

# Words Speak Louder than Action

An examination of the reciprocal relationship between the development of the common EPC stance and the Dutch national position on the Arab-Israeli conflict between 1973 and 1980



*The Heads of State of the soon-to-be Nine Member States of the European Economic Community (EEC) at the Paris Summit of 19-21 October 1972, where they confirmed their wish to strengthen European political cooperation. The Dutch Prime Minister Barend W. Biesheuvel (sixth person on the left) is talking to his French counterpart Pompidou. Copyright: Commission Européenne, 1972.*



**Universiteit  
Utrecht**

**Words Speak Louder than Action**

An examination of the reciprocal relationship between the development of the common EPC stance and the Dutch national position on the Arab-Israeli conflict between 1973 and 1980

Master's Thesis

International Relations in Historical Perspective

Faculty of Humanities, Utrecht University

E.V. (Victorine) Bax

Student number: 3049906

Thesis supervisor: Dr. Lorena De Vita

Second Reader: Dr. Simeon Paravantes

Word count: 15367

Date: 16 June 2024

## **Abstract**

How could the Dutch unequivocally support Israel in 1973 while recognising the Palestinian right to self-determination and condemning Israeli settlements by endorsing the European Venice Declaration in 1980? The prevailing explanation in the literature points to European Political Cooperation (EPC), a framework established in 1970 wherein European states aimed to align their foreign policies. Scholars generally agree that during the 1970s, the Netherlands increasingly adhered to the common EPC position on the Middle Eastern conflict, becoming more aware of Palestinian suffering. However, an analysis of the relationship between the development of the Dutch national position and the EPC common stance is missing. This thesis aims to fill this gap by examining, within the framework of Europeanisation theory, how the evolving EPC stance influenced Dutch foreign policy (downloading), and how Dutch policy impacted the EPC's stance (uploading) between 1973 and 1980. It contributes to the academic debate on foreign policy Europeanisation, where comprehensive studies on the policies of smaller EC member states towards the Middle Eastern conflict, based on archival material, continue to be scarce.

Drawing on archival material, including previously unseen sources, this thesis connects three levels: the EPC common standpoint, the Dutch role in EPC negotiations, and the Dutch national stance. Contrary to the prevailing notion that Dutch policy passively aligned with the EPC norm, the analysis reveals a continuation of the Dutch commitment to protecting Israeli interests and avoiding European involvement in the US-led peace process. The Dutch actively opposed several proposals in EPC discussions but attempted to avoid public isolation from the Nine to protect their reputation in the Arab world. Persistent Dutch opposition within the EPC, supported by other members conscious of Israeli interests, led to declarations perceived as groundbreaking. However, closer examination reveals that seemingly groundbreaking aspects were formulated in a way that was unlikely to have practical implications, underscoring ongoing disagreements between member states.

**Keywords:** The Netherlands, European Political Cooperation (EPC), the Arab-Israeli conflict, Europeanisation, Multilateralism

*“When defining our positions we should indeed prioritise the protection of the Dutch image in the Arab world. (...) We should let others (in particular the FRG and UK) take the lead, as much as possible, and let them do the dirty work.”<sup>1</sup>*

- Dutch Ambassador at Large to the Director General of Political Affairs

---

<sup>1</sup> Nationaal Archief (NA), Den Haag, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief [periode 1975-1984], nummer toegang 2.05.330, inventarisnummer 24989, Memorandum van Amad aan DGPZ, onderwerp: euro-arabische dialoog, 8 oktober 1979; the original saying in Dutch was: ‘hen de kastanjes uit het vuur laten halen’, which has been translated to ‘Let them do the dirty work’.

# Table of Contents

Abstract	ii
Table of Contents	iv
List of Abbreviations	v
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
Historiography	3
Theoretical Framework	6
Methodology	9
<b>1. 1970-1973: Establishing the EPC</b>	
<b>Great Ambitions, Weak Results</b>	<b>11</b>
1.1 The EPC, the Netherlands and the Middle Eastern Conflict	11
1.2 The Workings of the EPC	13
1.3 The October War and the Brussels Declaration	14
1.4 Europeanisation of Dutch Foreign Policy	15
<b>2. 1973-1977: From Brussels to London</b>	
<b>Cooperation in Public, Resistance in Private</b>	<b>17</b>
2.1 Dutch Even-Handedness after the Oil Crisis	18
2.2 The Netherlands' and EPC's Position on the PLO	20
2.3 The Netherlands' and EPC's Position on Palestinian Legitimate Rights	24
2.4 The Netherlands' and EPC's Position on Criticising Israel	27
2.5 Europeanisation of Dutch Foreign Policy	29
<b>3. 1977-1980: From London to Venice</b>	
<b>From Leading the EPC's Opposition to Awaiting Others to Oppose</b>	<b>31</b>
3.1 1977: A Year of Change	33
3.2 The Netherlands' and EPC's Position on the PLO	35
3.3 The Netherlands' and EPC's Position on the Palestinian Right to Self- Determination and a Palestinian State	38
3.4 The Netherlands's and EPC's Position on Criticising Israel	41
3.5 Europeanisation of Dutch Foreign Policy	44
<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>51</b>
Primary sources	51
Secondary sources	53

# List of Abbreviations

**CFSP:** Common Foreign and Security Policy

**DAM:** Department of the Middle East and North Africa of the Dutch Foreign Ministry

**DGPZ :** Director General of Political Affairs (in Dutch : Directeur-Generaal Politieke Zaken)

**EAD:** Euro-Arab Dialogue

**EAI:** Archive of European Integration, University of Pittsburgh

**EC:** European Community

**EEC:** European Economic Community (used interchangeably with EC)

**EPC:** European Political Cooperation

**EU:** European Union

**FRG:** Federal Republic of Germany

**HAEC:** Historical Archives of the European Commission

**HAEU:** Historical Archives of the European Union

**NA:** Dutch National Archives

**PLO:** Palestinian Liberation Organisation

**UK:** United Kingdom

**UN:** United Nations

**UNGA:** United Nations General Assembly

**UNIFIL:** United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

**UNSC:** United Nations Security Council

**US:** United States of America

**The Six:** Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy and Germany

**The Nine:** Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, the UK, Denmark and Ireland (from 1973 onwards)

# Introduction

---

‘Our Middle East policy was embedded in European cooperation. In political discussions, increasing attention was given to the Middle East since the Israeli-Arab War of 1973. Many [European] declarations were the result, without doing much to resolve the conflict.’<sup>2</sup>

---

Christiaan van der Klaauw, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1977 and 1981, wrote these words in his memoir in 1995. He wrote this reflection during an era of hope, with high expectations of what the end of the Cold War could bring to the peace process in the Middle East.<sup>3</sup> Two years previous, in 1993, a groundbreaking agreement had been reached in Oslo, in which the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the State of Israel had mutually recognised one another and opened direct negotiations. There was a glimmer of hope that at last, a comprehensive solution could be found to the conflict.

While the European Union (EU) supported the Oslo Accords, it did not have a political role in the peace process, mirroring the European Economic Community’s (EEC) hesitance to actively participate in various peace initiatives to resolve the Middle Eastern conflict in the 1970s. Nonetheless, since the inception of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) framework in 1970, the EEC contributed to legitimising Palestinian rights and the PLO through published declarations and public statements.<sup>4</sup> From its outset, the EPC placed the Middle Eastern conflict high on the agenda, as one of the key motivations for its establishment had been the member states’ inability to address the 1967 Arab-Israeli War due to divergent national policies.<sup>5</sup> This inaction underscored the EEC’s political weakness during a major international crisis, which should be prevented in the future.<sup>6</sup>

The outbreak of another war between Israel and several Arab states in October 1973 marked a new era for the EPC members: they issued their first declaration on the Middle East, acknowledging the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and expressing their willingness to

---

<sup>2</sup> Christoph Albert van der Klaauw, *Een Diplomatenleven: Memoires*, (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1995), 260.

<sup>3</sup> Patrick Müller, *EU Foreign Policymaking and the Middle East Conflict: The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy*. 1st paperback edition. (London: Routledge, 2013), 58.

<sup>4</sup> Anders Persson, “Introduction: The Occupation at 50: EU-Israel/Palestine Relations since 1967.” *Middle East Critique* 27, no. 4 (n.d.): 317.

<sup>5</sup> Müller, *EU Foreign Policymaking and the Middle East Conflict*, 45.

<sup>6</sup> Müller, *EU Foreign Policymaking and the Middle East Conflict*, 45-46.

negotiate with Arab countries.<sup>7</sup> Following 1973, other declarations followed, the most significant being the 1980 Venice Declaration. Patrick Müller concluded that with the Venice Declaration, most disagreements between members had been resolved. They had shown their willingness to reorient their foreign policies toward the European Community's (EC) principles.<sup>8</sup> Michael E. Smith echoed this conclusion.<sup>9</sup>

Van der Klaauw, as stated in the citation above, was correct in asserting that these declarations did little to advance peace in the Middle East. Nonetheless, the deliberations that emerged between EPC members to advance a common standpoint did impact their national policies. Several authors argued that this was particularly the case for the Dutch.<sup>10</sup> After fully supporting Israel during the wars in 1967 and 1973, the Netherlands became increasingly sympathetic to Palestinian suffering between 1973 and 1980.<sup>11</sup> This conclusion is generally based on Dutch agreement with EPC declarations, particularly the Venice Declaration, which called for involving the PLO in peace negotiations, recognised Palestinian self-determination, and condemned Israeli settlements as illegal under international law.<sup>12</sup>

The claim that Dutch foreign policy was greatly impacted by the EPC raises several questions, especially considering the intergovernmental nature of the EPC which gave every member the right to veto. How did the Dutch position themselves within the EPC? What were the issues that caused debate? And does the signing of a European declaration reflect a change in national position? The predominant reliance on EPC declarations as the measure of national policy change, combined with the lack of research on how the Dutch influenced the common European position, has led to the following central research question:

*What was the relationship between the development of the common EPC standpoint and the Dutch national standpoint regarding the Middle Eastern conflict between 1973 and 1980?*

---

<sup>7</sup> Declaration of the Nine Foreign Ministers of 6 November 1973, in Brussels, on the Situation in the Middle East (6 November 1973), available online via cvce.eu: [https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/a08b36bc-6d29-475c-aadb-0f71c59dbc3e/publishable\\_en.pdf](https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/a08b36bc-6d29-475c-aadb-0f71c59dbc3e/publishable_en.pdf)

<sup>8</sup> Müller, *EU Foreign Policymaking and the Middle East Conflict*, 56.

<sup>9</sup> Michael E. Smith, "Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Cooperation," *European Journal of International Relations* 10, no. 1 (2004): 117. Smith wrote: 'Most of these disagreements had been resolved by the time of the Venice Declaration of 30 June 1980, one of EPC's key policy statements.'

<sup>10</sup> Smith, "Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Cooperation," 118; Ben Soetendorp, "The Netherlands," in *European Foreign Policy-Making and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, ed. David Allen and Alfred Pijpers, (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1984), 45.

<sup>11</sup> Smith, "Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Cooperation," 118.

<sup>12</sup> The Venice Declaration (13 June 1980), European Council, online available via EEAS: [https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/mepp/docs/venice\\_declaration\\_1980\\_en.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/mepp/docs/venice_declaration_1980_en.pdf)



The contemporary conflict between Israel and Hamas reemphasises the importance of finding a comprehensive solution to the Middle Eastern conflict. Simultaneously, it has highlighted the powerlessness of the EU to play a role because of diverging standpoints, reflecting the early 1970s.<sup>13</sup> This thesis provides insight into the historical underpinnings of the EU's efforts to speak with one voice on the Middle Eastern conflict, with a focus on the Netherlands, to gain a better understanding of the sensitivities that shape the diverging positions, and to put the contemporary critique on the EU's inaction in a historical perspective.

## **Historiography**

Although several authors have noted the significant influence of the EPC on the Netherlands' stance regarding the Middle Eastern conflict, there has been little exploration of *how* the EPC affected the Netherlands and vice versa, looking beyond published declarations. This thesis aims to fill this gap by exploring, based on archival sources, how the Netherlands shaped the common EPC standpoint and how this common standpoint affected Dutch policy.

While there has been limited literature on this exact topic, this thesis builds on a wide range of historiography. Firstly, there are works on the EPC. The majority of these examined the EPC as one entity, looking at its internal structure and external policies. Recent research has shifted towards examining member states' roles in the intergovernmental EPC, particularly the UK, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Works researching the EPC's Middle East policy during the 1970s generally focus on the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD), initiated in 1974 to improve relations between Europe and the Arab League. The second historiographic field examines Dutch foreign policy vis-à-vis the Middle Eastern conflict, in which the impact of the EPC on Dutch policy is a topic of debate. This thesis integrates both fields by delving into the reciprocal relationship between the Dutch and the EPC position.

### *The Historiography of the EPC*

Many contemporary works on European foreign policy describe the EPC as a historical predecessor to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), with the EPC in the 1970s marking an initial step towards this goal.<sup>14</sup> These works offer an overview of the EU's foreign

---

<sup>13</sup> Pierre Vimont, "Europe's Moment of Powerlessness in the Middle East," *Carnegie Europe*, 10 October 2023, last accessed 13 June 2024, online available:

<https://carnegieeurope.eu/europe/strategic-europe/2023/10/europes-moment-of-powerlessness-in-the-middle-east?lang=en&center=europe>

<sup>14</sup> For example, Stephen Keukeleire and Tom Delreux, *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, Third edition. (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022); and Federiga M. Bindi and Irina Angelescu, eds. *The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World*. 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012).

policy but provide superficial insight into the EPC. While limited, more detailed examinations of the EPC exist, written by several historians during the 1980s and 1990s.<sup>15</sup> However, these studies lack archival sources and rarely analyse the role of national policies within the EPC.

A significant shift in the historiography occurred with Daniel Möckli's archival-based study, which examined the EPC's formative years from 1969 to 1974. Möckli focused on the roles of the UK, France and the FRG within the EPC.<sup>16</sup> Building on Möckli's research, Maria Găinar explored the EPC's inner workings and external policies between 1973 and 1980, using mainly French primary sources.<sup>17</sup> Despite these valuable contributions, the literature on smaller states within the EPC remains scarce.<sup>18</sup>

Thus, most literature examines the EPC as one entity or through the lens of its largest members. An exception to this is Ben Tonra, who researched whether the development of the EPC constrained or empowered Danish, Dutch and Irish foreign policy.<sup>19</sup> Tonra, publishing in 2001, was among the first to apply Europeanisation theory to EU foreign policy.<sup>20</sup> While Tonra theorised the concept, the term was already used in 1984 by Allen and Pijpers to describe how European cooperation influenced national foreign policies on the Middle Eastern conflict. They argued that Dutch policy was 'Europeanised' during the 1970s, but failed to explain what this meant and only looked at the EPC's impact on the Netherlands, not at the Dutch influence on the EPC position.<sup>21</sup>

Tonra proposed that Europeanisation involves a reciprocal relationship where national policies interact with and shape the evolving common European standpoint. This theory was later adopted by Patrick Müller, who focused on the Europeanisation of the UK, France and the FRG concerning the Middle Eastern conflict.<sup>22</sup> Both scholars, as political scientists, emphasised

---

<sup>15</sup> David Allen, Reinhardt Rummel and Wolfgang Wessels, *European Political Cooperation: Towards a Foreign Policy for Western Europe*, (Burlington: Elsevier Science, 1982); Alfred Pijpers, *European Political Cooperation in the 1980s: A Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe?* (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1988) and Simon J. Nuttall, *European Political Co-Operation*, (Oxford [England], New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1992).

<sup>16</sup> Daniel Möckli, *European Foreign Policy during the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity*, (London, New York: I.B. Tauris ; In the United States and Canada distributed by Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

<sup>17</sup> Maria Găinar, *Aux Origines de La Diplomatie Europeenne : Les Neuf et La Cooperation Politique Europeenne de 1973 à 1980*, (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2012).

<sup>18</sup> Laurien Crump and Angela Romano addressed this gap in the historiography by examining smaller European states during the Cold War on a wide array of themes, but they did not focus particularly on the EPC and the role of smaller states within the EPC. Source: Laurien Crump and Angela Romano, "Challenging the Superpower Straitjacket (1965-1975), in *Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe*, ed. Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2020).

<sup>19</sup> Ben Tonra, *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union*. (Repr ed. Aldershot etc.: Ashgate, 2002), 11.

<sup>20</sup> Tonra, *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy*, 11.

<sup>21</sup> Soetendorp, "The Netherlands," 45.

<sup>22</sup> Müller, *EU Foreign Policymaking and the Middle East Conflict*.

broad trends, resulting in only a brief examination of the 1970s, and did not extensively consult archival material.<sup>23</sup> Literature on the EAD offers a more focused examination of the EPC's policy on the Middle Eastern conflict during the 1970s, but treats the EPC as a singular entity in its interactions with Arab states, without focusing on different member states.<sup>24</sup>

This thesis builds on the works of Tonra and Müller by applying Europeanisation theory to Dutch foreign policy, examining how the Netherlands influenced the EPC standpoint and, in turn, how the EPC stance influenced the Dutch position on the Middle Eastern conflict. It extends beyond previous studies by focusing on the 1970s and a smaller EPC state, consulting archival sources.

### *The Historiography of Dutch Policy, EPC and the Middle Eastern Conflict*

Several studies have examined Dutch policy towards the Middle Eastern conflict, often highlighting the EPC as a driver of change, particularly after the 1973 Dutch oil crisis. Duco Hellema, Cees Wiebes, and Gerardus Tobias Witte investigated the Netherlands' role in the October War and the oil crisis.<sup>25</sup> In another work, Hellema provides a comprehensive overview of Dutch foreign policy, including an analysis of the 1970s.<sup>26</sup> Particularly noteworthy is the work of Peter Malcontent, who traced the development of the Dutch position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from 1917 to 2017, including a chapter on how the EPC influenced Dutch policy.<sup>27</sup> Malcontent's use of archival sources enhanced the research of Fred Grünfeld, who published a study in 1991 on how the Dutch impacted the EPC standpoint on the Middle Eastern conflict between 1973 and 1982.<sup>28</sup>

A central topic of debate within this field revolves around the EPC's impact on Dutch foreign policy. The prevailing idea is that during the 1970s, the Netherlands was profoundly influenced by the EPC's common position. Michael Smith even argued that no country's policy on the Middle Eastern conflict was as greatly impacted by the EPC as the Dutch, based on their alignment with EPC declarations.<sup>29</sup> Hellema supported this view, arguing that after the political

---

<sup>23</sup> Müller addresses the 1970s as a historical background but focuses on the period between 1991 and 2008. Tonra covers a timeframe between 1945 and 1996.

<sup>24</sup> Haifaa A. Jawad, *Euro-Arab Relations: A Study in Collective Diplomacy*, (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1992); and Saleh Al-Mani, *The Euro-Arab Dialogue: A Study in Associative Diplomacy*, (London: Pinter, 1983).

<sup>25</sup> Duco Hellema, Cees Wiebes, and Gerardus Tobias Witte, *The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis: Business as Usual*, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2004).

<sup>26</sup> Duco Hellema, *Nederland in de Wereld: Buitenlandse Politiek van Nederland*. 4e [geheel geactualiseerde], (Houten [etc.]: Spectrum, 2016).

<sup>27</sup> Peter A.M. Malcontent, *Een open zenuw: Nederland, Israël en Palestina*. (Amsterdam: Boom, 2018).

<sup>28</sup> Fred Grünfeld, "Nederland En Het Nabije Oosten: De Nederlandse Rol in de Internationale Politiek Ten Aanzien van Het Arabisch-Israëliësch Conflict 1973-1982," (Dissertation, s.n.], 1991).

<sup>29</sup> Smith, "Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Cooperation," 118.

isolation during the oil crisis of 1973, the Netherlands ‘tacitly accommodated itself to the positions adopted by the EPC’, adding that this happened particularly after 1977.<sup>30</sup>

While these authors emphasised the EPC’s impact on Dutch policy, another – yet less common – argument highlights the Dutch ability to shape the common standpoint. Tonra argued that ‘national foreign policy had a direct and identifiable influence upon the shape of collective policy’, contrasting with Hellema and Smith’s portrayal of the Netherlands as a passive follower.<sup>31</sup> Malcontent reconciled these perspectives by suggesting that Dutch willingness to oppose the common EPC stance depended on their ability to garner support among other members.<sup>32</sup> If the Netherlands could not secure support, it was compelled to conform to the EC norm.<sup>33</sup> In a broader context, Laurien Crump and Angela Romano argued that multilateralism could be used as an instrument of smaller powers ‘to stretch their room for manoeuvre in a Cold War order largely dominated by the superpowers’.<sup>34</sup> The EPC could thus allow the Dutch to pursue policies independently of the US. This thesis will contribute to this debate by demonstrating the involvement of the Dutch in EPC negotiations, thereby nuancing the claim that the Dutch quietly aligned their position on the Middle Eastern conflict with the EPC stance, and highlighting that the transatlantic alliance remained key.

## Theoretical Framework

Throughout this introduction, two different theories have been mentioned: intergovernmentalism and Europeanisation. Together, they will form the theoretical basis of this thesis. Intergovernmentalism argues that national interests converge within a multilateral framework, where states negotiate to achieve the best outcomes based on their national interests.<sup>35</sup> This results in compromises that are the lowest common denominator, meaning that the outcome is made on the least ambitious terms so that all parties can agree.<sup>36</sup> While this theory helps to understand the role of the Netherlands within the EPC, it does not fully explain

---

<sup>30</sup> Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*, 275. ; tacitely is a translation of ‘stilzwijgend’; on p.316 he argued that this particularly the case after 1977.

<sup>31</sup> Tonra, *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policies*, 303.

<sup>32</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 115.

<sup>33</sup> Peter Malcontent, Een open zenuw: Nederland & het Israël-Palestina conflict, *Clingendael Spectator*, 5 June 2018, online available: <https://spectator.clingendael.org/nl/publicatie/een-open-zenuw-nederland-het-israel-palestina-conflict>

<sup>34</sup> Crump and Romano, “Challenging the Superpower Straitjacket (1965-1975),” 13.

<sup>35</sup> Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan, *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics* (3 ed.), (Oxford University Press, 2009).

<sup>36</sup> Reuben Yik-Pern Wong and Christopher Hill, *National and European Foreign Policies: Towards Europeanization*, (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon [England]: Routledge, 2011), 5.

certain outcomes, such as the recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination, which appeared to go beyond the lowest common denominator.

That is why Europeanisation will be a crucial basis for this thesis. Europeanisation theory argues that European foreign policy cooperation influences national foreign policies and that states, over time, are willing to strengthen the European foreign policy cooperation framework.<sup>37</sup> Europeanisation, as put forward by Hill and Wong, includes two distinct but interrelated processes: downloading and uploading.<sup>38</sup> Downloading refers to a top-down process in which the member state adapts to the requirements of the EC framework.<sup>39</sup> It focuses on the constraints of European foreign policy cooperation for national action.<sup>40</sup> Uploading is a bottom-up process through which national foreign policies influence the common position.<sup>41</sup> This thesis will examine both processes to evaluate Malcontent’s claim that ‘the 1970s were characterised by a top-down process of Europeanisation during which the EC forced the Netherlands to adapt its policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.’<sup>42</sup>

A challenge with Europeanisation theory is that the impact of the EPC is often impossible to isolate. This thesis aims to contextualise Europeanisation arguments by including relevant international and domestic influences on Dutch policy.<sup>43</sup> A visualisation of this thesis’ theoretical framework is represented in Figure 1.



Figure 1: visualisation of Europeanisation theory

<sup>37</sup> Ben Tonra, ‘Europeanization,’ in *The SAGE Handbook of European Foreign Policy*, ed. Knud Eric Jørgensen, Åsne Kalland Aarstad, Edith Drieskens, Katie Verlin Laatikainen, and Ben Tonra, (London: SAGE Publications, 2015), 4-5.

<sup>38</sup> Wong and Hill, *National and European Foreign Policies*, 7.

Cross-loading is also mentioned by Wong and Hill as a third process. Cross-loading is the result of downloading and uploading and is related to European identity reconstruction. This is often seen as a long-term process, which happens over several decades of European cooperation. Because of the short timeframe under consideration, this dimension is excluded.

<sup>39</sup> Wong and Hill, *National and European Foreign Policies*, 7.

<sup>40</sup> Patrick Müller, “The Europeanization of France’s Foreign Policy towards the Middle East Conflict - from Leadership to EU-Accommodation,” *European Security* 22, no. 1 (2013): 115.

<sup>41</sup> Wong and Hill, *National and European Foreign Policies*, 7.

<sup>42</sup> Malcontent, “The Netherlands, the EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” 295.

<sup>43</sup> Müller, *EU Foreign Policymaking and the Middle East Conflict*, 33.

From this model, the following sub-questions arise:

1. How did Dutch foreign policy develop vis-à-vis the Middle Eastern conflict between 1973 and 1980?
2. How did the common EPC standpoint develop vis-à-vis the Middle Eastern conflict between 1973 and 1980?
3. How did the Dutch influence the EPC standpoint? (uploading)
4. How did the common EPC stance influence the Dutch standpoint? (downloading)

These sub-questions will be applied to three critical junctures, based on declarations that advanced the EPC stance. The first juncture (1970-1973) provides historical context, detailing the EPC's establishment, the Dutch position on the initiative and the role of the Middle Eastern conflict in the EPC. Although this period will not form a substantive part of this thesis's analysis, understanding the EPC's initial difficulties in articulating a common stance is crucial for appreciating its achievements in subsequent years. The second juncture (1973-1977) spans from the Brussels Declaration to the London Declaration and is characterised by Dutch opposition to the common EPC stance in negotiations with the Nine, despite cooperation with the EPC in public. The third juncture (1977-1980) covers the period between the London and Venice Declarations when the Dutch aimed to improve their reputation in the Arab world by occasionally adopting a less confrontational role in the EPC. These periods, each prelude a revised European stance regarding the Middle Eastern conflict will structure the chapters of this thesis.

### *Agency and actors*

This thesis examines the EPC's functionality in converging national standpoints, rather than its effectiveness in fostering peace in the Middle East.<sup>44</sup> While this choice is deliberate, it does provide a Eurocentric view. Nonetheless, this thesis will try to remain conscious of the agency of Middle Eastern actors, particularly by giving attention to how the Arab League members influenced the EPC's common standpoint, mainly through the EAD.<sup>45</sup>

---

<sup>44</sup> Christopher J. Bickerton, *European Union Foreign Policy: From Effectiveness to Functionality*, (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 2.

<sup>45</sup> The countries that founded the Arab League would also be the most active in challenging EPC members to advance their stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict. These countries were Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan and Yemen. Other Arab League members in the period under examination were Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti (from 1977), Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania (from 1973), Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Somalia (from 1974), Southern Yemen, Sudan, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates. The PLO was admitted in 1976. Source: League of Arab States (19 September 2006), United Nations Department for General Assembly and Conference Management, online available: <https://unterm.un.org/unterm2/en/view/38727503-9e12-41bd-9e0b-ccb02590ec3c>

This thesis will examine individuals from the Netherlands who actively promoted or protected Dutch national foreign policy during discussions within the EPC and in bilateral conversations with representatives from Israel and the Arab world. Attention will be given to the Dutch Director General of Political Affairs (DGPZ) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who represented the Netherlands in the *Comité Politique*, a body comprising representatives from each EPC state. Furthermore, the thesis will delve into the contributions of the Dutch Ministers of Foreign Affairs between 1973 and 1980, who actively engaged in EPC meetings at the Council of Ministers level. These were Max van der Stoep (1973-1977) and Chris van der Klaauw (1977-1980).

Moreover, this study will examine actors within the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from the Department of the Middle East and North Africa (DAM), as well as Dutch diplomats and ambassadors in the Middle East. These individuals played an important role in articulating Dutch foreign policy. Within the EPC framework, representatives from the other eight members will be examined, particularly the spokespersons of the common EPC standpoint.

## **Methodology**

### *Archival Sources*

This thesis will examine primary sources from different archives. To understand changes in Dutch policy and the Dutch position in EPC deliberations, sources from the Dutch National Archives (NA) will be examined. Additionally, the Historical Archives of the European Commission (HAEC) will be consulted to gain insight into the Dutch role in the EPC, especially regarding the EAD, as the Commission oversaw its economic aspects. Notably, files from BAC 113/1989 and BAC 210/1991 are declassified for this thesis, providing previously unseen information on the EAD and the EPC. Although detailed notes on pre-1986 EPC meetings are scattered across European archives, the NA and HAEC offer sufficient insight into Dutch contributions to EPC negotiations.<sup>46</sup>

Additional sources include the Bulletin of the EEC and EPC Declarations, available via the University of Pittsburgh's digital archives of European Integration (EAI) or CVCE. Some Israeli sources, translated by Sharon Pardo and Joel Peters, will be consulted.<sup>47</sup> Accounts from

---

<sup>46</sup> The EPC was fully institutionalised in 1986, which is why the archives of the Council of the EU only contain notes from after that year. This slightly complicates the reconstruction of discussions during earlier EPC meetings. However, combining sources from national and European archives provides important information on these negotiations. For example, Maria Gainar included EPC negotiations between member states in her book, mainly based on information from the French national archives.

<sup>47</sup> Sharon Pardo and Joel Peters, *Israel and the European Union: A Documentary History*, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2012).

*Diplomatieke Getuigenissen* will offer personal insights from those involved in EPC negotiations. Given the limited literature, newspapers from the Delpher database will help reconstruct events and examine domestic perceptions of changes in the Dutch position.

### *Measuring change*

To examine the downloading dimension, references made by Dutch officials regarding the EPC's influence on Dutch policy will be traced in archival sources. This impact of the EPC on Dutch policy will be categorised into three levels, based on the author's examination of archival material:

1. **Internalisation** of the EPC standpoint. Dutch officials refer to the EPC standpoint as being their standpoint.
2. **Partial integration**. Dutch officials incorporate certain elements of the EPC standpoint or other EPC members' policies to prevent isolation.
3. **No impact**. Dutch policy remains unaffected by the EPC standpoint, and the national standpoint dominates.

To investigate the uploading dimension, meaning the Netherlands' contribution to EPC deliberations, this thesis adopts three categories, inspired by Patrick Müller, that reflected the Dutch role in EPC negotiations: leading the opposition, waiting for others to oppose, or adopting a neutral stance.<sup>48</sup>

To examine changes in Dutch and EPC policy, archival materials and EPC declarations highlight three key topics of debate: recognition of or contacts with the PLO, acknowledgement of Palestinian political rights and the right to self-determination, and critique of Israel and its settlements. These topics will be addressed in chapters two and three. Before delving into the analysis, it is essential to provide historical context to understand the EPC framework, European ambitions regarding the Middle Eastern conflict, and the Dutch position within the EPC.

---

<sup>48</sup> Müller, "The Europeanization of France's Foreign Policy towards the Middle East Conflict."

In his article, Müller distinguishes between four different roles that France adopted in response to the opportunities and constraints of European foreign policy cooperation towards the Middle East conflict: leadership (pro-active strategy), facilitation (cooperative style), fence-sitting (neutral positions), and resisting (opposing the EU standpoint). Since the Dutch generally opposed any EPC statements on the Middle Eastern conflict, cooperative categories have been excluded.



# 1. 1970-1973: Establishing the EPC

## Great Ambitions, Weak Results

In late 1973, Dutch Prime Minister Den Uyl announced: “The government has decided that (...) petrol will only be available on the coupon, which means that for the first time since the war, a younger generation will be introduced to distribution due to scarcity.”<sup>49</sup> The measure had to be taken because of the complete oil embargo that several Arab countries had imposed on the Netherlands to punish it for its strong support to Israel during the October War of 1973. Following individual national responses to the war, the ensuing economic crisis compelled the EPC Nine to consolidate their positions, leading to the Brussels Declaration in November 1973.<sup>50</sup> This declaration, together with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 242, shaped European policy until the London Declaration of 1977.

This chapter will provide a historical context for subsequent analysis by examining the workings of the EPC and the Dutch opposition to any EPC standpoint regarding the Middle Eastern conflict. Additionally, the initial inability to discuss the conflict contextualises the significance of the EPC declarations between 1973 and 1980. Furthermore, this chapter will nuance the prevailing idea that the signing of the Brussels Declaration was a watershed moment in Dutch Middle East policy.<sup>51</sup>

### I. The EPC, the Netherlands and the Middle Eastern Conflict

The Middle East played a crucial role in the decision of the EC to establish the EPC framework. While the idea of European foreign policy coordination had surfaced throughout the 1950s and 1960s, it had failed to materialise.<sup>52</sup> It was not until 1967 that the initiative gained momentum, driven by escalating tensions in the Middle East. The tensions between Israel, backed by the US, and several Arab states,<sup>53</sup> supported by the USSR, posed a significant threat to European security because of potential superpower confrontation, and to European economic interests because of their dependency on Middle Eastern oil. Despite these threats, the EC failed to

---

<sup>49</sup> Binnenhof NL, (30 January 2021), *Toespraak premier Den Uyl – Oliecrisis 1973* [Video], YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fNYgIUUtZs>

<sup>50</sup> In 1973, the Six member states were joined by the UK, Ireland and Denmark, making them the Nine. These three new members had already been involved in the EPC framework but became official members after their accession.

<sup>51</sup> Hellema, *Nederland in de Wereld*, 275; Alfred Pijpers, “The Netherlands: How to keep the Spirit of Fouchet in the bottle,” in *National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation*, ed. Christopher Hill, (London: Publ. for the Royal Institute of International Affairs by G. Allen & Unwin, 1983), 176-77.

<sup>52</sup> Christopher J. Hill and Karen E. Smith, *European Foreign Policy: Key Documents*, (London: Routledge in assoc. with the Secretariat of the European Parliament, 2000), 71.

<sup>53</sup> Jordan, Syria and Egypt

respond to the rising tensions.<sup>54</sup> In May 1967, European leaders recognised the necessity of discussing the Middle East but could not even agree on how to proceed with discussions.<sup>55</sup>

When the tensions in the Middle East escalated into the Six-Day War between Israel and several Arab states, every EC member responded differently.<sup>56</sup> These individual responses highlighted the political powerlessness of the EC even when European interests were at stake, which was one of the driving forces behind the establishment of the EPC.<sup>57</sup> In 1969, European heads of state agreed that their Foreign Ministers should discuss political unification.<sup>58</sup> On 27 October 1970, the EPC was established, with the Middle East at the top of its agenda.<sup>59</sup>

The six EPC members initially reaffirmed their existing agreement on the Middle East. In May 1971, they confirmed their commitment to UNSC Resolution 242, which would remain a cornerstone of European and Dutch policy.<sup>60</sup> Resolution 242 was passed after the Six-Day War in 1967 and urged the ‘withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied.’<sup>61</sup> The ambiguity in this phrasing lay in the absence of the word ‘the’ before ‘territories occupied’, which could mean that Israel had to withdraw from some, but not all territories occupied in 1967.<sup>62</sup> After reaffirming Resolution 242, the Six advanced their position in the Schumann paper.<sup>63</sup> This report resolved Resolution 242’s ambiguity by adding the word ‘the’.<sup>64</sup> Additionally, it included the issue of ‘Arab’ refugees but did not yet mention the Palestinians.<sup>65</sup>

The Schumann report represented the EPC’s first unified standpoint on the Middle Eastern conflict. However, it immediately sparked discussions about whether the report’s contents should be made public. The Dutch were in favour of keeping it secret, fearing that an independent European policy on the Middle East, diverging from American policy, could harm the transatlantic alliance and jeopardise their ties with Israel.<sup>66</sup> The Six eventually agreed that the report would only be handed to EPC ambassadors and UN representatives to guide their

---

<sup>54</sup> Möckli, *European Foreign Policy during the Cold War*, 24.

<sup>55</sup> Müller, *EU Foreign Policymaking and the Middle East Conflict*, 45.

<sup>56</sup> Müller, *EU Foreign Policymaking and the Middle East Conflict*, 45.

<sup>57</sup> Müller, *EU Foreign Policymaking and the Middle East Conflict*, 45-46.

<sup>58</sup> Communiqué from the Hague Summit (2 December 1969), published in Hill and Smith, *Key Documents*, 74.

<sup>59</sup> Müller, *Foreign Policymaking and the Middle East Conflict*, 46.

<sup>60</sup> Archive of European Integration (AEI), Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 6-1971, vol.4, online available via University of Pittsburgh: <https://aei.pitt.edu/58646/1/BUL149.pdf>

<sup>61</sup> United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Res 242 (22 November 1967), online available via UN Peacemaker: <https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SCRes242%281967%29.pdf>

<sup>62</sup> Omar M. Dajani, “Forty Years without Resolve: Tracing the Influence of Security Council Resolution 242 on the Middle East Peace Process,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 37, no. 1 (2007): 31.

<sup>63</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 83.

<sup>64</sup> Bichara Khader, “The European Union and the Palestinian Question (1957-2014): The Performance-Expectation Gap,” *Rivista Di Studi Politici Internazionali* 81, no. 3 (323) (2014): 338.

<sup>65</sup> Müller, *Foreign Policymaking and the Middle East Conflict*, 46.

<sup>66</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 84.

conversations on the Middle East.<sup>67</sup> Additionally, the Dutch negotiated that the report would remain an internal working document, preventing it from being presented as official EPC policy.<sup>68</sup> Thus, Dutch national preferences had been successfully uploaded into the EPC. However, shortly after the meeting, the secret report was leaked.<sup>69</sup> This breach of trust temporarily halted the Six's efforts of speaking with one voice on the Arab-Israeli conflict and reignited debate on whether the EPC should play *any* political role in the Middle East.<sup>70</sup>

The Dutch actively participated in this debate, arguing against European political involvement in the Middle Eastern conflict. Their main concern was that such integration could harm Europe-US relations, as the US opposed any European initiatives in the Middle East that might conflict with its interests, as well as relations between the Netherlands and Israel.<sup>71</sup> Additionally, the Dutch feared that the EPC would be used by the French as an influence multiplier to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the US.<sup>72</sup> Besides protecting the alliances with the US and Israel, the Netherlands had to take into account the domestic setting, in which the Parliament and public opinion were predominantly sympathetic towards Israel.<sup>73</sup> Fortunately, the intergovernmental EPC framework allowed the Dutch to pursue common policies while maintaining the possibility to opt-out.

## II. The Workings of the EPC

In 1970, the Six established the operational procedures of the EPC. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs would meet twice a year and the Minister having the chair in the Council would chair EPC meetings, which would be prepared by a committee composed of the Directors of Political Affairs. That committee would meet at least four times a year.<sup>74</sup> The Political Committee would be composed of senior officials from national foreign ministries and would prepare ministerial

---

<sup>67</sup> Möckli, *European Foreign Policy during the Cold War*, 74.

<sup>68</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 84; and NA 2.05.313, 25823, Codebericht van Min BZ Luns voor ambassade te Rome, 12 mei 1971, onderwerp: midden-oosten overleg à six.

<sup>69</sup> NRC Handelsblad, "Israël is in een grimmige stemming," Rotterdam, 28-05-1971. Consulted via Delpher on 19-03-2024, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=KBNRC01:000031428:mpeg21:p005>; and Möckli, *European Foreign Policy during the Cold War*, 75.

<sup>70</sup> Möckli, *European Foreign Policy during the Cold War*, 68.

<sup>71</sup> Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*, 223 and Tonra, *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy*, 162; NA 2.05.313, 14243, Overzicht EPS aug 1971-dec 1972, geschreven op 29 april 1974 (voorgelegd aan de posten van DGPZ).

<sup>72</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 83-84.

<sup>73</sup> Malcontent, "The Netherlands, the EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict."

<sup>74</sup> The Davignon Report (Luxembourg, 27 October 1970), p.3, available online via CVCE: [file:///C:/Users/Gebruiker/Downloads/publishable\\_en%20\(7\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/Gebruiker/Downloads/publishable_en%20(7).pdf)

meetings, as well as set up working groups on important topics.<sup>75</sup> Once established, the EPC quickly institutionalised. The Nine decided in June 1973 that Political Committee meetings would occur as frequently as needed, and a group of Correspondents would monitor implementation.<sup>76</sup> Additionally, working groups, including one on the Middle East, were incorporated.<sup>77</sup> (see Figure 2) The framework further expanded in subsequent years, notably with the establishment of the European Council in 1974 and additional working groups, including one on the EAD.<sup>78</sup>




Figure 2: The decision-making system in the EPC anno 1973, source: Gainar, *Aux Origines de la diplomatie Européenne*, 91. (one of the four working groups was on the Middle East).<sup>79</sup> The framework remained similar in the following years.

Despite the EPC's institutionalisation in 1973, the members had not yet fully embraced the framework, as was reflected in their divergent responses to the October War. This conflict served as a wake-up call, reemphasising the need for a unified European policy by revealing the EC's vulnerability to Arab anger, particularly for the Dutch.

### III. The October War and the Brussels Declaration

On 6 October 1973, Egyptian and Syrian forces launched attacks on Israeli forces to regain territories occupied by Israel in 1967.<sup>80</sup> The Dutch government condemned Syria and Egypt for breaking the truce and fully supported Israel, even facilitating US arms shipments to the country.<sup>81</sup> On 13 October, Dutch Foreign Minister Van der Stoep vetoed an EPC proposal to

<sup>75</sup> Allen, Rummel, Wessels, and Duchêne, *European Political Cooperation*, 24; The Commission was 'invited to make known its views' if EPC issues affected EC activities and the European Parliament would be consulted biannually. Source: The Luxemburg Report (27 October 1970), published in Hill and Smith, *Key Documents*, 78.

<sup>76</sup> AEI, Bulletin of the European Communities, No 9-1973, vol.6, p.14-21, online available via the University of Pittsburgh: <http://aei.pitt.edu/56420/1/BUL099.pdf>

<sup>77</sup> AEI, Bulletin of the European Communities, No 9-1973, vol.6, p.14-21, online available via the University of Pittsburgh: <http://aei.pitt.edu/56420/1/BUL099.pdf>

<sup>78</sup> Gainar, *Aux Origines de la Diplomatie Européenne*, 337.

<sup>79</sup> The other working groups were the CSCE political under committee, the CSCE ad-hoc committee and the Mediterranean working group.

<sup>80</sup> Khader, "The European Union and the Palestinian Question (1957-2014)," 338.

<sup>81</sup> Tonra, *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy*, 201.

send France and the UK to the UNSC on behalf of the Nine, fearing their stance would be too pro-Arab.<sup>82</sup> In response, Arab OPEC countries imposed a full embargo on the Netherlands.

On 6 November 1973, three weeks after the oil embargo was imposed, EPC states met. As a result, the Nine published their first declaration on the Middle East.<sup>83</sup> This Brussels Declaration urged Israel to end its territorial occupation since 1967 and mentioned the EC's ambition to negotiate with Arab countries, laying the groundwork for the EAD.<sup>84</sup> Additionally, the Nine for the first time acknowledged the legitimate rights of the Palestinians in the pursuit of a fair and enduring peace.<sup>85</sup> The Netherlands had never previously agreed to a document referencing Palestinian rights. The oil embargo temporarily softened the Dutch opposition to any European statement on the Middle Eastern conflict. However, this oppositional stance remained ingrained in Dutch mentality regarding the EPC.

#### **IV. Europeanisation of Dutch Foreign Policy**

This chapter has elaborated on the EPC's intergovernmental framework, the Dutch prioritisation of the transatlantic alliance, and the importance of the Brussels Declaration and Resolution 242 for EPC and Dutch foreign policy from 1973 onwards. Furthermore, it has emphasised the difficulties of EPC members in establishing a common standpoint on the Middle Eastern conflict, highlighting the breakthrough of the Brussels Declaration. Nonetheless, the following chapters will show that, while the EPC became a more significant influence on Dutch foreign policy compared to before 1973, Dutch policy also showed many continuities, nuancing the claim that the Brussels Declaration was a watershed moment in Dutch policy regarding the Middle Eastern conflict.<sup>86</sup>

Applying the methodological framework illuminates the starting point for the upcoming analysis of Europeanisation post-1973. Between 1970 and 1973, the impact of the EPC on Dutch national policy, the downloading dimension, was weak. In the Schumann Declaration, the Six agreed on elements of a unified stance, but when the document leaked, the Dutch distanced themselves from it. During the October War of 1973, the Dutch did not coordinate

---

<sup>82</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 87.

<sup>83</sup> NRC Handelsblad, "EG eist terugkeer op positie 22 oktober," Rotterdam, 06-11-1973. Consulted via Delpher on 19-03-2024, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=KBNRC01:000031660:mpeg21:p001>

<sup>84</sup> Alan R. Taylor, "The Euro-Arab Dialogue: Quest for an Interregional Partnership." *Middle East Journal* 32, no. 4 (1978): 431.

<sup>85</sup> Declaration of the Nine Foreign Ministers of 6 November 1973, in Brussels, on the Situation in the Middle East (6 November 1973), available online via cvce.eu: [https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/a08b36bc-6d29-475c-aadb-0f71c59dbc3e/publishable\\_en.pdf](https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/a08b36bc-6d29-475c-aadb-0f71c59dbc3e/publishable_en.pdf)

<sup>86</sup> Hellema, *Nederland in de Wereld*, 275; Pijpers, "The Netherlands: How to keep the Spirit of Fouchet in the bottle," 176-77.

their reaction with the other EPC members. The Dutch agreement with the Brussels Declaration in November was driven more by economic concerns than by the EPC's impact on their policy. Concerning the uploading dimension, the Dutch opposed any EPC stance on the Middle East. However, once the Brussels Declaration was signed, the Dutch had no choice but to endorse it to protect their reputation in the Arab world. This will be explained in the following chapter.

## 2. 1973-1977: From Brussels to London Cooperation in Public, Resistance in Private

Between 1970 and 1973, the Netherlands tried to avoid antagonising the US by opposing the development of an EPC stance on the Middle Eastern conflict. However, once the EPC's position was formalised in the Brussels Declaration, the Dutch had no choice but to participate, as an isolated position within the EPC would negatively impact their reputation in the Arab world. On 13 April 1976, the director of the Middle East Department of the Dutch Foreign Ministry wrote to his colleagues about the Dutch position on the Middle Eastern conflict: 'For the Netherlands, it is important to avoid isolation within the Nine, as well as the appearance of it to the outside world.'<sup>87</sup> This would define the Dutch alignment with the EPC position between 1973 and 1977 in public.

While the Dutch aimed to improve their reputation by aligning themselves with the Nine in public, behind closed doors, they opposed the increasingly sympathetic positions of other members towards Arab countries. This delicate balancing act required the Dutch to avoid being labelled as 'unfriendly' by the Arab states, risking another embargo, while refraining from appearing supportive of Arab countries advocating for a Palestinian state and PLO recognition. Such a stance could harm Dutch relations with Israel and the US, which remained highly prioritised, and invite criticism from the Dutch Parliament.<sup>88</sup>

This chapter will examine how the EPC standpoint developed vis-à-vis the Middle Eastern conflict in relation to the Dutch standpoint between 1973 and 1977. In the literature, the predominant view is that the Netherlands complied with EPC positions. Duco Hellema wrote that after 1973 the Netherlands *tacitly* agreed with the EPC standpoint and distanced itself from Israel.<sup>89</sup> Alfred Pijpers argued that 'more visible than the Dutch contribution to the EPC is, conversely, the influence of EPC on the evolution of Dutch foreign policy in (...) the Middle East.'<sup>90</sup> This chapter will highlight that while the Dutch publicly agreed with EPC statements, they actively negotiated behind the scenes to ensure that the common EPC stance remained conscious of Israeli interests and would not impact US peace efforts, emphasising the uploading dimension.

---

<sup>87</sup> NA 2.05.330, 12338, Van DAM (redacteur: Heijnen), aan: de deelnemers aan de ambassadeursconferentie, 13 april 1976, onderwerp: verslag Ambassadeursconferentie Istanbul.

<sup>88</sup> On the pro-Israeli Dutch Parliament: Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 89.

<sup>89</sup> Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*, 275.

<sup>90</sup> Pijpers, "The Netherlands: How to keep the Spirit of Fouchet in the bottle," 176

This chapter will analyse three topics that, based on archival sources, sparked debate in the EPC: establishing contacts with the PLO, recognising the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, and criticising Israel's role in the conflict. These topics were reflected in the London Declaration from June 1977. Then, the Nine agreed on the territorial rights of the Palestinians to a homeland, on the representation of the Palestinian people in peace negotiations (hinting at the PLO) and it precluded a more critical European stance vis-à-vis Israel.<sup>91</sup> This chapter will emphasise that the EPC's impact varied per topic. While the EPC would be decisive for the Netherlands to establish contacts with the PLO, the Dutch followed the US when it came to Palestinian rights, particularly a homeland.

To examine these indicators, the focus will be on two arenas where the EPC sought to present a unified stance: the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the EAD. The UNGA is significant because it was a political forum where votes were publicly visible. Coordinated EPC voting led to surprising decisions by the Netherlands to avoid isolation. The EAD is interesting because the Arab states constantly challenged the Nine to reconsider their common stance. While the Europeans agreed to keep the EAD economically oriented, the Arabs tried to politicise it.

This chapter will first examine the Dutch national standpoint on the Middle Eastern conflict after the oil crisis. Then, each topic of debate will be examined by looking at three levels: the EPC common standpoint, the influence of the Dutch on that common standpoint (uploading dimension) and the impact that the EPC position had on Dutch national foreign policy (downloading dimension). While the impact of the EPC on Dutch policy regarding the PLO has been mentioned by Malcontent,<sup>92</sup> the EPC's potential impact on Dutch recognition of Palestinian rights and critique of Israel has been largely overlooked.

## **I. Dutch Even-Handedness after the Oil Crisis**

When Van der Stoel was called to the Dutch Parliament to justify his support for the EPC's Brussels Declaration, he confirmed, "I repeat that the Netherlands endorse and accept the declaration of 6th November."<sup>93</sup> Van der Stoel hoped that by signing the Brussels Declaration, Arab countries would lift their embargoes.<sup>94</sup> When that expectation was not realised, Van der

---

<sup>91</sup> European Council meeting, "London Declaration", 30 June 1977, available on: [consilium.europa.eu https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20785/london\\_june\\_1977\\_eng.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20785/london_june_1977_eng.pdf);

While not explicitly in the London Declaration, the EPC did condemn Israeli settlements publicly earlier in 1977.

<sup>92</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 103-104.

<sup>93</sup> NA, 2.05.313, 14513, Statement by the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs, 29 November 1973.

<sup>94</sup> Hellema, Wiebes, and Witte, *The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis*, 117.



Stoel expected that his European allies, in return for his cooperative attitude in the negotiations for the Brussels Declaration, would create a common policy to share the burden of the embargo.<sup>95</sup> He even refused financial aid from the US, to avoid the Netherlands, amidst a low point in Euro-US relations, being forced into a political choice between its European partners and the US.<sup>96</sup> However, European solidarity was far gone. The UK did not want to upset the Arab states by supporting the Dutch, and the French claimed the Dutch embargo was self-inflicted because of their pro-Israeli policy.<sup>97</sup> Garret Fitzgerald, Ireland's Foreign Minister, described the atmosphere in the EC at that time as "every man for himself."<sup>98</sup>

When it became apparent that the other EPC members were unwilling to help, Van der Stoel nuanced the Brussels Declaration's mention of the legitimate rights of Palestinians by arguing that these were only valid if they applied to a people connected to a demarcated territory, which was not the case for the Palestinians.<sup>99</sup> While the Brussels Declaration is often portrayed as a new direction of European policy in the Middle East,<sup>100</sup> for the Dutch, it was mainly a pragmatic move to persuade Arab states to lift the embargo. This interpretation was shared by Arab countries; as long as the Netherlands did not make an additional gesture, the embargo would endure.<sup>101</sup>

The embargo did establish a realisation among the Dutch that a similar Arab wrath in the future could have greater implications.<sup>102</sup> Thus, the Dutch dubbed their policy 'even-handed', meaning that any settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict had to take into account Israel's right to exist within recognised and secure borders as well as the rights of the Palestinians to fulfil their political aspirations.<sup>103</sup>

However, convincing the Arab states of the Dutch even-handedness proved challenging.<sup>104</sup> In a letter from February 1974, the Dutch ambassador in Beirut conveyed former Lebanese Prime Minister Saeb Salam's sentiment that the Netherlands was viewed as the 'black

---

<sup>95</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 90-91.

<sup>96</sup> NA 2.05.313, 25274, Codebericht aan Washington van Min BZ van der Stoel, 30 November 1973.

<sup>97</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 92.

<sup>98</sup> Yedua Lukacs, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Documentary Record 1967-1990* p 291-95, published in Rory Miller, "The PLO Factor in Euro-Israeli Relations, 1964-1992." *Israel Affairs* 10, no. 1-2 (2004): 131.

<sup>99</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 91.

<sup>100</sup> For example, Pardo and Peters, *Israel and the European Union: A Documentary History*, 76.; it is even called a 'watershed in EEC's Middle East policy' by Bichara Khader, "The European Union and the Palestinian Question (1957-2014)," 340.

<sup>101</sup> Joris Voorhoeve, *Peace, Profits and Principles: A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy*. [2nd print.]. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1985), 241.

<sup>102</sup> Soetendorp, "The Netherlands," 41.

<sup>103</sup> Soetendorp, "The Netherlands," 41.

<sup>104</sup> NA 2.05.330, 12338, Van DAM (redacteur: Heijnen), aan: de deelnemers aan de ambassadeursconferentie, 13 april 1976, onderwerp: verslag Ambassadeursconferentie Istanbul.

sheep' of the Arab world and needed to act to change this perception.<sup>105</sup> Consequently, one of the Netherlands' key objectives became the prevention of isolation within the Nine, as this would reinforce the Arab belief that the Dutch consistently opposed EPC stances favourable to Arab interests.<sup>106</sup> Additionally, the Netherlands sought to improve relations with the Arab world by endorsing the EAD in March 1974 under the condition that the embargo would be lifted.<sup>107</sup>

The Dutch preferred to establish the EAD after obtaining US approval.<sup>108</sup> However, since this seemed unlikely, they proposed to discuss only economic cooperation in the EAD, avoiding European interference with US peace efforts in the Middle East.<sup>109</sup> The other EPC members agreed. Nonetheless, when the EAD was established in July 1974, Washington responded outraged.<sup>110</sup> Nixon accused the EC of 'ganging up' on the US and, supported by Kissinger, criticised Europe for creating the EAD without consulting the US first.<sup>111</sup> A new low in Europe-US relations was reached.<sup>112</sup> This underscored the challenge of Dutch even-handedness, balancing between the EPC and the US, as well as between Israel and the Arab world. One of the most pressing issues on which it seemed impossible to maintain a neutral position concerned the PLO.

## II. The Netherlands' and EPC's Position on the PLO

### *The common EPC stance and Dutch uploading concerning the PLO in the UN*

In late 1974, the UNGA voted on two draft resolutions concerning the PLO.<sup>113</sup> In October, Resolution 3210, which named the PLO the representative of the Palestinian people, was accepted.<sup>114</sup> A month later, Resolution 3237 passed, granting the PLO observer status in the

---

<sup>105</sup> NA 2.05.313, 14515, Van Beiroet aan Min BZ, 5 februari 1974, onderwerp: Positie van Nederland in Arabische wereld.

<sup>106</sup> Grünfelt, *Nederland en het Nabije Oosten*, 173.

<sup>107</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 96.; NA 2.05.313, 25274, Codebericht van Min BZ van der Stoel aan ambassade in Parijs, 26 maart 1974.

<sup>108</sup> Historical Archives of the European Commission (HAEC), Brussels, BAC 113/1989, 25, Note de Karl Meyer à Monsieur Ortoli (président), 4 février 1974, object : discussions dans le cadre de la Coopération politique, le 1er février 1974, à Bonn, sur la suite du dialogue avec les pays arabes.

<sup>109</sup> NA 2.05.313, 14243, Documents concerning the EAD 14 and 15 December 1973; 6 and 7 February 1974.

<sup>110</sup> Rory Miller, "The Euro-Arab Dialogue and the Limits of European External Intervention in the Middle East, 1974-1977." *Middle Eastern Studies* 50, no. 6 (2014): 936.

<sup>111</sup> Miller, "The Euro-Arab Dialogue," 948.

<sup>112</sup> Pijpers, "The Netherlands: How to keep the Spirit of Fouchet in the bottle," 166.

<sup>113</sup> Anne Irfan, "Palestine at the UN: The PLO and UNRWA in the 1970s." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 49, no. 2 (2020): 33.; 105 countries voted in favour, 4 against and 20 countries abstained, including the Netherlands.

<sup>114</sup> UN General Assembly (UNGA), A/RES/3210(XXIX) (14 October 1974), Invitation to the Palestine Liberation Organization, available online via the United Nations Digital Library: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/189832?ln=en&v=pdf#files>

UNGA.<sup>115</sup> Van der Stoel was disappointed. Not only did he disagree with the formulation of the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinians, but he also thought it was too early to speak about the Palestinian people.<sup>116</sup> Most importantly, Van der Stoel believed that if the PLO would be accepted into the UN which was meant for states, it would implicitly mean recognition of the existence of a Palestinian state.<sup>117</sup>

Despite Van der Stoel's objections, preventing isolation within the Nine was crucial. At the UN, a Dutch vote against these resolutions would draw negative attention and anger Arab countries, particularly if the other eight abstained or voted in favour. While it seemed as if France and Italy would vote in favour of Resolution 3210, the other EPC members planned on abstaining. Van der Stoel instructed the Dutch ambassador to the UN to prevent the Netherlands from becoming isolated.<sup>118</sup> He wrote: 'The seven have urgently appealed to [the] French and Italians in this important matter to maintain unanimity of the Nine and let it prevail over national preference. [I] request you to work in the same spirit.'<sup>119</sup> Unfortunately for the Dutch, Italy and France were not convinced. They found support in Ireland for Resolution 3210, while the remaining member states chose to abstain.<sup>120</sup> To prevent isolation, the Dutch abstained as well.<sup>121</sup>

For Resolution 3237, the Netherlands found support amongst its European allies – minus France – and voted against granting the PLO an observer role in the UN.<sup>122</sup> Despite this vote, the Dutch abstention from Resolution 3210 enraged Israel, exemplifying the difficult balancing act the Dutch had to exercise between Israel and the Arab countries. Van der Stoel explained to the Israeli ambassador: 'As much as we regret the PLO's more accentuated role - we have to accept it as a fact of life.'<sup>123</sup>

The Dutch followed the EPC members in their voting behaviour in the UNGA to prevent isolation, showing a weak uploading dimension. Nonetheless, in EPC discussions, Van der Stoel protected the Dutch national position. In 1975, he proclaimed that on 'fundamental issues', the Netherlands would like to be able to maintain its national position rather than the

---

<sup>115</sup> UNGA, A/RES/3237(XXIX) (5 November 1974), Observer status for the Palestine Liberation Organization, available online via the United Nations Digital Library: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/189836?v=pdf#files>

<sup>116</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 98.

<sup>117</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 98.

<sup>118</sup> NA 2.05.273, 893, Coded message from Minister van der Stoel to New York PV, 10 October 1974.

<sup>119</sup> NA 2.05.273, 893, Coded message from Minister van der Stoel to New York PV, 10 October 1974.

<sup>120</sup> Allen, Rummel and Wessels, *European Political Cooperation*, 123.

<sup>121</sup> Allen, Rummel and Wessels, *European Political Cooperation*, 123.

<sup>122</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 99.

<sup>123</sup> NA 2.05.313, 11756, Memorandum from Minister van der Stoel on the visit of the Israeli ambassador, 29 October 1974.

EPC line.<sup>124</sup> This reflected the Dutch tactic to align in public while opposing further European integration in EPC meetings. This oppositional stance would become more pronounced within the EAD.

*The common EPC stance and Dutch uploading concerning the PLO in the EAD*

In October 1974, the Arab League acknowledged the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Consequently, they wished for PLO participation in EAD meetings.<sup>125</sup> This decision highlighted the divergent objectives of the European and Arab factions within the EAD: while the EPC emphasised economic cooperation, the Arab League aimed for a political dialogue to gain European support for a Palestinian homeland.<sup>126</sup>

The Nine were divided on the issue of PLO participation in the EAD. The main opposers were the UK, the FRG, Denmark, and the Netherlands.<sup>127</sup> They feared that allowing PLO participation would internationally be interpreted as supporting the PLO as an official entity.<sup>128</sup> The refusal of the Nine to allow PLO participation led to the suspension of the dialogue by the Arab League until mid-1975 when the Irish presidency introduced the Dublin formula.<sup>129</sup> The Foreign Ministers of the EC agreed that the General Commission, the EAD's highest representative body, would not meet based on country delegations but as European and Arab delegations.<sup>130</sup> This avoided recognising the PLO's participation, risking legitimising the PLO.

Nonetheless, the Nine could not prevent a politicisation of the EAD, sparked by the PLO issue. During the first meeting in May 1976, the Arab side appointed the PLO as its spokesperson to urge the Europeans to discuss the Arab-Israeli Conflict.<sup>131</sup> In a message to the Dutch ambassador in Luxembourg, Van der Stoel explained that cohesion among the Nine was maintained during the meeting by adhering to their pre-discussed 'balanced' opening statement. According to Van der Stoel, the Nine's position remained unaffected by the PLO's pressure, attributed to 'insistence from the Dutch and British sides.'<sup>132</sup>

---

<sup>124</sup> Het Parool, "Nederland blijft toch ook nationalistisch in Europa," Amsterdam, 07-03-1975, Consulted via Delpher on 23-04-2024, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ABCDDD:010839887:mpeg21:p004>; NA 2.05.330, 24964, Message on the Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Venice, 11 and 12 September 1975.

<sup>125</sup> Jawad, *Euro-Arab Relations*, 88-90.

<sup>126</sup> Jawad, *Euro-Arab Relations*, 91.

<sup>127</sup> Jawad, *Euro-Arab Relations*, 91-92.

<sup>128</sup> Miller, "The PLO Factor in Euro-Israeli Relations," 132.

<sup>129</sup> Tonra, *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy*, 181.

<sup>130</sup> Allen, Rummel and Wessels, *European Political Cooperation*, 75.

<sup>131</sup> Ahmad Sidqi Al-Dajani, "The PLO and the Euro-Arab Dialogue." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 9, no. 3 (1980): 89.

<sup>132</sup> NA 2.05.330, 24988, Coded message from Minister van der Stoel to Luxembourg, 25 May 1976.

In early 1977, during negotiations leading up to the London Declaration, the Nine again discussed the representation of the Palestinians. The French proposed to include the phrase ‘the representatives of the parties to the conflict, including the Palestinian people’. The Dutch were only willing to agree if this phrase was followed by ‘to be defined in consultation between all the interested parties.’<sup>133</sup> This condition implied that PLO participation would only be possible with Israeli agreement, a scenario considered unlikely, confirming the Dutch opposing role to any form of PLO recognition by the Nine. This exemplified how the Dutch uploaded their national stance into the EPC.

Despite their opposition, the Dutch could not prevent that during EAD meetings, PLO representatives and European diplomats came into contact, allowing several EPC members to establish diplomatic ties with the PLO.<sup>134</sup> Indirectly, the recurrent EAD meetings strengthened the status of the PLO in international diplomacy.<sup>135</sup>

*Downloading: the EPC’s influence on the Dutch position concerning the PLO*

While the Nine as a bloc did not recognise the PLO, several EPC members established bilateral secret contacts with the organisation. Already on 14 October 1975, the Dutch ambassador in Cairo informed Van der Stoel that all of his EPC colleagues ‘without exception maintain more or less regular informal contacts with PLO representatives.’<sup>136</sup> In 1976, several EPC countries opened information offices for the PLO.<sup>137</sup> Nonetheless, for the Netherlands, contacts with the PLO remained out of the question.<sup>138</sup>

Van der Stoel’s position remained firm when the ambassador in Tokyo requested permission in August 1975 to accept an invitation to a reception in honour of the PLO. The ambassador reasoned that since most EPC members would attend, the absence of the Netherlands would be noticed.<sup>139</sup> Despite the Dutch commitment to prevent isolation, attending a reception for the PLO was deemed a bridge too far. Van der Stoel’s answer was clear: ‘I prefer that you cancel the invitation with a plausible excuse. [I] request you to inform me about the

---

<sup>133</sup> HAEC BAC 327/1993, 5, 27.01.1977, projet de déclaration des Ministres sur le Moyen-Orient; and NA, 2.05.330, 13737, 27.01.77, from London coreu to all coreu, projet de déclaration des ministres sur le moyen orient.

<sup>134</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 103.

<sup>135</sup> Nuttall, *European Political Co-Operation*, 109.

<sup>136</sup> NA, 2.05.330, 13721, Coded Message from the Ambassador in Cairo to Min BZ, 14 October 1975.

<sup>137</sup> HAEC BAC 113/1989, 25, Discours prononcé par S.E.M. Abdel Aziz Sa’ad El Chamlan, Ambassadeur et Co-président arabe, Luxembourg le 18 mai 1976.

<sup>138</sup> NA 2.05.313, 14243, Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Dublin, 13 February 1975.

<sup>139</sup> NA 2.05.330, 13721, Coded Message from the embassy in Tokyo to Minister van der Stoel, 13 August 1975.

line followed by the other EEC countries.’<sup>140</sup> Van der Stoel took note of the actions of other European states but decided that national preference should prevail.

This would change from 1977 onwards. In secrecy from the Dutch Parliament, Van der Stoel allowed several diplomats to establish contacts with the PLO.<sup>141</sup> In early 1977, the ambassador in Cairo was the first to receive the ‘super-secret order’.<sup>142</sup> This decision was made after a Dutch ambassadors’ conference in 1976. The Director of the Middle East Department wrote that several ambassadors had agreed that ‘the predominant role of the PLO seems undeniable’ and that they wished to establish informal contact, similar to other Western countries. The director argued: ‘Care must be taken to ensure that any assets - such as recognition of the PLO - are played out while they still have their value, which would not be the case if the Netherlands, as the very last of the Nine, did end up being forced into recognition.’<sup>143</sup> This highlighted the impact of the EPC on the Dutch willingness to establish contacts with the PLO, showing a strong downloading dimension.

Before 1977, establishing contacts with the PLO was a red line in Dutch policy. However, their position eventually shifted to align with other European countries. Notably, the US did not engage with the PLO until 1983, suggesting that the Dutch prioritised the European alliance over the transatlantic alliance concerning the PLO.<sup>144</sup>

### **III. The Netherlands’ and EPC’s Position on Palestinian Legitimate Rights**

*The common EPC stance and Dutch uploading concerning Palestinian legitimate rights in the UN*

In November 1974, the UNGA voted on Resolution 3236 which reaffirmed the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, national independence, sovereignty and right to return.<sup>145</sup> The resolution’s controversial aspect was the absence of a mention of Israel’s right to exist.<sup>146</sup> Nonetheless, all Nine, including the Netherlands, abstained.

---

<sup>140</sup> NA 2.05.330, 13721, Coded Message from Minister van der Stoel to the embassy in Tokyo, 12 August 1975.

<sup>141</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 103.

<sup>142</sup> Huygens Instituut, Diplomatieke Getuigenissen, Interview met Dr Marcel Kurpershoek, 22-02-2023; Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 103.

<sup>143</sup> NA 2.05.330, 12338, Van DAM (redacteur: Heijnen), aan: de deelnemers aan de ambassadeursconferentie, 13 april 1976, onderwerp: verslag Ambassadeursconferentie Istanbul.

<sup>144</sup> Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “A Timeline of U.S. Policy Toward Palestine,” accessed 25 April 2024. <https://carnegieendowment.org/specialprojects/breakingtheisraelipalestinestatusquo/timeline>

<sup>145</sup> UNGA, A/RES/3236(XXIX) (5 November 1974), Question of Palestine, Available online via UN.org: <https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ARES3236XXIX.pdf>.

<sup>146</sup> Soetendorp, “The Netherlands,” 42.

This surprised the Dutch Parliament as well as Van der Stoel himself. He had instructed the Dutch Permanent Representative to the UN, Johan Kaufmann, to convince the other EPC members to vote against the Resolution.<sup>147</sup> When France decided last-minute to abstain, it sparked a chain reaction. Kaufmann – unable to reach Van der Stoel – abstained to prevent isolation.<sup>148</sup> The decision raised eyebrows in the Netherlands, mainly in the Parliament, where several members responded outraged.<sup>149</sup> In 1975, when multiple resolutions regarding Palestinian rights without acknowledging Israel’s right to exist were put to a vote, the Dutch opposed them. These times, their vote aligned with at least two other EPC members.<sup>150</sup> Thus, to avoid isolation, the Dutch aligned their votes with other EPC members, demonstrating a weak uploading dimension.

In addition to voting, the Nine utilised speeches at the UNGA to advance their standpoint. On 10 December 1975, the Italian representative speaking on behalf of the Nine emphasised the Palestinians’ right to express their *national identity*.<sup>151</sup> In 1976, the Dutch delegate speaking for the Nine added that this ‘could involve a *territorial basis*.’<sup>152</sup> Van der Stoel later recognised that a state was one of the possibilities.<sup>153</sup>

#### *The common EPC stance and Dutch uploading concerning Palestinian legitimate rights in the EAD*

Through the EAD, the Arab countries sought clarification on the practical implications of this ‘territorial basis’. However, the Nine refused to discuss it, preferring to keep the dialogue economically focused, but also because they could not agree on the implications of this territorial basis.<sup>154</sup> In 1974, only France and Italy were willing to recognise the Palestinian desire for a homeland.<sup>155</sup> Remarkably, the Netherlands did not oppose it because of its national standpoint. Already in April 1976, a Dutch official emphasised that ‘there is no doubt that the

---

<sup>147</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 99.

<sup>148</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 99.

<sup>149</sup> NRC Handelsblad, “Van der Stoel verdedigt stemgedrag in de VN,” Rotterdam, 28-11-1974. Consulted via Delpher on 17-04-2024, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=KBNRC01:000032907:mpeg21:p003>

<sup>150</sup> Regina Sharif, “The United Nations and Palestinian Rights, 1974-1979,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 9, no. 1 (1979): 24-26.

In one instance, the UK and FRG aligned with the Dutch. Belgium, Denmark, and Luxembourg joined these three countries in opposing the other two Draft Resolutions. Source: Soetendorp, “The Netherlands,” 42.

<sup>151</sup> Nuttall, *European Political Co-Operation*, 101.

<sup>152</sup> Voorhoeve, *Peace, Profits and Principles*, 246.

<sup>153</sup> Het Parool, “Van der Stoel licht EG-standpunt over Palestijnen toe,” Amsterdam, 30-09-1976. Consulted via Delpher on 23-04-2024, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ABCDDD:010840166:mpeg21:p003>

<sup>154</sup> Miller, “The Euro-Arab Dialogue,” 952.

<sup>155</sup> Soetendorp, “The Netherlands,” 42.

Palestinians have the right to be considered a nation.’<sup>156</sup> Instead, the Dutch opposition stemmed from the ambition to prevent the Nine from assuming a political role in the Middle East, which could potentially disrupt American peace efforts.<sup>157</sup> The Dutch official explained: ‘The creation of a Palestinian state will have to be accompanied by extensive security measures (...) This means that such a settlement is only conceivable in the context of an overall peace settlement, which makes a direct policy choice on the matter less opportune for the Netherlands.’<sup>158</sup> Thus, the Dutch prevented the EPC’s mention of a homeland to avoid European interference in the US-led peace process, demonstrating how they uploaded their national stance into the EPC.

In the London Declaration of June 1977, the Nine acknowledged the necessity of a homeland for the Palestinian people. This happened shortly after President Carter had called for such a homeland.<sup>159</sup> Furthermore, the Nine refrained from specifying the location or status of this homeland, deferring this decision to the US. Regarding a Palestinian homeland, the Dutch opposed any EPC initiative that would move beyond the American position.

*Downloading: the EPC’s influence on the Dutch position regarding Palestinian legitimate rights*

After signing the Brussels Declaration, Van der Stoel informed the Dutch Parliament that the Palestinian issue, previously perceived as solely a humanitarian issue, had a political dimension. He added: ‘Now that there is a real prospect of peace talks, the Palestinian political aspirations will have to be met in some form.’<sup>160</sup> This view became internalised in Dutch foreign policy. However, the common EPC standpoint on the ‘legitimate rights of Palestinians’ would rarely be advocated by the Dutch, and any mention of a homeland remained taboo. In October 1975, France asked for the inclusion of ‘a Palestinian people with a homeland’ in the EPC standpoint in the UNGA. The Dutch – supported by Denmark – blocked the proposal.<sup>161</sup> In September

---

<sup>156</sup> NA 2.05.330, 12338, Van DAM (redacteur: Heijnen), aan: de deelnemers aan de ambassadeursconferentie, 13 april 1976, onderwerp: verslag Ambassadeursconferentie Istanbul.

<sup>157</sup> Nederlands dagblad : gereformeerd gezinsblad / hoofdred. P. Jongeling ... [et al.], “Deze week start van dialoog tussen EEG en Arabieren,” Amersfoort, 17-05-1976, p. 1. Consulted via Delpher on 18-04-2024, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010572082:mpeg21:p001>

<sup>158</sup> NA 2.05.330, 12338, Van DAM (redacteur: Heijnen), aan: de deelnemers aan de ambassadeursconferentie, 13 april 1976, onderwerp: verslag Ambassadeursconferentie Istanbul..

<sup>159</sup> David Allen and Andrin Hauri, “The Euro-Arab dialogue, the Venice Declaration, and beyond,” in *European-American Relations and the Middle East: From Suez to Iraq*, ed. Daniel Möckli and Victor Mauer, (London: Routledge, 2011), 97.

<sup>160</sup> Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, “Nota van de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken betreffende recente ontwikkelingen in het Midden-Oosten (19 november 1973),” available online via cvce.eu, [https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2004/9/6/8ff042c7-3997-40e8-9b7d-2faa4ad321b9/publishable\\_nl.pdf](https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2004/9/6/8ff042c7-3997-40e8-9b7d-2faa4ad321b9/publishable_nl.pdf)

<sup>161</sup> NRC Handelsblad, “Negen hebben geen gezamenlijk standpunt over de Palestijnen,” Rotterdam, 31-10-1975. Consulted via Delpher on 17-04-2024, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=KBNRC01:000032010:mpeg21:p004>



1976, the French initiated a reference to a ‘territorial base’, a proposal rejected by the Dutch and the British.<sup>162</sup>

Rather than complying with the EPC stance, the Dutch took up an opposing role, preferably with the support of other EPC members, maintaining their allegiance to the US. This showed a weak downloading dimension. It is noteworthy that when Kissinger first talked about ‘the Palestinian People’ instead of ‘Palestinians’ in the autumn of 1975, Van der Stoel followed a few days later.<sup>163</sup>

#### **IV. The Netherlands’ and EPC’s Position on Criticising Israel**

The stronger cooperation between the EC and the Arab world, reflected in the EAD’s establishment and the Nine’s voting behaviour in the UNGA, developed at the expense of EC-Israel relations. Nonetheless, the EPC rarely critiqued Israel’s settlement policy, which hampered the prospect of peace.

##### *The common EPC stance and Dutch uploading concerning criticising Israel*

The most important objective of EPC statements between 1973 and 1977 was to recognise Israel’s right to exist.<sup>164</sup> While the Nine developed their stance on Palestinian rights and the PLO, they rarely mentioned Israeli settlements. The position that had been taken in the Brussels Declaration, which urged Israel to end the territorial occupation since 1967, remained static.<sup>165</sup>

Nonetheless, Israel harboured hostility towards any European engagement with the Palestinians, particularly regarding the PLO. Israel considered any EPC stance that did not explicitly reject the PLO as a threat, given the PLO’s refusal to recognise Israel’s right to exist.<sup>166</sup> Another red line for Israel was the mention of a Palestinian homeland or right to self-determination. According to the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, the latter would ‘create more problems than it solves.’<sup>167</sup> While the Nine tried to balance their standpoint, Israel’s settlements and indifference to Palestinian suffering led to mounting frustration.<sup>168</sup> Critique of

---

<sup>162</sup> Nuttall, *European Political Cooperation*, 101.

<sup>163</sup> NRC Handelsblad, “Negen hebben geen gezamenlijk standpunt over de Palestijnen,” Rotterdam, 31-10-1975. Consulted via Delpher on 17-04-2024, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=KBNRC01:000032010:mpeg21:p004>

<sup>164</sup> NA 2.05.313, 11756, Memorandum from Minister van der Stoel on the visit of the Ambassador of Israel, 29 October 1974.

<sup>165</sup> Declaration of the Nine Foreign Ministers of 6 November 1973, in Brussels, on the Situation in the Middle East (6 November 1973), available online via cvce.eu: [https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/a08b36bc-6d29-475c-aadb-0f71c59dbc3e/publishable\\_en.pdf](https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/a08b36bc-6d29-475c-aadb-0f71c59dbc3e/publishable_en.pdf)

<sup>166</sup> NA 2.05.313, 11756, Memorandum from Minister van der Stoel on the visit of the Ambassador of Israel, 29 October 1974.

<sup>167</sup> Israel State Archives—The State of Israel, ISA/RG 130/MFA/29, published in Pardo and Peters, *Israel and the European Union*, 139.

<sup>168</sup> Allen and Hauri, “The Euro-Arab dialogue, the Venice Declaration, and beyond,” 97.

Israel was left out of the EPC statements until February 1977, when the EPC condemned Israeli settlements in the EAD.<sup>169</sup> In June 1977, the Nine described Israeli settlements as a ‘policy of colonising the occupied territories’.<sup>170</sup>

France, Italy and Ireland were more willing to criticise Israel than the FRG, the UK Denmark and the Netherlands.<sup>171</sup> The Dutch remained the firmest protector of Israeli interests in the EPC.<sup>172</sup> In light of its even-handedness policy, they proposed establishing a dialogue between the EC and Israel as a counterpart to the EAD.<sup>173</sup> The Dutch director of the Department of the Middle East explained: ‘This to make clear that the Nine regard relations with Israel not as less important than relations with the Arab world.’<sup>174</sup> The Dutch were also the most persistent in de-politicising the EAD.<sup>175</sup> Nonetheless, they did not oppose the EPC from publicly condemning Israeli settlements, as the Dutch themselves also disapproved.<sup>176</sup> The Dutch negotiated EPC declarations to recognise Israel’s right to exist but maintained a neutral stance regarding the condemnation of settlements.

*Downloading: the EPC’s influence on the Dutch position regarding criticising Israel*

The tensions between the EC and Israel were reflected in Dutch-Israeli relations. In November 1974, the Israeli embassy in Brussels wrote to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs: ‘Cowardice has taken hold of everyone (...) Even in the Netherlands (...) there is a conspicuous deterioration, particularly on the Palestinian issue.’<sup>177</sup> In 1974-1975, the Dutch tried to convince Israel that they were safeguarding Israeli interests in their discussions with the Nine, using the EPC as a cover.

In late 1974, Israel demanded an explanation for the Dutch abstention on the UN Resolution which had named the PLO the representative of the Palestinian people. Van der

---

<sup>169</sup> HAEC BAC 113/1989, 23, Réunion de la Commission Générale à Tunis, 10-12 février 1977.

<sup>170</sup> AEI, Bulletin of the European Communities, No.11-1977, 111, online available via University of Pittsburgh: <https://aei.pitt.edu/83933/1/BUL182.pdf>

<sup>171</sup> Ilan Greilsammer and Joseph Weiler, “European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: an Israeli perspective,” in *European Foreign Policy-Making and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, ed. David Allen and Alfred Pijpers, (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1984), 136.

<sup>172</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 97.

<sup>173</sup> NA 2.05.313, 11756, Coded Message from Minister van der Stoel to Jerusalem on the visit of Bar-On, 25 July 1974.

<sup>174</sup> NA 2.05.313, 11756, Memorandum from DAM/MO to Minister van der Stoel on a parallel dialogue with Israel.

<sup>175</sup> NA 2.05.313, 11756, Coded Message from Minister van der Stoel to Jerusalem on the visit of Bar-On, 25 July 1974.

<sup>176</sup> NA 2.05.330, 13737, 5 mei 1976, verzonden telexbericht, afkomstig van min BZ, onderwerp: antwoorden 1e kamervragen betreffende m.o.

<sup>177</sup> Israel State Archives—The State of Israel, ISA/RG 130/MFA/29, published in Pardo and Peters, *Israel and the European Union*, 132.

Stoel explained that he shared the Israeli concerns, but that the Dutch had emphasised that the rights of *all* countries in the region should be guaranteed, highlighting the Dutch commitment to protecting Israeli interests.<sup>178</sup> In another meeting with the Israeli ambassador, Van der Stoel reassured his counterpart, who was concerned about Europe's attitude towards Israel and the lack of resistance to Arab 'blackmailing', that the Netherlands had shown a backbone in this regard, but that 'he could not speak for other European countries', emphasising the loyalty of the Dutch compared to other EPC members.<sup>179</sup>

From 1976 onwards, the Dutch became more critical of Israel and increasingly defended the Nine's statements. In April 1976, Van der Stoel urged his ambassadors to use the Dutch position as a friend to 'impress upon Israel the need for a more flexible stance', and to condemn Israeli settlements.<sup>180</sup> While it is difficult to assess the direct impact of the EPC on this stance, particularly because the condemnation of settlements was globally shared,<sup>181</sup> the use of the EPC as a cover by the Dutch did become less distinguishable after 1975. Additionally, they increasingly expressed the EPC standpoint as reflecting the Dutch standpoint, showing internalisation in the downloading dimension.

## V. Europeanisation of Dutch Foreign Policy

Throughout the chapter, two arguments have been articulated. Firstly, the Dutch did not, as Hellema put it 'comply quietly with positions taken by the EPC'.<sup>182</sup> This chapter has shown that the Dutch were firm opposers of expanding the EPC standpoint beyond what had been agreed upon in the Brussels Declaration and Resolution 242. Therefore, the influence of the Dutch on the EPC standpoint (the uploading dimension) was greater than indicated in the literature, particularly behind closed doors. Publicly, the Dutch tried to prevent isolation within the Nine.

Secondly, this chapter has highlighted that the diverging viewpoints within the EPC persisted. Allen and Hauri wrote: 'The London Declaration reflected a remarkable shift in the position of some traditional Israeli allies in the EC, above all Britain, West Germany, and the

---

<sup>178</sup> NA 2.05.313, 11756, Memorandum from Minister van der Stoel on the visit of the Ambassador of Israel, 29 October 1974.

<sup>179</sup> NA 2.05.313, 11756, Memorandum from Minister van der Stoel on the visit of the Israeli Ambassador, 4 December 1974.

<sup>180</sup> NA 2.05.330, 12338, Van DAM (redacteur: Heijnen), aan: de deelnemers aan de ambassadeursconferentie, 13 april 1976, onderwerp: verslag Ambassadeursconferentie Istanbul.

<sup>181</sup> Donald Neff, "Settlements in U.S. Policy," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 23, no. 3 (1994): 53.; the UNGA, UNSC, and the US had deemed Israeli settlements illegal since 1967.

<sup>182</sup> Hellema, *Nederland in de Wereld*, 275.

Netherlands.’<sup>183</sup> This chapter has nuanced this claim by highlighting that for the Netherlands, the alliance with Israel, and even more so the US, remained crucial.

Returning to the methodological framework, the uploading and downloading dimensions differed per indicator. Concerning the PLO, the downloading dimension can be categorised as Dutch policy *partially integrating* the stance of its fellow EPC members. The interactions between the other eight and the PLO directly influenced the Dutch decision to initiate secret contacts. However, the Dutch restricted such contacts to several diplomats in the Middle East. The Dutch involvement in the EPC’s efforts to formulate a unified stance on the PLO (uploading dimension) can be characterised by *leading the opposition* during EAD negotiations while adopting a *neutral stance* in the UNGA to prevent isolation.

The recognition that a peace settlement should take Palestinian political rights into account became *internalised* in Dutch foreign policy. Evaluating the EPC’s influence on this internalisation in contrast to other factors, particularly US policy, is challenging. The impact that the Dutch position had on the EPC (uploading dimension) was most noticeable when it came to the mention of a homeland for the Palestinians. The Dutch *led the opposition* to prevent the Nine from derailing the US peace efforts. Concerning the critique of the Israeli settlement policy, the Dutch *partially integrated* the EPC stance (downloading dimension), which aligned with the US. They first used the EPC as a cover, but later referred to the EPC stance as being the Dutch position. Regarding the uploading dimension, the Dutch *led the opposition* if any EPC statement excluded the recognition of Israel’s right to exist but were *neutral* about the condemnation of Israeli settlements.

This chapter has highlighted the importance the Dutch assigned to the transatlantic alliance, which at times created tensions in their decisions between aligning with Europe or the US. These tensions would increase following the 1978 Camp David agreements, which will be explored in the next chapter.

---

<sup>183</sup> Allen and Hauri, “The Euro-Arab dialogue, the Venice Declaration, and beyond,” 97.

### 3. 1977-1980: From London to Venice

## From Leading the EPC's Opposition to Awaiting Others to Oppose

‘When defining our positions we should indeed prioritise the protection of the Dutch image in the Arab world. While maintaining our position with regard to the Egyptian - as well as American - peace policy, it seems to me that in defending this we should let others (in particular the FRG and UK) take the lead, as much as possible, and let them do the dirty work.’<sup>184</sup>

These words were written in a memorandum by the head of the Middle East Department of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to DGPZ Charles Rutten on 8 October 1979. The citation shows that there was a growing consciousness among Dutch officials that their opposing role in the EPC, even behind closed doors, was damaging their reputation in the Arab world. Leading up to the 1980 Venice Declaration, the Dutch occasionally refrained from leading the opposition in the EPC, waiting for others to take the lead. Another change between 1977 and 1980 was the EPC's and the Dutch's increasing criticism of Israel's settlement policy. Despite these small alterations, the period from 1977 to 1980 largely reflected continuity, even after a new Dutch government assumed office in 1977. The transatlantic alliance remained key, with the Dutch positioning themselves as strong supporters of Camp David, a US-led peace initiative between Egypt and Israel.

This chapter will examine how the EPC standpoint developed vis-à-vis the Middle Eastern conflict in relation to the Dutch standpoint between 1977 and 1980. The emphasis will be on the period after the signing of the Camp David Accords in September 1978 until the publication of the Venice Declaration in June 1980. Despite the change in context, the most debated topics among the Nine remained similar to those in Chapter Two: PLO recognition, the Palestinian right to self-determination which implied a Palestinian state, and criticism of Israel and its settlements.

These topics are evident in the evolution of the EPC's common stance from the London Declaration to the Venice Declaration. In the latter, the Nine agreed on involving the PLO in peace negotiations, while the former did not explicitly mention the PLO. In Venice, the Nine

---

<sup>184</sup> NA 2.05.330, 24989, Memorandum van Amad aan DGPZ, onderwerp: euro-arabische dialoog, 8 oktober 1979; the original saying in Dutch was: ‘hen de kastanjes uit het vuur laten halen’, which has been translated to ‘Let them do the dirty work’.

emphasised the Palestinian right to self-determination, moving beyond the London Declaration's mentioning of territorial rights, which could also imply a Palestinian homeland under Israeli control. Lastly, the Venice Declaration condemned Israeli settlements – which had not been named in London – as illegal under international law. Additionally, the Nine expressed their intent to participate in the peace process.<sup>185</sup> The Venice Declaration is generally valued as a breakthrough in European Middle Eastern policy.<sup>186</sup> Müller and Smith argued that with the Venice Declaration, most disagreements between member states had been resolved.<sup>187</sup> Tonra highlighted that the Declaration represented a 'firm step in the direction of the Arab and Palestinian positions.'<sup>188</sup> This chapter will nuance these claims by examining the Dutch contributions to the EPC standpoint.

The Nine's renewed stance was shaped by various international developments. To contextualise these changes, this chapter will first elaborate on 1977. The changed dynamics in the Middle East and the US will be explained, focusing on the latter, followed by the objectives of the newly elected Dutch government. Secondly, this chapter will examine the three topics that indicated foreign policy change by looking at the common EPC standpoint, the deliberations among EPC members (uploading dimension) and the EPC's impact on the Dutch national position (downloading dimension).

Chapter Two focused on the EAD and the UN. However, archival evidence reveals that between 1977 and 1980, the institutionalisation of the EPC led to more meetings occurring outside of these forums, resulting in a varying structure throughout this chapter.<sup>189</sup> While the UNGA and EAD remained important for PLO discussions, Palestinian self-determination and Israeli settlements were mainly addressed in EPC meetings. Previously, Dutch officials cited the EPC's influence on their position. However, this chapter illustrates that its impact became less distinguishable between 1977 and 1980.

---

<sup>185</sup> The Venice Declaration (13 June 1980), European Council, online available via EEAS:

[https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/mepp/docs/venice\\_declaration\\_1980\\_en.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/mepp/docs/venice_declaration_1980_en.pdf)

<sup>186</sup> Malcontent argued for example that the Venice Declaration was 'a milestone in the history of EU policy,' Source: Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 250.

<sup>187</sup> Müller, *EU Foreign Policymaking and the Middle East Conflict*, 56; Smith, "Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Cooperation," 117.

<sup>188</sup> Tonra, *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy*, 204.

<sup>189</sup> In 1976, the EPC had developed into a multi-faceted organisation. In 1974, the European Council was established. Below the European Council, there were regular meetings between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Nine, between the Comité Politique and between several working groups on specific topics, for example, a Middle Eastern working group and a working group for the Euro-Arab Dialogue. For a full overview, see Gainar, *Aux Origines de la Diplomatie Européenne*, 337.

## I. 1977: A Year of Change

### *New Dynamics in the Middle East Peace Process*

Jimmy Carter's presidency, commencing in January 1977, heralded a fresh chapter in American Middle East policy. Carter broke with Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy and strived for a comprehensive peace settlement, including a Palestinian homeland and an Israeli withdrawal from the 1967 occupied territories.<sup>190</sup> However, this process was negatively impacted by the surprising victory of the Likud Party in the June 1977 Israeli elections.<sup>191</sup> Its leader, Menachem Begin, explained that Likud represented those Israelis who believed that Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip were rightfully Israel's.<sup>192</sup> This hampered the chances of establishing a Palestinian homeland and Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. Despite Israel's hardline policy, Egyptian President Sadat, sceptical of Carter's comprehensive settlement, surprised the world by visiting Israel in November 1977. After years of conflict, the prospect of a peace accord between these former enemies came within reach.<sup>193</sup>

Sadat's visit was historical, but it also estranged Egypt from its Arab partners.<sup>194</sup> Arab governments viewed Sadat's action as abandoning Arab unity and the Palestinian cause.<sup>195</sup> This led to the withdrawal of the other Arab countries from the Carter-initiated peace process and eventually to the suspension of Egypt from the Arab League.<sup>196</sup> Consequently, Carter had to return to Kissinger's step-by-step approach to achieve an agreement between Egypt and Israel.<sup>197</sup> In September 1978, a framework for peace was established at Camp David, which resulted in the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty in March 1979. However, self-governance for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza was excluded.<sup>198</sup>

---

<sup>190</sup> Allen and Hauri, "The Euro-Arab dialogue, the Venice Declaration, and beyond," 97.

<sup>191</sup> Kenneth W. Stein, *Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 1999), 201.

<sup>192</sup> Amir Goldstein, "Half-Heartedly: Menachem Begin and the Establishment of the Likud Party," *Middle Eastern Studies* 53, no. 6 (2017): 918.

<sup>193</sup> NRC Handelsblad, "Amerikaanse regering verrast door komend gesprek Sadat-Begin," Rotterdam, 16-11-1977, Consulted via Delpher on 03-05-2024,

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=KBNRC01:000026583:mpeg21:p005> ; and Allen and Andrin Hauri, "The Euro-Arab dialogue, the Venice Declaration, and beyond," 97.

<sup>194</sup> Thomas W. Lippmann, "Egypt Cuts Ties With 5 Hardline Arab Countries," December 5 1977, *The Washington Post*, online available: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/12/06/egypt-cuts-ties-with-5-hardline-arab-countries/5e27f1ca-516c-489f-9043-f9a0d09362dd/>

<sup>195</sup> Jawad, *Euro-Arab Relations*, 144.

<sup>196</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 102; The withdrawal of other Arab countries from the peace process was particularly disheartening because many Palestinian refugees had settled in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Finding a comprehensive solution to the question of a Palestinian homeland seemed impossible without their participation.

<sup>197</sup> Allen and Hauri, "The Euro-Arab dialogue, the Venice Declaration, and beyond," 98.

<sup>198</sup> Allen and Hauri, "The Euro-Arab dialogue, the Venice Declaration, and beyond," 98.

The Nine were disappointed in this outcome. They responded critically, urging the parties after signing the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty ‘to consider this not as a separate peace but as a first step in the direction of a comprehensive settlement.’<sup>199</sup> This standpoint ran counter to American interests, as the US ambassador had emphasised the importance of getting European support.<sup>200</sup> The Dutch government tried to prevent the EPC from taking this critical stance but to no avail.

### *A New Dutch Government*

Cabinet van Agt assumed office on 19 December 1977, with Christiaan van der Klaauw serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Despite this change, the Dutch approach to the Middle Eastern conflict saw minimal alteration.<sup>201</sup> Regarding the Dutch position within the EPC framework, Van der Klaauw argued that the EPC should not play a role in major conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, believing that only the US could negotiate peace.<sup>202</sup>

Duco Hellema claimed that ‘regarding the Middle East, the Netherlands followed increasingly the policies of the EC-members after 1977.’<sup>203</sup> Ben Soetendorp argued along the same lines, stating that ‘after 1977, it became increasingly clear that Dutch Middle East policy was largely determined by a consensus reached by member states (...) of the European Political Cooperation framework.’<sup>204</sup> This chapter will show that it was not as simple. Regarding the PLO and the idea of a Palestinian state, the Dutch remained close to their national standpoints and opposed EPC initiatives. Concerning Israeli settlements and the Palestinian right to self-determination, the Dutch aligned themselves with its fellow EC members but ensured that this would not endanger US peace efforts nor Israel’s right to exist.

Several external developments enabled the Dutch to support European initiatives sympathetic to the Palestinian people. Firstly, Dutch participation in the UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) shifted public opinion towards the Palestinians.<sup>205</sup> On 15 March 1978, Israeli troops invaded Lebanon to stop PLO attacks, prompting a request for the Dutch to

---

<sup>199</sup> Document 2/41 EC Declaration on the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, (26 March 1979), published in Pardo and Peters, *Israel and the European Union*, 144.

<sup>200</sup> Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), BAC 39/1986, 790; Confidential note from Crispin Tickell, to the European Commission, 16 March 1979. Online available:

[https://ec.europa.eu/historical\\_archives/archisplus/getPU.cfm?id=SU5WLTAwMDEtMjAxOC0wNzEy](https://ec.europa.eu/historical_archives/archisplus/getPU.cfm?id=SU5WLTAwMDEtMjAxOC0wNzEy)

<sup>201</sup> NA 3.05.330, 24989, Codebericht van Parijs PV Unesco aan Min BZ, 8 december 1980, onderwerp: euro-arabische dialoog, reference to continuous policy of even-handedness.

<sup>202</sup> Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*, 299; Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 111.

<sup>203</sup> Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*, 316.

<sup>204</sup> Ben Soetendorp, *Pragmatisch of Principieel: Het Nederlandse Beleid Ten Aanzien van Het Arabisch-Israëliësch Conflict*, (Leiden: Nijhoff, 1983), 251.

<sup>205</sup> NA, 2.05.330, 12444, 15 april 1980, bestemd voor Min BZ, afkomstig van Jeruzalem, onderwerp: gesprek met minister Shamir; Van der Klaauw, *Een diplomatenleven*, 265-66;



contribute troops to the UN mission. Dutch soldiers' deaths eroded Dutch public support for Israel, a trend that had started in 1977 due to Begin's continuous settlement policies.<sup>206</sup>

Secondly, the transatlantic relationship became less vulnerable to European political involvement in the Middle East. After Camp David, the US peace initiative stagnated, providing a window of opportunity for the Nine to take on a political role.<sup>207</sup> Nonetheless, Van der Klaauw continued to favour an American initiative out of fear that France's Arab-focused policies would dominate a European effort, leading to Dutch isolation in the EPC.<sup>208</sup>

Thirdly, the Dutch feared another oil crisis. In 1977, a PLO representative warned Europe that a second oil crisis could hit if their Middle Eastern Policy did not change.<sup>209</sup> The Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, further destabilising the Middle East, enhanced the risk of another oil crisis. To improve Europe-Arab relations, the Nine had to increase their involvement in the Middle East peace process, bringing the question of the PLO again to the forefront.<sup>210</sup>

## II. The Netherlands' and EPC's Position on the PLO

### *The common EPC stance and Dutch uploading concerning the PLO in the UN*

When President Carter assumed leadership of the peace process, the Nine were hesitant to move closer towards the PLO out of fear of undermining Carter's efforts.<sup>211</sup> It was not until September 1979 that the Nine mentioned the PLO for the first time in an official statement.<sup>212</sup> In the UNGA, Irish Foreign Minister O'Kennedy argued that the Palestinian people had the right to engage in peace negotiations 'through their representatives'.<sup>213</sup> O'Kennedy mentioned the PLO by name but stopped short of recognising them as the sole representatives of the Palestinians.<sup>214</sup> O'Kennedy later explained: 'I set out principles that were acceptable to all of us within the Nine.'<sup>215</sup>

---

<sup>206</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 147.

<sup>207</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 102.

<sup>208</sup> Van der Klaauw, *Een diplomatenleven*, 272.

<sup>209</sup> Rory Miller, *Inglorious Disarray: Europe, Israel and the Palestinians since 1967*. (London: Hurst, 2011), 77.

<sup>210</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 102.

<sup>211</sup> Gainar, *Aux Origines de la Diplomatie Européenne*, 432.

<sup>212</sup> Before then, the EPC had only referred to the 'representative of the Palestinian people' in official positions, without specifying who these were. For example, in the London Declaration, the Nine had implicitly hinted at the PLO, by including: 'the representatives of the parties to the conflict including the Palestinian people'. However, the PLO by its name was never mentioned.

<sup>213</sup> Speech by Michael O'Kennedy, (New York, 25 September 1979), accessed online via CVCE, [file:///C:/Users/Gebruiker/Downloads/publishable\\_en%20\(3\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/Gebruiker/Downloads/publishable_en%20(3).pdf)

<sup>214</sup> Speech by Michael O'Kennedy, (New York, 25 September 1979), accessed online via CVCE, [file:///C:/Users/Gebruiker/Downloads/publishable\\_en%20\(3\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/Gebruiker/Downloads/publishable_en%20(3).pdf)

<sup>215</sup> HAEU, Interview with O'Kennedy, Michael From *the Voices on Europe Collection*, INT669.

According to a Commission official, O’Kennedy’s statement was enabled by a shift in European thinking about the PLO.<sup>216</sup> The official cited three reasons for this change: increasing criticism of Israeli attitudes towards Palestinians, growing pressure from Arab countries with threats to reduce oil flow, and a belief that the PLO was focusing more on politics than terrorism.<sup>217</sup> Despite these changes in perception, member states’ views on the issue remained diverse.<sup>218</sup>

One of the countries that had always opposed any statement that included the PLO was the Netherlands. A few months after O’Kennedy’s speech, the Nine debated what the mentioning of the PLO had meant. When France proposed to take additional steps to recognise the PLO, the Netherlands – accompanied by Denmark – was reluctant as long as the PLO did not recognise Israel’s right to exist.<sup>219</sup> In June 1979, the Dutch DGPZ re-emphasised this standpoint in a meeting of the *Comité Politique*.<sup>220</sup> Thus, the Dutch blocked any EPC standpoint that advanced O’Kennedy’s mention of the PLO.

#### *The common EPC stance and Dutch uploading concerning the PLO in the EAD*

Between 1977 and 1980 the Nine’s reluctance to recognise the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people led to mounting frustration on the Arab side in the EAD. Due to Arab pressure, the Nine eventually agreed to discuss PLO recognition and promised to respond at the next EAD meeting in mid-1979.<sup>221</sup> However, in April 1979, the dialogue was suspended because of the turmoil the Egyptian suspension had caused within the Arab League.<sup>222</sup>

Despite the dissolution of the EAD, the Nine continued their discussions about PLO recognition.<sup>223</sup> Eight out of Nine members had established semiformal bilateral contacts with the PLO. The UK, the FRG, Denmark, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and France possessed, although in different forms, an information office for the PLO, meaning that the PLO was to

---

<sup>216</sup> HAEC, BAC 288/1993, 6; 15 October 1979, note for the attention of Mr. Tickell, subject: request by the PLO for a meeting with M. Cheysson; advice by C.J. Audland, Deputy Secretary-General for the EPC.

<sup>217</sup> HAEC, BAC 288/1993, 6; 15 October 1979, note for the attention of Mr. Tickell, subject: request by the PLO for a meeting with M. Cheysson; advice by C.J. Audland, Deputy Secretary-General for the EPC.

<sup>218</sup> HAEC, BAC 288/1993, 6; 15 October 1979, note for the attention of Mr. Tickell, subject: request by the PLO for a meeting with M. Cheysson; advice by C.J. Audland, Deputy Secretary-General for the EPC.

<sup>219</sup> HAEC, BAC 288/1993, 15, Réunion ministérielle informelle – Naples, 17/18 mai 1980 ; compte-rendu oral de M. Tickell.

<sup>220</sup> HAEC, BAC 288/1993, 15, Comité Politique, 5 et 6 juin 1979 – Paris.

<sup>221</sup> Jawad, *Euro-Arab Relations*, 151.

<sup>222</sup> Miller, “The Euro-Arab Dialogue,” 954.

<sup>223</sup> HAEC, BAC 210/1991, 108 ; Bruxelles, le 14 Mars 1979, Note à l’attention de Monsieur Ehlermann, Directeur Général du Service Juridique, object : Dialogue euro-arabe, participation de l’OLP a des conventions euro-arabe

some extent officially represented.<sup>224</sup> The French even gave PLO representatives a semi-diplomatic status.<sup>225</sup> Ireland did not have an office, but the government visited and received PLO officials.<sup>226</sup> The Netherlands was the only EPC member without official PLO representation.

This isolated Dutch position was exploited by several EPC members. In August 1979, the Ambassador in Beirut wrote to Van der Klaauw: ‘EC countries, in their contacts with PLO leaders, do not fail to give the impression that the Dutch position in many cases prevents the EC from accommodating the PLO position.’<sup>227</sup> Despite the Dutch efforts to improve their reputation by preventing isolation from the Nine, they opposed the mention of the PLO as *the sole* representative of the Palestinian people in the Venice Declaration, keeping options open for other representatives.<sup>228</sup> The Dutch took the lead in this opposition, proposing different formulations in the Middle Eastern Working Group and the *Comité Politique*.<sup>229</sup> This counters Frederik Grünfeld’s claim that the PLO was not mentioned as the Palestinians’ sole representative because of British resistance.<sup>230</sup>

Bilaterally, the Dutch became more receptive to engaging with the PLO following a motion passed by the Dutch Parliament in November 1979. This authorised Dutch diplomats to initiate official contacts with the PLO.<sup>231</sup> While this approval increased Dutch-PLO interactions, Van der Klaauw persisted that it did not suggest a *de facto* recognition.<sup>232</sup> He distinguished between ministerial-level interactions, which he refused because he considered this the most official form of contact, and other forms of contact.<sup>233</sup> Despite this bilateral engagement, the Dutch continuously opposed PLO recognition by the Nine.

---

<sup>224</sup> HAEC, BAC 210/1991, 108 ; Bruxelles, le 14 Mars 1979, Note à l’attention de Monsieur Ehlermann, Directeur Général du Service Juridique, object : Dialogue euro-arabe, participation de l’OLP a des conventions euro-arabe

<sup>225</sup> NRC Handelsblad, “Van der Klaauw geeft groen licht voor contact met PLO,” Rotterdam, 23-02-1979. Consulted via Delpher on 05-05-2024, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=KBNRC01:000026542:mpeg21:p003>

<sup>226</sup> HAEC, BAC 210/1991, 108 ; Bruxelles, le 14 Mars 1979, Note à l’attention de Monsieur Ehlermann, Directeur Général du Service Juridique, object : Dialogue euro-arabe, participation de l’OLP a des conventions euro-arabe.

<sup>227</sup> NA 2.05.330, 25299, Beiroet, 14 augustus 1979, onderwerp: Europa-PLO, aan Min BZ

<sup>228</sup> NA 2.05.330, 25433, 30 mei 1980, van: DAM/MO aan DGPZ via chef DAM, onderwerp: EPS-werkgroep Midden-Oosten (Rome 28-29 mei 1980)

<sup>229</sup> NA 2.05.330, 25433, 6 juni 1980, van: DAM/MO, aan: DGPZ, onderwerp: Speciale zitting CoPo over Midden-Oosten (Rome 4 juni 1980)

<sup>230</sup> Grünfeld, “Nederland En Het Nabije Oosten,” 169.

<sup>231</sup> De Volkskrant, “KAMER AKKOORD Nederland kan contacten PLO onderhouden,” 's-Hertogenbosch, 21-11-1979. Consulted via Delpher on 06-05-2024,

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ABCDDD:010881845:mpeg21:p003>

<sup>232</sup> Soetendorp, “The Netherlands,” 43.

<sup>233</sup> Soetendorp, “The Netherlands,” 43.

### *Downloading: the EPC's influence on the Dutch position regarding the PLO*

During the late 1970s, there was a divergence rather than convergence on the policies of EPC states concerning the PLO.<sup>234</sup> The dominance of national preference over a unified EPC policy was highlighted in October 1979, when Feroek Kaddoumi, the PLO's alleged Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited Belgium.<sup>235</sup> Earlier that year, Kaddoumi and PLO leader Arafat had visited France and Spain.<sup>236</sup> The controversy arose when Kaddoumi expressed his plan to meet a Commission official. The Deputy Secretary General for the EPC responded to this initiative, stating that 'a favourable response to the PLO's approach would provoke criticism from several and probably a majority of the Member States.'<sup>237</sup> He explained that particularly the Germans, Danes and Dutch would oppose because of their critical stance regarding the PLO.<sup>238</sup>

While the Dutch aimed to prevent isolation, they remained the only EPC member without official PLO representation.<sup>239</sup> In his memoir, Van der Klaauw did not even mention his European partners when explaining the decision to increase bilateral contacts with the PLO, showing no impact of the EPC on Dutch policy in the downloading dimension. Instead, Van der Klaauw argued that it had been the Dutch contribution to UNIFIL that had given the Dutch a role in the Middle East. To fulfil its mandate, the Netherlands had to talk with the PLO.<sup>240</sup>

### **III. The Netherlands' and EPC's Position on the Palestinian Right to Self-Determination and a Palestinian State**

*The EPC stance, uploading and downloading regarding the Palestinian right to self-determination*

---

<sup>234</sup> Al-Dajani, "The PLO and the Euro-Arab Dialogue," 93.

<sup>235</sup> Het Parool, "MINISTERS BELGIË SPREKEN PLO-MAN," Amsterdam, 26-10-1979. Consulted via Delpher on 06-05-2024, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ABCDDD:010847573:mpeg21:p006>

<sup>236</sup> Het Parool, "MINISTERS BELGIË SPREKEN PLO-MAN," Amsterdam, 26-10-1979. Consulted via Delpher on 06-05-2024, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ABCDDD:010847573:mpeg21:p006>

<sup>237</sup> HAEC, BAC 288/1993, 6; 15 October 1979, note for the attention of Mr. Tickell, subject: request by the PLO for a meeting with M. Cheysson; advise by C.J. Audland, Deputy Secretary-General for the EPC.

<sup>238</sup> HAEC, BAC 288/1993, 6; 15 October 1979, note for the attention of Mr. Tickell, subject: request by the PLO for a meeting with M. Cheysson; advise by C.J. Audland, Deputy Secretary-General for the EPC.

The note also included that the French and British would oppose this initiative, but not because of their stance vis-à-vis the PLO, but rather because it was outside of the Community's mandate.

<sup>239</sup> HAEC, BAC 210/1991, 108 ; Bruxelles, le 14 Mars 1979, Note à l'attention de Monsieur Ehlermann, Directeur Général du Service Juridique, object : Dialogue euro-arabe, participation de l'OLP a des conventions euro-arabe

<sup>240</sup> Van der Klaauw, *Een diplomatenleven*, 266.

In September 1977, the German Foreign Minister Genscher was the first of the Nine to mention the Palestinian right to self-determination in the UNGA.<sup>241</sup> Self-determination hinted at the right of the Palestinians to establish a state, which was why several EPC members were unwilling to use the expression, including the Netherlands.<sup>242</sup> Nonetheless, already in February 1978, this seemed to change. Officials in the Hague were increasingly inclined to explain the London Declaration as an implicit reference to the right to self-determination.<sup>243</sup> In late 1978, Van der Klaauw argued that the Nine were convinced that the crisis in the Middle East could only be resolved if the Palestinians were given the right to self-determination, adding that the Palestinians must be given a homeland.<sup>244</sup> In expressing this standpoint, Van der Klaauw referred to the other EC members, who took the same stance, showing internalisation of the EPC stance in the downloading dimension.<sup>245</sup>

The Dutch accepted the Palestinian right to self-determination before the Venice Declaration was published, countering the prevailing idea that this recognition was *the* breakthrough in Venice. Malcontent, for example, argued: ‘What really made the Venice Declaration a turning point (...) was that the Nine recognised for the first time unequivocally the Palestinian right to self-determination.’<sup>246</sup> Grünfeld stated that by the time the declaration was signed, ‘the recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination was no longer a source of conflict.’<sup>247</sup>

The confirmation that the reference to self-determination was not as groundbreaking as Malcontent and Grünfeld stated was expressed in a working file to Van der Klaauw before the Council Meeting in preparation for the Venice Declaration. The document stated: ‘Although

---

<sup>241</sup> Nieuw Israelietisch weekblad, “Twee jaar beleid Van der Klaauw Nederland is kritischer vriend geworden,” door Armelies van den Houten, Amsterdam, 21-09-1979, p. 41. Consulted via Delpher on 07-05-2024, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010858988:mpeg21:p041>

<sup>242</sup> Het Parool, “EG-landen oneens over het M.-Oosten,” Amsterdam, 30-09-1977. Consulted via Delpher on 07-05-2024, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ABCDDD:010839609:mpeg21:p009>

<sup>243</sup> Nederlands dagblad: gereformeerd gezinsblad / hoofdred. P. Jongeling ... [et al.], “EEG betreurt Israëls weigering Palestijnse rechten te erkennen,” Amersfoort, 11-02-1978, p. 3. Consulted via Delpher on 07-05-2024, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010682203:mpeg21:p003>

<sup>244</sup> Algemeen Dagblad, “Van der Klaauw terug voor Menten-debat,” Rotterdam, 11-12-1978. Consulted via Delpher on 07-05-2024, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=KBPERSON:002953009:mpeg21:p00007>

<sup>245</sup> Het Parool, “Nederland riep ambassadeur van Israël op matje,” Amsterdam, 14-03-1980. Geraadpleegd op Delpher op 07-05-2024, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ABCDDD:010847410:mpeg21:p002> and Het Parool, “Minister van der Klaauw in Cairo: 'Geen vrede zonder Palestijnse rechten',” Amsterdam, 12-03-1980. Consulted via Delpher on 07-05-2024, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ABCDDD:010847408:mpeg21:p003>

<sup>246</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 109.

<sup>247</sup> Grünfeld, “Nederland En Het Nabije Oosten,” 176.

the word ‘self-determination’ would be used here for the first time in a statement by the Nine, the concept had already been accepted by most member states including the Netherlands.’<sup>248</sup>

During the Venice negotiations, the Dutch supported the mention of Palestinian self-determination, which was internalised in Dutch policy. However, they aimed to prevent this mention from having practical implications, believing that this was to be decided within the US-led peace process. Consequently, Koos van Dam – the Dutch representative during the Venice negotiations – brokered to connect Palestinian self-determination to the rights of other parties. As a result, the Venice Declaration stated: ‘The Palestinian people (...) must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defined *within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement*, to exercise fully its right to self-determination.’<sup>249</sup> This addition implied that recognising Israel’s right to exist was a prerequisite for Palestinians to exercise their right to self-determination.<sup>250</sup> The Dutch had successfully uploaded their national goals – protecting Israel’s right to exist and preventing a role for Europe in the peace process – into the EPC stance, while having internalised the EPC’s position on the Palestinian right to self-determination.

#### *The EPC stance, uploading and downloading regarding a Palestinian state*

After agreeing on the principle of self-determination, discussions centred on how Palestinians could exercise this right, which implied a Palestinian state.<sup>251</sup> However, the Nine failed to reach a consensus on the establishment of such a state due to unresolved issues regarding its location and representation. While the Italians and French supported the idea of a Palestinian state and sought its inclusion in the Venice Declaration, this proposal was opposed by the British and Dutch.<sup>252</sup> The Dutch wanted to maintain the ‘Jordan option’, meaning the establishment of a Palestinian sub-entity in Jordan.<sup>253</sup> They believed Europe should not decide whether self-

---

<sup>248</sup> NA 2.05.330, 25433, Werkdossier ten behoeve van de bijeenkomst van de Europese Raad betreffende de Euro-Arabische Dialoog, gehouden van 12 - 13 juni te Venetië 1980- Europese Raad 27-28 april te Luxemburg, verklaring en in Venetië de toestemming om de EAD een politieke dimensie te geven

<sup>249</sup> The Venice Declaration (13 June 1980), European Council, online available via EEAS: [https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/mepp/docs/venice\\_declaration\\_1980\\_en.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/mepp/docs/venice_declaration_1980_en.pdf)

<sup>250</sup> NA 2.05.330, 25433, Werkdossier ten behoeve van de bijeenkomst van de Europese Raad betreffende de Euro-Arabische Dialoog, gehouden van 12 - 13 juni te Venetië 1980- Europese Raad 27-28 april te Luxemburg, verklaring en in Venetië de toestemming om de EAD een politieke dimensie te geven.

This was implied in the sentence: “autodetermination dans le cadre du reglement global de paix”.

<sup>251</sup> Miller, *Inglorious Disarray*, 85.

<sup>252</sup> Huygens Instituut, Diplomatieke Getuigenissen, Interview met dr. Koos van Dam, 18-03-2022.

<sup>253</sup> NA 2.05.330, 25433, 30 mei 1980, van: DAM/MO aan DGPZ via chef DAM, onderwerp: EPS-werkgroep Midden-Oosten (Rome 28-29 mei 1980)

determination meant an independent state or a federation with Jordan, Israel, or both.<sup>254</sup> This should be negotiated by the US.<sup>255</sup>

When France suggested mentioning a Palestinian state in Venice, the Dutch representative, Koos van Dam, knew his government could not agree. However, to avoid the Netherlands becoming the black sheep in the Arab world, Van Dam's chief instructed him to remain silent.<sup>256</sup> Van Dam followed the instructions, successfully forcing the German and Danish representatives to block the proposal.<sup>257</sup> Consequently, the question of whether the right to self-determination would lead to a Palestinian state was excluded from the Venice Declaration.<sup>258</sup> The Dutch stance was uploaded into the EPC even though the Dutch had awaited others to oppose.

#### **IV. The Netherlands' and EPC's common position on Criticising Israel**

The EPC members debated about recognising the PLO and a Palestinian state, but they were united in their stance on Israel. Between 1977 and 1980, Dutch officials increasingly critiqued the continuous settlements in Gaza and the West Bank. They emphasised, particularly from 1978 onwards, that the EPC stance aligned with their national position.

##### *The common EPC stance and Dutch uploading concerning criticising Israel*

In December 1977, the Nine voted in favour of a UNGA resolution that condemned Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories.<sup>259</sup> The Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, representing the Nine, expressed in his speech that Israel's settlement policy formed 'an extra obstacle' to peace.<sup>260</sup> On 26 March 1979, the Nine enraged Israel by calling the Egypt-Israeli peace agreement a 'treaty', valuing it as 'a first step in the direction of a comprehensive settlement'.<sup>261</sup> This standpoint was reemphasised in the Nine's Declaration of 18 June 1979, in which they stated that the Israeli government's settlement policy in occupied territories violated

---

<sup>254</sup> Soetendorp, "The Netherlands," 44.

<sup>255</sup> Van der Klaauw, *Een diplomatenleven*, 271.

<sup>256</sup> Huygens Instituut, *Diplomatieke Getuigenissen*, Interview met dr. Koos van Dam, 18-03-2022.

<sup>257</sup> NA 2.05.330, 25433, 30 mei 1980, van: DAM/MO aan DGPZ via chef DAM, onderwerp: EPS-werkgroep Midden-Oosten (Rome 28-29 mei 1980)

<sup>258</sup> Gainar, *Aux Origines de la Diplomatie Européenne*, 452.

<sup>259</sup> *Nederlands dagblad : gereformeerd gezinsblad / hoofdred. P. Jongeling ... [et al.]*, "Nederzettingen," Amersfoort, 01-11-1977, p. 6. Consulted via Delpher on 08-05-2024, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010627298:mpeg21:p006>

<sup>260</sup> *Nederlands dagblad : gereformeerd gezinsblad / hoofdred. P. Jongeling ... [et al.]*, "Nederzettingen," Amersfoort, 01-11-1977, p. 6. Consulted via Delpher on 08-05-2024, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010627298:mpeg21:p006>

<sup>261</sup> Document 2/41 EC Declaration on the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty (26 March 1979), published in Pardo and Peters, *Israel and the European Union*, 144.

international law.<sup>262</sup> O’Kennedy further added in 1979 in the UNGA that the Nine ‘cannot accept claims by Israel to sovereignty over occupied territories.’<sup>263</sup> This public criticism led to a deterioration of EC-Israel relations.

While the Dutch opposed settlements, they chose to voice their concerns to Israel through bilateral discussions rather than EPC statements. However, they did not oppose EPC initiatives to publicly condemn Israel’s settlements, especially as consistent efforts by the US and the Dutch to explain to Israel that it was losing support went unheard. Koos van Dam recalled Begin’s outrageous response to Dutch critique: ‘How can you occupy something that already belongs to you?’<sup>264</sup> Despite their criticism, the Dutch continued to protect Israel’s right to exist.<sup>265</sup>

Van Dam’s addition in Venice linking the Palestinian right to self-determination to Israel’s right to exist, highlighted the Dutch commitment to protecting Israeli interests, even when Dutch-Israeli relations were tense.<sup>266</sup> This commitment was further demonstrated when the German Foreign Minister Genscher proposed to include the condemnation of ‘demographic and property changes in the occupied Arab territories’ in the Venice Declaration. A Dutch official argued that this should be reconsidered at a later meeting, underscoring that the ‘omission of the passage (...) would somewhat spare Israeli feelings.’<sup>267</sup> This highlighted the Dutch dedication to protecting Israeli interests in the EPC without actively opposing EPC statements that condemned Israel’s hardline policy.

#### *Downloading: the EPC’s influence on the Dutch Position regarding criticising Israel*

Between 1977 and 1980, the Dutch became increasingly critical of Israeli settlements. Trying to isolate the EPC’s influence on the changing Dutch position, this paragraph examines whether and how Dutch officials referred to the EPC in bilateral conversations with Israeli counterparts and if they mentioned common EPC standpoints that critiqued Israel as reflecting Dutch views. One notable aspect of Dutch-Israeli relations was the Dutch embassy’s location in Jerusalem, which became a contentious issue following Israel’s declaration of Jerusalem as its capital and

---

<sup>262</sup> Document 2/44 EPC Middle East Declaration (18 June 1979), published in Pardo and Peters, *Israel and the European Union*, 148.

<sup>263</sup> Speech by Michael O’Kennedy, (New York, 25 September 1979), accessed online via CVCE, [file:///C:/Users/Gebruiker/Downloads/publishable\\_en%20\(3\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/Gebruiker/Downloads/publishable_en%20(3).pdf)

<sup>264</sup> Huygens Instituut, Diplomatieke Getuigenissen, Interview met dr. Koos van Dam, 18-03-2022.

<sup>265</sup> Van der Klaauw, *Een diplomatenleven*, 166.

<sup>266</sup> Huygens Instituut, Diplomatieke Getuigenissen, Interview met dr. Koos van Dam, 18-03-2022.

<sup>267</sup> NA 2.05.330, 25433, 30 mei 1980, van: DAM/MO aan DGPZ via chef DAM, onderwerp: EPS-werkgroep Midden-Oosten (Rome 28-29 mei 1980).



the annexation of East Jerusalem in July 1980.<sup>268</sup> However, as this thesis focuses on the period until June 1980, this topic will not be included.<sup>269</sup>

Tensions between the Netherlands and Israel increased quickly after Begin took office. On 30 November 1977, the Dutch embassy in Jerusalem reported to its Minister about a speech Begin had given in the Knesset. Begin had argued that, given the Shoah, Europe was not entitled to advise Israel on the peace process.<sup>270</sup> Begin spoke about the Netherlands: ‘You helped us save Jews, we will never forget this. But don’t you forget what happened. Know well – We don’t want famous books to be left by any other young girls like Anne Frank’s diary was.’<sup>271</sup> Begin’s use of the Shoah to garner support for Israel was not well-received by the Dutch.<sup>272</sup>

During his final weeks in office in 1977, Van der Stoel criticised Begin publicly by stating that ‘elements have come into Israeli policy that we cannot endorse’.<sup>273</sup> Nonetheless, the Minister also emphasised its strong support for Israel’s right to exist, which the Netherlands continued to protect within the EPC. In September 1977, Van der Stoel received a visit from the former Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin, who criticised the attitude of the Nine.<sup>274</sup> In his reply, Van der Stoel explained that the Dutch government ‘fully supported the statements of the Nine’, but also emphasised that these statements were ‘adapted also to the Dutch standpoint’, implying that these were not identical.<sup>275</sup>

Slowly but surely from 1978 onwards, the Dutch stopped emphasising their distinct role within the EPC. On 25 April 1978, Van der Klaauw explained to his Israeli counterpart Dayan that their continuous settlements did not promote a full solution. Van der Klaauw argued that their ‘European partners’ were also not positive regarding this Israeli policy.<sup>276</sup> In January 1978,

---

<sup>268</sup> Yael Yishai, “Israeli Annexation of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights: Factors and Processes.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 21, no. 1 (1985): 45.

<sup>269</sup> For more information on the issue of the presence of the Dutch embassy in Jerusalem, see for example Soetendorp, *Pragmatisch of Principieel*, 255-56.

<sup>270</sup> NA, 2.05.330, 11208; Ontvangen telexbericht afkomstig van ambassade in Jeruzalem aan min BZ, 30 november 1977, letterlijke vertaling van volledige passage uit Begin’s (red. MP van Israël) resume aan eind van het knessetdebat van 28 dezer.

<sup>271</sup> NA, 2.05.330, 11208; Ontvangen telexbericht afkomstig van ambassade in Jeruzalem aan min BZ, 30 november 1977, letterlijke vertaling van volledige passage uit Begin’s (red. MP van Israël) resume aan eind van het knessetdebat van 28 dezer.

<sup>272</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 100-101.

<sup>273</sup> Nieuw Israelietisch weekblad, “Minister Van der Stoel wenst grotere souplesse van Israël Onjuist beleid van Israël richt Haags kompas op Mekka,” Amsterdam, 02-12-1977, p. 9. Consulted via Delpher on 13-05-2024, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010860326:mpeg21:p009>

<sup>274</sup> NA 2.05.330, 12444, Memorandum van Mr. M. van der Stoel aan S, 20 september 1977, onderwerp: bezoek van de Israelische oud-minister Pres.

<sup>275</sup> NA 2.05.330, 12444, Memorandum van Mr. M. van der Stoel aan S, 20 september 1977, onderwerp: bezoek van de Israelische oud-minister Pres.

<sup>276</sup> NA 2.05.330, 12444, 25 april 1978, memorandum van van der Klaauw aan S, onderwerp: Gesprek met minister Dayan.

the Director of the Middle East Department referred to the standpoint of the Nine as reflecting the Dutch national position. He explained to Israeli Ambassador Argov that the Nine, including the Netherlands, believed Israel had demonstrated a lack of flexibility in the peace process.<sup>277</sup>

In April 1979, immediately after the Nine had criticised the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement, DGPZ Rutten met with the Israeli ambassador to discuss the matter. Rutten emphasised his concern about the lack of willingness of the Israeli government to discuss the autonomy of the West Bank and Gaza and argued that: ‘The Nine could not consider further steps in favour of Israel and Egypt until it was established that this element (...) would be approached and settled.’<sup>278</sup> The Hague had emphasised a year previous, that in bilateral contacts with Israel, the Nine should express that concessions could not be one-sided.<sup>279</sup>

Malcontent argued: ‘If Israel complained yet again in The Hague about the special ties of friendship between them being at risk, the government could always point out that the cause of this lay in other European government cities.’<sup>280</sup> However, archival material shows that the Dutch did not hide behind their European allies when criticising Israel. Instead, they increasingly expressed this criticism as embedded in both the Dutch and European stances, particularly after 1978. Despite this criticism, the Dutch continued to hold the Israeli alliance in high regard. The Dutch stance towards Israel, characterised by both criticism and friendship, was well-described by Van der Klaauw in 1979: ‘You do not always have to agree with your friends; you can also tell a friend the truth.’<sup>281</sup>

## **V. Europeanization of Dutch Foreign Policy**

When Koos van Dam outlined his role in the Venice Declaration negotiations, he named Dutch policy ‘very stringent’.<sup>282</sup> This supports the first argument of this chapter: the Dutch continued their opposing role within the EPC and did not, as Hellema and Soetendorp argued, increasingly follow the other EC members after 1977.<sup>283</sup> However, the Dutch’ growing consciousness that their opposing stance harmed their reputation in the Arab world made them at times await others to oppose.

---

<sup>277</sup> NA 2.05.330, 12444, 10 januari 1978, van DAM aan DGPZ, onderwerp: bezoek van Isarelische ambassadeur, memorandum.

<sup>278</sup> NA 2.05.330, 12444, 25 april 1978, memorandum van van der Klaauw aan S, onderwerp: Gesprek met minister Dayan

<sup>279</sup> Nederlands dagblad : gereformeerd gezinsblad / hoofdred. P. Jongeling ... [et al.], “Morgen tijdens overleg in Kopenhagen Ministers EEG-landen praten over Midden-Oosten en Afrika,” Amersfoort, 13-02-1978, p. 1.

Consulted via Delpher on 13-05-2024, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010682204:mpeg21:p001>

<sup>280</sup> Malcontent, *Een open zenuw*, 114.

<sup>281</sup> Van der Klaauw, *Een diplomatenleven*, 262.

<sup>282</sup> Huygens Instituut, Diplomatieke Getuigenissen, Interview met dr. Koos van Dam, 18-03-2022.

<sup>283</sup> Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*, 316; Soetendorp, *Pragmatisch of Principieel*, 251.

Secondly, this chapter has argued that the Venice Declaration was in some aspects less groundbreaking than it appeared. Contrary to Müller's and Smith's claims that with the Venice Declaration, most disagreements between member states had been resolved, it was negotiated in a way that minimised practical implications and allowed every EPC member to defend it at home.<sup>284</sup> Particularly the right to self-determination, valued as *the* breakthrough in Venice, had already been agreed upon and had little impact without specification of whether self-determination implied a Palestinian state.

Returning to the methodological framework, the impact of the uploading and downloading dimensions differed per topic. Concerning the PLO, the influence of the EPC framework on Dutch policy, the downloading dimension, was *negligible*. The domestic factors, such as shifting public opinion and parliamentary approval, appear to have been more significant drivers. Concerning the uploading dimension, the Dutch *led the opposition* to prevent PLO recognition by the Nine.

The recognition of the right to self-determination became *internalised* in Dutch foreign policy before the Venice Declaration. Examining the downloading dimension, it seems plausible that the EPC contributed to this internalisation, but this is not confirmed in archival documents. Concerning the uploading dimension, the Dutch maintained a neutral stance on self-determination. However, Van Dam negotiated the mention of this right in a manner that required Israel's agreement for it to be exercised. The Dutch opposed any mention of a Palestinian state but *waited for other members to oppose* first, aiming to protect their reputation.

Dutch policy *internalised* the EPC's statement that Israeli settlements were illegal under international law, exemplifying the downloading dimension. They referred to the standpoint of the Nine in conversations with Israel and increasingly mentioned after 1978 that the EPC stance reflected the Dutch position. Concerning the uploading dimension, the Dutch were *neutral* when it came to the EPC condemning settlements but actively negotiated for EPC declarations to include Israel's right to exist.

---

<sup>284</sup> Müller, *EU Foreign Policymaking and the Middle East Conflict*, 56; Smith, "Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Cooperation," 118.

## Conclusion

Between 1973 and 1980, the EPC's position on the Middle Eastern conflict evolved significantly. Before 1973, the Six had been unwilling to address the Middle Eastern conflict and referred to Palestinians as 'Arab refugees'. In the Brussels Declaration of November 1973, the Nine acknowledged the legitimate rights of Palestinians and called for Israel's withdrawal from *the* occupied territories. By 1980, the EPC's stance included the involvement of the PLO in peace negotiations, the recognition of Palestinian self-determination, and the condemnation of Israeli settlements. Although EPC declarations might suggest a uniform shift among all member states towards supporting Palestinian rights over Israeli interests, a closer examination of the Dutch position in the EPC reveals a more nuanced picture.

This thesis has explored the relationship between the EPC common standpoint and Dutch foreign policy between 1973 and 1980. It has used Europeanisation theory to highlight the reciprocal relationship, with the Dutch impacting the common EPC position – which had been generally under-researched – and the EPC influencing Dutch policy. This thesis has nuanced existing scholarship by connecting three levels: the Dutch national position, the Dutch contributions in EPC deliberations and the EPC stance vis-à-vis the Middle Eastern conflict.

The prevailing image in the literature was that the Dutch quietly adjusted their policy to the EPC.<sup>285</sup> Malcontent even argued that 'the 1970s were characterised by a top-down process of Europeanisation during which the EC forced the Netherlands to adapt its policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.'<sup>286</sup> This thesis has shown that while the Dutch at times adhered to the common EPC position, particularly in public, they actively opposed many EPC initiatives behind closed doors, highlighting the bottom-up influence of Dutch policy on the EPC stance. Thus, the Dutch were rather active opposers than quiet followers. Additionally, while this thesis has explained that the EPC did impact Dutch policy, particularly in their decision to establish secret contacts with the PLO in 1977, it has also nuanced this direct relation by emphasising that on several issues, the international context, mainly the transatlantic alliance, and the domestic context were equally or even more decisive than the EPC on the Dutch position.

This thesis has also nuanced the claim that Dutch foreign policy regarding the Middle Eastern conflict significantly shifted after 1973. It has emphasised that, while the Dutch became more aware of and sympathetic to Palestinian suffering, their primary goal remained the protection of Israeli interests and the transatlantic alliance. This contradicts Ben Soetendorp's

---

<sup>285</sup> Smith, "Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Cooperation," 118. Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*, 275.

<sup>286</sup> Malcontent, "The Netherlands, the EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," 295.

conclusion that, after 1973, the main objectives of Dutch foreign policy were to appease the Arabs and alter the Dutch pro-Israel image.<sup>287</sup> Nonetheless, a crucial finding has been that this dynamic shifted slightly after 1977. Then, the Dutch began to realise that they were perceived as the black sheep within the EPC, an image that other EPC members occasionally reinforced and which negatively affected Arab-Dutch relations. Consequently, the Dutch at times awaited other EPC members to take the opposition's lead. This aim to prevent isolation within the Nine underscores the disciplinary effect of the EPC on Dutch policy, distinguishing the EPC's influence from domestic and international influences.

A final conclusion of this thesis is that the London and Venice Declarations may not have been as revolutionary as depicted in existing literature. Müller and Smith argued that with the Venice Declaration, most disagreements between member states had been resolved.<sup>288</sup> However, this thesis has highlighted that the EPC members protecting Israeli interests negotiated these declarations so that seemingly groundbreaking elements – such as a Palestinian homeland in the London Declaration and the right to self-determination in the Venice Declaration – were formulated in a way that was unlikely to have practical implications, underscoring ongoing disagreements between member states. This approach was not merely out of sympathy for Israel but to ensure that the Nine would not assume a political role in the Middle East, a role that the Dutch reserved for the US.

Nonetheless, the historical context provided in the first chapter, which highlighted the inability of the Six to reach a unified stance on the Middle Eastern conflict until 1973, adds nuance to this conclusion. During the 1973 October War, the Dutch unequivocally supported Israel. Therefore, their readiness in 1980 to engage with the PLO, recognise Palestinian self-determination, and openly critique Israel represented a significant shift. It highlights that although negotiation outcomes at times reflected the lowest common denominator, there was a gradual convergence between the Nine on certain aspects of the Middle Eastern conflict, particularly concerning Israeli settlements and the recognition of Palestinian rights.

In addition to these nuances to the historiography, this thesis has contributed by making new sources available. The declassification of sources from the HAEC has allowed for a more comprehensive understanding of EPC negotiations among the Nine and the negotiations between the Nine and the Arab League in the EAD. This material has highlighted the divergent policies of EPC members, notably by highlighting differences in PLO representation offices.

---

<sup>287</sup> Soetendorp, "The Netherlands," 45.

<sup>288</sup> Müller, *EU Foreign Policymaking and the Middle East Conflict*, 56.

These declassified sources provide avenues for further research on the EAD, the EPC and Euro-Arab relations.

Furthermore, this thesis contributes to the historiography by applying a theoretical framework to a novel case study, enriching the academic debate on foreign policy Europeanisation, specifically on smaller EC states. Europeanisation theory has predominantly been examined within political science and European studies, often covering expansive timeframes without consulting archival sources. By integrating archival material, this study bridges the gap between political theory and historical research, offering a more nuanced historical perspective on the Europeanisation process of Dutch foreign policy. The thesis highlights the impact of Dutch national policy on the EPC standpoint, a dimension undervalued in political science literature which tends to focus on EPC declarations. This underscores the value of archival sources in enhancing our understanding of Europeanisation dynamics.

Besides these contributions, this thesis has aimed to show, by using the uploading and downloading dimensions, that the impact of Dutch policy on the EPC and vice versa differed per topic. These outcomes have been summarised in Table 1, in which the word ‘direct’ is added if the Dutch referred to the EPC’s impact on their national stance in archival sources.

<i>The topic of debate among the EPC member states</i>	<i>Timeframe</i>	<i>Downloading: a top-down process in which the EPC common position influences the Dutch national position, categorised in three levels:</i>  1. <i>Internalisation of the EPC position</i> 2. <i>Partial integration: incorporation of certain elements of the EPC position or other EPC members' policies</i> 3. <i>No impact of the EPC position on Dutch policy</i>	<i>Uploading: a bottom-up process in which the Dutch national position influences the EPC common stance, with a focus on the role that the Dutch took on in the EPC framework:</i>  1. <i>Leading the opposition</i> 2. <i>Waiting for others to oppose</i> 3. <i>Adopting a neutral stance</i>
	<b>1973-1977</b>		
<i>Establishing informal contacts with the PLO</i>		Dutch policy partially integrated the other EPC members' policies (direct)	Leading the opposition
<i>Recognising Palestinian political rights</i>		Internalisation of the EPC position in Dutch policy, but US policy seemed to be dominant	Neutral stance
<i>Recognising the need for a Palestinian homeland</i>		Little to no impact of the EPC on the Dutch national stance	Leading the opposition
<i>Articulating critique of Israeli settlements</i>		Dutch policy partially integrated the EPC stance (direct)	Neutral stance, but strong opposer of statements that did not include Israel's right to exist
	<b>1977-1980</b>		
<i>Recognising the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian People</i>		Little to no impact of the EPC on the Dutch national stance, domestic factors seemed more important	Leading the opposition
<i>Recognising the Palestinian right to self-determination</i>		Internalisation of the EPC position in Dutch policy, but the direct impact of the EPC is unclear	Neutral stance
<i>Recognising the need for a Palestinian state</i>		No impact of the EPC on the Dutch national stance	Waiting for other member states to oppose
<i>Articulating critique of Israeli settlements</i>		Internalisation of the EPC position in Dutch policy (direct)	Neutral stance

Table 1: Europeanisation

This table provides a nuanced perspective on the conclusions presented by political scientists, who described Europeanisation as either occurring or not occurring.<sup>289</sup> However, this table also underscores certain limitations of this thesis.

Firstly, the notion of alignment or opposition is based on a presumed consensus within the EPC which rarely was the case. While this thesis categorises the Dutch as opposers, the absence of a singular norm complicates such labels. The Netherlands often found support from Denmark, the UK, and the FRG, while France, Ireland, and Italy leaned towards protecting Arab interests. It thus seems impossible to support Müller's claim that EPC states were willing 'to reorient their foreign policies toward EC principles', as foreign policy outcomes were based on compromises rather than EC principles.<sup>290</sup> This raises the question of whether the downloading dimension can be applied to the EPC's intergovernmental framework in which every member state contributed to the common position. Additionally, examining a brief timeframe complicates assessing the downloading dimension, particularly the 'internalisation' of the EPC common stance, which more likely occurs over decades.

Another challenge of this thesis, especially post-1977, was to isolate the impact of the EPC on Dutch policy compared to other domestic and international factors. While this adds nuance to the historiography, as mentioned earlier, this thesis has not delved as deeply into these other factors as it has into the EPC. The international and domestic contexts should be further explored to fully understand the intricacies of Dutch foreign policy vis-à-vis the Middle East. While Malcontent covered the domestic context in his works,<sup>291</sup> future research could investigate the impact of the US, Israel or the Arab world on Dutch policy.

Lastly, the fact that the sources of EPC meetings are scattered over European national archives, coupled with the thesis's broad scope of analysing different facets of foreign policy change rather than, for example, solely focusing on the PLO, made it impossible to analyse the amount of available archival material. Examining these topics separately might provide more detailed insights than this thesis has been able to give. Moreover, future research could focus on other smaller EPC members, such as Ireland, Belgium, or Luxembourg, to better understand the role of smaller states within the EPC.

Despite these limitations, this thesis has enhanced our understanding of the EPC's common position and Dutch national foreign policy regarding the Middle Eastern conflict.

---

<sup>289</sup> Also by historians, for example, Soetendorp, "The Netherlands," 45. 'Has Europeanisation of Dutch foreign policy taken place with regard to the Middle East? The answer must be in the affirmative.'

<sup>290</sup> Müller, *EU Foreign Policymaking and the Middle East Conflict*, 56.

<sup>291</sup> Malcontent, "The Netherlands, the EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict."

Although this research has focused on the 1970s, parallels can be drawn with today. The ongoing war between Israel and Hamas has resulted in over 35,000 Palestinian deaths and both Israeli and Hamas leaders face accusations of war crimes and crimes against humanity.<sup>292</sup> The EU's inability to articulate a common standpoint and its lack of impact on promoting peace in the conflict have been severely criticised. The absence of a unified EU stance was particularly evident during the initial stages of the conflict in October 2023, coinciding with the fiftieth anniversary of the 1973 October War. Dutch Prime Minister Marc Rutte echoed his predecessor Den Uyl by initially offering unwavering support for Israel. Furthermore, the decision by Spain, Ireland, and Norway to recognise the Palestinian state, an action still considered unthinkable in Dutch policy, has further widened divisions within Europe.

The initial aspiration of this thesis was to gain insights from the 1970s regarding how European nations aligned their perspectives. However, the findings have proven somewhat disheartening. It is concluded that European political cooperation on the Middle Eastern conflict did not yield as groundbreaking outcomes as thought. Nevertheless, this conclusion offers a valuable historical context for the contemporary challenges faced by the EU. By highlighting the complexities faced when dealing with six or nine member states, this thesis underscores the challenging task of achieving consensus with twenty-seven members.

Van der Klaauw, in his memoir, emphasised that 'foreign policy, especially in a democracy, is characterised by continuity.'<sup>293</sup> Bearing this in mind, the EPC's impact on Dutch foreign policy should be nuanced, but not overlooked. This thesis has underscored that, despite the Middle Eastern conflict being one of the most divisive and controversial foreign policy topics, there was a traceable influence of the EPC on the convergence of national policies. While the Netherlands maintained strong support for Israel throughout the 1970s, their stance evolved from unconditional backing in 1973 to include more critical elements. This shift was partly influenced by EPC discussions, compelling the Dutch to develop a less binary view of the conflict. Van der Klaauw's statement on Dutch-Israeli relations in late 1979 encapsulates this evolution: 'You do not always have to agree with your friends; you can also tell a friend the truth.'<sup>294</sup>

---

<sup>292</sup> International Criminal Court, "Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC: Applications for arrest warrants on the situation in the State of Palestine," 20 May 2024, online available: <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-kc-applications-arrest-warrants-situation-state>

<sup>293</sup> Christiaan van der Klaauw, *Een diplomatenleven*, (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Bert Bakker, 1995), 201.

<sup>294</sup> Van der Klaauw, *Een diplomatenleven*, 262.



# Bibliography

## Primary Sources

### ***Dutch National Archives***

Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandse Permanente Vertegenwoordiging bij de Verenigde Naties te New York, nummer toegang 2.05.273.

Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief 1965-1974, nummer toegang 2.05.313.

Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief 1975-1980, nummer toegang 2.05.330.

### ***Historical Archives of the European Commission (HAEC)***

HAEC, BAC113/1989-23.

HAEC, BAC113/1989-25.

HAEC, BAC210/1991-108.

HAEC, BAC288/1993-6.

HAEC, BAC288/1993-15.

HAEC BAC327/1993-5.

### ***Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU)***

HAEU, BAC 39/1986, 790 Online available:

[https://ec.europa.eu/historical\\_archives/archisplus/getPU.cfm?id=SU5WLTAwMDEtMjAxOC0wNzEy](https://ec.europa.eu/historical_archives/archisplus/getPU.cfm?id=SU5WLTAwMDEtMjAxOC0wNzEy)

HAEU, Interview with O’Kennedy, Michael From *the Voices on Europe Collection*, INT669.

### ***Published sources***

AEI, Bulletin of the European Communities, No 9-1973, vol.6, p.14-21, online available via the University of Pittsburgh: <http://aei.pitt.edu/56420/1/BUL099.pdf>

AEI, Bulletin of the European Communities, No.11-1977, 111, online available via University of Pittsburgh: <https://aei.pitt.edu/83933/1/BUL182.pdf>

Archive of European Integration (AEI), Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 6-1971, vol.4, online available via University of Pittsburgh: <https://aei.pitt.edu/58646/1/BUL149.pdf>

Binnenhof NL, (30 January 2021), *Toespraak premier Den Uyl – Oliecrisis 1973* [Video], YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fNYgIUUtIZs>

Declaration of the Nine Foreign Ministers of 6 November 1973, in Brussels, on the Situation in the Middle East (6 November 1973), available online via cvce.eu:

[https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/a08b36bc-6d29-475c-aadb-0f71c59dbc3e/publishable\\_en.pdf](https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/a08b36bc-6d29-475c-aadb-0f71c59dbc3e/publishable_en.pdf)

European Council meeting, “London Declaration”, 30 June 1977, available on: [consilium.europa.eu](https://www.consilium.europa.eu)

[https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20785/london\\_june\\_1977\\_eng\\_.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20785/london_june_1977_eng_.pdf)

Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, “Nota van de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken betreffende recente ontwikkelingen in het Midden-Oosten (19 november 1973),” available online via [cvce.eu](https://www.cvce.eu), [https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2004/9/6/8ff042c7-3997-40e8-9b7d-2faa4ad321b9/publishable\\_nl.pdf](https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2004/9/6/8ff042c7-3997-40e8-9b7d-2faa4ad321b9/publishable_nl.pdf)

International Criminal Court, “Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC: Applications for arrest warrants on the situation in the State of Palestine,” 20 May 2024, online available: <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-kc-applications-arrest-warrants-situation-state>

Speech by Michael O’Kennedy, (New York, 25 September 1979), accessed online via CVCE, [file:///C:/Users/Gebruiker/Downloads/publishable\\_en%20\(3\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/Gebruiker/Downloads/publishable_en%20(3).pdf)

The Davignon Report (Luxembourg, 27 October 1970), p.3, available online via CVCE: [file:///C:/Users/Gebruiker/Downloads/publishable\\_en%20\(7\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/Gebruiker/Downloads/publishable_en%20(7).pdf)

The Venice Declaration (13 June 1980), European Council, online available via EEAS: [https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/mepp/docs/venice\\_declaration\\_1980\\_en.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/mepp/docs/venice_declaration_1980_en.pdf)

UN General Assembly (UNGA), A/RES/3210(XXIX) (14 October 1974), Invitation to the Palestine Liberation Organization, available online via the United Nations Digital Library: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/189832?ln=en&v=pdf#files>

UNGA, A/RES/3236(XXIX) (5 November 1974), Question of Palestine, Available online via UN.org: <https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ARES3236XXIX.pdf>.

UNGA, A/RES/3237(XXIX) (5 November 1974), Observer status for the Palestine Liberation Organization, available online via the United Nations Digital Library: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/189836?v=pdf#files>

United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Res 242 (22 November 1967), online available via UN Peacemaker: <https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SCRes242%281967%29.pdf>

### ***Newspaper Articles***

Algemeen Dagblad, “Van der Klaauw terug voor Menten-debat,” Rotterdam, 11-12-1978. Geraadpleegd op Delpher op 07-05-2024, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=KBPERS01:002953009:mpeg21:p00007>

De Volkskrant, “KAMER AKKOORD Nederland kan contacten PLO onderhouden,” 's-Hertogenbosch, 21-11-1979. Geraadpleegd op Delpher op 06-05-2024, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ABCDDD:010881845:mpeg21:p003>

Het Parool, “EG-landen oneens over het M.-Oosten,” Amsterdam, 30-09-1977. Geraadpleegd op Delpher op 07-05-2024,

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ABCDDD:010839609:mpeg21:p009>

Het Parool, “Minister van der Klaauw in Cairo: 'Geen vrede zonder Palestijnse rechten',” Amsterdam, 12-03-1980. Geraadpleegd op Delpher op 07-05-2024,

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ABCDDD:010847408:mpeg21:p003>

Het Parool, “MINISTERS BELGIË SPREKEN PLO-MAN,” Amsterdam, 26-10-1979. Geraadpleegd op Delpher op 06-05-2024,

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ABCDDD:010847573:mpeg21:p006>

Het Parool, “Nederland blijft toch ook nationalistisch in Europa,” Amsterdam, 07-03-1975. Geraadpleegd op Delpher op 23-04-2024,

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ABCDDD:010839887:mpeg21:p004>

Het Parool, “Nederland riep ambassadeur van Israël op matje,” Amsterdam, 14-03-1980. Geraadpleegd op Delpher op 07-05-2024,

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ABCDDD:010847410:mpeg21:p002>

Het Parool, “Van der Stoel licht EG-standpunt over Palestijnen toe,” Amsterdam, 30-09-1976. Geraadpleegd op Delpher op 23-04-2024,

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ABCDDD:010840166:mpeg21:p003>

Nederlands dagblad : gereformeerd gezinsblad / hoofdred. P. Jongeling ... [et al.], “Deze week start van dialoog tussen EEG en Arabieren,” Amersfoort, 17-05-1976, p. 1. Geraadpleegd op Delpher op 18-04-2024, <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010572082:mpeg21:p001>

Nederlands dagblad : gereformeerd gezinsblad / hoofdred. P. Jongeling ... [et al.], “Nederzettingen,” Amersfoort, 01-11-1977, p. 6. Geraadpleegd op Delpher op 08-05-2024,

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010627298:mpeg21:p006>

Nederlands dagblad : gereformeerd gezinsblad / hoofdred. P. Jongeling ... [et al.], “Morgen tijdens overleg in Kopenhagen Ministers EEG-landen praten over Midden-Oosten en Afrika,” Amersfoort, 13-02-1978, p. 1. Geraadpleegd op Delpher op 13-05-2024,

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010682204:mpeg21:p001>

Nederlands dagblad: gereformeerd gezinsblad / hoofdred. P. Jongeling ... [et al.], “EEG betreurt Israëls weigering Palestijnse rechten te erkennen,” Amersfoort, 11-02-1978, p. 3. Geraadpleegd op Delpher op 07-05-2024,

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010682203:mpeg21:p003>

Nieuw Israelietisch weekblad, “Minister Van der Stoel wenst grotere souplesse van Israël Onjuist beleid van Israël richt Haags kompas op Mekka,” Amsterdam, 02-12-1977, p. 9. Geraadpleegd op Delpher op 13-05-2024,

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010860326:mpeg21:p009>

Nieuw Israelietisch weekblad, “Twee jaar beleid Van der Klaauw Nederland is kritischer vriend geworden,” door Armelies van den Houten, Amsterdam, 21-09-1979, p. 41.

Geraadpleegd op Delpher op 07-05-2024,

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010858988:mpeg21:p041>

NRC Handelsblad, “Amerikaanse regering verrast door komend gesprek Sadat-Begin,” Rotterdam, 16-11-1977. Accessed via Delpher op 03-05-2024,

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=KBNRC01:000026583:mpeg21:p005>

NRC Handelsblad, “EG eist terugkeer op positie 22 oktober,” Rotterdam, 06-11-1973. Geraadpleegd op Delpher op 19-03-2024,

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=KBNRC01:000031660:mpeg21:p001>

NRC Handelsblad, “Israël is in een grimmige stemming,” Rotterdam, 28-05-1971.

Geraadpleegd op Delpher op 19-03-2024,

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=KBNRC01:000031428:mpeg21:p005> ; and Möckli, *European Foreign Policy during the Cold War*, 75.

NRC Handelsblad, “Negen hebben geen gezamenlijk standpunt over de Palestijnen,” Rotterdam, 31-10-1975. Geraadpleegd op Delpher op 17-04-2024,

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=KBNRC01:000032010:mpeg21:p004>

NRC Handelsblad, “Van der Klaauw geeft groen licht voor contact met PLO,” Rotterdam, 23-02-1979. Geraadpleegd op Delpher op 05-05-2024,

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=KBNRC01:000026542:mpeg21:p003>

NRC Handelsblad, “Van der Stoel verdedigt stemgedrag in de VN,” Rotterdam, 28-11-1974. Geraadpleegd op Delpher op 17-04-2024,

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=KBNRC01:000032907:mpeg21:p003>

Thomas W. Lippmann, “Egypt Cuts Ties With 5 Hardline Arab Countries,” December 5 1977, *The Washington Post*, online available:

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/12/06/egypt-cuts-ties-with-5-hardline-arab-countries/5e27f1ca-516c-489f-9043-f9a0d09362dd/>

### ***Oral History***

Huygens Instituut, Diplomatieke Getuigenissen, Interview met dr. Koos van Dam, 18-03-2022.

Huygens Instituut, Diplomatieke Getuigenissen, Interview met Dr Marcel Kurpershoek, 22-02-2023.

### ***Memoirs***

Klaauw, van der Christoph Albert, *Een Diplomatenleven: Memoires*, Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1995.

## Secondary Sources

Al-Dajani, Ahmad Sidqi. "The PLO and the Euro-Arab Dialogue." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 9, no. 3 (1980): 81-98.

Allen, David and Hauri, Andrin, "The Euro-Arab dialogue, the Venice Declaration, and beyond," in *European-American Relations and the Middle East: From Suez to Iraq*, edited by Daniel Möckli and Victor Mauer, 93-107. London: Routledge, 2011.

Allen, David and Pijpers, Alfred. *European Foreign Policy-Making and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1984.

Allen, David, Rummel Reinhardt and Wessels, Wolfgang. *European Political Cooperation: Towards a Foreign Policy for Western Europe*, Burlington: Elsevier Science, 1982.

Bickerton, Christopher J. *European Union Foreign Policy: From Effectiveness to Functionality*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

Bindi, Federiga M. and Angelescu, Irina eds. *The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World*. 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "A Timeline of U.S. Policy Toward Palestine," accessed 25 April 2024.

<https://carnegieendowment.org/specialprojects/breakingtheisraelpalestinestatusquo/timeline>

Crump, Laurien and Romano, Angela. "Challenging the Superpower Straitjacket (1965-1975), in *Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe*, ed. Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2020.

Dajani, Omar, "Forty Years without Resolve: Tracing the Influence of Security Council Resolution 242 on the Middle East Peace Process." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 37, no. 1 (2007): 24-38.

Gäinar, Maria. *Aux Origines de La Diplomatie Europeenne : Les Neuf et La Cooperation Politique Europeenne de 1973 à 1980*, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2012.

Goldstein, Amir. "Half-Heartedly: Menachem Begin and the Establishment of the Likud Party." *Middle Eastern Studies* 53, no. 6 (2017): 915-933.

Grünfeld, Fred. "Nederland En Het Nabije Oosten : De Nederlandse Rol in de Internationale Politiek Ten Aanzien van Het Arabisch-IsraëLisch Conflict 1973-1982." Dissertation, s.n.], 1991.

Guasconi, Maria Eleonora. "Europe and the Mediterranean in the 1970s the Setting up of the Euro-Arab Dialogue." *Les cahiers Irice* 10, no. 1 (2013): 163-175.

Hellema, Duco, Wiebes, Cees and Witte, Gerardus Tobias. *The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis: Business as Usual*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2004.

- Hellema, Duco, *Nederland in de Wereld : Buitenlandse Politiek van Nederland*. 4e [geheel geactualiseerde], (Houten [etc.]: Spectrum, 2016.
- Hill, Christopher J., and Karen E. Smith. *European Foreign Policy: Key Documents*. London: Routledge in assoc. with the Secretariat of the European Parliament, 2000.
- Irfan, Anne. "Palestine at the UN: The PLO and UNRWA in the 1970s." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 49, no. 2 (2020): 26-47.
- Jawad, Haifaa A. *Euro-Arab Relations: A Study in Collective Diplomacy*, (Reading, UK: Ithaka Press, 1992); and Saleh Al-Mani, *The Euro-Arab Dialogue: A Study in Associative Diplomacy*, London: Pinter, 1983.
- Keukeleire, Stephen and Delreux, Tom. *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, Third edition. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022.
- Khader, Bichara. "The European Union and the Palestinian Question (1957-2014): The Performance-Expectation Gap." *Rivista Di Studi Politici Internazionali* 81, no. 3 (323) (2014): 335-365.
- Malcontent, Peter A.M. *Een Open Zenuw: Nederland, Israël en Palestina*, Amsterdam: Boom, 2018.
- McLean, Iain and McMillan, Alistair. *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics* (3 ed.), Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Miller, Rory. "The Euro-Arab Dialogue and the Limits of European External Intervention in the Middle East, 1974-1977." *Middle Eastern Studies* 50, no. 6 (2014): 936-959.
- Miller, Rory. "The PLO Factor in Euro-Israeli Relations, 1964-1992." *Israel Affairs* 10, no. 1-2 (2004): 123-155.
- Miller, Rory. *Inglorious Disarray: Europe, Israel and the Palestinians since 1967*. London: Hurst, 2011.
- Möckli, Daniel. *European Foreign Policy during the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity*, London, New York: I.B. Tauris ; In the United States and Canada distributed by Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- Müller, Patrick. "The Europeanization of France's Foreign Policy towards the Middle East Conflict - from Leadership to EU-Accommodation." *European Security* 22, no. 1 (2013): 113-128.
- Müller, Patrick. *EU Foreign Policymaking and the Middle East Conflict: The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy*. 1st paperback edition. London: Routledge, 2013.
- Neff, Donald. "Settlements in U.S. Policy." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 23, no. 3 (1994): 53-69.
- Nuttall, Simon J. *European Political Co-Operation*, Oxford [England], New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1992.

- Pardo, Sharon and Peters, Joel. *Israel and the European Union: A Documentary History*, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2012.
- Persson, Anders. "Introduction: The Occupation at 50: EU-Israel/Palestine Relations since 1967." *Middle East Critique* 27, no. 4 (2018): 317-320.
- Pijpers, Alfred. "The Netherlands: How to keep the Spirit of Fouchet in the bottle," in *National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation*, ed. Christopher Hill, London: Publ. for the Royal Institute of International Affairs by G. Allen & Unwin, 1983.
- Pijpers, Alfred. *European Political Cooperation in the 1980s: A Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe?* Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1988.
- Sharif, Regina. "The United Nations and Palestinian Rights, 1974-1979." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 9, no. 1 (1979): 21-45.
- Smith, Michael E., "Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Cooperation." *European Journal of International Relations* 10, no. 1 (2004): 95-136.
- Soetendorp, Ben. *Pragmatisch of Principieel: Het Nederlandse Beleid Ten Aanzien van Het Arabisch-IsraëLisch Conflict*, Leiden: Nijhoff, 1983.
- Soetendorp, Ben., "The Netherlands," in *European Foreign Policy-Making and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, ed. David Allen and Alfred Pijpers, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1984.
- Stein, Kenneth W. *Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace*. New York, NY: Routledge, 1999.
- Taylor, Alan R. "The Euro-Arab Dialogue: Quest for an Interregional Partnership." *Middle East Journal* 32, no. 4 (1978): 429-443.
- Tonra, Ben. 'Europeanization,' in *The SAGE Handbook of European Foreign Policy*, ed. Knud Eric Jørgensen, Åsne Kalland Aarstad, Edith Drieskens, Katie Verlin Laatikainen, and Ben Tonra, London: SAGE Publications, 2015.
- Tonra, Ben. *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union*. Repr ed. Aldershot etc.: Ashgate, 2002.
- Vimont, Pierre. "Europe's Moment of Powerlessness in the Middle East," *Carnegie Europe*, accessed online: <https://carnegieeurope.eu/europe/strategic-europe/2023/10/europes-moment-of-powerlessness-in-the-middle-east?lang=en&center=europe>
- Voorhoeve, Joris. *Peace, Profits and Principles: A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy*. [2nd print.]. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1985.
- Wong, Reuben Yik-Pern and Hill, Christopher. *National and European Foreign Policies: Towards Europeanization*, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon [England]: Routledge, 2011.
- Yishai, Yael. "Israeli Annexation of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights: Factors and Processes." *Middle Eastern Studies* 21, no. 1 (1985): 45-60.

## PLAGIARISM RULES AWARENESS STATEMENT

### Fraud and Plagiarism

Scientific integrity is the foundation of academic life. Utrecht University considers any form of scientific deception to be an extremely serious infraction. Utrecht University therefore expects every student to be aware of, and to abide by, the norms and values regarding scientific integrity.

The most important forms of deception that affect this integrity are fraud and plagiarism. Plagiarism is the copying of another person's work without proper acknowledgement, and it is a form of fraud. The following is a detailed explanation of what is considered to be fraud and plagiarism, with a few concrete examples. Please note that this is not a comprehensive list!

If fraud or plagiarism is detected, the study programme's Examination Committee may decide to impose sanctions. The most serious sanction that the committee can impose is to submit a request to the Executive Board of the University to expel the student from the study programme.

### Plagiarism

Plagiarism is the copying of another person's documents, ideas or lines of thought and presenting it as one's own work. You must always accurately indicate from whom you obtained ideas and insights, and you must constantly be aware of the difference between citing, paraphrasing and plagiarising. Students and staff must be very careful in citing sources; this concerns not only printed sources, but also information obtained from the Internet.

The following issues will always be considered to be plagiarism:

- cutting and pasting text from digital sources, such as an encyclopaedia or digital periodicals, without quotation marks and footnotes;
- cutting and pasting text from the Internet without quotation marks and footnotes;
- copying printed materials, such as books, magazines or encyclopaedias, without quotation marks or footnotes;
- including a translation of one of the sources named above without quotation marks or footnotes;
- paraphrasing (parts of) the texts listed above without proper references: paraphrasing must be marked as such, by expressly mentioning the original author in the text or in a footnote, so that you do not give the impression that it is your own idea;
- copying sound, video or test materials from others without references, and presenting it as one's own work;
- submitting work done previously by the student without reference to the original paper, and presenting it as original work done in the context of the course, without the express permission of the course lecturer;
- copying the work of another student and presenting it as one's own work. If this is done with the consent of the other student, then he or she is also complicit in the plagiarism;
- when one of the authors of a group paper commits plagiarism, then the other co-authors are also complicit in plagiarism if they could or should have known that the person was committing plagiarism;
- submitting papers acquired from a commercial institution, such as an Internet site with summaries or papers, that were written by another person, whether or not that other person received payment for the work.

ChatGPT/Generative AI






You are not allowed to generate text, code, figures, images, etc. with Generative AI and present it as your own work. This is a form of fraud.

The rules also apply to rough drafts of papers or (parts of) theses sent to a lecturer for feedback, to the extent that submitting rough drafts for feedback is mentioned in the course handbook or the thesis regulations.

The Education and Examination Regulations (Article 5.14) describe the formal procedure in case of suspicion of fraud and/or plagiarism, and the sanctions that can be imposed.

Ignorance of these rules is not an excuse. Each individual is responsible for their own behaviour. Utrecht University assumes that each student or staff member knows what fraud and plagiarism entail. For its part, Utrecht University works to ensure that students are informed of the principles of scientific practice, which are taught as early as possible in the curriculum, and that students are informed of the institution's criteria for fraud and plagiarism, so that every student knows which norms they must abide by.

I hereby declare that I have read and understood the above.
Name: Victorine Bax
Student number: 3049906
Date and signature: 16-06-2024 

Submit this form to your supervisor when you begin writing your Bachelor's final paper or your Master's thesis.

Failure to submit or sign this form does not mean that no sanctions can be imposed if it appears that plagiarism has been committed in the paper.