument of transitional justice on peace and reconciliation in Burundi. Therefore, this chapter will start with a review of the perceptions of local youth on the two main instruments of transitional justice.

While the main focus of this paragraph will be directed at the two dominant instruments - i.e. (inter)national criminal tribunals and truth and reconciliation commissions- other instruments of transitional justice will also be taken into account when evaluating the expected contributions to peace. Since punishment is the main demarcating attribute of an (inter)national criminal tribunal compared to truth commissions, this section will start with an evaluation of perspectives on punishment, contrasted to pardon and determine the main motives that inspire these perceptions. This will be followed by an evaluation on the desirability and necessity of truth, as this is the main defining feature of a truth commission. The second section of this chapter will analyze these perspectives in relation to the potentials and constraints of the two main instruments of transitional justice, as laid out in the preceding chapter. Moreover, this final part will include insights on the local methods, practices and influences, as outlined in chapter two, that affect local reconciliation to enable an analysis of the expected effect of such a national endeavour on a grassroots level.

### 6.1. The Perceptions of Local Youth

All the local youth I have spoken to had heard from the proposed implementation of un 'Tribunal penal' and the 'Commission Nationale pour la Vérité et la Réconciliation' (Arusha 2000: 23). Similar to recent studies, it appears that the desire to 'pardon those who ask for it' is considerably stronger than a desire to punish (Samii 2009:5). Moreover, 'forgetting' was also valued highly by local youth.

One of the main findings in relation to the desirability of these two instruments is that the all the youth I spoke to favoured one, or both instruments *not* to be implemented. Moreover, when confronted with questions on the necessity of such an instrument, the majority of the Hutu youth contended that reconciliation and peace should be favoured over punishment while the majority of the Tutsi tended to reveal a slight preference for punishment. However, both groups seemed to favour 'forgetting' more than active truth seeking procedures. While opinions differed on the desirability these two national instruments and several different arguments were brought forward, the main perspectives were surprisingly similar within the two distinct ethnic groups. As will be displayed in the following sections, the cleavage between the two ethnicities can be perceived as particularly evident in their attitudes towards retributive justice.

### 6.1.1 Punishment versus Pardon

As contended in the beginning of this thesis, all the youth I spoke to in the Northern neighbourhoods of Bujumbura were victim of the latest war.<sup>147</sup> In this situation, it was particularly surprising that none of them brought up the issue of punishment, unless they were explicitly asked to do so. Moreover, none of the Hutu youngsters preferred punishment in the legal sense. The Tutsi youth did display a slight tendency in favour of legal punishment, but did so without excluding pardon as an option. While this might seem contradictory, it stems from, as will be seen below, a profound desire to have their suffering acknowledged.

All Hutu youth opposed punishments.<sup>148</sup> The lack of impartiality and trust in the judicial system was one of the reasons youngsters did not favour punishment. It was often argued that the judicial system did not work in Burundi, that the executive and the judicial branch were extremely intertwined and that corruption was pervasive. The outcome of a judgment was believed to rely more on the amount of money or influence of an individual than on impartial justice.<sup>149</sup> Therefore, nobody believed that legal justice was actually possible, as the rich and powerful would oppose and prevent prosecutions.

Moreover, the mass complicity in the crimes committed caused many to refute prosecutions as a viable option. As many 'ordinary' people were involved in the latest war and previous cycles of violence, a lot of youngsters contended that it was virtually impossible to punish all, as the majority of the population would have to be punished. Moreover, it was perceived as unnecessary and undesirable to do so: it was undesirable as many people would be incarcerated including the people that are perceived to be 'needed' in the current society, and it was unnecessary as the 'truth' that people were 'tricked' into violence by politicians, was already widely known. The argument that people were 'uneducated' back then and that this had made them particularly vulnerable to manipulation, was often heard or implied.<sup>150</sup> Therefore, people were believed to realize very clearly that the crimes they had committed were morally wrong and it would be of no help to punish them for their wrongdoings.<sup>151</sup>

Furthermore, both sides were involved in the atrocities and could at the same time be perceived as perpetrator and victim. Punishments would therefore not benefit cohabitation, as it would heighten the risk of

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<sup>147</sup> As contended in the beginning of this research, without exception, all had experienced either abuses during the war, or a loss of family members or friends and the loss of material assets.

<sup>148</sup> This is also in line with recent country-wide studies, in which the Hutu appeared to express a significant stronger desire to pardon (Samii 2009:5; Uvin 2009:149). The reasons underlying this difference in attitude will be explored further in the following section.

<sup>149</sup> As appeared from a focus group discussion: *'quand tu as une tante ou bien un frère bien placé, il peut convaincre le juge est il ferme le dossier. Le système judiciaire n'est pas commander par le droit. (...) quand tu as l'argent, tu es privilégié par rapport à les pauvres'* (8-04-2010).

<sup>150</sup> As one Tutsi respondent stated: *'Ils se disent la vérité et ils demandent pardon...Ma famille avait beaucoup des membres qui sont tue par les Hutu a l'intérieur du pays, pendant la guerre. Mais la majorité de la population Burundaise était non-instruit.. ils n'avaient pas étudié... c'est facile de manipuler'* (twenty-six years old man from Ngagara). As he explicitly argued for a truth commission, as he was asked on his opinion towards the two proposed instruments, he appeared to imply that it was not the fault of the population and that it would therefore be wrong to punish them.

<sup>151</sup> One respondent even considered punishment to be morally wrong, as he stated: *'When I do that, it is vengeance... When I put him in prison, it is vengeance. Because I do bad things to him also'* (twenty-one years old man from Kamenge).



violence on a local level.<sup>152</sup> It was suspected to result in 'accusatory practices' among locals as the mass complicity in the crimes committed makes suspicion widespread.<sup>153</sup> In the end, punitive justice was often considered subordinate to peace.

The perceptions on punishment that are put forward by the Tutsi youth are less straightforward. Most argued in favour of punishment as it would exert a strong moral condemnation of the crimes committed.<sup>154</sup> Moreover, some Tutsi youth appeared to support punishments as it would diminish personal motivations for vengeance and promote individual accountability. As appears from a statement from a twenty-eight years old woman from Cibitoke:

*'..there are still a lot of people who cannot give or ask pardon... So I think the people should be punished... I will give you an example... There was a girl here at the centre, and she said to me that she could never forgive the Tutsi... They have stolen her house and they have killed her father in 1972... Everything was stolen... She wouldn't take vengeance herself... But she could never forgive the Tutsi... This is bad... People have to be punished; otherwise people will never trust each other'.<sup>155</sup>*

Similarly, it was sometimes contended that the peace that is achieved would not be a durable one if impunity continued and the truth had not been told.<sup>156</sup> The peace was considered to be fragile as they felt their suffering was not acknowledged. As a twenty-four years old Tutsi from Cibitoke argued:

*'All should be held responsible for their acts.. the ones that have killed, the ones that have organized killings (...) we will establish the truth. It is difficult to pardon a person. Take for example the one that has killed my mother... one day, I will meet him... and people will say that we have to reconcile. But he didn't even come to me to ask for pardon, he is not even judged! He will have to be judged first, before I pardon him. (...) It is necessary that they are judged, and if it is necessary to pardon them, we will'.<sup>157</sup>*

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<sup>152</sup> Some contended that it would risk violence. As a thirty five years old man from Kamenge stated: *'Si on met en place un tribunal, des têtes pourraient tomber de tous les côtés. Il y a aussi le risque que les gens continuent à se protéger. Il y en a qui veulent ce tribunal parce qu'ils disent qu'ils sont propres. Il y en a d'autres qui voudraient dénoncer tel ou tel Hutu ou Tutsi pour des crimes commis. Des têtes tomberaient des deux côtés. Alors pourquoi continuer à vouloir ce tribunal... Il faut une amnistie générale.'*

<sup>153</sup> This argument was brought forward in a focus group discussion with local youth from a Hutu background. However, this was also evident in a personal interview in which the Rwandan example was cited to emphasize the possible negative effects of punishments: *'maintenant on va faire un tribunal qui s'appelle Gacaca. Il y avait encore des Gacaca, dans les années, nous avons dites, nous allons prier pour les gents qui ont nous quitter.. la si t'était la, quand tu ne pleurs pas, il te dit toi tu as fait les massacres.. on te tue ! il faut prier, tu dois prier et pleurer, si tu ne pleurs pas. Fioe..au Rwanda.. imagine toi cette tribunal.. Chez nous non.. complètement non'* (twenty-years old man from Kinama).

<sup>154</sup> As a twenty-one years old man from Ngagara contended: *'Yes, it would be good if they would be shamed. They should be punished.'*

<sup>155</sup>As appears from the quote, punishment is believed to be explicitly linked to trust between people on a local level. Therefore, it seems that she refers to the individualization of guilt as the story she told seems to imply that whole groups are still held responsible. However, she explicitly contended that people did not and should not talk about the past too much, as this would incite vengeance. It seems therefore, that she is arguing that guilt must be directed at the politicians in particular, and that the contribution of local people to violence should not be evaluated or told.

<sup>156</sup> As a respondent stated: *'Il y a toujours des choses caché. Sans trouver la vérité, il n'aura pas une paix. On verra semblent que il y a la paix, mais pas durable, pas durable. Parce-que, quand ces gents restent impunis, sera toujours (...) il aura toujours la haine'*(twenty-four years old man from Cibitoke).

<sup>157</sup> Translated from french: *'Tous doivent être responsables pour ses actes... celui qui a tué, celui qui a organisé des crimes(...) on établit la vérité. C'est difficile de pardonner une personne... prenez par exemple, une personne qui a tué ma mère. Il se ne même pas présenté chez moi pour demander le pardon, tu vois, il n'est même pas jugé ! Il faut que il est jugé en coup que je pardonne (...) Il faut qu'ils sont jugé. Si c'est nécessaire de pardonner, on les pardonne.'*

Indeed, the support for punishment stems mainly from Tutsi youth. The difference in attitudes towards punishment between the two ethnic groups appears to be caused by the differing interpretation both groups have on the latest cycle of violence. The Tutsi widely perceive themselves as victims of the latest war, and describe it as genocide against them. Therefore, “they tend to want punishment for the perpetrators” since this would provide them with the acknowledgment they demand for (Uvin 2009:150). In contrast, the Hutu youth stressed several times that both sides had committed crimes and that it was therefore unnecessary to punish. Moreover, they “tend to see the last twelve years as a civil war for equal rights, a necessary fight against a system of social exclusion that had prevailed for decades in which they were the victims” (Uvin 2009:150). Episodes of violence that occurred in 1965 or especially, 1972 are perceived as the irrefutable proof of this victimization.

However, the punishment as supported by the Tutsi youth seemed to include ‘public shaming’ as well, as respondents from a Tutsi background argued that they could and would pardon perpetrators if that was necessary and if they had revealed the truth and acknowledged their guilt. One even explicitly argued for a truth commission similar to the South-African truth and reconciliation commission.<sup>158</sup> It is therefore doubtful that a strict legal perception of justice dominated among Tutsi youth. It was however clear, that there is a strong need among the Tutsi youth to have their suffering acknowledged.

### 6.1.2 *Truth versus Forgetting.*

Perceptions on the necessity of truth seemed to differ greatly among local youth. However, as will be elaborated below, the main conviction among youth was generally in favour of ‘forgetting’ in a sense that local level perpetrators should not be confronted and people should focus on the future. Very few contended that this was a necessity for peace, as they contended that the truth was already known, and some argued the exact opposite and believed that the truth would incite renewed violence. The desire for truth also seemingly demonstrated a slight ethnic bias. Almost all of the Tutsi youth did seem in favour of ‘forgetting’ but also supported punishments, as seen supra.<sup>159</sup> Very few argued in favour of a truth commission. Youth from a Hutu background did seem to favour truth, however, as will be seen infra, this truth appeared to be a partial one.

Some respondents seemed to argue in favour of a truth-seeking procedure, as appears from the statements below.

*‘no, it is not sufficient... it is the state that has to do something. (..) There are kids that are born during the war...they don’t know the war! And they have to show them their past, to not make such a mistake again! (...) No, we don’t know our history...’* (Twenty-one years old man from Ngagara).<sup>160</sup>

<sup>158</sup> This was specifically argued by a twenty-six years old man from Ngagara with a Tutsi background. As he continued *‘maintenant, nous devons habiter ensemble. Donc, nous devons pardonner, ca marche.’*

<sup>159</sup> While this might seem contradictory, as punishment is also considered to include truth, it is based on an overall perception that the roles of local level perpetrators should not be revealed. This will be elaborated further in the next section.

<sup>160</sup> In this quote, he was talking about the change in mentality of former members of ‘sans echec’. As he started: *‘no, no, no... not them. Not everybody. They are really still kids... but even them, they play football at the Centre Jeunes Kamenge with them. That is the start! When a Hutu passes.. they are like.. don’t do anything stay calm, it where not them [but]no, it is not sufficient.. it is the state that has to do something. (..)’*

*'you see, that can do it. A lot of people have already forgotten the past. But the Burundians, we need the truth and know a history that is true. We don't have a history. There are a lot of history books, but not a single history book. We have to know, where the different ethnicities came from, that is what we want to know...the truth, and who has provoked it...'* (twenty years old man from Kinama).<sup>161</sup>

*'We are going to do like this... we take the people who have killed somebody else, and we take the family... and he will confess and say why he had killed that person and ask for pardon.. and he will tell how it was and why. And we have already seen the truth, but when he will deny that he has done it.. it is better that he will confess. We need to have the truth, and we will have to search the truth where it is... and put the truth on its place'* (twenty-one years old man from Kinama).

In these statements it is explicitly argued that the truth is needed as people should learn from the past and guilt should be acknowledged. However, it is also evident that they favour the *historic* and *factual* truth. Two of the respondents mentioned above also seemed to stress the exact opposite arguments, as they also argued in favour of 'forgetting':

*'we need the truth for this...but not the truth of the war, because then people will do it again... it will surface again (...) yes, in the end, I know that I want to know the truth. But really, if a person tells me that he wants to know the truth... it is a bad person... when you always have to come back on the past, you will arrive nowhere. Imagine, instead of continuing, you always think about the past'* (twenty years old man from Kinama).<sup>162</sup>

*'We forget everything... we always say that we have to forget the things that have happened in the past, and we have to look and search for the future. I can know that somebody has done something bad to me, and forget about it. When I see him I know what he has done to me, but I let it pass'* (twenty-one years old man from Kinama).

Others also stressed the dangers of truth-telling procedures, and contented that it was better to leave the past behind as it could endanger peace and because the truth was already known:

*'No... They want to leave the past behind...if they would talk about it a lot there could be vengeance again...'* (twenty-eight years old woman from Cibitoke)

*"forgetting' is better for reconciliation. We already know what politicians have done. People would only accuse each other".<sup>163</sup>*

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<sup>161</sup> Translated from French : *'tu vois... beaucoup de gens ont déjà, oublié le passé. Juste les burundais, on a besoin de la vérité et savoir un histoire qui est vrai. On a pas d'histoire. Il y a beaucoup de livres de histoire, on n'a pas un seul livre histoire. Alors, nous devons savoir, ou est venu des ethnies différents, c'est ca que nous voulons savoir, la vérité.. est qui a provoqué ca,.... la vérité..'*

<sup>162</sup> Translated from french: *'Alors, nous devons savoir, ou est venu des ethnies différents, c'est ca que nous voulons savoir, la vérité.. est qui a provoqué ca,.... la vérité, faux le qui fasse la vérité pour ca, mais pas la vérité pour la guerre parce-que les gents ventent encore un.. ca va encore monter. Oui .. en fait je sais que je veux savoir l'histoire. Mais vraiment quand il y a un personne qui me dit que il veut savoir l'histoire.. c'est un bonne pers... un mauvais personne... quand tu dois retirer en arrière tu arrivera nulle part. imagine toi, au lieu de continue, tu pense toujours de le passé'. Therefore, he seems to imply that the truth about the war should not be dwelled upon, as this would prohibit people to move on and would incite anger.*

<sup>163</sup> Focus group discussion on impunity- 8-04-2010. This appeared in several interviews, such as in one with the Amahoro Youth Club: *'no, it is not that I need truth.. because I already know. I know he was manipulated and me too, because we are living together and talk to each other. I know the truth! What I need is that, you come and see I will not do that again. If I am talking as a Burundian.. I would want that it had not happened.. but I know he was manipulated. There are people who have came and said he, if you don't kill him, he will kill you. I know this because they have also come to me.. saying ; 'if we don't fight, we will be dead'. So I know the truth, this is the truth'* (16-03-2010).

While the support for truth appears to be based on a desire of a common history, it is, at the same time, refuted as it would prevent people from moving on and could incite resentment and anger. While this might seem an explicit paradox, it could very well be based on different conceptions of the 'truth'.

The truth can be divided in different forms, as there is a "factual or forensic kind of truth, personal or narrative truth, and a social or 'dialogue' truth" (South African TRC 1998: 110; Lambourne 2009:39; Chapman and Ball 2001:10).<sup>164</sup> A 'dialogue truth' is valued to some extent, as it was explicitly considered valuable by some respondents that the perpetrator should meet the victims and ask for pardon. This was perceived to benefit the victims as their suffering would be acknowledged.

However, as also seen in the third chapter of this thesis, 'personal' or 'narrative' truth, conceptualized as the verbal recounting of memories, seemed of less, or no importance, as 'forgetting' is valued highly. It appeared that the real crux is inherent to the desire for 'forensic' or 'factual' truth. As many contended that there is a need for a 'history that is true', it can be said that local youth expressed a specific desire to know the facts. However, local youngsters contended at the same time that the specific causes of the war should not be revealed or discussed, as they feared this would ignite resentment and possibly, violence. As Peter Uvin rightly argues:

"talking about the causes of the war- and a fortiori assigning blame, naming and punishing individuals- is divisive, as people differ profoundly in how they view these matters, and often have an interested stake in the outcome. The frequent position against talking about the past (...) follows from the fact that many people realize that there are major divisions among them in how they see the past..." (2009:153-154).

Therefore, it appears that when youngsters argue in favour of the truth, they refer to 'dialogue' truth and to a partial 'forensic' truth in which the truth about individual events, cases, and people is explored, but *not* to the truth concerning the specific causes of the war. The term 'social forgetting' seems particularly fit: different individual memories stay intact but the overt verbal recounting of violence between different local groups does not take place as it is believed to 'encourage its return' (Shaw 2005:9).<sup>165</sup> With one exception, this is true for all the youth I spoke to.<sup>166</sup>

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<sup>164</sup> The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was the first to emphasize these different forms of truths. This commission understood 'factual or forensic truth' to consist of "impartial evidence that tells truth at two levels: (1) truth about individual events, cases, and people, and (2) about "nature, causes, and extent of gross violations of human rights, including the antecedents, circumstances, factors, context, motives, and perspectives that led to such violations" (Chapman and Ball 2001:10). 'Personal or narrative truth' refers to the verbal recounting of memories and experiences of individual victims and 'social or dialogue' truth points at the truth that is established through "interaction, discussion and debate"(South African TRC 1998: 113). On other form of truth, , 'healing and restorative truth' is also cited. This last form of the truth comprises "the truth that comes from putting facts in their contexts: in political context of power between social actors, in historical context of the sequence of contingent events, and in the ideological context in which contending visions of the social world compete" (Chapman and Ball 2001:11). This truth would provide the acknowledgment victims need, and would therefore lead to 'healing'. However, as the existence and possibility to arrive at this type of truth is contested, this form will not be included.

<sup>165</sup> It might seem that the statement of the young man from Kinama (twenty-one years old, page 67), in which he argues for dialogue between victims and offenders, contradicts this. However, he also explicitly referred to the value of forgetting, and he appeared to be describing the manner in which pardon could be granted. In these instances, he did not seem to suggest that the past should be discussed, but more that *pardon* should be asked in a manner similar or equal to the local practices of apologies as described in chapter two.

<sup>166</sup> One young (Tutsi) man argued in favor of a truth commission similar to the South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation commission.

## 6.2 Expected Impact of the Instruments of Transitional Justice on Peace

As displayed above, there is a slight tendency among the Tutsi youth to favour trials over ‘pardon’ and ‘forgetting’ over truth. Most youth from a Hutu background, however, explicitly advocate amnesties over trials and also displayed a general support to ‘partial forgetting’. In this section, the importance of these perspectives to the expected effects of an instrument of transitional justice will be analyzed. Moreover, the influences, practices and methods as illuminated in chapter two as well as the constraints of the two instruments as laid out in the preceding chapter, will be included to deepen this analysis.

### 6.2.1 *Expected Effects of an (Inter)National Criminal Tribunal*

As both ethnic groups tend to interpret past violence differently, the support for punishment is stronger among Tutsi youth. These differing interpretations however, generate several risks regarding the implementation of a tribunal in Burundi.

Firstly, as both groups tend to perceive themselves as victims, ‘war crime trials may be perceived as a confirmation of the victimization of one’s own group’. As happened in Bosnia, the truth that is then conveyed through trials, can ‘serve as useful foil in the hands of political propagandists’.<sup>167</sup> While the truth generated by trials would resonate better among local youth, the possible opposition trials are expected to incite would undue these positive effect. It would resonate better among local youth as individual, local level roles would mainly remain untouched as the necessary selective prosecution would direct blame towards politicians: a truth that is commonly accepted. However, as politicians are likely to oppose such trials, the danger that this truth will be manipulated is especially high in the context of Burundi, as they could capitalize on distrust that lingers beneath the surface. Indeed, several respondents, mostly from a Hutu background, implied exactly this aspect when stating that the truth about the war should not be included as it would only result in accusatory practices and would provide leaders with the means and incentives to provoke renewed violence.<sup>168</sup> As violence is to a large extent institutionalized in the Burundian society, and political violence occurs frequently, it seems reasonable to suspect that political leaders will use violence when threatened with prosecutions and punishment. Indeed, they have a vulnerable population at their disposal to which violence is an everyday normality.

Secondly, in the Burundian context, trials are especially susceptible to accusations of partiality as both groups consider themselves as victims, punishments are necessarily selective, institutions are generally weak, and moreover, judicial institutions are effectively controlled by the executive power. The capability of this instrument to remain impartial is therefore highly questionable. Indeed, even if it would succeed, convictions of partiality would severely undermine the legitimacy of such and endeavour, and may even provoke renewed violence.

Lastly, the argument is often brought forward that the implementation of a criminal tribunal would strengthen the rule of law in that particular society. However, individuals realize very well that the violence

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<sup>167</sup> See page 52 of this thesis.

<sup>168</sup> Compare this comment to the effects of trials in Rwanda on page 51 note 111. For perceptions of local youth, see page 64.

they have committed in the past was morally wrong and strongly resist a return to these abuses. A strong moral condemnation, as exerted by a criminal tribunal, would add to this locally shared sentiment but would not strengthen the rule of law if judicial institutions remain partial, dysfunctional and controlled by the executive power. Indeed, the absence of legal justice comprises one of the main impediments to the supposed functioning of a criminal tribunal.

It is also questionable if punitive justice would be most important to the healing process of Burundian youth. While the need for acknowledgement was specifically expressed by the Tutsi youth, it was also added that they did not exclude pardon. This acknowledgement could therefore also be established by other methods that are associated with the transitional justice paradigm, such as reparations, public apologies or commemoration days.<sup>169</sup> The existence of local level reconciliatory practices of apologies suggest that these methods to restore fractured relationships have considerable significance and meaning on a grassroots level.<sup>170</sup> Indeed, a director of a local NGO referred to this 'reconciliatory mentality' as one of the main reasons punitive justice is not widely preferred:

*'Traditionally, punitive justice is not integrated. Until today, punitive justice is not integrated in the Burundian mentality. Because the Burundians have always preferred, and that has always prevailed, reconciliatory justice... restorative... the bashingantahe. It was natural'.<sup>171</sup>*

The establishment of relations through practices of apologies accompanied by restitutions on a grassroots level can therefore be perceived as in direct opposition to punitive justice. Moreover, the factors that hindered the process of reconciliation among local youth were mostly due to political insecurity and poverty, forms of justice that are left unaddressed by retributive justice. In contrast, the need for socioeconomic and political justice appears to be more pressing (2009:41). Indeed, both ethnic groups, and especially the Hutu youth, seemed to value socioeconomic justice very highly, as the lack of jobs and nutrition returned in every conversation.<sup>172</sup> As one NGO explained the lack of support for punitive justice:

*'Why... ? They say, the judicial institution has not taken into account restitutions. It is only punishment... the person who is accused of a crime will be punished... and the person is psychologically repaired but the victims do not receive material reparations. (...) When you find a person in the interior of the country... who is left as the only one of his family... He says, yes I know the person responsible, and we live together now... (..) Because for example the Tutsi in Rwanda, my neighbour, he has killed.... But they say, it is they, who provide me with water, they provide me with salt... they bring me to the hospital when I am sick. What will I win if he is punished? So in the end, they demand material compensation.... Therefore, punishment is not valued by Burundians'.<sup>173</sup>*

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<sup>169</sup> Some of these measures, such as the erection of a monument and a national commemoration day, were already included in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation agreement. See page 47.

<sup>170</sup> Reparations and apologies are congruent with local level practices, in which apologies and small restitutions are offered and pardon is granted.

<sup>171</sup> This statement was taken from an interview with Benevolencija on 07-04-2010. As he continued: *'People have often consulted the Bashingantahe.. Especially in the interior of the country. (...). It is that institution that has always reconciled people. That is the first reason. Even for grave crimes... this institution could always reconcile people. Even for crimes like genocide... because grave crimes do not exist in Burundi. Because there are very little grave crimes punished here... always reconciliation'*

<sup>172</sup> As stated in a focus group discussion: *'we shouldn't be so concerned with the past.. if we had work and food and everything, people would be less concerned with punishment'*.

<sup>173</sup> Interview with Benevolencija on 07-04-2010.

Indeed, reparations might be more suitable in the context of Burundi, as this relates more to local practices and as the lack of socioeconomic justice is of direct concern to most locals. Furthermore, the lack of political justice was also often cited as a negative influence on societal peace. Measures such as the construction of effective accountability processes and controls might be more effective to foster this kind of justice as trials do not necessarily stimulate 'good governance'.

The retributive paradigm does not resonate well among local youth in Burundi, and, as appears from other recent studies, similar conclusions can be drawn for the majority of the Burundian population (Ingelaere 2009:7; Samii 2009:5; Uvin 2009:168). It is opposite to local practices and beliefs and underrates the importance of other forms of justice, such as political and economic justice, to local youth. Therefore, the expected effect of such a mechanism cannot be overrated and it is not likely that this national instrument will directly contribute to peace. However, one aspect of punishment remains attractive: The strong moral condemnation it exerts might set an example for the future, in contrast to which a failure to punish exerts the exact opposite value. However, as it will probably not translate into 'lived experiences' on a grassroots level, it might very well incite renewed violence and it is unlikely that the rule of law will be strengthened by this as institutions remain weak and partial, it is dubious –if not incredible- that it will directly contribute to societal repair.

### *6.2.2 Expected Effects of an (Inter)National Truth and Reconciliation Commission*

It seems that most of the Burundian youth does not directly support a national truth-telling procedure. The ones that did support a form of truth, mostly favoured a 'partial forensic truth' consisting of the historical facts concerning the past and a form of 'dialogue' truth. Moreover, some contended that truth telling would harm the fragile peace and could incite renewed violence.

The benefits of a national truth commission lie in the new 'shared' moral it is able to determine through a common understanding of history, the contextual account of the past it provides, the dignity of victims it would restore through accountability, and the institutional reforms it is able to recommend.

Indeed, the importance of a clear and shared history was the main reason offered in favour of the truth. The manipulation of ethnicity by certain 'extremist' or politicians was widely perceived as the main driver of the war, and therefore, so it was argued, the truth on the origins of ethnicity and manipulation should be revealed, as to assure its non-repetition. Moreover, guilt would be individualized with the revelation of this partial, forensic truth, an aspect that was valued by some youngsters as well.<sup>174</sup>

The role of politicians is, as seen above, sometimes explicitly cited as in need of clarification. However, as displayed earlier, truth and reconciliation commissions are especially sensitive to political manipulation as current violence can be 'conveniently overlooked' since the exploration of the truth is mainly, if not solely, directed at past abuses. This is often so when the aspiration of a government to genuinely 'turn the page' is absent and the implementation of a truth commission is largely the result of international pressure. Indeed,

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<sup>174</sup> See for example the quotation of twenty-eight years old woman from Cibitoke, on page 65.

the lack of a genuine aspiration to break with practices of the past seems to characterize the current Burundian government.<sup>175</sup> As was stated in a news article concerning the implementation of the proposed Truth and Reconciliation Commission:

“But as the political will lacks, nobody will hold on to illusions on what to expect of these two « machines », as de Gaulle would say, they are nothing more than « things » destined to keep up appearances for the country itself and the international community, [and] based on the South-African TRC, the Burundian Truth and Reconciliation Commission is (...) doomed to fail because all Burundian ethnic groups are comprised of arrant liars. And when they pretend to tell the truth, it is only to construct a nice ‘décor’ that clears them from all direct or indirect responsibility. To compare the South African commission (...) people will remember that the former first minister Pieter Botha has refused to appear for this commission.” (Netpress 21-06-2010).<sup>176</sup>

There is a strong sentiment among the Burundian population that the implementation of a truth and reconciliation commission is no more than a ‘façade’, executed by the Burundian government to satisfy the international community and to cover their own responsibility. The acknowledgement a truth commission could provide for the victims, especially for the Tutsi, would in this case be rendered meaningless as the main responsible actors will avoid public shaming.<sup>177</sup>

While the construction of a common history is valued by some youth, it is mainly a partial ‘factual truth’ that is referred to. This truth is believed to contribute to a durable peace as it would educate the population on the horrors of past violence. However, as the truth on the role of lower level perpetrators is not valued widely, as will be elaborated below, it is questionable if a truth commission initiated by the current government and similar to the South African model would be most appropriate to do so as a mandated commissions of inquiry, or independent historical commission, could suffice as well. Indeed, this might be more effective as accusations of partiality and an evaluation of the roles of local level perpetrators could be avoided.

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<sup>175</sup> This is for example evident in the way the current government deals with recent abuses. As stated in an interim report of the United Nations: “The independent expert noted a lack of institutional will to shed light on the circumstances surrounding the forced disappearance and execution of those 30 persons between May and August 2006 in Muyinga. Instead, there appears to be an attempt by the Government to wish away the truth. The prosecutor in charge of this case was transferred, and it is suspected that his transfer was the result of the Government displeasure with his role in the investigation. Some of the witnesses and families of the victims are reported to have been intimidated and threatened by local administration and soldiers of the fourth military region” (UN 2007: 16).

<sup>176</sup> Translated from French: “Mais comme la volonté politique manque cruellement, personne ne se fait d’illusion sur ce qu’il faudrait attendre de ces deux « machins » comme dirait de Gaulle, qui ne sont que des « trucs » destinés à amuser la galerie et la communauté internationale calquée sur la Cnvr sud-africaine, la commission vérité et réconciliation burundaise est vouée d’avance à l’échec, car les Burundais toutes ethnies confondues, sont des fieffés menteurs. Et quand il faut semblant de dire ce qui peut ressembler de loin à la vérité, c’est pour en faire un bien joli décor qui les dédouane de toute responsabilité directe ou indirecte. Pour faire un rapprochement avec la Cnvr sud-africaine que l’on voudrait mimer, on rappellera que l’ancien premier ministre blanc au temps de l’apartheid Pieter Botha a refusé avec dédain de comparaître devant cette instance”.

<sup>177</sup> As became evident in chapter three, *all* youth considered politicians to be responsible for the violence committed. The evaluation of the roles played by local level perpetrators was not valued by local youth. While the acknowledgment of the moral wrongfulness of past crimes would be beneficial to some, particularly Tutsi, victims, the ones at which such blame should be directed, i.e. the current government, are expected to escape such judgment, as is evident in the citation above. This is even complicated further by the fact that both groups tend to perceive themselves as victims. Even if crimes of first or second level perpetrators would be revealed publicly, it could lead to a retreat into ethnic sentiments as perpetrators avoid public shaming ‘by isolating themselves happily in their own ethnoracial enclave with similar beliefs’ (Adam 1999:146).



There is a general reluctance and opposition to scrutinize the role of local individuals as both groups are perceived to be victimized by political manipulation and as it could incite renewed violence. Moreover, the public recounting of violence and blame opposes social practices of 'forgetting' that are of significant importance on a local level. As illuminated in chapter three, social relations are constructed on this practice as a profound recounting of past experiences between perpetrators and victims does not occur and is believed to heighten tensions. As Peter Uvin remarks:

"the potential for transitional justice mechanisms to be divisive and unravel the ties that form the basis of this social capital is evident. In accusing or testifying against neighbours, individuals would break with the socially preferred silence and risk ostracism, suspicion, and reprisal, as well as heightening ethnic animosity and elevating barriers to the cooperation on which their survival depends" (2009:168).

The danger of unravelling the social ties based on widely practiced social forgetting is evident. While pardon is valued highly, this is not based on a pronounced exchange of memories but more on the need to resume normal patterns of living and acknowledgement. It is therefore questionable if the public revelation of crimes and suffering is most important for the 'healing' of victims, as a current widely shared sentiment is visible that the 'past should be left behind' and that people should continue their lives and 'make the most of it'. Indeed, several youngsters emphasized the need to focus on the future and especially not to dwell on the past as this would inhibit progress.<sup>178</sup>

In the eyes of youth 'healing' would therefore be more closely connected to socio-economic reconstruction and development and the containment of horizontal violence in their direct surroundings, as the lack of social justice and the pervasiveness of violence disrupts social ties and trust and results in an increased individualism.<sup>179</sup> These negative influences are responsible for a continuing victimization of local youth that impedes them from resuming their lives and causes them to re-live past traumas. Indeed, truth commissions are especially capable of recommending areas for reform and might therefore be able to shed light on these dynamics and recommend reforms regarding the transformation of the security and economic sector.

However, as contended before, truth commissions tend to focus on vertical violence and might therefore miss important dimensions of current violence as the truth that is produced by a truth commission is necessarily a confined one. As the aspirations of the current government to break with the past does not seem utterly sincere, the rupture with the past that is embodied in the truth that will be produced by the commission might therefore be a very artificial one, as it might ignore current abuses and mask a continuing

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<sup>178</sup> The need for a historical truth also seems to stem from this desire, as this need was especially emphasized in relation to the future. According to most youth, nothing of the past should be revealed that could contribute the repetition of violence. This encompasses 'controversial' truths, - i.e. truth that is perceived differently by the two ethnic groups, such as the causes of the war. Therefore, only those parts should be revealed that contribute to future peace. This would encompass truth in which both groups could believe, such as the 'falseness' of ethnicity or the 'manipulation by different politicians'. The desired truth is therefore perceived to be subordinate and in service of peace.

<sup>179</sup> Indeed, this is entirely in line with the findings of Peter Uvin who found 'safety', understood as the absence of violence and fear, and 'basic needs', defined as a minimum standard of material well-being, to be the most important aspects of peace to local citizens throughout Burundi (2009: 44-47). Therefore, the perspectives of local youth seem to be quite similar to the ones found in the Burundian society as a whole.

lack of social justice. As seen in the third chapter, these factors erode trust and solidarity among the population and subsequently a loss of hope and control.

In sum, the truth about past crimes is, according to local youth, subordinate to peace. There is an overall conviction discernable that the implementation of a truth commission would be no more than political tool to conceal current abuses and injustices and will therefore not result in 'public shaming' or structural reforms. Moreover, public truth-telling counters local custom and culture as forgetting and flexibility are valued highly. Therefore, similar to the expected effects of criminal trials, the expected effects of a truth commission on peace are suspected to be fairly small or even detrimental, as it would most likely negatively touch the established social fabric.

However, some other forms of the truth are valued by local youth. 'Dialogue' truth is for example, appreciated more as it is believed to reduce stereotypes and tensions. This entails a more local level approach in which individuals or families come together and engage in a constructive dialogue. These methods are already available and have produced fairly good results and, if expanded to the communal level, would be able to address existing stereotypes and distrust on this level. Moreover a 'partial' forensic truth is valued as well as the need to learn from past violence was often expressed by local youth. As suggested earlier, this could be done by an independent historical or fact finding commission, complemented by the expansion of history education to local youth. Moreover, reparations or restitutions also correspond to local level practices of apologies and material restitutions. As reparations inherently acknowledge guilt, this would also provide some symbolic acknowledgement to victims. Also, it would partly address the shared desire for socioeconomic justice, and increase acceptance and hope.

## PART II - Partial Conclusions

As laid out in the first chapter, the relation between a national process of transitional justice and peace is not an easy one: while a common conviction exists that past mass atrocities should be dealt with to effectively achieve a transition to (a democratic) peace, opinions differ on the assumptions and capabilities of such a national process. Moreover, as is evident in the political debate concerning transitional justice in Burundi, there is a continuing discussion on the right instrument that should be implemented. However, the necessity of the implementation of such an instrument is rarely questioned and the contribution of both instruments to peace and reconciliation is simply assumed.

However, a review of the two main instruments of transitional justice revealed that the effectiveness of (inter) national criminal tribunals and (inter) national truth commissions is contested. While (inter)national criminal tribunals can have a beneficial impact on peace and societal repair through the strong moral condemnation they exert, their deterrent value, the acknowledgment they provide to victims and the individual accountability they stimulate, these positive effects can be curbed by specific societal circumstances. Indeed, they can be incongruent with local needs and may even provoke new violence. Similarly, the effects of truth commissions on reconciliation and peace are contested, as they can actually fracture established relationships and serve as a 'façade' to conceal current violence and inequalities. Indeed, both instruments are particularly dependent on the particular situation and the local customs, culture and needs of the societies in which they are to be implemented.

As is laid out above, the perceptions of local youth display a general tendency to prefer 'forgetting' over the truth. Moreover, there is no unequivocal support for punishment discernable, and even when punishment is favoured, this support is not confined to a legal conception as amnesties were often included as an option. Indeed, the 'needs' as expressed by local youth pointed more in the direction of socioeconomic, legal and political justice as the most important areas of concern.

The arguments underlying these positions are quite realistic as there are certain risks to the implementation of these national instruments in Burundi. As a political desire to affect genuine change seems practically absent, institutions are weak and tensions linger, the societal circumstances appear generally unfavourable to the implementation of such a national instrument. As contended in the last section, the implementation of an (inter)national criminal tribunal could very well incite political opposition and renewed violence. Furthermore, the argument that trials could strengthen the rule of law is questionable as judicial institutions remain partial and dysfunctional. Moreover, different interpretations of history might lead to ethnically tainted interpretations of the 'truth' and result in accusatory practices on a local level and therefore distort established relationships. Similarly, the implementation of a national truth commission is widely believed to merely constitute a façade to conceal abuses of the current government. Also, the importance of truth-telling to healing is questioned, as it runs counter to local practices of silence and 'social forgetting'. Truth telling might therefore dismantle social ties instead of reinforcing them, and might even cause renewed violence.

In the end, it can be said that both mechanisms do not correspond well with local realities. Both instruments miss important dimensions of justice that appear to be of greater significance on a grassroots level. Indeed, the lack of social, economic, legal and political justice undermine relations on a grassroots level and jeopardize the fragile peace. Moreover, existing practices are in direct opposition to the underlying assumptions of both instruments, as reconciliatory values are deeply institutionalized and 'forgetting' is valued highly. Both instruments therefore appear to be incongruent with local needs, custom and culture. In addition to this, the particular political circumstances suggest that both instruments are quite likely to affect peace negatively. Therefore, in the context of Burundi, it appears that the expected effects of these two main instruments remain dismal.

## General Conclusions

As contended in the introduction, this thesis aimed to understand to what extent reconciliation is taking place on a urban communal level of youth in Bujumbura and which local methods and factors contribute to this process. Furthermore, based on this analysis, it questioned whether an (inter)national truth telling process or tribunal would be an effective measure to (further) contribute to a sustainable peace.

To provide an answer to this question, the concept 'reconciliation' was introduced and compared with local perceptions of youth. Indeed, the definition of reconciliation as a process, concerning the amelioration of relationships in a post conflict society that can comprise multiple interrelated levels, appeared to be fairly congruent with the signification local youth attributed to the concept. Moreover, it was valued highly by local youth.

The local process of reconciliation among youth was mainly stimulated by contact, education and the distribution of impartial information. And indeed, combined with practices of apologies, religious, and historical influences, these methods proved quite effective as local youth established friendships across ethnic divisions. While this applied more to the younger generation of youth, as the relations among youth older than twenty-five seemed less sincere, this does show the remarkable resilience that is possible after a decade of violence. While relationships among older youth are characterized by more distrust and are established out of a necessity and maybe, a culturally influences 'flexibility', these do have the potential to survive. However, as seen in the first chapter, reconciliation comprises a process of systems change as the multiple levels of society are intimately connected. Indeed, the negative influences exerted from the societal and communal level have a potential to unravel this fragile social fabric and imply that the methods and mechanisms used on a grassroots level are not sufficient to secure inter-personal reconciliation. It suggests that a change of the system is far from complete.

Factors that impede this process stem mainly from the societal level, as political corruption, economic deprivation and politically stimulated violence create dynamics that disrupt social bonds. The micro-level presentation of urban neighbourhoods in Bujumbura illustrated this well as a decline in solidarity, and the rise of jealousy, criminality and distrust are intimately connected to these societal factors. Moreover, a lack of change on a communal level is highly visible as interpersonal friendships are not reflected on a neighbourhood level. Therefore, interpersonal ties are either not strong enough to counter communal practices and values of ethnic segregation, or communal values continue to exert a considerable influence on individual beliefs. Most likely, it is a combination of both.

As the lack of political, socioeconomic and legal justice were defined as the main impediments to grassroots reconciliation, a change on the national or political level appears to be crucial to effectuate a genuine process of reconciliation. A premature conclusion of all this would suggest that a national level process of transitional justice could be an effective measure to generate this process. However, a closer look at the grassroots level, compared with academic and political insights, suggests a more nuanced view. It suggest that there is a lack of desire on the political level to effectuate a genuine change, and it suggest that it runs counter to expectations, desires and practices on a local level.

As laid out in chapter five of this thesis, the supposed beneficial effects of instruments of transitional justice are to a large extent based on the support that is present among the population it is meant to affect. Since local, urban youth is considered to be an important target group in the durable resolution of conflicts, as rebel groups are mainly comprised of youth and they are especially important in the determination of the future, the lack of support among local youth is telling. Their meagre support of punishment and their overall rejection of an all-encompassing truth seeking procedure would therefore advise against the implementation of an international truth commission or international criminal tribunal. A combination of these two mechanisms in a hybrid structure, as actually proposed in the case of Burundi, was refuted by all youth as they either favoured none of these instruments to be implemented, or favoured one of these instruments.

Besides the perspectives on the desirability of these national instruments, local practices can also inform the feasibility of truth telling procedures and criminal trials. As became apparent in chapter three, local practices are mainly based on a socially favoured 'silence' and 'forgetting'. Moreover, they are based on a historically institutionalized practice of reconciliation and 'moving on'. These practices are therefore incompatible with the assumptions inherent to both instruments of transitional justice as they are fundamentally based on truth and punishment or 'public shaming'. Moreover, the assumed importance of both instruments to the 'healing process' of victims is also countered by local perceptions. The need for political and socio-economic justice is articulated by youth from both ethnic groups and is conceived as more pressing. These are, in the end, the factors that determine their future, and instead of 'dwelling' on the past, it is perceived that obstacles to a better future must be tackled.

Indeed, as stems from local level perceptions of urban youth, other instruments might be more effective. While acknowledgement for past crimes is specifically desired by the Tutsi youth, socioeconomic, legal and political justice constitute shared objectives of both ethnic groups. Reforms of the judicial, economic and political sector are indeed imperative. Moreover, as hinted at above, reparations might address some of these desires as it would provide material benefits but also a symbolic and moral acknowledgement to victims. This acknowledgement could be complemented with memorials or national commemoration days. Dialogue is also valued highly by local youth. Indeed, dialogue and contact have contributed greatly to local reconciliation and might therefore be considered as an effective instrument to tackle lasting stereotypes and distrust in their communities. Moreover, it would diminish the existence of differing historical perspectives, another factor that influences trust negatively. Lastly, as was displayed in the last chapter, there is quite a desire noticeable to learn from the past to prevent future violence. This account of the past could be established by an independent historical commission for example, and then distributed through the inclusion of this history in school curriculums and through history education.

The above mentioned instruments are some examples of what could be done, they are not meant to be exhaustive or to promote an all-encompassing solution to achieve a positive peace in Burundi. They are small components of a larger framework that could address some of the problems experienced by local youth. However, Burundi encompasses more than urban youth, and there is no doubt that new and different desires exist in the interior of the country. However, this micro-level representation does provide a sample of the difficulties that can be expected in Burundi as a whole as all different social groups and accompanying

tensions tend to convert in Bujumbura. Moreover, they point to the main problems associated with the transitional justice paradigm: it is evident that the reality displays a much more complex picture than the transitional justice paradigm would want to believe. As critics contend, real cases reveal different obstacles and restraints to the capabilities ascribed to these instruments, as the needs and expectations of particular post-conflict societies differ. Indeed, the main instruments of transitional justice seem attractive and moreover, they sometimes seem to be the only effective mechanisms at hand to address such complex problems, as the paradigm encompasses so many theories and strategies. However, they are by no means a 'panacea' for post-conflict situations; it is unrealistic to believe that either a truth commission or criminal tribunal alone could secure a sustainable peace. And even more so, present fears among local youth may be quite right as the implementation of these instruments could very well incite violence.

This evaluation is, however not yet complete as there is one crucial hiatus left. While the two instruments are probably not able to directly contribute to peace, and might even incite renewed violence in the short-run, it is generally unclear how the situation would improve *without* the implementation of a national instrument. Since the political level is for the largest part responsible for factors that negatively influence the communal and grassroots level, and the political will to address these issues seems particularly absent, the prospects of change also seem dismal. Indeed, almost all the measures that have been suggested are dependent on efforts initiated on the political level. Without incentives to adjust policies and political behaviour then, there is a fair chance that changes will not occur and that abuses, violence and corruption continue unabated.

Indeed, the case for the implementation of a national instrument of transitional justice seems to turn on the consequences of the failure to implement them, as the chance that legal, political and socioeconomic justice will naturally come about seem dismal. Even if such a national instrument does not correspond with local level practices and needs, and even if it would provide incentives for renewed violence, is it possible that the failure to implement such an instrument implies even greater risks for the future of a durable peace in Burundi? What consequences does a failure to prosecute past abuses entail for current and future violations of the law? And similarly, even if the truth is currently not valued, what would a failure to uncover the truth of past abuses signify to future generations? While these questions are outside the scope of this research, and are difficult, if not impossible to answer, they are of utmost importance. While it appears from this research that the implementation of one, or a combination of, the two main instruments of transitional justice will not directly enhance peace in Burundi, and in contrast, could disrupt the fragile negative peace, they could produce effects that contribute to a future sustainable and positive peace. Indeed, Burundi seems enclosed in an implicit paradox: while there is a real sentiment of change at the basis, they cannot effectuate change without changes on the political level. However, it is exactly this level that opposes change, and blocks the positive effects that instruments of transitional justice could possibly achieve.

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## Articles :

Netpress, 'Enfin la Cnvr, mais pour quoi faire ?' *Bujumbura le 21 juin 2010.*

## Interviews

Centre Jeunes Kamenge	Camilla, 22-04-2010
	Harushimana, Guillaume. 12-04-2010
	Focus group discussion on impunity. 8-04-2010.
Amahoro Youth Club	Giramahoro, Armand and Bigirimana, Jean-Bosco .16-03-2010
Coalition for Peace in Burundi (COPA)	Nsengiyumva, Sylvere. 23-03-2010
Benevolencija	Batungwanayo, Aloys. 07-04-2010
Centre d'Alerte et de Prévention des Conflits (CENAP)	Ndayiziga, Charles. 24-03-2010
Jamaa	Tuyaga, Adrien. 13-04-2010
Association de Lutte Contre la Delinquance et la Pauvreté (ALDP)	Katumbulu, Anaclet. 14-04-2010
Infeld. 30-3-2010.	22 years old man from Kinama. Mixed background.
Hussein, 10-03-2010.	20 years old man from Kinama, Hutu
Patrick, 16-04-2010	21 years old man from Kamenge. Mixed background.
Floribert. 18-03-2010.	20 years old Congolese man, from Kamenge.
Eddy. 25-03-2010.	21 years old man from Kinama. Hutu.
Amandine. 16-04-2010.	28 years old female from Cibitoke. Tutsi.
Armand.	
09-04-2010/ 20-04-2010.	21 years old male from Ngagara. Ganwa.
Copain Bonaventure.	24-03-2010. 26 years old man from Ngagara. Tutsi.
Felix.	24 years old man from Cibitoke. Tutsi.





## **Annex- Transcripts Interviews**

- **Kamenge - Nyange, Floribert. 18-03-2010**
- **Kinama - Butoyi, Hussein, 10-03-2010.**
- **Ngagara -Nyonsaba, Copain Bonaventure. 24-03-2010**
- **Cibitoke- Hakizimana Felix, 21-04-2010.**

### **NGO's**

- **Centre Jeunes Kamenge (Cejeka) Projet Paix et Réconciliation- 12-04-2010.  
(Harushimana, Guillaume)**
- **Coalition for Peace in Burundi (COPA) 23-03-2010 (Nsengiyumva, Sylvere)**

In this annex a representative sample of the interviews that were conducted are included. From a total of nine interviews with local youth, four interviews are included in this annex, each from a different neighbourhood. Furthermore, two interviews with local NGO's are included. These two NGO's were chosen according to the methods they used, -as the Centre Jeunes Kamenge mainly focuses on contact and Coalition for Peace in Burundi is more concerned with dialogue and development- and the general quality of the interview.

All interviews are transcribed in French. The questions are displayed in italics and between brackets, while the answers are displayed in a normal lay-out.

## Kamenge

- Nyange, Floribert. 18-03-2010

*(Tu peux commencer à raconter un peu de votre histoire, tu es né ou, comment c'était avant la guerre, après la guerre).* Je suis né le 30 juin 1990. Je suis né ici au Burundi, ici à Kamenge. Quand je suis né, après trois ans ici il y a eu la guerre. Nous avons fui au Congo, parce-que c'est notre pays d'origine. *(En 93 ?)* Oui, en 93-94. Mes parents sont du Congo, ils sont des Congolais tous. Après avoir été reparties au Congo, j'ai commence mes études la bas, l'école maternelle en 1996 à 6 ans. J'ai commence la première année primaire en 1998. J'ai fait 5 ans au Congo et en 2001, je suis revenu ici, quand la guerre était terminée. *(C'était vraiment termine ?)* C'était vraiment termine... pas vraiment. Parce-que, il y avait des quartiers ou il y avait une destruction totale... comme à Kamenge, à Cibitoke... Les quartiers Nord. Donc on est retourné dans les quartiers du sud, c'est la ou... On vivait avec ma mère, parce-que ma mère a divorce avec mon père, quand j'avais peut-être deux ans. Puis, ma mère a décide de marier un autre homme, elle a eu un enfant qui est ma sœur, une petite comme ça une petite comme ça, maintenant elle a l'âge de 12 ans. *(Mais le nouveau mari de ta mère, il est Burundais ?)* Non il est Congolais aussi. Est mon père aussi il a décidé de marier une autre femme, mais je n'étais pas avec lui au Congo, je vivais avec mes grand parents, et quand je suis retourné ici j'ai commence à vivre chez ma mère. Après quelques ans, ma mère a décide de m'envoyer au Congo, donc j'ai fait ma première année de l'école secondaire la bas. Puis la deuxième année secondaire, en 2003. Et puis, quand j'étais au Congo... C'était la ou j'ai entendu que ma mère était morte... C'était une maladie de muscle. J'ai oublié le terme qu'on utilise. C'était en 2004. à la fin de 2004. Donc je suis retourne encore. C'est la raison pourquoi je vis encore chez mon père. Jusqu'à maintenant j'ai vécu chez mon père... *(Lui, il était à Kamenge tout le temps ?)* Oui, seulement ils ont construit des maisons, les gens commencent à retourner... De temps en temps ils retournent, les bus commencent à arriver. Le bus n'arrivait pas jusqu' ici, c'était juste là. Ils ne voulaient pas aller vers le nord parce-que peut-être il arrive des grenades ..... Les choses commencent à s'établir... les choses se sont établies en 2004. C'est grâce aux choses du centre que les choses ont commencé à être bien. Les amis se rencontrent ici, ils discutent, ils font des conversations concernant la vie, la paix. En fait. Les ethnies, les différentes ethnies se rencontrent ici, les différentes religions, les différentes troupes, le centre ici a organise tout. Il a organise des rencontres entre les gens pour pouvoir bien vivre ensemble. En 2005 on avait un nouveau président, on a commence la démocratie. C'était Pierre Nkurunziza... Maintenant son mandat va se terminer parce-qu' on va organiser les deuxièmes élections. Bon... Ma vie je pense que je vis dans les quartiers Nord depuis, depuis 6 ans.

*(Je sais que tu étais très jeune quand la guerre à commence, mais tu connais les changements d'avant la guerre et après la guerre ? la vie a change beaucoup ?)* Oui, elle a change beaucoup. Donc avant la guerre et après la guerre, comment les choses sont allées. Donc avant la guerre, il y avait la guerre partout, dans le quartier Nord, il y avait des morts, des massacres, ça c'est en 93-94. *(Donc pendant la guerre)* Donc, aucun droit n'était respecte. Ça, c'est avant la guerre *(avant ?)* avant la guerre. Aucun droit n'était respecte, parce-qu' il avait la dictature... Les tutsi, ca. *(Avec l'Uprona)* avec l'Uprona, le Frodebu.. Parce-que le CNDD est un nouveau parti. Ce que je peux te dire d' avant la guerre, pendant la guerre.. .... Il y a eu beaucoup de massacres, on avait perdu des membres de famille, mes oncles, mes grand- parents, nos arrière grand- parents étaient morts *(de toi ?)* oui, j'ai perdu beaucoup de membres de ma famille.. Mes oncles.. *(Mais ils n'ont pas fui au Congo ?)* Oui ils avaient fui mais s' ils sont attrapés en route, on les a tues sur le champ. Si tu avais la chance de fuir tu fuyais, mais s'ils t'attrapent tu étais tue sur le champ. *(Donc pour toi c'était un peu le bonheur)* oui parce-que nous avions des mères qui nous portent sur le dos.. Nous avons eu la chance, c'était grâce à Dieu que nous avons atteint la frontière du Congo. Mais les autres qui n'avaient pas la chance d'échapper sont tues. Si tu étais de l'autre ethnie t'étais tue sur le champ. *(Mais la rébellion à Kinama et Kamenge était Hutu, ce n'était pas eux qui ont tue les gens qui essayaient de fuir, oui ?)* Non, ils ne viennent pas de Kinama et Kamenge. Il y avait des gens de Cibitoke et Ngagara.. Les groupes de Kamenge et Kinama. Des groupes sont venus à Cibitoke pour tuer sur le champ, si t'étais de Cibitoke tu allais à Kinama pour tuer. Et les gens de Ngagara avaient un conflit avec les gens de Kamenge. Mais ils n'ont pas tue les femmes.. Seulement les hommes. S'il s voyaient un homme, ils croyaient que tu étais un rebelle. C'est

la raison pour laquelle on te tue sur le champ. C'est pas parce-que tu es un refuge. Et si tu avais la mauvaise chance d'être un hutu, on te tuait sur le champ. Et si t'étais un tutsi et te vois avec un hutu tu étais tue sur le champ. Grace a dieu on a eu des élections et on a élu un nouveau président. Je pense que, dans les élections qui viennent, si une fois il n'y aura pas une autre guerre, si on arrive à organiser bien les élections, qu'a vote un président..... parce-que, pour le moment on a 44 partis, tu vois. Et les 44 partis politiques, tous veulent gagner ! Tous veulent gagner ! Sauf que, il y a des partis qui ont les moyens, ils sont financés par des autres.. Je ne sais pas quoi, des autres.. Sponsors, d'autres organisations.. Il y a d'autres partis qui n'ont rien. Ces partis qui n'ont rien peuvent être, s'ils ne veulent pas échouer, ils peuvent utiliser leur force.. De faire la guerre. Ils ne peuvent pas avoir un échec.. Ils peuvent encore se venger. Pour faire encore de.. ca c'est, ca c'est ce que je pense moi.. C'est le grand risque des élections. S'il n'y aura pas de guerre je pense que toutes les choses vont bien s'arranger. Après la guerre il y avait encore la dictature avec Buyoya, il est entre au pouvoir en faisant un coup d'état. Après, en 2004, il y avait un autre président qui s'appelle.. Tu as entendu qu'il y a un président qui était incarcère ? Il avait fait une sottise, en fait il a baissé le budget du gouvernement ( ? ) donc on dit qu'il a pris l'argent du gouvernement pour s'enrichir . Il avait son vice -président il s'appelle Marie Kadege. Alfons Marie Kadege ils ont été pris tous les deux, et pris dans la prison et incarcérés et torturés. Comment d'argent je ne sais pas quoi..(Il est torture pourquoi) parce-qu'ils sont accusés d'avoir vole du gouvernement c'est ca.

Après la guerre je peux dire que certains droits ont commencé à être respectés, mais ce ne sont pas tous les droits. Ici au Burundi on n'a pas les droits des hommes et des femmes.. parce-qu'on considère les femmes comme un outil de travail, il n'y avait pas les droits des femmes, il n'y avait pas les droits des enfants.. Il n'y avait pas de droits civiles, il n'y avait pas le droit des réunions, il n'y avait pas le droit politique, si tu faisais seulement des activités politiques t'étais tué sur le champ. Si une fois, tu te manifestés pour savoir ce que la politique veut dire.. Tu veux commenter un autre parti, ce qu'il fait, l'autre parti, cela tu avais beaucoup de problèmes parce-qu'ils ne voulaient pas que tu parles de ca.(*il n'y a pas la liberté d'expression*) pas de liberté d'expression, pas de liberté de se parler, il n'y a pas la liberté de se promener, tu vois ? Toutes ces libertés n'étaient pas respectées pendant la guerre. (*J'avais une question, j'ai entendu de quelques garçons d'ici, que la vie était meilleure pendant la guerre*) Ah concernant la vie, c'est autre chose. Alors, pendant la guerre, si nous parlons de la vie quotidienne c'était bien. On vivait bien, on ne manquerait de rien. Pendant la guerre, parce-que, la toutes les choses étaient, a bas prix. Mais maintenant, tous les choses ont augmenté .(*pourquoi le prix était bas ?*) Il y avait beaucoup de ressorts. Tu vois la route qui va de l'intérieur du pays. Il était ouvert ! Il n'y avait pas de frontières il n'avait pas de barrières ! Pour le moment il y a beaucoup de barrières ! On paye beaucoup de taxes !taxe de route, taxe de marchandises .. L'argent va au gouvernement (et après, l'argent va ou ?) ah, le gouvernement il construit les grandes maisons.. C'est vraiment..pff. (*Et pour les droits, a ton avis, quel droit est le plus respecté aujourd'hui et quel droit est le moins respecté ?*) Je pense, le droit qui est le plus respecté ici, est le droit de famille, et le droit d'éducation. Parce-que, même le président, le jour qu'il est arrive au pouvoir, il a dit d'aujourd'hui que je suis au pouvoir, toute l'éducation sera gratuite pour tous les élèves, ca c'est le droit d'éducation. Aussi le droit de la famille, il a dit quand il est entré au pouvoir, toutes les femmes accoucheront gratuitement. Les droits qui ne sont pas respectés.. Eh(*c'est quoi les droits qui sont le moins respectés?*) eh, le droit de la vie politique.. ca c'est un droit qui est vraiment bas. (*Ce n'est pas vraiment une démocratie oui ?*) Non, ce n'est pas vraiment une démocratie.. Parce-que nous sommes dans le chemin de démocratie.. Mais on n'est pas encore arrive.. Parce-que, quand tous les droits seront respectés, en ce moment la nous avons une démocratie. Pour le moment il n'y a pas une démocratie.. (*Comment ca se passe pour le moment.. avec la vie politique ?*) Pour le moment.. Les partis politiques existent dans tout le pays..Ils sont divisés partout, dans chaque commune, chaque zone.. Chaque personne a son parti politique.. Donc les partis politiques n'ont pas une région au bien une commune.. Si toi tu es un FNL, moi je suis CNDD, on vit comme ca.. Chaque un a son parti politique, c'est comme ca qu'on vit. Concernant les partis politiques.. Il y en a quelques -uns , qui sont en haut des autres, ceux qui ont beaucoup de moyens. Ils sont quatre. Il y a le parti au pouvoir, le CNDD-FDD... je pense qu'il a cinquante pourcent des votes de la population.. parce-qu'ils sont au pouvoir. (*Que' est-ce qu'ils font pour convaincre la population ?*) En fait.. L'autre président.. Il est aussi du CNDD.. Il y a un système de plantation des arbres, il va dans toutes les provinces et il plante des

arbres, tu vois ? . Puis, quand il voit que dans certaines provinces on n'a pas planté d'arbres, ils plantent des arbres, ils construisent des écoles, des hôpitaux.. C'est la raison pour laquelle les gens l'aiment, il veut que le parti reste au pouvoir pour avoir des avantages.. Ils plantent beaucoup d'arbres, ils construisent des hôpitaux, ils donnent l'alimentation aux pygmées ou aux Bantu a l'intérieur du pays, il les aide beaucoup, c'est la raison pour laquelle il y a beaucoup de gens.. Donc ici en ville, presque la moitié des hôpitaux sont de CNDD-FDD. Est-ce que je peux dire. *(Et le support du CNDD, se localise dans quelques communes ?)* Ehm, il y a des permanences, ici à Kamenge, j'ai déjà vu 11 permanences. Des différents partis politiques.. Donc des bureaux. Des partis politiques. Si tu es d'un parti et son bureau est là, tu peux aller là, tu peux discuter.. Si tu es d'un autre parti, tu peux aller à l'autre.. Tu peux discuter avec les gens de votre parti.. Concernant la vie politique.. *(Mais à Kamenge, le CNDD est le plus grand parti ?)* Oui, parce que ils ont la permanence ici tout près.. Et le deuxième parti est le MSD.. *(Donc ils sont deuxième)* dans tout le pays ils sont le premier parti.. *(Mais à Kamenge ?)* À Kamenge je pense qu'ils sont le troisième.. Le deuxième est le FNL. *(Qu'est-ce que le parti fait ici en Kamenge ? Ils plantent des arbres aussi ?)* Non en fait, ici ils font des meetings, tu vois ? Ils donnent de l'argent pour les attirer, ils donnent de quoi à manger, pour qu'ils viennent donner leur voix. Donc.. Le problème qui existe pour le moment, pour les prochaines élections, c'est que les gens peuvent te faire des menaces.. Tu vois, ce que j'ai vu en ville là, il y avait quatre ans que nous discutons, ils disaient..... Au Burundi que leurs partis, par exemple moi je suis de FNL, je viens de citer dans le publique..le FNL oh !La si je suis d'un autre parti.. Tu vois il y a des menaces *(des provocations ?)* des provocations oui des provocations, même s'ils peuvent se battre, si ils viennent de se mettre en colère, pour défendre leur parti *(ca c'est fréquent à Kamenge ?)* non à Kamenge ce n'est pas fréquent parce-qu'ici, à cause du centre, toutes les idées là, que des partis nous foutent dans la tête. On a appris à vivre ensemble, on nous enseigne ici comment tu vas voter, pour connaître un beau parti (...) on t'enseigne comment tu peux vivre après la guerre...comment on peut avoir accès au droit, les libertés fondamentales... concernant la démocratie..On a une définition, c'est le pouvoir du peuple, pour le peuple, et par le peuple.. Mais ce n'est pas pour le peuple, non c'est pour le président.. Ce n'est pas pour le peuple par le peuple, ici c'est pour le président. C'est le président qui décide. (...) pour la vie quotidienne, le transport ici en ville c'est bien.. Le bus est bien. Mais tous les prix avaient monté. Il y a beaucoup de changement, d'augmentation de prix. C'est une grande conséquence qu'on a eu au Burundi. Un Fanta sucre.. ça coûtait 250 francs.. Avant la guerre. Pendant la guerre avant la guerre. Après la guerre et maintenant c'est 400 francs. Et le bus, on payait 150 francs (nu 200-250)*(la pauvreté a augmenté ?)* oui en fait.. Je pense que l'homme qui touche le prix bas dans la journée, il touche bien 2000 francs.. Donc la pauvreté a augmenté de plus en plus. Parce-que, pour avoir la nourriture il faut avoir, de l'argent, pour manger il faut avoir de l'argent. Parce-que ici on ne cultive pas beaucoup.. Dans l'intérieur du pays on cultive beaucoup. Les gens d'intérieur amènent les aliments ici pour les vendre..Quand à la route il y a beaucoup de bastions, ils réussissent à augmenter le prix..Donc la conséquence ici est seulement.. Il y a beaucoup de pauvreté. C'est la raison pour laquelle beaucoup de personnes te demandent.. Muzungu muzungu. Même ici au centre il y a des jeunes qui peuvent te demander si tu as quelque chose pour aider, moi je ne sais quoi, j'ai faim.. Tu peux me donner un peu d'argent, que moi je peux survivre.. Mais tout ça, ce n'est pas de leur faute, c'est la pauvreté. Ils n'ont pas accès à ce qu'ils devraient manger. (.....)

*(Comment on peut surmonter la pauvreté ? il y a des groupes qui peuvent surmonter plus facilement que les autres ?)* Oui, si tu es un politicien tu peux surmonter plus facilement.. Tu as les moyens pour arriver dans la vie. Tu as la chance de monter à la vie la plus haute. Aussi d'autres gens comme les commerçants, ils font du commerce seulement pour avoir de la nourriture.. Ils peuvent faire quelque chose. Ici aussi pour arriver à quelque chose il faut étudier. (...) ca c'est la raison pour laquelle tous les gens ici étudient.. Quand tu n'as pas fait une étude, tant pis pour toi. *(J'ai entendu que pendant la guerre, mais aussi avant la guerre, il n'y avait pas beaucoup d'éducation par exemple pour les Hutu. Il y a encore des différences entre les deux groupes en parlant d'éducation ?)* Oui maintenant ça donne la différence, parce-que pour le moment, maintenant ils ont commencé à étudier, ont eu accès à l'éducation.. Comme tout le monde.. Avec le système que tout le monde peut étudier gratuitement. Tout le monde a accès, même les Tutsi et les Hutu. (...) même le gouvernement, la majorité de gouvernement est Hutu.. 60 pour cent. *(Mais c'est structuré oui ? 60 pour cent Hutu et 40 de Tutsi ?)*

Oui c'est structuré. Parce-que, à partir de la politique..Beaucoup de gens surtout dans la politique et les autorités le font pour leur propre intérêt. Même s'ils ont des moyens, ils le font pour leur intérêt.(..) c'est les intérêts qui sont prioritaires.. (*Donc tu peux monter par la vie politique. Es-ce que cela est une raison pour joindre un parti politique ?*)C'est la raison pour laquelle beaucoup de gens se bagarrent, parce-que si ton parti politique vient de passer , il aura aussi une autorité encore pour donner des avantages.. Donc si tu restes membre d'un parti politique qui monte, toi aussi tu montes. C'est ça la guerre qui existe la bas. (*C'est ça que donne les problèmes maintenant*).. Oui.. . Mais moi je ne suis pas Hutu, même Tutsi, je ne suis pas Tutsi. (*Parce-que tu viens du Congo*) Oui, je viens du Congo.. Parce-que, le caractère de Tutsi je le connais. Le caractère des Hutu je le connais. Les Hutu ils sont.... je m'en fous, ils ne s'intéressent à rien. Mais les Tutsi ils ont un caractère, qui n'est pas valable à la société. Ils peuvent avoir un conflit avec toi..Ils ne vont pas te le dire, mais ils vont seulement te faire du mal. En secret. Mais un (tutsi, maar bedoelt hutu) Hutu a un conflit avec toi, il peut te dire la vérité.. Moi j'ai un conflit avec toi, c'est comme ça c'est comme que la paix existe, faisons ça ici, faisons ça ici. Si tu veux.. . Donc un Hutu est ouvert, mais un Tutsi est toujours fermé. C'est ça. (*Pourquoi c'est comme ça tu penses ?*) Je pense que c'est comme ça parce-que.. Eh.. Pour voir un Tutsi c'est plutôt plus facile. Parce-que les Hutu ont un nez qui n'est pas, qui n'est pas long.. C'est comme ça qu'on les distingue. Si tu vois quelqu'un qui a un nez long donc.. (*Moi je pensé que c'est plus mêlé maintenant, et tu ne pouvais pas le voir ?*) Tu ne peux pas le voir ? Oui, si tu es habitué à vivre ensemble ça se voit. Seulement parce-que.. Les Tutsi, il y a eu des mélanges.. Pour le moment les Tutsi se marient avec des Hutu.. Si ils ont fait des enfants, tu ne peux pas les distinguer d'où il vient. Donc l'enfant est de deux ethnies. C'est nous les jeunes d'aujourd'hui qui, après la paix, après avoir fait la paix, avons commencé à nous marier.. C'est la raison pour laquelle nous on profite de ces mariages, de mélange. (*Mais ils sont plus jeunes ?donc c'est la génération prochaine ? la génération qui sera mêlée ?*) Oui ils sont plus jeunes.. Ehm.. Oui. La génération qui est mêlée ce n'est pas la génération qui existe aujourd'hui, mais c'est la génération qui existait pendant la guerre . Mais la génération d'aujourd'hui.. Tu ne peux pas distinguer parce qu'ils sont presque semblants. Parce-qu'ils sont mélangés.. (*Maintenant ?*) Oui maintenant. (*Tu vis à Kamenge, c'est mêlé maintenant ? à Kamenge ?*) .. Eh Oui. Oui, ce conflit existe encore mais on ne le manifeste pas quoi.. On le fait en secret. (*C'est un conflit de quoi.. de confiance ?*) Des ethnies seulement.. (*Comment tu peux le voir.. le conflit ?*) En fait tu peux le voir si.. Par exemple, quand les équipes de football.. Il y a des équipes de tutsi seulement.. Quand tu es Hutu tu ne peux pas jouer la bas. Les équipes de basketball.. Tu ne peux pas jouer la bas parce-que tu es Tutsi et il y a seulement des Hutu (c'est aussi ici au centre ?) oui.. Non pas dans le centre.. Dans la, dans le quartier. Par exemple nous, on a une autre équipe de football, je pense que tous les majoritaires sont des Hutu.. Je pense deux ou trois Tutsi. Et la, c'est comme ça que ça marche. Il y a aussi une autre équipe de football la bas ou il y a seulement des Tutsi (*à Ngagara ?*) oui à Ngagara.. Pas à Cibitoke c'est à Ngagara. Aucun Hutu n'est dans leur équipe. Donc si tu vois les choses comme ça tu peux distinguer que les différentes ethnies existent encore. (*Comment ça marche. Quand il y a une équipe ou la majorité est Hutu, ils ne veulent pas des Tutsi ? Il les tutsi ne viennent pas ?*) Seulement, les Tutsi ne s'intéressent pas. Seulement que les Tutsi ne s'intéressent pas aux Hutu. Ils ne veulent pas. Donc ils savent.. Je ne sais pas quoi dire.. Ils ne veulent pas participer dans un groupe Hutu. Mais les Hutu ne veulent pas même participer dans un groupe des Tutsi.. Tu vois. Même dans un cabaret tu peux trouver.. Vous êtes tous en train de boire une bière.. Tu vois un groupe comme ça, qui boivent seulement c'est un groupe de Hutu.. Tu ne peux pas aller rapprocher. S'il y a tes amis tu peux rapprocher et parler.. C'est comme ça, mais si tu es un Tutsi et tu viens dans un cabaret, et tu vois à cette table il y a des Hutus, ah moi je ne peux pas aller la, je vais la ou il y a des gens de mon ethnie. Mais si tu ne peux pas les voir, si tu n'es pas habitué.. Et que tu vois seulement des gens.. Qui dansent sur la musique..Mais c'est qu'ils sont dedans.. Si tu es habitué tu peux dire la ou là.. Pas de problème. Mais pendant la guerre il y avait seulement les boîtes pour les Tutsi.. Les boîtes seulement pour les Hutu.. Tu ne pourrais pas aller à une boîte de tutsi si tu es un hutu. (*Et comment tous les gens peuvent savoir, vous avez un carte d'indentite ou quoi ?*) Non le visage seulement ! Ils se regardent par le nez.(...)

(*Et maintenant, quelle sont les influences qui ont un mauvais effet, qui donnent plus de division parmi les différentes ethnies et quels sont les processus qui peuvent mélanger encore ?*) Par exemple dans le sport.. .... , on fait tout ensemble.. À l'école aussi.. Tu peux te croiser avec les Tutsi, vous étudiez

ensemble (*et religion par exemple*) Oui dans la religion aussi il a des musulmans, des catholiques.. Il y a des catholiques qui sont de différentes ethnies.. Dans l'Islam il a beaucoup de différentes ethnies. (*Par exemple quand tu viens à une église, les gens qui visitent l'église sont mélangés ?*) Non pour le moment on a mélangé tous.. Si tu veux tu peux aller à la messe à Ngagara tu peux y aller.. Si tu veux aller à la messe à Kamenge.. Tu peux faire ce que tu veux .. Il n'y a aucun problème. (*Et la politique maintenant ? la violence entre les différents partis politiques, il y a un effet dans la division ethnique ?*) Moi, ce que je peux dire de la politique.. La politique que nous sommes en train de vivre maintenant, c'est une politique pour laquelle le président de la république lui même, affirme son responsabilité.. Il dit, si aujourd'hui, dans mon pays arrive quelque chose il sera dans ma tête, donc ils ne veulent plus avoir des conflits. Il fait tous ses actes, de planter les arbres, de construire des maisons pour satisfaire la population.. Pour montrer à la population qu'il a une bonne volonté de construire son pays. Pour le parti politique, il n'a jamais persécuté l'autre parti, parce qu'il est de l'autre parti politique. Non. Au contraire il dit au burundais seulement de bien choisir leur parti qui fait leur intérêt.. Pour bien diriger le pays.. (...) parce qu'il y a des politiciens qui disent que moi, quand tu votes pour moi, je fais.. gratuitement.. Et l'autre dit moi quand tu votes pour moi je vais faire diminuer le prix des aliments.. Diminution de prix. L'autre il vient, moi je vais faire .. C'est pour ça que le président a fait son discours, il a dit que tu ne dois pas voter pour les personnes qui disent comme ça.. Ils disent mais ils ne tiennent pas leurs promesses . Si vous voulez voter pour le parti qui est dans votre cœur, qui vous donne de la confiance . (*ça c'est aussi ce que la population fait maintenant ?*) Bien sûr, mais pas tout à fait. Il y en a qui essayent de chercher de l'argent. Ils donnent l'argent, et on leur donne sa carte d'identité.. C'est comme ça qu'on fait à l'intérieur du pays. Mais les gens qui viennent dans le quartier, ils te donnent 1000 francs 2000 francs.. Vous donnez votre carte d'identité, et puis ils prennent toutes vos cartes d'identité pour avoir beaucoup de voix. (*Tu donnes ta carte d'identité ?*) On t'achète ça.. Ils viennent, ils donnent l'argent et ils t'achètent ça. Et celui qui a ta carte d'identité, c'est lui qui va voter pour toi. (*ça c'est parce que il y a beaucoup des gens qui n'ont pas une carte d'identité ?*) Oui c'est ça, oui. (Donc ils viennent dans le quartier.. et) non ce n'est pas ici en ville.. C'est dans l'intérieur du pays. C'était même à la radio, ce qui se passe à l'intérieur du pays. (*Donc, il y a 44 partis politiques. Les 4 grands partis, ils sont mêlés aussi*) Oui ils sont mêlés ! Ils sont mêlés dans cette histoire. Malheureusement c'est le CNDD qui fait ce truc là à l'intérieur du pays, il faisait rassembler les cartes des électeurs pour les voler. C'est le président du CNDD qui a dit que les élections vont bien se passer, n'aie pas peur ! Cette phrase nous a fait beaucoup de chose. Donc ils vont gagner, par la paix, par la guerre, ils vont gagner. il avait dit par abord. Les élections vont se passer bien, n'aie pas peur. C'est nous qui avons le pouvoir, tout va bien se passer, tu vois ? tu peux l'analyser. C'est une phrase qui a trouble beaucoup de gens.. Pourquoi il a dit ça. Et à la fin nous avons appris ce qui s'est passé à l'intérieur du pays. (...) donc il a dit que, ils vont gagner les élections. Mais nous, on ne sait pas qui va gagner, parce-qu' on attend encore les élections. (... petite conversation de héros.. pas vraiment importante...)

Il y a un autre problème qui existe ici au Burundi. Tu vois que, dans le CNDD tous faisaient partie du gouvernement, mais tous n'étaient pas acceptés. Il y a eu des démobilisés, des soldats qu'on avait rejetés. Et dans le FNL aussi il y avait des soldats qu'on avait rejetés. Et pour, et avant de les rejeter on avait promis leur argent. Pour les démobilisés. Pourtant ils n'ont pas eu cet argent. Même le CNDD, même le FNL. Ils n'ont pas eu cet argent. Ce qui on eu cet argent.. Ils sont là, dans le gouvernement. Et ceux qui n'ont pas eu de l'argent sont dans la cité. Et ils ont encore leurs armes, si une fois ils .. Ils ont déjà dit, si ils ne paient pas notre argent, on va organiser une autre rébellion, on va encore, créer la guerre en Burundi. (*Donc ça veut dire, que les démobilisés va se séparer de CNDD et organiser une rébellion avec leur groupe*) Oui.. Par exemple il y a un certain Hussein Radjab. Il était président de CNDD-FDD, mais il est incarcéré trois ans, tu vois. Mais il a aussi son parti, il a aussi son parti le UPD. Et maintenant il veut, si on le relâche, il va continuer avec son parti, c'est l'autre CNDD, donc ils sont divisés en deux. Tu vois, et lui il est musulman.. Et toute la population musulmane est dans ce parti. Les gens de Buyenzi, de Buyiza.. Tous sont de ce parti de ce type. Même si il est dans la prison, on garde encore la possibilité (la dénoté ?) qu'il peut remporter la victoire aux élections. Donc les démobilisés là il sait que, any time, any day, ils peuvent faire une guerre. C'est comme ça qu'on attend ce qui va arriver. Seulement que, l'ONU les avait calmés.. L'ONU. Ils sont des Nations Unis et ils on dit non.. Pas de problème.. Vous ne vous vengez pas, on va vous donner votre argent. C'est

comme ça qu'ils attendent.. (..)Ce sera vraiment une période chaude, parce-qu' ils gardent encore leur armes, jusqu'à maintenant. (*Et qu'est-ce que ils font maintenant.. ils restent calmes ?*) Oui ils sont calmes, ils attendent les élections. Mais il y a surtout des voleurs armés dans le soir, ce sont eux, qui volent. Ils peuvent venir chez toi dans la nuit, tu donnes ce qui te reste de ton argent, tu fais.. Ou tu te suicides sur le champ.. comme ça. C'est la raison que tu attends les grenades la nuit. Il veut voler quelque part, il jette une grenade.. Il veut voler une moto, une chose dans une boutique.. Pour se nourrir. (*Mais maintenant c'est plus qu'avant.. les grenades et les coups de feu. Il y a aussi un peu de tension avec les élections tu penses ?*) Oui c'est comme ça.. On avait fait.. Même quand Camilla n'était pas encore venue ici, on avait fait comme deux ans sans entendre aucun feu. Aucune grenade, aucun fusil. (*Donc ils ne sont pas seulement des voleurs*) oui, la majorité se sont des voleurs.. (..)Ils jettent une grenade, il te tue sur le champ. Comme ça, c'est facile. Comme une mouche. Le mort ici au Burundi.. C'est rien. Il y a un garçon la, il a dit qu' on remercie Dieu qu' on est encore en vie.. Tu vois, c'est une phrase qu' on utilise ..... Tu sais que. Tous les moments tu peux mourir. C'est comme ça qu'on vit au Burundi. (*Donc pour le moment la plupart de la violence vient des voleurs*) Non parce que c'est dans le carare qu' ils volent. Ce n'est pas fréquent. Une fois par mois.. Les choses comme ça. Il y a aussi la police.. Elle assure la sécurité.. Même si tu peux écouter des fusils dans la nuit.. Ils sont entrain de chasser les voleurs. C'est aussi la police qui tire. (*La dernière fois tu as dit que il y quelques choses politiques aussi, tu as parlé de massacres secrets..*) Oui ça existe aussi. La tuerie en secret. Mais je ne sais pas ,dans la ville ça va, mais ce qui se passe dans l'intérieur du pays je ne sais pas vraiment. Dans l'intérieur il y a le conflit par exemple de champs comme ça, si tu es en train de cultiver chez le voisin ils viennent un soir .Ils te coupent avec une machette, seulement pour ça. (*Tu penses que la violence est plus normale à cause de la guerre ?comme une mode de vie ?*) Oui.. C'est une mode de vie.. Parce-que, tuer une personne est trop simple. Trop, trop , trop simple.

(..... petite conversation sur la liberté..)

.. Je pense que la liberté est entrain de changer maintenant. Parce-que, il n'y a pas la liberté de circuler partout, la liberté de s'exprimer (*il n'y a pas la liberté de circuler ?*) non quand tu vas a l'intérieur du pays, ils veulent voir ta carte d'identité.. Ils te posent beaucoup de questions.. Quand tu es né ou.. Etc. (pourquoi) ils font ça pour savoir que tu vas réellement ou tu dis que tu vas. (...) dans les quartiers nous sommes libres.. Dans la vie nous sommes libres.. Seulement que la police nous fait des menaces, si tu ne marches pas avec ta carte d'identité.. Elle va te demander si tu as ta carte d'identité, et si tu n'as pas, tu dois lui donner de l'argent.....c'est la corruption.....tout ça.... tu n'es pas libre (*mais dans les quatre quartiers, le police travaille bien ?*) Ils font la sécurisation de la population.. Mais ils ne font pas bien.. Quelque fois ils le font bien, quelque fois ils ne le font pas bien. Quand ils ne trouvent pas quoi manger ils commencent à menacer la population.. Ils passent dans la nuit et ils confisquent ton vélo. Chose comme ça. Et toi tu as peur de la..tu t'en fous. (*Ils sont quelques fois liés a un parti politique ?*) Oui ils peuvent être liés a un parti politique.. Ils sont dans le gouvernement, peut-être du parti au pouvoir. (*Mais par exemple, ils font des manifestations pour un parti politique ?*) Non les policiers.. Ils ne votent pas. Ça c'est une règle. Une loi. (...) ils sont des policiers qui ont fait la guerre, qui ont participé dans la guerre. Et maintenant ils sont des policiers, c'est comme ça. Ils gardent le même esprit.. de l'avant. (*Donc ils ont lutté pour un parti qui est un parti politique maintenant*) non.. Il y a beaucoup de policiers du CNDD, ils sont nombreux. Parce-que le CNDD a dit que vous, vous serez les policiers.. parce-qu' ils sont au pouvoir. (*ça ne donne pas des problèmes ?*) Non parce-qu' ici au Burundi.. Le parti qui a le pouvoir, il a vraiment le pouvoir. Tous les grands personnages sont de ce parti qui a passé.(quand un autre parti va gagner, il donne aussi des places a ses membres ? des policiers?) oui, dans la police et dans l'armée. Le chef d'état majeur doit être de ce parti. (*Et dans la justice ?*) Dans la justice c'est le même cas.. Donc dans tous les domaines, ils mettent leurs membres. Tu vois dans certains cas le magistrat peut être d' un parti et le fils peut être d'un autre parti.. Pour montrer qu' on a mélangé mais ce n'est pas le cas. (.....)

(*D'accord, pou la dernière question.. la réconciliation, ça veut dire quoi pour toi ?*)Ehm.. Pour moi la réconciliation, d'abord c'est se réconcilier. Se mettre ensemble, dialoguer.. C'est ça la réconciliation.. selon moi.. en plus la réconciliation, n'est pas appliquée.. dans notre pays. Parce que, les gens ne dialoguent pas.. Certains dialoguent, mais beaucoup ne dialoguent pas.. (*par exemple dans le centre..*) oui, ici on dialogue.. Ici on a la réconciliation.. On voit des films ensemble, et est dans la bibliothèque ensemble.. L'esprit est la pour le faire avec les autres. Et pour dire que tu la vis comme ça.. Et tu

peux dire a ton ami, ce sera bien quand tu viens au centre.. ca peut avoir des effets dans la commune.. Parce-que presque tous les jeunes des quartiers Nord, viennent ici.

## **Kinama**

- **Butoyi, Hussein, 10-03-2010.**

C'était comme ca, je recommence ou bien ? (*Non, tu habitais a Buyenzi etc.*) Donc j'étais a Buyenzi, et je dépendais de mon papa, mais malheureusement ses derniers jours, ca commence de pas bien marcher, et ca faisait ma mère beaucoup penser, comment trouver de l'argent... mwa, en fait ca me dérange, ca me dérange totalement. Et, je grandis et de l'année 98 comme ca, alors ma mère avait comme ca un autre homme...Alors. Ils se sont mariés (*sont divorcés?*) oui ma Maman et mon papa, et Maman a mis au monde un garçon. A 19.. Elle a mis au monde encore une fille et en 2004 elle a mis au monde une fille encore, donc nous sommes quatre. Alors, on est venu ici a Kinama, Alors, tu vois et la j'habite avec le papa qui n'est pas le mien, et la, je n'arrive jamais a s'entendre avec lui. (*Tu n'aimes pas*) Et je crois que lui aussi ne m'aime pas, et il pense que je profite de la richesse pour ses enfants tu vois... En fait je n'ai pas de maman et papa, tu vois ? Je ne les aime parce que les ans que nous sommes ici c'est elle qui arrive à payer l'argent scolaire, tu vois. Et même avant, je dépendais de moi même je vous dis ca parce que, je veux te dire Laura, j'ai commence l'école maternelle, aucune personne de ma famille, est venue me dire, Hussein to vois un plus un égalent deux, non ? Jusqu'a maintenant, moi-même, si j'arrive à comprendre l'école, ok, mais je ne comprends pas bien, je n'arrive pas a demander a une personne tu vois mes amis, non non, c'est comme ca. (*Mais tu viens ici peut être ah..*) Oui oui oui, parce que moi je peux dire que j'arrive à m'élever moi-même. Parce-que aucun jour ma maman ou mon papa m'ont approche pour me dire Hussein, le chemin que tu es en train de suivre n'est pas bon. Je fais, tout ce que je fais, ..... si ma maman et mon papa, si nous sommes à table on se parle jamais... (*Donc c'est pour ca que tu dois avoir une maison toi-même*) Oui, est c'est pour ca que j'avais dit que je veux être un bon père. Parce-que j'avais raison...J'avais toujours trouve l'argent..

Mais depuis que j'étudiais en ville, il m'a jamais manque d'argent, jamais.moi même je n'arrive pas a comprendre... même elle ma maman, elle ne m'a jamais vu me voir demander, maman, j'ai besoin d'argent... je crois qu'elle pense que je travaille quelque part mais... nulle part. En fait je disais souvent que la vie se donne, à n'importe quel moment elle va se donner. Quand je refuse, la vie va refuser... Mais si on fait la vie, elle va se donner. Parfois, il y a beaucoup de gens, de jeunes qui sont désespérés... C'est que beaucoup de gens ont des rêves, et ils veulent, tu vois ?Ils ont besoin de faire quelques chose, ok, aujourd'hui je vis dans des mauvaises situations, mais je pense que demain je vais l'avoir, des milliers ont des espoirs ok ? (*oui c'est bien parce que il y a beaucoup de gens qui n'ont pas d'espoirs*) les problèmes, les problèmes qui sont la, avec les problèmes qu'on rencontre dans sa vie, tous les vœux qu'il avait, les rêves qu'il avait vont être détruits. Alors la, oui, Par exemple, un rêve tu demandes, moi j'ai un rêve de construire des maisons.. J'arrive à trouver de l'argent> quand je la construis, je commence par la fondation, je vais monter au moins vingt briques.. Et ca tombe. (*Pourquoi ?*) eh, soit le vent, soit la gelée, il y a des choses qui te touchent, ca n'arrive pas. Si tu touches.., maintenant j'ai touche vingt mille francs et je vais acheter le... mais, parfois il a disparu. Par exemple moi et ma maman, elle travaille, elle gagne de l'argent, mais si elle va à la maison..sjjj. Et t'avais des rêves, t'avais des espoirs.. Moi j'ai le rêve que j'achèterai quelques chose l'année prochaine mais.. Je pense que tu trouves, tu perds, tu trouves tu perds, ca te donne le désespoir. Et alors tout ce que tu as fait, les rêves que tu as faits vont être détruits. Donc je travaille pour l'argent que je gagne, la tu travailles sans espoir.

(*Quand tu t'es déplace a Kinama, c'était quand ?*)Alors en 1999. (*Pourquoi vous vous êtes déplacés à Kinama ?*) Parce-que, le mari de ma maman a achète une parcelle la, a Kinama, alors il voulait habiter la avec sa femme et ses enfants.. Alors ma maman a dit que je ne veux pas laisser mon fils la, donc alors nous allons partir ensemble. Comme ca, ils m'ont élève dans tous mes problèmes. (*Buyenzi était mieux ?*) Oui, quand je vais à Buyenzi, je suis bien. (*C'est plus riche ?*) non.. C'est parce que la, bon en fait c'est simple parce-que la, a Buyenzi, il y a tous les gens, tu ne trouveras jamais une grande maison, mais ce sont des gens qui ont de l'argent, tu arrives la, ils mangent bien il faisait bien, l'argent que t'as (... ?) tu arrives à manger le matin, le midi et le soir, tu dis merci, c'est bien... et même chez ma maman je suis bien mais je sais même si elle travaille, elle gagne de l'argent et elle croit qu'elle est



entraîn de gagner pour moi mais elle ne gagne pas pour moi parce qu'elle, elle est chez son mari, et son mari il a trois enfants.. Ils vont bien il est entraî de construire une grande maison, et tout cela c'est pour eux pas pour moi... moi je suis encore ici parce que je n'ai jamais de problèmes (...) Imagine toi, une fille... ils faisaient comme tu n'es pas ton enfant. Ou est-ce que ton enfant commencera sa vie... moi je déteste ça. Et quand la vie la, commence mal pour l'enfant, aussi va être mal élève, soit peut être il veut devenir un bandit parce-que personne de la famille...ne... *(Il y a encore beaucoup d'incidents de violence à Kinama ?)* Maintenant ? On dit, en fait, si nous allons prier on peut dire, peut être pendant les élections ça ne va pas être certain, c'est vraiment terrible.. Mais nous ne sommes pas sûrs que ça va aller, parce-que, les partis politiques sont là, ils sont plus divisés... le FNL, si tu as déjà entendu, et le parti présidentiel, ils ne s'entendent pas. *(Je ne sais pas si je peux demander, mais le quartier Kinama, c'est mêlé maintenant ? le Hutu et Tutsi habitent la ensemble, ce n'est pas un problème ?)* C'est pas un problème, maintenant, il n'arrivera pas une guerre de hutu et tutsi, non il n'arrivera jamais. C'est une guerre de partis politiques. Maintenant il y a des jeunes qui se bagarrent toujours parce que, son ami n'est pas dans un parti. Par exemple lui est dans le parti qui a le pouvoir et si un de vos amis est dans un autre parti, ils se fâchent... je peux dire, le parti qui a le gouvernement, a une grande majorité, mais malheureusement maintenant il est en train de perdre. Tu vois maintenant il y a beaucoup de partis *(oui 44)* oui, et malheureusement le parti qui est au pouvoir peut perdre pendant les élections parce que, tous les autres partis qui sont là, au moins 80%- 85% ils n'aiment pas le parti qui a le pouvoir. Alors, s'il arrivera à passer au deuxième tour des élections, peut être les partis qui sont là, vont donner les votes à un autre parti et le parti qui a le pouvoir peut perdre. Ça donne les problèmes, je crois que .. Tu vois il y a des démobilisés, alors les démobilisés ici dans les quartiers chaque démobilisé a son arme dans la maison. Cela ce sont des problèmes. Moi pendant les élections je vais fuir, je te dis, tu vois dans notre quartier de Kinama, il y a beaucoup beaucoup de FNL. Et ici à Kamenge il y a beaucoup de CNDD-FDD, le parti qui a le pouvoir. *(et Ngagara et Cibitoke ?)* En Ngagara et Cibitoke, ça c'est bon. Là il y a des Tutsi, les tutsi ne sont pas là,, nous *(c'est vraiment une lutte politique entre les deux partis Hutu)* Les Tutsi sont vraiment des gens qui sont sérieux et qui ont une grande intelligence. Une bonne intelligence. Parce-que...tu vois un jour il est arrivé un certain moment que, quand le parti au pouvoir est en avant, si lorsque ils sont partis dans le champ, quand on venait ici au cite, c'est bien eux qui sont allés chercher des amis, alors tu cherches un ami hutu avec un fusil, alors les tutsi étaient là, à regarder *(mais c'est pourquoi..)* ah alors, demande- toi, pourquoi à Ngagara, on ne se bagarre pas... Pourquoi à Cibitoke on ne se bagarre pas ? Parce-que, à Kamenge et Kinama toujours.. Ok, demande- toi, à Mutankura, jamais, à Kiriri on a jamais vu de bagarres, à Kinindo, jamais, jamais jamais.. ici *(Mais tu penses comme ils sont... d'accord, nous avons notre parti politique et ce que vous faites ne nous intéresse pas, quand vous voulez lutter entre vous-mêmes.. c'est bien.. c'est comme ça, ou... ?)* oh.. ok, selon moi, moi ce que je pense, ce que j'avais vu, c'est que je pense moi. Ok tu vois, les hutu avaient besoin et la soif du pouvoir, et le problème est que ce sont les gens qui si on irait là, au niveau d'argent, ce n'est pas encore arrivé.. Alors, quand ils avaient voulu, quand ils avaient besoin et soif du pouvoir, tu vois que les tutsi sont, ils ont laissé la place, et c'est mieux même quand on se chamaille encore? Entre eux, mais pendant le gouvernement des tutsi, tout était bien, tout était bien. (...) *(Pourquoi tu dis ça, pourquoi tu dis qu'ils sont plus intelligents ?)* Écoute, parce que, tu veux le pourquoi. En fait, le parti qui est étalé pendant les bagarres... donc la première rébellion c'était le viol, c'était en 1980. Ils sont allés aux champs *(il avait un grand incident à Bujumbura aussi)* oui, oui... alors, ils sont allés là avec, ils n'avaient pas leur chef, il s'appelle Gahutu Remi. Ils étaient là.. en 1993 et.. La question qui était là, pourquoi, cette rébellion a été fondée, pourquoi cette rébellion a été fondée. Parce que en 70- combien, il y avait beaucoup de massacres ici au Burundi, beaucoup, et les hutu, ils avaient, ils ont dit que nous ne pouvons pas accepter cela. Ils avaient un seul but, avoir la liberté, et le droit de travailler, tous tous tous. Ils sont allés aux champs, faire un peu de muscade dans la rue comme ça. En 1993, pendant qu'on a voté à Ndayaye, pendant la guerre, alors il a été fondé un parti qui s'appelle CNDD FDD. C'était le CNDD FDD qui avait un chef qui s'appelle Nkoma et le secrétaire général il s'appelle Hussein Radjab. *(C'était un musulman ?)* Oui, d'Hussein tu entendas parler beaucoup, maintenant il est en prison central. Alors, en 1996 il y avait la guerre au Congo, et à Goma on a été aidé par les Congolais. Et la bas au Congo, Hussein il voulait rester avec les soldats, un petit groupe de soldats, et à Goma ils étaient là ( ?) Hussein, il a fait un coup d'état, alors il a dit a

Goma, que toi tu restes la avec ton petit groupe a Goma, et nous allons rester avec le CNDD-FDD.. A Goma il est rentre les écouter, maintenant c'est deux CNDD-FDD. (..) Le CNDD de Hussein Radjab a élu un autre président qui s'appelle... j'ai oublié le nom. Et lui aussi, c'était mal entendu.. un coup d'état encore, il a pris le pouvoir (*ca c'était tout au Burundi*) oui, c'est dans la foret ou ca s'est passe, et ici, c'était la crise, pendant 93..nous avions une grande crise... mais, tu vois, pendant la crise, c'était la crise, mais on mangeait bien, nous arrivions a faire tout ce que nous voulions. Mais tu vois maintenant pendant la démocratie, ca va pas en fait, si moi je mange, je arrive à me divertir mais je suis sur que, peu de gens, ils le font, peu,... mais pendant la guerre, c'était bien ! (*vraiment ? c'était mieux pour vous pendant la crise ?*) Oui! Pendant la crise, tu demanderas à n'importe qui. Mais celui qui a eu un peu d'études, pendant la crise, tu demandes c'était comment pour vous, c'était bien .Les gens, pendant la crise, depuis 1993, c'était bien. (*Pourquoi ? il y avait plus de choses qui venaient du Congo, ou...*) Si mais, les gens arrivaient à cultiver, et la terre était bonne, bien cultivée, et nous avions beaucoup à manger, du riz, des haricots, on a mangé bien. (*À Kinama ?*) Non, en fait dans tout le Burundi, c'était bien pendant la crise, je te le dis, moi... (*Mais ca c'est incroyable*) haha, et oui... et la, le président qui était la, il s'appelait Buyoya. Et c'était un tutsi, mais il mangeait beaucoup d'argent du pays, mais nous, nous arrivions à vivre, on a, on vivait bien, c'était bien.. (*Mais c'est incroyable, quand tu lis in livre d'histoire par exemple, il y avait beaucoup de morts*) oui, les morts étaient la, si il y avait beaucoup de morts. Mais les gens qui devraient manger, ils mangeaient. Il y avait beaucoup de morts, je t'assure, beaucoup. (*Il avait un part de Kinama qui était détruit aussi, n'est-ce pas ?*) Beaucoup, en fait a Kinama toutes les maisons ont été détruites (comme a Kamenge) oui, et tous les gens sont allés au Congo, beaucoup (*et pour vous*) en 1994 on est allé au Congo, ici a Ulvira, et longtemps après, on est rentre ici (*a Buyenzi ?*) oui a Buyenzi... et en 99, a Kinama. Parce-que la on a passe au moins deux mois, et après nous sommes allés a Buyenzi. Maintenant quand tu marches à Kinama tu trouveras des maisons qui sont montées, mais ce n'était pas comme ca avant. Alors, le CNDD-FDD est venu en croyant que nous avons fait un bon gouvernement, ca ce passera bien, donc ils avaient fait leur propagande, c'était bien, ils avaient beaucoup de membres, c'était totalement bien .. Ils sont arrivés la, ca ne marchait pas bien comme il le fallait. (*Après avoir été élus ?*) Tu vois que, on a trouve certains membres des tutsi.. Maintenant, le chef d'état major est Tutsi. (... ) Lui ici tu vois comme il est, il ne paie pas, il ment... et c'est bien eux- mêmes qui commencent a s'entre- tuer, eux- mêmes. Alors, ou est-ce que nous allons ? Personne ne voit la ou nous irons.. Et maintenant, Hussein il est en prison. Et eux, maintenant ils commencent à regretter, pourquoi ils ont maintenant mis Hussein en prison. Parce-que, il est dans la prison mais il a déjà fonde son parti (*dans la prison*) même dans les quartiers, et il a des membres, les mêmes membres du parti au pouvoir. et ils ne sont pas surs que les membres sont du cote de Hussein ou du parti au pouvoir (*mais qu'est-ce qui se passe dans les quartiers maintenant, parce-que j'ai entendu qu'il y a des partis politiques qui veulent gagner les élections... les derniers jours, au moins, on dit qu'ils se bagarrent.. même avec des fusils (dans la nuit ?)*) oui pas pendant la journée, dans la nuit, a Kinama (il rigole), Kinama c'est terrible. mieux maintenant, mais avant a Kinama c'était terrible. Tu vois même moi, j'ai des amis qui ne me parlent plus. Parce-que, j'ai abandonne mon parti, moi. (*Parce-que, ils ont un autre parti ?*) Mais moi, je n'ai pas. Peut-être c'est comme ca, ok. Je vais comme vous voyez et moi je suis arrive nulle part, Et venir dans notre parti je ne veux pas... vous allez faire tout ce que vous voulez. (*Tu veux être neutre*) si, parce-que, ici nous avons fait la formation pendant le camp de travail, on a pu montrer que c'est bien les jeunes qui sont les victimes. Parce-que peut être que le parti qui avait échoué pendant les élections, et puis il dit non, vous vous êtes des hommes, vous allez faire des manifestations (...). Tu ne trouveras aucun boss la... pendant les manifestations. Mais nous les jeunes sommes la... peut être le moment arrivera qu'il y aura des morts. Pourquoi me laisser amener... j'ai dit non. Tu vois le problème qui est la, tous les partis ont les ligues de jeunes. Tous les partis (avec les armes ?) si...parfois surtout le parti au pouvoir. C'est terrible. (*Mais il n'y a pas un parti tutsi avec des jeunes armes qui essaient de faire quelque chose ?*) Ceux qui sont la : tous les partis qui sont ici ont des groupes de jeunes, par exemple le parti au pouvoir, les jeunes qu'ils ont, on les appelle les ligues de jeunes, a Kirundi on dit 'Imbonerakure'. Ce sont des gens qui voient de loin... en français. Et pour le FNL on les appelle... (*Mais ils font quoi les ligues de jeunes ?*) Tu vois la politique, on dit par exemple, ils parlent a l'étranger tu vois, de ce que nous faisons, c'est pour montrer aux gens que nous nous voulons garder cette génération, nous allons les faire des études, c'est bien eux le futur... tu vois ? C'est la politique mais ce

n'est pas vrai ! Et si tu regardes ça... tu ne peux pas aller prendre un vieux. De 60 ans, tu prends un jeune homme, c'est un problème il te dit, vous êtes le chemin, vous avez la force... tu vois, celui-là, fait l'organisation. Et les jeunes là ils sont beaucoup agiles, allons-y... est c'est des problèmes. Alors, moi quand je vois, je dis à un journaliste que ce n'est pas vrai, ce n'est totalement pas vrai. Les jeunes ce sont des jeunes qui ont de la méfiance, ils arrivent à faire tout. Ils ont toutes les possibilités de faire tout ce qu'ils veulent. (...) Alors, parfois ils peuvent faire des bagarres... on dit, tu la fermes, tu la fermes, ils commencent à pieu... directement... et c'est pas du tout bien, ce n'est pas comme un vieux, quand tu dis tu la fermes on s'arrête toujours. Ça ne peut pas avancer vers toi, mais les jeunes tu leur dis tu la fermes et les jeunes, ils avancent, ils avancent. *(Il n'y a pas une façon de résoudre le conflit sans violence, c'est ça ?)* Tu vois le parti qui était très dangereux ici, c'est le interehamwe ( ? ) qui a fait des massacres au Rwanda, c'est un parti Rwandais... c'est bien la première rébellion en Afrique qui avait la force... (.....) Le FNL c'était la troisième rébellion, qui avait la force. *(Ici, on parle beaucoup de réconciliation et tout ça. Pour toi, par exemple, ça veut dire quoi ?)* La réconciliation... pour moi la réconciliation... ehm, c'est vrai qu'ici, surtout dans les quartiers nord... on a eu beaucoup de divisions. Des jeunes... des quartiers différents. Quand il y avait, ces différences, alors le centre il a pu trouver certaines activités, et les moyens d'avoir cette réconciliation. Et moi aussi, quand je suis arrivé, quand j'ai mis mon premier pied ici au centre, j'ai passé certaines activités, je voyais des gens et, certains Tutsi, mais, à un certain moment j'ai su que lui, je peux travailler avec lui et avec lui, parce-que, ce n'est pas la même personne que j'ai trouvé dans la rue. Si il y avait beaucoup de problèmes, là à Kamenge si tu étais tutsi tu ne passes pas par la bas. *(C'était pendant la guerre ?)* Oui, Mais si tu es arrivé ici, on habite Hutu Tutsi ensemble. C'était bien. Sais pas que lui il est un tutsi oui... peut-être quand nous arrivions ici, on faisait semblant de ne rien voir, mais nous, nous savions très bien qu'ici c'est bien. Est certains gens pendant la guerre, ils avaient pris le refuge ici. Ni les Tutsi ni les Hutu, sont les ennemis ici ( ? ). Alors, la réconciliation, c'est savoir que tu peux travailler avec ta pression. Même si vous ne voulez pas vous avez les différences ethniques, les moyens d'argent... tous tous tous. Mais vous pouvez vivre ensemble, et vous parlez. C'est ça la réconciliation. Alors le centre a fait cela dans ce quartier. Par exemple, tous les terrains qui sont ici, on arrive tous à jouer ensemble. Par exemple moi, ici dans le terrain de volleyball, je joue avec les soldats... on arrive à jouer ensemble. *(Tu connais toutes les personnes qui ont lutté pendant la guerre ?)* bah.. En fait je les connais, mais... je les connais. Tous les leaders, Ce sont des leaders ( ? ) des partis politiques...tu vois ? Et maintenant ils sont arrivés dans... à leur place... ils ne veulent plus regarder derrière. Tu vois par exemple le chef de la documentation... la chef de la documentation il est membre, il est membre aussi du centre de jeunes Kamenge, et il est ne ici à Kamenge, et il est là, il est un boss mais il ne va pas dans son quartier. Lui il attend toujours quand... on commence le vote qu'il viendra ici... 'moi je suis de Kamenge !! oui oui !!'.. haha.. C'est toujours comme ça. Oui ? Il y fument. Quand ils ne fument pas, ils boivent. Quand ils ne boivent pas, ils font n'importe quoi. Et les gens vous connaissent très bien, tu vois celui là, il est dans le groupe de... tu vois, et ce n'est pas bien. *(C'est comme un gang ?)* oui oui... . Alors, moi quand je suis ici, j'arrive à me détendre, parce-que je peux faire tout ce-que je veux. J'arrive à parler à n'importe qui, j'arrive à trouver des amis, moi, à un certain moment j'ai déjà vu qu'un ami, il est plus important que mon frère, et que ma sœur. Parce-que ce n'est pas moi-même. Que j'ai quelques problèmes avec ma famille... mais... j'ai déjà vu qu'un ami, il peut me dire, beaucoup plus que mon frère. Il peut le faire. Ton frère il peut te dire, moi je ne veux pas te donner. Mais un ami, lui il peut te faire sortir là où tu es... un amis il peut t'aider. Beaucoup, beaucoup. Il est plus important que ma petite famille. J'ai trouvé beaucoup d'amis ici, beaucoup de choses que j'ai pu découvrir, les choses que je ne savais pas mais je pouvais savoir. Surtout la matière de la vie. Ce que moi j'ai pu connaître ici, c'est la maîtrise de soi. ( ? ) C'est connaître comment tu es. Moi je suis Hussein, si je bois, je bois au moins une seule bière. Si je bois trois, je commence à me bagarrer, ok ? Moi je m'appelle Hussein, si je parle avec une personne, il commence à faire monter la voix, là je me fâche, et puis on commence à se bagarrer. Mais si je peux me maîtriser, je me dirai, je vais boire une seule bière. Si je monte jusqu'à la troisième, je commence à me bagarrer. *(etc. min. 9-..Maîtriser soi-même, tu peux donner des exemples ? Au Camp de travail, les quatre personnes qui travaillent fort, les autres quatre ne font rien. Hussein était l'animateur du camp de travail, et a demandé aux quatre de faire quelque chose. Ils ont refusé, devenaient un peu agressifs.*

*Mais après, parce-que Hussein a dit que quand ils refusent tout le temps, ils ne pourraient plus jamais utiliser les facilités du centre. Après ils ont demandé pardon)*

*(Mais sais que les gens se bagarrent vite, je ne suis pas sure mais, ca c'est, peut être, aussi une mentalité qui vient de la guerre ?) Oui (ou c'était toujours comme ca ?) oui en fait la guerre a fait beaucoup de choses. La guerre avait fait les gens être un peu plus agressifs, ils ne se maitrisent pas. Tu vois par exemple le fleuriste, tu vois le fleuriste. Nous, on est parfois allé boire ensemble. le fleuriste, Patrick est Innocent . Parfois on se bagarre, la, parce-que, on se connait.. Tu fuis. Haha une fois, nous sommes allés à une fête, et le fleuriste a fait quelque chose a une fille... mais le fiance de cette fille était la, et est directement venu chez le fleuriste... et on s'est bagarre ! Et tous les gens qui sont sortis à l'extérieur et eux aussi ont commencé à se bagarrer avec n'importe qui... haha. Mais tout cela me montre d'abord, comment je vais me maitriser. (.....) (Mais c'est ce qui t'a aide à te réconcilier avec les autres) s'il n'y avait pas la réconciliation, je ne sais pas si je serai la même personne que je suis maintenant. Moi je suis musulman, et je vois bien les catholiques. Parfois on arrive à prier pour les gens qui nous ont quittés. Claudio m'a dit, si c'est la religion, qui te fait... donc, parce-qu' avant mes amis descendaient la, moi j'ai refuse de venir ici... alors, si la religion te fera la différence avec tes amis, tu dois rester dans la maison, parce-que tu n'es pas sur encore quand tu veux venir au centre. Moi je peux te dire que je suis ici au moins six ans. Mais, c'est pendant deux ans et demi que je vois mon intérêt ici au centre. Toues les années, je suis allé voir des films.. Tu vois ? J'ai joué quoi, mais je n'ai pas vu mon intérêt au centre, je ne savais pas ce que ca signifie le centre... j'avais dit même a Claudio la, c'était pendant le camp de travail. Je l'ai regardé... et il me demandait pourquoi te me regardes comme ca... Claudio moi, je voulais te dire : félicitations ! Il a rigolé.. Pourquoi ? Parce-que, tout ce que tu fais, moi-même je ne savais pas que out serait change sans le centre... je ne savais pas que mes amis représentaient l'avenir. Mais un certain moment j'ai pu découvrir, ca ce que c'est qu'est le centre. Et quand j'ai vu ca, toute cette organisation qui existe dans le camp de travail, c'est beaucoup. Imagine toi, ici il y a beaucoup de jeunes ils ont beaucoup de problèmes et il leur manque l'argent, Alors 4 brouettes, ca coute au moins 260.000 francs.. Et on te donne pendant qu'on crame le bois toute cette somme d'argent... imagine un jeune et on lui donne tout cela. Et tout ce qui est élémentaire... mais on dit, a midi tu dois amener tous le matériel au centre.. T'imagines cette confiance. La fidélité que Claudio a utilisé, je te donne l'argent n'importe quoi, mais tu dois le ramener, tu dois savoir que ca ce matériel d'ici, soit aujourd'hui tu le fais travailler, mais peut-être le lendemain c'est ton petit frère qui aide ton ami. moi je peux te dire que, je me donne pour le centre. Parce-que, moi si j'ai envie d'aller au Rwanda, Congo, n'importe où, je peux parce-que je ne manque pas d'argent pour y aller. Mais je travaille toujours au centre.*

*(Tu penses que le changement de comportement et de mentalité, comme tu as trouvé, est aussi présent dans ton quartier ? – si le changement de mentalité que vous, les jeunes, découvrez ici, passe par la commune entière ?) ..Heureusement si les jeunes viennent ici, peut être ils ont des problèmes dans leur quartier, mais ici... peut être quand ils quittent le quartier, ca retourne, les problèmes ( Quand par exemple il y aura une autre crise, ce serait possible que les gens dans ta commune aillent lutter encore une fois ?) Je sais très bien que beaucoup de gens, on connait la guerre. Ils savent ce que c'est que la guerre. Si il passe encore des gens pour les retirer, ca sera facile.. oh, ca sera difficile. (Pour trouver les gens qui veulent) qui veulent aller, piew piew piew. Beaucoup de gens ici ont connu la guerre.. Celui qui te dit fais encore la guerre, selon moi, celui la c'est une personne qui devrait être .....décapitée... (Il fait le geste de la décapitation). Peut-être quelques personnes, mais pas la majorité selon moi.*

Tu vois qu'il y a un projet de paix et de réconciliation .Par exemple tous les concerts et spectacles d'ici. Par exemple, quand je suis la, je vois quelqu'un d'un autre quartier, et après quand on se voit je dis salut. *(Mais tu parles aussi de ce qui c'est passé ?)* Je pense que beaucoup de gens pensent seulement à leur avenir. Parce-que beaucoup des gens ont beaucoup perdu. Si tu penses toujours en arrière, tu n'arriveras nulle part. Par exemple tu peux penser qu'avant j'avais une grande maison ici a Kamenge, ma maison a été détruite. Est-ce que je la construis encore. La guerre ne peut pas revenir pour la détruire encore une fois, tu vois ? La tu n'arrives nulle part. Mais si tu dis ok, la guerre est venue mais je veux la construire, tu penses toujours à l'avenir, tu peux arriver n'importe où. en a, ils sont des lutteurs... beaucoup beaucoup sont venus des quartiers Nord. Ils sont la, ils ne parlent,...jamais... de leur quartier, c'était avant. Mais maintenant tu ne peux jamais les voir (les

voir ?) s'ils passent dans leur voiture crado la voiture a été volée. Et ils passent. Toi, tu t'en fous mais lui il attend quand, le vote commencera, la propagande, ils viennent... oui, vous allez voter pour nous, vous allez voter pour nous. Moi je suis un jeune d'ici, je suis ne ici, et... toi. Ici quand tu es seul, tu vas faire ce qu'il va te dire. Mais tu vas le faire parce-que.. la vie euh.....

*(Vous êtes changé ? toi ? par les activités ?)* Moi, je peux dire si. J'ai changé. Parce-que je me suis demandé, tu vois maintenant si je reste dans la maison. Ou est-ce que j'étais maintenant, si je reste dans la maison. Soit je dormais, ou bien j'étais dans un ligala, tu entends ligala ? (non) c'est un groupe.. Tu vois, si tu vois un groupe dans les quartiers, ce n'est pas un bon groupe... si je peux être la bas je peux peut-être boire, si je peux être la bas je peux peut-être fumer. C'est un groupe du quartier... s'ils fument, ils

*(Mais ils veulent implémenter un tribunal de vérité et réconciliation ou un tribunal pénal ici.. tu as déjà entendu ?)* Oui. J'ai déjà entendu, parce-que. Le MONUC est venu ici. Non pas la MONUC, le gens de BINUB. On veut un tribunal. Mais ils sont entrain de dire ce tribunal, est-ce que. On veut des étrangers qui travaillent dedans ? Ou bien la population Burundaise... tu vois ? Donc il faudra voter. Pour ce tribunal, on va le faire. *(Tu pense qu'une commission de vérité ou un tribunal peut aider ?)* Si ca peut faire quelques chose, ca peut le faire mais... tu vois ca ce sont les faits... beaucoup de gens ont déjà, oublié le passé. Juste les burundais, on a besoin de la vérité et de savoir la vraie histoire. On n'a pas d'histoire. Il y a beaucoup de livres d'histoire, mais ici on n'a pas un seul livre histoire. Alors, nous devons savoir, d' ou sont venues les ethnies différentes, c'est ca que nous voulons savoir, la vérité... et il faut savoir la vérité pour pouvoir éviter une autre guerre. Tu vois par exemple le Rwanda, moi je ne crois pas qu'ils connaissent la vérité, parce que... écoute, au Rwanda, ils font cela, pour les Hutu. Mais ils oublient qu'ils avaient des Tutsi qui ont tué les Hutu... imagine toi. Comme moi j'étais venu te frapper, ce n'est pas a moi de le juger, c'est toi qui devrait me juger, moi je veux venir te frapper, alors si les Hutu ont fait des massacres, c'est parce-que les Tutsi ont fait des mauvaises choses. *(Et le tribunal ?)* C'est pour ca que j'ai dit, la commission de vérité, si elle peut être la, Ok, mais pas pour ca. *(Pas un tribunal criminel)* la on a dit, maintenant on va faire un tribunal qui s'appelle gachacha. Il y avait encore des gachacha, dans les années, nous avons dit, nous allons prier pour les gens qui nous ont quittes... la si t'étais la, quand tu ne pleures pas, ils te disent toi tu as fait les massacres... on te tue ! Il faut prier, tu dois prier et pleurer, si tu ne pleures pas. Imagine- toi ce tribunal... hé. Chez nous non. Complètement non *(il y a beaucoup de gens qui veulent oublier l'histoire ?)* oui... en fait je sais que je veux savoir l'histoire. Mais vraiment quand il y a une personne qui me dit qu'il veut savoir l'histoire. Il y a de bonnes et de mauvaises personnes .Quand tu dois retourner en arrière tu n'arriveras nulle part. Imagine- toi, au lieu de continuer, tu penses toujours au passé. *(Mais avec un tribunal de vérité ils vont examiner tous les incidents et toutes les crises.)* ca peut être encore amené des trucs je veux dire des problèmes. Ah nous avons tue, ils nous cherchent... que-est ce que nous allons faire... on va fuir d'ici !

(...Rwanda...)

Moi tu vois, je me demande .... Parce-que quand j'avais entendu...oh au Rwanda, les Hutu ont tue les Tutsi... ah bon... mais je me suis pose la question ... pourquoi ? (tu ne sais pas ?) Non je ne savais pas... mais ce que moi je pense, avant, les blancs quand ils sont venus ici, ont mesuré. Tu vas ici, ah toi tu vas étudier dans cette classe. Etc. Après certaines personnes se sont réalisées que ce n'est pas bien comme ca. Ok ? Ils ont créé une certaine force... parce-que... je crois que tu connais l'histoire. Un roi il est en train de coucher avec sa femme, et lui, il fait comme ca... .. Courage courage courage ! Ici t'arrives à savoir que les tutsi sont arrives pour se venger vraiment, c'est pour ca que j'ai dit, que la commission de vérité doit travailler. Pour savoir la vérité... .. Plus cette vie..... Et c'est vrai qu'ils sont très intelligents... jamais tu trouveras un tutsi qui se bagarre... mais les gens que tu trouves pour faire des bagarres... ce sont des Hutu. Tu vois le parti au pouvoir... il fait comme ca. Ils sont de leur même ethnie... il ne veut même pas laisser la place a l'autre ethnie. Et si tu ne veux pas aider ton prochain, qui va t'aider, toi ?

**Ngagara**

- **Nyonsaba, Copain Bonaventure. 24-03-2010**

*(Tu peux me raconter un peu de ton histoire? Tu est née ou, quand etc.)* Je suis née en 1984, à Ngagara. Mais je me suis déplacé aussi. (...) En 1986 je suis revenu ici, à Kamenge, pour un peu plus de deux ans. Parce-que, il voulait construire une maison plus grande, donc nous avons cherché une autre maison à Kamenge. Mais la situation financière a changé, donc nous étions obligés de revenir là bas, à Ngagara. J'ai fait mon école primaire à Ngagara, au quartier trois. (...) L'école secondaire je l'ai fait à Mutangana. (...) Apres, avant comme il avait la guerre... il y avait un système pour après l'école. C'est comme en Israël. Apres l'école tu dois faire une année de formation civique... tu apprends te défendre... d'être un soldat, c'est ça. *(À Ngagara?)* Non c'était dans tous le pays. C'est une formation militaire civique. Où tu apprends à aimer votre pays, à le protéger. (...) C'est comme ci tu es un réserviste. Mais, moi j'avais la chance, cette politique était abandonnée avant que je termine l'école secondaire. T'avais quelques études civique, mais oralement... pas comme avant. Mais quand même, je devrais attendre presque une année, après que les autres ont fini les études. Donc je devrais attendre au moins 7 mois. Apres j'ai commencé de fréquenter l'université nationale. *(Pourquoi ce système était termine?)* Parce-que ca couté trop de moyens... pour acheter des armes, pour s'habiller, pour le salarie etc. C'était en 2003-4 et la guerre est terminée... sans avoir des signes que la guerre se termine définitivement. Donc les réservistes il y en avait trop. *(Ok, et pendant la guerre, tu es resté à Ngagara ?)* Oui, j'étais à Ngagara. En octobre 93 quand le président était assassiné.. Tu sais ca ? *(oui, oui)* Ici dans les quartiers c'était encore un peu stable. Mais dans l'intérieur du pays les gens ont commence à s'entre tuer.. Tu sais l'histoire des Hutu des Tutsi. Donc à l'intérieur du pays, c'était la guerre. Mais ici à Bujumbura la guerre a commencé en 1994. Ici même à Kamenge, ici. La formation de rebelle. Tu connais le FDD ? *(La CNDD-FDD ?)* oui, ce sont des rebelle qui gouverne maintenant. *(Le nom était FDD seulement ?)* Avant il y avait des rebelles, du le parti de FNL. Mais ils n'habitaient pas ici. Ils habitaient en Tanzanie. Ils ne dérangent pas le pays...en Tanzanie. Oui, se mouvement débutant... en 83-84. C'est ca ? Ils avaient des militants très très très forts. Ils organisent à l'extérieur du pays. Les FNL *(ils étaient des refuges ?)* Ils étaient des refuges, soit des gents Hutu qui viennent de Tanzanie, il s'organisait sur le terrain militairement pour attaquer le pays, mais ils n'avaient pas suffisamment des forces. Quand Ndadaye... en 1994, le CNDD avait (...) ici même à Kamenge. Ils ont des fusils et ont commencé à tirer, et comme une armée ils étaient très très très forts. En moins de deux semaines, ils ont chasse le chef de CNDD. Mais après un mois, ils ont commencé encore. Et après deux semaines... tu vois les toutes ces maisons n'existaient plus. C'était une ruine. *(Ce n'était pas le FNL ?)* Non, c'était le CNDD, FNL était encore en Tanzanie. Ils n'étaient pas leur force. (...) Et pendant ca le centre existe. La vie était terrible... toutes les maisons étaient détruites. Mais à peu près 95... Le combat ici, donc les rebelles, sont monte sur les montagnes ici. A cette époque, tout le Bujumbura était comme divisé. Un parti pour les Tutsi, un parti pour les Hutu. L'Interbank là bas, c'était comme la limite... de ce côté c'était pour les Hutu, de ce coté c'était pour les Tutsi. Même à Cibitoke, c'était pour les Tutsi. Tu vois, tu connais la route ici, un parti était pour les Tutsi à Cibitoke, l'autre cote pour les Hutu à Kamenge. C'était pas du tout possible de traverser la. (...) Ngagara c'était pour les Tutsi. ca se continuer comme ca jusqu'en 95-96. (...) Il avait un président qui s'appellait Buyoya, Pierre Buyoya. Lui il a vraiment un peu stabiliser la sécurité...la situation... il a décidée que ceux qui ont tué un autre, vont aller à la prison, sur le champ. Mais tu sais que les rebelles ont tué beaucoup des gens, mais pas la population. (...) Moi j'étais en septième, encore en secondaire. Nous nous déplaçons, nous sommes passé par ce côté ici. Nous sommes pas passé par la bas (Kamenge)... il y avait quelques personnes ici, à Kamenge. Beaucoup étaient de réfugiés. Ici on se rencontrer avec quelques gents de Kamenge, Cibitoke. *(Donc tu as commence à venir au centre depuis 96 ?)* Oui c'était en 96. Et vraiment c'était cool. Arrivant comme ca, on voyait que, l'histoire des Hutu et des Tutsi n'ont pas d'importance pour nous. Ca commence à nous sortir de notre tête. Ici on joue vraiment amicalement, on organise des tournois..., compétition. (...) Ici dans la capital ca commencer a amélioré petit a petit. Plus parce-que, les gents d'ici ils ont fuit d'ailleurs, ils étaient entrain de construire des maisons, ils habitaient petit à petit. Et le père Claudio à organiser le camp de travaille... même ce sont des scouts qui ont organisé le travail comme ca. De construire des maisons. (...) En vacances... de juillet, ok on construisait des maisons, les gents ont commencé à revenir dans le quartier, les membres ont augmente ici. Et ils ont commencé petit à petit. Et les jeunes ne voyaient il voyait que (...) ce n'était pas un problème. C'était pour les politiciens. Mais entre temps, les rebelles ont continué à se battre, ils

ont amené la guerre dans les montagnes. Et dans les montagnes, surtout dans les autres provinces. *(Ce n'était pas à Bujumbura, c'était dans l'intérieur du pays ?)* Oui plus dans l'intérieur du pays, vers 97..la capitale a commencé à devenir être un peu stable. Mais sauf, les rebelles attaquent ici la capitale, le soir, ils viennent de ces montagnes que tu vois ici, venez attaques les positions militaires, et d'autres cherchaient dans la population de vivre, cherchez de quoi a manger, des habilles. (...) Ils attaquer dans le soir pour piller.. C'était comme ca, mais c'était un peut stable. *(Et ca à continuer jusqu'au quand?)* Ah, ca, le vol, ca continuais jusqu'au 2003. Les attaques rebelles... Bon, vers 95, 96,97, 98... En quelques provinces, il avait la guerre. Mais ici, le centre c'était vraiment bien ici. *(Tu étais membre du centre vraiment tôt. Pourquoi tu as décidé de venir ici ?)* Ici ? Vraiment c'était un lieu un peut stabilise... on peut s'amuser. Tu sais, à Bujumbura je connais un seul terrain de tennis (...) par exemple on venait ici, le terrain de basket s'existe en Ngagara, on peut jouer là bas. (...) on voit des films, c'est toujours jouer avec des amis, c'est vraiment bonne. *(Mais c'était encore dans l'époque de la guerre ?)* Non il y avait encore la guerre. Mais nous avions la part de venir ici, parce-que, nous savons que personne nous ne toucher. Non... les gens qui habite ici, avant, c'était impossible de venir ici en Kamenge mais vers 96, 97 c'était encore possible. (...) Ca cesse. Cette tuerie cesse... *(Quelle tuerie?)* Ici en Bujumbura, quand tu voyais un Hutu ah tuer lui, c'est terminer comme ca. *(Donc c'était trop dangereuse de passer par Kamenge)* c'était trop dangereux... *(Mais c'est pour ca que je demandais pourquoi tu as décidé de venir ici au centre. Il avait beaucoup de tension entre les deux ethnies à cette époque donc..)* Ah ok, c'est la raison pour laquelle je suis venue ici, parce que beaucoup des gents des autres quartiers ont fui. (...) *(Et tes parents, ils étaient ok avec ca ?)* Oui, c'était ok. On n'avait pas peur de moi. Mais parfois quand les rebelles ont attaqué le quartier, je passais une, deux semaines sans venir ici. Pour la sécurité. Et mes parents ne s'inquiètent pas pour moi. Bon, ils avaient confiance que il avait de la paix au centre, l'idée que c'était vraiment bon au centre, le centre avait vraiment une bonne image. (...)

(...) et je continuais mes études. Jusqu'à, ok après 2000, il y avait la cessation des hostilités... le mouvement (...) cessez le feu. Mais la guerre avait continué, c'était vraiment sur le maquis, mais ce n'était pas grave comme avant. C'était en 2003, 2004, il y a eu des, préparations de faire la paix (...). Les rebelles ... Ils ont gagné, sans venir de maquis (...) et 2005, les élections. Ok le problème que existe était le FNL (...) ils ont signé la cessation de feu après, après le FDD. *(Et avant, le CNDD et FNL ont forme une coopération?)* Parfois ils ont travaille ensemble, ils ont commencé à se diviser vers 2003. Mais comme la situation a change, le CNDD a commencé à travaillé avec le gouvernement, contre le FNL. C'est comme ca que le FNL a perdu a force. (...) c'est que la communauté internationale a dit que bon vous, vous avez pris des armes en disant que, les Hutu sont discrimines. Mais maintenant, la paix ne gouverne pas les Hutu, pourquoi ne venez pas signer. Maintenant, ils sont au pouvoir. On n'avait pas une raison pour continuer la guerre. Il fallait s'arrêter... abandonnez le combattre. Ils ont décidé de signer... en 2007, je pense? (...) le problème qui reste c'est qu'ils affrontent aux politiciens. Les gens ne voyant plus comme avant que c'est un problème entre les Hutu et les Tutsi. Maintenant il a de mal entente des Hutu entre eux. Si vous êtes aux pouvoir tu cherche ..., la richesse du pays. C'est le problème du maintenant. Mais les gens basse (classe) ce commence à cohabiter ensemble sans problèmes. La classe basse, ils cohabitaient sans problème, sans peur. Alors, il y a des gens qui s'affrontent, parce-qui ils ne veulent pas partager les trésors. C'est au niveau des dirigeants, du sénat, de l'assemblée générale...le gouvernement en général. Donc, il y a des malentendus. On fait semblant de partager le pouvoir entre les Hutu et les Tutsi. Mais comme il y a eu les élections démocratiques en 2005, que les Hutu sont plus nombreux ... il sont 84%. C'est normal qu'ils gagnent quand on fait une élection comme ca... tu comprends? Ils doivent gagner. Ok ils sont au pouvoir, mais entre eux, ils ne s'entendent pas concernant le partage du pouvoir, comment se partager les postes. Ils se battent entre eux. (...) donc, les Hutu sont 84%, donc ils gagnent les élections... mais l'accord D'Arusha a dit, que les Tutsi doivent être inclus, et doivent recevoir quelques postes. (...) en 2005, la lutte était encore politisée. Ils ont dit, qu'un Hutu, doit choisir un Hutu pour les élections. Comme ca ils ont gagné. Mais, ces 84% ils doivent partager les voix. Donc les trois grands partis, dois partager les voix. Mais comme le CNDD était très forte, ils ont gagné beaucoup de voix, 60%. (...) maintenant il y a aussi l'UPD, et le FNL. Peut-être il (le CNDD-FDD) ne peut pas gagner cette élections... ils perdent beaucoup des postes. C'est ca la situation d'aujourd'hui. *(Mais dans cette histoire, ou bien maintenant, ou sont les partis Tutsi ?)* Oh, j'ai déjà dit 84%, ca laisse

16%. Il y a beaucoup de petits partis Tutsi. Le plus grand parti c'est Uprona. Mais maintenant il y a aussi beaucoup des Tutsi à Uprona. Et le parti MRC...et Parena. Donc les Tutsi, vont voter pour ces partis. (*Donc, mais tu as dit aussi que il y a quelques Hutu à Uprona*) Oui, et il y a aussi quelques Tutsi qui vont voter ici... mais pas beaucoup. Ils doivent convaincre... en fait c'est comme Obama, ... avec les blancs. En fait on ne sait pas si un blanc veut voter pour un noir. C'est comme ça. Mais, je suis sûr que les choses changera petit à petit ici en Burundi. Peut être si t'étais Hutu, et tu viens pour me convaincre de ton politique... si vous avec un politique qui favorisent les jeunes ou bien un politique pour le développement de pays, quelques Tutsi peuvent se prononcer. C'est possible que la question ethnique commence à disparaître... ça commence. (...)

(*à ton avis, c'est quoi la premier raison pour le conflit historique?*) Avant? Avant la colonisation, les Burundais vivaient vraiment pacifiquement. C'était avant la colonisation. Avant les Allemands. Il avait le pouvoir monarchiste... le roi. Il n'y avait pas les problèmes comme l'ethnisme. Au Kenya et en Congo, par exemple, il a des langues différentes... mais ici non. Avant c'était comme ça... mais après les allemands, après la guerre mondial... ils ont perdu. C'était la raison pour laquelle ils ont perdu le Burundi. Les Belges sont venus. Et ils ont appliqué la même politique. Ils ont pris le Burundi et le Rwanda comme un seul pays. Normalement les Tutsi était comme des éleveurs, oui. Si vous êtes éleveur vous avez comme alimentation, vous consommez le lait, la viande et on manger le sang des vache. Donc quand vous avez cette alimentation pendant plusieurs années, vous devenez plus grandes. Donc les Belges, ils ont mesuré votre taille, ok votre taille... deux mètre. Et ils ont aussi mesuré le nez. Pour dire que, celui qui a au moins deux mètres ou à peu près deux mètres et plus, et un nez pointé, ils étaient Tutsi. Même le roi, en plus qu'il avait beaucoup des vaches. Et parce-qu'il avait la taille comme les Tutsi. Des Baganwa. Ok ils ont commencé la même politique du Rwanda au Burundi. Au Rwanda ils ont favorisé, alors, ils les favorisent à étudier, ils ont construit des écoles (...). En 59 au Rwanda, les Hutu se sont rebellé. Ils ont dit, que comment ils peuvent gouverner, Il faut une révolte. Donc, ils ont tué des Tutsi. Depuis '59 les Tutsi Rwandais ont fui. Ils sont venus ici au Burundi, les autres en Congo, les autres en Uganda. La situation avait changé en Uganda, les Hutu étaient au pouvoir. C'était en '68. Le période de '61, c'était l'époque de l'indépendance (*au Burundi ?*) Surtout en Afrique, la politique de chasser les blancs. Ok en Burundi. A la période avant l'indépendance, c'était les Tutsi et les Baganwa qui ont gouverné le pays. Les Hutu ne sont pas encore rebellés, pour renverser la pouvoir. Donc les Tutsi ont continué à gouverner. Mais comme partout en Afrique, il y avait des régimes militaires, de coups d'état. Parmi les Tutsi, les chefs d'armée ont organisé des coups d'état. Donc, à l'indépendance... on a chassé le roi, et tué son fils. Donc vers '66, le premier président, c'était un soldat. Un Tutsi, donc la minorité gouvernait le pays, 14%. Ils ont commencé à former une armée, de Tutsi seulement. Quand t'était Hutu, tu ne pouvais pas joindre. Alors, l'année '72 était catastrophique. '72... alors, les Hutu se sont un peu stigmatisés, ils étaient discriminés. Ils se sont révoltés en '72. Mais les Hutu n'étaient pas très forts... comme ils ont combattu avec peu de fusils, avec des machettes. (...) Donc l'armée les a tués. (...) Si il y avait un Hutu dans l'armée, on les tuait. Si il y avait un Hutu intellectuelle, on les tuer. C'était en '72. Donc les Hutu qui ont fui en '72, d'autres Hutu. Ils sont partis vers le Rwanda. Les autres ils ont fui en Tanzanie. Les autres sont laissé ici au Burundi. Donc, après '72, quand ils ont tué beaucoup d'intellectuelles Hutu, le gouvernement continué à être très forte. Par l'armée. C'est ça leur... le conflit a commencé. (...) Les Hutu, ils se sont revolté en '88 vers le Nord. Mais ils n'avaient pas des forces. En '91... Depuis 84 le FNL a fait... mais ils n'avaient pas la force. Mais depuis '92 la politique internationale a changé. On a vu que, ce régime militaire... ce n'était pas bonne. C'était comme la dictature. Donc, si vous ne favorisez pas la démocratie, les élections... ou bien... bien les élections. Etablissez le démocratie, nous ne donne pas d'aide, si vous n'avez pas des élections. Donc nous avons deux partis politiques... Frodebu et Uprona.. Donc nous avons un peu de tension ethnique tu vois. Parce-qu'il y a beaucoup des Hutu, le Frodebu a pensé, que nous devons gagner. Parce-que ils sont nombreux. On a fait les élections '93, en juin. (...) Ils ont gagné les élections. Ils ont gouverné en juillet. En octobre, on l'a tué. (*C'est une histoire très longue, mais tu as dit que maintenant c'est bon. C'est quoi la différence entre maintenant et avant la guerre ?*) Ok avant, nous étions petites et il n'avait pas la question ethnique. Mais la guerre... beaucoup des Hutu sont morts ici. Plus que le régime en place était vraiment dictatorial. (...) Mais avant, par exemple moi j'ai commencé à connaître l'histoire d'Hutu et Tutsi pendant cette année... pendant '93. Pour dire que avant, il n'avait pas de tension. Ça commence



lorsque, Ndadaye était tué. les Hutu se sont révolté, et ont commencé à tuer les Tutsi. C'était une génocide (*et maintenant ? tu as dit que les tensions on diminué.. ?*) ok, avant on voit que, ce sont les Tutsi qui sont vraiment... ils sont au pouvoir, ils ne donnent rien et nous sommes pauvre. C'est parce-que les Tutsi sont au pouvoir... ils ne **développaient pas** le Burundi parce-qu'ils gouvernaient. Mais depuis 2002-2003, les Hutu ont commencé à gouverner. Et maintenant le pays est gouverné par les Hutu, depuis les accords d'Arusha, depuis 2005. Mais au lieu de se développer, nous sommes encore sous-développés. Vraiment il comprend maintenant que ce n'était pas seulement les Tutsi qui piller... mais c'est n'importe qui, qui est au pouvoir, qui peut voler. Donc ce sont le Tutsi qui sont les voleurs, mais aussi les Hutu. Maintenant ils comprennent que n'importe qui veut voler. C'est comme ca depuis cinq-six ans. Il n'y a plus des problèmes entre les Hutu et Tutsi. Parce-que même si le pays est gouverne par les Hutu on voyait qu'il existe le sous-développement, pas de travail, de tuerie, des vols de malversations économique... comme ca. (*Quelle sorte de violence est le plus fréquent en Ngagara?*) Maintenant, le phénomène que existe en Burundi... la guerre est terminée... mais chaque fois que la guerre termine il y a le phénomène après-guerre. La première chose de ce phénomène est le banditisme. Avec les gens qui sont démobilisé ou bien des ancienne combattants, ils n'ont pas de travaille... peut-être ils ont cache les armes et ils les utilisent pour les vols. C'est le phénomène d'après guerre. Et deux, c'est le phénomène des enfants de la rue. Il y a des enfants de quatre jusqu'à douze ans, qui demandaient de l'argent dans la rue. Même si avant la guerre, ils étaient peu... mais maintenant ils sont très nombreux. Peut être par la pauvreté. (...) C'est ca le problème. Surtout la pauvreté. Mais le gouvernement... ils ne font rien pour le développement du pays... ils commencent à piller. (...) Et le chômage... (...) et en plus, on crée beaucoup d'école, mais sans travaille. (...) (*Et la jeunesse qui lutte pour un parti politique ?*) Oui... c'est dans l'intérieur du pays... mais aussi quelques fois un Ngagara. C'est un problème entre le FDD en le FNL. Le FDD veut gagner les élections. Il faut me donner la jeunesse, qui intimide, la population dans la campagne. (*Mais pourquoi je n'écoute pas les parler des partis Tutsi ?*) Parce-qu'ils ne gagneront les élections jamais.. Ils sont peu...les Tutsi. (*Parce-que je pensais qu' il y a moins de tension maintenant et...*) oui moins de tensions, mais ca change petit a petit... peut être a deux-mille quinze...même ici ils peuvent voter pour Uprona... ca commence à venir. Même ici tu peux trouver Uprona... ca commence (*Ok, une autre question.ils veulent implémenter un tribunal ici...pénal ou une commission de réconciliation.. ca peut aider quelques chose?*) Ah... a mon avis, sera plus forte... un tribunal de réconciliation. Comme ca c'est passé en Afrique du Sud. (Pour toi, c'est quoi la réconciliation ? c'est entre les Hutu et les Tutsi, ou bien entre..)Hutu et Tutsi.. Donc quand tu affirmes que tu avais tué des Hutu... ou bien si tu affirme que... moi j'étais un rebelle, j'ai tué des Tutsi. C'était vraiment, à la fin de la guerre c'était... on avait commencé à mettre un peu... mais maintenant il faut cohabiter ensemble. Donc, demande pardon, on pardonner les autres... comme ca. Ca marche. Parce-que, peu des partis ont demandé pardon. Parce-qu' en '93 beaucoup de Tutsi sont mort, et c'était comme si c'est la vengeance... quand les soldats sont montés la bas.. Ils ont tué...tous. (...) (*Tu penses qu'une commission de vérité et réconciliation va aider à etabli la relation entre les deux groupes?*) Oui, oui. Puisque, il y a eu... des deux cotés oui ? Des fautes graves, des crimes graves... contre l'humanité.. Les deux cotés. Si il sont coupables, ils se disent la vérité et demandent pardon. (*C'est nécessaire une chose comme ca?*) C'est nécessaire... si vous êtes Hutu... c'est sur que. Des crimes commis par les Hutu par exemple. Présentez vous. Je me présente moi. Parmi ma famille...il y avait beaucoup des gens qui on été tué par les Hutu. A l'intérieur du pays... comme ca. Mais je n'avais pas appris qui... c'était comme la guerre, ils ont vengé la mort de leur président, plus ici au Burundi, c'était une population non-instruit. Et ils n'ont pas étudié, ils n'ont pas fait ses études. Donc ils sont faciles à manipuler. Une parti viens, il te dit quelque chose et te demande de tuer ce tip la, et tu le tues. (*Tu pense que maintenaient, cette mentalité a changé?*) Presque.. ca va petit à petit... ca va disparaître. (*Tu pense qu'il y a encore beaucoup des membres de ta famille ou de la commune, qui emporte encore du mal?*) Oui, oui.. Dans ma famille, quelques personnes à l'intérieur du pays... qui ont perdu tout... leur maison, leur vaches... enfants. Ils sont encore des choses. Mais petit à petit, ca va être disparu. (*Tu pense que la commission va aider ca ?*) Ok... à mon avis il faut réconcilier... quand il a y besoin de se réconcilier tu ne peux pas donner une punition. Ils ont commencé de vivre, les deux ensemble... les gens qui ont commis des crimes, ils sont nombreux... des deux cotés... ils sont nombreux.

## **Cibitoke**

- **Hakizimana Felix, 21-04-2010.**

*(Tu peux me raconter un peu de ton histoire ? tu es née ou ? comment c'était avant la guerre, après la guerre etc.)* Donc je suis né ici, à Bujumbura, en 1986. J'étudie maintenant.. La communication. *(En Cibitoke ?)* Oui à Cibitoke. *(T'étais ici à Cibitoke pendant la guerre ?)* Oui oui... *(Et par ton avis, quoi sont les changements par rapport à avant – la guerre)* Oui.. Moi. J'étais encore petit quand la guerre a commence. Je n'ai pas compris totalement ce que c'est passé. Bon après... j'ai vu mon amie... un certaine famille a quitté sa maison... pour s'installer dans un autre quartier ou ils sont plus protégés. Moi je ne comprenais pas. Tu vois, tu es juste petit, tu joue avec les autres... on te dit, pourquoi tu joues avec ce petit la et pas avec l'autre... alors, on joue ensemble, on partageait parfois la nourriture, alors j'arrivais chez eux. Mais après la guerre a commencé...elle a divisé tout le monde. Pour moi c'était difficile à comprendre... avant nous avons partagé tout, mais maintenant c'est tous divisé. *(Tes parents a dit par exemple que tu ne pouvais plus jouer avec certains enfants?)* Oui... mes parents, mes aussi leur parents. Même, ils ne voulaient pas que je joue avec les petits. Alors, comme ca tu voyais que quelque chose a changé. Comme avant. Ma famille aussi, parce-que ils savaient que les choses... avant. (...) On avait peur de l'autre. Et ca aussi je ne comprenais pas. Mais, en grandissant... avec l'histoire aussi, t'es obligé de comprendre, même si tu es petit. (...) mais mes parents ne voulaient pas dire directement. *(Tu as parlé avec des amis de ce sujet ? As-tu compris l'histoire et le conflit après)* non, j'ai compris après. Parce-qu' il y avait des familles qui ont partagé tous... Mais à un certain moment, ils ne sont pas invités. Et tu demandes, pourquoi? Et ils te cachent la vérité. Et tu vois aussi les autres familles qui restent. Et continuent à venir. Et tu demandes. Pourquoi ils viennent et les autres ne viennent plus? C'est la ou j'entendais. Tu vois, je joue au basket. Depuis j'avais huit ans... neuf ans. Je jouais au basket bien. Et la aussi... quand ils voyaient que le petit avec qui tu joues n'est pas de toi ou des autres... ils commencent à discriminer. C'est la ou j'ai commencé à comprendre. (...) *(C'était à Cibitoke ou aussi ici, dans la centre)* Non en Cibitoke. Dans cette époque, vers '96, c'était difficile de venir ici au centre. Nous avons peur de venir ici, parce-que il avait un barricade la. (...) Mais la, je suis me habituer à fréquenter le centre. Parce-que ici, nous avons les ballons. Ce n'est pas partout que nous avons des ballons. Mais ici, il y avait des ballons, et un terrain disponible et après vous prenez une douche. C'est pour ca que je suis resté dans le centre, même si il avait la guerre. *(Mais tu es resté à Cibitoke, tout le temps ?)* Oui, même si il y avait la guerre, mais chaque fois, il y avait des gens qui protégeaient le quartier. *(Des groupes comme sans défaite et sans échec ?)* Oui sans défaite...ils sont des gens qui s'amènent comme ca pour affronter les fusils des autres quartiers... qui défendent l'ethnie. Ce sont des bandes. Quelques fois tuer des gens, quelques fois piller, lorsque tu quittes la maison, on vient chez toi, on vole tous... c'est des malfaiteurs *(aussi pendant cette époque ?)* oui oui, ils sont des malfaiteurs. *(On avait peur pour cette bande ? les gens qui habitaient la ? parce-que, ils disaient qu'ils sont la pour protéger et défendre le quartier)* oui, ils disaient que ils sont la pour protéger le quartier... pour protéger l'ethnie. Alors, peut être, si on partage leur ethnie ils disent qu'ils sont la pour protéger, ils vont me protéger. Mais quelques fois, ils font les choses horrible même a les gents qui partage leur ethnie. Ils sont des voleurs. Mais quelques fois, ils donnaient l'impression qui ils sécurisaient mais... je ne sais pas si... *(à ton avis se sont des voleurs)* oui... si. Des bandits. *(Tu connais quelques personnes qui ont participé à ce groupe ?)* Oui, mon grand frère, quelques amis... je les connais ! Mais maintenant ils sont grandit, ils sont grand et (...) cette une histoire qui appartient au le passé. Maintenant ils se sont mariés, ils sont... si ils ne sont pas emprisonné ils sont toujours la. *(Maintenant ils ne font rien ?)* Non ils sont la, ils n'ont pas de travaille... ils sont des gents qui ont quitté l'école. *(Mais maintenant, les gens n'ont pas peur d'eux ? ils ne sont pas stigmatisé ?)* Non, je ne crois pas... maintenant, je crois que, pour le moment, on a déjà oublié. Parce-que dans leur principe... ils disaient, ils protégeaient. Bon, je donne un exemple. Dans mon ethnie, ils les pareille qu'ils sont la pour protéger... son groupe. Quelques fois, on les voyait comme les héros. Ils sont la pour nous protéger, quand ils attaquent, ils sont la pour nous protéger. Mais, maintenant, si la guerre n'est plus la... on ne les voyait pas comme les gents... bon, quelques fois, on a respect. Parce-qu'ils avaient la rébellion, qui venait jusque ... chez nous. Tu vois, ils pouvaient nous tuer. Alors, mais si je n'ai pas fui le quartier, c'est parce-que, les rebelles avaient peur de la

défense. Parce-que, ils avaient des fois subi une défaite, quand les rebelles venaient (...) tu vois ou j'habite, aux 80... Jusqu'au 60. (...)

La partie de Cibitoke, qui était proche de Kamenge.. Était détruite. Les gents ont fui. (...) Mais l'autre part était protégé. *(Et l'armée ? L'armée était la aussi ?)* Ils entraient mais... combattre avec quelqu'un, qui n'importe pas d'uniforme, c'est difficile. Identifier une personne qui était une rebelle, c'était difficile. C'est comme en Afghanistan. (...)

*(Donc, les quartiers étaient séparés pendant la guerre. Et maintenant, c'est déjà plus mêlé ?)* Oui, Oui, maintenant c'est déjà plus mélangé. Il y a la paix, tout le monde est revenu. *(Il y avait des groupes comme sans échec et sans défaite, et toutes les familles sont retournées. Ils demandent pardon à ces familles quelques fois ? La cohabitation, comment ça marche ?)* Prenez par exemple, un ami qui m'a quitté, il a fui peut être a Ngagara...il a des gens qui ont fui au Congo, les gens de Kamenge. (...) les Hutu ont toujours fui au Congo. Contrairement les Tutsi. Ils n'ont pas fui. *(Pourquoi les Congolais sont considéré comme les Hutu ?)* C'est l'histoire. Bon, au Congo, Burundi et Rwanda...c'est l'histoire. On dit que, les Bantu sont d'origine Hutu. Bon en voyant comme ils sont grands... ils ont beaucoup de force, tu vois, physiquement. Alors, ce sont des Hutu. On dit lesquelles des Tutsi sont de Banyamulenge. Plus élancé, pas de force. Alors, on sait les identifier, comme ça. (...) Bon au Burundi, les Tutsi forment une minorité. Ils estiment que les Tutsi sont 12%. Comme la ils ont, avec l'historique... le congolais la historique. Alors, ils on dit que, les Tutsi, c'est eux qui ont le pouvoir. Ils mentient, ils maltraitent. Ils se disent qu'ils sont très intelligent, au niveau de travaille c'est eux qui ont la force, qui sont moins nombreux aussi. Alors, ce sont eux qui ont commencé la révolte.bon. Je ne comprends pas que les Congolais s'identifient comme des Hutu. (...) On dit aussi que les Banyamulenge sont des Congolais. Mais ils disent qu'ils sont de Rwanda ou de Burundi. Pas de Congolais. C'est comme ça alors.

*(Comment ça était passé dans ton quartier. Parce-que avant il y avait de bonnes relations entre les familles et tout. Comment se sont-ils divisé)* Bon après, c'est l'histoire du Burundi. Il avait beaucoup de guerre ici au Burundi. Des guerres, mais pas comme en 1993. Alors, la guerre est commencée par les dirigeants. Parce-qu' Il y a peu d'histoire qu'on enseigne au Burundi. Depuis l'indépendance, il y avait un seul parti politique ; L'Uprona. Il y avait des Hutu et des Tutsi dans ce parti. Donc, après l'indépendance. Apres le mort de Rwagasore. Il u a eu une division, la division ethnique. Les proches de lui, de Rwagasore, étaient des Hutu. Et lui, il était Tutsi. Donc, les Tutsi n'étaient pas d'accords, et ils ont créé les problèmes. (...) dans les institutions, ou bien des gents intelligent, des intellectuelles, il etait toujours des Tutsi. Parce-qu'ils étaient toujours très intelligents. C'est eux qui avaient toujours l'opportunité d'étudier à l'étranger. Alors, comme ils étaient intelligents, ils ont pris le pouvoir. Dans Uprona il avait des Hutu qui ont dit, non... on a aidé. Mais en voyant l'armée, dans l'armée il n'y avait que de Tutsi. Ils ont fait tout pour garder l'armée. Lorsque tu es au collège, ils te disent, allez dans l'armée. (...) parce-que ils ne sont pas nombreux. Quand un jour il y aura la guerre on aura une protection. C'est comme ça l'armée était toujours Tutsi, c'était la force Tutsi. Mais les Hutu, puisque il n'avaient pas une armée, ils avaient peur. (...) mais il avait toujours la haine, pourquoi nous pourquoi nous. Ils voyaient des intellectuelles Hutu qui étaient toujours menacé. Il y avait beaucoup de gens qui commençaient à vivre à l'étranger. *(À quel pays?)* Au Rwanda. Ils ont dit, viens ici, étudie et tous. Un jour on verra, que nous avons la force. Alors, pour venir en 1993. Il avait le président qui a signé le multipartisme. Il faut que nous ayons la démocratie. Il a accepté, le président a accepté. A coté d'Uprona, il avait les autres partis qui sont confirmé. Mais en tête, ils avaient toujours l'idée, que un jour, ils doivent faire une révolte. Ils doivent, eux aussi ils doivent aller au pouvoir. (...) Ils étaient nombreux quoi, 88%. Dans leur tête, ils s'enseignent quoi, ...on est nombreux. Le pouvoir, c'est à nous. Tu vois, enseigner au peuple, que tu as été une esclave. Une esclave par les gents, minorité. Alors, avec le pouvoir, il avait une armée, une armée Tutsi toujours. Alors, l'armée a décidé de tuer le président, le président élu démocratiquement. C'est la ou la guerre a commencé. Mais à voir comment la guerre a éclaté. A voir comment les gents s'avaient organisé vite... pour, pour juste aller tuer les autres. Quelque fois on disait qu'il avait déjà les préparatifs. *(Ce n'était pas spontané)* C'est ça ! On ne pouvait pas dire que, on a habité ensemble depuis une décennie. A une seule journée, on a pris que nos président est mort. Directement on a des machettes, on a des armes, on a tous, tous, tous, tous ! On commence à tuer. Ce n'est pas logique ça. (...) ils avaient toujours l'envie de revanche. (...) *(Et l'armée, ils étaient déjà présents ? ou c'était après ?)* Que est-ce que c'est passé... les quartiers ou il avait plus d'Hutu, ils avaient exterminé les Tutsi. Ils avaient de quartiers ou ils étaient plusieurs

Hutu... comme en Kamenge, Kiama. Et piller tous, tous. Ils se sont directement organisés pour liquider les Tutsi. Il avait un autre quartier ou il était plus de Tutsi. Comme en Cibitoke. Et eux aussi, ils se sont organisé pour tuer les Hutu. C'est comme ça. Chaque province, ou une ethnie était la majorité... ils se sont organisé pour liquider l'autre ethnie. (...) ils avaient aussi des organisations, les jeunes qui s'organisent... quand l'autre a tué ta mère, pour aller à l'autre famille et tuer aussi. Pour une revanche. C'est comme ça que les gents se sont organiser, juste pour mettre la force ensemble. Comme par exemple, il avait un jour que les assaillants sont allés ici en Cibitoke. Ils ont tué un dizaine de personnes. Il ya des jeunes, les vieux qui ont dit que non, nous devons aussi organiser les jeunes. Ils se sont organisés, ils ont cherché d'argent, ils ont acheté des licences... si par exemple je suis vieux, et j'ai une arme, je ne suis pas allé mais je peux prêter mon arme à une jeune. Ils sont entrés en Kinama, ils sont entré et tué aussi. C'était comme le revanche. Il avait aussi des politiciens qui se cachent derrière. Ils viennent et disent, vous voyez, comment les autres quartiers, comment il se défend. Vous aussi, vous faites le coup... c'est eux qui organisé les villes mortes. (...) quand il avait une décision au niveau de gouvernement, et les gents ne sont pas d'accord, il y a toujours des politiciens, d'opposition, qui organise les choses comme les villes mortes, sans défaite... (..) Mais c'était toujours les politiciens qui étaient les mauvaises intentions. (...) allez, allez combattre, c'est lui l'ennemi. C'est comme ça, avec l'esprit a chauffé, pas de réflexion. Tu fais n'importe quoi, même si ce n'est pas ton volonté.

*(Mais maintenant, le conflit a changé ?)* Oui, parce-que les gents...si tu es Hutu, est moi je suis Tutsi...que est-ce que je fais. Se combattre entre nous quand il y a des dirigeants du politique qui ont une maison et une voiture ? Pourquoi combattre jusqu'à ce que toi et moi, nous sommes mort. Maintenant je crois même si il aurait une guerre... ce ne sera pas la même. Je crois que la chose a changé... la mentalité quoi. Parce-que, maintenant on voit que, ce n'est pas nous qui gagne. Mais il y a des gens qui profitent. On te trompe... (...) *( 'Nous' ca veut dire le peuple 'normal' ?)* le bas peuple. Tu vois, les jeunes des quartiers Nord. Ils ont une vie moyenne...bon, pas une bonne vie mais, rien de spécial. *(Donc c'est plus une mentalité ensemble ?)* Bon, c'est pour dire que, moi je suis Tutsi, lui il est Hutu. Avant c'était comme lui, il est Hutu, il veut faire du mal... il va profiter de toi un jour. Maintenant je crois que, ce n'est pas la même chose. *(Pourquoi cette mentalité a changé, tu penses ?)* C'est la situation socio-économique... il y a le peuple qui souffre. Il y des gents qui ont faim. Par exemple, les gents qui fréquent le centre, les gents qui étaient dans la rébellion, les démobilisés. Ils leur avaient dit, allez combattre, allez combattre les Tutsi. Quand nous sommes au pouvoir, vous serez des administrateurs. Vous serez des parlementaires. Et maintenant, vois ou ils sont. Ils sont rien. Ils ont donné seulement 200.000 francs. Ils ont combattu vingt ans, et reçu seulement 200.000 francs, tu vois ? (...) et les gents qui ont dit 'allez combattre', ils ont des voitures, des enfants qui étudient a l'étranger, il est la au parlement il ne dit rien. Il fait construire les belles maisons partout, tu vois ? Ils ont profité. Mais c'est nous qui avons combattu pour ça. (...) et c'est la même avec les jeunes ici, des sans échec etc. il voient le gens qui disait qu'il fallait se protéger, qui fallait combattre... qu'est-ce que on a maintenant. On n'a rien. Et ces gens sont dans la politique maintenant. Je pense que ça a changé. *(Mais il n'y a pas des démobilisés par exemple, qui sont très fâché ?)* Oui, ils sont très fâchés, très très fâché. On a menti, on est a promis des choses..(..) Il y a des démobilisé qui ont perdu une jambe, et qu'es-ce que ils vont faire ? Ils n'ont rien. (...)

*(C'est quoi le plus grande problème de Cibitoke maintenant)* C'est le banditisme. Je suis jeune, je n'ai pas de travail, j'ai une arme, alors, qu'est-ce que je vais faire. Pourquoi pas ça. Il vient dans la nuit, il voit quelqu'un avec une téléphone, il vol. Le cas du banditisme. Ils tuent, n'importe où, n'importe comment. *(Il te tue comme ça ?)* Oui. Ce n'est pas plus une question d'ethnie. Je viens chez toi, tu n'ouvre pas la porte, j'insiste, j'insiste et je te tues. Et j'emporte tous que je veux. *(Et les policiers, ils aident quelques fois ?)* C'est eux même, c'est eux même. Ils sont en complot... Ils sont en complot. Leur salaire, alors... ils cherchent les moyens partout. Je suis allé une fois au 'night-club', et a la porte, il avait un policier qui conduisait un taxi moto. Le soir. (...) il est un policier, mais il conduit le taxi moto pour chercher de l'argent. Il a un salaire très bas. Mais même, ils étaient dans la rébellion. Et la, ils consommaient trois fois par semaine, la viande. Tu vois. Et aussi, pendant la rébellion, lorsqu' ils s'introduisaient dans le quartier, et ils demandaient... ils pillaient. (...) ils été habituer à avoir beaucoup de chose. Et maintenant, c'est difficile de t'habituer à ça. *(C'est seulement comme ça en Cibitoke ?)* Non je pense que c'est comme ça partout. Parfois c'est plus difficile de voler en quelques quartiers. (...) ils

viennent de tous les quartiers. Seulement la stratégie est différente. Il y a des quartiers où il n'y a pas d'électricité pendant la nuit. Et la nuit, on vole les personnes qui passent dans la rue. *(Une autre question. Il y avait quelques incidents à Kinama, entre les groupes des jeunes de FNL et CNDD, tu sais quelque chose?)* Bon, les deux partis avaient une seule idée d'origine. Mais, quand ils sont devenus plus grands, il y avait déjà la rivalité entre ces deux groupes, pendant la rébellion. Eux, tous, ils se disaient protecteur des Hutu. Donc ils avaient des gens qui ont commencé à s'organiser pour leur propre rébellion. Propre aide, financement, tu vois ? Avant c'était une seule idéologie. *(C'était quand, la division ?)* C'était la période d'Arusha. Chacun voulait se présenter. Ils sont divisés par les raisons individuelles. Maintenant alors, il y a un seul pouvoir. Le CNDD-FDD. Au lieu de se dire protecteurs des Hutu, il y a même des Hutu qui commencent à s'augmenter. Alors, vous avez dit que vous êtes pour nous protéger. (...) Mais maintenant, on vous fait souffrir. Qu'est-ce qui se passe ? Maintenant, le FNL, a leur propagande, ils disent... alors tu vois... Comment, nous partageons l'idéologie. Protéger les Hutu, maintenant ils nous combattent... Maintenant le FNL dit.. Si vous ne nous donnez pas la voix... faut mieux donner la voix... pas à la CNDD-FDD... mais à l'Uprona. C'est un parti Tutsi. Il y a des Hutu, mais ils la propagande comme des Tutsi. (...) donc ils créent la rivalité... cela ce que j'ai dit que, l'idéologie a changé. Tu vois, le FNL, les Hutu, qui combattent les Hutu... alors pourquoi ? Avant c'était les Tutsi qui nous avons menacé... mais maintenant, sont nous même. Nous avons un dirigeant Hutu, qui disait qu'il nous protégerait. Mais, il nous voler, il nous menacer, il nous tuer. Tu vois ? alors ils se demandent.. Ou est le changement.. Le dirigeant peut-être Tutsi, soit Hutu... nous ne profitons rien. (...) pourquoi dire 'le Tutsi nous menace'.. faut mieux les Tutsi ! Lorsque, ils disent que c'est un Tutsi, il ne peut pas m'aider... mais maintenant le dirigeant Hutu... je ne comprends pas. *(Donc, j'ai compris que beaucoup des jeunes sont fatigués de la guerre)* oui. Tous. *(Mais il y a des milices de jeunes.. ils sont quels jeunes ?)* Qu'est-ce qui se passe. Les politiciens sont là pour nous diviser. Que est-ce qu'ils font. Maintenant ils sont dans la campagne électorale. (...) ils organisent deux, trois jeunes. Ils leur donnent... ils prennent l'argent ils leur donnent la... ils leur donnent la bière... pour la mentalité. Il y a beaucoup des analphabètes... ils n'ont rien à faire. Il passe leur journée dans un *ligala*. Il passe une personne, et lui disent... si tu vas faire, si tu vas.... Fait des manifestations. De n'importe quoi... je te donne 200 francs au retour. Tu vois... la mentalité ? Normalement, au fond, ils n'ont rien... je ne sais pas que ils ont... ils pensent comme, maintenant je n'ai pas rien, demain j'ai une bière... c'est ça... la pauvreté. (...) Ils organisent les milices... quand un parti, ils ne gagnent pas. ils font tous pour survivre, tous qu'ils ont à leur disposition. Pour rester le plus longtemps possible... parce-que, si non, ils vont être jugés. *(Maintenant tu parles de la CNDD ?)* Oui... maintenant, il faut rester au pouvoir. Parce-que' ils ont commis des choses horribles... ils ont emprisonné beaucoup des gens, ils ont tué beaucoup de gens... alors. (...) des massacres qui ont eu lieu... c'est gens là ils ont peur d'être jugé. Donc ils font tous possible... *(Dans cette histoire, où est l'Uprona par exemple... ou sont les partis Tutsi ?)* Parce-que... en disant c'est un parti Tutsi. *(Mais ils sont plus mélangés maintenant)* oui ils sont mélangés... mais les personnes Tutsi, ils se disent que c'est encore leur parti. Alors, que-est ce qui se passé... ils sont peu. Numériquement, ils sont peu. Tu vois... mais c'est eux, qui sont plus intelligents. Ils sont les vieux... lourds. Ils ont fait beaucoup d'écoles. Ils sont des économistes... ils sont les vieux qui sont là, qui font tout, qui calculent tout. (...) si on va démocratiquement au vote, ils ne gagnent pas. Quand l'idéologie reste là, il aura toujours un président Hutu... ils sont nombreux... et l'Uprona... le vice-président, c'est toujours un Tutsi, donc l'Uprona est toujours dans ce poste. Avec ce poste, il maîtrise la situation. Ça veut dire que, pour chaque décision ils doivent donner leur accord. Maintenant, que est-ce qu'ils font. Maintenant ils disent, ce n'est pas notre guerre. Ce n'est pas une guerre à nous. Si le FNL veut se combattre avec le CNDD... ils sont mécontents. Donc l'Uprona ne peut pas intervenir... parce-que'ils profitent. Les gens qui sont mécontents, ils viennent dans l'Uprona. C'est du calcul... ça c'est le raison pour laquelle ils n'ont pas encore donné leur candidat. *(Mais tu as dit, quand l'idéologie reste.. il aura toujours un président Hutu et en vice-président Tutsi... donc les voix sont encore divisées ?)* Oui... bon. C'est comme en 2005. Le CNDD a eu 65 percent. Alors ce que je dis. Le CNDD n'aura pas le 60 percent... parce-que ils sont divisés. Les mécontents de CNDD il son crée un autre parti (UPD). Tu vois, là c'est déjà un nombre important qui diminue. Il y a aussi le FNL. (...) Ils doivent partager les voix Hutu. *(Mais ça que je veux dire, les Hutu, ils ne votent pas pour on parti originalement Tutsi ?)* Oui.. Non, ça. L'Uprona... quelque fois ils passent le pourcentage... comme 20 percent. Il y a des gens qui ne partagent pas la voix avec un parti Tutsi... qui sont des Hutu. Il y a des

gents qui votent toujours pour leur ethnie. (...) mais maintenant je crois que ca va changer. Il y a beaucoup des déçus. (...)

*(Tu pense que... comme tu as dit que le CNDD par exemple a commis des crimes horrible... il veut implémenter un tribunal pénal ou une commission de vérité et la réconciliation. Tu pense que ce sera une bonne chose ?)* Ils ne peuvent pas... ils ne peuvent pas accepter ce tribunal. Mais oui c'est sur. Il y a avait le colle quatre... en 2000... Ce sont des gens Tutsi de la société civile qui ont dit qu'il ne faut pas négocier avec des gents qui ont commis des crimes. En '93. Que disaient qu'il ne faut pas négocier avec des Hutu qui on t commis des crimes. Qu'il fallait, premièrement, juger. Avant les négociations. Alors, comme L'Uprona disait, ils on dit que... nous ne pouvons pas juger les gents qui ont des armes tout juste, avoir la confiance. Il faut que les laisse... ils seront jugés. Mais ils sont aussi les Tutsi qui ont commis des crimes horrible... donc l'Uprona a se divise. Il y avait des gents qui ont dit, non on ne peut pas accepter négocier avec des gents qui ont commis des crimes. On n'accepterait pas, les négociations. Mais à la fin, ils ont fait l'unification. (...) il y a même le rapport des Nations Unis... concernant des massacres. Alors. On disait que les gents doivent être jugé. Mais il avait des gents qui disaient que non... il faut chercher la paix (...) pour gagner la paix il y a des sacrifices. Tu vois. (...) alors il demandait le tribunal international, le tribunal pénal la... pour que, tous le monde qui a commis un crime est juge... *(Soit les Tutsi et les Hutu)* oui c'est tout le monde... tout le monde qui a commis un crime ! Alors... ce gents la... avec l'Uprona de gouvernement. Ce gents de Frodebu, ils ont commis des crimes... on fait une transition. Mais ca continue comme ca... mais il y a les gents qui réclame ca, chaque mois le 21. Ce gents la continue à réclamer, que la justice soit fait. (...) alors qu'est-ce ils ont fait. Ils ont crée une commission de vérité et réconciliation. C'est juste un truc. *(Pour prolonger le processus ?)* Oui c'est ca. *(mais à ton avis, ce sera mieux d'avoir un tribunal pénal ?)* Oui oui... se sera une bonne chose. Que tous le monde soit être juger. *(Mais il y a des gents qui disent que il faut mieux oublier les choses)* Tu vois... bon. Quand il aura les politiciens qui continuer à gouverner, qui ont commis les atrocités. Il n'aura pas cette justice. C'est eux qui décident, s'il aura besoin de ce tribunal. Prenez l'exemple de ce président, il était condamnee. il y avait des plaintes contre lui. De la justice. On disait que, tu ne peux pas te poster pour le président de la République si tu as des plaintes contre toi. Alors selon.. Les trucs, on a fait de trucs juste pour continuer. Ils disaient qu'il y a des milices. (...) *(Pourquoi c'est important pour toi ? punir les coupables)* Pour moi ? *(oui ou pour la société ?)* il faut que chaque' un apprend ces actes. Il faut que, celui que a tué, celui qui a organisé, celui qui a investi, celui qui a donner (...) celui qui as, même pas... pour tuer. Qui sont punis. Jusque, pour que, on établit la vérité. Parce-que, c'est difficile, tu vois... comme on dit, c'est difficile de pardonner une personne. Prennent par exemple une personne qui a tué ma mère, .. Et puis je le vois un jour, me dit que il faut faire la réconciliation... .. il ne s'est même pas présenter chez moi pour me demander pardon ! Tu vois, qu'il n'est même pas jugé ! Il faut que il est jugé en coup que je le pardonne (...) faut pas que, les choses se fas comme il n'a jamais existe, tu vois. Autour de dire, il faut laisser, tu vois, la paix... non, Il faut qu'ils soient jugé. Si c'est nécessaire de pardonner, on les pardonne. Mais serait difficile de voir une personne qui a tué... un ami, un proche. Ca me donne l'impression... il faut que ce gents sont juger. N'importe qui, n'importe quelle ethnie. Selon moi, il n'y a une personne qui se dise, même si je commis cette crimes, cette horrible chose... je continue la vie comme ca. Comme ces gents qui pille le trésor publique, si il n'est pas punis, il continuera.. Il y a une personne, ce general...il doit être jugé au nom public. (...) se sera normal. (..) Et aussi, il aura toujours les choses cachées... sans trouver la vérité... il n'aura pas la paix. C'est sur. On fait semblant d'avoir un paix, mais pas durable... parce-que quand ces gents restera impunis, il aura toujours la haine. (...) Maintenant... il y a un président qui décide que les gents qui sont emprisonner, plus que la moitié de leur ethnie doit être libéré. Comme ca... tu vois ? Tout ca, créé le chaos ! Il est emprisonné, pour avoir violer par exemple, une fille, peut être ma sœur, il est liberé comme ca ! (...)

## **Non Governmental Organisations.**

### **- Centre Jeunes Kamenge (Cejeka) Projet Paix et Réconciliation- 12-04-2010. (Harushimana, Guillaume)**

*(Votre projet est-il un projet pour la réconciliation ?)*

Normalement ce ne sont pas des choses que l'on peut dire. C'est un projet qui est créé juste pour assurer de contribuer au dialogue, à la fraternité et à l'acceptation mutuelle des jeunes durant la période de crise. En 1996 certaines autorités administratives ont proposé au Centre de développer à l'extérieur du Centre des activités qui étaient (...). C'est le début de ce projet.

*( Est-ce le gouvernement qui a fait cette proposition ?)* Non, c'est l'administration locale.

*(L'administration locale des Quartiers Nord seulement?)* Les administrateurs communaux, parce que plusieurs fois il était difficile pour eux de rassembler les jeunes. Ils voyaient que c'était tellement facile pour le Centre. Alors le Centre a créé ce projet. Il a mis à la disposition de chaque commune un animateur qui travaillait à temps plein. Le but était de voir quelles activités chacun pouvait organiser pour faire que les jeunes se rencontrent. Progressivement on a été obligé de collaborer avec les écoles. *( C'était dans quelles communes ?)* Les six communes : Kamenge, Kinama, Ngarara, Cibitoke, Gihosha et Buterere. Donc, dans chaque commune on a mis un animateur qui devait être un habitant de la même commune ; qui devait donc savoir la situation dans la commune. Petit à petit ces animateurs ont pris contact avec les écoles, les communautés religieuses, l'administration, et les chefs de quartier. Au niveau de la hiérarchie, il y a l'administrateur communal, et en bas il y a les chefs des quartiers et les chefs des communautés. *(De quelles communautés ?)* Des communautés religieuses : les protestants, les catholiques, les musulmans. (...) Ce sont des composantes dans les communes. Dans les communes on peut trouver une communauté religieuse, une école et les autorités administratives qui sont en haut de la hiérarchie. (...) Entre l'animateur et les chefs de cette communauté, les directeurs d'écoles, les chefs des collines, les chefs de quartier, les administrateurs communaux, il s'agissait de voir quelles activités on peut mettre en place pour que les gens puissent se rencontrer.

*(C'était là le premier but : mettre les gens ensemble?)* Lorsque l'animateur rencontrait un administrateur, un chef d'école, de communauté ou de quartier, c'était pour voir quelles activités on pouvait organiser. Je peux donner un exemple. On approchait la journée internationale des droits de l'homme. L'animateur pouvait aller trouver l'administrateur, lui dire qu'on approche la commémoration de cette date et lui demander ce que l'on peut faire, quel thème on peut choisir. Avec les recherches sur internet il pouvait lui dire le thème qui était choisi par les Nations Unies et lui soumettre plusieurs activités possibles : celle d'organiser un concours de dessins et un concours de poèmes pour les élèves des écoles secondaires ; celle d'organiser un tournoi de football ; de prendre une semaine pour projeter des films sur les droits de l'homme ; ou de chercher un expert en matière des droits de l'homme pour qu'il puisse faire une formation aux jeunes. On pouvait examiner toutes ces possibilités et voir ce que l'on peut faire. Ce sont toutes des activités qui peuvent rassembler les jeunes. Et ces jeunes sont de provenance de différentes communautés religieuses et ont donc une religion différente. Ils sont d'une ethnie différente et appartiennent à différents partis politiques. Ils pouvaient se rencontrer et discuter sur les mêmes thèmes. *(Faites-vous une formation avec les hommes de tous les quartiers ensemble, ou faites-vous une formation dans une école ou un quartier ?)* Cela dépend des possibilités, mais la plupart des fois il est mieux de faire la formation avec toutes les communautés. Il y a ainsi une connaissance mutuelle entre des jeunes qui ne se connaissent pas. Ils discutent, échangent sur un thème ; ils commencent petit à petit à faire, à créer l'amitié ; ils se connaissent, se rendent visite, discutent d'un problème d'un autre, d'un problème politique ou social (...). Petit à petit c'est toute la communauté, toute la population qui se met ensemble et trouve que la guerre qui a éclaté au Burundi n'avait pas de sens. Ce sont donc de petites activités, mais qui amènent progressivement les jeunes et les adultes à pouvoir raisonner sur un sujet, à pouvoir vraiment savoir pourquoi il y a eu une crise, si cela valait la peine qu'il y eut cette crise, ce qu'il y avait à l'origine de cette crise, et ce que l'on peut faire pour ne pas retomber dans les mêmes erreurs.

*(S'agit-il de la crise de 1993, ou aussi des crises d'avant cette date ?)*

Surtout de celle de 1993.

*(Quand tu compares la situation du moment où le projet a commencé avec celle d'aujourd'hui, vois-tu un changement dans la mentalité ?)*

Oui, il y a une différence. Je peux donner des exemples. Pendant la crise, des jeunes Hutu ont participé dans les mouvements armés, dans la rébellion. Des jeunes Tutsi ont participé dans des groupes qui s'organisaient avec les militaires pour aller (...)

(...)... pour aller attaquer un quartier Hutu. Ils le faisaient ensemble. Des hommes politiques et des militaires donnaient de petites sommes d'argent aux jeunes pour qu'ils aillent faire des bavures dans les différents quartiers Hutu. (...).

À partir de 1996, il y a eu des débuts de rapprochement entre ces jeunes. Avant il y avait une méfiance, (...) mais petit à petit, avec les petites rencontres organisées avec les camps de travail, - qui eux faisaient aussi partie du projet paix et réconciliation -, des rapprochements se dessinent. Ainsi un Tutsi est allé dans un quartier Hutu pour aider à la reconstruction des maisons. Des jeunes Hutu allaient dans les quartiers Tutsi pour aider à la reconstruction. Des Hutu et Tutsi se rencontraient dans les formations que nous faisons dans les camps de travail. Cela a créé une amitié. Ils ont vu qu'ils avaient été trompés par les hommes politiques. C'est là qu'on trouvait une nouvelle génération de jeunes qui n'ont plus peur de parler de la guerre, mais qui savent bien qu'un tel, qui est Hutu, et cet autre, qui est Tutsi, peuvent s'accepter comme cela ; qui savent qu'on peut être de différents partis politiques ; qu'on ne doit se détruire lorsqu'on fait une compétition de rôles politiques ; qu'on peut faire cette compétition, mais qu'on n'a pas besoin de replonger dans la violence. C'est cela la grande différence.

Autre grande différence est le retour de gens dans leur quartier.

*( Les quartiers sont-ils plus mêlés maintenant ? Est-ce là la différence dont tu parles ?)*

Oui, c'est-à-dire qu'avant la guerre les quartiers étaient mixés. À Kamenge et Kinama il y avait beaucoup d'Hutu et aussi des Tutsi ; à Cibitoke et Ngarara il y avait beaucoup de Tutsi, mais aussi des Hutu. Quand la crise a éclaté, la population minoritaire a fui le quartier. Les Tutsi qui étaient à Kamenge et Kinama sont allés à Ngarara et Cibitoke ; d'autres qui étaient à Ngarara et Cibitoke sont allés à Kinama ; d'autres sont partis à l'étranger. Mais maintenant les gens ont commencé à regagner leurs parcelles, à cause aussi des camps de travail et la construction des maisons.

Les camps de travail et les autres activités du Centre, comme la formation et le sport, les concours de danse, de poèmes et de dessins, sont des activités qui amènent les gens à réfléchir ensemble.

Il y a aussi d'autres petits projets. Au niveau du projet paix et réconciliation, le Centre Kamenge vient de bénéficier d'un financement. Le bailleur peut dire : vous allez choisir cinq cent enfants des écoles primaires ; on va les aider pour le matériel scolaire, les uniformes et tout le reste du paiement des frais scolaires. Pour montrer aux gens que tous les hommes sont égaux, on doit choisir les cinq cent jeunes dans toutes les communes et écoles. À Kamenge on va prendre cinquante personnes dans cinq écoles. Le nombre est très petit, mais quand même, on va savoir qu'on choisit dans toutes les écoles. (...) On se trouve là avec les Tutsi et les Hutu qui sont au courant du pourquoi on a reçu ce projet. (...) Les enfants doivent savoir qu'ils ont reçu la même chose.

Il arrive qu'on invite des enfants provenant de diverses communes à venir participer à une activité et qu'ils se parlent. Ainsi ils découvrent petit à petit qu'ils se trouvent dans une même situation. Et lorsqu'ils retournent à la maison, ils peuvent raconter tout ce qu'ils ont fait. Et petit à petit des familles sont aussi au courant que leurs enfants vont rencontrer des enfants qui viennent de familles différentes. Ainsi la mentalité des parents change elle aussi. Cela est important, parce que dans le passé ce sont surtout les parents qui ont joué un grand rôle pour montrer aux enfants qu'ils sont de familles différentes. Il y a des parents Hutu qui ont expliqué à leurs enfants que les Tutsi sont leurs ennemis ; qu'il ne faut pas avoir des amitiés avec des Tutsi. Quand l'enfant grandit, il grandit avec cette mentalité dans la tête.

Mais lorsqu'un enfant est devenu adulte et découvre la réalité, il peut changer d'esprit et peut aussi changer l'esprit des autres. Il peut aussi affronter ses parents, leur disant qu'ils ont essayé de le tromper.

*(Est-ce que cela se passe souvent ? Les parents n'ont-ils pas passé un temps vraiment difficile ? Dans l'histoire du Burundi, il s'est passé beaucoup entre les deux ethnies. Peut-on vraiment changer la*



*mentalité ?*) Oui, la mentalité peut changer. Elle a déjà changé, mais pas à cent pour cent. Et je pense qu'il y a des extrémistes dans toutes les sociétés.

Je me rappelle : Quand j'étais à l'école secondaire, j'ai appris que j'étais un Hutu. Je l'ai su à travers les amis. Et lorsque la crise a commencé, j'ai brusquement vu les groupes qui commençaient à s'organiser. Pendant la récréation, on voyait des groupes d'Hutu et des groupes de Tutsi. Et lorsqu'on doit aller à la maison, il n'y avait plus l'amitié qui existait avant. On est extrémiste, et on ne sait pas pourquoi on l'est. Quand tu grandis, tu découvres toi-même ; tu vas lire certains livres qui parlent de l'histoire du Burundi ; tu vas essayer de mettre en balance parce que tu vois que l'auteur de ce livre, Hutu ou Tutsi, est modéré, qu'il est au milieu ; qu'il montre qu'il y a des erreurs dans études. Quand on grandit, on découvre beaucoup de choses.

*(Comment l'histoire est-elle enseignée dans les écoles ?)*

Les enseignants n'entrent pas en détail. À la limite, ils diront qu'il y avait la monarchie jusqu'à cette date, qu'il y a eu la première, la deuxième et la troisième république. Ils parleront de la conquête du territoire dans le Burundi ancien. On se limite à cela. Ils peuvent signaler qu'il y a eu des massacres dans telle ou telle année, mais ils n'entrent pas en détail.

Chacun peut lire des livres qui fournissent des informations supplémentaires sur l'histoire du Burundi, mais il faut une démarche personnelle pour les chercher dans les bibliothèques. Une fois à l'université, on est obligé de faire des recherches. C'est là que l'on peut découvrir beaucoup de choses sur l'histoire. Autre chose que l'on peut découvrir, concerne la société civile : les associations des jeunes, des femmes et des jeunes filles ; toute la société civile qui s'est constituée et le grand rôle qu'elle a joué surtout à partir de 1990.

Il y a une catégorie de gens qui en a assez, mais il faut que les jeunes soient au courant de ce qui s'est passé au Burundi. S'ils ne le sont pas, on va continuer d'avoir une société de crises et de massacres.

*(L'éducation ne joue donc pas un rôle très positif. Au moment de la crise, elle n'a pas empêché que se forme des groupes Hutu et Tutsi.)*

C'est vrai, on est devenu des ennemis, mais petit à petit on s'est rencontré en plusieurs choses : dans le service militaire, à l'université. On en est même arrivé à se demander pourquoi il n'y a pas une école pour les Tutsi et une école pour les Hutu seulement?

*( Qu'en est-il actuellement des écoles ? Sont-elles plus mêlées ?)*

Même avant elles étaient mêlées, sauf qu'au Burundi il y a des événements qui ont eu une grande influence sur la gestion du pays. On pouvait trouver des écoles à majorité Hutu où les Hutu ont dû fuir parce que les Tutsi étaient protégés par les militaires. Eux pouvaient rester à l'école et continuer à étudier. Les Hutu étaient devenus des réfugiés ; ils étaient allés se cacher quelque part ; ils n'avaient pas le courage de retourner à l'école.

*(Je reviens à la question de l'éducation. Il n'y a donc pas de système en place qui assure que les enfants soient informés sur la société civile. Y aurait-il actuellement dans les écoles un programme d'enseignement concernant la réconciliation ?)*

Suite à la crise, différents programmes ont été créés par l'Unesco ou d'autres organisations internationales qui voulaient contribuer à l'éducation des jeunes. Mais ces programmes n'existent plus. Cela n'a pas continué parce que, suite à des accords entre les partis, il a été décidé qu'une Commission devra d'abord revoir l'histoire du Burundi. Mais jusqu'à présent cette décision n'a pas eu de concrétisation. Ce sont des choses qui sont toujours en standby.

Sinon, la situation est la même dans les écoles. Ce qui contribue, surtout dans les écoles, c'est la société civile. C'est le Centre, par exemple, qui invite les jeunes à avoir une discussion, à poser des questions aux animateurs ; ce qui contribue à leur développement mental.

*(Tout cela contribue positivement à la réconciliation. Y a-t-il aussi des facteurs qui ont une influence négative ? Des incidents violents entre partis politiques, ou des parents qui continuent à transmettre des préjugés ethniques à leurs enfants, ont-ils une influence négative sur les jeunes ?)*

Comme je l'ai dit auparavant : dans toute société il y a des extrémistes qui ont leur influence. Jusqu'à présent il y a des jeunes des partis politiques qui sont vraiment antagonistes, mais ce n'est plus le cas

de dire que c'est un problème entre les Hutu et les Tutsi. Il y a maintenant de grands partis politiques qui sont Hutu, mais il y en a aussi qui sont croisés (...). Il y a en ce moment plusieurs partis politiques pour lesquels on peut militer. (...). Ce n'est plus comme dans les années 1990 quand un Tutsi se voyait obligé d'être membre d'un parti Tutsi et un Hutu d'un parti Hutu. (...) Suite au changement des mentalités, des jeunes ont commencé à se réaliser que le problème n'est pas ethnique.

*(Ce changement de mentalité est-il surtout dû aux programmes de la société civile ?)*

Surtout la à la société civile et les media ; aux gens de la société civile qui prennent le micro à la radio et font un débat. Les jeunes qui sont à l'écoute en prennent compte et peuvent poser des questions. En effet, pendant l'émission les gens ont la possibilité de prendre le téléphone et de poser des questions à la personne qui anime le débat.

*(Il y a beaucoup de monde qui écoute ces programmes de la radio ?)* Oui. Avant 1990 il n'y avait pas beaucoup de radios. Il y avait la radio nationale. Maintenant on a beaucoup de radios privées. La liberté de la presse à, elle aussi, contribué à orienter les esprits. Ainsi que les adultes qui ont vécu tout ce que le Burundi a vécu comme histoire, ne sont pas membres de partis politiques et se donnent la peine d'aller dans les media et de participer dans la société civile pour essayer d'éduquer les jeunes et de leur montrer qu'ils ne doivent pas être trompés.

*(On peut rencontrer des jeunes qui apportent cette mentalité positive dans les cafés.)*

Oui, des jeunes de différentes ethnies qui discutent sans violence, critiquent les mentalités dépassées de certains parents, s'interpellent pour qu'ils évoluent et comprennent (...) que pour arriver à avoir une vie normale, nous devons converger nos forces, nous devons, chacun de son côté, expliquer de quoi est fait le bien pour la vie de tout le monde. Il y a donc une propagation de bonnes idées, aussi parmi les jeunes. Mais il y a toujours des extrémistes.

*(Pourrais-tu dire quel est le pourcentage de gens qui restent fixés dans les anciens antagonismes ?)*

Ils ont été démasqué. Certes, il y a encore des extrémistes. Mais je peux aussi donner un exemple. J'entends dire un jeune de dix huit ans qu'il est venu pour la première fois au Centre parce qu'il n'y a que de la violence dans la commune de Kamenge. Il faut se demander où il a entendu cela. Alors on peut lui dire : viens, fréquente les quartiers, et tu verras que la réalité est toute autre. Je vois des jeunes Hutu qui pensent ne pas pouvoir marier une fille de famille Tutsi. Ce qui est un extrémisme qui n'a pas de sens. Cette mentalité est en train de changer.

Ce qui est aussi en train de grandir chez un jeune, c'est qu'il veut faire de la politique. On peut lui dire qu'il ne devrait pas faire de la politique dans le milieu de son ethnie seulement, mais qu'il devrait aller chercher dans les quartiers des sympathisants Hutu ; qu'il est obligé d'être ouvert à des gens qui ne sont pas de son ethnie ou de son parti. Parce que, quand on a envie de se développer dans tous les sens de la vie, on doit trouver quelqu'un qui n'a pas le même tempérament, qui n'a pas les mêmes idées, qui n'est pas de la même religion.

*(Est-ce qu'il y a une grande différence entre Hutu et Tutsi au niveau économique. Cette différence existait. Qu'en est-il maintenant ?)* Cela commence à se balancer, mais quand même. On voit qu'il y a des opportunités. Avant, seuls des Tutsi étaient hommes d'affaire. Maintenant des Hutu commencent à se propulser à ce niveau. Ils peuvent créer leurs petites entreprises ; des ateliers de réparation par exemple. (...) Il y avait aussi cette façon de faire dans l'administration publique. Il y avait presque seulement des Tutsi. Avec le changement politique on y rencontre aussi des Hutu (...).

Et si tu dois diriger une entreprise, tu ne dois pas la diriger comme ta propriété privée ; tu dois y rencontrer des Hutu et des Tutsi. Si tu cherche des fournitures, tu trouveras des Hutu et des Tutsi qui se font la concurrence. Mais il existe encore le sentiment qu'au niveau économique ce sont les Tutsi qui font le contrôle. L'histoire ne peut pas changer brusquement.

*(Est-ce qu'il y a aussi un peu de jalousie à cause de cela ?)* Pas tout à fait. Les hommes d'affaires peuvent lutter entre eux pour essayer de continuer leur business, mais cela ne doit pas affecter les gens. *(Comment faites-vous l'évaluation des programmes ?)* IL est très difficile de faire l'évaluation des programmes. Au Centre, nous avons déjà fait des évaluations (...) et nous en ferons peut-être pour cette année et l'année prochaine. L'évaluation que nous faisons, se fait surtout en demandant aux jeunes quelles sont leurs impressions. Ceci pour voir si l'on peut rectifier le tir ; si l'on peut changer la façon de travailler. Mais nous n'avons pas encore fait d'enquête.

Mais quand-même, lorsqu'on rencontre des autorités des écoles, des communautés religieuses ou des autorités administratives, elles donnent leurs avis, leurs impressions sur le changement de la situation dans le quartier. (...) Il y a aussi des gens qui ont travaillé au Burundi ; des étrangers qui sont venu ici pour différentes organisations en 1993 et pouvaient aller dans les quartiers et se rendre compte de la situation. Quand ils reviennent maintenant, ils voient qu'il y a des changements.

*(Je voudrais aussi vous demander si vous travaillez avec les chefs de commune. J'ai entendu dire que les chefs de commune craignent les rapports de tout ce qui se passe dans les quartiers.)* Oui, ils doivent faire es rapports pour le niveau central.

*(Je voudrais savoir. Il y a beaucoup de coups de feu. On dit que ce sont des voleurs.)* Oui, ce sont des cas de vol, parce qu'il y a encore des armes. À cause des problèmes dans les familles et, le chômage, il y a des jeunes qui ne savent plus quoi faire pour gagner leur vie. S'ils ont encore des armes chez eux, ils s'en servent. Tout cela est la faute du gouvernement, parce qu'il ne veut pas organiser le désarmement total de la population.

Cela aussi est un jeu politique. Lorsque le gouvernement, le parti au pouvoir, a été intégré au sein des institutions de sécurité, il n'a pas remis toutes les armes. J'ai beaucoup d'amis qui étaient des rebelles et qui ont gardé leurs armes à la maison.

*(Pourquoi gardent-ils les armes ?)* Avant, parce que des membres de la police et de l'armée qui faisaient partie de l'FDD n'étaient pas sûrs que la situation aille continuer (39.19). Maintenant, après cinq ans de pouvoir, ils attendent des élections et ne savent pas s'ils vont gagner ; ils ne sont pas sûr de la victoire. C'est mon constat quand je parle des démobilisés. Ils se disent : On s'est battu pendant plus de dix ans. Pourquoi doit-on rester au pouvoir pendant cinq ans seulement ? Et plus à partir des élections ? *( Est-ce la même chose avec le FNL (Forces Nationales de Libération) ? )* Oui, c'est la même chose avec le FNL. Le FNL (...) va attendre pour voir si la situation va se normaliser (...). Plusieurs ont été intégrés dans la police et l'armée et se demandent quand le tissu sera cautérisé à cent pour cent. Ils se disent qu'il vaut mieux garder les armes, surtout parce qu'il y a encore des violences dans certains coins du pays, et qu'ils peuvent aussi être attaqués. C'est que chacun veut tirer de son côté. Cela au niveau des politiciens, des hommes politiques.

*( Les anciens groups comme (...) ont-ils été démobilisé ? ).* Non, ils n'ont pas été démobilisés. (...) *( Je pense que les grands groupes de Tutsi ne sont pas sûr de gagner les élections. )* Non, ils ne vont pas la gagner. Mais ils continuent à dire qu'ils sont désorientés ; qu'ils ont besoin de garanties pour leur sécurité. Et il y a de grands officiers qui étaient très influant au niveau de l'armée et de la police avant et pendant la crise et font partie de partis Tutsi. Ils sont là, ne disent rien, sont mécontents de l'intégration d'ex rebelles dans l'armée et dans la police, et estiment qu'ils sont les anciens, qu'ils encore les maîtres de la situation. On ne sait pas ce qu'ils entendent faire. *( Ils sont un peu extrémistes. )* Ils ne sont pas extrémiste, mais ils ne sont pas contents, et cela aussi parce que certains d'entre eux ont perdu leur poste. *( Que penser des ex rebelles qui sont intégrés dans l'armée et la police ? J'ai entendu dire qu'il y a des policiers qui ne sont pas nets. Qu'en est-il ? )* Si les hommes politiques ne font pas attention, on pourrait avoir des problèmes dans le futur (...) suite aux réformes de l'armée et de la police. Ces problèmes pourraient venir des officiers pensionnés qui sont mécontents de leur situation, et aussi d'ex rebelles qui n'arrivent pas à acquérir le poste et les responsabilités qu'ils désirent dans l'armée ou la police. *( Et-ce que le tribunal d'Arusha pourrait apporter quelque aide ? )* Si on met en place un tribunal, des têtes pourraient tomber de tous les côtés. Il y a aussi le risque que les gens continuent à se protéger (...). Il y en a qui veulent ce tribunal parce qu'ils disent qu'ils sont propres. Il y en a d'autres qui voudraient dénoncer tel ou tel Hutu ou Tutsi pour des crimes commis. Des têtes tomberaient des deux côtés. Alors pourquoi continuer à vouloir ce tribunal (...). Il faut une amnistie générale. *( Il n'y a pas pour vous une pression pour savoir ce qui s'est passé ? )* Oui, il faudrait déjà avoir une Commission de Réconciliation. On est en train d'en mettre une en place, car il y a aussi les élections en jeu en ce moment. Si cela réussit, on n'a plus besoin de tribunal. Par exemple, le président de la République a été condamné à mort en 1997 quand il était encore dans la rébellion. Il a été condamné à mort parce qu'il avait posé des mines sur des routes ; ce qui a causé la mort de beaucoup de personnes dans les voitures qui sautaient. Il y a des anciens officiers de l'armée qui ont eu des responsabilités dans l'assassinat de (...). préjugés. C'est là qu'on se demande pourquoi mettre en place un tribunal ? *( Il n'y a pas d'espoir ? )* Oui, il y a de l'espoir. Il y des gens qui sont bien, qui n'ont pas besoin d'être condamné parce qu'ils n'ont rien fait. Si ces gens-là arriveront aux

commandes du pays, il faudra revoir l'accord d'Arusha pour mettre en place tout ce qu'on était convenu de mettre en place. Ce serait bien, parce qu'il y a des injustices qu'il faut punir à un certain moment.

*( Et la réconciliation ? )* C'est déjà le début de la réconciliation effective. Les gens ont le droit de savoir ce qui s'est passé. De savoir par exemple qui a tué un de leurs proches. Cela vaut aussi pour ceux qui ont quitté le pays en 1972 et sont revenu au pays. Et pour ceux qui ont perdu leur maison parce qu'elle a été occupée par d'autres personnes. À un certain moment ils devront réclamer leur propriété. *( Je comprends. Mais j'ai entendu beaucoup de jeunes dire : non, nous devons oublier parce que tous les soirs... )* Oui, il y a des gens qui disent qu'il faut oublier tout cela, mais il faut voir pourquoi ils le disent. Je sais qu'ils veulent parfois oublier parce qu'ils ont des responsabilités et devraient se justifier, répondre à la justice. Ils disent qu'il faut oublier parce qu'ils ont peur du tribunal international. *( Et-ce que cela vaut aussi pour les jeunes que je rencontre ici ? )* Oui, mais ils sont parfois mal éclairés. Pardonner, oublier, oui. Mais il faut que les gens soient punis pour ce qu'ils ont fait. *( Punir, est-ce aussi pardonner ? )* Non. Mais il faut que la justice travaille, qu'elle joue son rôle. Cela peut être l'opinion de chacun. C'est mon opinion personnelle. *( Punir, est-ce toujours mettre en prison ? )* Non. Devant une Commission de Réconciliation, on demande pardon ; mais avant de demander pardon on doit dire pourquoi on demande pardon. *( Et cela est déjà une punition sociale. )* Oui.

### **-Coalition for Peace in Burundi (COPA) 23-03-2010 (Nsengiyumva, Sylvere)**

Hier vous aviez des questions que nous pourrions reprendre. *( Je voudrais savoir pourquoi vous avez pensé qu'il y a nécessité ici pour un centre de résolution des conflits. Quel était votre objectif ? )*

L'objectif est de créer un cadre d'échanges entre organisations qui sont impliqués dans le processus de paix. Cela me rappelle une chose. La COPA est un réseau, ce n'est pas une organisation. C'est un réseau (un network) entre associations qui sont engagés dans la gestion des conflits. Les organisations membres sont au nombre de dix sept maintenant avec des membres individuels. Des organisations et aussi des individus de ces organisations ou associations sont membre.

*( Quelle est votre perspective du conflit au Burundi ? )* Nous projetons toujours de continuer à renforcer les capacités des organisations qui sont impliqués dans le processus de paix.

Autre chose : on est en train de marier la paix et le développement, parce qu'on a dit qu'à la source des conflits chez nous, dans les pays en sous-développement, il y a toujours la pauvreté. Et les milieux politiques font la confrontation pour arriver au pouvoir ; et le pouvoir dans nos pays est la source de richesse. C'est pourquoi il y a toujours des batailles pour arriver à ces postes.

Et encore, quand ces politiciens cherchent à arriver au pouvoir, ils utilisent des jeunes et des gens pauvres en les manipulant, soi-disant qu'une fois qu'ils sont au pouvoir, ils vont bénéficier de tel ou tel avantage. Mais, ce sont des mensonges. C'est pourquoi on est en train de voir comment justement faire marier la paix et le développement. (...) *( La source des conflits est le mal développement, la pauvreté ? )* La pauvreté est vraiment un élément très important. À cela s'ajoute notre inquiétude sur les préjugés des uns sur les autres.

*( Les préjugés existent encore parce que l'histoire des conflits est si longue. Quelle est en cette matière la situation actuelle par rapport à celle d'avant ? )* Je ne peux pas dire à cent pour cent qu'on n'a plus de préjugés ethniques entre Twa, Hutu et Tutsi, mais ce n'est plus, en ce moment, un facteur qui peut influencer l'intensification du conflit. On a essayé de casser cela. Maintenant on voit que le mal du problème ne réside pas au niveau des ethnies. Bien sûr, il y a encore quelques politiciens qui utilisent ce préjugé. Mais, vraiment, cela n'a pas d'impacte.

*( Tu ne penses pas qu'ils peuvent mobiliser les gens autour de l'ethnie ? J'ai entendu dire que les partis politiques ne sont pas vraiment mêlés maintenant ; et que c'est plus normal de voter pour un parti Hutu quand on est Hutu. Cela me donne à penser qu'il y a encore des divisions entre les partis politiques qui sont encore un peu basé sur l'ethnie. )* Je ne pense pas. À l'époque les leaders étaient des Tutsi.

Maintenant on a en tout peut-être une dizaine de partis politiques dont les leaders sont des Tutsi. Chez les Hutu c'est dans les trente. (...). Comprenez bien : voter ce n'est plus voter un Hutu pour un Hutu, un Tutsi pour un Tutsi. (...)

*( Pourrais-tu expliquer un peu ? Qu'est-ce qui s'est passé ? )*

Ce qui se passe c'est la lutte au pouvoir Hutu. On ne peut pas aller expliquer bouche à oreille à la population que ce sont toujours les Tutsi qui occupent le pouvoir, et non pas les Hutu.

Ce que l'on explique aux gens actuellement, c'est que tels groupes sont des pilleurs, des assaillants, des voleurs, des tueurs, etc. Ce sont ces mots-là qui dominent, et non le mot ethnies. Je peux citer comme exemple le cas de Kirundo au Nord du pays. Il y a dans les communes de cette région des chicaneries entre le FNL et surtout des groupes à dominance Hutu. Il y en a même qui disposent de leur propre milice. Il y en a qui se blessent. À certains moments, ils s'entre-tuent. Même au niveau des guères de partis, cela ne marche pas du tout. Cet exemple montre qu'il ne s'agit plus de luttes ethniques, mais d'un enjeu.

*( Quel est, à ton avis, le facteur le plus important qui a fait que la question de l'ethnie n'est plus vraiment importante en ce moment ? )* Selon mon expérience c'est le rapprochement des communautés et la création d'un cadre sécurisant où tout le monde peut s'exprimer vraiment. C'est-à-dire les formations de discussion autour de sujets-clés. *( Est-ce là les méthodes que vous utilisez ? )*. Oui. Les sujets que nous abordons concernent les préjugés. Nous développons et discutons dans ces rapprochements des communautés les questions suivantes : comment les Tutsi se perçoivent-ils ? Comment les Hutu perçoivent les Tutsi ? Nous posons ensuite la question : quelle image aimerions-nous que les autres - Hutu ou Tutsi - aient de nous ? On dira par exemple : écoute, ici on dit que les Tutsi sont des assaillants, des tueurs, des criminels, etc., mais toi, que veux-tu qu'on pense de toi ? Après avoir écouté toutes les réponses, on pose la question : que pouvons nous faire ensemble ?

*( Pratiquez-vous cette méthode dans toutes les provinces du pays ? )*

En effet. J'ai travaillé dans presque toutes les provinces du pays. *( Travaillez-vous avec des groupes d'une centaine de personnes ? )* Avec des groupes de quarante, cinquante personnes au maximum.

*( Le travail avec ces groupes opère-t-il des changements de mentalité ? N'y a-t-il pas des moments de stress ? )* Oui. Pour donner un exemple. À l'université c'était un peu difficile. Il y avait des moments très chauds. À certains moments on a dû interrompre les discussions et faire appel au recours de la surveillance (...). Lorsqu'on travaille avec des groupes différents et cela n'a pas marché, on se réunit avec les groupes à part et on se demande ce que l'on peut faire. Ces groupes proposent des solutions. On cherche une voie à suivre, un compromis pour avancer. Ainsi, après avoir rapproché ces jeunes universitaires et avoir mené un dialogue franc, c'est eux qui ont créé au niveau de l'université un club, appelé « Nouvel Horizon ». Ce club a été initié pour influencer la communauté universitaire et promouvoir la participation à ces séances de dialogue ; je dis de dialogue et non de réconciliation, car ce serait trop dire. Le travail était difficile, mais a eu en même temps un impact durable. Ce club est actif. Lorsqu'il y a un problème politique ou autre, il nous appelle. Ainsi, petit à petit, le petit groupe a un impact au niveau de toute la communauté universitaire. (...).

*( Pourquoi le changement opéré à l'université ne peut pas être considéré comme réconciliation ? Qu'est ce que le mot réconciliation veut dire pour toi ? )* D'abord, c'est un mot possessif. On parle de réconciliation quand on a dit la vérité, quand la justice grandit, et quand on a fait un effort pour pardonner. S'il n'y a pas ces éléments de vérité, de justice et de pardon, on ne parle pas de réconciliation. C'est pourquoi parler de réconciliation chez nous serait trop dire. Ce serait trop dire que la population s'est réconciliée. (...) On parle de réconciliation quand les bourreaux parlent de la raison qui les a poussés à faire du mal à quelqu'un ; quand les victimes comprennent les réactions de ceux qui ont montré cela. Certes, au niveau des formations avec les communautés où l'on travaille avec les émotions, on peut peut-être dire que l'on se réconcilie. Dans ces formations on peut parler avec émotion de ce qui s'est passé, témoigner de ce qu'on a vu et vécu. Mais le gouvernement n'a pas encore fait cela. (...) Il ne faut pas devancer la politique du gouvernement.

*( Tu fais une distinction entre la réconciliation au niveau politique et la réconciliation au niveau communautaire. )* Oui, au niveau communautaire, pendant des séances de vérité, de réconciliation, on avoue par exemple d'avoir volé des casiers de bière, on demande pardon et on promet de rembourser. Mais le gouvernement n'a jamais avoué avoir planifié des actions injustes, demandé pardon et promis de réparer les dégâts. Et, en plus, les plus grands ne sont jamais jugés en justice. Aucun ministre, général ou colonel, n'a été jugé.

*( La réconciliation est donc quelque chose de profond qui restaure les relations au niveau de la communauté. )* Au niveau communautaire, oui. En fait, la réconciliation la plus lucide devrait concerner ce qui s'est passé au niveau politique. Même en Afrique du Sud, on n'a pas vu.. le pierre

Botha ou les autres grandes personnes.. de demander pardon et dire qui on a planifié.. non, personne (...) La plus petite, le Sud Africain... il y a la vie des blancs, la vie de noirs. (...) En Afrique du Sud il y a eu des exemples de cette réconciliation, mais nous ne sommes pas en Afrique du Sud. (*Comment vois-tu la situation au Burundi ?*) Pour que la population du Burundi puisse vraiment se réconcilier, il faudrait à mon avis deux choses. D'abord, continuer à créer des cadres d'échange sur les perceptions et les préjugés ethniques. Donc, travailler sur l'esprit des gens. Faire l'éducation à la paix pour les enfants. J'ai développé, à ce sujet, un projet, pour lequel je cherche encore un financement. J'ai opté pour une éducation informelle, et non pour une éducation formelle, parce que à l'école, les élèves vont apprendre pour gagner des points, et non pour vivre ce qu'ils ont appris. C'est pourquoi la meilleure stratégie c'est de faire une formation informelle.

(*Et-ce que l'histoire fait partie de cette éducation ? Je veux dire la connaissance de tout ce qui s'est passé et ne devrait plus jamais revenir.*)

Oui, et cela d'abord pour travailler les esprits de leurs parents ou les communautés d'option. Parce que l'éducation à la paix au Burundi a des retombées traditionnelles. Par exemple, on nous disait le proverbe suivant: « Quand tu tues un lézard, ton grand-père va mourir ». Lorsque nous rencontrons un lézard, nous allions donc le protéger pour éviter que grand-père meure. Mais on ne nous expliquait pas que c'est tuer qui est mauvais. On disait que ton grand-père va mourir, parce que les petits enfants aiment leur grand-père.

On disait encore : « Quand tu tues un lézard, les seins de ta mère seront coupés ». Lorsque tu tuais un lézard, même sans le vouloir, tu avais peur que ta mère soit mutilée, et ta mère te dira plus tard que ces seins ne sont pas coupés parce que tu as tué le lézard involontairement. C'était pour montrer que tuer est toujours mauvais. Cela peut arriver, mais il ne faut pas le faire volontairement. C'est maintenant que l'on commence à comprendre ce que ces interdits traditionnels voulaient dire.

On peut aussi chercher avec les enfants des proverbes kirundi qui sèment la haine et la division entre les gens. Il s'agit par exemple de proverbes qui disent : « Si tu lance une pierre dans son domaine, demain il va te tuer ». Ou : « Pour manger quelque chose d'un Tutsi, il faut d'abord l'enterrer ». Cela crée des problèmes. On utilise dans ces proverbes des mots qui s'associent à des actes violents, pour souligner l'importance d'un interdit, ou pour dire qu'il est difficile d'obtenir quelque chose.

Pour que la population du Burundi puisse vraiment se réconcilier, il faut que l'éducation à la paix des enfants et le rapprochement des communautés pour parler de la question ethnique soient accompagnés du développement. Si les gens n'ont rien à faire, il est normal que...

(*Les trois points les plus importants sont donc, l'information, l'éducation à la paix et le développement.*)

Le développement communautaire. Il faut susciter l'intérêt des gens pour qu'ils se développent ensemble, travaillent ensemble. Dans ce sens, le Centre de Kamenge fait de bonnes choses, par exemple l'organisation des camps de travail, mais il faut qu'ils avancent un peu. (...). Il y a des rencontres et des jeux ; c'est bon ; mais il faut qu'on travaille à la transformation de l'esprit des gens en abordant d'autres questions, comme celle du comportement démocratique, ou ce qu'il faut faire quand il y a un problème. Il faut aborder les problèmes les plus préoccupants qui se posent dans les quartiers respectifs.

(50.59 – 54.39)

(*Une autre question : quelles sont les influences qui créent le plus de tensions dans les quartiers ; les influences qui détériorent les relations entre les différents groupes ?*)

Je dirais que c'est la manipulation politique avec des promesses peu réalistes et irréalisables. Par exemple, les promesses comme celle-ci : si mon parti gagne, tu seras chef de zone ; je te donnerai une motocyclette. Il est facile d'essayer de manipuler des jeunes qui ne sont pas allés à l'école et n'ont pas d'instruction.

(*Les partis manipulent-ils les gens seulement pour qu'ils votent pour eux ?*)

En effet, lors des élections ils offraient de petits cadeaux (quelques kilos d'haricots ou de riz, par exemple) pour motiver les gens à aller voter et à voter pour leur parti.

Il y a d'autres manipulations. On engage des gens pour travailler sur les routes avec la promesse qu'ils gagneront beaucoup d'argent. Plus tard ils seront déçus, car cette promesse ne sera pas tenue.

( *Quelle est la relation des partis avec les jeunes parents ?* ) Chez nous, ce n'est pas comme aux États-Unis entre démocrates et républicains. Il est rare de trouver des familles dont les membres partagent le même parti politique. Même dans les familles pauvres mari et femme n'ont pas les mêmes opinions politiques. On trouve même des cas où le fils tue le père parce qu'il ne partage pas le même parti politique. Et cela arrive aussi entre les familles.

( *C'est grave, cela. Je pensais que les familles étaient plus unies.* ) (01.00.57 – 01.03.29)

Il faut à l'Afrique une démocratie adaptée, c'est-à-dire une démocratie qui donne à chacun la chance d'avoir accès aux droits de chaque citoyen. Avant, par exemple, une femme qui travaille à la banque où travaille son mari, n'avait pas droit au crédit.

( *Il y a aussi des inégalités entre hommes et femmes dans le domaine des héritages. Les femmes ont-elles la position la plus basse dans la société burundaise ? Et-ce qu'elles ont des chances de monter au niveau social ?* )

Tout le monde a les mêmes chances. C'est une question d'éducation. Il y a, malheureusement, des parents dans les campagnes qui ne donnent pas à leurs enfants qui vont à l'école, le temps de réviser les leçons données pendant la journée. Rentrés à la maison, les enfants doivent participer aux travaux ménagers. Le soir, il n'y a même pas de lumière qui permettrait qu'ils révisent ces leçons. Le niveau de l'éducation est très bas. Les enfants doublent en première, deuxième et troisième année de l'école primaire. Ils font jusqu'à quinze ans à l'école primaire. Entre temps les filles sont devenues femme ; si elles n'ont pas obtenu les points suffisants pour aller à l'école communale, elles préfèrent abandonner l'école. Elles se marient et ont des enfants.

( *Tu as signalé certaines influences qui empirent la situation au lieu de l'améliorer. Pour revenir au sujet de la réconciliation, je me demande si les incidents de violence n'ont pas une influence négative sur les réconciliations ?* )

Quand on parle de violence chez nous, on vise surtout les violences sexuelles. Et ces violences sont très fréquentes.

Ce qui a une influence négative sur la réconciliation, ce sont les violences psychiques, psychologiques. Il faut d'abord que nos leaders politiques soient détraumatisés. Il faut qu'ils aillent dans des centres de rééducation. Il arrive qu'un leader qui a tué des personnes dans le passé, ou commis d'autres actes graves, soit toujours traumatisé par ce qu'il a fait. Il se comporte toujours comme un détenu parce qu'il a eu beaucoup de temps pour faire le mal, et que c'est trop difficile de faire du bien en faisant du mal.

( *La violence stagne donc dans les mentalités.* )

Il y a n effet une violence psychologique. Quand j'ai donné une formation à la police, on s'est posé la question pourquoi la police utilise toujours la violence pour gérer des problèmes de la ville. C'est parce que la majorité des policiers sont des ex-miliciens qui ont tué des gens. Il faut découvrir pourquoi on use de la violence. Il n'a pas d'autres alternatives. Il faut accompagner les personnes pour qu'elles changent leur comportement. Cela est un processus ; demande du temps.

( *Est-ce un processus personnel ou aussi un processus collectif ?* ) Un processus personnel, et aussi un processus collectif. (...) ( *Penses-tu que l'installation de quelque chose comme les Commissions de Vérité et Réconciliation d'Afrique du Sud, pourrait aider aux changements au niveau communautaire ou politique au Burundi ?* ) C'est une question juridique qui ne concerne pas la réconciliation politique, mais celle de la population. Il serait important de voir quelles responsabilités ces Commissions avaient. Elles ont cherché à découvrir qui avait des responsabilités. Ce qu'elles ont fait est déjà beaucoup. Cela pourrait nous inspirer, mais ces commissions ne sont pas à copier.

( *Qu'est-ce que l'on devrait faire au niveau politique pour effectuer ou stimuler un processus de réconciliation ?* ) On a besoin de Commissions de réconciliation chez nous pour deux raisons. D'abord pour comprendre ce qui s'est passé et pourquoi cela s'est passé. Car lorsqu'on fait l'analyse du conflit au Burundi, on essaye de faire l'analyse historique du contexte, etc. (...). On verra que, fin de fin, que ce soit les hutu soit les tutsi, disent qu'ils ne sont pas responsable. On parle toujours des blancs, de colonisateurs belges. C'est un faux contexte. Quand un personne.. de muyinga, a tuer son voisin. Es-ce que ce gent la a connaiser les colenes belges ? non. A l'independance, avant Rwagasore était tue, il avait l'Uprona. Et l'uprona était déjà melanger. Donc le renaissance de l'ethnisme.. les belges était

déjà parti ! et maintenant pourquoi ça continue. ça c'était néanmoins pas un problème en ce niveau là.. selon moi. Alors. C'était le contexte ethnique ethnique.. mais pour moi,... ça était un prétexte. Pour faire ce qu'on devrait faire. Se cacher derrière ethnique pour faire ça.

(...) *(Revenons aux activités de la Copa.)*

Nous faisons de la recherche. Nous développons des outils d'analyse des conflits. Nous faisons la documentation, qui est même utilisée par des étudiants de l'université qui font des recherches sur les conflits au Burundi. Nous faisons la formation (...). Nous faisons des fois des médiations communautaires. On intervient comme un parti impartial et on fait la médiation.

*(Quelle est la dernière médiation que vous avez faite ?)* C'était à Bujumbura, il y a quatre mois, je pense. Un directeur du lycée avait été tué sur place, fusillé devant les élèves sur le drapeau. Les raisons pour lesquelles il ait été tué, on disait qu'il avait fait partie du parti au pouvoir et avait utilisé son influence pour désavantager des membres d'autres partis. Des parlementaires et gens de l'administration auraient fait des travaux de groupe pour arriver au conflit. C'est ce que l'on disait. En fait, le régionalisme n'est pas trop prononcé au Burundi, mais il est là (...). D'autres raisons concernaient des intérêts matériels, comme la gestion des fonds collectifs et l'accès à des postes. Cela est devenu un conflit ouvert (...). L'administrateur de la commune était impliqué et a été emprisonné. Après la tension a monté. La Copa a été saisie, a travaillé avec des groupes différents, formations, échanges etc. jusqu'à ce qu'on a décidé de mettre en place un comité de paix, qui va toujours intervenir lorsqu'il y a un malentendu. Maintenant cela marche.

Il faut comprendre que le fait que l'administrateur de la commune était impliqué dans un assassinat avait affecté presque toute la commune.

*(La Copa fait ce genre de médiation combien de fois par an?)* Je n'ai pas terminé la présentation de la Copa. La Copa était d'abord un comité régional. Lorsque les fonds pour ce comité étaient épuisés, on n'a pas voulu laisser tomber notre approche et on a créé la Copa Burundi qui est, comme je l'ai dit, un réseau d'organisations membres. Cela veut dire que la Copa n'a pas de fonds propres pour planifier des activités. Elle doit être invitée pour entreprendre faire des médiations ou pour animer des formations. Ce qui nous permet d'animer trois ou quatre animations par semestre, mais tout dépend des ONG qui viennent me voir. Ce qui fait que je peux faire dix ou seulement deux ou trois animations par mois. Les médiations sont volontaires. Pour elles, on n'est pas payé. Les membres associations nous saisissent..(...)*(Est-ce que la Copa a beaucoup d'activités à l'intérieur du pays ? Ou est-ce les autres associations qui travaillent là ?)* (...) Il y a un bureau national où les associations se rencontrent. Sinon il y a des enquêtes à Gitega où des associations de Gitega se rencontrent pour échanger sur leurs activités, les problèmes qui se posent et les solutions apportées. Il y a les mêmes rencontres ici, pour les associations qui travaillent à Bujumbura. Et chaque trimestre on fait une assemblée générale pour évaluer où nous en sommes.

Lorsqu'il y a un financement qui arrive pour animer une formation, on invite un formateur de Gitega pour venir animer une formation à Bujumbura (...).

Et ce n'est pas nous qui nous proposons pour telle ou telle animation ou formation. On est interpellé. (...)*(Tu as dit qu'il y a deux raisons pour lesquelles il faut un Comité de vérité et de réconciliation. La première c'est de comprendre ce qui s'est passé et pourquoi cela c'est passé...)*

La deuxième raison c'est qu'est-ce qu'on va faire avec la vérité ? Si un travail de recherche est fait, qu'est-ce qu'on va faire avec la vérité ? *(Cela est une grande question. Peut-être enseigner l'histoire.)* Ce travail est mené par les politicologues. On n'a pas besoin du Comité pour cela.

*(Peut-être pas. Mais pour la population ce sera peut-être bien. Pour voir l'histoire complète et être capable de dire : je ne veux pas que cela arrive encore.)* C'est difficile. *(Qu'est-ce que vous allez faire avec la vérité ?)* D'abord un exemple. J'ai posé la question au représentant de au Burundi : qu'est-ce que vous allez faire avec les résultats de toutes vos enquêtes, vos analyses, vos recherches ? Il ferait un rapport. Et quelle est la finalité de ce rapport ? Il ne le savait pas !

Personnellement, je dirai : j'ai besoin de la vérité pour faire comprendre aux gens que la question ethnique n'est pas une préoccupation pour nous au Burundi. Lorsqu'on comprendra qu'il y a un autre intérêt dans ce qui s'est passé, et que c'est à partir de cet intérêt qu'il faut développer ; après avoir compris que cet intérêt n'est pas ethnique, mais un autre intérêt caché, la paix viendra au Burundi. J'explique un peu. Quand le petit paysan comprendra que le vieil homme politique n'est pas venu expliquer la question ethnique pour le faire avancer, mais plutôt pour son propre avancement, il



pourra poser la question : qu'est-ce que je vais gagner avec cela ? C'est toi qui monte ! À partir de cette vérité, les gens vont examiner leur conscience et comprendre que le politicien en question n'a pas les moyens pour payer les promesses qu'il fait.

Je me rappelle un politicien qui a fait la promesse vraiment irréalisable, de créer un lac dans la province de Muyinga, à l'est du pays. Il expliquait à la population que cela pourra réussir. Pour parer cela, il faut de l'éducation.

