

# Beyond Eurafrica; European Development Cooperation in Dutch New- Guinea (1957-1963)



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Abstract:

This thesis aims to go beyond Eurafrica, both conceptually and physically. It attempts this by illuminating a case of EEC-funded development in a region that has been neglected by the historiography on the connections between colonialism and European Integration. By analysing the Dutch perspectives on EEC-funded development projects in Dutch New-Guinea, this thesis uncovers that these projects were political in nature, separate from Eurafrica, and influenced by colonialism in various ways. These projects and the colonial power-relations inherent to them were not only significant to the history of European integrations, but also to the history of West-Papua itself.

Cover: Nationaal Archief, The Hague, 2.24.01.09, No. 911-0243, Demonstratie in Nieuw Guinea bij vertrek van staatssecretaris Bot, inspectie erewacht door mr. Th. H. Bot, 11-02-1960, Rijksvoorlichtingsdienst

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## Introduction

On the 25<sup>th</sup> of March 1957, representatives of six different states came together to sign a treaty. With this treaty they agreed, moving forward, they would collaborate. They would collectively leave the conflicts, that had ravaged their continent in the past, and work on a brighter future. Seven years before these states signed the treaty, on the 9<sup>th</sup> of May 1950, the Schuman Declaration was made, which first put these states on the trajectory, away from war and towards peace. After the Schuman Declaration, the Treaty of Paris was signed in 1951. With this treaty six states, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This supranational community guaranteed cooperation within the coal and steel sectors of its members states. With the Treaty of Rome of 1957, these six member-states founded the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). This treaty would further expand cooperation between the member-states to other sectors, guaranteeing continued peace and prosperity on the European continent through cooperative and collaborative efforts.

One of the first steps that was taken by the newly formed EEC was to fund development projects on a tropical island on the other side of the world. This island was New-Guinea, and at that time the western half of the island was under control of the Netherlands. Dutch New-Guinea was the last piece of their former larger colony, the Dutch East Indies, which had declared its independence following the Second World War in 1945.<sup>1</sup> What motivated the EEC, a European organisation focussed on peace through economic cooperation, to fund development projects in a colonial nation on the other side of the world? These EEC-funded development projects do not seem to fit into this narrative of peace through economic cooperation, which has been spread by the European Union (EU), the direct descendant of these European institutions.<sup>2</sup> This narrative is akin to a founding myth, and is even celebrated by the EU as such, with Europe Day being celebrated on the 9<sup>th</sup> of May, the day of the Schuman declaration.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Many different terms and names have been used to describe the western half of the island of New-Guinea. Dutch New-Guinea is a historical name used to refer to this region between 1949 and 1962. Indonesia later used the names West-Irian or Irian-Barat to refer to the region. Western or West-New-Guinea are more neutral geographical terms, while the indigenous population prefers West-Papua or Papua. For this text the term Dutch New-Guinea will be used when referring to the region in the specific historical context associated with the term. When other references are made to the region that do not fall in this specific historic context the name, West-Papua, will be used.

<sup>2</sup> Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014), 4–5.

<sup>3</sup> European Union, *Europe Day*. Accessed through: [https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/symbols/europe-day\\_en](https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/symbols/europe-day_en) (15-06-2023)

This reading of history fails to place European integration in a broader and more global context. Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson set out to place European integration in a more global context, ultimately uncovering how European integration is fundamentally linked with history of colonialism and decolonisation.<sup>4</sup> In their aptly titled book, *Eurafrica; The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism*, Hansen and Jonsson describe, among other things, how France tried to utilize European integration to retain control over their colonial empire, and go against the push for decolonization. As part of the Treaty of Rome, France wanted its overseas territories to be associated with the EEC, building forth on earlier ideas on Eurafrika.<sup>5</sup> The establishment of EEC-funded development projects in Dutch New-Guinea and other overseas territories was a direct result of the Treaty of Rome and EEC association with the overseas territories.

The Netherlands was, similarly to France, trying to retain control over its colony in New-Guinea. After the Dutch had recognized Indonesian independence in 1949, both would claim the region, leading to the New Guinea Dispute. In conjunction with the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Luns, Theo Bot, the State-Secretary for Dutch New-Guinea, unleashed a soft power offensive to convince the international community to support the Dutch position in the dispute.<sup>6</sup> Development cooperation was part of this strategy, with the Dutch spending 91 million guilders on the development of the region in 1961.<sup>7</sup> Dutch New-Guinea and the Netherlands are, however, scarcely mentioned in the book of Hansen and Jonsson, as well as in most historiography on the connection between colonialism and European integration. This gap in the historiography was the starting point of this thesis.

By focusing on one single colony of one of the member states of the EEC, this research aims to extend the concept of Eurafrika beyond its physical boundaries of Europe and Africa, and to approach it from an angle that, up to this point, has not been explored in the existing historiography. Additionally this thesis attempts to explore how the EEC-funded development projects in Dutch New-Guinea fit into the larger story of the decolonisation of the region. This thesis will answer the following question: How did the Dutch state perceive the EEC-funded development projects in Dutch New-Guinea between 1957 and 1963? The specific timeframe

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<sup>4</sup> Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrica*, 5.

<sup>5</sup> Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, 'Bringing Africa as a "Dowry to Europe" European Integration and the Eurafrika Project, 1920–1960', *Interventions* 13, no. 3 (2011): 455–58; Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, 'Another Colonialism: Africa in the History of European Integration', *Journal of Historical Sociology* 27, no. 3 (2014): 444; Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrica*, 148–54.

<sup>6</sup> Vincent Kuitenbrouwer, 'Beyond the "Trauma of Decolonisation": Dutch Cultural Diplomacy during the West New Guinea Question (1950–62)', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 44, no. 2 (3 March 2016): 306–8.

<sup>7</sup> Kuitenbrouwer, 315.

chosen for this analysis is based on the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia in 1963. The EEC development fund was established through the signing of the Treaty of Rome, which allowed the establishment of EEC-funded development projects. The change of sovereignty in 1963 marked the end of the presence of these development projects in Dutch New-Guinea.

To sufficiently answer this thesis' main question some further questions will need to be answered, which will all elaborate further on varying aspect tie to the existing literature. The first question will discuss how the EEC-funded development projects fit into Bot's soft power strategy to retain control over Dutch New-Guinea. This includes an analysis that aims to uncover to what extent the Dutch cared about the well-being of the Papuans and their right to self-determination. The second question covers the influence of the concept of Eurafrica on the development projects in the colony. While the Dutch might have had similar motivations to the French for ultimately signing the Treaty of Rome, namely the retention of their colonies through development cooperation, it is unclear if this motivation is derived from the idea of Eurafrica. To answer this question an additional examination will be given on how the EEC was generally perceived by the Dutch. Lastly, this text will also explore the role of colonialism in the establishment of the EEC-funded development projects in Dutch New-Guinea. The idea of Eurafrica is one form of colonialism, but other ideas derived from colonialism might have also influenced the establishment and nature of the development projects.

### The Histories of Dutch New-Guinea and Eurafrica

To uncover how these questions relate to the existing literature, an elaboration on the relevant historiographies must be given. The historiography on Dutch New-Guinea is focussed on the New-Guinea Dispute and the period after the change of sovereignty leading up to the plebiscite, that has become known as the Act of Free Choice. This historiography, however, mostly centres around the debate on the motivation of the Netherlands for holding onto Dutch New-Guinea for as long as they did during the New-Guinea Dispute.<sup>8</sup> In this dispute the Dutch were facing heavy pressure from the decolonizing and decolonized world or the Global South, along with military pressure stemming from Indonesia itself.<sup>9</sup> Arend Lijphart argues in his book, *The Trauma of Decolonization*, that the Dutch had no strong economic or strategic motivation to retain control over the territory. He stated that a Dutch emotional attachment to colonialism and resentment towards Indonesia, caused by the traumatic experience of the Indonesian War of

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<sup>8</sup> Kuitenbrouwer, 307.

<sup>9</sup> P. J. Drooglever, *Een daad van vrije keuze: de Papoea's van westelijk Nieuw-Guinea en de grenzen van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht* (Den Haag : Amsterdam: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis ; Boom, 2005), 216.

Independence, was the deciding factor in the decision to attempt to retain sovereignty over Dutch New-Guinea.<sup>10</sup> P.J. Drooglever argues against this notion, stating that some Dutch officials did genuinely believe in the principle of Papuan self-determination.<sup>11</sup>

Vincent Kuitenbrouwer aims to go beyond this debate by not focusing on why the Dutch wanted to retain sovereignty over the region, but on how they tried to achieve this goal. According to Kuitenbrouwer, the Dutch tried to convince the international community that a break in their policy on Dutch New-Guinea had occurred. They claimed to have shifted away from a colonial policy to a policy which aimed to prepare the Papuans for self-determination.<sup>12</sup> This was to be done through the further development of the region, the implementation of democratic institutions and the adoption of national symbols.<sup>13</sup> Theo Bot, the State-Secretary for Dutch New-Guinea between 1959 and 1962, was fundamental for this policy, and under his watch the Dutch government raised funds destined for the development of Dutch New-Guinea up to the previously mentioned 91 million guilders per year.<sup>14</sup> In the end, this Dutch policy was unsuccessful, as Indonesia could count on more support, which was largely because of the Bandung Conference of 1955, which had guaranteed them the support of most if the decolonized or decolonizing states.<sup>15</sup> While it is not the aim of this thesis to settle this larger debate on the Dutch motivations for their retention of control over Dutch New-Guinea, it does aim to deepen the historiography by examining one smaller aspect of the New-Guinea Dispute.

The other historiography that is relevant for this thesis is about the influence of colonialism on European integration. The book by Hansen and Jonsson was largely written in reaction to other texts and scholars that have failed to place European integration in a larger and more global context.<sup>16</sup> By placing it in a global context, they were able to analyze how colonialism influenced European integration and played a crucial role in the establishment of the Treaty of Rome. This was in opposition to statements by other scholars, who have either underemphasized the role of colonialism, or saw it as an obstacle for European integration. Walter Lipgens, for instance, pondered ‘how much more smoothly European unification in its first decisive stage would have proceeded if the almost total loss of empire had occurred.’<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Kuitenbrouwer, ‘Beyond the “Trauma of Decolonisation”’, 307; Drooglever, *Een daad van vrije keuze*, 147.

<sup>11</sup> Drooglever, *Een daad van vrije keuze*, 173–74; Kuitenbrouwer, ‘Beyond the “Trauma of Decolonisation”’, 307.

<sup>12</sup> Kuitenbrouwer, ‘Beyond the “Trauma of Decolonisation”’, 307.

<sup>13</sup> Kuitenbrouwer, 315.

<sup>14</sup> Kuitenbrouwer, 315–17.

<sup>15</sup> Kuitenbrouwer, 311.

<sup>16</sup> Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrica*, 262.

<sup>17</sup> Walter Lipgens, Paul Stephen Falla, and A. J. Ryder, *A History of European Integration: 1945-1947*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 12.

Moravcsik and his theory of liberal intergovernmentalism disregarded the role of colonialism by mostly focussing on the role of economics in the European integration process.<sup>18</sup>

Giuliano Garavini argued in her book, that Eurafrica, despite its relatively short lifespan, has had an enormous impact on the relation between the Global South, and the EEC and its descendants, with the the Yaoundé convention being just one example of this.<sup>19</sup> The influence of colonialism on European integration is even noticeable in the modern-day EU, as argued by Aline Sierp and Patrick Pasture. They both utilized insights gained from Hansen and Jonsson's analysis of Eurafrica, and researched how and why this history was forgotten.<sup>20</sup> Their analyses further deepened the understanding on the effects that this forgotten colonial past has had on EU policy and scholarship. A concept that is criticized in both their texts is Normative Power Europe, which as a concept was largely developed by Ian Manners in his text, *Normative Power Europe; A Contradiction in Term?* According to Manners, it is through its normative power that the EU was able 'to shape conceptions of 'normal'' and thus shape international norms in accordance with the European values of peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights.<sup>21</sup> Both Sierp and Pasture recognize an inherent assumption of superiority and uniqueness in the Manners' analysis, in the process questioning the universality of the EU's norms.<sup>22</sup> By questioning its uniqueness, the authors also provincialized the EU, which had been previously done by Kiran Klaus Patel.<sup>23</sup>

The failure to recognize the influence of colonialism on European integration has had real effects on the policies of the modern-day EU. Sierp argued that 'the EU has failed to "adequately gauge the weight of the colonial legacy of some of the EU's member states on the EU's external relations" might lie in its inability to remember and/or its conscious choice to forget this legacy [and that t]his neglect potentially opens doors to the recreation, consolidation and deepening of the asymmetries and hierarchies produced by former European colonial empires'.<sup>24</sup> Pasture also recognized this phenomena, and used it to critique the way the EU/EC

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<sup>18</sup> Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrica*, 263–64.

<sup>19</sup> Giuliano Garavini and Richard R. Nybakken, *After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South 1957-1986* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 48–49.

<sup>20</sup> Aline Sierp, 'EU Memory Politics and Europe's Forgotten Colonial Past', *Interventions* 22, no. 6 (2020): 686–702; Patrick Pasture, 'The EC/EU between the Art of Forgetting and the Palimpsest of Empire', *European Review* 26, no. 3 (2018): 545–81.

<sup>21</sup> Ian Manners, 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 2 (2002): 235–58.

<sup>22</sup> Pasture, 'The EC/EU between the Art of Forgetting and the Palimpsest of Empire', 561–63; Sierp, 'EU Memory Politics and Europe's Forgotten Colonial Past', 692.

<sup>23</sup> Kiran Klaus Patel, 'Provincialising European Union: Co-Operation and Integration in Europe in a Historical Perspective', *Contemporary European History* 22, no. 4 (2013): 649–73.

<sup>24</sup> Sierp, 'EU Memory Politics and Europe's Forgotten Colonial Past', 699.



tries to promote its values through development cooperation and its accession policy, drawing parallels between normative power and the colonial civilizing mission.<sup>25</sup> Within this historiography, the Netherlands and Dutch New-Guinea have not received much attention, which this thesis aims to sort out. This is not the only reason as to why this thesis is relevant. Colonialism has had very long lasting influences on European integration, as has been established in the previous paragraphs. These influences, that carry over to the modern day, are the reason why this thesis is not solely relevant for the historiography it interacts with and builds upon.

### Postcolonialism and post-development

To uncover the influences of colonialism and its legacies, postcolonialism, and the ideas inspired and utilized by it, must be examined. Postcolonialism has its roots in Subaltern Studies, which focusses on the study of disenfranchised or in any way disadvantaged people.<sup>26</sup> Postcolonialism has also taken major influences from the works of Edward Said, most notably his book, *Orientalism*. In this book Said analyzes the discourse of orientalism by applying the earlier poststructuralist ideas of Foucault on discourse and the power-relations inherent therein. Through this analysis he was able to deconstruct the discourse of orientalism, in the process discovering that this discourse was constructed by the occident, Europe, to exert power over the orient.<sup>27</sup> Through the use of similar techniques and by focusing on power-relations, other authors have more recently levied postcolonial critiques against systems of knowledge generation.<sup>28</sup> However, postcolonialism as a field of study is enormous and cannot be classified as a unified theory or school of thought, especially when it is compared to International Relations theories.<sup>29</sup> For this thesis, postcolonialism will offer a lens through which historical events can be analyzed. By using this postcolonial lens, this thesis will be able to analyze and deconstruct the discourse on the EEC-funded development projects in Dutch New-Guinea. Through this analysis, it will become apparent how these development projects were influenced by colonialism and the power-relations inherent to it.

To adequately accomplish this feat, this thesis will also utilize the ideas of post-development. Post-development, which similarly to postcolonialism, cannot be seen as a

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<sup>25</sup> Pasture, 'The EC/EU between the Art of Forgetting and the Palimpsest of Empire', 563.

<sup>26</sup> Gyan Prakash, 'Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism', *The American Historical Review* 99, no. 5 (1994): 1476–77.

<sup>27</sup> Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (Pantheon Books, 1979), 1–30.

<sup>28</sup> Ann Laura Stoler, 'Along the Archival Grain', in *Along the Archival Grain* (Princeton University Press, 2010); Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Beacon Press, 2015).

<sup>29</sup> Charlotte Epstein, 'The Postcolonial Perspective: An Introduction', *International Theory* 6, no. 2 (July 2014): 295.

unified school. It has taken insights from postcolonialism and applied these to the field of development cooperation. Development cooperation or, formerly known as, development aid differs from humanitarian aid, which is usually provided in response to catastrophes, like war or natural disasters. Development cooperation aims to improve the well-being of people in other states over a longer period of time through, for instance, economic growth or the expansion and betterment of medical services.

Post-development offers a critique on the discourse of development cooperation, by utilizing a poststructuralist deconstruction, inspired by Foucault and Said. Through this deconstruction scholars have laid bare the power-relations inherent to this discourse<sup>30</sup>. According to scholars of post-development, it was the West that was able to construct the discourse on development, through the power it could exercise over the rest of the world. Through this power-relation the West was able to classify who or which state could be seen as developed. In order to become more developed states needed to become more like the West. This in turn means that the term, developed, means little more than modern or Western. By being able to decide who can be seen as developed or underdeveloped the West is able to exert power over these other regions, as it makes these regions dependent on the West for development cooperation to hopefully one day be granted the label of “developed”. Because of this, development cooperation fails to help people rise out of poverty, as their programs are mostly focused on economic progress, disregarding culture, local institutions and social relations.<sup>31</sup>

The links between development cooperation and colonialism have been well established in existing historiography, including the historiography on Dutch development cooperation.<sup>32</sup> What makes post-development unique is that it was able to cast ‘a serious doubt not only on the feasibility but on the very desirability of development.’<sup>33</sup> Arturo Escobar and Wolfgang Sachs

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<sup>30</sup> Arturo Escobar, ‘Beyond the Search for a Paradigm? Post-Development and Beyond’, *Development* 43, no. 4 (2000): 11.

<sup>31</sup> Aram Ziai, ‘Post-Development 25 Years after the Development Dictionary’, *Third World Quarterly* 38, no. 12 (2017): 2547–48; Escobar, ‘Beyond the Search for a Paradigm?’, 12.

<sup>32</sup> Esther Helena Arens, ‘Multilateral Institution-Building and National Interest: Dutch Development Policy in the 1960s’, *Contemporary European History* 12, no. 4 (2003): 459; Inge Brinkman, ‘Beyond the “Development Era” Debates on Colonialism, the Christian Missions and Development’, *The Netherlands Yearbook on International Cooperation*, 2007, 103; Peter Van Dam and Wouter van Dis, ‘Beyond the Merchant and the Clergyman: Assessing Moral Claims about Development Cooperation’, *Third World Quarterly* 35, no. 9 (2014): 1639; Maarten Kuitenbrouwer, ‘The Never-Ending Debt of Honour: The Dutch in the Post-Colonial World’, *Itinerario* 20, no. 2 (July 1996): 24; Kuitenbrouwer, ‘Beyond the “Trauma of Decolonisation”’, 322.

<sup>33</sup> Escobar, ‘Beyond the Search for a Paradigm?’, 11.

and their respective works can be seen as fundamental to post-development.<sup>34</sup> Other scholars, such as Jan Nederveen Pieterse, have however also levied critiques against post-development.<sup>35</sup>

The insights gained from post-development are especially relevant for this thesis as development cooperation logically plays an important role in the story of EEC-funded development projects in Dutch New-Guinea. Insights from post-development can be used to analyze not only the nature of the EEC-funded development project, but also on the underlying ideas and motivations that influenced the establishment and execution of these projects.

## From Eurafrika to New-Guinea

To appropriately apply these perspectives provided by postcolonialism and post-development, this thesis will utilize a qualitative discourse analysis. This analysis will be used to discover the underlying power-relations that influenced the Dutch decision-making process on the EEC-funded development project and how these power-relations influenced their perception of the projects. A discourse analysis also allows other observations and distinctions to be made, that can for instance uncover if the Dutch were more influenced by either the Eurafrika ideas and discourse, or perhaps by more broadly colonial ideas and discourses. Other examples of how these perspectives and a discourse analysis can be utilized in this thesis are: looking at what terms are used to describe Dutch New-Guinea and the Papuans, how the Dutch tried to justify the nature of specific projects and how many references are actually made to Eurafrika by Dutch officials.

The sources that will be analysed in this thesis all stem from the Dutch National Archives in The Hague. For this thesis the archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has supplied most of the sources. However, the archive of the Ministry of the Interior has also been examined to a lesser extent. The State Secretary for Dutch New-Guinea, Theo Bot, operated within this ministry. The reason why the focus of this thesis is more on the archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is that this ministry served as the middleman between the EEC and Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry of the Interior and its predecessor the Ministry of Overseas Affairs were responsible for the development of proposals for EEC-funded development projects. It was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that submitted these proposals to the Commission of the EEC for their approval. Because of this position, the archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs both contains sources on interactions between them, the

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<sup>34</sup> Wolfgang Sachs, *The Development Dictionary a Guide to Knowledge as Power* (London: Zed Books, 2010); Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development* (Princeton University Press, 2011).

<sup>35</sup> Escobar, 'Beyond the Search for a Paradigm?', 12–13.

Commission and the Ministry of the Interior, as well as most proposals, reports and memoranda regarding the development project in Dutch New-Guinea. By casting a wide net, when it comes to differing kind of sources, this analysis will provide information on both the projects, as well as Dutch perspective thereon. Furthermore, by comparing and contrasting both internal and external communications, a clear distinction can be made between how the Dutch justified their actions and what actual motives were underneath these justifications.

The thesis will be structured chronologically, starting with a chapter that covers the period leading up to the signing of the Treaty of Rome. While this chapter, will be mostly based on pre-existing literature, it serves as a necessary piece of context, needed for the analysis of the primary sources that will follow it. This first chapter will cover events such as the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the negotiations between the member states leading up to the Treaty of Rome. The following chapter will focus on the early stages of the establishment of the EEC-funded development projects in Dutch New-Guinea. In the period between the signing of the Treaty of Rome and 1960, a lot of projects were still in their developmental phase or waiting for approval from the EEC to receive funding. This chapter will thus provide an excellent insight into how the projects were developed by the Dutch state, why certain project were put forward for approval and how the Dutch perceived the eventual approval or rejection of these projects by the EEC. The third chapter focusses on the period between 1960 and March 1962, just before the New York Agreement of 1962 was signed. It was with this agreement that the change of sovereignty with Indonesia was arranged. This is the period wherein some projects were in various stages of being executed, while others were still being developed. The final chapter will focus on the period right before September 1962, and the period leading up to the eventual change of sovereignty in 1963. In this chapter the focus will be mostly on the reactions of both the EEC and the Dutch on the end of EEC development cooperation in Dutch New-Guinea, while also highlighting some of the lasting effects of these projects.

## From Bandung to Rome (1955 - 1957)

As has been mentioned in the introduction, this chapter will present a short elaboration on some of the relevant history that predates the establishment of the EEC-funded development projects in Dutch New-Guinea. It will start with a short elaboration on the origins of the New-Guinea Dispute and how it was internationalized. Indonesia was able to accomplish this feat through its hosting of the Bandung Conference of 1955, ‘the first intercontinental conference of coloured peoples in the history of mankind.’<sup>36</sup> This conference has been often overlooked by scholars, but is incredibly significant in the story of the rise of the Global South.<sup>37</sup> Contemporarily, it was an event that massively worried the Western powers still clinging on to their colonial possessions. It influenced not only the Dutch, but also the negotiation leading up to the Treaty of Rome.<sup>38</sup> Additionally, this chapter cover how these negotiations were influenced by the Bandung Conference, while covering the Dutch position in regards to the association with the overseas territories and the EEC development fund. As will become clear in the latter half of this chapter, the Dutch were quite skeptical in regards to the Eurafrikan scheme. What influenced the Dutch to eventually agree on the term of the treaty and how did this process take place?

### The New-Guinea Dispute and Bandung Conference

The dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia over the sovereignty of West-Papua had been ongoing since 1949. This was the year when the Dutch finally recognized Indonesian independence, following a brutal four-year colonial war. West-Papua had been purposefully left out of the peace settlement by the Dutch with the idea that this would be settled at a later date.<sup>39</sup> The breaking down of relations between the Dutch and Indonesian after failing to come to an agreement eventually resulted in the Dutch retaining control over the region until 1962, seventeen years after Indonesian independence. The difference in ethnicity between the Papuans and other Indonesians was used by the Dutch to justify their actions.<sup>40</sup> The Dutch furthermore claimed they wanted to prepare the Papuans for self-determination.<sup>41</sup> What their

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<sup>36</sup> Sukarno, ‘Address given by Sukarno (Bandung, 18 April 1955)’, *Asia-Africa speak from Bandung* (Jakarta Indonesia. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1955): 19-29. Accessed through: [https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/opening\\_address\\_given\\_by\\_sukarno\\_bandung\\_18\\_april\\_1955-en-88d3f71c-c9f9-415a-b397-b27b8581a4f5.html](https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/opening_address_given_by_sukarno_bandung_18_april_1955-en-88d3f71c-c9f9-415a-b397-b27b8581a4f5.html) (15-06-2023)

<sup>37</sup> Amitav Acharya, ‘Studying the Bandung Conference from a Global IR Perspective’, *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 70, no. 4 (2016): 342–44.

<sup>38</sup> Kuitenbrouwer, ‘Beyond the “Trauma of Decolonisation”’, 311; Hansen and Jonsson, ‘Bringing Africa as a “Dowery to Europe”’, 458.

<sup>39</sup> Drooglever, *Een daad van vrije keuze*, 164.

<sup>40</sup> Kuitenbrouwer, ‘Beyond the “Trauma of Decolonisation”’, 312.

<sup>41</sup> Kuitenbrouwer, 310.

actual motivations were for retaining control over the region can most certainly be argued about, as has been illustrated in the introductions of this thesis. That resentment between both states was present, is however a fact that cannot be argued against, and which is not that surprising, considering the war that had just been fought between them. Indonesia's motivations were rather straight-forward, as they considered West-Papua an integral part of the Indonesian state. Sukarno's vision for the new Indonesian nation state encompassed all territories of the former Dutch East Indies, from Sabang to Merauke.<sup>42</sup> In the period following its recognition of independence, Indonesia was still struggling with much internal unrest and had been unsuccessful in internationalizing the dispute. This would change in 1955, when Indonesia played the host for the Bandung Conference.<sup>43</sup>

By 1955 a host of states had thrown off their colonial yokes, and had become independent states that could pursue their own interests on the world stage. Decolonization was, however, still an ongoing process, with lots of African states suffering from the effects of colonialism. Furthermore, these newly independent states often found that they had less freedom of choice in diplomatic affairs than they had anticipated, with Cold War tensions rising and the United States (US) and the Soviet Union becoming more active in the Asian and African theatres. It was against this backdrop that the Bandung Conference was hosted, attended by states ranging from Liberia to Japan, from Afghanistan to China and from Egypt to India.<sup>44</sup> It was certainly not the case that all attending states were always seeing eye to eye, with most major discussions during the conference stemming from Cold War dynamics.<sup>45</sup> Despite these internal divisions, the attending states were able to put aside their differences for a common cause, anti-colonialism.

All attending states came together to draft a document, which has become known as the Bandung Declaration. The Bandung Declaration has been characterized as a merely symbolic document, but there is more to it than first meets the eye. Firstly, it was incredibly significant in regard to norm-setting with agreements on non-intervention, non-interference and the integration of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) into the declaration.<sup>46</sup> This would set a precedent for all attending decolonized states and other decolonizing states.<sup>47</sup> Some Asian and African states believed the UN to be nothing more than a tool with which the West could pursue

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<sup>42</sup> Drooglever, *Een daad van vrije keuze*, 121–22.

<sup>43</sup> Kuitenbrouwer, 'Beyond the "Trauma of Decolonisation"', 311.

<sup>44</sup> Acharya, 'Studying the Bandung Conference from a Global IR Perspective', 343.

<sup>45</sup> Naoko Shimazu, 'Diplomacy as Theatre: Staging the Bandung Conference of 1955', *Modern Asian Studies* 48, no. 1 (2014): 227.

<sup>46</sup> Acharya, 'Studying the Bandung Conference from a Global IR Perspective', 344–45.

<sup>47</sup> Acharya, 350.

its own interest. Up to a certain extent this was the truth, as the US saw the UN mostly as just another tool it could use on the international stage.<sup>48</sup> The integration of the principles of the charter in the declaration led to all newly independent former-colonial states to eventually join the UN.<sup>49</sup> This had the very real effect of shifting the balance of power within the UN's General Assembly southward. With the Bandung Conference the decolonized and decolonizing world was able to form an anti-colonial block that held real power within the UN's General Assembly.<sup>50</sup>

This new block was the main drive behind the establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the New International Economic Order. The goal was to create more equality between the Global South and the rest of the world and reform how development cooperation was practiced by the Western states.<sup>51</sup> The Bandung Conference also majorly influenced the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement, which aimed to rise above tensions and conflicts caused by the Cold War.<sup>52</sup> The threat of a more unified anti-colonial voice, that was also gaining power within the UN, was most certainly felt by the states they were advocating against. Most critiques were levied against France and her large African colonial empire.<sup>53</sup> This threat was however also felt by the US, who as a result of the power block in the General Assembly, was less able to utilize the UN as its own tool. Forcing them to seek out other means with which they could provide development cooperation.<sup>54</sup>

Through the Bandung Conference, Indonesia was able to rally support from the attending states for its position in the New-Guinea Dispute. The fact that the region was still controlled by a colonial power made it relatively simple to gain the support of the attending states of the anti-colonial Bandung Conference. With this support, Indonesia was able to place the dispute on the agenda of the UN, successfully internationalizing the issue.<sup>55</sup> A unified anti-colonial voice within the General Assembly that held actual power resulted in an increase of international pressure against the Dutch. The Dutch could still with relative certainty count on support from other colonial nations, meaning mostly France.<sup>56</sup> This proved to be insufficient, as some actors within the Dutch government realized. They required additional support for

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<sup>48</sup> Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present* (Penguin Group USA, 2013), 215.

<sup>49</sup> Acharya, 'Studying the Bandung Conference from a Global IR Perspective', 350.

<sup>50</sup> Mazower, *Governing the World*, 272.

<sup>51</sup> Mazower, 299–304.

<sup>52</sup> Acharya, 'Studying the Bandung Conference from a Global IR Perspective', 345.

<sup>53</sup> Bart Stol, 'De enige zekere bondgenoot - Nederland, Frankrijk en de zwanenzang van het Europese kolonialisme (1950-1962)', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 122, no. 1 (1 March 2009): 24.

<sup>54</sup> Mazower, *Governing the World*, 272.

<sup>55</sup> Kuitenbrouwer, 'The Never-Ending Debt of Honour', 311.

<sup>56</sup> Stol, 'De enige zekere bondgenoot', 33.

which they needed a new strategy to gain influence within the block of anti-colonial states in the UN.<sup>57</sup>

Joseph Luns mostly continued with his approach, which was based on realpolitik and counted on US support in the event of an escalation. Other actors tried to demonstrate to the rest of the world that a break in policy on Dutch New-Guinea had occurred.<sup>58</sup> They claimed the Dutch had shifted away from a colonial approach towards an approach based on development and the preparation towards self-determination. The adoption of a semi-democratic council were measures meant to illustrate Dutch intentions to the international community. Development cooperation was another important aspect of this strategy, with funding for the development of Dutch New-Guinea rising from 15 Million guilders in 1950 to 91 Million guilders in 1961.<sup>59</sup> The Papuans themselves showed their agency by raising international support and adopting national symbols, like a flag and an anthem.<sup>60</sup> The Papuans and the Dutch were able to garner some support from some former-colonial nations, to the great displeasure of Indonesia. This support mostly came from members of the Brazzaville Group, which consisted of states that had been part of the French colonial empire.<sup>61</sup> Theo Bot, who became State-Secretary for Dutch New-Guinea in 1959, was the most influential Dutch official in regard to this strategy.<sup>62</sup>

The Bandung Conference and the rise in prominence of the Global South can be directly linked to the Dutch adopting development cooperation as a policy to achieve their goal of retaining control over Dutch New-Guinea. Understanding what influenced the Dutch to adopt this new strategy to retain control over the region is crucial in understanding how the EEC-funded development projects fit into this larger strategy.

## All roads lead to Rome

With the Bandung Conference of 1955 the Global South had let its presence be known on the international stage. The increased anti-colonial pressure was felt by the colonial powers. This not only influenced the Dutch and their policy for Dutch New-Guinea, but also had a momentous influence on the discussions leading up to Treaty of Rome, as well as its contents.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Kuitenbrouwer, 'Beyond the "Trauma of Decolonisation"', 311.

<sup>58</sup> Kuitenbrouwer, 314–15.

<sup>59</sup> Kuitenbrouwer, 315.

<sup>60</sup> Richard Chauvel, 'Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaptation', *Policy Studies*, no. 14 (2004): 22.

<sup>61</sup> Emma Kluge, 'West Papua and the International History of Decolonization, 1961-69', *The International History Review* 42, no. 6 (2020): 1165; Kuitenbrouwer, 'Beyond the "Trauma of Decolonisation"', 319–20.

<sup>62</sup> Kuitenbrouwer, 'Beyond the "Trauma of Decolonisation"', 307.

<sup>63</sup> Hansen and Jonsson, 'Bringing Africa as a "Dowry to Europe"', 458.



It was during the Messina Conference of June 1955, that the first real steps were taken towards the Treaty of Rome. As a result of the conference the Spaak report was drafted, which did not yet mention France's plan in regard to its colonial ambitions.<sup>64</sup> It was during Venice Conference of April 1956 that France's colonial intentions concerning the proposed common market became apparent. France wanted to enter the Common Market with its colonial empire.<sup>65</sup> They furthermore proposed a common European development fund, to which all member states would have to contribute, and which would be used to further develop the French overseas territories, with the goal to collectively exploit France's colonies, realizing the Eurafrikan dream.<sup>66</sup>

France gained most support on its position from Spaak's Belgium, while Germany and the Netherlands were more skeptical. "For The Hague and Bonn to become identified with 'vestiges of imperialism' was asking a great deal; to compound this request by demanding over \$250 million from the one and possibly \$100 million from the other presented a diplomatic obstacle of formidable proportions."<sup>67</sup> The fact that Germany and the Netherlands did not outright reject France's Eurafrikan proposition allowed discussions between the six governments to continue. Most discussion led to some form of compromise between the member states, with France or Germany giving up on or changing one small aspect of their position. However, the association with the overseas territories and the European development fund remained an intrinsic part of the French position.<sup>68</sup>

In the fall of 1956, negotiations shifted into a higher gear, which could be explained by both external and internal factors. The internal factors consist of Germany and France finding a settlement on the question of Saarland and those same countries experiencing internal pressures, which could hinder further integration if they gained more influence.<sup>69</sup> The external pressures stemmed mostly from the rising Global South, which has been previously discussed in regard to the Bandung Conference. France was already feeling these external pressures, which influenced their decision to pursue Eurafrikan. By recasting its colonial empire in the more collective Eurafrikan, which was believed by France to be largely beneficial to both Africa and Europe, France hoped to alleviate some of this anti-colonial pressure from the Global South.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrikan*, 147–48.

<sup>65</sup> Pierre-Henri Laurent, 'The Diplomacy of the Rome Treaty, 1956-57', *Journal of Contemporary History* 7, no. 3 (1972): 210.

<sup>66</sup> Hansen and Jonsson, 'Bringing Africa as a "Dowry to Europe"', 454–55.

<sup>67</sup> Laurent, 'The Diplomacy of the Rome Treaty, 1956-57', 214.

<sup>68</sup> Laurent, 210–11.

<sup>69</sup> Laurent, 212.

<sup>70</sup> Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrikan*, 369.

The unfolding crisis in Egypt made this perceived threat from the South more apparent to the rest of the Six. The Suez Crisis ensured that France would continue to perceive Egypt as a threat to its North-African possessions, but it also showed the rest of Europe France and Britain's inadequacies when it came to acting on the world stage.<sup>71</sup>

Because of these factors Germany took on a more compromising stance. The Dutch however remained the most sceptical of the Six. The Dutch still held on to their reservations about the cost and political entanglements association brought with it.<sup>72</sup> They had been largely supportive on France's colonial stance within NATO and the UN, but feared direct involvement through association.<sup>73</sup> In February of 1957 the negotiations were reaching their final chapter. In early February, before the negotiations could resume, Spaak himself had come to the Hague to personally dissuade the Dutch government from abandoning the negotiations.<sup>74</sup> This not only illustrates Dutch scepticism towards Eurafrika, but furthermore indicates that the Dutch were willing to sacrifice further European integration for it. While the Dutch re-joined the negotiating table they had lost their strongest ally Germany in the negotiations, forcing them to also shift to a more consolatory stance. The fear of becoming politically isolated had become too great and on the 20<sup>th</sup> of February 1957, following the negotiations at the Hotel Matignon in Paris, the Six eventually reached a compromise on the overseas territories after negotiations that lasted two days and nights.<sup>75</sup>

Some final hurdles still had to be cleared, but, with the most pressing and divisive issues being cleared on the 20<sup>th</sup> of February, the representatives of the Six came together in Rome on the 25<sup>th</sup> of March to sign the Treaty of Rome, with which the Six established the EEC and EURATOM and finally realized the Eurafrika dream.<sup>76</sup> It was decided that Dutch New-Guinea would be included in the association, and that it would receive funds from the European development fund. Furthermore, it was decided that this fund would be considerably smaller than first proposed by the French. The funds it would have access to were almost halved from \$ 1 billion to just more than \$ 500 million. The Dutch would only have to contribute \$ 70 million to the fund, of which \$ 35 million would be reserved for the development of Dutch New-Guinea, as opposed to the original proposal, which placed the Dutch contribution to the fund at \$ 100 million.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Hansen and Jonsson, 157–60.

<sup>72</sup> Laurent, 'The Diplomacy of the Rome Treaty, 1956-57', 315.

<sup>73</sup> Stol, 'De enige zekere bondgenoot', 27.

<sup>74</sup> Laurent, 'The Diplomacy of the Rome Treaty, 1956-57', 315.

<sup>75</sup> Laurent, 215–16.

<sup>76</sup> Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrika*, 234–38.

<sup>77</sup> Hansen and Jonsson, 224–25.

It took the Dutch much convincing to eventually go along with France's Eurafrican plan. While it is unclear if the inclusion of Dutch New-Guinea did ultimately influence the Dutch regarding the eventual compromise that led to the Treaty of Rome, Dutch scepticism towards Eurafrica was very clear. While the Netherlands did not outright reject the plan, they were hesitant due to the costs and political entanglements associated with the plan.<sup>78</sup> This scepticism towards the establishment of Eurafrica and even the EEC itself was not an outright rejection of French colonialism or colonialism itself, as the Dutch had been supportive of the French in other political arenas.<sup>79</sup> The negotiations do indicate that there was an important difference between Eurafrica and the soft power strategy that would be employed later by the Dutch to retain control over Dutch New-Guinea. Even though both were heavily influenced by the pressures of the rising Global South and utilized development cooperation, both were separately developed, with the EEC association building upon Eurafrican ideas. The following chapters will cover how or if both these strategies intersect with the start of the EEC development fund.

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<sup>78</sup> Laurent, 'The Diplomacy of the Rome Treaty, 1956-57', 214.

<sup>79</sup> Stol, 'De enige zekere bondgenoot', 27.

## **Preparing for Development (1957 - 1960)**

On the 16<sup>th</sup> of May 1958 Joseph Luns received a letter from Professor Walter Hallstein, the President of the Commission of the EEC. In this letter was contained that the Dutch could start sending proposals to the Commission for evaluation.<sup>80</sup> This is the starting point of EEC-funded development in Dutch New-Guinea. This chapter will analyze the first stages of EEC-funded development cooperation in the region. It will discuss how initially the Dutch were unprepared and skeptical of the EEC development fund and how position its slowly started to change, resulting in the eventual approval of the first projects for Dutch New-Guinea. Internal divisions among Dutch officials, in regard to the nature of the projects and proposals, were present throughout the period analyzed by this thesis. It was during this period that these divisions were most apparent, which is indicative of the fact that Dutch officials were still uncertain about how they imagined development cooperation in Dutch New-Guinea and how colonialism influenced this.

### **Missed the starting gun (1957 - January 1959)**

Following the letter from Walter Hallstein, the Dutch were dealing with two issues that affected their ability to gain approval from the Commission for their proposed development projects. These issues were not only indicative of how the Dutch viewed the EEC and its development fund in the early period of the fund, but also showed how the Dutch were influenced by colonialism in regard to development cooperation and their image of the Papuans.

To establish new EEC-funded projects in Dutch New-Guinea, the Dutch would not only need the approval of the EEC Commission, but also from the local authorities of the respective overseas territory.<sup>81</sup> The problem with this last aspect is, that at this time there were no local authorities, apart from the governor and Minister of Overseas Affairs. From the Commissions point of view this would not suffice, as these institutions did not represent the population of the Dutch New-Guinea. The Dutch tried to solve this issue by stating that a council, which would represent the indigenous population of the region, was in the works, but that this would take some time.<sup>82</sup> The fact that local representation was a requirement for the establishment of EEC-funded projects indicates that this was the norm among the EEC colonial power. That the Dutch

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<sup>80</sup> Nationaal Archief (NA), The Hague, 2.05.118, Inventaris van het code-archief van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 1955-1964, Inv. No. 22277, Letter 12-05-1958, Walter Hallstein, President van de Commissie, Brussels, to Joseph Luns, Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, The Hague.

<sup>81</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22277, Notities voor de Minister, J. Grooters.

<sup>82</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No 22178, Memorandum 16-08-1958, Mr. P.H. Houben to Sous-Chef Directie Integratie Europa (DIE).

did not have any form of local representation is illustrative of Dutch power-relation with Dutch New-Guinea. This power-relation was strictly colonial and the Dutch were highly condescending towards the Papuans. Dutch officials even had doubts about the possibility of actually filling the New-Guinea Council. They blamed this on the perceived low developmental level of the Papuans.<sup>83</sup>

This condescending and colonial position towards the Papuans is further epitomized by the first projects the Dutch send to the Commission for approval. The Ministry of Finances and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs disagreed on the nature of these projects, which was based on a difference in interpretation of the Treaty of Rome. The treaty states that the development projects funded through the EEC development fund would have to have an additional character, 'effort complémentaire'.<sup>84</sup> The internal difference in interpretation was in regard to this additional character these projects were supposed to have. The Ministry of Finances was unwilling to undertake the development of new projects that would result in more funds going to the development of Dutch New-Guinea than had been planned in the budget, instead proposing that the EEC development fund be utilized to fund already existing or planned projects in Dutch New-Guinea. This would mean the Dutch could alleviate some of the costs they were incurring for the development of the region.<sup>85</sup> Instead of seeing the development fund as an opportunity to further help the Papuans, the Ministry of Finances merely saw it as a way to save some costs in the national budget. This illustrates the colonial power-relation between the Dutch and the Papuans. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs actually wanted to develop new projects, as opposed to the Ministry of Finances, it does not exclude the ministry from this colonial power-relation, as, for example, it was an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that referred to the low development of the Papuans.<sup>86</sup> While the ministries might have disagreed on one specific aspect of the nature of EEC development in Dutch New-Guinea, both were influenced by colonialism.

The requirement that projects were to be of an additional nature, which had been integrated in the Treaty of Rome, had been left vague on purpose by the French delegation. This led the Dutch to suspect that the French would use the fund to take on some of the costs calculated in their budget.<sup>87</sup> The fact that the Ministry of Finances was trying to accomplish the

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<sup>83</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No 22178, Memorandum 16-08-1958, Mr. P.H. Houben to Sous-Chef DIE.

<sup>84</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22277, Memorandum 19-06-1958, DIE to Joseph Luns.

<sup>85</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22277, Memorandum 16 04-07-1958, Joseph Luns to Secretaris-Generaal, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken.

<sup>86</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No 22178, Memorandum 16-08-1958, P.H. Houben to Sous-Chef DIE.

<sup>87</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22277, Memorandum 19-06-1958, DIE to Joseph Luns.

same, while still being critical towards the French, indicates that the Dutch were not merely skeptical towards the French intentions, but Eurafrica as a whole.

Ultimately, it was decided that a combination of new projects and projects that were already part of the budget for Dutch New-Guinea would be sent to the Commission for evaluation. All projects proposed in this first batch of proposals were rejected by the commission of the EEC. The descriptions provided by the Dutch on the content and nature of these projects were deemed by the EEC to be too short and not elaborate enough. This was a fair assessment by the EEC, as these proposals were sent as more of a test by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to assess what kind of projects the commission would accept. The second reason the Commission rejected the proposals was, because the projects were not of an additional character. By this the Commission meant that the projects had to be newly developed and thus not already existing projects, as were proposed by the Ministry of Finances. Some of the projects proposed to receive funding from the EEC were already at the executive stage, clearly indicating to the EEC that they did not meet their definition of additional.<sup>88</sup>

The fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was willing to send proposals for development projects as a test, means they suspected these proposals were not of a high enough quality to gain approval from the Commission. This indicates that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was somewhat indifferent towards actually furthering the development of Dutch New-Guinea, otherwise they would have sent in proposals of a higher quality. It also further illustrates the contempt towards the EEC among officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as they were willing to send proposals to the Commission that they themselves believed did not meet the requirement of being additional.

### A slow start (February 1959 - July 1959)

With the first batch of proposed projects rejected by the Commission, the Ministry of Overseas Affairs set out to draft a new set of projects. While this following period was still characterized by disagreement among Dutch officials about the nature of the EEC-funded development, a certain shift among Dutch government circles was noticeable and the realization of EEC-funded development projects in Dutch New-Guinea became a higher priority. It did not mean that the skepticism towards the EEC and Eurafrica disappeared. The same could be said about the colonial power-relation between the Dutch and the Papuans.

On the 11<sup>th</sup> of February 1959 ten new projects were submitted for an interdepartmental evaluation; A mechanical rice farming project, an agricultural project at Hollandia, an

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<sup>88</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22277, Letter with annexes 08-01-1959, Josep Luns to Jan de Quay.

agricultural education center, an aerial mapping project, an agricultural research center, a medical center, a hotel, a radio project, a demographical survey and a geological survey.<sup>89</sup> Only three were accepted and further developed, namely the demographical and geological surveys and the agricultural research center. By the 6<sup>th</sup> of April 1959 these projects were sent to Brussels for their evaluation by the EEC.<sup>90</sup> It was not surprising that of the ten new proposed projects these three were the first ones to be sent to the Commission, as all three projects were crucial for the development of the region.

All three of these projects were research oriented, which is indicative of a lack of Dutch knowledge on the region. This is not that surprising considering the Dutch had paid little attention to the region during its reign over the Dutch East Indies. This lack of knowledge, stemming from a lack of interest in the region, indicates the continuation of a colonial power-relation after the dissolution of the Dutch East Indies. The Dutch recognized that, in order to somewhat realize the further development of the region, they needed to increase their knowledge of the region. This is especially clear for the demographical survey, as there can be no doubt about the justifiability of this research project. If a state wants to help develop a region it needs some basic data about the population of that region.

The agricultural research centre was similarly justifiable, as the Dutch did not have the necessary knowledge on agriculture, forestry and animal-husbandry, needed for further development of Dutch New-Guinea. Their solution for this lack of knowledge was the research centre, where they could do research on the consistency of the soil, what grew in the forest and what crops could be produced in the region, for instance.<sup>91</sup> However, the Dutch did not consult the Papuans, who had lived and survived in this rugged region for ages, for their knowledge about local flora and fauna. Disregarding local indigenous knowledge and overvaluing of Western scientific knowledge is indicative to the colonial power-relations inherent to this development project.

The colonial power-relation inherent to this apparently necessary projects is further illustrated by the geological survey. While this colonial power-relation is more veiled in regard to the research centre and demographical survey, it is more apparent in the geological survey. This is because the geological survey is more explicitly exploitative and focussed on economic gains. Of these three projects it was the geological survey that was most costly, with the Dutch

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<sup>89</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22277, Memorandum 28-02-1959, Bureau Oost-Azië (DOA/OP) to Chef Directie Oosten (DOA).

<sup>90</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22277, Letter 14-05-1969, J.I.M. Wesseling, Plaatsvervangend Permanente Vertegenwoordiger bij de EEG en Euratom (PVEE), Brussels, to Josph Luns, The Hague.

<sup>91</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22277, Agrarisch Proefstation Manokwari.

asking the EEC \$ 4.737.000 for the realization of the project.<sup>92</sup> The fact, that the project most oriented towards economic gains was to receive most funding, is symptomatic of not only the colonial power-relation between the Dutch and the Papuans, but also on the exploitative nature of this power-relation. That this project was part of the first batch of proposed projects following the test-proposals suggests that economic factors played a large role. The Ministry of Overseas Affairs was less enthusiastic over this proposal, which indicated they were less influenced by economic factors. That does not mean however, they were not influenced by colonialism, but merely by a more paternalistic, less exploitative form of colonialism.

While these three projects were under evaluation by the EEC, four other projects, namely a reception center, the agricultural education center, the radio project, and the mechanical rice production project, got redrafted by the Ministry of Overseas Affairs and were reshared with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for evaluation.<sup>93</sup> Of these projects, the radio project is most interesting, as it highlights another colonial dimension of the EEC-funded development projects. The radio receivers and transmitters, which were to be purchased with EEC funds, could be used to block Indonesian broadcasts.<sup>94</sup> While previous projects had been influenced by colonial power-relations, this project had a political dimension, aimed at the retention of Dutch colonial control over Dutch New-Guinea. It is clear that the Dutch perceived the EEC development fund not merely as a tool to further the development of Dutch New-Guinea, but also as a tool to pursue its own political goals. This is even explicitly mentioned in one source: 'We must be aware that it is politically of the utmost importance for EEC aid to be given to New Guinea in the short term. One of the reasons why we agreed to the whole arrangement of the Overseas Territories was that we consider European aid to New Guinea to be of the utmost political importance.'<sup>95</sup>

In a later adjustment to the proposal for the radio project, the stated goal of the project had changed to an educational one.<sup>96</sup> In this case there is a clear difference in the goal, as presented to the Commission, and the actual goal of the project. The change in justification is not only indicative of the lengths the Dutch were willing to go to pursue their political goals, but also the remaining scepticism of the EEC among Dutch officials. Joseph Luns is most explicit in his scepticism towards the EEC and its supranational nature, voicing his annoyance

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<sup>92</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22279, Letter with annexes 16-03-1960, Walter Hallstein, Brussels, to Joseph Luns, The Hague.

<sup>93</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22277, Memorandum 01-05-1959, Houben to Directoraat-Generaal Europese Samenwerking (DGES).

<sup>94</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22277, Memorandum 10-02-1959, Houben to DIE.

<sup>95</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22277, Memorandum 11-02-1959, Drs. E.H. van der Breugel to DIE

<sup>96</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22277, Memorandum 18-06-1959, DOA/OP to Chef DOA.



towards the objectivity of Dutch officials working at international bodies, arguing that other officials still support the interest of their respective states.<sup>97</sup> His scepticism also extends to the Commission's evaluation of Dutch proposed development projects, stating the Commission had a lack of interest in development projects in Dutch New-Guinea due to the precarious political situation in regards to the ongoing dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia.<sup>98</sup>

The critiques of the EEC expressed by Luns and the fact that the Dutch considered 'European aid to New Guinea to be of the utmost political importance', is furthermore telling for another change that is taking place in this period.<sup>99</sup> While the Dutch seemed relatively uninterested in EEC development in Dutch New-Guinea in the first period covered in this chapter, this had changed. Joseph Luns, himself reiterated to his own staff that there was haste in the realization of these projects.<sup>100</sup> This new apparent urgency is further exemplified by the critiques levied by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs against the Ministry of Overseas Affairs for their perceived careless work-ethic when it came to the development of these projects.<sup>101</sup> By the 14<sup>th</sup> of May 1959 an approximate 200, mostly French, projects had been sent to the EEC for evaluation while the Dutch had only sent three.<sup>102</sup>

### A second wind? (August 1959 - March 1960)

In the last half of 1959 some major departmental changes took place within the Dutch state. The Ministry of Overseas Affairs, which was responsible for Dutch New-Guinea, the Dutch Antilles, Curaçao and Surinam, was disbanded and the Ministry of the Interior took over responsibility for Dutch New-Guinea. This would lead to the introduction of another important character in the story of EEC development projects in Dutch New-Guinea, namely Theo Bot. Bot became the first State-Secretary for Dutch New-Guinea on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of November 1959.

It was under Bot's influence that the Dutch started with their soft power strategy, which was aimed at convincing the international community that the Dutch were preparing the Papuans for self-determination. Development cooperation became an integral part to this strategy, with Dutch funds committed to development cooperation in Dutch New-Guinea

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<sup>97</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22277, Memorandum 12-03-1959, Joseph Luns to Secretaris-Generaal, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

<sup>98</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22277, Minute 25 May 1959, Joseph Luns to Henk Korthals, Minister van Zaken Overzee.

<sup>99</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22277, Memorandum 11-02-1959, Van der Breugel to DIE

<sup>100</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22277, Minute 12-05-1959, DGES, The Hague, to het Hoofd van de PVEE, Brussels.

<sup>101</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22277, Memorandum 01-05-1959, Houben to DGES.

<sup>102</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22277, Letter 14-05-1969, J.I.M. Wesseling, Plaatsvervangend PVEE, Brussels, to Joseph Luns, The Hague

increasing during Bot's time as the head of his department.<sup>103</sup> With his emphasis on the usefulness of development cooperation, it is not surprising that under his influence the Dutch continued to recognize the necessity for the realization of EEC-funded development in Dutch New-Guinea.

The value placed on EEC-funded development projects and the urgency to realize them can be further illustrated by the interactions between the Ministry of Finances and the Ministry of the Interior, concerning a new proposed project for the establishment of a medical centre in Hollandia.<sup>104</sup> A new project for a health centre in Hollandia was submitted for internal evaluation. The Ministry of Finances objected to the project, as they did not recognize the urgency or need to realize the project. The Ministry was furthermore dubious about the long-term costs of the centre.<sup>105</sup> Toxopeus, the Minister of the Interior, did not agree with these objection and was supported in this by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<sup>106</sup> In an internal memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the following is stated: 'Due to the refusal of Finances ... it has been impossible for us ... to submit to the EEC Commission a new series of projects for financing from the development fund.'<sup>107</sup> In the same memorandum these critiques are again echoed, blaming Finances for other delays: 'In this way, we never get around to a minimum use of our drawing rights.'<sup>108</sup>

These interactions however also indicate that this urgency to realize projects was not universal among Dutch officials. The Ministry of Finances was more concerned with the costs projects would bring with them. This further illustrates the point that while Dutch officials were influenced by colonialism in their decision-making process, this influence could take on different forms. While some officials were more influenced by the political goals that could be achieved through development, the Ministry of Finances was more concerned with the costs of development, placing less importance on the well-being of the Papuans, who could benefit from a medical centre.

Following Bots appointment in November 1959, the agricultural research centre at Manokwari was the first to get the approval of the EEC commission on the 18<sup>th</sup> of December

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<sup>103</sup> Kuitenbrouwer, 'Beyond the "Trauma of Decolonisation"', 315–17.

<sup>104</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22279, Letter with annexes 05-11-1959, Mr. J.H. Hoogesteger, Hoofd van de Afdeling Financiële en Economische Zaken voor de Directie Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea (DNNG), to Prof. Dr. J. Kymmel.

<sup>105</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22279, Letter 23-11-1959, Jelle Zijlstra, Minister van Financiën, to DNNG.

<sup>106</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22279, Letter 11-02-1960, Edzo Toxopeus, Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken, to Jelle Zijlstra.

<sup>107</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22279, Memorandum 18-02-1960, Bureau EEG en Benelux (DIE/EB) to DIE and Sous-Chef DIE.

<sup>108</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22279, Memorandum 18-02-1960, DIE/EB to DIE and Sous-Chef DIE.

1959.<sup>109</sup> The demographical and geological surveys would be discussed later by the Commission and were predicted to gain the Commission's approval within the month. On the 25<sup>th</sup> of February the EEC approved the financial agreement regarding the agricultural research centre.<sup>110</sup> The financial agreements for demographical survey and the geological survey would be approved a little less than a month later on the 16<sup>th</sup> of March 1960.<sup>111</sup>

At the beginning of the period covered in this chapter, the Dutch were sceptical towards the EEC, the French Eurafrikan plan and EEC-funded development projects in Dutch New-Guinea. While this scepticism would remain relatively consistent towards Eurafrikan and the EEC, EEC-funded development grew in importance throughout this period. This culminated in the appointment of Theo Bot as State-Secretary for Dutch New-Guinea. He would make development cooperation a fundamental aspect of the Dutch strategy to retain control over the region and, as the following chapter will illustrate would defend the importance of EEC development in Dutch New-Guinea.

Between 1957 and 1959 the proposals submitted to the Commission were knowingly qualitatively inadequate and did not meet the requirements stipulated by the Treaty of Rome. Between 1959 and 1960, the Dutch were able to produce three proposals that were approved by Commission. While the research oriented nature of these projects was perfectly justifiable, the lack of knowledge the Dutch had of the region was apparent. This lack of knowledge and the failure to consult local knowledge is indicative of the colonial power-relation between the Dutch and the Papuans. While Dutch officials had differing opinions on what the nature of EEC development in Dutch New-Guinea should be, with the Ministry of Finances for example being more focussed on the costs, all were grounded in colonialism. While the influence of colonialism is noticeable throughout this period the influence of Eurafrikan is lacking in Dutch government circles. This is not to say the development in Dutch New-Guinea was non-political, as the radio-project illustrates.

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<sup>109</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22279, Memorandum 09-12-1959, DIE/EB to DGES via Mr. Italianer and DIE.

<sup>110</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22279, Letter 25-02-1960, Robert Lemaigen, Chairman of the Permanent Committee for Overseas Territories, Brussels, to Joseph Luns

<sup>111</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22279, Letter with annexes 16-03-1960, Walter Hallstein, Brussels, to Joseph Luns, The Hague

## **The EEC comes to New-Guinea (1960 - 1962)**

In this chapter it will become apparent what role Theo Bot would play in the establishment of EEC-funded development projects in Dutch New-Guinea. From the relatively slow start, described in the last chapter, Bot was able to leave his mark by consistently and systematically developing new projects. Through this chapter's analysis of a period, characterized by relatively few conflicts, both internal and external, it will uncover how EEC development fits into the Dutch quest for the retention of their colony.

### **Bot takes charge (April 1960 - November 1960)**

At this time three projects had been accepted by the EEC, and the Dutch could take the first steps towards their actual realization, Bot's department within the Ministry of the Interior continued with the development of new projects. By 1960, after the bureaucratic reorganization, Bot's department had shifted into a higher gear. By the beginning of April 1960 the previously mentioned project for a health centre in Hollandia had been revised and sent to the EEC for evaluation.<sup>112</sup> By May 1960 another project for the aerial mapping of Dutch New-Guinea was sent to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finances for an internal evaluation.<sup>113</sup> The submission of this project was closely followed by the submission of another agricultural project for internal evaluation. This was an agricultural education centre in Manokwari, which would work in conjunction with the agricultural research centre, similarly located in Manokwari.<sup>114</sup>

What is interesting about these projects is that their nature is characteristic for the systematic way Bot approached EEC development in Dutch New-Guinea. The medical centre in Hollandia was part of a larger plan to tackle the availability of medical services in the region.<sup>115</sup> The aerial mapping project was dependent on another project, the geological survey.<sup>116</sup> As previously mentioned the agricultural education centre would work in conjunction with the aforementioned research centre, but was furthermore part of a larger ten-year plan.<sup>117</sup> That Bot and his department had shifted to a more systematic approach to EEC development in

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<sup>112</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22280, Letter 08-04-1960, Theo Bot, Staatssecretaris voor Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea to Joseph Luns.

<sup>113</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22280, Letter with annexes 16-05-1960, Theo Bot to Joseph Luns

<sup>114</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22280, Letter 11-06-1960, Theo Bot to Joseph Luns.

<sup>115</sup> 13 juni 1961

<sup>116</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22284, Memorandum 07-11-1962, Bureau Algemene Integratie en EGKS (DIE/AE).

<sup>117</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22280, Letter 11-04-1960, Theo Bot to Joseph Luns; NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22280, Letter 11-06-1960, Theo Bot to Joseph Luns.

Dutch New-Guinea is even explicitly mentioned in a letter to Joseph Luns.<sup>118</sup> Another noticeable aspect of all three of these projects was that all three were less explicitly economically focussed, when compared to the geological survey.

While the medical centre and education centre projects, developed by Bot's department, were geared more towards the well-being and education of the Papuans, does not mean they were not colonial in nature. This is yet another example of different departments in the Dutch government being influenced by colonialism in differing ways, with Bot's department subscribing to a more paternalistic form of colonialism, epitomized by the education centre, which literal goal was to educate the Papuans. The variety in ways the departments were influenced by colonialism is further illustrated by discussions surrounding another agricultural project that was developed by Bot's department, the Koembé rice project.

The goal of the project was to designate an area near Merauke where a large polder of 3700 hectares or 9100 acres would be built. Through the utilization of local labour the project would have made Dutch New-Guinea self-sufficient in regard to the production of rice, eliminating the need to import rice.<sup>119</sup> Zijlstra, the Minister of Finances, and his colleague De Pous, the Minister of Economic Affairs, were opposed to the project, objecting to the continued costs that would have to come from the Dutch treasury. That these objections were influenced by the colonial power-relation between the Dutch and the Papuans, and not merely on frugality or economic motivations, is illustrated by a statement from Minister De Pous. He was doubtful about 'the suitability of the population for use in this rice cultivation', clearly showing his colonial bias against the Papuans.

After a discussion in the *Ministerraad*, Zijlstra dropped the issue, resulting in the project being sent to the EEC for evaluation.<sup>120</sup> Proposals for the aerial mapping project and the agricultural education centre were similarly submitted to the Commission for evaluation.<sup>121</sup> On the 20<sup>th</sup> of October 1960 another project, the medical centre at Hollandia, gained the approval of the EEC.<sup>122</sup> The ability of Bot's department to continue with the development of new proposals, despite internal criticism, is illustrative to him and his department's dedication to furthering the development of Dutch New-Guinea. This was also apparent in regard to Bot's

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<sup>118</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22282, Letter with annexes 13-06-1960, Hoogesteger to Joseph Luns.

<sup>119</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22281, Memorandum 07-09-1960, DIE/EB.

<sup>120</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22281, Memorandum 16-09-1960, Joseph Luns to Secretaris-Generaal Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken.

<sup>121</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22281, Report 30-09-1960, Brussels.

<sup>122</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22281, Letter 20-10-1960 Walter Hallstein, Brussels, to Joseph Luns, The Hague

position in another internal dispute, which this time centred around the inclusion of the Dutch Antilles and Surinam in the EEC development fund.

By the 10<sup>th</sup> of November Bot's department had prepared seven new sketches for development projects. The issue was that, if all these projects would be accepted, the funds allocated to the Netherlands by the EEC would be completely depleted. This would leave nothing for Surinam and the Dutch Antilles. What is however important to note is that both Surinam and the Dutch Antilles had not yet signed an association treaty with the EEC, making them not eligible to receive funds from the EEC development fund. As the fund was planned to be replenished after 1962, Bot was somewhat unsurprisingly opposed to saving funds for areas that were not yet associated with the EEC.<sup>123</sup> This dedication to the further development of Dutch New-Guinea is even further illustrated by the fact that officials from Bot's department had apparently been sending sketches to the EEC, without the knowledge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which logically greatly displeased them.<sup>124</sup> His department's willingness to go around the back of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs speaks volumes. In the short time Theo Bot had been active up to this point, he had definitely left his mark on EEC development in Dutch New-Guinea, epitomized through his dedication and systematic approach that was grounded in a paternalistic form of colonialism.

### Continuing development (December 1960 - June 1961)

With the signing of a financial agreement between the Commission and the Netherlands on the 4<sup>th</sup> of December 1960, the Dutch now had four approved EEC-funded development projects. These were the medical centre in Hollandia, the agricultural research centre in Manokwari and the two surveys.<sup>125</sup> Three other projects, the aerial mapping project, the Koembé rice project and agricultural education centre, were still under evaluation by the Commission. The following period would be characterized by Bot's soft power strategy, aimed at convincing the international community, reaching its full potential. This period would also present the Dutch with some setbacks, partly caused by the increasing uncertainty among Dutch entrepreneurs about the political future of Dutch New-Guinea.

There was something else that would similarly influence the establishment of new EEC-funded development projects in Dutch New-Guinea. It is in this period that the Commission began more critically evaluating the proposed projects. This criticism differed from the

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<sup>123</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22281, Memo van de Staatssecretaris van Binnelandse Zaken 10-11-1960, Theo Bot.

<sup>124</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22281, Memorandum 01-11-1960, DIE to Joseph Luns.

<sup>125</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22281, Financieringsovereenkomst tussen de Europese Economische Gemeenschap en Nederlands Nieuw Guinea

criticism aimed at the rejected test projects, as these were fully fledged out proposals. The first project to receive this criticism was the Koembé rice project. The Commission was sceptical on the feasibility of the project.<sup>126</sup> As a result of this, the Commission chose to send out a survey-mission made up of EEC officials to Dutch New-Guinea between the 15<sup>th</sup> of November and the 4<sup>th</sup> of December 1960. When the officials returned from their visit they still retained some of their reservations towards the project.<sup>127</sup> That the Commission was hesitant to approve the Koembé rice project was not surprising, as it was projected to cost \$ 12,5 Million. This was significantly more than any of the projects previously submitted and more than a third of all funds allocated to the Netherlands for the development of their overseas territories.<sup>128</sup>

Because of the high costs associated with the project and the fact that the Commission sent out a survey mission, it is unlikely that at this point the Commission was heavily influenced by possibility of a change in the political situation in Dutch New-Guinea. It is more likely that the EEC was functioning correctly and evaluating this relatively costly proposal accordingly. This is reinforced by the Commission approving the aerial mapping project on the 10<sup>th</sup> of February, which had an estimated cost of around \$ 3.099.000.<sup>129</sup> Around the 23<sup>rd</sup> of June another project, the agricultural education centre at Manokwari, was approved by the Commission. The funds allocated to this project were, however, reduced by the Commission from \$ 820.000 to \$ 680.000.<sup>130</sup> The fact that the Commission was still approving new projects, while critically evaluating them, which is illustrated by the reduction in funding, indicates the marginal place of political considerations in their evaluation.

While the EEC, at this point, was not noticeably influenced by the rising uncertainty surrounding the political future, Dutch entrepreneurs were. As a result of these anxieties they were hesitant to invest their profits into the region, hampering the further economic development of the region.<sup>131</sup> Some companies, like Freeport Sulphur were less concerned with the possibility of a changing political situation.<sup>132</sup> That Freeport Sulphur was less concerned with the political uncertainty can be explained by the fact that they were not a Dutch company. Freeport Sulphur probably correctly predicted that in the event of an Indonesian take-over of

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<sup>126</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22281, Notes 15-11-1960, Brussels.

<sup>127</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22281, Report 03-01-1961. Brussels.

<sup>128</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22315, Memorandum 30-11-1961, Houben to Chef DIE.

<sup>129</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22282, Letter 10-02-1961, J. Vignes, Directeur voor Directoraat-Generaal voor Ontwikkeling van Landen Overzee voor de Commissie van de EEC, Brussels, to DNGG, The Hague.

<sup>130</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22282, Letter with annexes 28-06-1961, Calmes, Secretaris-Generaal voor de Raad van de EEC, Brussels, to Joseph Luns

<sup>131</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22281, Memorandum 04-11-1960, Joseph Luns to Secretaris-Generaal;

NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22281, Memorandum 10-01-1961, DIE/EB to DIE

<sup>132</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22282, Memorandum 03-02-1961, Joseph Luns to Secretaris-Generaal.

the Dutch New-Guinea they would be less affected, as they are still currently operating in the region.<sup>133</sup> In fact, in the region they now operate the largest gold mine in the world, which is simultaneously one of the largest copper mines. This anxiousness among Dutch entrepreneurs did not directly affect the EEC-funded development project, because the Dutch state offered more guarantees when it came to these projects.<sup>134</sup> It was however indicative of the rising military pressure from the Indonesians and the international attention the New Guinea Dispute kept receiving.

### EEC development and Dutch soft power (July 1961 - December 1961)

While the dispute continued to garner international attention, Bot's department similarly continued establishing policies aimed at convincing the international community of the Dutch position. The Dutch attempted to convince the international community that an end had come to their colonial policy, and that they were preparing the region and the Papuans to exercise their right to self-determination.<sup>135</sup> The importance placed by the Dutch on demonstrating that they had abandoned colonialism, stemmed from the increased power of the Global South and the anti-colonial sentiment that was inherent to it.<sup>136</sup> In 1961 funds allocated by the Dutch government for the development of Dutch New-Guinea reached its highest point of 91 Million guilders.<sup>137</sup>

Development was not the only way the Dutch tried to demonstrate to the rest of the world that they had abandoned colonialism. On the 5<sup>th</sup> of April 1961 the New Guinea Council was inaugurated. The New Guinea Council was a semi-democratic body meant to represent the Papuan people. While some of the seats in the council were taken up by Papuans, another section was taken up by non-elected Dutch colonial officials.<sup>138</sup> After its inauguration the New Guinea Council would have to approve of the EEC-funded projects. While the New Guinea Council had very limited legislative power, the Papuans on the council were able to exercise their agency in other ways. A delegation of the New Guinea Council visited the UN headquarters in New York, where they tried to gain attention for their quest for self-determination. The council also independently adopted national symbols, like an anthem and

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<sup>133</sup> Susan Schulman, 'The \$100bn gold mine and the West Papuans who say they are counting the cost', *The Guardian* (02-11-2016). Accessed through: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/nov/02/100-bn-dollar-gold-mine-west-papuans-say-they-are-counting-the-cost-indonesia> (15-06-2023)

<sup>134</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22282, Memorandum 03-02-1961, Joseph Luns to Secretaris-Generaal.

<sup>135</sup> Kuitenbrouwer, 'Beyond the "Trauma of Decolonisation"', 307.

<sup>136</sup> Kuitenbrouwer, 311.

<sup>137</sup> Kuitenbrouwer, 315.

<sup>138</sup> Kuitenbrouwer, 315–17.



the Morning Star flag.<sup>139</sup> The Papuans were furthermore able to gain the support of members from the Brazzaville Group, after envoys from that group had visited the region.<sup>140</sup>

While it was never explicitly mentioned that the EEC-funded development projects were part of Bot's soft power strategy, it is likely that they were. First of all, it is explainable the connection between EEC development and the Dutch strategy was not explicitly made in any sources. It is likely that Dutch officials did not recognize each individual policy geared towards convincing the international community as being part of a grand strategy. These individual policies were only later analysed as such by the historian, Vincent Kuitenbrouwer. If Dutch officials did not perceive a grand strategy they could also make no reference to it. The political importance of development cooperation had been previously mentioned.<sup>141</sup> However in November 1961 it is explicitly mentioned in one source that EEC-funded development is important to the 'government policy' for the fastened development of Dutch New-Guinea.<sup>142</sup> Despite the fact that the explicit goal of this 'government policy' is not mentioned, it is highly unlikely that this goal was not the retention of control over Dutch New-Guinea, which would make the EEC-funded project part of this Dutch strategy.

That EEC-funded development projects were part of the Dutch strategy to retain control over Dutch New-Guinea, however, does not mean that it was entirely similar to France's Eurafrican plan. There is one major difference between these two plans. While for France Eurafrica, including the development fund and association with the EEC, was the entire plan, for the Dutch only one aspect of Eurafrica was of importance, namely the development fund. As described by Kuitenbrouwer, the Dutch had a larger strategy to retain control over Dutch New-Guinea, which included development cooperation.<sup>143</sup> The EEC development fund was merely a way more funding could go to this one aspect of this Dutch strategy. This does not mean that the inclusion of Dutch New-Guinea in the development fund did not influence the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Rome, it merely means that the Dutch strategy to retain control over the region played no role in these negotiations.

During the latter half of 1961, Bot's department continued with the development of new projects, and, by the 14<sup>th</sup> of December 1961, two new projects were submitted to the Commission for approval. These were a school for village-educators, and a hospital in

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<sup>139</sup> Chauvel, 'Constructing Papuan Nationalism', 22.

<sup>140</sup> Kluge, 'West Papua and the International History of Decolonization, 1961-69', 1165.

<sup>141</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22277, Memorandum 11-02-1959, Van der Breugel to DIE

<sup>142</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22315, Memorandum 30-11-1961, Houben to Chef DIE.

<sup>143</sup> Kuitenbrouwer, 'Beyond the "Trauma of Decolonisation"', 315.

Manokwari.<sup>144</sup> Over the period analysed in this chapter the influence of Bot is certainly noticeable. Bot was able to influence the Dutch strategy for the retention of control over Dutch New-Guinea independently from France's Eurafrikan plan. Bot approached development in a systematic way, while the Commission of the EEC was able to adequately evaluate his department's proposal. Internal tensions among Dutch officials were present at the beginning of Bot's time in office. During 1961, these internal tensions and disagreements were less noticeable. The first concerns about the political future started coming up among Dutch entrepreneurs, during the period covered by this chapter. The following chapter will cover how these concerns intensified and spread, culminating in the New York Agreement.

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<sup>144</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22282, Dossier-copy 14-12-1961, Dr. J. Linthorst-Homan, Hoofd der Gecombineerde Nederlandse Permanente Vertegenwoordiging bij de E.E.G. en G.G.A, Brussels, to Celer, The Hague.

## **In the End (1962 - 1963)**

By 1962 the Dutch had succeeded in gaining the approval of the Commission for six projects, the geological and demographical surveys, the agricultural research centre, the aerial mapping project, the agricultural education centre and the medical centre at Hollandia. Three other projects had been submitted to the Commission and were still waiting for approval. These were the Koembé rice project, the school for village educators and the hospital in Manokwari. In this chapter it will be illustrated how the political realities of the New Guinea Dispute finally caught up with the Dutch and how this influenced them and the Commission. Lastly, this chapter will cover the period after the signing of the New York Agreement. What did this agreement entail for the future of the EEC-funded development projects in the region and did they have a lasting impact?

### **Trouble is brewing (January 1962 - July 1962)**

By 1962 it was becoming more apparent that a political change might be coming to Dutch New-Guinea. Tensions had been constantly rising between the Netherlands and Indonesia as both states had been slowly increasing their military presence in the region. By March 1962 it had become clear to Joseph Luns that the US would not offer as much support in the dispute as he had hoped. With negotiations going on in Middelburg between the Netherlands and Indonesia, the Commission began asking questions about the political future of Dutch New-Guinea.<sup>145</sup> If the region were to become part of Indonesia this would logically have negative consequences for the continuation of EEC development in the region, as the fund was meant for territories associated with the EEC.

While the Commission's anxiousness was perfectly logical, it was not much appreciated by the Dutch. Over the past two years there had been no apparent tensions between the Dutch and the Commission concerning the EEC-funded development projects in Dutch New-Guinea. This had now changed. Theo Bot argued that the Dutch were being treated differently as, according to him, the Commission had not asked question, about the political future of Algeria.<sup>146</sup> In the same month as the Commission asked these question the Dutch got the official confirmation that the Koembé rice project had been rejected by the EEC.<sup>147</sup> By then the project

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<sup>145</sup> Drooglever NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22315, Memorandum 02-03-1962, Joseph Luns to Secretaris-Generaal.

<sup>146</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22315, Memorandum 02-03-1962, Joseph Luns to Secretaris-Generaal.

<sup>147</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22282, Letter 21-03-1962, H. Rochereau, President van de Groep voor ontwikkeling van landen overzee voor de Commissie van de EEC, Brussels, to Linthorst-Homan, Brussels.

had been under evaluation for over a year.<sup>148</sup> On the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> of March 1962 two other projects got conditional approval from the Commission, receiving a draft financial agreement. These were the hospital in Manokwari and the school for village educators, which received significantly less funding from the EEC than the Dutch had originally hoped for, being reduced from \$ 1.390.000 to only \$ 398.000.<sup>149</sup>

Theo Bot had an interest in continuing the establishment of new EEC-funded development projects. The further development of Dutch New-Guinea was still part of the Dutch strategy to retain control over the region and it is clear in the sources that he was not aware of the impending New York Agreement. This is because he still continued with the development of new proposals, sending a proposal to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Grimé-Ransiki-regional-development project.<sup>150</sup> While at first the Commission claimed that it had not taken political consideration into account when evaluating new projects, it became apparent to the Dutch that they had. As has been previously established, reservations on the Koembé rice project were not unfounded, as they had even been expressed by Dutch officials. The Commission had similarly rationalized its decision to give significantly less funding to the village education school, by stating that the Dutch had overestimated the amount of educators it needed.

That political consideration about the future of Dutch New-Guinea had influenced the decision-making process of the Commission became clear, when the Dutch required additional funding for the continuation of the demographical research project. Before the Commission would approve this additional funding, it first wanted to discuss the political future of Dutch New-Guinea with Dutch officials. The Dutch claimed this went against the rules of the development fund as the Commission should only evaluate projects on technical considerations.<sup>151</sup> In the cases of the Koembé rice project and the village education project, the Commission stated that it had taken the longevity of projects and the possibility of follow up into account when evaluating the projects. The EEC claimed these were technical considerations, while the Dutch claimed these considerations were still political in nature.<sup>152</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22315, Memorandum 30-11-1961, Houben to Chef DIE.

<sup>149</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22283, Voorstel tot Financiering van een Sociaal Project Betreffende Nederlands Nieuw Guinea 20-03-1962, Directoraat-Generaal voor Ontwikkeling Landen Overzee voor de Commissie van de EEC; NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22283, Voorstel tot Financiering van een Sociaal Project Betreffende Nederlands Nieuw Guinea 21-03-1962, Directoraat-Generaal voor Ontwikkeling Landen Overzee voor de Commissie van de EEC.

<sup>150</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22283, Letter with annexes 30-03-1962, Theo Bot to Joseph Luns.

<sup>151</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22283, Letter with annexes 27-04-1962, Theo Bot to Joseph Luns.

<sup>152</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22283, Memorandum 04-05-1962, plv. DIE to Secretaris-Generaal.

The tensions between the Dutch and the EEC are exemplary for the Dutch urge to retain control over Dutch New-Guinea for as long as they could, clearly being heavily influenced by colonialism. This is not to say that colonialism did not influence the EEC and its Commission. While the Commission was hesitant to establish new projects in the Dutch New-Guinea, this was not based on aversion to Dutch colonialism or colonialism generally. This hesitancy was based on the fear of an Indonesian take-over of the region, be it through force or diplomacy. If this were to happen some funding committed to Dutch New-Guinea might be recovered, but a significant amount might be lost, that otherwise could have been spend on other projects in other regions.

These other regions were the Dutch Antilles and Surinam. While internal tensions had been less apparent over the past two years, similarly to tension between the Dutch and the Commission, these tensions became more noticeable again. On the 5<sup>th</sup> of March 1962 letters were sent to both the Dutch Antilles and Surinam. In these letters it was stated that, while they were not yet associated with the EEC, they could begin with making proposals for development projects, which could be funded through the EEC fund.<sup>153</sup> This meant that Surinam and the Dutch Antilles could still benefit from the EEC development fund, which would run until the end of 1962, but would mean that less funds could go to Dutch New-Guinea.<sup>154</sup>

This policy was more actively pursued by the Ministry of Finances as opposed to the Ministry of the Interior.<sup>155</sup> This is again exemplary of how colonialism influenced Dutch departments and ministries differently, with the Ministry of the Interior committing to Dutch New-Guinea and the Ministry of Finances, taking a more pragmatic approach, perhaps being more aware of the coming New York Agreement. It could be argued that the Ministry of the Interior was not only influenced by the Dutch soft power strategy in its decision to commit to EEC development in Dutch New-Guinea and also cared about the well-being of the Papuans and their right to self-determination. This does not mean that colonialism did not influence this motivation, as being able to decide when people are ready for self-determination is indicative of a colonial power-relation. Who were the Dutch to decide the Papuans could not exercise their right to self-determination?

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<sup>153</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22283, Letter 05-03-1962, Houben to Dr. R.H. Pos, Gevolmachtigd Minister van Suriname; NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22283, Letter 05-03-1962, Houben to Dr. W.F.M. Lampe, Gevolmachtigd Minister van de Nederlandse Antillen.

<sup>154</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22315, Memorandum 02-03-1962, Joseph Luns to Secretaris-Generaal.

<sup>155</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22283, Letter 27-06-1962, plv. Thesaurier-Generaal voor de Minister van Financiën to Theo Bot.

Interestingly enough, this commitment to EEC development in Dutch New-Guinea continued until at least the 18<sup>th</sup> of July 1962.<sup>156</sup> The reason as to why this is interesting is that less than a month later, on the 15<sup>th</sup> of August, the Dutch and Indonesians signed the New York Agreement, which determined that the sovereignty over West-Papua would be transferred from the Netherlands to Indonesia after a short period of UN administration over the region. Despite increasing internal divisions among the Dutch, no signs of the Dutch actively anticipating the signing of the New York Agreement can be found in the sources regarding the EEC-funded development projects. The EEC, despite being anxious about the political situation, similarly did not see this drastic move coming, as they granted the projects for the school for village educators and the hospital in Manowkwari their full approval on 28<sup>th</sup> of May 1962.<sup>157</sup>

### What now? (August 1962 - December 1962)

International pressure had finally become too much for the Dutch. Under pressure from the anti-colonial Global South, the military pressure from Indonesia and without a guarantee for support from the US, the Dutch had signed the New York Agreement. This agreement was made despite protest from the Papuans, who were also not included in the negotiation leading up to the agreement. Included in the agreement was a vague promise by the Indonesians to organize a plebiscite before 1969, with which the Papuans could decide if they wanted to become independent or remain part of Indonesia. This can be seen as the Dutch almost completely abandoning the Papuan right to self-determination and was perceived by some Papuans as a betrayal by the Dutch and more specifically by Luns.

Before sovereignty would be granted to Indonesia, West-Papua would fall under the authority of the UN, under the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA). With the Dutch no longer having sovereignty over the region, what would this mean for the EEC-funded development projects, as the region would no longer be associated with the EEC? It might be logical to cancel projects that were not started yet, but what about projects that were already in their executive stage when the agreement was signed? These exact questions are what Dutch and EEC officials were grappling with following the signing of the New York Agreement.

In the discussion between the 7<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> of September 1962, EEC officials made the claim they would have the obligation to try to realize all projects for which it had signed

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<sup>156</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22283, Memorandum 18-07-1962, DIE/EB to plv. DIE.

<sup>157</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22283, Letter 28-05-1962, Calmes, Brussels, to Joseph Luns, The Hague

financial agreements.<sup>158</sup> They however did not keep this promise, with the first projects appearing on the chopping board being the two schools for village educators and the hospital in Manokwari. While the EEC was not totally against the continuation of projects in the region, they claimed that not all official documents had been signed for these two projects and that the EEC was thus unwilling to take on new obligations. This was objected to by the Dutch, with Bot again leading the charge in defending the development projects in West-Papua. His first argument consisted of noting that these project had been all but officially signed. According to Bot, the EEC was well aware it would be only a matter of time for these projects to receive funding, making the claim that these were new obligations incorrect.<sup>159</sup>

Another argument levied by Bot for the continuation of these projects is aimed more at the Dutch themselves, as it concerns Surinam and the Dutch Antilles receiving the funds freed up by the possible discontinuation the West-Papuan projects. He states that they would already be receiving more funds from EEC than they were promised at first. ‘Against the background of the repeated assurance that the Netherlands will continue to take the further development of the Papuans to heart, the argument that the extra amount for Suriname and the Antilles would be slightly smaller sounds improper’. In another statement in the same memorandum Bot presents an even more moral and emotional argument for the continuation of the projects. ‘I do, however, have serious objections to the sudden tilting to the other side, which means that the Papuans ‘just at the last minute’ would not receive the two training schools for village educators ... and the much-needed renovation of the hospital in Manowkari.’<sup>160</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which at first had supported the transfer of funds to Surinam and the Antilles eventually agreed to support Bot after a discussion in the *Ministerraad*.<sup>161</sup>

Previously the argument could be made that Bot only actively pursued the further development of Dutch New-Guinea because it was part of the Dutch soft power strategy to retain control over the region. This argument cannot be made anymore. This is because the Dutch had lost this diplomatic battle, which means this was no longer a motive to continue with the EEC-funded development projects in Dutch New-Guinea. The emotional arguments used by Bot for the continuation of the projects is indicative of him genuinely caring about the well-being of the Papuans. That Bot cared about the well-being of the Papuans does not mean

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<sup>158</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22284, Aantekeningen bij brief Hr. Rochereau van 26 Oktober 1962 en bij interne nota van Hr Hednus, Dir.-Gen. van het Ontwikkelingsfonds, Elias to Theo Bot.

<sup>159</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22284, Memorandum 18-09-1962, Theo Bot to Joseph Luns.

<sup>160</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22284, Memorandum 18-09-1962, Theo Bot to Joseph Luns.

<sup>161</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22284, Memorandum 28-09-1962, Joseph Luns to Secretaris-Generaal.

colonialism did not influence him, but instead indicates that he was influenced by a more paternalistic form of colonialism, as opposed to a more exploitative form of colonialism.

Bot caring for the well-being of the Papuans is further reinforced by him continuing to pursue the realization of as many projects as possible, despite EEC intentions. In an internal EEC memo, which was later sent to the Dutch, the EEC planned to liquidate even more projects than the hospital and school for village educators. This was a slap in the face for the Dutch, as in their eyes the EEC was backtracking on earlier promise made to them. This sentiment was eventually nuanced, with the EEC stating that they would only fund projects that could be finished before the 1<sup>st</sup> of May 1963, which was when the UNTEA period would end, and Indonesia would gain sovereignty over the region. According to Bot, the EEC could contractually not make this a condition for the continuation of the projects.<sup>162</sup> Nonetheless, the EEC promised it would establish contacts with the UN and UNTEA.<sup>163</sup>

This promise was made in September, but by the 7<sup>th</sup> of November 1962 this had yet to be undertaken by the EEC.<sup>164</sup> This is indicative of the Commission being significantly less interested in the continuation of its development projects in Dutch New-Guinea than Bot. This disinterest would only become more apparent, while Bot continued to pursue the further development of the region.

### Goodbye Europe. Hello UN?

In January, after the Commission had made contact with UNTEA, the Dutch finally received confirmation, which projects would be completed and continue to receive funding. The EEC stated that from the eight projects that got full or partial approval only one would continue to be funded.<sup>165</sup> This was significantly less than the Dutch had predicted could be realized before the UNTEA period was over.<sup>166</sup> The project that was to be continued was the agricultural research centre in Manowkari, which would be completed, be it in a less extensive way. According to the Commission, the other projects could either not be completed before the end of April or, in the cases of both surveys, were not met with any enthusiasm from both UN or

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<sup>162</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22284, Aantekeningen bij brief Hr. Rochereau van 26 Oktober 1962 en bij interne nota van Hr Hednus, Dir.-Gen. van het Ontwikkelingsfonds, Elias to Theo Bot.

<sup>163</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22284, Memorandum 07-11-1962, DIE/AE.

<sup>164</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22284, Memorandum 07-11-1962, DIE/AE.

<sup>165</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22284, Received coded message 10-01-1963, Spierenburg, Gecombineerde Nederlandse Vertegenwoordiging Brussel, Brussels, to Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, The Hague.

<sup>166</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22284, Memorandum 07-11-1962, DIE/AE and NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22284, Sent coded message 14-11-1962, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken en Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, The Hague to Hollandia.



Indonesian authorities.<sup>167</sup> Bot did not believe in this stated lack of interest from the side of Indonesia and UNTEA, as he saw this information as necessary for the further development of West-Papua, concluding that Indonesia and UNTEA must then also not be interested in the further development of the region.<sup>168</sup>

Bot not believing the Commission is illustrative of the increased tensions between him and the Commission, stemming from their differing levels of commitment to the further development of West-Papua. His disbelief in UNTEA and Indonesia being uninterested further illustrates this commitment, as his disbelief in them not caring, indicates that he does care for the further development of the region. The fact that the Indonesians indicated that they had little interest in the EEC-funded development projects, further reinforced the point that Bot had no apparent ulterior motives for furthering development in the region. Because the Indonesians had no interest in the projects, their continuation would not lead to better relations between the Dutch and Indonesia.

Nonetheless it was eventually decided by the Commission that both surveys could be finished in the Netherlands, based on the data that was already collected.<sup>169</sup> With the end of the UNTEA period and the transfer of sovereignty over West-Papua to Indonesia on 1<sup>st</sup> of May 1963, an end came to the presence of the EEC on West-Papua. But the EEC development fund would go on to influence the region in an indirect way, as the fund inspired the creation of another development fund, the Fund of the United Nations for the Development of West Irian (FUNDWI). The UN proposed that some of the funds the EEC had committed to West-Papua, combined with additional funding from the Dutch and potential third parties, could be committed to FUNDWI. UN itself would supply the technical assistance. The EEC could however not agree to this plan, as under this plan the UN and not the EEC would be responsible for the projects, which was disallowed for EEC-funded projects.<sup>170</sup>

FUNDWI was eventually realized, with the Dutch pledging to donate \$ 30 Million over a three year period.<sup>171</sup> FUNDWI's history was perhaps even more troubled than the history of EEC development in Dutch New-Guinea, with tensions and distrust amongst the Indonesians

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<sup>167</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22284, Received coded message 10-01-1963, Spierenburg, Gecombineerde Nederlandse Vertegenwoordiging Brussel, Brussels, to Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, The Hague.

<sup>168</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22284, Letter 17-01-1963, Theo Bot to Joseph Luns.

<sup>169</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22285, Letter 13-03-1963, Rochereau, Brussels, to Permanente Vertegenwoordiging van Nederlands bij de Europese Gemeenschappen, Brussels.

<sup>170</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.118. Inv. No. 22284, Sent coded message, 05-12-1962, Joseph Luns, The Hague, to Nederlandse Permanente Vertegenwoordiging bij de Verenigde Naties te New York, New York. and Hollandia.

<sup>171</sup> NA, The Hague, 2.05.273, Inv. No. 1011, Received coded message 22-06-1967, Celer, The Hague, to Nederlandse Permanente Vertegenwoordiging bij de Verenigde Naties te New York, New York.

and Dutch remaining high. The fund managed to realize the establishment of more projects than the EEC and the Dutch, whom had only realized two incomplete surveys and one rushed agricultural research centre. It could however be argued that the situation in West-Papua had not improved much for the Papuans. The colonial power-relation that had influenced the EEC-funded development projects was still present throughout FUNDWI's existence.<sup>172</sup> In 1969 the Act of Free Choice was organized by the Indonesian government. With this plebiscite the Papuans were supposed to be able to determine if they wanted to become independent or remain with Indonesia. Even contemporarily this plebiscite was deemed to be a complete farce, with the outcome being that the region remained part of Indonesia.<sup>173</sup>

Between 100,000 and 500,000 Papuans have died due to violence inflicted upon them by the Indonesian government.<sup>174</sup> The Indonesian government has stated it has tried to better its treatment of the Papuans, with one example being the change of the official name of the region from an Indonesian one to a Papuan name. However, to this day Papuans still face discrimination, have poor access to public services and are negatively affected by transmigration. This all while the region is extremely rich in national resources, which are partly exploited by the previously mentioned Freeport Sulphur, which coincidentally is also the largest tax-payer in Indonesia.<sup>175</sup> This chapter has explored Theo Bot's apparent interest in the well-being of the Papuans and his continuousness quest for the further development of West-Papua. Despite that, colonialism has heavily influenced the Dutch and EEC development in the region. Sadly, the colonial-power relation that was present during the presence of the EEC in the region continued to be present throughout the history of West-Papua up till the modern-day.

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<sup>172</sup> Toon aan de Stegge, 'Alpha and Omega; West New Guinea and FUNDWI as the End of Dutch Colonialism and the Beginning of Dutch Developmental Cooperation (1962-1974)' (Leiden, Leiden University, 2021), 43–45, <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3562582>.

<sup>173</sup> Drooglever, *Een daad van vrije keuze*, 728–29.

<sup>174</sup> Nieuwsuur 'Als wij de genocide nu niet stoppen, hebben Papoea's geen toekomst meer', (23-01-2022). Accessed through: <https://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2414153-als-wij-de-genocide-nu-niet-stoppen-hebben-papoea-s-geen-toekomst-meer> (15-06-2023)

<sup>175</sup> Susan Schulman, 'The \$100bn gold mine and the West Papuans who say they are counting the cost', *The Guardian* (02-11-2016). Accessed through: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/nov/02/100-bn-dollar-gold-mine-west-papuans-say-they-are-counting-the-cost-indonesia> (15-06-2023)

## Conclusion

This thesis set out to go beyond Eurafrika. This has not only been accomplished by physically leaving the boundaries of Eurafrika, but also by illuminating a case wherein the concept of and discourse on Eurafrika play a lesser role. By stepping outside of Hansen and Jonsson's analysis, which mostly focussed on France and Eurafrika, it has illustrated that other examples of EEC-linked colonialism played a role in the history. Colonialism has had very long lasting influences on European integration, as has been well established in existing literature.<sup>176</sup> These influences, that carry over to the modern day, are the reason why this thesis is not merely relevant for the historiography it interacts with and builds upon. Colonialism or the failure to recognize colonialism in history has influenced not only the EU's policy, but also on West-Papua, not only historically but temporally.

The EEC-funded development project in Dutch New-Guinea had a troubled, yet nonetheless very interesting history. While at first the Dutch struggled to get any projects of the ground, they eventually succeeded in streamlining the process, and were able to approach development in Dutch New-Guinea systematically and consistently. This was followed by the swift and abrupt end of the EEC-funded development projects and the Dutch presence in West-Papua.

EEC-funded development cooperation in Dutch New-Guinea had always been political. While it was not explicitly mentioned in the sources, everything indicates that these development projects were part of a larger Dutch strategy to retain control over the region. Bot's persistence in guaranteeing the realization of as many EEC projects as possible through his systematic approach is indicative of this. The fact that it was explicitly mentioned that EEC-funded development was essential to the 'government policy' for the fastened development of the region, only reinforces that. Despite this Theo Bot did up to a certain extent believe in the well-being of the Papuans and their right to self-determination, as is exemplified by his actions after the New York Agreement.

While the Dutch strategy to retain control over its colony might seem similar France's, as both were in response to the Bandung Conference and utilized EEC-funded development project. This is not the case, as for France Eurafrika, which included association and the development fund, was the strategy. For the Dutch only the development fund was part of the strategy. This strategy also included other aspects, such as the New Guinea Council.<sup>177</sup> The fact

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<sup>176</sup> Garavini and Nybakken, *After Empires*; Sierp, 'EU Memory Politics and Europe's Forgotten Colonial Past'; Pasture, 'The EC/EU between the Art of Forgetting and the Palimpsest of Empire'.

<sup>177</sup> Kuitenbrouwer, 'Beyond the "Trauma of Decolonisation"', 315.

that Dutch officials did not subscribe to the Eurafrikan ideas is illustrated by the tensions and distrust between Dutch and EEC officials. This is further illustrated by the term, Eurafrika, never being mentioned in any Dutch sources analysed for this thesis.

Because the EEC-funded development projects were a part of the Dutch strategy to retain control over Dutch New-Guinea, they are inherently colonial. There are other aspects of these EEC-funded development projects that further substantiate this claim. The Dutch referring to the developmental level of the Papuans and their over-reliance on Western knowledge, as opposed to local knowledge, being examples of the influence of a colonial power-relation. The internal tensions and disagreements among Dutch officials do not disprove this, but illustrate how colonialism had differing influences on these officials. Despite Bot's genuine care, he was for example clearly more influenced by a paternalistic form of colonialism, as opposed to the Ministry of Finances, which was more concerned about the costs.

The colonial power-relation, which was present throughout the existence of EEC-funded development in Dutch New-Guinea, continues to influence the region to this day, illustrating the long shadow colonialism can cast. This is the reason why additional research into the links between the EU and colonialism is essential; to uncover how colonialism continues to influence the EU and the places its member-states colonized.

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## **List of abbreviations**

ECSC = European Coal and Steel Community

EEC = European Economic Community

EU = European Union

Euratom = European Atomic Energy Community

FUNDWI = Fund of the United Nations for the Development of West Irian

UN = United Nations

UNTEA = United Nations Temporary Executive Authority

US = United States



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