The road to the EU enlargement wave of 2004

An analysis of Dutch political discussions on the 2004 enlargement from 1997 to 2004

The Treaty concerning the accession to the European Union was signed in Athens, Greece, in 2003 on behalf of the Netherlands by Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende (left) and Foreign Minister Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (right).[1]

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[1] European Commission. *Signing ceremony of the accession treaty of the New Member States of the EU – photo ID: P-009815/00-39.* April 16, 2003, photo by Jan van de Vel.

Abstract

The 2004 European Union (EU) enlargement resulted in the expansion of the EU from 15 to 25 member states. Academic literature on the 2004 enlargement often focuses either on the post-2004 effects of the enlargement, or the history of the enlargement from the perspective of candidate countries or EU institutions. However, the perspective and enlargement debates of Western European countries on the 2004 enlargement is frequently understudied.

This thesis addresses the perspective of Western European countries on the 2004 enlargement by taking the Netherlands as a case study. The central question formulated was: How did discussions on the 2004 EU enlargement develop within the Dutch parliament and government between 1997 and 2004? The study analysed 121 Dutch parliamentary and governmental records which were obtained by a systematic search in the official archive and information service of the Dutch public authorities and government, overheid.nl. The discourse framework of Helen Sjursen on EU enlargement was used for the analysis, focusing on two types of enlargement discourses: the pragmatic discourse and the identity discourse.

The findings show that, until the Nice Treaty in 2001, Dutch enlargement debates primarily focussed on EU institutional reforms, which were seen as a necessary step before enlargement with new countries could take place. After 2001, the focus of the debate shifted towards citizen engagement (notably discussing referenda), and concerns about the lack of progress of candidate countries in adopting EU standards (i.e. the Copenhagen criteria). Key enlargement topics for Dutch politicians throughout 1997-2004 included the Common Agricultural Policy reforms and concerns regarding individual candidates, notably Cyprus and, after 2001, Poland. The results show that Dutch politicians across the political spectrum employed a mixture of identity and pragmatic discourses. The progressive/left-wing parties leaned more heavily on identity arguments, often to emphasise the political benefits of enlargement or to critique human rights standards in candidate countries. In contrast, conservative/right-wing parties favoured a pragmatic discourse when critiquing the enlargement process, typically highlighting the risks of enlargement to Dutch national interests. Finally, the two largest political parties between 1997-2004, *Partij van de Arbeid* (PvdA) and *Christen Democratisch Appèl* (CDA), used a balanced mix of both discourses in their positions on the 2004 enlargement.

Key words: EU 2004 enlargement, EU enlargement discourse, Dutch-EU relations, Dutch parliamentary history, Dutch foreign policy

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List of abbreviations

The list of abbreviations contains the following order:

1) The abbreviation; 2) The full name of the abbreviation; 3) If relevant, the English translation of Dutch names in *italics*

CAP – Common Agricultural Policy

CEEC – Central and Eastern European countries

EC – European Commission

EU – European Union

IGC – Intergovernmental conference

MP – Member of Parliament

WRR – Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid *The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy*

Abbreviations of Dutch political parties, their English name and political ideology:

CDA: Christen-Democratisch Appèl – *Christian Democratic Appeal*
Ideology: *Christian democratic*

CU: ChristenUnie – *Christian Union*
Ideology: *Christian democratic*

D66: Democraten 66
Ideology: *Social liberal*

GL: GroenLinks – *Green Left*
Ideology: *Green politics*

LPF: Lijst Pim Fortuin – *List Pim Fortuin*
Ideology: *Right-wing populist*

PvdA: Partij van de Arbeid – *Labour Party*
Ideology: *Social democratic*

SGP: Staatskundig Gereformeerde Partij – *Reformed Political Party*
Ideology: *Conservative Christian*

SP: Socialistische Partij – *Socialist Party*
Ideology: *Democratic socialist*

VVD: Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie – *People's Party for Freedom and Democracy*
Ideology: *Conservative liberal*



Map of the EU 2004 enlargement.[2]

Introduction

"When the clock struck midnight, on the 1 May 2004, a whole continent burst into celebration. The flames of bonfires lit up the night in the Baltic states. A thousand fireworks coloured the sea around Malta and Cyprus, and the lakes of Slovenia, and the Ode to Joy resonated in the cities of Central and Eastern Europe, previously on the other side of the Iron Curtain. It was not just the birth of a larger Union; it was the birth of a new era. It was a night of promise, because Europe is a promise: the promise that all Europeans can be masters of their own destiny. The promise of freedom and stability, peace and prosperity. And in the twenty years that followed, this promise has been fulfilled."[3]

On April the 24th, 2024, the president of the European Commission (EC) Ursula von der Leyen gave a speech on the occasion of the twentieth birthday of the 2004 EU enlargement. Von der Leyen emphasised in her speech the historic significance of the 2004 enlargement, and how this enlargement wave strengthened "Europe's voice on the global stage". The speech was also an occasion for Von der Leyen to look forward towards the future, and she argued that "today, the desire to unite Europe and complete our Union is more important than ever before", referring

[2] CVCE.EU (Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe). *The accession of ten new Member States to the European Union (2004)*. 2025.
[3] European Commission. "Speech by President Von Der Leyen at the European Parliament Formal Sitting on the 20th Anniversary of the 2004 EU Enlargement," 2024.

to the EU enlargement with Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia.[4] However, the role of western EU members in the 2004 enlargement process was missing in Von der Leyen's speech.

The 2004 enlargement, which started in early 1990 with association agreements with most of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC), and the official approval by the EU of applicant status to several CEEC in 1997, resulted in a significant transformation of the EU.[5] This transformation still impacts the EU that we know today. The 2004 enlargement affected not only the geographical size of the EU (with ten new members), but it also reformed the institutional governance, the economic and multiannual financial framework, and the European collective identity.[6]

The 2004 enlargement heavily influenced public and political debates about EU enlargement in general, as well as academic debates analysing EU enlargement after 2004.[7] However, debates on the 2004 enlargement already occurred in the 1990s and early 2000s, for example in the western EU member states. Before 2004, the possible impact of transformations within the EU (enlargement and institutional reform) profoundly affected Dutch political opinions towards the EU. The Netherlands was historically categorised within academia as one of the most pro-European countries, with low levels of Euroscepticism among both political parties and the general public. However, this academic perception changed, particularly after the Dutch vote against the European Constitution during a national referendum in 2005 - a byproduct of the 2004 enlargement.[8] Several studies have analysed this change within Dutch-EU relations in general.[9] However, none of these studies have attempted to analyse and reconstruct the Dutch political attitude on EU enlargement in the run-up to 2004. This research therefore aims to examine this development of the political debate on EU enlargement in the Netherlands before 2004. It will answer the research question: **How did discussions on the 2004 EU enlargement develop within the Dutch parliament and government between 1997 and 2004?**

Academic debate

Academia has extensively researched the concepts and ideas that drive the EU enlargement process. Three main ideas are important to understand why EU enlargement occurs: liberal intergovernmentalism, pan-European identity and post-functionalism.

The theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, developed by Andrew Moravcsik, argues that EU member states only support enlargement "because they consider enlargement to be in their long-

[4] Ibid
[5] EUR-LEX, "The 2004 Enlargement: The Challenge of a 25-member EU," 2007.
[6] Christophe Hillion. "The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Policy." Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2010, 27-28.
[7] See for the changing academic debate Helene Sjursen. "Introduction: Enlargement and the Nature of the EU Polity." In *Questioning EU Enlargement*, 1–16. Routledge, 2006.
[8] Marcel Lubbers and Eva Jaspers, "A Longitudinal Study of Euroscepticism in the Netherlands: 2008 Versus 1990," *European Union Politics* 12, no. 1 (2011): 22.
[9] See for example Bertjan Verbeek and Anna Van Der Vleuten, "The Domesticization of the Foreign Policy of the Netherlands (1989–2007): The Paradoxical Result of Europeanization and Internationalization," *Acta Politica* 43, no. 2–3 (2008): 357-377; Robert Harmsen. "The Evolution of Dutch European Discourse: Defining the 'Limits of Europe.'" *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 9, no. 3 (2008): 316–41; Lubbers and Jaspers, "A Longitudinal Study of Euroscepticism in the Netherlands: 2008 Versus 1990."

term economic and geopolitical interest."[10] Several studies on the 2004 enlargement have employed this theoretical perspective. Antoaneta Dimitrova & Elitsa Kortenska for example state that the accession negotiations of 2004 had an "intergovernmental nature" with a "leading role [... for] member states' officials."[11] Frank Schimmelfenning argues that Liberal Intergovernmentalism "accounts plausibly for most of the enlargement preferences [...] and explains why the association of Central and Eastern European countries [occurred]".[12]

The concept of pan-European identity, which originated in the 1930s with the idea of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi and his pan-European movement[13], suggests that the EU operates within a shared identity framework. This framework, built on norms such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights, serves as a driving force for EU enlargement. We see this for example in research by Helene Sjursen, who argues that the most explanatory reason for the 2004 enlargement was "a sense of 'kinship-based duty'."[14] Ulrich Sedelmeier states that the "EU's collective decision to enlarge eastwards [...] can only be fully understood when taking account of the EU's self-ascribed identity as a pan-European community of democracies."[15] Schimmelfenning reinforces this idea by stating that "since the beginning, European integration has been legitimated by the ideology of a pan-European community of liberal-democratic states."[16]

These two ideas on EU enlargement are complementary to Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks' theory of post-functionalism. Hooghe and Marks posit that "politicization" of citizen concerns transforms these concerns into national or European political problems. This happens when EU decisions (such as EU enlargement) negatively affect citizens' economic circumstances or perceived identity. Initially, these citizens' concerns are first addressed at the national political level, before subsequently becoming a concern at the European-level.[17]

Most scholarship on the 2004 EU enlargement focuses on its effects and analyses the opinions of political actors and citizens using the three theoretical ideas discussed above. Scholars have argued that there was a shift towards a negative perception of enlargement due to effects like enlargement fatigue, the (in)effectiveness of EU institutional reforms, and the increased gap between political elites and citizens after 2004 [18] Furthermore, literature on the 2004

[10] Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Vachudova. "National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement." *East European Politics and Societies: And Cultures* 17, no. 1 (2003): 43.
[11] Antoaneta Dimitrova and Elitsa Kortenska, "Understanding Enlargement: Discourses in Six Countries," *European Union Studies Association Conference*, 2015, 2.
[12] Frank Schimmelfennig. "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union." *International Organization* 55, no. 1 (2001): 47.
[13] See for the origins of the idea of Pan-European identity: Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. "The Pan-European Outlook." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939)* 10, no. 5 (1931).
[14] Sjursen, Helene. "Why Expand?: The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 3 (2002): 508.
[15] Ulrich Sedelmeier. "Europe After the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: 2004-2014." Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union, 2014.
[16] Schimmelfennig. "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union," 48.
[17] See for an in-depth explanation of post-functionalism: Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks. "A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus." *British Journal of Political Science* 39, no. 1 (October 27, 2008): 1–23.
[18] For examples of post-2004 studies, see Sedelmeier. "Europe After the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: 2004-2014."; Anna Szolucha, "The EU and 'Enlargement Fatigue': Why Has the European

enlargement indicates that there has been an increase in overall debates on future enlargements waves following the 2004 enlargement.[19] However, these studies primarily focus on developments after 2004, offering limited attention to the evolution of enlargement discussion in the years preceding the 2004 enlargement.

The question is therefore how the 2004 enlargement discussions developed pre-2004? This research aims to address this gap in the literature. The majority of scholarship on the pre-2004 enlargement discussion often focusses on the perspective of the CEEC or EU institutions.[20] The reason for this focus is due to the perceived limited role of western EU members in the enlargement process. However, I argue there were important developments in western European discussions on EU enlargement that influenced not only the enlargement debates in the 1990s and early 2000s, but also shaped the scholarship on EU enlargement post-2004. This research will specifically focus on the Netherlands as a case study, analysing how enlargement debates developed in one of the least Eurosceptic countries in the early 1990s, which has since experienced one of the largest increases in Euroscepticism among European countries since then.[21]

There are few studies on the development and changes in Dutch-EU relations before 2004. Authors such as Bertjan Verbeek and Anna van der Vleuten, for example, have looked at Dutch foreign policy realignment after the Cold War. They argued that the Netherlands tried to compensate its losing power within the EU and wanted to change the increasing negative public perception towards EU integration by applying a more intergovernmentalist approach.[22] Another study by Robert Harmsen analysed Dutch parliamentary discussions on EU integration in general, observing the emergence in the early 1990s of a more negative EU attitude within political debates. This negative attitude took off after the 2002 general election and the 2005 EU constitutional referendum.[23] Furthermore, studies on the Dutch political landscape and emergence of euroscepticism also observed changes in the 1990s and early 2000s. Paul Pennings and Hans Keman argued that since the 1990s, Dutch politics has become more adversarial and polarised, whereby the main political parties (CDA, PvdA, VVD) moved closer towards the political centre, which created opportunities for new Eurosceptic parties to emerge.[24] Another study on Dutch politics by Marcel Lubbers and Eva Jaspers argued that the less educated Dutch population had become disillusioned by the main political parties, which

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Union Not Been Able to Counter 'Enlargement Fatigue'?," *Journal of Contemporary European Research* 6, no. 1 (2010): 107–22. Hilion. "The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Policy."; Sjursen. "Introduction: Enlargement and the Nature of the EU Polity," 1–16.

[19] See for example Spyros Economides, Kevin Featherstone, and Tom Hunter. "The Changing Discourses of EU Enlargement: A Longitudinal Analysis of National Parliamentary Debates." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 62, no. 1 (2023): 168–85; Dimitrova and Kortenska. "Understanding Enlargement: Discourses in Six Countries."; Anna Herranz-Surrallés. "Justifying Enlargement in a Multi-Level Polity: A Discursive Institutionalist Analysis of the Elites–Public Gap Over European Union Enlargement." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 50, no. 3 (2012): 385–402.

[20] See for an overview of scholarship on Eastern Europe and EU institutions: Sjursen. "Introduction: Enlargement and the Nature of the EU Polity," 5.

[21] Lubbers and Jaspers, "A Longitudinal Study of Euroscepticism in the Netherlands: 2008 Versus 1990," 22.

[22] Verbeek and Van Der Vleuten, "The Domesticization of the Foreign Policy of the Netherlands (1989–2007), 357-377.

[23] Harmsen. "The Evolution of Dutch European Discourse: Defining the 'Limits of Europe.'," 316–41.

[24] Paul Pennings and Hans Keman, "The Changing Landscape of Dutch Politics Since the 1970s: A Comparative Exploration," *Acta Politica* 43, (2008): 154–79.

partly explains a strong increase in euroscepticism during the 1990s and 2000s.[25] These studies on the Netherlands however fail to specifically address the development of political debates on the 2004 enlargement.

There are however studies on this topic, performed in other western European countries. Research on the UK showed a developing gap between the positive enlargement discourse used by the government and the negative perception of enlargement among UK citizens and media in the early 2000s.[26] Scholarship on Germany identified several arguments which were used in German political debates on the 2004 enlargement. These arguments ranged from economic self-interests and promotion of identity norms in Eastern Europe[27], to more critical perspectives on enlargement and EU institutional reform.[28] Studies on France revealed a critical stance toward EU enlargement among citizens. While, French leadership tried to emphasise the need for EU enlargement, emphasising the positive impact for French citizens and French economic interest.[29] However, French citizens and the political opposition were critical towards these arguments leading to a more negative perception of the EU and its enlargement process.[30]

In general, all studies mentioned above have focused either on Dutch-EU relations in general or they analysed the political debates on the 2004 enlargement in other western EU members. As stated earlier, the existing literature fails to provide an adequate analysis and reconstruction of the political debates on the 2004 enlargement from the Dutch perspective. Addressing this research problem will create a deeper understanding of the origins and development of the 2004 enlargement and political discussions in the Netherlands, thereby contributing to the literature on the 2004 enlargement from the western European perspective. Furthermore, this research will add to the currently limited existing literature on Dutch-EU relations during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Lastly, this research contributes to the larger theoretical academic discussion on the question what drives EU enlargement.

Analytical framework and methodology

This research analyses the development of discussions by Dutch political actors (national parliament and government) on the 2004 enlargement, by directly addressing the gap in the literature. There are two reasons for choosing to focus on political actors (and subsequently excluding citizens as actors). One reason is due to logistical and time constraints of this research. The other reason is due to limited Dutch public involvement before 2002 in the enlargement debate. Consequently, this study focuses on political debates in the Netherlands between 1997 and 2004.

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[25] Lubbers and Jaspers, "A Longitudinal Study of Euroscepticism in the Netherlands: 2008 Versus 1990."
[26] Oya Dursun-Ozkanca. "European Union Enlargement and British Public Opinion: The Agenda-Setting Power of the Press." *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 12, no. 2 (2011): 139–60.
[27] Marcin Zaborowski. "More Than Simply Expanding Markets: Germany and EU Enlargement." In *Questioning EU Enlargement*, 104–20. Routledge, 2006.
[28] Christiane Lemke. "Germany's EU Policy: The Domestic Discourse." *German Studies Review* 33, no. 3 (2010).
[29] Helene Sjursen and Børge Romsloe. "Protecting the Idea of Europe: France and Enlargement." In *Questioning EU Enlargemen*t, 142–64. Routledge, 2006.
[30] Vivien Schmidt. "Trapped by Their Ideas: French Élites' Discourses of European Integration and Globalization." *Journal of European Public Policy* 14, no. 7 (2007): 992–1009.

To understand the enlargement discussions in the Netherlands and analyse its development, this research will apply Helen Sjursen's discourse framework on EU enlargement.[31] Sjursen identifies three types of EU enlargement discourse (meaning different types of political language or statements that are based on certain political values and beliefs). I will combine the discourses into two types — pragmatic and identity discourse — to better align with the theoretical concepts discussed in the state of the literature. Pragmatic discourse, based on the idea of national interests, aligns with the liberal intergovernmentalism theory of Moravcsik. Identity discourse, based on the idea of a shared identity framework, aligns with the idea of pan-European identity proposed by Coudenhove-Kalergi and other authors).

The pragmatic discourse is "based on a means-ends type of rationality" and is centred around the idea of national interests. Sjursen notes that politicians use this discourse to "find efficient solutions to concrete problems or dilemmas", whereby politicians try to achieve "an output that could be seen as beneficial to given interests and preferences".[32] In the Netherlands, politicians may employ this discourse either to underscore the economic advantages of EU enlargement or to argue that enlargement undermines national interests by necessitating institutional reforms within the EU that could dilute the Dutch position.

The identity discourse combines Sjursen's ethical-political and moral discourses, focusing on a "collective 'us' and a particular idea of the [shared] values".[33] In the Netherlands, this discourse might be used to highlight the shared values, such as democracy and human rights, between the EU and the candidate countries, or politicians could use the discourse to argue that candidate countries did not align with European values, thus justifying their exclusion from the EU.

The theoretical enlargement discourses described above will be applied during each sub conclusion of the different chapters. This enables a structural comparison and analysis of the development of the enlargement debate over time.

This thesis focusses on the period from 1997 to 2004, which covers the start of the enlargement process during the EU Council in December 1997 until the official enlargement on May 1st, 2004. In order to systematically find source material produced by Dutch politicians, the official archive and information service for Dutch governmental and parliamentary records, Overheid.nl, was used to search for primary sources. Since access to the notes of Dutch cabinet meetings and personal archives of government ministers is restricted by the National Archives Law until the end of the 2020s, these source materials could unfortunately not be used for this research.

In order to systematically find relevant sources, two subpages on Overheid.nl (*parlementaire documenten* and *openbare overheidsdocumenten*) were used. The subpage *parlementaire documenten* was relevant since it contained the majority of parliamentary documents, such as notes of plenary debates, meeting notes of specific committees, and parliamentary questions. Together, these documents created an overview of parliamentary discussions (and government response) that could be analysed for this research. *Openbare overheidsdocumenten* was relevant to analyse official government policy records and the Dutch position on EU enlargement, for example by using EU policy briefs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as policy letters

[31] Sjursen, Helene. "Why Expand?: The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy."
[32] Ibid, 8.
[33] Ibid, 8.

by the minister for foreign affairs and staatsecretaris for European affairs. To find related documents on the 2004 enlargement in these search engines, the following key words were used: *EU uitbreiding, Kandidaat lidstaten, EU toetreding, Toetreders EU, Toetreding Oost Europa, Uitbreiding 2004, geassocieerd lidstaat*. Furthermore, the search for primary sources was widened by searching on specific dossiers numbers discussing EU enlargement. These dossiers were: *Uitbreiding Europese Unie*, nr 23987; *Staat van de Europese Unie*, nr 29201; *Europese Raad*, nr 21501-20; *commissie voor Buitenlandse Zaken en algemene commissie voor Europese Zaken*, nr 21501-02.

This search resulted in 121 relevant primary sources with Dutch discussions on the 2004 enlargement (for a complete overview, see the header Primary Sources at the end of this thesis). The reliability and accessibility of these sources is ensured by the obligation of politicians that all official governmental and parliamentary materials must be publicised and archived. However, while these documents provide comprehensive insights into parliamentary debates, they only allow for limited analysis on official government statements. This research is therefore constrained by the inability to examine policy developments on EU enlargement that occurred within the government behind closed doors (since these documents are still classified). Due to the focus of this research on political debates within the Netherlands, and not just the Dutch government, the available parliamentary and limited governmental sources are therefore still relevant.

A few important notes: Countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and the western Balkans were discussed in Dutch enlargement debates between 1997 and 2004. However, none of these countries joined the EU in 2004, and will therefore not be included in the analysis.

Furthermore, as we will see during the description of the findings, the term enlargement was often interpreted in several ways in the Netherlands. Enlargement could mean deepening by reforming and expanding EU institutions (often the Dutch terms *uitbreiding* or *verdieping* were found) and widening of the EU with new member states (often using terms such as *toetreders* or *verbreding*). The research question of this thesis will primarily focus on the widening of the EU (the latter interpretation).

The primary sources of this research are all in Dutch. English translations of these sources, including quotations, were translated using the translation software Deepl and checked and if needed refined by the author to accurately convey the context and content of the source for English language readers.

In order to analyse the most important politicians in the enlargement debates in the Netherlands, this research focusses on the major political parties in the Netherlands. These included the coalition parties during the different cabinets between 1997-2004, and the largest opposition parties in the Dutch parliament. To prevent overcomplication for the reader, smaller political parties (which sometimes did not partake in relevant parliamentary commissions) will only be mentioned if they did add new perspectives or arguments to the enlargement debate.

To systematically analyse the 117 primary sources and to address the research question, the following sub-questions were formulated:

- How did Dutch politicians use enlargement discourses in their arguments on the 2004 enlargement?

- How did other historical developments effect the enlargement debates within the Netherlands? (For example, the Nice Treaty of 2001)
- How did enlargement debates develop on specific enlargement topics between 1997-2004? (For example, discourse on specific candidate countries)

To answer the research question and the sub-questions a chronological structure is used to analyse the development of enlargement debates over time. The first chapter will examine the period of January 1997 to December 1999. This chapter marks the start of the enlargement process with the introduction of Agenda 2000. It further explores discussions on individual EU applicant countries, with special attention for the case of Cyprus. The second chapter covers the period from January 2000 until May 2002. The chapter will focus on the Dutch government's position regarding enlargement and parliamentary debates on the EU's Common Agricultural Policy reforms. This period also includes discussions on the application of the Copenhagen criteria and the first Dutch discussions on citizens engagement after the Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty in 2001. The final chapter will analyse the Balkenende I and II cabinets from May 2002 until May 2004. It will analyse the political positions adopted after the 2002 election by the Balkenende cabinets and new political parties. This chapter will also analyse Dutch discussions on the lacking progress in adopting the Copenhagen criteria in candidate countries and the parliamentary debate on the Athens accession treaty of 2003. Finally, the thesis end with the conclusion answering the research questions.

Group photo of leaders and foreign ministers of the 15 EU member states and the 5+1 group marking the launch of the enlargement process during the European Council of Luxembourg in December 1997. The Netherlands was represented by prime minister Wim Kok and minister of foreign affairs Hans van Mierlo. [34]

Chapter 1: The start of the EU enlargement process, January 1997 – December 1999

The year 1997 marked a historic moment in the European integration process. In December of that year the fifth enlargement process officially started when several Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) and Mediterranean countries were granted EU applicant status. In the lead-up to 1997, discussions on EU integration already resulted in association agreements between the EU and several CEEC in the early 1990s, and the establishment of the Copenhagen criteria in 1993, which set the conditions for EU membership.[35] In the Netherlands, the first[36] and (from 1998) second Kok cabinets would dominate the Dutch political arena until the general election in 2002. The coalition parties of the Kok cabinets consisted of the social democratic *Partij van de Arbeid* (PvdA), the conservative-liberal *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie* (VVD), and the progressive-liberal *Democraten 66* (D66). The largest opposition parties were the *Christen Democratisch Appel* (CDA) and the green-left *GroenLinks* (GL).[37]

[34] European Commission. *European Council of Luxembourg, 12-13/12/1997 – photo ID: P-002123/02-18A*. December 12, 1997, photo by Jean Guyaux.
[35] EUR-LEX. "The 2004 Enlargement: The Challenge of a 25-member EU," 2007.
[36] Palement.com. "Kabinet-Kok I (1994-1998)," n.d.
[37] Parlement.com. "Kabinet-Kok II (1998-2002)," n.d.

This chapter will highlight the key political discussions and themes in the Netherlands on EU enlargement in the 1990s. To understand the discussions of the 1990s, it is crucial to consider the broader context. Enlargement debates were not only about widening (admitting new members), but primarily linked to debates about deepening the EU via institutional reform to prepare for enlargement. This chapter shows how debates about deepening in the Netherlands effected the Dutch view on EU widening by analysing discussions on the Agenda 2000 framework. The second part of this chapter delves deeper into discussions on widening, and discussions on the central Dutch question of the 1990s: Which candidate countries from Eastern and Mediterranean Europe belong in the EU?

1.1 European enlargement: not just widening but also deepening

In the late 1990s, the question of EU enlargement in the Netherlands was often discussed in the context of Agenda 2000. Agenda 2000 was a vision adopted by the European Council and European Commission (EC) in December 1997. It outlined the goals and the stages of the enlargement process. The first stage focussed on EU institutional and financial reforms through several Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) – which would lead to the Nice Treaty of 2001 – in preparation of the EU enlargement. The second and third stages of Agenda 2000 focussed on pre-accession aid to applicant countries and on monitoring each applicant's progress in adopting the acquis communautaire (commonly known as the Copenhagen criteria).[38]

Several Dutch politicians were curious how the technical details of Agenda 2000 would develop and work in practice. Political parties frequently asked for updates on the progress of enlargement, often by questions to the Dutch minister of foreign affairs on the vision of the Dutch government or the EC on the enlargement process. A common question for example was: "How exactly is the political dialogue on enlargement going?"[39] The primary sources do not explain why these questions were important to Dutch politicians. However, it is relevant to mention that until 2002, the number of candidate countries (ten) that would join the EU later, and the data of enlargement (May 1st, 2004) was not determined yet. During the 1990s, Dutch politicians did not know how many and which countries would join, how the enlargement process would function in practice, or when the enlargement would occur.

The debate on Agenda 2000, however, primarily focussed on EU reforms and the future financial contributions of the Netherlands to an enlarged EU. To avoid the EU becoming ineffective as a result of enlargement, reforms to its financial and political systems were needed — this is known as deepening. Dutch politicians were particularly concerned about how these reforms would affect the political and financial interests of the Netherlands, the EU as a whole, and the applicant countries. For example, D66 Member of Parliament (MP) Van den Bos stated that his party was "not in favour of starting negotiations with all candidate countries under Agenda 2000", arguing that severe funding shortages for EU pre-accession assistance hindered necessary reforms in the applicant countries.[40] GL echoed similar concerns, warning that inadequate funding to the CEEC could result in a "population" from an applicant country who are "so fed up with the EU's austerity and privatisation dictates that they vote to reject the

[38] European Parliament. "Briefing No 36: Agenda 2000 and the accession process to the European Union," 1999; *Kamerstuk II* 1997/98, 21501, nr. 217.
[39] *Kamerstuk II* 1996/97, 21501-02, nr. 189, page 16.
[40] *Kamerstuk II* 1997/98, 21501-02, nr. 216, page 1.

accession treaty in a referendum."[41] D66 and GL argued that the Agenda 2000 framework would harm the interests of the EU and the CEEC.

Other Dutch politicians focussed on the harm of Agenda 2000 to Dutch interests. CDA MP Eversdijk stated: "under the current [Agenda 2000] proposals, the Netherlands' financial position would deteriorate further".[42] Michiel Patijn, *staatssecretaris* for European Affairs (similar to a deputy minister) during Kok I shared Everdijk's concerns. Patijn also pointed out proposed reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy, which would reduce income support for Dutch farmers. He also highlighted changes in EU structural funds that would limit the Dutch eligibility for EU funding. "These [reforms of Agenda 2000] are blows", Patijn noted. Agenda 2000 required greater financial contributions from the Netherlands to an enlarged EU, while more structural EU and agricultural funding was transferred to future members.[43] Simultaneously, and somewhat contradictory, the Dutch ministry of Economic Affairs argued that "accession based on the [Copenhagen] agreements [...] [would be] of great importance to the Dutch economy", highlighting new trade and market possibilities for Dutch companies.[44] While they were critical on Agenda 2000, the CDA stated that a greater financial contribution to an enlarged EU was justified. The Netherlands was a wealthy country and should show solidarity with poorer members. Enlargement also served "our own [Dutch] interests". The CDA mentioned that being committed to enlargement, through the Agenda 2000 framework did not meant that "watching the pennies is [a] bad thing."[45]

However, none of the political parties was as critical on Agenda 2000 as the reformed Christian *Staatskundig Gereformeerde Partij* (SGP). While the SGP acknowledged that "institutional reforms [were] needed to make [...] enlargement possible," it firmly opposed the loss of veto power in the EU since "it would harm our [Dutch] sovereignty."[46] The SGP also questioned the future scope of the EU: "Should all that [employment policy, social policy, and foreign and security policy] be part of the responsibilities of a [European] Union of 20 to 30 member states?"[47] In summary, Dutch politicians primarily discussed enlargement in the 1990s in light of Agenda 2000 and EU reform issues, not primarily from the perspective of admitting new members states.

1.2 Applicant countries and the European family

Although most of the enlargement debate in the 1990s was focussed on Agenda 2000 - and therefore focussed on EU deepening - there were some discussions on EU widening. The main question in these discussions was which Eastern and Mediterranean countries should become part of the EU.[48]

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[41] *Handeling I* 1997/98, nr.8, p. 279-298, page 288.
[42] Ibid, page 280.
[43] *Handeling I* 1997/98, nr.8, p. 312-335, page 318.
[44] *Kamerstuk II* 1997/98, 21501, nr. 225.
[45] *Handeling I* 1997/98, nr.8, p. 312-335, page 325-326.
[46] *Handeling II* 1996/97, nr. 39, p. 3211-3260, page 3224.
[47] *Handeling II* 1998/99, nr. 86, p. 5003-5030, page 5019.
[48] Some other countries which would not join the EU in 2004 were also discussed in the enlargement debate during the 1990s (and in the early 2000s). The most prominent were Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007. The discourse towards the CEEC analysed in this paragraph can be applied in general to Romania and Bulgaria as well. Turkey on the other hand is still an EU

The first interesting observation is that all political parties argued that EU enlargement was important for the safety, stability and peace in Europe. For example, GL MP Zwerver commented that he was "very happy about [enlargement], as the participation of the [CEEC] in the EU can play a stabilising role."[49] The CDA argued that enlargement was important to prevent "a political division" between the different CEEC countries and the EU, which "would cause political damage, not only to Europe [...] but especially to the new democracies [in the CEEC]."[50] CDA MP Van den Akker elaborated on EU enlargement (and enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation), "the [applicant] countries have the right to freedom, peace, democracy, a higher standard of living, and greater prosperity. We sympathise with them since they have endured years under the oppression of Nazism and Communist rule. It is our duty to help them. [...] Freedom and democracy do not stop at Oldenzaal."[51] PvdA MP Jurgens described the argument for supporting EU enlargement as a "moralist" ideal. Eastern European countries, "after years of Soviet oppression, have the right to join us", he argued.[52] Even the VVD – which was often critical on EU enlargement – agreed that the best way to secure stability in Eastern Europe was EU enlargement.[53]

Apart from general statements on enlargement, there were also discussions on some individual countries. An example was the accession request of Malta. Malta was a small "microstate" and could therefore easily join the EU without raising too many issues on the ongoing reforms of Agenda 2000. PvdA MP Timmermans urged that accession negotiations should "be opened soon".[54] The CDA opposed this idea, since "honouring Malta's request for accession" would send the wrong signal to other candidate countries still pending their accession request.[55] Another discussion focussed on the Baltic states. Estonia was among the initial group of countries (the 5+1 group) with which the EU started accession negotiations in March 1998.[56] However, Latvia and Lithuania were not part of this group. CDA MP Eversdijk was surprise by this discission, since "it is absolutely absurd to make a distinction between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. [...] From a European perspective, we cannot create a division between these three democracies."[57] Other discussions emerged in the case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In the case of the Czech Republic, the PvdA was concerned about "Roma [that] have been expelled from the Czech Republic due to national legislation", which violated European values of protecting human rights and minorities. The PvdA was stunned that the EC "nonetheless concludes that the Czech Republic exhibits all the characteristics of a democracy."[58] There were also instances, for example questions by GL MP Karimi, on Slovakia's accession. In Slovakia's

candidate country. Enlargement discussion in the Netherlands during the 1990s and early 2000s (especially after 2004) focussed heavily on Turkey. The majority of Dutch politicians argued against its accession to the EU. Turkey is still a candidate country, although the accession negotiations were suspended in 2019.

[49] *Handeling I* 1999/2000, nr. 8 p. 257-278, page 266.

[50] *Handeling I* 1997/98, nr.8, p. 279-298, page 280.

[51] *Handeling II* 1997/98, nr. 89, p. 6043-6065, page 6045.

[52] *Handeling I* 1999/2000, nr. 8 p. 257-278, page 278.

[53] Ibid, page 263.

[54] *Kamerstuk II* 1998/99, 21501-02, nr. 279, page 2.

[55] *Kamerstuk II* 1998/99, 21501-02, nr. 271, page 6.

[56] The countries in the 5+1 group were Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus. See: European Parliament, “Briefing No 38: The role of the European Parliament in the enlargement process,” 1999.

[57] *Handeling I* 1997/98, nr.8, p. 279-298, page 280.

[58] *Aanhangsel handeling II* 1997/98, nr. 1010.

case, there were concerns regarding the HZDS party, which was one of the most influential political parties in Slovakia and was widely regarded as authoritarian and Eurosceptic.[59] It is furthermore interesting to note that several major countries which would join the EU in 2004 - Poland and Hungary - were not discussed during the 1990s.

Dutch enlargement discussions, while critical in some cases, were in general quite positive. This can be explained by the often-unspoken underlying idea behind EU enlargement in the 1990s: the political desire to overcome "the division of Europe from the last century".[60] However, one country was an outlier in the enlargement debate and was not discussed in favourable terms.

1.3 The Cyprus problem in EU enlargement

Within the enlargement debate, there was one outlier, Cyprus. After the division of Cyprus in 1974, the internationally recognized Greek part of the island submitted an application for EU membership in 1990. In March 1998, the EU started accession negotiations with Cyprus. The island of Cyprus however was still divided in a Greek and Turkish zone, and as Neill Nugent has argued, this caused concern with several western European governments, especially the French. As Nugent stated, these governments feared that if Cyprus joined the EU before the Cyprus problem was settled, the EU would "be importing a deep-rooted security dispute within its borders, will add fuel to Greek–Turkish tensions, and will probably damage the EU's relations with Turkey".[61]

There was a similar concern in the Netherlands on Cyprus. In 1997 *staatssecretaris* Patijn mentioned in response to questions of the VVD that the "start of accession negotiations with Cyprus [...] is seriously complicated if there is no movement to solve the political problem".[62] Later in 1997, minister of foreign affairs Hans van Mierlo stated that "it is difficult to imagine a divided Cyprus joining the [European] Union", adding that it was in the interests of the EU to solve the Cyprus problem.[63]

During the late 1990s, especially the VVD was critical towards the accession of Cyprus. In 1997, VVD MP Hessing raised the question: "What is the [European] Union to do with Cyprus where there is no stable peace situation?"[64] In 1998, Hessing spoke in stronger terms, stating that "the VVD does not feel the need of two seats for Greece or to import a war situation".[65] Other politicians adopted similar critical arguments towards Cyprus, although not as strongly formulated as the VVD. For example, the CDA agreed that Cyprus could only join the EU when a political settlement for the Cyprus problem was reached.[66] A parliamentary resolution on

[59] *Kamerstuk II* 1998/99, 21501-02, nr. 277, page 5.
[60] *Kamerstuk II* 1998/99, 26580, nr. 1, page 3.
[61] Nugent, Neill. "EU Enlargement and 'The Cyprus Problem.'" Journal of Common Market Studies 38, no. 1 (2000): 134.
[62] *Kamerstuk II* 1996/97, 21501-02, nr. 206, page 13.
[63] *Kamerstuk II* 1997/98, 21501-02, nr. 216, page 7.
[64] *Kamerstuk II* 1997/98, 21501-02, nr. 220, page 3.
[65] *Kamerstuk II* 1998/99, 21501-02, nr. 275, page 9.
[66] Ibid, page 7.

Cyprus by CDA MP Verhagen stated a similar argument.[67] The opposition to Cyprus accession even became Dutch governmental policy in 1999: "a divided island cannot join the EU".[68]

Dutch politicians, especially from the VVD, were concerned for the security and stability of the EU, if a divided Cyprus would join, referring to the stability of the island of Cyprus, as well as the stability of the political mechanisms of the EU. The argument of the VVD on 'two seats for Greece' implied that Cyprus' membership would strengthen the Greek influence within the EU and would weaken the voting power of other EU members. Furthermore, there were concerns that either Turkey or Greece could veto Cypriot membership. As PvdA MP Koenders stated, a veto could be "a potential bomb for the enlargement negotiation process."[69] A veto would undermine the role of the EU in the negotiation process. This concern was highlighted in a statement by *staatssecretaris* Patijn, who argued that negotiations with Cyprus "does not mean that the key to Cyprus' accession will lie in Ankara".[70] Another example is CDA MP Van der Linden's comment to urge "that neither Greece nor Turkey could impose a veto [on Cyprus]".[71]

1.4 Conclusion

In the 1990s, Dutch politicians first and foremost focussed on EU deepening by discussing Agenda 2000. The application of the discourse framework outlined in the introduction revealed that Dutch politicians used a pragmatic and an identity discourse. Pragmatic arguments can be seen in positions of the VVD, CDA and SGP, all stating that the needed reforms for EU enlargement (such as CAP reform) were not always in the Dutch interests and could harm the Dutch financial and economic position. Parties such as D66 and GL adopted a combination of pragmatic and identity arguments by arguing that the Agenda 2000 framework was not in the interests of the EU and the applicant countries, since Agenda 2000 was insufficient for the applicant countries to adopt to the European values described in the Copenhagen criteria.

When Dutch politicians discussed enlargement in terms of widening, they all shared a similar conviction: EU enlargement benefited the safety, stability and security of Europe. I would argue that the underlying idea for this conviction can be characterised as identity discourse driven. Dutch politicians emphasised that enlargement would benefit the new democracies in Eastern Europe and support the Eastern European countries in their search for freedom and economic prosperity (values that are central to the EU). When discussing individual countries, Dutch politicians also spoke in terms of an identity discourse. For example, the Baltics according to the CDA were part of Europe since they were all democracies that belonged to each other, and the Czech Republic according to the PvdA did not adhere to the European values of human rights due to their treatment of Roma. The notable outlier in the enlargement debate was Cyprus. Dutch politicians (especially from the VVD) used pragmatic arguments to argue against accession. Cyprus would strengthen Greek interests and undermine the interests of other EU members (including the Netherlands) and would destabilise the security within the EU.

[67] *Aanhangsel handeling II* 1997/98, nr. 182.
[68] *Kamerstuk II* 1999/2000, 21501-02, nr. 321, page 7.
[69] *Kamerstuk II* 1997/98, 21501-02, nr. 232, page 2.
[70] Ibid, page 6.
[71] *Kamerstuk II* 1997/98, 21501-02, nr. 239, page 5.

Dutch prime minister Wim Kok during his 2001 visit to Brussels meeting European Commission President Romano Prodi. The ongoing process of EU enlargement was discussed, among other agenda items.[72]

Chapter 2: The 'road map' to enlargement during the new millennium, January 2000 - May 2002

By the early 2000s, the EU enlargement process was well underway. During this period, prime minister Wim Kok and his government remained in power (until the May 2002 elections), with PvdA, VVD, and D66 forming the coalition government. CDA, GL, and smaller parties like the SGP and the *ChristenUnie* (CU) remained in opposition.

The first part of this chapter analyses the Dutch governmental position on the enlargement process, particularly in relation to the EC's 'road map' to enlargement and the fight against terror after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the chapter illustrates Dutch debates on EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms, which were deemed necessary for enlargement. In addition to frequent Dutch discussions on EU institutional reform through deepening — partially addressed by the Nice Treaty of 2001 — another question emerged among Dutch politicians: following the deepening of the EU, should enlargement proceed under the existing Copenhagen criteria, or should these criteria be revised in light of the difficulties candidate countries faced in adapting to the acquis?

The second part of this chapter analyses this debate on the Copenhagen criteria, including alternative approaches to enlargement. It demonstrates Dutch discussions on the 'big bang'

[72] European Commission. *Visit by Wim Kok, Dutch Prime Minister to the EC – photo ID: P-008411/00-3*. September 26, 2001, photo by Christian Lamboitte.

strategy, as well as potential transition periods for candidate countries. The early 2000s also marked the first time when Dutch politicians discussed the role of citizens in EU enlargement. The last part of the chapter looks at the Dutch response to Ireland's 2001 referendum on the Nice Treaty and further emerging discussions in the Netherlands on citizen engagement.

2.1 The 'road map' to enlargement and the obstacle of the Common Agricultural Policy reforms

In November 2000, the EC published a strategic 'road map' for the enlargement strategy.[73] It established a framework for negotiations with all candidate countries — which were initially six at the EU Council in December 1997 and expanded to twelve by December 1999.[74] The EC's 'road map' aimed to finish negotiations with the most advanced candidate countries as soon as possible. Advanced candidate countries in this context meant those countries which were already close to the liberal economic and democratic values of the EU (for example Malta). In several phases between 2001 and 2002, important issues regarding the internal market, agricultural policy, and other social and economic policies were to be negotiated with the candidate countries.[75]

The majority of primary sources discussing the EC's 'road map' were produced by the Dutch government, primarily intended to inform the Dutch parliament of its position on enlargement. Therefore, these sources enable the in-depth analysis of the position of the second Kok cabinet on enlargement. And one might say that the Dutch government was notably very positive about EU enlargement.

Minister of foreign affairs Jozias van Aartsen stated in his letter to the Dutch parliament on the progress of enlargement in November 2000: "The enlargement process is well on track. All 12 countries with which the EU is negotiating are now functioning democracies in which the EU's fundamental values [...] are increasingly firmly rooted." However, Van Aartsen acknowledged that the transition by the candidate countries to EU standards on the economy and the rule of law "proves to be a long-winded process." Enlargement, "apart from the economic benefits," was perceived to be "of the utmost political importance." In the view of the Dutch government, the enlargement process (not the actual joining of the EU in the future) had already positively contributed to the safety and stability of Europe.[76] The enlargement process was not only "a historical chance to undo the division of Europe," but would also have "a positive impact on [economic] prosperity, stability and security on the European continent and [...] the European Union's political and economic position in the world".[77] The need for a stable European continent was further strengthened by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. As Van Aartsen stated in a memo in late 2001: "The attacks in the United States last September 11th present the world with new challenges. Only a stable and united Europe will be able to face these challenges adequately. [...] The enlargement of the European Union is therefore desirable now more than

[73] European Commission. "Enlargement Strategy Paper 2000: Report on progress towards accession by each of the candidate countries," 2000.
[74] In 1999, six countries were designated candidate countries - Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Matla, Romania and Slovakia – in addition to the six candidate countries of 1997 – Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. The only candidate country that was deemed unsuitable to start negotiations with was Turkey.
[75] *Kamerstuk II* 2000/01, 23987, nr. 3, page 5.
[76] Ibid, page 3.
[77] *Kamerstuk II* 2001/02, 23987, nr. 8, page 2.

ever, and is in the interests of both the candidate countries and the current 15 EU members. A stable Europe is in the global interest."[78]

While the Dutch government was positive about EU enlargement, it did acknowledge the difficulties of adopting the acquis by candidate countries, when it came to the market economy. An illustrative example, which lead to several discussions in the Dutch parliament, was the incorporation of the candidate countries into a reformed CAP.

The need to reform the CAP was driven in part by demands from the World Trade Organization, and in part by the need to reduce EU financial costs. As prime minister Kok illustrated: "it is unsustainable to spend 80% of the EU budget on financing agricultural, structural and cohesion funds."[79] In regards to EU enlargement, reforming the CAP was necessary to solve a key "dilemma", according to *staatssecretaris* of European affairs Dick Benschop. The prevailing CAP at that time did not allow extra income support to farmers in the candidate countries, "an agricultural policy that does not align with Polish conditions, and [would] discriminate between candidate countries and existing member countries."[80] The majority of Dutch politicians agreed that reforming the CAP was necessary. CDA MP Balkenende stressed the need for a new CAP to prevent increased financial costs for the Netherlands to an enlarged EU without reforms.[81] Another example is the PvdA which stated that the "readjustment" of the CAP was in the interests of "the enlargement of the [European] Union and development cooperation policy"[82]

While all political parties agreed CAP reform was necessary, several politicians were concerned that reforming the CAP could change the Copenhagen criteria or delay the enlargement process. "Is the European Union with [the] Nice [Treaty] now ready for enlargement," as ChristenUnie MP Van Middelkoop questioned, "or will the new countries have to wait for said policies [the CAP] to be in order?"[83] The PvdA and D66 were worried that CAP reform "imposes a new Copenhagen criterion, which is unfair to the accession countries". PvdA MP Timmermans mentioned that "these conditions [reforming of CAP and structural funding] cannot be set as absolute conditions for accession, as this would formulate new criteria for accession. This would [...] undermine EU cooperation."[84] The VVD disagreed with Timmermans, arguing that "if other [accession] criteria have to be added, it will have to be done step by step. [...] Before accession can take place, there has to be reform of agricultural policy and structural funds."[85] The reason, as MP Dijkstal stated, was that "it cannot be accepted that enlargement leads to a weakening of the [European] Union. [...] We believe it can only be prevented by strictly enforcing the Copenhagen criteria. [...] We do not choose speed over content, but content over speed."[86] Another reason why the VVD was arguing in favour of reforming the CAP, potentially halting the enlargement process, was the fear that "if a number of countries were to join the

[78] *Kamerstuk II* 2001/02, 23987, nr. 9, page 2.
[79] *Handeling II* 2001/02, nr. 14, p. 760-797, page 787.
[80] Ibi, page 793-794.
[81] Ibid, page 769.
[82] *Kamerstuk II* 2000/01, 21501-02, nr. 371, page 1-2.
[83] *Handeling II* 2001/02, nr. 14, p. 760-797, page 779.
[84] *Kamerstuk II* 2001/02, 21501-02, nr. 415, page 2.
[85] Ibid, page 3.
[86] *Handeling II* 2001/02, nr. 14, p. 760-797, page 764.

[European] Union in 2004, it could well be that a blocking minority would emerge to prevent adjustments to the [CAP]."[87]

2.2 How to enlarge? Sticking to Copenhagen or another approach

Besides enlargement debates on the EC's 'road map' and CAP reform, Dutch politicians focused on the question of how candidate countries should be integrated into the EU. Should candidate countries individually be joining the EU at a different pace, and if necessary, through a transition period? Or were several candidate countries better clustered into groups of countries and joining the EU simultaneously? This last option - also known as the 'big bang' - was favoured by the EC since it would speed up the enlargement process. The EC an the EU Council determined that accession negotiations with the candidates would end in late 2002, thereby enabling candidate countries - if the Copenhagen criteria had been adopted properly - to join the EU before the year 2005 as VVD MP Van Baalen noted.[88] Perhaps the candidates could already join in 2004 and participate in the 2004 European Parliament election.

In order to join the EU, candidates would be judged on their individual progression and adoption of the Copenhagen criteria. However alternative strategies to adopt the acquis were also discussed within the EU. In general, Dutch politicians were against an "alternative strategy for enlargement" which would lead to "a big bang of ten countries at once [joining the EU]" as PvdA MP Timmermans described it.[89] Apart from the PvdA, other political parties such as the VVD and CDA opposed this 'big bang' method as well. For example, CDA MP Verhagen questioned in February 2002 the method of the EC proposal to initiate a 'big bang' enlargement in 2004.[90]A similar concern on the method of the EC was raised by the VVD just a few days later.[91] These parties argued that the 'big bang' would lead to "a delay in the enlargement process," as not all ten countries were at the same stage in adopting the Copenhagen criteria.[92] Dutch politicians were concerned that allowing a cluster of countries to join simultaneously would result in some countries being admitted to the EU despite the fact that they did not yet met the Copenhagen criteria. A potential accession treaty, encompassing all ten candidates of the 2004 enlargement, could prevent the Dutch parliament from individually evaluating each candidate, and forced the Dutch parliament to either approve or reject the accession of the entire group as a whole.

It is important to note that the Copenhagen criteria were almost sacred to Dutch politicians, however in-depth discussion on the meaning of these criteria were not as frequent. Discussion on enlargement in the Netherlands are littered with mentions of sticking to the Copenhagen criteria. D66 for example frequently stated the importance of the Copenhagen criteria: "during the enlargement there should be no tampering of the criteria of Copenhagen."[93] The VVD in every discussion on EU enlargement would state, in one formulation or another, that the "enlargement of the [European] Union will have to take place on the basis of the Copenhagen

[87] Ibid, page 794.
[88] *Kamerstuk II* 2000/01, 21501-02, nr. 364, page 5.
[89] *Handeling II* 1999/2000, nr. 93, p. 6031-6055, page 6033-6034.
[90] *Kamerstuk II* 2001/02, 21501-02, nr. 420, page 1.
[91] *Kamerstuk II* 2001/02, 23987, nr. 11, page 2.
[92] *Handeling II* 1999/2000, nr. 93, p. 6031-6055, page 6043.
[93] *Kamerstuk II* 2000/01, 21501-02, nr. 384, page 4.

criteria."[94] Similarly the PvdA would comment that "the Copenhagen criteria should be adhered to".[95] The major opposition parties, CDA and GL, also frequently stressed the importance of sticking to the Copenhagen criteria. Some statements on the Copenhagen criteria were more in-depth, such as comments by GL MP Karimi, stating that some candidates "meet those criteria but it is not clear exactly how that conclusion was reached", questioning if there was effective monitoring on the Copenhagen criteria.[96] In general, however, the political discussion rarely delved into the significance or questioned the application of Copenhagen beyond superficial statements.

There were discussion related to the Copenhagen criteria on the so-called *overgangstermijnen,* or transition periods. In August 2001, the *Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid* (WRR) - known in English as The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy - provided an advisory opinion to the Dutch government on the EU enlargement process and the adoption of the acquis by candidate countries. In line with earlier statements by the EC and European Council, the WRR recommended to create conditions that would allow some candidate countries to join certain policy areas of the EU through a transition period. In other words, candidate countries would join the EU but were given additional time to adopt certain EU standards and regulations on specific policies. In October 2001, prime minister Kok confirmed that the Dutch government supported the idea of transition periods suggested by the WRR.[97]

Alongside the government, several political parties supported the idea of transition periods. The PvdA argued that "in a number of areas, for example agriculture, transition periods cannot be avoided." While the PvdA and D66 found transition periods acceptable in certain areas, these parties opposed a transition period for policy areas essential to the functioning of the EU internal market, such as the free movement of people.[98] The CDA partially agreed with the PvdA and D66, in the sense that transition periods were acceptable. However, as MP Balkenende argued, the CDA was concerned that "long transition periods to meet the Copenhagen criteria" could results in "a dilution of the process".[99] For example the CDA was worried about compliance to food security regulations in CEEC slaughterhouses. "In Poland, less than 5% of slaughterhouses comply with EU rules, so it is very ambitious to want to achieve enlargement with a country like Poland as early as 2004." The ability of Poland to request a transition period in this policy area would "risks compromising the quality of enlargement as well as monitoring on the accession criteria".[100] The VVD had a similar stance on transition periods, arguing that transition period could be applied, as long as it did not lead to the "weakening of the internal market".[101] The SGP was the most critical on transition periods, raising concerns about both their necessity and duration. During a parliamentary debate, SGP MP Van der Berg highlighted his concerns: "I had the pleasure of attending a congress on this matter in Hungary recently. I learned there that in terms of urban wastewater standards, Hungary asked for a transition period until 2015. Should we think in these terms? Surely the pressure

[94] *Handeling II* 1999/2000, nr. 93, p. 6031-6055, page 6033.
[95] *Kamerstuk II* 2000/01, 21501-02, nr. 364, page 3.
[96] Ibid, page 11.
[97] *Kamerstuk II* 2001/02, 23987, nr. 8.
[98] *Kamerstuk II* 2000/01, 21501-02, nr. 384, page 2.
[99] *Handeling II* 2001/02, nr. 14, p. 760-797, page 769.
[100] *Kamerstuk II* 2000/01, 21501-02, nr. 382, page 1.
[101] *Kamerstuk II* 2000/01, 21501-02, nr. 364, page 4.

needs to be maintained? The stability and unity of the [European] Union must not be jeopardised in any way."[102]

2.3 The Nice Treaty and Irish referendum – the question of citizen engagement

The enlargement discussions in the Netherlands were heavily focussed on the results of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in Nice during late 2000 and early 2001. In fact, the IGC in Nice can be seen as the end phase of the Agenda 2000 process to institutionally prepare the EU for enlargement. Why was it necessary to prepare the EU via the IGC in Nice? As MP Timmermans of the PvdA argued, "the IGC" was necessary to "avoid the need to rewrite the fundamental rules for the European Union with each new enlargement [wave]".[103] The goal to avoid rewriting these rules led to the establishment of the Nice Treaty in February 2001. The Nice Treaty implemented "reforms [to] the EU institutions so that they can function efficiently in an enlarged EU of 27 member countries". These reforms included among others changes to the EC, changes to the voting procedure in the European Council, and the parliamentary seat allocation in the European Parliament.[104] There were several discussions in the Netherlands during the leadup to the Nice Treaty of 2001. However, analysing these discussion goes beyond the scope and relevancy of this research, since the discussion focussed primarily on EU deepening rather than widening.

One interesting development that did occur due to the Nice Treaty, was the 2001 Irish referendum on Nice. Ireland was the only EU member which held a referendum on the Nice Treaty. In June 2001, the Irish population rejected the Nice Treaty, with almost 54% voting against. The opposition camp expressed concerns that the Nice Treaty reforms would weaken the Irish control over domestic affairs and threatened the Irish neutrality. In October of 2002, after some textual changes were made, a second referendum on the Nice Treaty was organised in Ireland, and this time the Nice Treaty was approved.[105] Due to the Irish referendum, discussions on citizen engagement in the EU enlargement process gained traction in the Netherlands.

Dutch politicians were already debating a potential referendum on EU enlargement before the Irish referendum in 2001 took place. In September 2000, EU Commissioner for Enlargement Günter Verheugen suggested in an interview that Germany (his home country) and others should hold a referendum on enlargement. This, according to Verheugen, "would have forced [... the] political elite" in member states to engage with the public and promote the idea of enlargement.[106] Commissioner Verheugen's comments, alongside *staatssecretaris* Benschop "positive" response to these comments, sparked a debate on citizen engagement in the enlargement process, which especially GL was missing in the political debate.[107]

The discussion on citizen engagement became even more prominent after the Irish referendum in June 2001. Dutch public support for the enlargement process was only 41% in October 2001

[102] *Handeling II* 2001/02, nr. 14, p. 760-797, page 781.
[103] *Handeling II* 1999/2000, nr. 93, p. 6031-6055, page 6043.
[104] EUR-Lex. "Treaty of Nice: Summary of Treaty of Nice," 2018.
[105] Bower, Helen. "Nice Treaty: Irish Vote 'YES' in Second Referendum, October 2002." European Sources Online Cardiff University, 2002.
[106] The Economist. "A Row About a Bigger EU." The Economist, September 7, 2000.
[107] *Kamerstuk II* 2000/01, 21501-02, nr. 355, page 2.

(four months after the Irish referendum), according to Eurobarometer data highlighted by ChristenUnie and SGP during a parliamentary debate.[108] Although the Irish referendum was not directly related to the EU enlargement process - and as VVD MP Weisglas noted, it would not hinder enlargement negotiations with EU candidates - Weisglas emphasised that "the Irish signal should be taken seriously."[109] PvdA and D66 agreed with the VVD that the referendum in Ireland was an "important political signal" showing the gap between politicians and citizens on the subject. While the enlargement process should continue unabated, the signal showed the PvdA that "the people of EU member states [...] must be convinced of the importance of enlargement."[110] The CDA, similar to the VVD, PvdA and D66, agreed that it was necessary that after the Irish referendum, new debates on citizen engagement were needed. The results of the Irish referendum according to the CDA, unfortunately meant that the EU could not proceed with its enlargement process. Rejection of the Nice Treaty meant that the EU would not be adequately prepared for enlargement, making "contemplation on the further course of action [...] necessary."[111] Although the Irish voted in favour of the Nice Treaty in late 2002, thereby allowing the enlargement process to continue, the referendum sparked new discussions on citizen engagement in the Netherlands.

2.4 Conclusion

In light of the 2001 Nice Treaty, Dutch discussions on EU enlargement in the early 2000s primarily focused on deepening the EU. One prominent example was the debate on reforming the CAP in preparation for enlargement. When adapting the discourse framework outlined in the introduction, the arguments surrounding CAP reform reflected both pragmatic and identity discourse. The CDA and VVD adopted a pragmatic stance, arguing that reforming the CAP before enlargement was to the benefit of Dutch financial and political interests. In contrast, the PvdA and D66 combined pragmatic and identity discourses, asserting that CAP reform served not only Dutch interests but also those of the EU and its future members.

Alongside debates on deepening, discussions on widening the EU also incorporated elements of both identity and pragmatic discourse. The Dutch government's language on enlargement for example was predominantly identity discourse, since it emphasised the successful adaption of the candidate countries to European values such as democracy. With regard to the Copenhagen criteria, Dutch politicians opposed a 'big bang' enlargement, arguing that it would hinder the Netherlands' ability to monitor and assess individual accession processes (and was therefore not in the Dutch interest). Similarly, discussions on transition periods were on the one hand more identity driven, for instance by the PvdA and D66 which argued that transition periods were supportive measures to help candidate countries adapt to the common acquis. While on the other hand parties like the VVD, CDA, and SGP had pragmatic concerns fearing that transition periods would create a regulatory grey zone, undermine the acquis, and thereby harm the interests of both the EU and the Netherlands. Finally, the discourse around referenda was largely pragmatic. Citizen engagement became a political concern after Irish citizens voted against EU integration. Dutch politicians were not primarily worried that a referendum would

[108] *Handeling II* 2001/02, nr. 14, p. 760-797, page 780.
[109] *Kamerstuk II* 2000/01, 21501-02, nr. 394, page 3.
[110] Ibid, page 1.
[111] Ibid, page 2.

halt the enlargement process itself, but rather that Dutch citizens might share similar views on enlargement — views which were not fully aligned with the mainstream political parties. A negative outcome of the referendum or weak public support for enlargement could undermine the interests of Dutch politicians and the general pro-enlargement views.

Dutch prime minister Balkenende together with German chancellor Gerad Schröder and Greek prime minister Constantin Simitis during the European Council in Brussels of October 2002. On the agenda were discussions on CAP financing, financing of the 2004 enlargement, and the final preparations for the signing of the Athens accession treaty in April 2003.[112]

Chapter 3: The end phase of the 2004 enlargement in a turbulent Dutch political arena, May 2002 – May 2004

After the Dutch parliamentary elections in May 2002, the political landscape was reshaped. Jan Peter Balkenende, previously the leader of the CDA party, became the new prime minister. His new coalition (Balkenende I) consisted of his own CDA, the VVD, and the new kid in town, the populist party LPF (Lijst Pim Fortuin).[113] This coalition wouldn't last long due to internal troubles and the (deterioration of the) relationship between the coalition parties. In May 2003, a new coalition (Balkenende II) consisting of the CDA, VVD and D66 started to govern the Netherlands.[114] The largest opposition parties during this unstable political period were the PvdA, GL, SP (*Socialistische Partij*), D66 (between May 2002 and May 2003), and the LPF (after May 2003).

While the political landscape in the Netherlands was redrawn during the 2002 and 2003 general elections, the enlargement process was drawing to a close. As a consequence of the changing Dutch political landscape, several political parties adopted a new enlargement discourse. This chapter analysis the position on EU enlargement of both Balkenende coalitions and of new political parties such as the LPF and SP. The opposition/coalition parties (LPF and D66) called

[112] European Commission. *Brussels European Council, 24-25/10/2002 – photo ID: P-009420/00-7*. October 24, 2002, photo by Christian Lamboitte.
[113] Parlement.com. "Kabinet-Balkenende I (2002-2003)," n.d.
[114] Parlement.com. "Kabinet-Balkenende II (2003-2006)," n.d.

for referenda on EU enlargement and the VVD and CDA addressed the issue of CAP reforms before EU enlargement. While all the government parties were critical on enlargement, the Balkenende coalitions saw that the critical Dutch position on the 2004 enlargement became an isolated voice within Europe. The chapter continues its analysis of the discourse on the progress of EU admission preparation of several candidate countries. Reports by the EC in late 2003 showed that the majority of the candidate countries did not adequately adapt the Copenhagen criteria. While the Dutch government was convinced that the lacking progress on the acquis was nothing to worry about, because of the so-called safeguard clauses, several other political parties were worried about the lack of progression. The chapter finishes with the final enlargement debate in the Netherlands in November 2003. In April 2003, the European governments and ten candidates signed the Athens accession treaty. This treaty would form the legal basis for the accession on the 1st of May 2004, and was rectified by the Dutch parliament at the end of 2003. The 2004 EU enlargement was now official.

3.1 The Dutch election of 2002: new political opinions and positions on EU enlargement

On the 15th of May 2002, the Dutch general election took place, marking a new era in Dutch politics. A new cabinet under the leadership of CDA leader Jan Peter Balkenende was formed. The new Balkenende cabinet reluctantly adopted a similar position on the EU enlargement process as the previous Kok cabinets. The Kok II cabinet (while it was a *demissionair* or caretaker cabinet) proposed the "country by country" principle, or the idea of individual assessment on the Copenhagen criteria in June 2002. This idea was supported by Balkenende, who was forming his new coalition at that time, and also agreed upon by all other EU governments. However, these same EU governments (including the Kok II cabinet) also formally agreed that "a (1) joint treaty would be drafted for the emerging group of ten candidates", in other words, a 'big bang' treaty for ten countries.[115] .[116] Almost all Dutch politicians, including Balkenende's CDA and his coalition partners the VVD and LPF, were opposed to the big bang approach. Within Europe however, the Dutch position against a joint treaty gradually weakened. A letter by minister of foreign affairs Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and *staatssecretaris* of European Affairs Atzo Nicolaï in October 2002 showed the Dutch dilemma: "The governments of the remaining 14 member states (as well as the candidates) seem [...] to agree to the [European] Commission's proposal to begin the conclusion of negotiations with the group of 10 candidate[s] [...]. Moreover, for several member states, accession of [...] specific candidates are of strategic [and political] importance. [... This] does mean that the political importance of enlargement will ultimately prevail [over individual assessment of candidate]."[117] While the Balkenende cabinet initially opposed the idea of a 'big bang' treaty, it is likely that pressure from other EU countries and candidates influenced the Dutch position to ultimately accept the EC's proposal. In the same letter, the Dutch government stated that it would "be able to co-operate with a decision that the accession negotiations [...] can be concluded in 2002", paving the way for a big bang accession treaty.[118] There was one Dutch condition however, the inclusion of extra checks on the adoption of the Copenhagen criteria trough *vrijwaringsmaatregelen* (safeguard clauses) on some parts of the acquis. (Safeguard clauses

[115] *Kamerstuk II* 2002/03, 23987, nr. 16, page 2.
[116] *Kamerstuk II* 2002/03, 23987, nr. 16, page 2.
[117] Ibid, page 9-10.
[118] Ibid, page 12.

were similar to the idea of transition periods as discussed in chapter two.) Following the adoption of safeguard clauses at the European Council in October 2002, the clauses became an official part of any accession treaty, enabling the Dutch government to support the 2004 enlargement.

Besides adjustments in the position of Balkenende I on EU enlargement, shifts in the Dutch parliament after the 2002 elections also led to changes in EU enlargement debate. Two themes were most prominent, a referendum on an accession treaty and reforms to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).

Since the Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty in 2001, the topic of a referendum in the Netherlands became increasingly prominent in the enlargement debate. The SP, LPF and D66 were all in favour of a referendum, although all had different motivations. The SP, while supportive of enlargement, was critical about the needed EU reforms and possible problems of enlargement. As SP MP Van Bommel argued, these problems – among others the "agriculture in Poland, return of Germans to the Czech Republic and the division of Cyprus" - were not solved by a few debates, but required a broad societal discussion and the possibility of a referendum by the Dutch people.[119] D66, also a supporter of enlargement, agreed with the SP that a referendum was needed, since "Dutch voters then have a say in crucial decisions affecting their own future".[120] The LPF argued that more citizen engagement was needed to make EU institutions (such as the European Parliament) and EU processes (such as enlargement) relevant for citizens. A referendum was therefore needed because a referendum "is intended to increase citizen involvement in this [enlargement] process".[121] In general, the LPF was "not against enlargement. [...] However, there must first be [EU] constitutional reform." The Nice Treaty of 2001 was a start, but not enough to ensure an effective EU after enlargement. The LPF was therefore not yet "enthusiastic about enlargement. "[122] In October 2002, both D66 and the SP submitted a resolution to request the Dutch government to organise a referendum on the question of EU enlargement before the parliament would vote on any accession treaty.[123] In an official response, the Dutch government stated that a referendum was not possible: "Referenda [...] would seriously delay ratification. The European Council's schedule [is] to complete ratification [...] before the European Parliament elections in June 2004 [...]. It is highly doubtful whether a consultative referendum can be held prior to such a decision [to ratify]. After all, this would require the creation of a complex legal regulation, which [... has] to leave sufficient time for the proper preparation and actual organisation of such a referendum."[124]

Besides the discussion on referenda, discussions on the CAP once again were prominent. The LPF argued that CAP reform was needed if the EU would enlarge and was therefore relevant to discuss. The current proposals to reform the CAP (which allowed income support for farmers in the candidate countries) would, according to the LPF, put "vital interests" of western EU members (including the Netherlands) at risk.[125] The CDA and VVD (both historically critical on CAP reforms) agreed with the LPF. However, as CDA MP Verhagen noted during a debate

[119] *Handelingen II* 2001/02, nr. 86, p. 5102-5127, page 5140.
[120] Ibid, page 5117.
[121] *Kamerstuk II* 2001/02, 21501-02, nr. 437, page 3.
[122] *Kamerstuk II* 2001/02, 21501-02, nr. 439, page 2.
[123] Resolution by D66: *Kamerstuk II* 2002/03, 23987, nr. 23; and by SP: *Kamerstuk II* 2002/03, 23987, nr. 21.
[124] *Kamerstuk II* 2002/03, 23987, nr. 28, page 4-5.
[125] *Kamerstuk II* 2001/02, 21501-02, nr. 437, page 2.

on EU enlargement in October 2002: "the CDA faction is of the opinion that the [CAP] should be reformed [...]. The CDA faction is also of the opinion that you should say 'yes' to enlargement". While CAP reform was important, "it is not a condition for enlargement".[126] The VVD supported the CDA position, with VVD MP Zalm arguing that income support was not "in the interests of new member states" since it would have negative economic effects, such as increased prises and weakening of non-agricultural sectors.[127] The VVD, like the LPF, could not support a CAP reform with income support for the candidate countries, and therefore called on the government to "play it tough [...]. [CAP reform] is not only in the interest of the Netherlands, but it is also a global interest".[128] GL argued against the positions of the LPF, CDA and VVD. While GL agreed that CAP reform was desirable, it should however not be linked to discussion on enlargement. There were two reasons for GL. First, the party did "not consider it decent to the candidate countries to use enlargement to achieve [CAP] reforms". Second, GL feared that "insisting all the time on agricultural reforms" led to the relegation of "constitutional law and respect for human rights [...] to the background, which is exactly what [enlargement] is all about".[129] Prime minister Balkenende commented that the government agreed that CAP reforms where needed. "However, if a candidate country qualifies [to join the EU], it should not face new barriers. The government has therefore never used or wanted to use the reform of the [CAP] to block EU enlargement."[130]

3.2 The (lacking) progress of candidate countries

While Dutch politicians were discussing enlargement referenda and CAP reform, new progress reports by the EC sparked discussions on the adaption of the Copenhagen criteria. In early November of 2003 – six months before the enlargement in May 2004! – minister de Hoop Scheffer and *staatssecretaris* Nicolaï stated in a letter that "the [European] Commission identified 39 areas of serious concern" in adoption of the acquis across all ten candidate countries. A few examples: Poland and Lithuania did not yet comply to EU regulations in the fisheries sector; the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia were all behind in adoption of the minimum requirements for the internal market; Hungary was unprepared for the EU rural development programmes; several candidate countries had insufficient financial and administrative infrastructure to implement the acquis; and all candidates (except Cyprus) were behind schedule for the effective implementation of EU regulations on the free movement of goods and services. Although these areas were major (economic) concerns, the Dutch government was convinced that "the scheme of measures [safeguard clauses] provides sufficient tools to ensure, where necessary, the proper functioning of the acquis and the security of European citizens".[131] Also in November 2003 – and once again six months before enlargement – the parliamentary commission on European Affairs presented its report of the Dutch parliamentary field trips to all ten candidates. The goal of the parliament was "to get to know the 10 countries more closely and to gain an understanding of how they are preparing for accession."[132] The parliamentary commission stated that all ten

[126] *Handelingen II* 2002/03, nr. 12, p. 575-660, page 607.
[127] Ibid, page 612.
[128] Ibid, page 613.
[129] *Handelingen II* 2001/02, nr. 86, p. 5102-5127, page 5108.
[130] *Kamerstuk II* 2001/02, 21501-02, nr. 438, page8.
[131] *Kamerstuk II* 2003/04, 23987, nr. 33, page 13.
[132] *Kamerstuk II* 2003/04, 23987, nr. 34, page 1.

candidates received a "positive assessment [... on their] preparations to join the European Union." The parliamentary commission raised concerns on, for example the treatment of Roma in Hungary and the Czech Republic, corruption and lack of agricultural reforms in Poland and the fragile political institutions in Poland and Slovakia.[133] Although overall, the report concluded that the reforms undertaken by the candidates were adequate enough to determine that the ten candidates met the necessary requirements to join the EU.

Not everyone - especially the LPF, VVD, CDA and D66 - shared this positive judgement of the Dutch government and parliamentary commission. VVD MP Rijpstra was "surprised that the [European] commission did not back up its observation that candidate countries were making good progress with an assessment" for example on the rule of law. The VVDs' support for enlargement was dependent, according to Rijpstra, on the state of the rule of law in the candidate countries.[134] Both D66 and the LPF questioned how the EU intended to address the 39 areas of serious concern in practice via the safeguard clauses. D66 for example asked: "how will you [Dutch government] enforce safeguard clauses at the European level?"[135]

Besides discussions on the '39 areas of serious concern,' enlargement discussions also covered other topics concerning the candidate countries. The VVD and CDA expressed their concern on the economic impact of enlargement on labour migration. The VVD stated that the Netherlands was unprepared for the impact to accommodate and employ migrant workers from Eastern Europe. This concern was especially pressing due to studies highlighting an "influx of 30,000 Polish workers by 1 May 2004" which could lead to a brain drain in Eastern Europe.[136]

Discussion in the Netherlands also specifically focused on Poland and the Czech Republic. Both Poland and the Czech Republic wanted financial compensation as they would not receive direct income support for farmers under the current CAP until 2006. To ensure that especially Poland would agree to the conclusions of their accession negotiations, the European governments agreed to give an extra €400 million compensation fund to Poland, and furthermore exempted the country of certain EU rules on how to spend the funds. The CDA, CU, SP and SGP were worried about these concessions. While the SGP questioned if the Dutch "government [...] got week in the knees" by giving in to Polish demands[137]; the CDA and other parties wondered if these concessions to Poland were a once off, or "whether there is not now a risk that this tool will be used again in the future."[138] If concessions became common practice, other candidates and future candidates would feel unequally treated and could demand concessions as well.

Another discussion topic, especially for the VVD and LPF, was once again Cyprus. Peace negotiations headed by the United Nations in 2002-2003 between Turkey, Cyprus and Greece did not come to any fruitful conclusion. The VVD argued that these peace negotiations failed due to the EU enlargement process: "Everyone is somewhat locked into the big bang process, because the accession of 10 countries was bound to be decided. In the [accession] conclusions,

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[133] Ibid: see for example Hungary page 18; Poland page 65; Slovakia page 82; and the Czech Republic page 92.
[134] *Kamerstuk II* 2001/02, 21501-02, nr. 438, page 3.
[135] *Aanhangsel handeling II* 2003/04, nr. 367; for questions by LPF, see *Aanhangsel handeling II* 2002/03, nr. 1286.
[136] *Aanhangsel handeling II* 2003/04, nr. 393; for questions by CDA, see *Aanhangsel handeling II* 2003/04, nr. 394.
[137] *Handelingen II* 2002/03, nr. 34, p. 2499-2525, page 2503.
[138] Ibid, page 2504.

it says that the [European] Union is in favour of the accession of a united Cyprus, but the pressure [to achieve this] is effectively gone." The pressure was gone because "according to the established formulas, Cyprus [will be] part of the [European] Union", creating no incentive for Cyprus or any other party to solve the division before joining the EU.[139] The LPF drew on arguments from the 1990s. They argued that if Cyprus would join the EU, the EU would in turn import "a problem and becomes a direct party to the Cyprus conflict."[140] While the Dutch government was previously against the accession of a divided Cyprus, minister de Hoop Scheffer stated that he "could have imagined more desirable scenarios [on Cyprus division] than the current one. [...] It was a political reality at the Copenhagen Summit [in December 2002] that fourteen EU member states supported this solution [to welcome a divided Cyprus to the EU]. The Dutch government made the political decision to accept this outcome [...]. The political choice was thus not to delay the enlargement of the European Union".[141]

3.3 Ratification of the Athens accession treaty of 2003 in the Netherlands

While Dutch politicians were still discussing the lack of progress of candidate countries, need of CAP reforms and national referenda, the final deadline of the EU enlargement process, 1st of May 2004, was quickly approaching. On April the 16th, 2003, the accession negotiations officially concluded when the fifteen EU members and ten candidates joined together in Athens to sign the Athens accession treaty of 2003.[142] However, before the accession treaty and the 2004 enlargement would be official, the treaty had to be ratified first by all national parliaments, including the Netherlands.

On the 19th of November 2003, the Dutch parliament debated on the Athens accession treaty. The PvdA and GL were positive about the treaty. PvdA MP Timmermans reminded that at the start of the enlargement process in the 1990s, the PvdA already made "a clear choice for the widening of Europe". The "39 areas" the EC was concerned about were nothing to worry about. Timmermans argued that the candidates had until May 2004 to solve their issues, and in case the candidate countries failed, there were still safeguard clauses that would protect Dutch interests.[143] GL had an "idealistic optimistic [...] expectation of an enlarged European Union". Enlargement would contribute to an enrichment of Europe. GL did however had two major concerns. First, the (precarious) state of human rights in the candidate countries, and second – a concern shared by the PvdA - the lack of EU food security regulations in the candidate countries (for example, the lack of food security regulations in Polish slaughterhouses, that the CDA worried about in the 2000s).[144] The SGP would also vote in favour of enlargement. The

[139] Ibid, page 2506.
[140] Ibid, page 2510.
[141] Ibid, page 2517.
[142] With the Athens accession treaty of 2003, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia would become full EU member states. The Dutch government sent prime minister Balkenende and minister of foreign affairs de Hoop Scheffer to sign the accession treaty in Athens on behalf of the Netherlands in April 2003; *Kamerstuk II* 2002/03, 23987, nr. 31.
[143] *Handelingen II* 2003/04, nr. 26, p. 1795-1827, page 1802.
[144] Ibid, page 1821.

SGP argued that the candidate countries had a certain expectation of the EU, and that the EU had an obligation to fulfil its promise to enlarge in May 2004.[145]

The coalition parties - CDA, VVD and D66 - were all in favour of enlargement. The CDA saw enlargement as an historic step to unify Europe, although it was reluctant to accept a 'big bang' accession treaty. The CDA had further concerns on the adaption of criteria on the internal market and food security regulations. However, the CDA, in line with the Dutch government, was in favour of enlargement since the safeguard clauses would allow the candidates to gradually adopt the acquis and protect the EU.[146] D66 was also in favour of enlargement, as D66 MP Van der Laan elaborated: "For D66, [enlargement] is first and foremost about our European values." There were concerns about the political acquis, since "the [Dutch] government and [European] Commission both find extensive shortcomings in [...] the political criteria, such as good governance and rule of law, treatment of minorities and respect for human rights."[147] However, D66 would support enlargement since delaying the enlargement process "is not in the interest of those [candidate] countries, not in the interest of Europe and not in the interest of the Netherlands." Enlargement was "the best insurance that there will be prosperity and peace [...] for our external and internal security [... and] of new economic prospects with new markets for Dutch exports."[148] The VVD was enthusiastic about EU enlargement. The candidates were striving to pursue their freedom and complied to the Copenhagen criteria and were helped by safeguard clauses. "For the VVD, Poland is very welcome in the EU. Equally welcome are Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania [...]. Welcome, too, are the Czech Republic and Slovakia. [...] Welcome is also Hungary". Even Cyprus was "welcome", since the country should not be punished for the island's division.[149] (Another reason to support Cyprus was that Cyprus' accession would effectively block Turkey's accession to the EU - a key issue for the VVD, who opposed Turkey's EU accession.) The VVD, however, emphasised one concern: the influx of cheap labour from Eastern Europe and the potential (negative) impact on the Dutch economy.

The positive attitude of the VVD towards enlargement did catch the attention of PvdA MP Timmermans. He questioned VVD MP Van Baalen: "On 2 October, Mr van Baalen said the VVD would no longer obstruct EU enlargement. On 6 November, Mr van Baalen said the VVD saw no possibility of voting for the treaty if there was no prospect of the safeguard clauses. In Buitenhof, he told me that this enlargement was absolutely rubbish, but that he agreed to it 'with a gun to his chest' [...]. Now he is again enthusiastically saying he is in favour of enlargement." Van Baalen responded that his party "is incredibly troubled by the [European] commission's handling of this [enlargement process]. [...] I literally said that you walk into a dark room, that you have to see how [safeguard clauses] will be resolved. [...] I see very serious problems, but in last consideration I think the enlargement of the [European] Union is more important. [...] You can read 'Het Parool', you can check 'Buitenhof': the VVD stands for enlargement, but has problems with the way it has been handled."[150]

[145] Ibid, page 1816.
[146] Ibid, page 1796.
[147] Ibid, page 1818.
[148] Ibid, page 1820.
[149] Ibid, page 1808-1809
[150] Ibid, page 1812.

While all other parties intended to vote in favour for enlargement, the SP and LPF were still considering their vote and were awaiting the Dutch government's responses to their concerns. The SP was in favour of enlargement. However, it was deeply concerned about the economic effects. The adoption of the acquis made the candidates economically weak, and the safeguard measures created extra barriers for EU integration. The lacking progress in the rule of law also contributed to corruption in several candidates according to the SP. Another concern was the human rights situation for example of Roma and LGBT communities in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.[151] The LPF on the other hand was never a supporter of a 'big bang' accession treaty with ten countries. Its major concern was how the safeguard clauses would be implemented. The LPF explained their argument: "You should have just said: these are the requirements and anyone who meets them can join [the EU]. Then it would have been much simpler. Now we could end up with a very strange situation. One country can join at 1% with all possible safeguard clauses and another country at 99%. This will create the greatest possible ambiguity."[152] Minister of foreign affairs de Hoop Scheffer tried to take away the concerns by stating that "we should be well aware that if the candidates themselves were to fail to make the timely progress they need to make [...] they themselves would suffer. The [European] Commission may, in the event of failure to comply with the [39] points use safeguard measures. [...] If the acceding countries do not meet the targets [...] they could suffer great damage."[153] As the EC would closely monitor progress and it was in the candidates' own interest to comply with the acquis, the Dutch government saw no reason to be concerned about the partial adoption of the acquis. The reassurances of De Hoop Scheffer apparently pleased the SP and LPF, as one week later, the Dutch parliament adopted the Athens accession treaty unanimously.[154] In February 2004, the Dutch senate (Eerste Kamer) also adopted the Athens accession treaty without taking a vote.[155] The 2004 enlargement debate in the Netherlands was officially concluded.

3.4 Conclusion

Following the 2002 Dutch general election, the enlargement debate shifted focus from primarily discussing EU reform to discussing EU widening. Applying the discourse framework stated in the introduction, it becomes clear that the Balkenende cabinets used a more pragmatic argument compared to Kok II. Both Kok II and Balkenende I initially opposed a ‘big bang’ accession treaty. However, the Balkenende I coalition (and Kok II during its caretaker period) realised that the Dutch position was no longer shared by other EU governments. Therefore, Balkenende ultimately supported the ‘big bang’ approach after securing the inclusion of safeguard clauses, which protected Dutch and EU interests from the worst-case scenario, if the acquis was not adopted by candidates.

Other topics in the enlargement debate were also driven by a more pragmatic stance. The referendum discussion can be perceived as identity driven (for example, the LPF and D66 argued that democratic ideals demanded the engagement of citizens). However, referenda were also used in political discourse due to pragmatic motivations. A referendum was in the interests

[151] Ibid, page 1805-1807.
[152] Ibid, page 1815-1816.
[153] Ibid, page 1823.
[154] *Handelingen II* 2003/04, nr. 28, p. 1939-1940.
[155] *Handeling I* 2003/04, nr. 17, p. 810-831.

of the Netherlands and the Dutch people (and perhaps also in the interests of Dutch politicians to appeal to their voters). Another example of a pragmatic argument was the position of the LPF, CDA, and VVD regarding CAP reforms and labour migration. If these issues weren't dealt with before enlargement, both would negatively affect Dutch (economic) interests.

The final Dutch enlargement debate - on the Athens accession treaty of 2003 - showed a combination of pragmatic and identity arguments. The PvdA and GL supported enlargement because the new member states would enrich the EU democratically and culturally (identity), while also emphasising the protective function of safeguard clauses for Dutch national interests (pragmatic). The coalition parties (CDA, VVD and D66) also used identity arguments to support EU enlargement. For instance, the CDA described enlargement as a historic unification of Europe. D66 and the VVD emphasised that enlargement was about European values such as democracy and a liberal economy. Interestingly, despite its opposition in the 1990s, the VVD supported Cyprus's accession, arguing that the country should not be punished for the island's division. While the coalition parties used primarily identity arguments, there were also instances of some pragmatic discourse. For example, D66 stated that enlargement was ultimately in the national interest of the EU, the candidates, and the Netherlands.

The SP employed identity discourse arguments to question the readiness of Eastern Europea to join the EU, due to the shortcoming on economic, rule of law and human rights standards. The LPF, with a mixture of identity and pragmatic arguments, remained wary about the negative consequences of safeguard clauses and the adoption of the acquis by candidates, which could impact the functioning and interests of the EU. Despite the use of varying arguments and enlargement discourses, all Dutch political parties ultimately voted in favour of the 2003 accession treaty, showing unanimous Dutch support for the 2004 enlargement.

Raising of the flags of the ten new EU members at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, May 2004.[156]

Conclusion

After several years of preparation the fifth EU enlargement wave officially took place on the 1st of May 2004. While most academics nowadays tend to focus on the effects and influence of the 2004 enlargement on current EU enlargement debates (for example with Ukraine), an in-depth analysis of the 2004 enlargement itself and an explanation of its history is often missing in these contemporary studies. Furthermore, enlargement discussions did not only take place in EU candidate countries (the CEEC plus Malta and Cyprus) or on the EU level, but also in the Western EU members. This thesis has striven to fill the knowledge gap in the literature regarding the understudied 2004 EU enlargement debates in Western Europe, by focussing on political discussions in the case scenario of the Netherlands. This thesis asked: How did discussions on the 2004 EU enlargement develop within the Dutch parliament and government between 1997 and 2004? In order to answer this research question, three sub questions were formulated and two enlargement discourses (pragmatic and identity discourse) were used to analyse the Dutch enlargement debate over three consecutive periods.

In reflection on how historical developments affected the enlargement debates, there were a couple of noteworthy events. Before the Nice Treaty of 2001, the EU enlargement was primarily discussed within the context of EU institutional reform and Agenda 2000. An example of this discussion were pragmatic arguments by the VVD and CDA in the 1990s – which argued that

[156] European Parliament. *Accession ceremony welcoming 10 new member states into the European Union – Reference: 20040503_Accession_Ceremony*. May 3, 2004.

EU reform via Agenda 2000 would increase Dutch financial contributions to the EU and simultaneously decrease EU funding to the Netherlands, and as such would harm Dutch (financial) interests. After the Nice Treaty of 2001, the Dutch discussion on EU enlargement primarily focussed on the adaption of the Copenhagen criteria by the candidate countries (with the exception of discussions on agricultural reforms). Another important historical event was the Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty in 2001. This event signified a new development in the Dutch enlargement debate: the discussion on citizen engagement. Especially after the 2002 general election, the discussion on a referendum - supported by D66, and the winners of the 2002 election, the SP and LPF - became a prominent theme in the EU enlargement debate. However, due to legal and logistical factors (a referendum would mean new legal regulations, and there wasn't enough time to organise a referendum before 2004), the Dutch government decided that a referendum on the 2004 enlargement was not possible, thereby ending the referendum discussion.

Besides these historical events, several specific EU enlargement topics reoccurred between 1997 and 2004 in the Dutch discourse. The most prominent topic of all was the debate on the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which emerged after the 'road map' of the EU Commission (EC) in 2000. Especially the VVD, CDA and later the LPF argued, in pragmatic fashion, that CAP reforms were needed before the EU could enlarge, otherwise the CAP would harm Dutch (financial) interests. PvdA, GL and D66 were against CAP reform from an identity perspective. A new CAP would mean new Copenhagen criteria which was unfair for the candidate countries, and especially GL was worried that discussion on CAP would overshadow the discussion on human rights.

Several individual countries were discussed in the discourse as well (for example the Baltic states and the Czech Republic), however two countries were the most interesting to analyse. The first is Poland. In the 1990s, Poland was never individually discussed by Dutch politicians. In the 2000s, a discourse on Poland substantially increased. The CDA for example, was worried about the adoption of EU food security regulations, and it used the example of Polish slaughterhouses which didn't adopt these EU regulations. After the EC report in 2003, which highlighted '39 areas of serious concern', Poland was frequently discussed as one of the countries which lacked the most in adoption of the acquis. Furthermore, the EU financial concessions to Poland sparked debate in the Netherlands on the fairness of the EU enlargement process.

Another country which was frequently discussed is Cyprus. In the 1990s, Dutch politicians argued that the admission of a divided Cyprus would harm the security of the EU and would strengthen the Greek position in the EU. Both arguments were pragmatic, as they perceived the Cypriot candidacy as harmful for Dutch and EU interests (especially by the VVD). During the early 2000s, discussions about Cyprus resurged after failed peace initiatives in 2002-2003. The Dutch government and several political parties reassessed their position. While it was regrettable that the division of Cyprus was not solved, settlement of the Cyprus issue should not delay the EU enlargement process. The LPF was the only political party who was against this position, using the initial argument from the 1990s about harming EU security. The VVD was, compared to the 1990s, in favour of Cypriot accession to the EU (the country should not be punished for its division) but was still critical about EU enlargement negatively influencing the peace initiatives of 2002-2003.

If we analyse the development of the EU enlargement debate in general - and ask how Dutch politicians used enlargement discourses in their arguments - we see that all politicians used both pragmatic and identity discourses. However, some topics were dominated by one type of discourse over another. The same applies to Dutch political parties and the different governmental coalitions. The Kok II cabinet was strongly in favour of enlargement. Enlargement did not only positively contribute to the Dutch national interests and economy (pragmatic discourse); but most of all it was expected to contribute to the safety and security of Europe and furthermore to the rooting of EU values such as democracy in the candidate countries (identity discourse). The Balkenende cabinets, while adopting similar identity arguments as Kok II, used a more pragmatic discourse. Dutch critiques on the big bang approach were of a lesser concern for the other European governments. The Balkenende cabinets therefore finally supported the enlargement process in return for EU safeguard clauses that would protect the interests of the EU and the Netherlands.

The progressive and left-wing parties (GL, D66 and SP) were in general more inclined to use a form of identity discourse. These parties often supported enlargement due to identity driven arguments (enlargement contribute to the spread and safeguarding of European values) and were often concerned about the (lacking) adoption of the political acquis (human rights, rule of law, democracy) in the candidate countries. For the PvdA and CDA, it cannot be stated if either preferred one discourse over another. For example, the CDA in the 1990s used identity arguments when it came to argue in favour of EU enlargement to the Baltic states (enlargement supports democracy), or Dutch financial contributions to an enlarged EU (showing solidarity with the EU candidates). Simultaneously, starting in the 2000s, the CDA argued that CAP reforms were needed since it would otherwise harm Dutch interests, a prime example of a pragmatic discourse. Also the PvdA sometimes argued more identity driven (the PvdA worried about the lack of human rights in the Czech Republic in the 1990s), and sometimes argued more in a pragmatic discourse (in 2001, the PvdA argued that using transition periods was more realistic, provided they did not affect areas vital to Dutch interests, such as the free movement of people.) The conservative and right-wing parties (VVD, SGP and LPF) on the other hand were in general more inclined to use a form of pragmatic discourse. All parties supported the idea of EU enlargement from an identity perspective (enlargement would be a historical chance to revert the divide of Europe and support democracy in the CEEC). However, these three parties were often critical of the enlargement process from a pragmatic point of view, since the increased financial contributions from the Netherlands (a concern especially in the 1990s, but also afterwards), EU institutional reforms, and the weakening of the Copenhagen criteria (an argument emerging after 2000 and increasingly used after 2002) would harm the Dutch national interests.

In short, the 2004 enlargement debate in the Netherlands was, until 2001, directly linked to discussions on EU institutional reform. However, after 2001, the enlargement debate shifted focus to citizen engagement (via referenda) and the lack of progress in the EU candidates. During the period between 1997-2004, recurring topics in the Dutch debate were CAP reforms and several individual candidates like Cyprus. We see that all parties used a mixture of identity and pragmatic discourses in their arguments. In general, however, the left-wing parties tended to use identity driven arguments (often to argue the benefits of enlargement or critique the slow adopting of the political acquis), while the right-wing parties were more inclined to use a pragmatic form of discourse (to highlight dangers of enlargement to Dutch and EU interests).

The insights of this thesis contribute to several academic debates on EU enlargement: the literature on the drives of EU enlargement; the literature on discourse of the 2004 enlargement from the perspective of the western EU members; and the scarce literature on Dutch-EU relations between 1997-2004. While this research has added new Dutch political perspectives to the existing literature and academic debates, it failed to analyse the full Dutch perspective on the 2004 enlargement. The limited source material on the Dutch governmental position between 1997-2004, due to the classification of the national archives until the end of the 2020 decade, resulted in a limited analysis of the EU enlargement debate from the perspective of the Dutch cabinet and government ministries. Furthermore, this thesis chose not to focus on Dutch public discourse (for example media) on the 2004 enlargement. Therefore, it remains unclear how and to what extent public debates affected the Dutch political debates on enlargement and vis-á-vis. Further research, based on new source materials, is needed to take into account these other perspectives and expend the knowledge about EU enlargement discourses of the Dutch government and the Dutch public. New historical research on Dutch enlargement debates in the 1990s and early 2000s from other perspectives and sources, in combination with this thesis, will lead to a more full academic understanding of the 2004 EU enlargement debate in the Netherlands.

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Universiteit Utrecht

Faculty of Humanities
Version June 2024

PLAGIARISM RULES AWARENESS STATEMENT

Fraud and Plagiarism
Scientific integrity is the foundation of academic life. Utrecht University considers any form of scientific deception to be an extremely serious infraction. Utrecht University therefore expects every student to be aware of, and to abide by, the norms and values regarding scientific integrity.

The most important forms of deception that affect this integrity are fraud and plagiarism. Plagiarism is the copying of another person's work without proper acknowledgement, and it is a form of fraud. The following is a detailed explanation of what is considered to be fraud and plagiarism, with a few concrete examples. Please note that this is not a comprehensive list!

If fraud or plagiarism is detected, the study programme's Examination Committee may decide to impose sanctions. The most serious sanction that the committee can impose is to submit a request to the Executive Board of the University to expel the student from the study programme.

Plagiarism
Plagiarism is the copying of another person's documents, ideas or lines of thought and presenting it as one's own work. You must always accurately indicate from whom you obtained ideas and insights, and you must constantly be aware of the difference between citing, paraphrasing and plagiarising. Students and staff must be very careful in citing sources; this concerns not only printed sources, but also information obtained from the Internet.

The following issues will always be considered to be plagiarism:

- cutting and pasting text from digital sources, such as an encyclopaedia or digital periodicals, without quotation marks and footnotes;
- cutting and pasting text from the Internet without quotation marks and footnotes;
- copying printed materials, such as books, magazines or encyclopaedias, without quotation marks or footnotes;
- including a translation of one of the sources named above without quotation marks or footnotes;
- paraphrasing (parts of) the texts listed above without proper references: paraphrasing must be marked as such, by expressly mentioning the original author in the text or in a footnote, so that you do not give the impression that it is your own idea;
- copying sound, video or test materials from others without references, and presenting it as one's own work;
- submitting work done previously by the student without reference to the original paper, and presenting it as original work done in the context of the course, without the express permission of the course lecturer;
- copying the work of another student and presenting it as one's own work. If this is done with the consent of the other student, then he or she is also complicit in the plagiarism;
- when one of the authors of a group paper commits plagiarism, then the other co-authors are also complicit in plagiarism if they could or should have known that the person was committing plagiarism;
- submitting papers acquired from a commercial institution, such as an Internet site with summaries or papers, that were written by another person, whether or not that other person received payment for the work.

ChatGPT/Generative AI
You are not allowed to generate text, code, figures, images, etc. with Generative AI and present it as your own work. This is a form of fraud.

Universiteit Utrecht

The rules also apply to rough drafts of papers or (parts of) theses sent to a lecturer for feedback, to the extent that submitting rough drafts for feedback is mentioned in the course handbook or the thesis regulations.

The Education and Examination Regulations (Article 5.14) describe the formal procedure in case of suspicion of fraud and/or plagiarism, and the sanctions that can be imposed.

Ignorance of these rules is not an excuse. Each individual is responsible for their own behaviour. Utrecht University assumes that each student or staff member knows what fraud and plagiarism entail. For its part, Utrecht University works to ensure that students are informed of the principles of scientific practice, which are taught as early as possible in the curriculum, and that students are informed of the institution's criteria for fraud and plagiarism, so that every student knows which norms they must abide by.

I hereby declare that I have read and understood the above.
Name: Vincent Wesel Student number: 0910325
Date and signature: 16-06-2025 

Submit this form to your supervisor when you begin writing your Bachelor's final paper or your Master's thesis.

Failure to submit or sign this form does not mean that no sanctions can be imposed if it appears that plagiarism has been committed in the paper.