

Small States, Big Aspirations?

Shifting Dutch development policies (1973) and Dutch technical aid to Colombia:
the Microbiological and Parasitological Centre project (1969-1976)

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Abstract

Jan Pronk, Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation, implemented a progressive development policy in 1973, which drastically affected Dutch development aid to the Third World. These developments were embedded in the rise of anti-capitalist and non-Western development theories, shaping new North-South relations. This study conducted archival research into Dutch technical aid to Colombia based on the case study of the Microbiological and Parasitological Centre (MPC) project at the University of the Andes in Bogotá, Colombia from 1969-1976. It focussed on two turning points: the concentration policy (1966) and the progressive policy shift (1973). The research question is as follows: *How did the shift in the Dutch development policy influence the allocation, structure and effectiveness of Dutch technical aid to Colombia from 1969-1976?* By using a conceptual framework on small states and development aid, it aimed to uncover new explanations regarding the historical development relation between the Netherlands and Latin America. The study found that due to the shift in development policy towards the promotion of *self-reliance*, and the reduction of self-serving interests of donor countries in line with *humane internationalism*, new criteria for concentration countries were introduced. Based on these interpretations, Colombia got demoted in 1975 from a general concentration country to a special concentration country. This led to similar allocations, a change in aid from long-term, extended technical assistance programmes to short-term, project-based aid, and a decline in the effectiveness of aid due to a temporary stagnation in technical cooperation. The focus of also aid turned towards projects that more directly benefited the socio-economically disadvantaged. The MPC project and its research into tropical diseases can, moreover, be seen as a successful example of Dutch-Colombian technical cooperation in this period, despite its shortcomings.

List of Abbreviations

DTH	Department of International Technical Assistance
DGIS	Directorate-General for International Development
EPTA	Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance
KIT	Royal Tropical Institute
KOS	Commission Development Cooperation of Reformed Churches
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
INCORA	Colombian Institute for Agrarian Reform
IGGI	Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia
IMC	International Medical Centre, the Royal Tropical Institute
MPC	Microbiological and Parasitological Centre
MOS	Section Medical Development Cooperation, the Royal Tropical Institute
NCO	National Development Strategy Committee
NOVIB	Dutch Organization for International Assistance
OECD	The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
ODA	Official development assistance
PvdA	Labour Party
SUNFED	Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
WITHALL	Working Committee on Technical Assistance to Low-Developed Countries

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Introduction

“In the Netherlands, the Colombians and their recent efforts to develop their own resources are held in very high esteem. I believe that I will personally have the opportunity to corroborate what is already a recognised fact in Europe, that Colombia is on the right track.”

B.J. Udink, Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation, 1969.¹

Udink, Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation, commended Colombian efforts towards socio-economic development during his visit to Colombia in 1969. Since 1966 the Netherlands had been providing Colombia bilateral aid as part of its ‘concentration’ policy. Also in the wider Latin American region the Netherlands provided aid, such as Peru, Cuba and Jamaica.² This aligned with the many other developed countries that were engaged in development cooperation with the Third World. The United Nations even proclaimed the 1960s the “First United Nations Development Decade.”³

A peak during the advancing Dutch development thinking in the 1960s and 1970s was reached in 1973. Jan Pronk, Minister of Development Cooperation, implemented a progressive development policy which would drastically affect Dutch development aid to the Third World. This shift was embedded in the rise of anti-capitalist and non-Western development theories and movements that emerged since the second half of the 1960s, which shaped new North-South relations. Pronk’s policy was based on international wealth distribution and the empowerment of the poor and built upon the concentration policy.

The thesis looks at two turning points: the introduction of the concentration policy in 1966 and the shift in policy in 1973. It will thereby focus on a case study revolving around Dutch technical aid to Colombia from 1969-1976. This thesis aims to answer:

How did the shift in the Dutch development policy influence the allocation, structure and effectiveness of Dutch technical aid to Colombia from 1969-1976?

¹ “Holanda Da Ayuda sin Condiciones: Udink,” *El Tiempo*, 12 March, 1969, 13, retrieved from Google Books. Translation provided by the author.

² Duco Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld: de buitenlandse politiek van Nederland* (Houten – Antwerpen: Unieboek/Het Spectrum, 2016): 294.

³ Peter Jackson, “A Prehistory of the Millennium Development Goals: Four Decades of Struggle for Development in the United Nations,” *UN Chronicle*, n.d., retrieved from <https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/prehistory-millennium-development-goals-four-decades-struggle-development-united-nations#:~:text=Recognizing%20that%20the%20problem%20was,%22United%20Nations%20Development%20Decade%22>

It will be supported by the following sub-questions:

1. How did Dutch development policies develop from 1949 to 1976?
2. How did the concentration policy of 1966 influence Dutch bilateral and technical aid to Colombia, as well as their relationship?
3. How did the shift in the development policy of 1973 influence Dutch bilateral and technical aid to Colombia, as well as their relationship?

The reason for focusing on Dutch-Colombian technical cooperation is multi-fold. Firstly, there is not a lot of recent literature regarding historical Dutch development cooperation in Latin America except Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles. This study would contribute to providing more insights into this matter by focussing on a specific aspect of development cooperation and applying it to a specific Latin American country. Moreover, the Netherlands does not have a complicated, colonial past with Colombia, which may give a more nuanced understanding of Dutch development cooperation in Latin America outside a colonial framework. Thirdly, research on Dutch technical aid within the concentration policy is also understudied. Lastly, when examining instances of small-scale cooperation between actors, such as the case study of a technical aid project, it may provide a new perspective to understanding larger, macro-scale developments.

The demarcation of the period 1969-1976 is chosen due to two reasons. It aligns with the case study of the Dutch technical aid project in Colombia from 1969-1976. Furthermore, this period happens exactly when the shift in development policy from Minister Pronk occurs. By grounding this in the historical and political background of Dutch development cooperation from 1949-1976 a deeper understanding of larger developments of this shift can be reached.

Case study

The case study concerns a Dutch technical aid project of the establishment of a Microbiological and Parasitological Centre (MPC) at the University of the Andes in Bogotá, Colombia from 1969-1976. The project was a shared undertaking of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Royal Tropical Institute (KIT). The responsibility of the project fell under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, more specifically the Department of International Technical Assistance (DTH) within the Directorate-General for International Development (DGIS).⁴ The goal of the project

⁴ “*Directie Internationale Technische Hulp*”, retrieved from <https://actorenregister.nationaalarchief.nl/actor-organisatie/directie-internationale-technische-hulp>.

was to train medical analysts, and provide a laboratory and materials to facilitate research into tropical diseases. The case study was chosen out of the archives from the KIT.

Limitations

Dutch development and bilateral aid will be the main subject of this study. While the list of civil society organizations involved in the Dutch history of development cooperation is extensive, including nongovernmental organizations, faith-based organizations, and volunteer networks, for the scale and purpose of this research, they will barely be taken into account. Additionally, the research's archival materials are primarily from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Royal Tropical Institute. This, unfortunately, excludes sources of Colombian parties. However, some of the archival materials contain Colombian sources (small letters, annotations) and will be taken into consideration.

Historiography

The following section will provide an overview of discussions concerning the history, objectives and perceptions of Dutch development policy based on a few key authors and works. Next to that, the literature on Dutch development policy in Latin America will be examined.

The evolution of the Dutch development cooperation

This study based its research inter alia on two significant works on the history of Dutch development history. Both have a different approach to explaining the major developments in Dutch development cooperation.

Leon van Damme and Mari Smits distinguish four areas of tension in Dutch development cooperation. In the first place, there was a discrepancy in the spending of the aid budget between motives of economic interest and the idealistic rationale of poverty reduction. This was deemed the struggle between the 'clergyman and merchant', described by Paul Hoebink for the first time.⁵ Secondly, there was a divergence in methods, namely multilateral vis-à-vis bilateral development cooperation, in which international political development and old colonial heritage played a determining role. Additionally, there was a disagreement about which type of aid to offer, such as technical or financial aid, and project or programme aid.

⁵ P. R. J. Hoebink, "How the clergyman defeated the merchant. An un-balanced overview of 57 years of Dutch development cooperation," (2007).

Lastly, there was friction between the channels of aid, in particular the position of the government department in relation to private organisations.⁶

Nekkers and Malcontent, however, argue from the stand point of ‘resilience’ which has been apparent throughout the decades. They argue that since the foundation of development cooperation was established in the 1960s, there has been considerable resilience, which complicated the implementation of fundamental policy changes. This resilience is being contributed to a wide variety of factors: the colonial past, the bi-polar world system as a result of the Cold War, belief in the "malleability" of developing countries, the expectation that economic growth would occur through the transfer of capital and expertise, emphasis on poverty alleviation nurtured among a large segment of the population, felt moral obligation to share one's high level of prosperity with the Third World, and the high degree of consensus on principles of development cooperation.⁷ Both books argue from the standpoint of the government. What they then lack according to critics, however, is the ‘other side’ of the picture. Goudoever, criticizing Nekkers and Malcontent, for example, explains the lack of donor recipient’s perspective.⁸ Jan van der Poel, reviewing Van Damme & Smits, highlights that the exclusion of civil society actors leaves out a fundamental part of the field of development policy.⁹ To counter this discrepancy, the analysis will include Colombian material on their expectations and evaluation of Dutch development cooperation to give a more holistic view of their partnership.

One of the debates also revolves around the pursuit of principles or profits in Dutch development policy. Adherents of the principles argument, such as Voorhoeve and Bertholet, both contend that the Netherlands pursued principles in their foreign policy, and overlooked the impact of economic interest.¹⁰ Stokke, according to Hoebink, therefore also reaches the wrong conclusion and argues that the Dutch foreign policy aligns closely with those of Scandinavia.¹¹ On the other hand, Hoebink contends that the Netherlands has only recently earned the reputation of being a generous donor. The aid programme started in the second half of the 1960s

⁶ L.J. van Damme & M.G.M. Smits (red.), *Voor de ontwikkeling van de derde wereld. Politici en ambtenaren over de Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 1949-1989* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2009): 10.

⁷ J. A. Nekkers, P. A. M. Malcontent, ed., *De geschiedenis van vijftig jaar Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1949-1999* (Den Haag: SDU uitgevers, 1999): 58.

⁸ Goudoever, A.P. van. 2000. "J.A. Nekkers, P.A.M. Malcontent, *De Geschiedenis Van Vijftig Jaar Nederlandse Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1949-1999*". *BMGN - Low Countries Historical Review* 115 (4):657-58. <https://doi.org/10.18352/bmgn-lchr.5391>.

⁹ Jan van de Poel, 2011. "L.J. Van Damme & M.G.M. Smits (eds.), *Voor De Ontwikkeling Van De Derde Wereld. Politici En Ambtenaren over De Nederlandse Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 1949-1989*," *TSEG - The Low Countries Journal of Social and Economic History* 8, vol. 4 (2011):137-39. <https://doi.org/10.18352/tseg.349>.

¹⁰ Voorhoeve, *Peace, Profits and Principles*, 1979 and Bertholet *et al*, "Dutch Development Cooperation," 1984 in: Paul Hoebink, "The humanitarianisation of the foreign aid programme in The Netherlands," *The European Journal of Development Research* 11, no. 1 (1999): 177.

¹¹ Stokke, "European Aid Policies," 1984, 1 in Hoebink, "The humanitarianisation," 177.

started as being commercial and self-interested, only thereafter would it take the humanitarian path.¹² Helena Arens focuses on multilateral institution-building and national interests and argues that during the 1960s business interests played a significant role played in shaping the conditions for Dutch foreign aid.¹³ Van Damme & Smits takes more a nuanced stance, and positions that both idealistic and economic motives would dominate. The economic tide affected this development, as Dutch economic self-interest dominated during economic crises, which repress the principle of poverty alleviation.¹⁴ It is apparent in this debate that the proponents of the principles are a bit outdated, whereas the commercial principle is more recent. However, this study aligns with the perspective shared by Van Damme & Smits, as it contends that the interplay of motives and principles is more intricate than a simple black or white.

When looking at determinants of foreign policy and development aid of the Netherlands, the debate revolves broadly around external and internal determinants. On the one hand, Hellema argues from a more external point of view and contends that the Netherlands' foreign policy is an 'organised adjustment' to international developments.¹⁵ Voorhoeve states, to the contrary, that the internationalist-idealist Netherlands is the main driver for the relatively progressive development and human rights policy from the 1970s onwards.¹⁶ Hellema, however, points out that external socialist, progressive developments contributed to this policy. Kuitenbrouwer, additionally, emphasises more internal determinants such as wealth growth, the 'cultural revolution' of the 1960s, the protest generation and the spread of post-materialist welfare values which contributed to an increasingly progressive policy.¹⁷ Moreover, Cooper and Verloren van Themaat consider that aid policies are largely formed by domestic factors, especially the expectations of the public and political parties about the role of the state in domestic affairs, which is then transferred to relations with developing countries.¹⁸ This research takes a nuanced position in the middle, along the same lines as Van Damme & Smits do in the debate on principles and profits.

¹² Hoebink, "The humanitarianisation," 177.

¹³ Esther Helena Arens, "Multilateral Institution-Building and National Interest: Dutch Development Policy in the 1960s", *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 12, no. 4 (2003): 457.

¹⁴ L.J. Van Damme & M.G.M. Smits (red.), *Voor de ontwikkeling van de derde wereld. Politici en ambtenaren over de Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 1949-1989* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2009): 17.

¹⁵ Hellema, *Buitenlandse politiek van Nederland*, in: Kuitenbrouwer, "Nederland Gidsland?" 193.

¹⁶ J.J.C. Voorhoeve, *Peace, profits and principles*, in: M. Kuitenbrouwer, "Nederland Gidsland? De ontwikkelingssamenwerking van Nederland en gelijkgezinde landen, 1973-1985," J.A. Nekkers and P.A.M. Malcontent (red.), *De geschiedenis van vijftig jaar Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1949-1999* (The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers, 1999): 193.

¹⁷ Kuitenbrouwer, *Ontdekking*, in: Kuitenbrouwer, "Nederland Gidsland?" 193.

¹⁸ Charles Cooper and Joan Verloren van Themaat, "Dutch aid determinants, 1973-85: Continuity and change," *Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty* (1989): 154.

Lastly, Baehr explores Dutch human rights policy and the problems that arise when carrying out development aid in the Third World.¹⁹ He determines that there are two main objectives for delivering development aid: 1) to ensure basic standard living conditions as a fundamental human right, in which rich nations should help poor nations by giving, among other things, financial and technical support, and 2) national self-interest, namely to combat poor countries joining the Communist bloc and the possible withholding of raw materials. Both are long-term foreign policy objectives which can be at odds with one another.

Dutch development cooperation in Latin America

At first glance, few studies have been done on Dutch development cooperation in Latin America. This seems logical, as Africa, and not South America often has been dubbed the ‘backyard’ of Europe and received focus for development. Latin America was left to the interference of the United States.²⁰ When looking at Africa, Dutch development cooperation in for example Tanzania, Kenya, and the broader Dutch ‘Africa policy’ have come under scrutiny.²¹

There are some considerable older publications on Dutch development cooperation in Latin America that have not been taken into account for this study due to the lack of access. When looking at development aid to the former colonial territories in Indonesia and Surinam, more comes to the fore. For example, a study found in Surinam examined the issue of suspension by the Netherlands of a treaty on development assistance to Surinam. Bosma contends that “the Netherlands did not correctly invoke a fundamental change of circumstances.”²² Moreover, van de Ham looks at the determination of the development cooperation relationship with the Netherlands by Indonesia and contends that there was genuine annoyance with Dutch policy and its implementation, as well as the political considerations in international and political areas. By exclusion of the development element from the bilateral relationship resulted in a more equal footing which can be seen as the last step in the

¹⁹ Peter R. Baehr, “Concern for Development Aid and Fundamental Human Rights: The Dilemma as Faced by the Netherlands,” *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring, 1982): 39-52.

²⁰ R.G.A. Kool, “De Bilaterale Ontwikkelingssamenwerking met Midden- en Zuid-Amerika,” in: *Ontwikkelingshulp en het Nederlandse bedrijfsleven in Latijns Amerika*, Vol. 27 (Centrum voor Studie en Documentatie van Latijns Amerika, 1983): 81-82.

²¹ See for example: Eelco Tinga, “Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en armoedebestrijding in Tanzania,” *Derde wereld: tijdschrift over imperialisme, onderontwikkeling en verzet* 16, no. 4 (1997): 452-469; Hoebink, Paulus Richardus Josef, *Geven is nemen: de Nederlandse ontwikkelingshulp aan Tanzania en Sri Lanka* (Nijmegen: Stichting Derde Wereld Publikaties, 1988); en Beleidsvaluatie, Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, “Het Nederlandse Afrikabeleid 1998-2006: Evaluatie van de bilaterale samenwerking IOB Evaluaties” (2008); Sara Kinsbergen, “The legitimacy of Dutch do-it-yourself initiatives in Kwale County, Kenya” *Third World Quarterly* 40, no. 10 (2019): 1850-1868; Grundy, K. (1974). *Dutch Policy toward South Africa*. *Kroniek van Afrika*, 1974, p. 139-165.

²² Dionne Bosma, “The Dutch-Surinam Treaty on Development Assistance: A Correct Appeal to A Fundamental Change of Circumstances?,” *Leiden Journal of International Law* 3, no. 2 (October 1990): 201-220.

decolonization process.²³ These studies depart from a colonial framework. This research is therefore unique, as Colombia has no colonial ties with the Netherlands and can provide other perspectives on Dutch-Latin American development cooperation.

There are also, remarkably some studies detailing the political interactions between the Dutch solidarity movement and Chilean refugees in the context of the coup d'état in 1973. Perry emphasizes the positive reception of the refugees by Dutch society, that Dutch solidarity contributed to maintaining essential international attention in the condemnation of the regime, and that the foundation of the Institute for a New Chile was the main contribution to the democratic transition in Chile.²⁴

When moving towards publications of civil society, there is a bit more to be found at hand. Studies into Dutch development cooperation in Colombia are very scarce or not easily available. Based on the initiative of the Commission Development Cooperation of Reformed Churches (KOS) and Aktie Colombia with the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, a study was undertaken to examine the effects of Dutch investments and development activities in Colombia. The final COLEVAL report was finished in 1978. A summary with the most important results and implications was bundled in the book *Counting guilders in Colombia, and the people?* by KOS.²⁵ The conclusions of the study were devastating for Dutch development policy, as the programs intended to help the poor ended up working to their detriment. The evaluation demonstrated that even well-intended aid to the impoverished is unlikely to reach them as social and political power cannot be formed simultaneously against the power of ruling groups. The study was handed to Pronk in 1978, who, according to Beerends, disregarded it too quickly by stating it was outdated as aid politics had changed drastically.²⁶

Methodology

Conceptual framework

In this section, a conceptual framework for small states and development cooperation is laid out. Through this framework, the motivations and behaviour of small states, and the quality of their aid in carrying out development cooperation can be examined. Recently there has been a

²³ Allert P. van de Ham, "Development Cooperation and Human Rights: Indonesian-Dutch Aid Controversy," *Asian Survey* vol. 33, no. 5 (May, 1993): 538.

²⁴ Mariana Perry, "With a Little Help from My Friends': The Dutch Solidarity Movement and the Chilean Struggle for Democracy," *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies / Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe*, no. 101 (April, 2016): 75-96.

²⁵ Kommissie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking van de Gereformeerde Kerken (KOS) & Aktie Colombia, *Guldens tellen in Colombia en de mensen? Effekt van Nederlandse investeringen en ontwikkelingshulp* (Studio Pascal: Amsterdam, n.d.).

²⁶ Hans Beerends, *30 jaar Nederlandse ontwikkelingshulp 1950-1980: zin, onzin, effecten, perspectieven* (Landelijke vereniging van Wereldwinkels, 1981): 92-93.

resurgence of interest in the influence of small states in the international system during the Cold War.²⁷ This thesis intends to add to the literature on small-state behaviour during the Cold War by focusing on the dimension of development aid. It will offer insights into the way small states engage in development cooperation in the Third World. Moreover, the limits of development cooperation of small states will become clear, as they have limited resources and capabilities. The case study of Dutch bilateral and technical aid will also be unique, as it looks at aid outside the multilateral framework. As the academic literature on small states as aid donors is quite sparse, three different concepts will be used for application and comparison.

Small states

To examine the nexus between small states and development aid, it must be determined what a 'small state' entails. Galal defines it as "the state which is characterised by limited national capabilities and the way by which it uses such capabilities in achieving the objectives of its foreign politics, with make a comparison between its capabilities and other countries' capabilities. It must be perceived as a small state by its leaders and other states' leaders in the international system."²⁸

Ultimately, smallness is contextual.²⁹ Moreover, the relative position of a state changes throughout the years and is also dependent on perception.³⁰ Even if small states are disadvantageous in an international system, they are not without influence and power. Small states were able to contribute to Cold War dynamics and found ways to pursue their goals and execute influence, regardless of alignments, in the margins of manoeuvre.³¹ The foreign policy of small states depends mostly on domestic and external influences. Internal stability, flexible administration and alliance formation are critical for successful foreign policy.³² Moreover, small states generally prefer multilateralism, can develop issue-specific power, and thus develop power disproportionate to their size, succeed in using strategies such as prioritisation,

²⁷ Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson (ed.), *Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe: The Influence of Smaller Powers*, ed. Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson (Routledge, 2019, 1st ed.): 4, <https://doi-org.proxy.library.uu.nl/10.4324/9780429425592>.

²⁸ Abdelraouf Mostafa Galal, "External behavior of small states in light of theories of international relations," *Review of Economics and Political Science*, vol. 5, no. 1 (2020): 45. Another thesis also makes use of this definition in small state theory: Clarissa de Ruijter, "The Two Faces of the Netherlands A Multilateral Approach to the Dilemmas in Dutch Foreign Policy Regarding the Korean War and the NDVN 'Nederlandse Detachement Verenigde Naties'" [Master Thesis] (Utrecht University, 2022).

²⁹ Crump and Erlandsson, "Introduction: Smaller Powers," 4.

³⁰ Jan Hoffenaar, "Nederland en zijn militaire veiligheid," 179, in: Jacco Pekelder, Remco Raben and Mathieu Segers (red), *De wereld volgens Nederland: Nederlandse buitenlandse politiek in historisch perspectief* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2015).

³¹ Crump and Erlandsson, "Introduction: Smaller Powers," 4.

³² Christos Kassimeris, "The foreign policy of small powers," *International Politics*, vol. 46 (2009): 99, <https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2008.34>.

coalition-building and image-building, and their informality, flexibility, and the autonomy of diplomats prove beneficial in negotiations and within institutional settings.³³

For this thesis, the Netherlands will be considered a small state within a Cold War context. Other authors have also recognized the Netherlands as being a small state: J. Stephen Hoadley categorises the Netherlands as a ‘small donor’ in his research on small states and development aid; Peter Baehr, Monique Castermans-Holleman and Fred Grünfeld look at human rights in Dutch foreign policy as a small state; Jan Egeland remarks that the Netherlands is an efficient human rights advocate using its ‘favourable image as small state’; and Jan Hoffenaar counts the Netherlands as a smaller power in his research on the history of Dutch military security.³⁴ This thesis also assumes that even though the Netherlands is a small state, it has an asymmetrical relationship with Colombia due to its difference in political and socio-economic power and influence.

Development aid/cooperation

The concepts of development aid and cooperation will be used interchangeably as the use and application of the terms have also varied widely over time. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) distinguishes ‘official development assistance’ (ODA) from other forms of aid. It entails “government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries.”³⁵ Generally, development aid can be differentiated between bilateral aid, aid provided on a multilateral basis, and private aid from civil society organisations.³⁶ Wickstead considers, furthermore, technical assistance, or technical cooperation as “the provision of expertise, advice, or personnel in support of development objectives.”

Motivations for development aid primarily fall under two categories: those of self-interest and moral interest. Self-interest can be subdivided into three principles: pursuing direct interests such as money and influence, guaranteeing (international) stability, and self-interest

³³ Baldur Thorhallsson and Sverrir Steinsson, "Small State Foreign Policy," *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, 24 May, 2017: 2.

³⁴ J. Stephen Hoadley, "Small States as Aid Donors," *International Organization* 34, no. 1 (1980): 121-2, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706619>; Peter R. Baehr, Monique C. Castermans-Holleman, and Fred Grünfeld, *Human rights in the foreign policy of the Netherlands* (Intersentia, 2002): 14, 133, 235; Jan Egeland, "Human Rights. Ineffective Big States, Potent Small States," *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 21, No. 3 (Sep., 1984): 210, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/424022>; Hoffenaar, "Nederland en zijn militaire veiligheid," 180.

³⁵ OECD, "Official development assistance (ODA)," retrieved from [https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/official-development-assistance.htm#:~:text=Official%20development%20assistance%20\(ODA\)%20is,of%20financing%20for%20development%20aid.](https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/official-development-assistance.htm#:~:text=Official%20development%20assistance%20(ODA)%20is,of%20financing%20for%20development%20aid.)

³⁶ Michael A. Cohen, "Giving to Developing Countries: Controversies and Paradoxes of International Aid," *Social Research*, vol. 80, no. 2 (2013): 592, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24385619>.

as part of the general interest or global survival. Moral motives include the right to development, aiming to create a better world (linked for example with the concept of ‘universal values’), and individual potential or the belief that development creates a greater degree of freedom.³⁷ Additionally, bilateral donors tend to allocate aid according to self-interest and recipient needs. However, there is very little importance on recipient merit.³⁸

Small states and development aid

One of the most cited works is J. Stephen Hoadley’s article *Small States as Aid Donors* from 1980. Here Hoadley examines the relationship between the size of aid donors and the quality of their aid.³⁹ When applying propositions of Small State Theory to foreign policy and practice, he comes to the following statements:

1. Small donor aid will tend to be given to a relatively narrow geographic range of recipients;
2. Small donor aid and resource transfers will tend to be more generous, a more prominent facet of statecraft;
3. Small donor aid will tend not to be given to the enemies of large states with whom the small donor is allied;
4. Small donor aid will tend to be channelled through multilateral agencies through a greater concern;
5. Small donor aid will tend to achieve internationally accepted norms and targets more freely.⁴⁰

Hoadly also adds in the conclusion that small states prefer giving aid which is focused more towards recipient needs and less politically or economically self-interested.⁴¹ Hoadley, however, cautions that size is merely a quality which must be taken into account, but does not determine a state’s behaviour directly. It is arguably an older framework which may have outdated elements. However, few works provide a comprehensive framework on small states and development aid, and this provides a good starting point to reexamine the way small states could make an impact internationally in the development sector. These principles will be applied to the case study to explain Dutch development and technical aid to Colombia.

³⁷ Hoebink, *Geven is nemen*, 25-34.

³⁸ A.Hoeffler and V. Outram, “Need, Merit, or Self-Interest—What Determines the Allocation of Aid?” *Review of Development Economics*, vol. 15 (2011): 237-250, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2011.00605.x>.

³⁹ J. Stephen Hoadley, “Small States as Aid Donors,” *International Organization* 34, no. 1 (1980): 121-137, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706619>.

⁴⁰ East, op. cit., p.557 in: Hoadley, “Small States,” 124; Hoadly, “Small states,” 124.

⁴¹ Hoadly, “Small States,” 136-7.

Status-enhancing through aid

Other research has focussed on the motive of status-enhancing through aid, and this variable will be used to expand on Hoadley's framework. Crandall and Varov looked at Estonia's bilateral aid policy with Georgia and Moldova and highlighted the concept of status. They stated that Estonia could maximise its aid by relying on ideational aspects and could therefore improve its impact and status as an aid donor by relying on its 'own success story'.⁴² Isabelle Duyvesteyn contends that small states are present in power politics and able to wield significant power and engage in interest-driven foreign policy.⁴³ By examining Dutch participation in international peace operations and their large investments in development aid in the 1990s, Duyvesteyn concludes that these contributed to the Netherlands' standing in the international political system.

Humane internationalism

Another additional explanation is that of *humane internationalism*. This policy is underlined "by an underlying moral obligation to alleviate global poverty, but also serving the realist conviction that poverty alleviation will serve the long-term interests of the Western countries."⁴⁴ Foreign aid was linked with the security concerns of Northern countries. It was believed that a rule-bound and mutually supportive international order is in small states' interest and that economic development was critical for the development of democracy, global peace and security in the long run.⁴⁵ Countries with this aid profile had an indirect long-term interest in promoting prosperity in the Third World by reforming the world trade system and through development aid. In the Netherlands, the moderate, commercial *liberal internationalism* dominated, which also accounts for the increased binding of their bilateral aid.⁴⁶ This concept will also be used to expand Hoadley's work to explain Dutch development and technical aid to Colombia.

⁴² Matthew Crandall & Ingrid Varov, "Developing status as a small state: Estonia's foreign aid strategy," *East European Politics* vol. 32 no. 4 (2016): 421, DOI: 10.1080/21599165.2016.1221817.

⁴³ Isabelle Duyvesteyn, "Machiavelli and Minor States: Power Politics in the International System," *Atlantisch Perspectief* 41, no. 5 (2017): 29, 31, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48581379>.

⁴⁴ Stokke 1981, 11 in: Engh and Pharo, "Nordic cooperation," 112.

⁴⁵ Holmberg 1989, 162 in Engh and Pharo, "Nordic cooperation," 115.

⁴⁶ Indirectly derived from O. Stokke, ed. *European development assistance*; O. Stokke ed., *Western middle powers and global poverty*; C. Pratt ed., *Internationalism under strain*; idem ed., *Middle power internationalism*; M. Kuitenbrouwer, *De ontdekking van de Derde Wereld*, in: Kuitenbrouwer, "Nederland Gidsland?" 193-195.

Sources

The primary sources of this research will be archival material. Firstly, the inventory of the archives of the Royal Tropical Institute (1856), 1910-1995 has been chosen, as it contains quarterly reports, materials lists, evaluations, financial reports and some limited correspondence regarding the M.P.C. project.⁴⁷ These can give firsthand accounts of the operations of the project in Colombia. The code archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1965-1974 will also be used, as it sketches a broader picture of Dutch technical assistance and development cooperation with Colombia.⁴⁸ It comprises reports, treaties, working visits, and correspondence. Next to that, Dutch Parliamentary Records will be used to provide more clarification on the policy and allocation of costs of development aid.⁴⁹ Lastly, the Huygens Institute for the History of the Netherlands carried out a project from 1998 to 2009 on behalf of the Minister for Development Cooperation to gather historiography and source publications of post-1945 Dutch development cooperation.⁵⁰ The secondary literature will concern the history of Dutch development cooperation and Dutch cooperation with the Third World, especially Latin America and Colombia. Notable authors are Paul Hoebink, J.A. Nekkers and P.A.M. Malcontent, Duco Hellema and L.J. van Damme and M.G.M. Smits.

A limitation of this research is that there has solely looked at Dutch archival sources. There is therefore a restricted view of the Colombian perspective. Development cooperation, as its name implies, is an undertaking between two countries. In the Dutch reactions to conversations and meetings with the Colombian president or government, the Colombian side can be slightly highlighted, but will not be the main priority of the study.

Structure

The chapters will be in chronological order, starting from the beginning of Dutch development cooperation until the end of the case study. The first chapter will explore the historical and political dimensions of Dutch development policies from 1949 up until 1969, with a particular focus on Latin America and Colombia. In 1949 the Netherlands first started giving development aid through the UN. From the 1950s onwards, the principles of Dutch development policy were laid out, but aid was primarily given in a multilateral context. During the 1960s, Dutch

⁴⁷ Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Inventaris van het archief van het Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, (1856) 1960-1995, entry 2.20.69.

⁴⁸ Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Inventaris van het code-archief van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 1965-1974, entry 2.05.313.

⁴⁹ Dutch Government, retrieved from <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/> and <https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/>.

⁵⁰ Huygens Institute for the History of the Netherlands, "Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1949-1989," retrieved from: <https://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/ontwikkelingssamenwerking>.

development cooperation matured and became more coherent. The share of bilateral aid within development cooperation also increased. In 1966 the concentration policy was introduced to combat the fragmentation of development aid and to ensure its effectiveness. The following years saw a break with its predecessor and a shift towards a more progressive development policy.

The second chapter will focus on Dutch development (bilateral and technical) aid to Latin America and Colombia until 1969, the start of the MPC project. To gain a better comprehension of the objectives and outcomes of Dutch technical aid to Colombia, two memoranda from 1966 and 1969 will be analysed. Afterwards, there will be an analysis of Dutch technical aid to Colombia until 1969 based on primary resources. Dutch development aid to Colombia started as multilateral aid via a consultative group under the World Bank. However, with the establishment of a technical agreement in 1966 in the context of the concentration policy, Dutch technical cooperation with Colombia intensified and satisfactory aid was provided.

The third chapter will then look at the Dutch development history from 1969-1976. Afterwards, the Dutch technical cooperation with Colombia from 1969-1976 will be examined, before going to the case study of the MPC project. From 1969-1973, Ministers Udink and Boertien pursued a development aid programme that mostly focused on promoting the Dutch economy, as well as facilitating the socio-economic development of developing countries. In 1973 Jan Pronk took over and implemented a development policy based on international wealth distribution and the empowerment of the poor. He expanded the number of concentration countries and added new criteria. The shift in Dutch development policy and Colombian resulted in a temporary stagnated technical cooperation. When turning to the Microbiological and Parasitological Centre (MPC) project, this can lead to a successful example of Dutch-Colombian technical cooperation, despite its shortcomings.

Chapter 1: The history of Dutch development policy, 1949-1969

This chapter will give a historical overview of Dutch development policy from 1949-1969. It will set the stage for the technical cooperation between the Netherlands and Colombia with the introduction of the concentration policy in 1966.

Development aid in a decolonized world

Following the Second World War, international political and economic relations were ambiguous and confusing. War-torn Europe was in shambles, the United States (US) was deemed the victorious superpower, and a wave of decolonization swept over Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Newly independent states formed and demanded a place at the world table. In this context, the US supported a renewed perspective on international relations based on decolonisation and political independence. This idea was reiterated in Truman's inaugural address (1949) where he introduced 'Point Four': "for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas".⁵¹ Similar discussions were held at the United Nations (UN), and in response, the UN set up the *Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance* (EPTA). These initiatives were also discussed in the Netherlands. A Working Committee on Technical Assistance to Low-Developed Countries (WITHALL) was formed, primarily made up of a small group of high-ranking colonial officials. Based on the Committee's preparatory work, the Netherlands decided to contribute to EPTA with 1,5 million Dutch guilders (NLG).⁵²

The Netherlands was initially not very invested in development aid, as it was focused on post-war reconstruction and the liberation perils of Dutch Indonesia. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs took over the responsibility of WITHALL from the Ministry of Union Affairs and Overseas Governments in 1950 and created the Bureau of International Technical Assistance (ITH) under the Department of International Organisations. According to J.J.P. de Jong, there was not a clear vision or deeper motivation regarding Dutch development aid in this period.⁵³ Nevertheless, in a memorandum (1950) by the Minister of Foreign Affairs D.U. Stikker the

⁵¹ Harry S. Truman, *Inaugural Address*, Speech, Washington, D.C., January 20, 1949, "Inaugural Address", Truman library, retrieved from <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/public-papers/19/inaugural-address>.

⁵² L.J. Van Damme and M.G.M. Smits (red.), Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, "Inleiding," in: *Voor de ontwikkeling van de Derde Wereld: Politici en ambtenaren over de Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 1949-1989* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2009; Den Haag, Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis): 11.

⁵³ J. A. Nekkers and P. A. M. Malcontent, ed., "Inleiding: doe wel en zie niet om," *De geschiedenis van vijftig jaar Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1949-1999* (Den Haag: SDU uitgevers, 1999): 11-13; Damme and Smits, *Voor de ontwikkeling*, 11; Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*, 161-162.

principles of Dutch development aid policy were laid out.⁵⁴ Contributing to the technical programme would lessen the differences in living standards and purchasing power, resulting in easing international tensions; it would promote Dutch science and businesses by training ‘fellows’ in the Netherlands; the dispatching of Dutch specialists could present opportunities for Dutch exports, and technical aid could be seen as a chance to ‘open doors’ in Asia, Africa and Latin America as the Netherlands was losing Indonesia as an export area.⁵⁵ The memorandum underlined the positive role the Netherlands could play in development aid at the international level and emphasised the benefits for the Netherlands and underdeveloped countries.⁵⁶ Looking forward, the ground principles of Dutch development cooperation started to take shape in the 1950s and continue to develop.⁵⁷

The 1950s: development aid in its infancy

Overall, the Dutch development aid in the 1950s remained limited and was given primarily through multilateral channels, in particular the United Nations. As Lindert and Verkoren noted, in the early 1950s “the budget for development co-operation was ‘only’ a few hundred million Dutch Guilders.”⁵⁸ The reason for taking the multilateral course stemmed from a belief that it was better suited for a smaller power such as the Netherlands. Additionally, after the war, the Netherlands had only limited funds.⁵⁹ This multilateral preference was reiterated in the *Memorandum on Aid to Less-developed Areas* (1956) published under two Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Joseph Luns and Jan Willem Beyen. They believed that Dutch participation and influence were better protected with a multilateral approach.⁶⁰ Furthermore, the memorandum implies that insufficient economic performance was the sole cause of development problems. Industrialised nations should contribute by supplying technical and financial aid, however, underdeveloped countries still carried the main responsibility of accelerating their own economic growth.⁶¹ The Netherlands took a prominent place in the UN technical aid programme

⁵⁴ Handelingen der Staten-Generaal, 1949-1950, Bijlagen 2e Kamer, no. 1734-4, *Nota betreffende de Nederlandse bijdrage aan het programma der Verenigde Naties voor technische hulp aan economisch laag-ontwikkelde landen* (1950).

⁵⁵ Esther Helena Arens, “Multilateral Institution-Building and National Interest: Dutch Development Policy in the 1960s,” *Contemporary European History* 12, no. 4 (2003): 459.

⁵⁶ P. van Dam and W. van Dis, “Beyond the merchant and the clergyman: assessing moral claims about development cooperation,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 9 (2014): 1646.

⁵⁷ Paul van Lindert, and Otto Verkoren, “Continuity and change in Dutch development co-operation,” *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie* 94, no. 3 (2003): 401.

⁵⁸ Van Lindert and Verkoren, “Continuity and change,” 401.

⁵⁹ Nekkens and Malcontent, *De geschiedenis van vijftig jaar*, 16.

⁶⁰ From the *Memorandum on Aid to Less-developed Areas*, Parliamentary Papers, no.4334, memorandum no. 2, April 1956, in: Paul Hoebink, “How the clergyman defeated the merchant: An un-balanced overview of 57 years of Dutch development cooperation,” in: *The Netherlands Yearbook on International Cooperation*, ed. Paul Hoebink (Assen, van Gorcum, 2007): 24.

⁶¹ *Memorandum on Aid to Less-developed Areas* (1956), 3-5, in: Nekkens and Malcontent, *De geschiedenis van vijftig jaar*, 29.

with 56 experts. Next to that, the Netherlands also preferred to supply financial, capital aid via the UN. Minister Luns supported the 1952 Indian initiative to establish a *Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development* (SUNFED) that would supply ‘soft loans and gifts’ in addition to ‘hard’ credits from the World Bank. Luns believed the Netherlands could play a role as a bridge between the Western capital world and the large group of developing countries. However, the initiative never took off due to disinterest from Western countries, in particular from the Americans.⁶²

The Cold War and the threat of communism also played a role in shaping Dutch development cooperation. Development cooperation was perceived to be just as crucial for protecting liberty as armaments. For example, the memorandum *The Dutch Contribution to the Development of Backward Areas* (1954) stated that in the absence of non-communist nations to close the development gap in Asia, Africa and Latin America it would be “easy for communist countries with strong increasing productivity to satisfy the demands of developing countries, resulting in the serious disruption in international relations.”⁶³ Similar notions on the threat of political unrest and the lure of communism were made by Joseph Luns, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a memorandum two years later.⁶⁴

However, even if the focus of Dutch aid was initially focused on multilateral aid through the UN, public awareness grew and demanded more direct action. In the 1950s Dutch public involvement in development cooperation became institutionalised.⁶⁵ Pressure from civil society moved the government into action. For example, pleas by Johan Wrinkler, chief editor of *Free Netherlands*, called for the Netherlands to make available “aid to the world crying out for general solidarity”. The public sermons by Father Simon Jelsma on the Plein in The Hague reiterated similar calls. Both initiatives came together in the establishment of the Dutch Organization for International Assistance (NOVIB).⁶⁶ Concludingly, the 1950s saw the first steps towards the shaping of Dutch development cooperation policy, however small. Aid initiatives undertaken by the government were primarily seen as a way to promote trade.⁶⁷ Only from the 1960s onwards did Dutch development policy mature and become more coherent.

⁶² Nekkers and Malcontent, *De geschiedenis van vijftig jaar*, 16.

⁶³ Van Damme and Smits, *Voor de ontwikkeling*, 12.

⁶⁴ Handelingen der Staten-Generaal, 1955-1956, Bijlagen 2e Kamer, no. 4334 - 2, *Memorandum on Aid to Less-developed Areas* (1956), in: Van Damme and Smits, *Voor de ontwikkeling*, 12.

⁶⁵ Gabi Spitz, Roeland Muskens, and Edith van Ewijk, “The Dutch and development cooperation: ahead of the crowd or trailing behind?” *Amsterdam: NCDO* (2013): 10.

⁶⁶ Van Damme and Smits, *Voor de ontwikkeling*, 17.

⁶⁷ Marc L.J. Dierikx, “Policy versus Practice. Behind the Scenes in Dutch Development Aid, 1949-1989,” *The International History Review*, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2017): 642.

The 1960s: maturation and the bilateral course

The foundation of Dutch development cooperation was established in the 1960s, with a firm embedment in foreign policy and broad societal support.⁶⁸ Dutch development policies became more defined, and the budget expanded greatly. However, the aid was still shaped around Western values and ideas and was a way to promote the Dutch economy.⁶⁹ The character and size of Dutch development aid transformed due to shifts in development thinking, the international political climate, and internal developments. One of the most important developments apparent during the 1960s was the Dutch orientation towards bilateral aid and the linking of the international financial-economic system to development aid.⁷⁰

In 1958 a very small Dutch bilateral aid programme had already been set up consisting of a fellowship programme, an expert programme, an assistant-expert program and projects. With the introduction of the *Special Fund* of the UN in 1959, which provided technical assistance to developing countries, the Dutch government initially decided to finish the projects it had already started with its bilateral aid programme without having the intention to add new projects.⁷¹ However, various internal and external developments stimulated the expansion of a bilateral programme. One of the external developments concerned Indonesia. After Indonesia gained independence in 1949, relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands rapidly deteriorated. Following the decline of Sukarno's political influence and the worsening socio-economic condition of Indonesia in the second half of the 1960s, the Netherlands attempted to re-establish the relationship. They organised an aid conference with the US which led to the formation of the *Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia* (IGGI) in 1967, to which the Netherlands provided large bilateral financial aid to Indonesia. Among other objectives, the Netherlands wanted to enhance its position in Asia by doing this.⁷²

Furthermore, internally increasing pressure arose from lobby activists. Church communities were primarily concerned with promoting the social and economic development of developing countries.⁷³ Dutch businesses pressed the Dutch government to start direct bilateral aid to support trade. Private businesses were losing export markets due to the 'loss' of Dutch Indonesia and were experiencing difficulties competing internationally with other

⁶⁸ Van Lindert and Verkoren. "Continuity and Change," 401.

⁶⁹ Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*, 250.

⁷⁰ Nekkers and Malcontent, *De geschiedenis van vijftig jaar*, 29.

⁷¹ Ibidem, 107.

⁷² Ibidem, 26-27.

⁷³ Ibidem, 25.

Western countries against their bilateral development policies and export credits.⁷⁴ More specifically, they demanded the government “to provide loans for the delivery of capital goods, promoting joint ventures, and providing guarantees for exports and private investment.”⁷⁵ Hearing the pressuring calls, Luns set up an interdepartmental working group. It published a report in 1961 acknowledging the advantages of bilateral aid and called for bilateral aid channels to be established.⁷⁶ Initially, these were met with opposition from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance, but they eventually yielded due to pressure.⁷⁷

In the *Memorandum on aid to less-developed countries* (1962) bilateral aid is stated to play a complementary role to multilateral aid, which paved the way for bilateral aid programmes.⁷⁸ The year after, the Netherlands set up a modest bilateral programme of extended technical aid projects.⁷⁹ The government announced a yearly increase of 2.5 million NLG in bilateral technical assistance, 20% of which was intended to subsidise projects of Dutch businesses, mainly the implementation of technical assistance programs for bilateral projects. A new state apparatus was also established. The first State Secretary of Development Aid, Isaïc Diepenhorst was appointed in 1963, and the Directorate-General for International Cooperation was set up in 1964. In 1964 the bilateral program was expanded with ‘threshold projects’ and trade policy projects.⁸⁰ The Netherlands started giving aid to India, and by 1965 aid to other countries followed.⁸¹ Forms of mixed aid also came to the fore, such as bilateral financial aid coordinated within multilateral cooperation agreements, including consortia and consultative groups under the World Bank and the OECD.⁸²

Theo Bot was appointed as the first Minister of Development Cooperation in 1965 in the centre-left cabinet-Cals. According to Bot, development aid was central to Dutch foreign policy. Its key component was “the rapid development of the economies of newly independent states in the existing world economy.”⁸³ He issued a *Memorandum on aid to less developed countries* (1966) that served as a blueprint for the coming years. It emphasized promoting good relations with foreign countries and preventing international conflicts. It also defined new

⁷⁴ Report *Samenwerking met Ontwikkelingslanden* (1960), Arens, “Multilateral Institution Building” in: Marc L.J. Dierikx, “Policy versus Practice. Behind the Scenes in Dutch Development Aid, 1949-1989,” *The International History Review*, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2017): 642.

⁷⁵ Hoebink, “How the clergyman,” 24.

⁷⁶ Van Damme and Smits, *Voor de ontwikkeling*, 14.

⁷⁷ Hoebink, “How the clergyman,” 25.

⁷⁸ Van Damme and Smits, *Voor de ontwikkeling*, 15; Arens, “Multilateral Institution-Building”, 465.

⁷⁹ Peters, “Van de nood,” 108f in: Arens, “Multilateral Institution-Building,” 465; Nekkers and Malcontent, *De geschiedenis van vijftig jaar*, 109.

⁸⁰ Van Damme and Smits, *Voor de ontwikkeling*, 15.

⁸¹ Hoebink, “How the clergyman,” 25.

⁸² Van Damme and Smits, *Voor de ontwikkeling*, 15.

⁸³ Hans Beerends, *30 jaar Nederlandse ontwikkelingshulp 1950-1980: zin, onzin, effecten, perspectieven* (Landelijke vereniging van Wereldwinkels, 1981): 42-3, 47.

relations between the North and South, which focused on economic development and respecting developing countries' sovereignty. The ultimate objective was to increase living standards. Long-term (export and investment prospects) and short-term (market protection) economic interests were critical. As such, the memorandum recommended expanding bilateral tied aid and multilateral aid.⁸⁴ Bilateral tied aid entailed that the goods and services requested by the recipient country had to be produced or supplied by the Netherlands.⁸⁵ The policy recommendations of Bot comprised ultimately of the following: the increase of aid to 1% of the national income, expansion of bilateral aid directly or through consortia, the introduction of multi-year programming, concentration policy of bilateral aid and reforming the world trade system in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).⁸⁶ Unfortunately, due to the fall of the cabinet-Cals in November 1966, Bot was not able to set his plan into action.⁸⁷

Udink succeeded Bot as Minister of Development Cooperation in cabinet-De Jong in 1967. He continued Bot's policy and strengthened export promotion and investment incentives. In 1967 Udink also implemented the *concentration policy* (formulated in the 1966 Memorandum) to combat the fragmentation of development aid and to ensure its effectiveness. Based on certain criteria countries were selected for bilateral aid. Next to overseas territories such as Surinam and the Dutch Antilles, aid would be mostly concentrated in Indonesia, India, and Pakistan, thereafter Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, Tunisia, Colombia and Peru.⁸⁸ There was initially a lack of clarity about the criteria. Criteria such as the need for aid, its benefit to the recipient country, the political implications and the significance to the Dutch economy were named. Later on criteria such as the involvement of the recipient country with consortia or aid groups, low-income level, degree of development, growth potential and already existing aid or economic relations with the Netherlands became significant.⁸⁹ During Udink's ministerial term (1967-1971) the total aid increased from 281 million NLG in 1966 to 388 NLG in 1967 and, after some pressure to commit 1% of the national income to development aid, to 996 million NLG in 1971. The share of bilateral aid increased from 83 million NLG to 301 million NLG in 1971, while that of multilateral aid remained consistent at 197 million NLG. There was further a sharp increase in the percentage of tied aid, up to as much as 90%.⁹⁰ Lastly,

⁸⁴ Kuitenbrouwer, *De ontdekking*, 142.; Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*, 142-143, 248.

⁸⁵ Hans Beerends, *30 jaar Nederlandse ontwikkelingshulp 1950-1980: zin, onzin, effecten, perspectieven* (Landelijke vereniging van Wereldwinkels, 1981): 100.

⁸⁶ Kuitenbrouwer, "*De ontdekking*", 143.

⁸⁷ Nekkers and Malcontent, *De geschiedenis van vijftig jaar*, 30.

⁸⁸ Kuitenbrouwer, *De ontdekking*, 145.

⁸⁹ Nekkers and Malcontent, *De geschiedenis van vijftig jaar*, 27; Kuitenbrouwer, *De ontdekking*, 145.

⁹⁰ Kuitenbrouwer, *De ontdekking*, 144.

the Netherlands joined several consortia, the most important being the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia, and the World Bank aid groups for Nigeria, Sudan, Tunisia and Colombia.⁹¹ Udink would remain Minister of Development Cooperation until 1971. However, only by 1973, a shift towards a more progressive development policy would occur under Jan Pronk.

Conclusion

*How did Dutch development policies develop from 1949-1969?*⁹²

The Netherlands started its development aid with a small contribution to the UN in 1949 in the context of EPTA. During the 1950s, development aid remained limited and in a multilateral setting, as it was better suited for a small power like the Netherlands. However, the first principles of the development policy were set. During the 1960s, Dutch development policy shifted towards bilateral aid, and development aid got interlinked with international economic reforms. Moreover, the concentration policy got introduced in 1966 to ensure more effective bilateral aid and to promote Dutch economic business interests. This set the stage for technical cooperation between the Netherlands and Colombia.

⁹¹ Kuitenbrouwer, *De ontdekking*, 145.

⁹² The period 1969-1976 will be discussed in Chapter 3.

Chapter 2: Dutch development aid to Latin America and Colombia until 1969

This chapter will first provide an analysis of two policy documents of Dutch aid to understand the broader motives of Dutch development aid, the Dutch concerns as a small state, the effectiveness of aid, and the practicalities of technical aid. The documents push for a redirection towards bilateral aid and extended technical programmes, consisting of capital elements and a combination of different forms of technical assistance. Afterwards, the chapter will look at the beginning of Dutch development aid with Latin America and Colombia, and show how there was a beneficial technical cooperation between the two parties.

Policy documents on Dutch aid (1966 and 1969)

Memorandum on aid to less developed countries (1966)

The *Memorandum on Aid to less developed countries* (1966) issued by Theo Bot lays out political and economic arguments for the delivery of development aid.⁹³ Generally, there is a growing awareness and consensus that developing countries have the right to determine and shape their development. Moreover, the responsibility of the Netherlands and other developed countries to promote development and increase prosperity is emphasized, both by providing the economic means to do so and by creating international conditions to make it possible. However, the motives are still self-interested. Bilateral aid was primarily tied to promoting the Dutch economy and businesses. Also, the Netherlands fostered security and political concerns and pursued a peaceful international order through development aid. It is, however, in stark contrast with the 1950s when aid was mainly meant to incentivize trade. The Netherlands also takes on a more prominent role to contribute towards the economic development of developing countries.⁹⁴

Concerning multilateral aid, the memorandum states that:

“As a small country, the Netherlands has insufficient financial resources to provide large-scale aid to less-developed countries bilaterally. Only a very limited number of these countries would therefore qualify for such aid, which could negatively affect relations with other countries. [...] The danger, therefore, exists that if the Netherlands were to decide to give bilateral aid to some arbitrary countries, our country would come under political and economic pressure to provide aid on a more

⁹³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Nota hulpverlening aan minder-ontwikkelde landen* ('s-Gravenhage, 1966), retrieved from <https://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/ontwikkelingssamenwerking/pdfs/nota1966.pdf>.

⁹⁴ *Ibidem*, 22, 25-26.

extensive scale than its financial capacity affords. [...] The Netherlands, as a small country, unlike international organisations and large countries, does not have the political weight and administrative apparatus that would enable it to exercise effective control over the rational and economic use of funds in the recipient countries."⁹⁵

The Netherlands is worried, on the one hand, about its lack of financial and political capacities to provide large-scale aid bilaterally. However, bilateral aid does promote cultural and bilateral ties and contribute to prospective economic opportunities. Opting out of it would be unfavourable, as a majority of the international aid is multilateral.⁹⁶

Furthermore, the memorandum contends that technical aid retains many outdated practices and regulations and needs to be revised.⁹⁷ The focus should revolve around providing effective expert assistance by identifying relevant priorities, investing in skills of knowledge transfer and combatting 'paternalistic attitudes' of deployed experts, combating intellectual drain and integrating projects and resources into so-called 'technical assistance packages'.⁹⁸ The latter is described as "the most favourable combination of expert help, equipment supply, training, research, fellowships and younger volunteers."⁹⁹

The memorandum also clarifies the 'concentration of Dutch aid'. It was meant to combat the fragmentation of aid and maximize effectiveness. It is therefore highly relevant for small with limited resources and capabilities. It proposes the selection of a limited number of recipient countries, the focus on Dutch domains of expertise, and the concentration of certain forms of aid in the region. The memorandum furthermore mentions the global typology of economist Galbraith. He argues that the inhibitions in the development process differ between (groups of) countries, resulting in different needs and specific measures necessary to remove the obstacles. Projects related to the social structure of Latin American countries should gain preference.¹⁰⁰ The typology of Galbraith contains strong generalizations. This raises questions on how Third World countries were typecast, and what type of aid the Netherlands deemed fit.

Lastly, the memorandum explains the Dutch bilateral aid programme. A large part of the bilateral aid was reserved for Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles. The rest was reserved for the Dutch Technical Aid programme which aims to achieve long-term improvements and ensure continuity of the aid in the developing countries.¹⁰¹ It comprised of an expert and

⁹⁵ *Nota hulpverlening aan minder-ontwikkelde landen*, 1966, 54. Translation provided by the author.

⁹⁶ *Ibidem*, 55.

⁹⁷ *Nota hulpverlening aan minder-ontwikkelde landen*, 1966, 37-39.

⁹⁸ *Ibidem*, 37-39.

⁹⁹ *Ibidem*, 39.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibidem*, 61-63.

¹⁰¹ *Ibidem*, 96.

assistant expert program, where specialists were deployed to train local authorities and assist in the project; a fellowship programme for university-educated individuals from underdeveloped countries; an ‘extended technical aid’ programme; and a literature programme, youth volunteers, financing of institutions and courses, and applications Dutch science and technology.¹⁰²

Report Evaluation of Dutch Development Aid (1969)

To evaluate the effectiveness of Dutch development aid, Minister Theo Bot requested L. H. Janssen, professor of economics of developing countries and director of the Institute for Development Issues to conduct research into the matter. The report *Evaluation of Dutch Development Aid* was published in 1969.¹⁰³ It placed critical comments regarding the allocation of Dutch development aid.¹⁰⁴ The report emphasizes, again, the responsibility of the Netherlands to partake in international aid, however modest. It argues that larger donor countries are more easily swayed by political and economic self-interest and that conforming to their administration therefore would lead to a misdirected Dutch aid effort.¹⁰⁵ The report also notes that the Netherlands should make use of international studies with objective data and principles to shape their foreign aid. Regarding technical aid, the report concludes that it is mostly based on principles selected by the Netherlands “which are partly intrinsic, partly arbitrary and sometimes applied rigidly and sometimes very loosely.”¹⁰⁶

When turning to technical aid, the report argues that there is a strong motive to deliver aid bilaterally, as it requires an established institutional infrastructure. It, furthermore, notes that restricting criteria such as knowledge transfer, and upper limits on duration and costs can interfere with the programmes. To increase its effectiveness, capital elements and a combination of different forms of technical assistance should merit attention.¹⁰⁷ Lastly, as documented in the memorandum of 1966, the report concludes that bilateral aid delivery and the orientation regarding recipient countries should be done in consultation with the international community.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰² *Nota hulpverlening aan minder-ontwikkelde landen*, 1966, 97, 100, 103, 105-113.

¹⁰³ Werkgroep Evaluatie Nederlandse Ontwikkelingshulp, *Rapport Evaluatie van de Nederlandse ontwikkelingshulp* (Tilburg, 1969), retrieved from: [https://resources.huylgens.knaw.nl/ontwikkelingssamenwerking/pdfs/Rapport%20Evaluatie%20van%20de%20Nederlandse%20Ontwikkelingshulp%20\(1969\).pdf](https://resources.huylgens.knaw.nl/ontwikkelingssamenwerking/pdfs/Rapport%20Evaluatie%20van%20de%20Nederlandse%20Ontwikkelingshulp%20(1969).pdf).

¹⁰⁴ M.L.J. Dierikx, e.a. eds., *Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Bronnenuitgave. Vol III, 1967-1973* (The Hague, 2003): XVI.

¹⁰⁵ *Rapport Evaluatie van de Nederlandse ontwikkelingshulp*, 1969, 4.

¹⁰⁶ *Rapport Evaluatie van de Nederlandse ontwikkelingshulp*, 1969, 4.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibidem*, 12.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibidem*, 13.

Dutch development aid to Latin America and Colombia until 1969

From multilateral organizations to a technical assistance agreement

A prominent part of the aid from 1950-1965 was allocated to the former colonial territories Surinam and the Dutch Antilles, New Guinea, and multilateral institutions.¹⁰⁹ Dutch aid to Latin America at the beginning was also primarily given through multilateral organizations. The Netherlands engaged in multilateral programs for the same nations it had special aid relations with or was planning to. For example, in 1963 the Netherlands became a member of the Consultative Group from the World Bank for Colombia, and in 1972 it was co-founder of a similar Consultative Group for Peru. In 1965 the Netherlands, moreover, entered into a cooperation agreement with the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) which was responsible for all Dutch loans to Latin American countries.¹¹⁰ With the establishment of a modest Dutch bilateral aid program in 1963, the focus slowly shifted beyond these areas.¹¹¹

A few Dutch bilateral initiatives in Colombia had already been launched between 1962-1965. These consisted of a few deployed experts, fellowships and youth volunteers.¹¹² In 1965 discussions started to emerge regarding the establishment of a general technical assistance agreement between the Netherlands and Colombia. For example, the Chief of DTH requested DGIS on the 10th of March 1965 a revision on the position not to engage in such agreements due to the limited bilateral aid programme. He proposes a list of countries to establish a technical assistance agreement. He includes Colombia, as the lack of framework appears to be very inconvenient for the two volunteer projects and technical projects underway.¹¹³ More than a year later in April, the negotiations on the technical assistance agreement are in the final station and a preliminary list of projects for extended technical cooperation.¹¹⁴ On 19 July 1966, the *Agreement concerning technical cooperation between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Colombia* was ultimately established.¹¹⁵

The Colombian and Dutch authorities maintained cordial contact, and the former was very pleased with the technical cooperation. The new Colombian president Carlos Lleras Restrepo took office in 1966 and envisioned a lot of changes for Colombia. He was keen on enabling a more vigorous and consistent policy for Colombia's national economy and had plans

¹⁰⁹ Beerends, *30 jaar Nederlandse ontwikkelingshulp*, 40.

¹¹⁰ C. Paulien Tempel, *De Nederlandse ontwikkelingshulp aan Latijns Amerika en het Caribisch gebied* (Leiden, 1984): 9.

¹¹¹ Beerends, *30 jaar Nederlandse ontwikkelingshulp*, 40.

¹¹² Information retrieved from NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 28056, 10 March 1965, 2, 4; NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 28056, 30 November 1965, 1-2.

¹¹³ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 28056, 10 March 1965, 2, 4.

¹¹⁴ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 28056, 20 April, 1966, 1-3.

¹¹⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Agreement concerning technical co-operation between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Colombia*; Bogotá, 16 July 1966, *Trb.* 1966, 216, retrieved from <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/trb-1966-216>.

to establish a Colombian Planning Office. He was also very impressed with Dutch development efforts and had high regard for Dutch professor and economist Tinbergen, whose advice and guidelines he requested regarding his economic plans.¹¹⁶ In a letter from Dutch Ambassador Bergsma to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on October 7th of 1966, Bergsma details Restrepo's great appreciation for the technical cooperation projects, for example on tropical agriculture and construction training, and his hope for a continuation of the pleasant cooperation.¹¹⁷ However, technical cooperation did not come without strains. In that same conversation, a disagreement came up over the issue of granting the KLM Royal Dutch Airlines landing rights in Colombia, in which Bergsma changed his tone and noted that the Dutch government might take a different stance on their technical cooperation.¹¹⁸ Another letter on the 6th of December features a similar exchange between Restrepo and the newly appointed Dutch Ambassador Meurs, who spoke of the sincerity of Restrepo for more intimate cooperation and the desire of the Netherlands to do the same.¹¹⁹

Dutch development cooperation with Colombia: concentration policy and technical aid

With the introduction of the concentration policy in 1966, and the start of its implementation in 1967, Colombia and Peru became the only two Latin American countries to receive direct bilateral aid from the Netherlands. The interpretation and implementation of the concentration policy progressed and became more defined over the coming years. Latin America was not high on the list of priorities for Dutch bilateral aid. A majority of the aid from the concentration policy would be supplied to Africa and Asia. However, the Netherlands still could and wanted to play a role in the international aid delivery to Latin America, and tried to tailor its assistance to the specific situation. It did this with great consideration of the already existing multilateral programmes in the countries and bilateral programmes from other donor countries. The aid to Colombia from the multilateral channels continued, while Dutch bilateral aid to Colombia began to increase to 7 million NLG in 1968.¹²⁰

Colombia received multiple forms of aid from the Netherlands. Firstly, financial aid in the form of loans to the Colombian government under favourable conditions was issued. Secondly, there was technical aid with the primary goal of knowledge transfer. A large majority consisted of projects, embedded in official development programmes. Thirdly, the Netherlands

¹¹⁶ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 28056, 6 May 1966, 1-2.

¹¹⁷ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 11720, 7 October 1966, 2.

¹¹⁸ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 11720, 7 October 1966, 2.

¹¹⁹ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 11720, 6 December 1966, 1.

¹²⁰ KOS & Aktie Colombia, *Guldens tellen in Colombia*, 62.

supported particular projects in Colombia by private businesses and non-governmental organizations in the Netherlands. These acted as mediators between the Dutch government and NGOs in the Third World and were supported by the Dutch government via co-financing constructs.¹²¹ In oversight, not much of the bilateral aid was allocated to Colombia (figures speak of 2% of the total amount of development aid given by the Netherlands from 1968), and Latin America was not in the prominent view of Dutch development policy. However, the Netherlands was the second-largest donor giver after the United States (even though American aid was twenty times larger than the Netherlands).¹²²

From 1967 on, the Netherlands considered it vital to document the impediments to socio-economic growth and get a comprehensive understanding of the needs of Colombia. By combining it with Dutch aid figures, they thought it to be possible to determine to what degree the development plan's aims had been met and what sources were responsible for the shortfall.¹²³ In a revised text draft of the concentration policy on 20 October 1967, it is stated that technical aid to Latin America, given their relatively high development level, should be focused on pre-investment activities, and thus a more commercial approach should come to the forefront.¹²⁴ In the case of Colombia, the Dutch Ambassador to Colombia Meurs in a letter to Udink on the 27th of August 1968 welcomed the concentration policy and underlined how much the technical aid appreciated was on the ground. Not all the initiated Dutch technical aid projects had satisfactory outcomes, he claims, but in general, they had been fruitful. He further suggested collaborating with some institutions on the ground to promote concentration and shared the successful results with the participation of Dutch students in technical projects.¹²⁵ In a later memorandum on the 12th of November, 1968 to the Chief of the DTH on the concentration of technical aid, it is mentioned that due to the social problems dominating in the Latin American region, aid should be centred around promoting public awareness and raising the prosperity levels. There was a preference for short-term expert projects, fellowships in the Netherlands, specialized education projects and co-financing projects.¹²⁶ It concludes that, due to current limitations on providing effective assistance, the proportion of technical aid to Latin America from the total aid should ideally be around 15%.¹²⁷ Many preparations were also made to prepare so-called 'country cahiers'. These detailed the socio-economic situation of the country,

¹²¹ KOS & Aktie Colombia, *Gulden tellens in Colombia*, 62-63.

¹²² KOS & Aktie Colombia, *Gulden tellens in Colombia*, 66. This book also notes that this is not a problem regarding the analysis, as the relevancy of this study is in its exemplifying the practice of development assistance more broadly.

¹²³ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 28056, 12 September 1967, 1-2.

¹²⁴ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 27212, 20 October 1967, 14.

¹²⁵ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 28056, 27 August 1968, 1-2.

¹²⁶ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 27212, 12 November 1968, 7-8.

¹²⁷ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 27212, 12 November 1968, 9.

the financial and technical aid it already receives, and what the Netherlands could contribute. When completed, it would be offered to the government of the concentration country to serve as a basis for further discussions, ultimately resulting in an aid agreement based on the wishes of the recipient country.¹²⁸ The country cahier of Colombia was eventually finished in August 1969.¹²⁹

The technical cooperation remained to be considered beneficial. In a visit from the Minister of Development Cooperation Udink to Colombia in March 1969, Udink remarked that his presence was a testimony of the Dutch recognition regarding the development efforts Colombia had made under President Lleras Restrepo. The decision to invest in Colombia particularly was due to its encouraging results in the past and the bright prospects of the future. Additionally: “in Holland, the Colombians and their recent efforts for the development of their resources are held in very high esteem. [...] Colombia is on the right track.”¹³⁰ He highlights that Dutch technical and financial aid is unconditional and does not obligate beneficiaries to purchase from the country.¹³¹ Udink attended, inter alia, meetings at the Colombian Ministry of Agriculture and Economic Development on 12 and 13 March. Among other issues, projects of priority were named where Dutch technical assistance could contribute. These included rice improvement projects, a tropical agriculture research institute, and the expansion of technical assistance of INCORA projects (Colombian Institute for Agrarian Reform).¹³² Udink also shared that the Netherlands would mobilize almost 23 million NLG for new projects and 5,3 million NLG for ongoing projects until 1971, in addition to new credits.¹³³ What was remarkable about the discussion was the appreciation by the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs López Michelsen of the Dutch understanding of development cooperation and the bitter sentiment towards the ‘failed’ Alliance for Progress.¹³⁴ It was introduced by American president Kennedy in 1961 as a ten-year foreign aid program consisting of 20 billion dollars for Latin American countries.¹³⁵ It was meant to foster political reform and economic growth. It ultimately failed, according to López Michelsen, as America increasingly used this plan to promote their exports.¹³⁶

¹²⁸ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 27212, 3 December 1968.

¹²⁹ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 27212, 5 August 1969.

¹³⁰ “Holanda Da Ayuda sin Condiciones: Udink,” *El Tiempo*, 12 March, 1969, 13, retrieved from Google Books. Translation provided by the author.

¹³¹ *Ibidem*.

¹³² NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 28056, 13 March 1969, 1-3

¹³³ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 28056, 12 March 1969, 6; NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 28056, 24-18 March 1969.

¹³⁴ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 28056, 12 March 1969, 1.

¹³⁵ Jeffrey Taffet, *Foreign aid as foreign policy: The alliance for progress in Latin America* (Routledge, 2012): 5.

¹³⁶ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 28056, 12 March 1969, 1.

After the talks in March the plans for multi-annual coordination of development aid progressed further. The newly established Colombian Planning Office went on to be in charge of managing the cooperation program, to make sure that the priorities will be determined in conjunction with the development plans and policies. Eventually, on August 12 1969 a new list of technical aid projects for 1969-1971 from the Planning Office was shared with the Hague. The cost of the projects for the Netherlands was estimated to be around 14 million NLG. The new projects put forward included three requests by the University of the Andes: the provision of experts and equipment for the Microbiology Department, the construction and equipment of a study centre, and the establishment of a psychology faculty.¹³⁷ The first request of the University, which culminated in the Microbiological and Parasitological Centre project, will be the core focus of the remaining study.

Conclusion

How did the concentration policy of 1966 influence Dutch bilateral and technical aid to Colombia, as well as their relationship?

Before the implementation of the concentration policy, Dutch aid to Colombia mainly went through multilateral organizations. However, the lack of a framework for earlier bilateral initiatives was deemed inconvenient, which led to the Netherlands coming to a technical assistance agreement with Colombia in 1966. The concentration policy formalized and intensified Dutch bilateral and technical aid initiatives in Colombia. It, therefore, served as a turning point in their development cooperation. The Netherlands pursued the concentration policy because it recognized its limited national and financial capabilities as a small state, and wanted to maximize its aid effectiveness. This approach allowed the Netherlands to engage in bilateral aid, promote its economy and contribute to the socio-economic development of Colombia.

Hoadley's framework may allow further explanations to answer the question:

1. *Narrow geographic focus:* The Netherlands concentrated its technical aid in Colombia, and therefore tried to maximize the effectiveness and deepen its relationship with Colombia, which Colombia was very appreciative of, even if the outcomes were not always satisfactory.

¹³⁷ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 28056, 12 August 1969.

2. *Generosity and statecraft*: The Netherlands provided yearly slight increases in allocation of the bilateral aid, despite its limited funds. It, therefore, was able to be a generous donor to Colombia, as such being the second-largest donor to Colombia. A point of nuance, however, is that the amount of aid designated for Colombia was on the lower side of the concentration countries.
3. *No enemies of allies*: The list of concentration countries in 1966 did not include enemies of allies, which is in line with Hoadley's framework, but did not seem to influence the aid or relationship.
4. *Multilateral aid preference*: Even though the aid was given bilaterally, the Netherlands coordinated technical aid projects with great consideration of the multilateral and bilateral programs.
5. *International accepted norms and targets*: The Netherlands was able to promote its economy and contribute to the socio-economic development of Colombia, as the internationally accepted practices were.
6. *Less self-interested and recipient needs*: By collaborating with institutions on the ground and assessing the most effective forms of aid for Colombia and Latin America, the Netherlands enhanced technical concentration and tried to meet the needs of Colombia, even though the Netherlands believed there were limitations on providing effective assistance. The most effective form of aid ranged from pre-investment activities to promoting public awareness and raising prosperity levels. The Netherlands as a small state also did not want to conform to larger donor's self-interested practices and disapproved of the linking of aid to international antagonism.

Regarding the status-enhancement through development aid, the Netherlands was able to maintain a good reputation in Colombia due to its technical aid, as the Colombian government was often very appreciative of the work of the Netherlands. Moreover, by being the second-largest donor of Colombia, the Netherlands could also increase its status. The valued technical cooperation also contrasted with the failed Alliance for progress, which puts the Netherlands in a better perspective for Colombia.

Lastly, the concept of *humane internationalism* aligned with the notion that the Netherlands promoted prosperity in Colombia through development aid, as they fostered security and political concerns and benefitted from an international peaceful order. The Netherlands also aligns with moderate commercial *liberal* internationalism, as 90% of the bilateral aid was tied.

Chapter 3: Dutch technical aid to Colombia. The Microbiological and Parasitological Centre project (1969-1976)

This chapter will firstly detail how there was a shift from a development policy under Udink and Boertien, based on the reformation of the international economic order, towards Jan Pronk's policy based on international wealth distribution and empowerment of the poor. Afterwards, the Dutch technical cooperation with Colombia will be examined from 1969-1976. The cooperation temporarily stagnated and Colombia was demoted to a 'special' concentration country in 1975. Lastly, this chapter will show how the Microbiological and Parasitological Centre (MPC) project, can lead as a successful example of Dutch-Colombian technical cooperation, despite its shortcomings.

Dutch development policy (1969-1976)

The optimism surrounding development cooperation in the 1960s shifted at the start of the 1970s to a more sombre outlook. The gap between rich and poor, in Western and Third World countries was widening and reform attempts of the international economic system by industrialized countries were waning.¹³⁸ In this context, Udink pursued a development policy underlying the economic relevance of Dutch development cooperation and maintained that it was a method to stimulate employment in the Dutch economy.¹³⁹ His provocative statements and capitalist growth vision met a lot of resistance from Third World activist groups and were criticized by academics.¹⁴⁰ During the second part of the 1960s, an alternative perspective on development aid arose, inspired by growing doubt and critics from civil society on current policies.¹⁴¹ Anti-capitalist and non-Western development theories were gaining ground. These were concerned with global unequal power relations and the poverty resulting from that. An influential thinker was the Dutch economist J. Tinbergen, who pleaded for a global and systematic approach to the development issue. His ideas were similar to that of the concept of the *New International Economic Order*, where the G77 was seeking structural reform of the global economy by equal redistribution of power and wealth.¹⁴² In the later years of his term, Udink attempted to introduce elements of Tinbergen's philosophy in his development policy. For example, he supported Tinbergen's attempt at a new structural development strategy for the

¹³⁸ Nekkers and Malcontent, *De geschiedenis van vijftig jaar*, 31.

¹³⁹ Interview in the weekly *Accent*, 4 January 1969, in: Hoebink, "how the clergyman," 25.

¹⁴⁰ Beerends, *30 jaar Nederlandse ontwikkelingshulp*, 49-50.

¹⁴¹ Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*, 250.

¹⁴² Beerends, *De Derde Wereldbeweging*, in: Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*, 250; Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*, 264, 291.

second UN Development Decennium.¹⁴³ Moreover, he participated in consultations with ‘like-minded countries’, including Sweden, Canada, France, India, Tunisia and Yugoslavia with the conviction to act as a ‘bridge’ between developed and developing countries. In the same vein, Udink set up the National Development Strategy Committee (NCO) under the guidance of Prince Claus in 1970 to strengthen societal support of development aid.¹⁴⁴

Udink was succeeded by Cornelis ‘Kees’ Boertien in 1971. Boertien broadly maintained his policy with the 1% criterion and the balance between multilateral and bilateral aid and continued the shift towards structural international economic reform. Furthermore, he added Chile, Bangladesh and Chile to the list of concentration countries.¹⁴⁵

In 1973 Jan Pronk stepped forward. Pronk was a member of the leftist Labour Party (PvdA) and was Minister of Development Cooperation in the cabinet of Den Uyl from 1973-1977.¹⁴⁶ Under his leadership, cabinet-den Uyl attempted to implement a progressive policy of development cooperation based on international wealth distribution and empowerment of the poor.¹⁴⁷ He was active in the Third World Movement before he was appointed Minister and advocated addressing inequality in its roots.¹⁴⁸ Pronk was inspired by the vision of Tinbergen on the “optimal division of labour in which all countries should produce primarily those goods that they can produce at least cost by their climatic and historical condition.”¹⁴⁹ He was also influenced by anti-capitalist and non-Western development theories such as *Dependency theory* and ‘*the New International Order*’, which state that poverty results from unequal international relations.¹⁵⁰ According to Pronk, development policies should contribute to breaking the existing economic and political dependencies of developing countries. Autonomy of the recipient countries and political and social empowerment of the poor (*self-reliance*) and reduction of the self-serving interests of donor countries were key to realising this.¹⁵¹ Regarding bilateral aid, Pronk believed that it should be directed to Third World countries whose social policies actively tried to improve the fate of the poor. Next to that, he also wanted to reduce the influence of Dutch businesses in the field of development cooperation. In line with his new vision of development, he introduced three new criteria for development in 1974: 1) the degree

¹⁴³ Nekkers and Malcontent, *De geschiedenis van vijftig jaar*, 31.

¹⁴⁴ Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*, 250.

¹⁴⁵ Kuitenbrouwer, *De ontdekking*, 147-148; Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*, 270.

¹⁴⁶ J. A. Nekkers and P. A. M. Malcontent, ed., *De geschiedenis van vijftig jaar Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1949-1999* (Den Haag: SDU uitgevers, 1999), 33.

¹⁴⁷ Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*, 291.

¹⁴⁸ Beerends, *30 jaar Nederlandse ontwikkelingshulp*, 51.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, 20.

¹⁵⁰ Gabi Spitz, Roeland Muskens, and Edith van Ewijk, "The Dutch and development cooperation: ahead of the crowd or trailing behind?" *Amsterdam: NCDO* (2013): 21; Nekkers and Malcontent, *De geschiedenis van vijftig jaar*, 33.

¹⁵¹ Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*, 292; Nekkers and Malcontent, *De geschiedenis van vijftig jaar*, 34.

of poverty; 2) specific needs for aid; 3) efforts at the socio-economic restructuring of the domestic policy (with a special focus on human rights). Moreover, he expanded the list of concentration countries to a total of seventeen (adding Zambia, Egypt, Cuba, Jamaica, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Northern Yemen and Upper Volta).¹⁵² These policy changes received criticism, as the opposition feared that aid would be supplied to socialist-leaning countries and would be used to interfere with the internal affairs of developing countries.¹⁵³ The addition of Cuba as a concentration country mainly amounted to a lot of criticism, as they noted that there was insufficient poverty, the human rights situation was worrisome and the deployment of Cuban military personnel in Africa since 1976 was deplorable.¹⁵⁴ At the end of his term, his policies were seen to become more moderate, as apparent in his *Memorandum Bilateral Development Cooperation* (1976). Nevertheless, his political ambitions were ultimately inhibited due to political opposition and an increasingly unfavourable international economic system for the Third World.¹⁵⁵

Under Pronk, the Netherlands managed to allocate 0,7% of its national budget to ODA in line with UN targets. The scale of Dutch aid grew exponentially from 1150 million NLG in 1973 to 3000 million NLG in 1977, and the bilateral aid programme increased from 410 (1973) to 1000 (1977) million NLG.¹⁵⁶ However, up to 75% of the bilateral aid remained tied. The Dutch development aid in this period also became more “ideologically and morally motivated.”¹⁵⁷ Additionally, the Dutch public and society in turn supported liberation movements in Latin America, Africa and Asia, which were backed with funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation.¹⁵⁸

Dutch development aid to Colombia: concentration policy and technical aid (1969-1976)

The policy changes disturbed the Dutch aid and cooperation with Colombia. Whereas the cooperation initially was considered to be very fruitful, the changes following Pronk’s reform, and the internal turmoil and changes of power in Colombia led to a partial stagnation of the technical cooperation.

At the beginning of the 1970s, Dutch aid to Colombia was primarily focused on the traditional sectors such as agriculture, cultural engineering and water management. The

¹⁵² Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*, 294.

¹⁵³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵⁴ C. Paulien Tempel, *De Nederlandse ontwikkelingshulp aan Latijns Amerika en het Caribisch gebied* (Leiden, 1984): 19.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, 296.

¹⁵⁶ Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*, 293-294.

¹⁵⁷ Gabi Spitz, Roeland Muskens, and Edith van Ewijk, "The Dutch and development cooperation," *Amsterdam: NCDO* (2013): 21.

¹⁵⁸ Spitz, Muskens and van Ewijk, "The Dutch," 11.

technical aid projects were often study-oriented in the long term.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, the Netherlands and Colombia had a good development cooperation relationship. In 1970 Misael Pastrana Borrero took office as the new Colombian president. Interactions between Borrero and the Dutch Ambassador Varekamp emphasized the excellent relationship between the two countries, especially in the field of technical cooperation.¹⁶⁰ By July 1970, however, questions arose about whether there should be an expansion of the number of concentration countries and the introduction of a 'reserve list'.¹⁶¹ Concentration countries were formerly selected on the premise that it was involved in a consortium or Consultative Group of the World Bank. This was due to the belief that the Netherlands as a small country was not able to evaluate the development potential and policy of a developing country.

The development cooperation between the Netherlands and Colombia continued and a development aid agreement was reached in 1972, which totalled the amount of aid Colombia would receive to 72 million NLG over four years.¹⁶² Nearing the end of 1973, frustration began to arise from the Netherlands in preparation for the prospective multi-annual planning for bilateral technical cooperation. The structure of the cooperation left much to be desired and more coordination on general development issues and future structured cooperation was demanded by the Netherlands. People even expressed that in the case of a possible restructuring of the concentration policy, Colombia could be removed from the list.¹⁶³

Turning to 1974, two interesting developments occurred. The first one is the start of an evaluation study on Dutch activities in development cooperation and private investment in Colombia aid and investments in Colombia conducted by the VU Amsterdam en Development Cooperation Committee of the Reformed Churches (KOS).¹⁶⁴ Furthermore, plans were shared for a provisional distribution of bilateral technical and financial aid funds for 1975 and 1976 for all concentration countries.¹⁶⁵ Much was still tentative about the distribution of funds and development cooperation. However, new concentration countries were added to the list and proposals were made to increase the allocations of most concentration countries by around 25%. The technical aid commitment for Colombia was estimated at 9 (1975) and 10 (1976) million

¹⁵⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Begroting 1977*, hoofdstuk V, nr. 2, 68, retrieved from

https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/19761977/0000190163/1/pdf/SGD_19761977_0002595.pdf

¹⁶⁰ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 11720, 16 October 1970, 2.

¹⁶¹ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 27212, 13 July 1970, 1.

¹⁶² KOS & Aktie Colombia, *Guldens tellen in Colombia*, 62.

¹⁶³ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 28060, 8 November 1973.

¹⁶⁴ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 28060, May 1974. The report, titled *COLEVAL: een poging tot evaluatie vanuit de basis van de Nederlandse particuliere investeringen en overheidshulp in Colombia* by G.J. Apeldoorn and J.J. Goudsmit would eventually be published in 1977 and presented to Pronk in 1978. The conclusions were devastating, as the report claims that projects designed to benefit the poor often fell to their disadvantage. See also: Beerends, *30 jaar Nederlandse ontwikkelingshulp*, 92-93.

¹⁶⁵ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 27212, 23 August 1974.

NLG, but no elaborations were made as to why.¹⁶⁶ Plans were, moreover, made to demote Colombia to a ‘special concentration country’. This meant that their aid requirement was limited and they would mainly receive project-based aid. Their eligibility for foreign aid was primarily based on the criterion of a domestic policy that benefited the entire country (Pronk’s third criterion).¹⁶⁷ However, concerns were raised that double standards were being applied in the case of Peru and Colombia, of which the former would remain a normal concentration policy despite indicators that Colombia would also be eligible (for example when looking at the per capita income and growing support for socio-economic reforms).¹⁶⁸

In 1974 Alfonso López Michelsen took over the presidency. At the time, Colombia was experiencing an economic crisis, which demanded Michelson take a host of drastic economic and social measures. The relationship between the Colombian and Dutch authorities seemed to be fine.¹⁶⁹ However, difficulties arose in aligning the technical cooperation efforts. In a letter from the Dutch Ambassador to Colombia Regtdoorzee Greup to Minister Pronk on 6 December, he detailed difficulties in aligning the technical cooperation between Colombia and the Netherlands. The Colombian authorities are unable to deliver new project proposals on time, resulting in difficulties for Dutch project management. This is apparently due to the change of government and the current financial-economic situation of the country. The Ambassador mentions possible explanations for the stagnation in cooperation, such as differences in views on development priorities and incompatibility between the Dutch terms of cooperation and Colombian national self-awareness mandating autonomous decision-making power. In conclusion, he cites policy and power shifts are hindering the formulation of development plans and requests Pronk to grant them more time.¹⁷⁰

Over the period 1975-1976, Colombia would be designated as a special concentration country and receive 8 million NLG (1976) in technical aid. The emphasis of the aid shifted towards projects that were more short-term and focused on benefitting the socio-economically weaker members of society. The Colombian government also had ambitious plans to close the wealth gap for the poorest 50% of the country.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁶ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 27212, 23 August 1974, 2.

¹⁶⁷ C. Paulien Tempel, *De Nederlandse ontwikkelingshulp aan Latijns Amerika en het Caribisch gebied* (Leiden, 1984): 14.

¹⁶⁸ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 28060, 12 August 1974.

¹⁶⁹ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 11720, 15 November 1974.

¹⁷⁰ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 28060, 6 December 1974.

¹⁷¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Begroting 1977*, Hoofdstuk V, nr. 2, 68, retrieved from https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/19761977/0000190163/1/pdf/SGD_19761977_0002595.pdf.

The Microbiological and Parasitological Centre project (1969-1967)

Developments leading up to the project

In August 1969 the request for the establishment of a Microbiological and Parasitological Centre (MPC) for the University of the Andes was communicated to the Hague. The project would consist of training of medical analysts, and the provision of a laboratory and equipment to promote research on tropical diseases. The International Medical Centre (IMC) of the Royal Tropical Institute (KIT) of the Netherlands had greenlighted the project.¹⁷² The KIT had several projects under its belt, including medical projects in Kenya and Tunisia. The IMC, moreover, functioned as an advisory institute for Dutch technical aid projects in the medical sector. The KIT deemed the project highly beneficial to Colombia's public health sector. Furthermore, it declared that it would contribute to the scientific research of the IMC and facilitate useful exchange between the Southern American and African regions through the KIT.¹⁷³

The KIT was therefore appointed by the Dutch government to take charge of the project. A medical advisor of the Centre, Vervoorn, was asked to discuss the implementation with the University and the Embassy during a visit to Colombia in September.¹⁷⁴ He concluded after his visit that the proposal was a well-defined plan and gave a positive verdict.¹⁷⁵ Regarding the costs, the provisional estimated cost of the project for the Netherlands was set out to be 420,000 NLG (out of a total of 11,2 million NLG for technical aid projects designated for Colombia from 1969-1971), which covered the experts, materials and other costs.¹⁷⁶ The Colombian government and University would be responsible for the salaries of the Colombian staff.¹⁷⁷ Whereas normally the funding for deployed experts would come from the funds for the expert programme, in the case of MPC it came from the funds for the project programme.¹⁷⁸

The Colombian and Dutch parties encountered some difficulties, however, in the coordination of the project. The Netherlands was frustrated vis-à-vis Colombia for not submitting project proposals within the agreed financial framework, as well as repeated modification of the list of project proposals. which might affect the timely start and implementation of the projects. On the Colombian side, it was unclear as to who determines where the funds allocated for technical cooperation would go (distinction between government projects and co-financing of projects by businesses and non-governmental organizations). This

¹⁷² NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 28056, 12 and 25 August 1969.

¹⁷³ NL-HaNA, Royal Tropical Institute (1856) 1910-1995, 2.20.69, inv. nr. 4245, 1 August 1969.

¹⁷⁴ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 28056, 12 and 25 August 1969.

¹⁷⁵ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 28256, 17 October, 1969.

¹⁷⁶ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 28056, 6 October 1969, 1.

¹⁷⁷ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 28056, 25 August 1969, 2.

¹⁷⁸ NL-HaNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1965-1974, 2.05.313, inv. nr. 28056, 13 October 1969, 2.

was eventually smoothed over by communication efforts on both sides and in April 1970 it was decided the project could take off.¹⁷⁹

Initially, the project was scheduled to commence on 1 October 1970. Dr C. J. Marinkelle, appointed by the KIT, would be the project leader as a deployed expert. Furthermore, an amount of 33,000 NLG preparatory expenses for 1969-1970 and a total budget of 617,000 NLG for the period 1970-1974 was set aside, higher than first estimated.¹⁸⁰ However, it took more time than expected due to the pending finalization of the administrative agreements. Therefore, the funds remained inaccessible. The administrative agreement between the DTH (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the KIT was reached at the end of 1971.¹⁸¹ The project would also consist of a literature programme and fellowships. Lastly, another administrative agreement was signed between the KIT and the University of the Andes in which the Colombian contribution was established to be the provision of counterpart personnel and part of the equipment and library.¹⁸²

The expectations of the project were high, even if the project was small in size. If successful, the project could enhance technical cooperation between the Netherlands and Colombia, as well as enhance knowledge transfer. In order to examine this, a few key events will be highlighted.

Analysis of the project: noteworthy events

Marinkelle, the appointed project leader, wrote a series of quarterly or trimestrial reports over the period 1971-1975 for the KIT. He tracked the parasitological and microbiological courses given to the students, supervised and trained the students and local personnel, oversaw research activities, coordinated other activities and travels in the interest of the project, coordinated with other Colombian and foreign institutions and oversaw the literature program. He was supported by other Dutch (assistant) experts, Colombian counterparts and local Colombian staff.¹⁸³ He indicated that the project was off to a slow start, due to the lack of signed administrative agreements, student strikes over the country, the closing of universities, resignation of the various high-level University officials, and communication troubles with various university directives.¹⁸⁴ However, the project got up to speed as the above obstacles got cleared.

¹⁷⁹ NL-HaNA, Royal Tropical Institute (1856) 1910-1995, 2.20.69, inv. nr. 4245, 16 April 1969.

¹⁸⁰ NL-HaNA, Royal Tropical Institute (1856) 1910-1995, 2.20.69, inv. nr. 4245, 18 August 1970. The Colombian contribution would amount to 3,87 million Colombian pesos.

¹⁸¹ NL-HaNA, Royal Tropical Institute (1856) 1910-1995, 2.20.69, inv. nr. 4245, 31 December 1971.

¹⁸² NL-HaNA, Royal Tropical Institute (1856) 1910-1995, 2.20.69, inv. nr. 4247, 3 September 1971

¹⁸³ NL-HaNA, Royal Tropical Institute (1856) 1910-1995, 2.20.69, inv. nr. 4246.

¹⁸⁴ NL-HaNA, Royal Tropical Institute (1856) 1910-1995, 2.20.69, inv. nr. 4246, July 1971.

One of the first notable events is recorded in a report about M. M. van Poll's working visit from 20 July until 22 August 1972.¹⁸⁵ The purpose of the visit was based on accusations by H. Hanssen (the resigned Colombian counterpart of project leader Marinkelle) against the project leader and the intentions of the Colombian authorities to investigate as a result of these accusations. To avoid unnecessary action by the Colombian side, the Dutch ambassador had already insisted on launching an investigation from the Dutch side as well. The accusations revolved around a few core issues. During the project, Marinkelle conducted research for the "Life Sciences Division of the Army Research Office in the United States" (related to the transmission of *plasmodium Brasilianum* under natural conditions in Colombia) in the time allocated to the MPC project. He also declared his activities as part of the MPC operations for the American Army project and directed a fellow to do the same. Furthermore, he allegedly was also conducting research for the Bayer Corporation of Colombia and received a substantial sum of money for it. Additionally, there were mentions of fellowship amounts that had to be ceded to Marinkelle, as well as issues concerning fellows who have quit, negative remarks against colleagues and issues regarding the management of project funds and assets. Van Poll concludes that before conclusions can be drawn, further definitive measures should be taken to bring the project back in order, clarification should be received from Marinkelle and the KIT, and a critical evaluation of the relationships between the different parties should be carried out.¹⁸⁶ Remarkably, there is little to no mention of the outcome of these charges in the archival material. Marinkelle remained the project leader until the end of the project. This sensitive issue may have been addressed outside the documentation, glossed over or not have been entirely accurate.

Due to a long absence from Marinkelle (sickness and vacation) in 1971, the project ran into major delays. However, according to Marinkelle's reports in 1973, they were able to overcome most of the delays.¹⁸⁷ The Director of the Department of Tropical Hygiene from the KIT visited the University in January 1973 to observe the functioning of the project and, managed to solve the doubts or misunderstandings that were plaguing the project.¹⁸⁸

Other events to note were the two working visits H. Dikken, a visiting expert, undertook in 1973 and 1974. The reason for his visit was to teach courses and conduct observations about the project. Both of his visits were met with great enthusiasm of the students and great

¹⁸⁵ NL-HaNA, Royal Tropical Institute (1856) 1910-1995, 2.20.69, inv. nr. 4248, 4 September 1972.

¹⁸⁶ NL-HaNA, Royal Tropical Institute (1856) 1910-1995, 2.20.69, inv. nr. 4248, 4 September 1972.

¹⁸⁷ NL-HaNA, Royal Tropical Institute (1856) 1910-1995, 2.20.69, inv. nr. 4246, 1973.

¹⁸⁸ NL-HaNA, Royal Tropical Institute (1856) 1910-1995, 2.20.69, inv. nr. 4246, 1973.

appreciation from the project leader.¹⁸⁹ His first visit was from 11 June to 11 July 1973.¹⁹⁰ His initial impression is that the project is progressing fairly smoothly, all necessary facilities are available, and the groups are making concerted efforts towards the project's goals. The major obstacle, however, is the lack of effective communication with the Netherlands, primarily the Medical Development Cooperation section (MOS) of the Department of Tropical Hygiene (KIT). This issue has caused difficulties in important areas such as financial management and acquiring essential equipment, notes Dikken, and should be resolved quickly.¹⁹¹ Marinkelle also mentions in his last report from 1973 several pending issues which had to be straightened with the KIT and DTH. However, he states that despite the “numerous misunderstandings since early 1972” the work carried out in Colombia has led to satisfactory progress in the project.¹⁹² The working visit of Dikken helped eradicate most of the ‘existing misunderstandings’, notes Marinkelle.¹⁹³

The rest of the project advances without any significant incidents. Marinkelle receives, for example, an award from the rector of the University for his scholarly efforts and receives high praise for his generous donation of scientific material to the university library.¹⁹⁴ The project was in 1975 extended for another six months to ensure successful completion.¹⁹⁵ The final report of Marinkelle in 1976 explains in detail how the project had progressed and which aims had been fulfilled.¹⁹⁶ In summary, the activities of the project improved the teaching of courses, formed well-trained staff members, and carried out and facilitated original research. Most importantly, it “developed [...] techniques for the diagnosis of diseases which are especially common among the poor part of the population, and has provided numerous diagnostic tests for hospital patients.”¹⁹⁷ Moreover, the university and the government entity COLCIENCIAS offered additional grant support and positions as staff members to the students to ensure the continuation of the research activities and education.

Conclusion

How did the shift in the development policy of 1973 influence Dutch bilateral and technical aid to Colombia, as well as their relationship?

¹⁸⁹ NL-HaNA, Royal Tropical Institute (1856) 1910-1995, 2.20.69, inv. nr. 4246, 1973 and 1974

¹⁹⁰ NL-HaNA, Royal Tropical Institute (1856) 1910-1995, 2.20.69, inv. nr. 6809, July 1973.

¹⁹¹ NL-HaNA, Royal Tropical Institute (1856) 1910-1995, 2.20.69, inv. nr. 6809, July 1973.

¹⁹² NL-HaNA, Royal Tropical Institute (1856) 1910-1995, 2.20.69, inv. nr. 4246, 1973.

¹⁹³ NL-HaNA, Royal Tropical Institute (1856) 1910-1995, 2.20.69, inv. nr. 4246, 1973.

¹⁹⁴ NL-HaNA, Royal Tropical Institute (1856) 1910-1995, 2.20.69, inv. nr. 6809, 3 September and 18 December 1974.

¹⁹⁵ NL-HaNA, Royal Tropical Institute (1856) 1910-1995, 2.20.69, inv. nr. 6809, 1975.

¹⁹⁶ NL-HaNA, Royal Tropical Institute (1856) 1910-1995, 2.20.69, inv. nr. 6812, April 1976.

¹⁹⁷ NL-HaNA, Royal Tropical Institute (1856) 1910-1995, 2.20.69, inv. nr. 6812, April 1976.

The shift in policy led to a demotion of Colombia to a ‘special concentration country, which limited its aid to be short-term and project-based, and the allocations remained similar. The focus of aid turned towards projects that more directly benefited the socio-economically disadvantaged. The policy transformed from structural economic reforms and a focus on stimulating the Dutch economy into the promotion of *self-reliance* and reduction of self-serving interests of donor countries in line with *humane internationalism*. The Netherlands greatly increased its spending on (bilateral) aid, increased the number of concentration countries, introduced criteria based on poverty and socio-economic restructuring, reduced the influences of Dutch businesses and pursued ideologically and morally inspired policy. The high bilateral tied aid at 75% also aligned the Netherlands with the more moderate commercial *liberate internationalism*. The developments surrounding the shift, coupled with the Colombian change of power and economic crisis, led to a temporary stagnation in their technical cooperation.

The MPC can furthermore lead as a successful example of Dutch-Colombian technical cooperation, despite its shortcomings. The project fulfilled its objectives successfully and received recognition and praise from the Colombian parties. The project also contributed to the betterment of the poor population, in line with *humane internationalism*, as the project developed techniques for the diagnosis of tropical diseases which often plagued poor communities. However, the lack of effective communication, delay in operations, and unintended external interference shows the limitations of aid by small states, as these often were attributable to limited national or financial capabilities.

With the changes in policy under Pronk, the applicability of Hoadley’s framework changes as well. Due to the expansion of the aid and the concentration countries, three principles fail to explain the new behaviour of the Netherlands as a small state. Firstly, the limited geographic range, as Pronk expanded the number of concentration countries to seventeen. Secondly, regarding the enemies of allies, Pronk’s policy also supplied aid to Cuba, which has a conflicted relationship with the United States. Thirdly, the preference for multilateral aid, as donor aid increasingly was given bilaterally (even though multilateral aid was still very significant). However, the principles regarding generous aid and achieving internationally accepted norms and targets still apply. Regarding the sixth principle (aid tends to be less self-interested), the Netherlands indeed shifted towards a policy that was less self-interested.

Lastly, the Netherlands could enhance its status by greatly increasing its aid spending and contributing to the global alleviation of poverty, as well as acting as a bridge between developed and developing countries. This was less the case for Colombia.

Conclusion

This thesis looked at the context of the progressive shift in development policy from 1973 Dutch technical aid to Colombia, in particular to the Microbiologic and Parasitological Centre project of the University of the Andes from 1969-1976. It examined two turning points, the introduction of the concentration policy in 1966 and the shift itself in 1973. By using a conceptual framework on small states and development aid, it aimed to uncover new explanations regarding the historical development relation between the Netherlands and Latin America. The research question was:

How did the shift in the Dutch development cooperation influence the allocation, structure and effectiveness of Dutch technical aid to Colombia from 1969-1976?

Due to the shift in development policy from promoting the Dutch economy and contributing to the socio-economic development of developing countries towards the promotion of *self-reliance* and the reduction of self-serving interests of donor countries in line with *humane internationalism*, three new criteria were introduced by Pronk. These determined the categorisation of concentration countries. Based on these new interpretations, Colombia got demoted in 1975 from a general concentration country to a special concentration country. This led to similar allocations, a change in technical from long-term, extended technical assistance programmes to short-term, project-based aid, and a decline in the effectiveness of aid due to a temporary stagnation in technical cooperation. The focus of aid turned towards projects that more directly benefited the socio-economically disadvantaged.

There were a few other consequences. Firstly, the aid became less self-interested, Secondly, the aid relationship changed between Colombia and the Netherlands, as Colombia was designated to have limited aid requirements. Thirdly, instead of enhancing its status in Colombia, the Netherlands was able to increase its status outside Colombia by greatly increasing its aid spending and contributing to the global alleviation of poverty, as well as acting as a bridge between developed and developing countries.

Moreover, the MPC project can be seen as a successful example of Dutch-Colombian technical cooperation in this period, which was initiated before the shift in policy in 1973 but ran the entire course. The project also suffered from similar problems such as the stagnation in cooperation, which was primarily due to communication issues and other shortcomings from the Dutch side. It also aligns with *humane internationalism* as it improved the fate and health of the poor by facilitating research and developing techniques for the diagnosis of tropical

diseases that plagued these communities. However, the lack of effective communication, delay in operations, unintended external interference shows the limitations of aid by small state, as these often were attributable to limited national or financial capabilities.

Furthermore, there is no indication that the goal of maximizing effectiveness has been changed, as well as the alignment with international norms and targets. More remarkably, the shift led to the Netherlands providing aid to Cuba, which is quite a controversial figure at this time.

This research was a micro-scale study of Dutch development cooperation with Colombia from the 1960s and 1970s. It shows that well-meaning policy changes, in this case, meant to combat power and lessen dependency on the industrialised world, do not always work out well for every recipient country. Colombia was experiencing an economic crisis and a government that experienced policy and power changes when it got demoted. The Netherlands' decision to expand their concentration policy meant intensifying the cooperation with Latin America on the one hand (by adding new countries), but downsizing the aid relationship with a specific country on the other.

The study had a few limitations. The most pressing was the lack of Colombian sources, such as archival materials, academic articles, books, reports, and media. The collection of materials requires more time but would have resulted in a more balanced study. It would have been relevant to highlight both sides of the cooperation to assess the differences in motives, expectations and actions of both development partners, or to investigate unequal power relations. Another limitation was the scope of the study. A more comprehensive understanding of Dutch-Colombian development cooperation could have been achieved by comparing several projects over a longer period. The insights of the research are now highly dependent on the coincidences of the project. In this context, it would be highly interesting to conduct comparative research on all the medical projects under the responsibility of the KIT. As far as can be deduced from the archival materials there were five medical projects, that were carried out in Colombia, Kenya and Tunisia. Differences and similarities in the planning, coordination and implementation might provide more insights into the medical development cooperation of the KIT as well as the cooperation with the African and Latin American regions.

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PLAGIARISM RULES AWARENESS STATEMENT

Fraud and Plagiarism

Scientific integrity is the foundation of academic life. Utrecht University considers any form of scientific deception to be an extremely serious infraction. Utrecht University therefore expects every student to be aware of, and to abide by, the norms and values regarding scientific integrity.

The most important forms of deception that affect this integrity are fraud and plagiarism. Plagiarism is the copying of another person's work without proper acknowledgement, and it is a form of fraud. The following is a detailed explanation of what is considered to be fraud and plagiarism, with a few concrete examples. Please note that this is not a comprehensive list!

If fraud or plagiarism is detected, the study programme's Examination Committee may decide to impose sanctions. The most serious sanction that the committee can impose is to submit a request to the Executive Board of the University to expel the student from the study programme.

Plagiarism

Plagiarism is the copying of another person's documents, ideas or lines of thought and presenting it as one's own work. You must always accurately indicate from whom you obtained ideas and insights, and you must constantly be aware of the difference between citing, paraphrasing and plagiarising. Students and staff must be very careful in citing sources; this concerns not only printed sources, but also information obtained from the Internet.

The following issues will always be considered to be plagiarism:

- cutting and pasting text from digital sources, such as an encyclopaedia or digital periodicals, without quotation marks and footnotes;
- cutting and pasting text from the Internet without quotation marks and footnotes;
- copying printed materials, such as books, magazines or encyclopaedias, without quotation marks or footnotes;
- including a translation of one of the sources named above without quotation marks or footnotes;
- paraphrasing (parts of) the texts listed above without proper references: paraphrasing must be marked as such, by expressly mentioning the original author in the text or in a footnote, so that you do not give the impression that it is your own idea;
- copying sound, video or test materials from others without references, and presenting it as one's own work;
- submitting work done previously by the student without reference to the original paper, and presenting it as original work done in the context of the course, without the express permission of the course lecturer;
- copying the work of another student and presenting it as one's own work. If this is done with the consent of the other student, then he or she is also complicit in the plagiarism;
- when one of the authors of a group paper commits plagiarism, then the other co-authors are also complicit in plagiarism if they could or should have known that the person was committing plagiarism;
- submitting papers acquired from a commercial institution, such as an Internet site with summaries or papers, that were written by another person, whether or not that other person received payment for the work.


The rules for plagiarism also apply to rough drafts of papers or (parts of) theses sent to a lecturer for feedback, to the extent that submitting rough drafts for feedback is mentioned in the course handbook or the thesis regulations.

The Education and Examination Regulations (Article 5.15) describe the formal procedure in case of suspicion of fraud and/or plagiarism, and the sanctions that can be imposed.

Ignorance of these rules is not an excuse. Each individual is responsible for their own behaviour. Utrecht University assumes that each student or staff member knows what fraud and plagiarism



entail. For its part, Utrecht University works to ensure that students are informed of the principles of scientific practice, which are taught as early as possible in the curriculum, and that students are informed of the institution's criteria for fraud and plagiarism, so that every student knows which norms they must abide by.

I hereby declare that I have read and understood the above.
Name: Irene Veth
Student number: 6114296
Date and signature:  16-8-2023

Submit this form to your supervisor when you begin writing your Bachelor's final paper or your Master's thesis.

Failure to submit or sign this form does not mean that no sanctions can be imposed if it appears that plagiarism has been committed in the paper.