# Generation distrust: how financial uncertainty influences political trust among Dutch young adults

A study on the association between financial concerns and political trust, influenced by educational level and gender



# **Master Thesis**

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# Preface

I am pleased to present this research paper, which explores the association between financial insecurity and political trust among Dutch young adults, considering the influence of educational level and gender. Political trust plays a crucial role in fostering social cohesion, policy acceptance, and economic stability. It encourages civic participation and strengthens democratic processes. Using data from the LISS Panel, I discovered that financial insecurity is a significant predictor for political trust. This study contributes to the existing literature on political trust and provides valuable insights that may inform policies aimed at enhancing trust and improving democratic processes.

I would like to express my gratitude to everyone involved in this process, especially to my thesis supervisor, Deni Mazrekaj, my internship supervisor, Johanan Korevaar, and my peers for their valuable guidance, feedback and encouragement throughout this research process. I am grateful for their support during these past intense months, which allowed me to grow both academically and personally.

Hopefully, this study sheds light on the critical issue of political trust among Dutch young adults and serves as a modest contribution to the field. I also hope it drives efforts towards fostering an equitable political environment to strengthen democratic processes and enhance social cohesion in the Netherlands.

Nienke van Pel

# Abstract

Introduction: Political trust is crucial for both politics and society. It has been declining among newer generations resulting in negative outcomes, such as the increase of popularity of populistic parties. Financial concerns exacerbate this distrust, particularly among young adults. This study aims to give insights on political trust, by investigating the influences of educational level and gender. The research objective therefore is: to what extent do financial concerns explain political trust and to what extent is this influenced by being high educated or being woman? Theory: The institutional theory and the socio-psychological theory are explored to understand how financial concerns affect political trust. The importance of policy feedback, socio-economic status and experiences with trust and betrayal are emphasized in these theories. The potential influence of being high educated is discussed by the increase of perceived unfair treatment, and the potential influence of being a woman is discussed by the increase of misperceptions. Method: Questionnaires from the LISS panel from the year 2021 were used to conduct multiple linear regression analyses by making use of IBM SPSS 29. Results: Significant effect was found on the association between financial concerns and political trust. No significant was found for the moderating influences educational level and gender. Conclusion and policy advice: Political trust is negatively affected by financial concerns among young adults in the Netherlands. Being high educated or being woman have no significant effect on this association, possibly due to the influence of COVID-19 and not using longitudinal data. The policy advice is to increase equality of opportunity among young adults, especially in vulnerable neighborhoods. Show people the importance of democracy and inspire them to participate in politics.

**Ethical approval:** The study is approved by the Ethical Review Board of the Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences of Utrecht University under filing number 24-0417.

# Introduction

Political trust enhances social cohesion and policy acceptance; citizens are more likely to comply with laws and regulation and collaborate on common goals. It encourages civic participation, increases voting turnout and stimulates economic growth and stability (Wroe, 2015). In recent decades, political trust has been decreasing among newer generations (Norris, 2011). As young adults transition into adulthood, they test political views and participation, often resulting in greater distrust in politicians and institutions (Chevalier, 2019). They exhibit lower levels of political trust compared to older generations and economic insecurity may exacerbate this issue (Chevalier, 2019). Decreasing political trust can have negative outcomes for both politics and society. It is a critical source of perceived stability and legitimacy, enhancing political systems' authority and their ability to govern effectively (Kolczyńska, 2020). Its potential contribution to the rise of populist political parties is an endangered consequence (Heiss & Matthes, 2017). Low levels of political trust may stimulate individuals to vote for populistic parties (Rooduijn, 2017). The popularity of these right-wing parties is rising, especially among young adults with lower political trust. Their appealing connection to strong emotions such as anger or frustration resonates with individuals who feel unheard (Heiss & Matthes, 2017).

This study aims to investigate the association between individuals' perception of their financial future and political trust among young adults and whether this association is influenced by being higher educated or being woman. Van Erkel & Van der Meer (2015) emphasize the importance of predicting economic performance on political trust. Citizens' perceptions play a crucial role: political trust increases when citizens are satisfied and decreases when satisfaction is lacking. Following van der Meer & Hakhverdian (2016) from their literature review, I understand that while many scholars have studied the relationship between macro-economic outcomes and political trust, results have been inconsistent. Wroe (2015) focuses on evaluations of the individuals' economic situation at the micro-level. In the American context, he suggests that personal financial insecurity significantly diminishes one's political trust. I contribute to this knowledge by studying this association among young adults in the Netherlands. The disproportionately divided housing and unstable labor market contribute to financial insecurities among young adults, exacerbating intergenerational (between generations) and intragenerational inequality (within generations) (Arundel & Doling, 2017). Building on the study of Wroe (2015), it is relevant to examine their influence on young adults' political trust.

Young adults often experience financial instability due to weakened position in the housing and labor market (Hochstenbach & Arundel, 2020). Following the economic crisis of 2008, homeownership has become a precarious and financially risky venture (Fuster et al., 2018). A notable trend is the increase in private renting and the decline in homeownership among young people, intensifying concerns about housing inequality (McKee et al., 2020). Housing prices are rising, housing availability is diminishing, and mortgage accessibility is decreasing (Hochstenbach & Arundel, 2020). These conditions discourage young people from making crucial life transitions, leading to delayed home-leaving, re-entries to parental homes, and increased housing precarity (Fuster et al., 2018). In the Netherlands, proportion of young adults who desire to relocate but face housing shortages has doubled (Gielen, 2022). Reliance on private rental housing and short-term leases exacerbates intergenerational inequality, placing younger generations at an economic and financial disadvantage. Despite recovery of the economic crisis of 2008, longer-term transformations in the labor market continue to undermine the financial stability of younger adults, driven by decreasing employment participation and a decline in well-paid and stable jobs (Arundel & Doling, 2017).

The limited prospects and postponed ability to achieve homeownership negatively impact the long-term wealth accumulation of young people and deteriorate their financial situation (Fuster et al., 2018). The evolving life-course trajectories influence the attainment of full adult independence by diminishing quality of life and potential future economic wellbeing (Arundel & Lennartz, 2017). Life-cycle investments, such as purchasing a house, are critical for ensuring financial security (Doling & Ronald, 2010). Numerous studies also associate these trends with delayed fertility and family-related life-course decisions. The adverse changes result in lower fertility rates, as these conditions are unfavorable and discourage family formation (Mulder & Billari, 2010; Vignoli et al., 2012). Additionally, there is a strong association between psychological well-being and the perception of financial situation. Future financial perceptions play a crucial role as they foster negative feelings when perceived negatively (Iannello et al., 2020). Hence, it is crucial to understand how much young adults worry about their economic future, given the influence of an unfavorable financial situation on multiple facets of their life. The descriptive question formulated for this study is: *'How much do young adults in the Netherlands worry about their economic future*?'.

As stated above, I aim to investigate whether the association between future financial concerns and political trust is influenced by being high educated and being woman. Research indicates that highly educated people generally exhibit higher levels of political trust. Higher

education is associated with greater political interest and knowledge, which fosters increased tolerance and trust (Hooghe et al., 2014). Additionally, less educated people are more likely to judge political institutions based on their economic performance, given their greater vulnerability to economic downturns (van Erkel & van der Meer, 2016). However, financial security is rising among higher educated young adults due to loan systems, inflation and rising energy costs (Egelmeers et al., 2023). Due to this current trend, this study expects that being high educated will negatively influence the relationship between future financial concerns and political trust. Political dissatisfaction increases when individuals experience a gap between the level of inequality they prefer, and they perceive. When this inequality is perceived as not implemented politically, one's political trust will decrease (Bobzien, 2023). Despite its positive association with political trust in previous research (Van Elsas, 2014), this study aims to highlight the possibility of the opposite effect for higher educated young adults. Therefore, the relevance rests in addressing this knowledge gap on political trust regarding educational level due to current economic trends, which may eventually influence their voting behavior.

This study also investigates gender differences in the association between financial concerns and political trust. Existing studies on financial concerns show inconsistent findings regarding gender differences. While some research suggests that men are more concerned about financial issues, other studies refute this claim (Taft et al., 2013). It is generally accepted that higher financial well-being reduces financial concerns through increased financial literacy (Taft et al., 2013). Women consistently experience lower levels of financial literacy than men, a gap that persists even among young women who are well educated with strong labor market participation (Bucher-Koenen et al., 2016). This study expects that being a woman will negatively influence the relationship between financial concerns and political trust. Understanding gender differences in political trust is crucial for both theoretical and practical reasons. By studying gender differences, this study contributes to the current body of literature by providing insights into this gender gap. These insights can inform policies aimed at enhancing trust and improving democratic processes, fostering greater inclusivity and equity within political systems (Bunting et al., 2021).

Overall, by investigating whether the association between financial concerns and political trust differs for higher educated individuals or for women, this study contributes to the existing literature on political trust. The research question is: *"To what extent do financial concerns explain political trust and to what extent is this influenced by being high educated or being woman?"*. This study holds societal implications. If I find being higher educated stimulates a negative association between financial concerns and political trust, new insights


on the influences of political trust can be provided, which would be useful for policymakers. By studying gender differences, this study contributes to the current body of literature by providing insights into the gender gap. These insights can inform policies aimed at enhancing trust and improving democratic processes. It may enhance greater inclusivity and equity within political systems (Bunting et al., 2021). Lastly, I will delve deeper into policy recommendations based on the findings of this study. The following policy question will be answered: "*How can policymakers influence political trust among young adults in the Netherlands*?".

# **Theoretical framework**

### **Political trust**

The concept of political trust can be defined as the degree of confidence individuals have in their legal and political institutions (Berg & Hjerm, 2010). It refers to citizens' evaluations of political institutions and politicians, entailing a positive assessment of the attributes that make each political institution trustworthy. Central to this notion are factors such as credibility, fairness, competence, transparency and openness in policy formulation (Zmerli, 2014). Political trust encompasses the personal belief that political institutions will uphold their commitments and make every effort to fulfill them (Newton, 2017). It is distinguished by five dimensions; confidence in the political community, confidence in the principles of the regime, confidence in the performance of the regime, confidence in institutions and confidence in political leadership (Norris, 2011). Diminished levels of political trust may indicate a pervasive critical attitude towards institutions and political figures (Welzel & Inglehart, 2011).

Figure 1. Conceptual model.



#### The association between financial concerns and political trust

First, I examine the association between financial concerns and political trust. Differences in political trust across national levels can be attributed to four key factors at the individual level: culture, political attitudes, assessment of policy output and political evaluation (Zmerli & van der Meer, 2014). These factors stem from the cultural theory and institutional theory on political trust (Schoon & Cheng, 2011). A third theory, often used to predict political trust, is the socio-psychological theory (Erikson, 1950). The primary disparity between these theories lies in the timing of trust formation. The cultural theory focuses on early-life experiences and development, while the institutional theory underscores more proximate and contemporary experiences (Schoon & Cheng, 2011). The socio-psychological approach does not account for timing and focuses on both early-life and adulthood trust development (Erikson, 1950). Navigating through these approaches, I derive the first hypothesis based on the institutional and socio-psychological perspectives.

# The cultural theory

Traditional sociologists such as Putnam and Inglehart emphasized cultural factors as the determinants of political trust. The underlying mechanism of the cultural theory is outside the political sphere (Mishler & Rose, 2001). For instance, individuals' socialization experiences and value formation during early life are considered (Schoon & Cheng, 2011). Early-life socialization and interpersonal trust, rooted in cultural norms, define someone's trust. Furthermore, it suggests that shifts in political trust necessitate long-term cultural changes and generational transition (Schoon & Cheng, 2011). Therefore, this study does not use this theory to explain the association between financial concerns and political trust.

#### *The institutional theory*

Unlike traditional political sociology, contemporary studies emphasize the importance of taking institutional arrangements into account. They are considered the most important determinants of political trust (Chevalier, 2019). According to the institutional theory, these institutional arrangements include factors such as institutional performance, transparency, accountability and responsiveness to citizens' needs. It is the experience with institutions that shape political trust, viewed as a cognitive process influenced by direct knowledge and interactions with these institutions (Schoon & Cheng, 2011).

Individual attitudes towards institutional performance emerge as the primary determinant of political trust (Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund, 2015). It is argued that political trust is shaped by individuals' perspectives on institutional effectiveness and policies. This is

particularly influenced by policies impacting the transition into adulthood and by young people's political attitudes within society. The absence of welfare policies, such as universal and inclusive policies, stimulates political distrust. To bolster political trust among young adults, state intervention and public policies play an important role in providing financial recourses that support their independence and societal participation. This underscores the importance of understanding policies and their effects, also termed policy feedback (Chevalier, 2019). Perceptions of the political system are mostly based on economic policy feedback, as economic performance and government management serve as primary predictors (Mishler & Rose, 2001).

Wroe (2015) explains that during times of perceived poor economical government performance, especially during economic downturns, political trust declines. This connection between economics and political trust, the economic policy feedback, is intuitive and straightforward. The underlying mechanism stems from perceived economic insecurity at both individual and national levels (Wroe, 2015). The first explanation is rooted in psychology and draws on Kahneman & Tversky's (1979) prospect's theory. This theory gives insight into people's aversion towards economic insecurity, as they feel vulnerable and threatened. It suggests that people weigh losses more heavily than gains. Economic insecurity threatens the core human instinct to avoid losses and protect what they already have, leading to heightened sensitivity to potential losses and risks (Kahneman, 2011). The second explanation, grounded in the negative bias theory within psychological and behavioral economics, suggests that negative economic conditions exert a greater impact on people. This declines people's political participation. Moreover, focus of media on negative economic aspects also contributes to more negative political perceptions (Wroe, 2015)

Economic performance is a broad construct and can be divided in multiple measures: objective macro-level (national output, unemployment rate, inflation), objective micro-level (income, employment and job status), and subjective perceptions of personal financial situation (Wroe, 2015). The objective measures at both national and individual level, seem less important when explaining political trust. Nevertheless, the individual subjective perceptions are crucial due to their substantial effect on political trust. However, this is particularly true regarding perceptions on the wider economy rather than personal financial situation (Dalton, 2004). This could be the result of inadequate measurement of personal economic well-being. Criticism states that questions like 'feeling financially better or worse' do not fully capture the impact of economic changes on political trust. Solely focusing on short-term changes may overlook important details about how people truly perceive their economic situation and will not capture their real concerns (Wroe, 2015).

Hence, contemporary studies highlight the importance of individual attitudes towards institutional performance in explaining political trust (Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund, 2015). Policy feedback refers to the impact of policies on individuals' perception of those same policies (Chevalier, 2019). The prospect theory and negative bias theory explain how economic policy feedback impacts political trust, due to the noteworthy influence of economic insecurity (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, 2011; Wroe, 2015). Individuals' subjective perceptions appear to be the most important in measuring the economic insecurity (Dalton, 2004; Wroe, 2015).

#### The socio-psychological approach

The social-psychological approach is, alongside the cultural and institutional theories, often used to predict political trust. In both early childhood and later adulthood, individuals develop personality traits that influence their behavior and predisposition to trust or distrust others (Erikson, 1950). Multiple theories within this approach offer explanations for political trust. The theory of 'social success and well-being' explains why political trust declines when having financial concerns within this approach (Choi & Woo, 2016). It focuses on adults' experiences and socio-economic status, suggesting that wealthy people tend to be more trusting than people with lower socio-economic status. For poorer people, trusting behavior is riskier, because they cannot afford to lose when their trust is betrayed, and they also gain less from trusting behavior. Moreover, wealthier people will receive more respect and honesty, which further enhances their trusting tendencies (Choi & Woo, 2016). Financial uncertainty strongly affects the psychological well-being of young adults. Fear of losing job, reduced income, falling in debt and unavailability of essential goods are factors contribute to higher levels of anxiety, depressed mood and lower life satisfaction (Taft et al., 2013). Additionally, decreased financial well-being leads to increased financial concerns (Taft et al., 2013). According to the 'social success and well-being theory', the interaction of negative well-being and lower socio-economic status results in lower political trust (Choi & Woo, 2016).

# Hypothesis 1

Based on the institutional theory and the social-psychological approach, it is expected that political trust will decrease when financial concerns arise. This leads to the first hypothesis:

#### The influence of educational level

Second, I look at the moderating influence of education and focus on higher education. Education positively impacts political engagement and participation and is an important positive determinant of political trust. This mechanism is mostly explained by knowledge, as higher-educated individuals may have more political knowledge, which motivates them to be more politically engaged and attentive (Van Elsas, 2014). Lower educated people tend to rely more on general sentiments, while higher educated people may base their trust more on rational evaluations of the political context (Elchardus & Smits, 2002). Education directly influences political trust through knowledge and understanding of politics and indirectly through cognitive abilities to use this knowledge (Van Elsas, 2014). Another explanation for the effect is that education enhances levels of trust through social interactions and through the educational context, which promotes pro-social attitudes (Hooghe et al., 2012). However, several factors may moderate this effect.

This study builds on the assumption that higher-educated people perceive more unfair treatment recent years due to economic trends, which may affect their political trust. Studies have proven a positive relationship between education and financial well-being (Taft et al., 2013). Those with higher education tend to be more financially satisfied (Joo & Grabble, 2004). However, young adults experience increasing wealth inequality due to delayed homeownership and wealth accumulation (Zhan et al., 2016). Attitudes and perceptions towards public officials, like politicians and institutions, play a significant role in shaping political trust (Marien & Werner, 2018). Citizens' collective assessment of political performance may not accurately reflect reality due to deviating individual perceptions. Hence, individuals' perceptions affect political trust more than collective assessments, because objective assessment of performance seems to be difficult (Marien & Werner, 2018). Institutional experiences are a major determinant of political trust (Schoon & Cheng, 2011). Perceived fair treatment is very important in someone's individual assessment, as it increases political trustworthiness and willingness to comply with and cooperate in politics (Marien & Werner, 2018). Perceived unequal income distributions, for example, negatively affect one's political trust (Zmerli & Castillo, 2015). Policies like increasing student loan stimulate perceived wealth inequality, as more student loan decreases the opportunity of building wealth by less home ownership opportunities (Cooper & Wang, 2014). The Dutch housing market also suffered more than other West-European housing markets, due to several government

policies in both rented and owner-occupies sectors. Especially young households, who are looking for their first owned house, experience unequal treatment (Boelhouwer, 2019). Due to increasing economic insecurity among young adults (Arundel & Doling, 2017), they experience less fair treatment, which may result in less political trust. This is because satisfaction with democracy and agreement on institutional performance decreases with the existence of socioeconomic changes (Schoon & Cheng, 2011).

# Hypothesis 2

These findings suggest that high educated people experience more perceived unfair treatment. Therefore, the following hypothesis is posited:

H2: The negative relationship between financial concerns and political trust becomes more negative when being high educated.

# The influence of gender

Third, I look at the moderating influence of gender, focusing on being woman. The gender gap in politics is a much-addressed subject. Historically, women are less engaged in politics than men, and they report lower levels of political interest, participation and knowledge. This is rooted in the underrepresentation of women in politics, which has resulted in lower political engagement and trust for women (Burns et al., 2002). Besides that, women often underestimate their own professional and political skills, which makes them feel discouraged to be politically active (Pfanzelt & Spies, 2018). Many countries have nowadays implemented gender quotas to improve women's presence in politics. This has become crucial for promoting democracy and participatory citizenship. It diminishes gender differences in political engagement and women show, after implementation of this quota, higher levels of trust in politics and institutions compared to men (Hinojosa et al., 2017). Nevertheless, based on the socialization theory, individuals are socialized to behave according to specific behavioral roles based on their gender (Bunting et al., 2021). This also impacts engagement with politics, which results in the possibility of women being less active in politics due to social expectations of characteristics associated with the underrepresentation of female political leaders (Bunting et al., 2021).

Recent research findings are, however, often incoherent in demonstrating gender differences. Some studies state women naturally have lower levels of trust, while others deny this (Bunting et al., 2021). Other research explains that women may have higher levels of political trust than men by participating more in society through membership in organizations and voting (Schoon & Cheng, 2011). Additionally, men are less likely to recover their trust after being betrayed and are more hesitant to trust again when they have been betrayed in the past. Cumulative experiences of trust violations and skepticism contribute to decay of trust among men, but this is not specified for political trust yet (Umer, 2023). The differences between genders in political trust are probably due to measurement issues and interpretations of respondents, which makes it difficult to investigate the influence of gender on political trust (Bunting et al., 2021).

This study builds on the assumption that women tend to have larger misperceptions than men (Arin et al., 2024), which may negatively affect their political trust. As written above, research seem to be mixed about gender differences explaining political trust. However, the study of Arin et al. (2024) found results for gender influencing misperceptions. They investigated misperceptions as inaccuracies in individuals' beliefs across various societal domains and found that women are associated with higher misperceptions. These inaccuracies can lead to flawed policy decisions and hinder consensus on crucial debates. This influences electoral outcomes, as it contributes to the rise of polarizing political movements. Additionally, high misperceptions may shape political preferences and voting behavior. Considering these findings of Arin et al. (2024), I expect that the association between financial concerns and political trust may be affected by being a woman based on their tendency to misperceive.

#### Hypothesis 3

Based on women being historically underrepresented in politics (Burns et al., 2020), the socialization theory (Bunting et al., 2021) and women having greater misperceptions than men (Arin et al., 2024), the following hypothesis has derived:

H3: The negative relationship between financial concerns and political trust becomes more negative when being a woman.

# Data

To investigate the association between financial concerns and political trust, data from the LISS panel (Longitudinal Internet studies for the Social Sciences) managed by the nonprofit research institute Centerdata (Tilburg University, the Netherlands) was used. Since 2007, the longitudinal LISS Core Study has been consistently carried out within the panel. It covers a large variety of domains including health, work, education, income, housing, leisure and time use, political views, values and personality. The research conducted in this paper has been ethically approved by the Ethical Review Board of the Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences of Utrecht University (nr: 24-0417).

For this study, variables from the questionnaires 'Background variables' and 'Politics and Values' and from the project 'Young people in the labor market' were used to analyze the research question. From the 'Background variables' and the 'Politics and Values' questionnaires, I used the 13<sup>th</sup> wave of the LISS study, to match the year of the 'Young people in the labor market' questionnaire. The data were collected in the year 2021.

The total sample of the LISS panel is a true probability sample of households sourced from the population register by Statistics Netherlands. LISS panel assures the sample to be an accurate representation of the Dutch population by randomly selecting respondents using a stratified sampling method. Individuals lacking a computer or internet access are supplied with the necessary equipment. Respondents range between 16 to 98 years old, and the sample is equally divided between male and female respondents (LISS panel, n.d.). Only respondents who participated in the project 'Young people in the labor market' and the questionnaire 'Politics and Values' were included. The project 'Younge people in the labor market' has a response rate of 74.1% and the questionnaire 'Politics and Values' has a response rate of 88.1%. For control variables, variables from the questionnaire 'Background variables' were used. In total, all used variables combined contain 10,219 observations. The variables used from the project 'Young people in the labor market' contain only 933 observations due to the small selection of respondents for the entire questionnaire. After excluding missing cases (i.e., people who did not respond to one or more questions involved), I am left with 800 respondents. As this research is focused on young adults, respondents in the age categories 15-24 years old and 25-34 years old were selected. This resulted in a final sample of 796 respondents.

# Variables

The dependent variable of this research is political trust. To measure this concept, four items were used which measured to what degree respondents trust the Dutch government, parliament, politicians and political parties. A scale was used to answer all the questions with 0 meaning '*no confidence at all*' to 10 meaning '*full confidence*'. I chose to only include political trust in Dutch government. Building on Bobzien (2023), citizens hold their own nationals' institutions accountable when it comes to income inequality and political trust. The items measuring foreign political trust, like European Parliament and United Nations, and the items measuring trust in the police and the legal system were excluded. The items of the

question '*Can you indicate, on a scale from 0 to 10, how much confidence you personally have in each of the following institutions?*' that were used were '*Dutch government*', '*Dutch parliament*', '*politicians*' and '*political parties*'. These were combined into one scale variable and the average score was calculated to indicate the overall political trust. They were already coded in such a way that a higher the score indicated a higher level of trust. A reliability's test gave a Cronbach's Alpha of .954, which indicates high internal consistency.

The independent variable in this study is financial concerns, measuring how much respondents worry about their financial status. To study this concept, questions from the LISS Panel Core Study 'Young people in the labor market' were used. This was measured by means of the following items: 'I am worried as to whether I will be able to buy a home before I am forty', 'I am worried as to whether I will be able to build up enough pension capital', 'I am worried as to whether I will be able to lead an enjoyable life' and 'I am worried as to whether I will be able to continue paying my bills in the long term'. For all questions, the answer categories included '1: not', '2: somewhat', '3: fairly' and '4: very'. A higher answer indicated the respondent being more worried about their financial status. The items were combined into one scale variable and the average score was calculated to indicate the overall financial concerns of the respondents. The Cronbach's Alpha following from the reliability's test is .778, which indicates an acceptable internal consistency.

Corresponding with the study of Wroe (2015), respondents' demographics were used as control variables. The control variable age and the variables gender and education, which are also moderator variables, were used. They all stem from the questionnaire 'background variables'. Age was created as an ordinal variable with multiple categories including multiple age years. Due to this study focusing on only young adult respondents, only the categories 15-24 years old and 25-34 years old were included. The variable was recoded into a dummy variable with value 0 for 15-24 years old and value 1 for 25-34 years old. Gender was a variable with only two answer options 'male' and 'female'. The LISS panel added in February 2022 the third option 'other', however, to match the other datasets, the questionnaire from 2021 was used. This questionnaire did not contain the option 'other' yet. This made it a binary construct. It was recoded into a dummy variable with value 0 for male and value 1 for female respondents. Education was measured with the ordinal variable 'level of education in CBS (Statistics Netherlands) categories'. This included all Dutch educational levels from the lowest level 'primary school' to the highest level 'university'. The variable was recoded into a dummy variable with a distinction between lower education and higher education. Statistics Netherlands (2019) recognizes 3 different educational levels in the Dutch school system,

which are low, mediate and high education. The answer categories of this variable differentiate in the lower and mediate levels and thus do not match. Therefore, the low and mediate levels were combined into one category 'lower education', which incluedes all educational levels up to and including the category 'mbo *(intermediate vocational education, US: junior college)*'. 'Higher education' contained the options '*hbo (higher vocational education, US: college)*' and '*wo (university)*'. So, the variable was finally recoded into a dummy variable with value 0 for low education and value 1 for high education. It is important to mention that the terms 'low' and 'high' education can be perceived as stigmatizing. Therefore, it may be more appropriate to use the descriptors 'practical' and 'theoretical' education instead (de Vries, 2021). However, I chose to use the current official terminology, with the understanding there is no inherent value judgement associated with the choice of words.

Gender and education are both used as control variables and moderator variables. These were coded as dummy variables into an interaction variable, after excluding all the missing values.

#### Method

This study employs a simple linear regression and four multiple linear regressions analyses, to investigate the association between financial concerns and political trust and to make predictions about this association. I made use of IBM SPSS Statistics software version 29. First, Model 1 tested hypothesis 1 by measuring the independent variable financial concerns being a predictor for political trust. In Model 2, the control variables were added to investigate whether this main effect is influenced by these additional factors. Subsequently, in Model 3, hypothesis 2 is tested by adding the first moderator, which is educational level. In Model 4, hypothesis 3 is tested by adding the second moderator, which is being female. Both models include the control variables. Finally, in Model 5, the influences of both interactions in one model are investigated, measuring whether the effect between financial concerns and political trust is different for higher educated people or for women.

# Results

#### **Descriptive results**

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables included in the regression analyses. The final sample consisted of 796 respondents between the age of 15 and 34 years

old. Table 1 includes a breakdown by educational level and gender. The control variable '*age*' is measured in two groups, with 0=15-24 years old and 1=25-34 years old.

The distribution of the sample on educational level is approximately even, with 51% of respondents classified as lower educated (*N*=408) and 49% as higher educated respondents (*N*=388). The higher educated group reports significantly higher levels of political trust compared to the lower educated group. The mean difference in political trust between the two groups is -.772. Most of the higher educated respondents fall within the 15-24 years old group, whereas the lower educated respondents are more evenly distributed across the two age categories. Women represent the majority in both educational groups, which is around 60% of the sample.

Gender distribution within the sample includes 41% female respondents (N=327) and 59% male respondents (N=469). When comparing them, it is noticeable they both experience similar levels of political trust and financial concerns. Male respondents tend to have marginally lower educational attainment, though the difference is minimal.

To investigate whether there is a difference in means between the comparison groups, a *t-test* was conducted. Results reveal a significant difference in means between lower and higher educated people on political trust, indicating that higher educated people significantly experience greater political trust than lower educated people. Additionally, a significant difference in political trust was observed between male and female respondents, with males reporting slightly higher levels than females.

To answer the descriptive question "*How much do young adults in the Netherlands worry about their financial future?*" the variable '*financial concerns*' was analyzed. The total sample mean score was 2.204 on a scale of 1 to 4, approximating the value 2, which corresponds to the answer category '*somewhat*'. The *t-test* results revealed a significant difference in means, indicating that the groups differ significantly in financial concerns. Lower educated people slightly experience greater financial concerns than higher educated people. The results did not reveal a significant difference in means between genders, suggesting that male and female respondents have similar levels of financial concerns.

 Table 1. Descriptive statistics.

		Total	Lower	Higher	Difference	Male (0)	Female	Difference
		(N=796)	educated	educated (1)		(N=327)	(1)	
			(0)	(N=388)			(N=469)	
			(N=408)					
Political	0-10	5.802	5.426	6.198	772***	5.885	5.683	203*
trust		1.937	2.081	1.686	(.134)	1.831	2.077	(.143)
Financial	1-4	2.024	2.175	1.866	.309*	2.040	2.002	038
concerns		.742	.757	.693	(.051)	.725	.766	(.054)
Age	0-1	.3618	.571	.142	.429***	.3774	.3394	038*
					(.030)			(035)
Gender	0-1	.589	.603	.575	.028			
					(.035)			
Higher	0-1	.487				.4755	.5046	.029
educated								(.036)

*Note.* Age 0 = 15-24 year, age 1 = 25-34 year. Standard deviations are indicated in italics. Standard errors are between parentheses. \*p<.05; \*\*\*p<.001 (two-tailed independent *t*-test).

## **Regression analyses**

The results of the regression analyses are presented in Table 2, existing out of 5 models.

In Model 1, the results of the bivariate regression analysis are shown with financial concerns are a predictor for political trust. It significantly presents that people who experience financials concerns decrease 0.527 points on their political trust. Model 1 explains 4% of variance in political trust.

To improve the first model, I added control variables to Model 2 to test if they influence the relationship between financial concerns and political trust. The control variables *'high education'* and *'age'* appear to have a significant effect on political trust. Political trust still decreases with 0.461 points, with a significance level <.001, indicating that financial concerns negatively influence political trust. This confirms the first hypothesis. Including the control variables hardly changes the results compared to the first model and increases the variance to 9%.

In Model 3 and Model 4, I tested whether the relationship between financial concerns and political trust differs for educational level and gender separately. Model 3 explains the influence of educational level. The interaction term of being high educated is negative (B=-.344), however there is no significance. This means that the association between financial concerns and political trust is not significantly affected by being high educated. Model 4 explains the influence of gender. Contrary to the expectations of the third hypothesis, the influence of being woman is positive (B=.341). Additionally, no significance is found for this interaction term, meaning that the association between financial concerns and political trust is not significantly affected by being high educated

Model 5 contains all control variables with both the interaction terms of educational level and gender. The main association between financial concerns and political trust is significant negative, the effect decreases with 0.499 points. As both interaction terms are for higher educated people and for women, the main association in this model represents respondents who are lower educated and male. The interaction term of being high educated negatively influences the main association with a decrease of 0.339 points. This is the result for higher educated male respondents. The interaction term of being female, which explains the results for lower educated females, positively influences the main association with an increase of 0.336 points. Keep in mind, however, that both the interaction terms are not significant. This model explains 10% of the variance in political trust, which is rather high.

Due to these results, the second and the third hypothesis, that the association being financial concerns and political trust will decrease when being high educated or being female, are not supported.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Financial	527***	461***	308*	652***	499***
concerns	(.091)	(.091)	(.121)	(.135)	(.158)
High education		.915***	1.603***	.911***	-1.590***
		(.149)	(.393)	(.149)	(.392)
Female		.222	.224	465	454
		(.133)	(.133)	(.383)	(.383)
Age		.650***	.649***	.638***	.638***
		(.153)	(.153)	(.153)	(.152)
Financial			344		339
concerns * high			(.182)		(.181)
education					
Financial				.341	.336
concerns *				(.178)	(.178)
female					
Constant	6.869***	5.923***	5.591***	6.311***	5.978***
R2	.041	.091	.095	.095	.099

**Table 2.** Regression analyses for variables predicting political trust including interaction variables (N=796).

*Note*. Standard errors are between parentheses. \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001.

# **Conclusion and discussion**

In this study, the relationship between financial concerns and political trust of young adults in the Netherlands is examined, with a focus on whether this is influenced by being high educated or being female. Although previous research has primarily addressed this among lower educated people, this study expects this relationship to be negative for higher educated people. It also focuses on gender and expects a negative relation for female respondents based on women having greater misperceptions, which may influence their political trust. The following research question will be answered: *"To what extent do financial concerns explain political trust and to what extent is this influenced by being high educated or being woman?"*. Representative data from the Netherlands, collected by the LISS Panel, is used to answer this question and to test the hypotheses. Results indicate a significant negative association between financial concerns and political trust for young adults. Additionally, results indicate no significant differences between financial concerns and political trust for higher educated or female respondents.

Based on these findings, I conclude that financial concerns negatively affect political trust among young adults, corresponding with previous research. It aligns with the expectations based on the institutional performance theory and the socio-psychological theory. The institutional performance theory describes that political trust is shaped by the influence of institutional performance, transparency, accountability and responsiveness (Chevalier, 2019; Schoon & Cheng, 2011). Economic policy feedback during economic downturns, which exacerbates economic insecurity, strongly negatively influences political trust (Wroe, 2015). The socio-psychological approach also supports this mechanism. Within this approach, the theory of 'social success and well-being' suggests that financial concerns can lead to decreased political trust. Particularly among those with lower socio-economic status, due to increased risk aversion and negative impacts on psychological well-being (Choi & Woo, 2016; Taft et al., 2013). To conclude, financial concerns negatively shape individuals' political trust, which confirms the first hypothesis.

Additionally, deriving from the theoretical framework, this study hypothesized that this association would be even more negative for higher educated people or for women. Due to the absence of statistically significancy for both interaction terms, these hypotheses could not be confirmed. For higher educated people, a negative effect was found. This would implicate that the relationship between financial concerns and political trust will become more negative when being high educated. This can be contributed to the increasing wealth

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inequality among highly educated individuals. Delayed homeownership, increasing student loans and perceived economic insecurity enhance feelings of increasing unfair treatment and decrease political trust (Zhan et al., 2016; Cooper & Wang, 2014; Boelhouwer, 2019). These factors exacerbate dissatisfaction with democracy and institutional performance (Arundel & Doling, 2017; Schoon & Cheng, 2011). For women, a positive effect was found, which implicates that the negative association becomes more positive when being a woman. I expected this to be negative, due to women having more misperceptions than men (Arin et al., 2024), the historically underrepresentation of women in politics and based on the socialization theory (Burns et al., 2002; Bunting et al., 2021). However, previous research was already somewhat inconsistent on gender differences in political trust. A possible explanation of the founded significant positive influence can be that women tend to have higher political trust than men. This is explained by greater participation in societal activities and men struggle more to recover trust after betrayal (Schoon & Cheng, 2011; Umer, 2023).

Based on these findings, I conclude that financial concerns negatively shape young adults' political trust. This conclusion is concerning for society. Declining political trust threatens social cohesion and policy acceptance, potentially contributing to the rise of populist political parties (Norris, 2011; Heiss & Matthes, 2017). These trends are already evident and have been discussed in recent research (Burger & Eiselt, 2023). Policymakers should take note of these findings. Rising populism for example can push for homogeneity of the public, enhancing dictatorship without room for pluralism (Lucardie, 2011). Dissatisfaction of personal well-being and society drives populist voting, often accompanied by feelings of underrepresented by the ruling elite (Burger & Eiselt, 2023). The results for higher educated people and for women are insignificant, hence no statements can be made. Further research could delve deeper into the process of current economic insecurities and trends (e.g. the decreasing possibility of building wealth for young adults) and their voting behavior. Additionally, polarization and gender differences must be under the attention of policy makers to stimulate social cohesion and policy acceptance.

This study is not without limitations. First, the data I used was collected during the COVID-19 pandemic, which may have influenced the results. The same mechanism, as explained in the study of Arin et al. (2023), may have occurred. It states that external threat such as terrorist attacks increases misperceptions. These misperceptions can impact behaviors, attitudes and potentially influence social norms. Likewise, it is possible that the external threat posed by the COVID-19 pandemic may have influenced misperceptions, thereby affecting political trust. Second, the data is collected in one wave, and I did not make use of

longitudinal data. Using longitudinal data provides information on the relationship with regards to the influence of time, as it employs continuous or repeating measures (Caruana et al., 2015). It may have positive influence on the significancy of the results, which I strongly advice for future research. Third, the study is focused on young adults, I selected respondents between the age of 15 and 35 years old. The data was collected in a way that respondents could select their age in categories, which were 15-24 years old and 25-35 years old. The inclusion of respondents as young as 15 years old may have affected the results. They may not experience financial concerns yet and do not worry about their pension or about buying a home. The average age of home buyers in the Netherlands has increased to around 37 years old the last decade (Statistics Netherlands, 2017), suggesting that financial concerns may be more relevant for older individuals. Besides, chances are high they did not develop a political opinion yet, what may influence the results of their political trust.

Overall, this study contributes to existing literature about political trust. It was the first to investigate the association between financial concerns and political trust among young adults in the Netherlands. It supports the negative relationship between worrying about financial prospects and political trust. Policy makers should consider these findings in the process of policy developing, given the implications for social cohesion, policy acceptance and polarization. Future research should consider a narrower age range and longitudinal data collection with minimal external factors possible influencing political trust.

### **Policy recommendations**

Nationally, political trust can be stimulated through both centralized and decentralized policies. During my internship at Nautus, a consultancy company for municipalities, I focused on decentralized policy making. Therefore, for this study, I concentrate on recommendations municipalities can employ to increase equality of opportunities and stimulate political participation of young adults.

#### **Intergenerational poverty**

Political trust is negatively influenced by inequality of opportunities during early-life (Vrooman et al., 2023). Additionally, inequality of opportunities is strongly linked to intergenerational poverty, where poverty is passed down from generation to generation (Van Lanen et al., 2023). Youth living in insecure social and financial conditions are more likely to abstain from voting or to vote for extreme left or right-wing parties. They exhibit lower political trust and often feel neglected by the government. This cycle of social insecurity

within intergenerational poverty shapes individuals' political behaviors (Vrooman et al., 2023).

To address these challenges, I propose policy recommendations aimed at promoting equal opportunities. This encompasses broad-ranging municipal policies aimed at fostering equality across education, youth, health, employment, income, and housing (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, z.d.). Dutch municipalities collectively receive €85 million in state funding, known as 'Klijnsma gelden,' specifically allocated for policies to combat child poverty (Bureau Bartels, 2020). The primary goal is to promote inclusive participation, ensuring that parental income does not hinder children's societal engagement (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, z.d.). My policy recommendations focus on enhancing educational participation and deepening participation in democracy.

# **Recommendations in education**

In the policy evaluation on child poverty by Bureau Bartels (2020), successful strategies include in-kind provisions that enhance children's participation in activities like school, sports and culture. An example is the fashion voucher, which enables children to buy new clothing, something their families might not otherwise afford. Municipalities have observed increased outreach by offering such provision, however, they still struggle to reach the target group. They indicate that education plays a key role in this (Bureau Bartels, 2020). To bolster educational engagement, I propose two interventions that municipalities can implement: the school supplies card and funding for tutoring through special assistance.

The school supplies card aims to support families in purchasing school supplies. Some municipalities are already implementing this initiative. The card is a physical card, like a standard debit card, which allows young people to shop at several selected (local) stores. It is designed to only allow purchases of school supplies such as pens, gym clothes, notebooks, and a geometry set. This promotes the participation of young people in education.

#### The roadmap:

Who: Children and young people aged 3-18 years.

**Where:** Municipal policy, implemented in places with vulnerable neighborhoods where municipalities enforce this initiative.

**How:** Utilize budget from the Klijnsma funds for financing. Parents can apply for the school supplies card via an online application form provided by the municipality. Criteria should

include an income, potentially set up to 120% above the minimum income level, with schoolage children enrolled in elementary, secondary, or vocational education.

**Time period:** The cards are issued for a duration of 2 years, distributed 2 months prior to the start of the 2024/2025 school year.

**Steps:** First, a budget must be allocated, which may vary per municipality and age category of children. For instance,  $\notin$ 70 for children aged 3-10 and  $\notin$ 120 for children aged 11-18. Next, (local) stores must be selected to accept the budget. Options could include larger chains like HEMA or supporting local businesses through partnerships. Once the development phase is complete, the cards can be distributed.

The second intervention is funding extra tutoring through the special assistance fund. Special assistance is provided when individuals lack sufficient means to support themselves (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2024). Since it targets livelihood security, funding for extra tutoring does not fall under this category. Some municipalities provide partial reimbursements or subsidies for tutoring, but these often come with limitations. Expanding funding options from the special assistance fund for tutoring creates equality of opportunity among students and promotes participation in education.

The roadmap:

Who: Young people aged 12-18 years.

Where: Municipalities.

**How:** Adjust policies regarding the use of special assistance to include funding for tutoring. Consider legal possibilities.

**Time period:** Based on legal possibilities, this can be implemented in a time range of 6 months.

**Steps:** First, policies must be developed. Criteria must be created for who are eligible, this can vary between municipalities. Second, municipalities must reach out to families that make use of the special assistance fund and educate them on the importance of extra tutoring when children are having hard times in education. Third, children must be motivated for extra tutoring by inspiring them and showing them the advantages of educational development.

These interventions aim to address barriers to educational participation caused by financial constraints, thereby fostering equal opportunities for children and youth from economically disadvantaged backgrounds.

# The use of positive role models

It is crucial to foster political trust among young people. One policy approach to achieve this is to utilize positive role models. I focus on vulnerable neighborhoods, where the need for role models outside the family is most pressing. Community centers serve as gathering places for residents, including young adults, fostering mutual support and interaction. This provides municipalities an opportunity to reach young people through positive role models, introducing them to political information and participation. Additionally, efforts can be made to involve young people in democratic citizenship. Through interactive formats such as workshops or events, young people can be inspired to actively participate in politics. They will discover their potential for political engagement regardless of their socio-economic status.

#### The roadmap:

Who: Young people aged 12 to 25.

Where: Community centers in vulnerable neighborhoods.

**How:** Initiate contact with community centers to identify potential role models. It is important that these role models come from the same neighborhood or community, share common backgrounds and have achieved success in politics or other relevant societal arenas. The objective is for young people to relate to these individuals, envisioning possibilities and becoming inspired and motivated. Diversity and inclusivity are central to this approach. Social media or local events can be used to reach out to young people and spotlight role models. Furthermore, these platforms can facilitate interactions between them.

**Time period:** This initiative can be implemented over a period of 3 to 4 months, with ongoing development.

**First steps:** Develop a policy plan, engage with community centers and provide them with resources to involve role models and young people. Additionally, create a plan for events, workshops, and themed evenings.

This approach aims to empower young people in vulnerable communities by connecting them with inspirational figures who can guide them towards greater political engagement and civic participation.

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# **Appendix 1: syntax**

\* Encoding: UTF-8.

\* selectie leeftijd

SELECT IF (lftdcat >=2 AND lftdcat <=3). FREQUENCIES lftdcat.

\*indepent variabele

RENAME VARIABLES (wg21a029=huiskopen). FREQUENCIES huiskopen.

RENAME VARIABLES (wg21a031=pensioen). FREQUENCIES pensioen.

RENAME VARIABLES (wg21a032=inkomen). FREQUENCIES inkomen.

RENAME VARIABLES (wg21a033=rekeningen). FREQUENCIES rekeningen.

\* schaal independent

DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. RELIABILITY /VARIABLES=huiskopen pensioen inkomen rekeningen /SCALE('ALL VARIABLES') ALL /MODEL=ALPHA /SUMMARY=TOTAL.

COMPUTE toekomst = (huiskopen+pensioen+inkomen+rekeningen) /4. EXECUTE.

FREQUENCIES toekomst.

\* missings verwijderen independent

COMPUTE nomiss=nmiss(toekomst) =0. FILTER BY nomiss. FREQUENCIES nomiss. \* dependent variable

RENAME VARIABLES (cv21m013=regering). FREQUENCIES regering.

RENAME VARIABLES (cv21m014=parlement). FREQUENCIES parlement.

RENAME VARIABLES (cv21m017=politici). FREQUENCIES politici.

RENAME VARIABLES (cv21m018=partijen). FREQUENCIES partijen.

\* schaal dependent

DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. RELIABILITY /VARIABLES=regering parlement politici partijen /SCALE('ALL VARIABLES') ALL /MODEL=ALPHA /SUMMARY=TOTAL.

COMPUTE vertrouwen= (regering+parlement+politici+partijen) /4. EXECUTE.

FREQUENCIES vertrouwen.

\* missings verwijderen dependent

COMPUTE nomiss=nmiss(vertrouwen) =0. FILTER BY nomiss. FREQUENCIES nomiss.

\* controle variabelen

\* controle variabele age

RECODE lftdcat (2=1) (3=0) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO age. EXECUTE. FREQUENCIES age.

\* moderatievariabele geslacht

RECODE geslacht (1=0)(2=1) (ELSE=SYSMIS) INTO female. EXECUTE. FREQUENCIES female.

\* moderatievariabele education

RENAME VARIABLES (oplcat=education). FREQUENCIES education.

RECODE education(1=0)(2=0)(3=0)(4=0)(5=1)(6=1) INTO highedu. EXECUTE. FREQUENCIES highedu.

\*missings van alle verwijderen

COMPUTE nomiss=nmiss(toekomst vertrouwen age female education) =0. FILTER BY nomiss. FREQUENCIES nomiss.

DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES toekomst vertrouwen age female highedu.

\* t-test to compare means education

T-TEST GROUPS=highedu(0 1) /VARIABLES=toekomst vertrouwen age female /MISSING=ANALYSIS /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

\* t-test to compare means female

T-TEST GROUPS=female(0 1) /VARIABLES=toekomst vertrouwen age highedu /MISSING=ANALYSIS /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

\* interactieeducation maken

compute interaction1=toekomst\*highedu.

\* interaction geslacht maken

COMPUTE interaction2=toekomst\*female.

\* regressie + interactiemaken

\* model 1

DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. REGRESSION /MISSING LISTWISE /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA CHANGE COLLIN TOL /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) /NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT vertrouwen /METHOD=ENTER toekomst.

\* model 2

REGRESSION /MISSING LISTWISE /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA CHANGE COLLIN TOL /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) /NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT vertrouwen /METHOD=ENTER toekomst /METHOD= enter toekomst highedu female age.

\*Model 3

REGRESSION /MISSING LISTWISE /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA CHANGE COLLIN TOL /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) /NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT vertrouwen /METHOD=ENTER toekomst /METHOD= enter toekomst highedu female age /METHOD= ENTER toekomst highedu female age interaction1.

\* model 4

REGRESSION /MISSING LISTWISE /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA CHANGE COLLIN TOL /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) /NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT vertrouwen /METHOD=ENTER toekomst /METHOD= enter toekomst highedu female age /METHOD= ENTER toekomst highedu female age interaction2.

\*model 5

DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. REGRESSION /MISSING LISTWISE /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA CHANGE COLLIN TOL /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) /NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT vertrouwen /METHOD=ENTER toekomst /METHOD= enter toekomst highedu female age /METHOD= ENTER toekomst highedu female age interaction2 /METHOD= ENTER toekomst highedu female age interaction1 /METHOD= ENTER toekomst highedu female age interaction1