

Utrecht University



‘Legitimizing the Dutch empire 1945-9’

How Dutch public discourse changed from favoring diplomacy to favoring a colonial war.

MA thesis International Relations in Historical Perspective

Final version

MA thesis International Relations in Historical Perspective

Faculty of Humanities

Student: Vincent Klein Ikkink

Student no: 1017926

Supervisor: Dr. Christiaan Harinck

Second reader: Dr. Jan Hoffenaar

Date: 22nd of June 2023

Word count: 16500

Contents

| | |
|---|-----------|
| 'Legitimizing the Dutch empire 1945-9' | 1 |
| List of abbreviations | 3 |
| Abstract | 4 |
| 'Legitimizing the Dutch empire 1945-9' | 5 |
| <i>How Dutch public discourse changed from favoring diplomacy to favoring a colonial war</i> | 5 |
| Introduction | 5 |
| Historiography | 6 |
| A decolonization war after WWII and imperial framework | 6 |
| Excessive violence and economic arguments | 7 |
| Media and public discourse | 8 |
| Methodology | 11 |
| Security culture | 11 |
| Methodological approach | 13 |
| Chapter 1 The Future Right for Self-Determination | 16 |
| I. Dutch political discourse: rhetoric concerning legitimacy and the Dutch empire..... | 17 |
| II. Security and military intervention: discourse regarding the use of force and military preparations..... | 20 |
| III. Diplomacy: rhetoric related to diplomatic negotiations | 22 |
| IV. (Sub-theme) Post WWII reconstruction: economic discourse..... | 23 |
| Conclusion chapter 1 | 24 |
| Chapter 2: 'A duty to restore peace and order.' | 26 |
| I. Diplomacy: rhetoric related to diplomatic negotiations | 27 |
| II. Security and military intervention: discourse regarding the use of force and military preparations..... | 30 |
| III. Dutch political discourse: rhetoric concerning legitimacy and the Dutch empire..... | 33 |
| IV. (Sub-theme) Post WWII reconstruction of NL: economic discourse. | 36 |
| Conclusion chapter 2 | 37 |
| Chapter 3 'The Indies lost, Disaster Born' | 38 |
| I. Dutch political discourse: rhetoric concerning legitimacy and the Dutch empire..... | 39 |
| II. Diplomacy: rhetoric related to diplomacy..... | 42 |
| III. Security and military intervention: discourse regarding the use of force and military preparations..... | 44 |
| IV. (Sub-theme) Post WWII reconstruction of NL: economic discourse. | 47 |
| Conclusion chapter 3 | 48 |
| Final conclusion | 50 |

| | |
|---|-----------|
| Reflection | 54 |
| Bibliography | 55 |
| <i>Primary sources</i> | 55 |
| <i>Secondary sources</i> | 56 |
| PLAGIARISM RULES AWARENESS STATEMENT | 61 |

List of abbreviations

ARP – Anti-Revolutionaire Partij
 CHU – Christelijk Historische Unie (Christian Historical Union)
 CPN – Communistische Partij Nederland (Communist Party Netherlands)
 DLC – Dienst voor Legercontacten
 INR – Indonesian National Revolution
 KNP – Katholieke Nationale Partij (Catholic National Party)
 KVP – Katholieke Volkspartij (Catholic People’s Party)
 PvdA – Partij van de Arbeid (Labor Party)
 PvdV – Partij van de Vrijheid (Freedom Party)
 NCHR - Nationaal Comité tot Handhaving der Rijkseenheid (National Committee for the Maintenance of Unity of the Kingdom)
 NEFIS – Netherlands Forces Intelligence Services
 VDB – Vrijzinnig Democratische Bond (Free-thinking Democratic League)
 VVD – Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy)
 USI – United States of Indonesia
 WWII – the Second World War

Abstract

This research sets out to explore the interpretive frameworks of Dutch public discourse during the decolonization war (1945-9) in Indonesia, using security culture as an analytical framework. Especially in context to the end of WWII in the Netherlands, and the five years of occupation that the Dutch had endured by Nazis, the question will be raised how a democratic Dutch government and Dutch media used rhetoric and discourse to make sense of the colonial war's realities, and how they legitimized the colonial war to the public. The main argument is that the Dutch government and media developed the pre-existing security culture, which was still reflective of the previous world order, to serve as a legitimization framework for the colonial war in Indonesia. In this way, the Dutch were able to 'sell' the necessity and importance to the Dutch public, as the public was not interested in the Indonesian National Revolution (INR) during the beginning phase of the conflict.

'Legitimizing the Dutch empire 1945-9'

How Dutch public discourse changed from favoring diplomacy to favoring a colonial war.

Key words: Decolonization, Indonesia, security culture, imperialism

Introduction

Dutch Minister of War, Jo Meynen, told the 27 000 deploying Dutch troops in September 1945 and January 1946:

'remember to be builders and do everything in your power to ensure that the native people hold the white man in awe and reverence.'¹ 'the duty to retain the overseas imperial territories for the Netherlands now rests on your shoulders. If we lose the Indies, then we are relegated to a small unimportant nation.'²

In 1942, Japan ended Dutch colonial rule by occupying Indonesia. Though the Indonesians were treated horribly by the Japanese (estimated deaths range from 2.5 to 4 million), and their rule was harsher than the Dutch colonial rule had been, many Indonesian nationalists collaborated with the Japanese in 1945 to gain independence from the Netherlands.³

On the 17th of August 1945, Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta proclaimed the Indonesian Declaration of Independence. The Dutch launched a colonial war against the Republic two years later, euphemistically called the 'police actions' by the Dutch. This term signified that it was not a colonial war, but an internal affair; the Dutch did not acknowledge Indonesian independence.⁴

The public discourse and the interpretive rhetoric that the Dutch used to legitimize this war was a crucial part of the conflict but has rarely been analyzed as a central, in-depth research topic. As the Dutch were occupied for five years by Germany, it is an interesting research topic to make sense of why the Dutch began to favor a colonial war over time to regain authority over Indonesia.

The Indonesian War for Independence ended with the official transfer of sovereignty to the Indonesians in 1949. In June 2023, the Dutch government de facto recognized Indonesian Independence on the 17th of August 1945.

¹ Het Parool 13-09-1945, "Stoottroepen naar Indie"; Het Parool 29-09-1945, "27.000 man naar Indie"

² Trouw 15-01-1946, "Minister Meynen sprak de troepen toe".

³ Christian L.M. Penders. *The West New Guinea Debacle: Dutch Decolonisation and Indonesia, 1945-1962*. Brill (2021): 12-24 ; Gert Oostindie, Rémy Limpach, Bart Luttikhuis, Remco Raben, Peter Romijn, Onno Sinke, Fridus Steijlen et al. *Beyond the Pale: Dutch Extreme Violence in the Indonesian War of Independence, 1945-1949*. Amsterdam University Press, (2022): 43-6.

⁴ Ad van Liempt. *Nederland valt aan: op weg naar oorlog met Indonesië, 1947*. Uitgeverij Balans, (2012): 8.

Historiography

A decolonization war after WWII and imperial framework

Various scholars have stressed the logical nature of the Indonesian Declaration of Independence related to its occupation by Japan. Among these scholars are Burgers, Hagen, and Captain & Sinke.⁵ Burgers and Hagen are unique in their historiographical approach, placing the INR in a larger imperial framework; Burgers focuses on the Dutch imperial and colonial oppression that took place and which eventually influenced Indonesian nationalism over the course of 350 years.⁶

According to Captain and Sinke, Burgers, and Oostindie et al. the Japanese military defeat over the Dutch dealt a huge blow to Dutch prestige, but also led to a widespread sentiment that foreign interference with Indonesia had to be avoided.⁷

However, the literature rarely asks the question of how the colonial war against the Indonesian nationalists can be explained from the Dutch aggressor side. Van Liempt, Oostindie, and Koekkoek et al. are exceptions to this rule, though the question is not fully answered by any of them.⁸ As approximately 250.000 Dutch citizens lost their lives during WWII,⁹ one can ask the question why the Dutch government and its citizens were willing to fight another war shortly after German occupation ended. The analysis in the substantive chapters tries to find an answer to this question.

⁵ Herman Burgers. *De garoeda en de ooievaar; Indonesië van kolonie tot nationale staat*. Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, (2010): 257-349; Piet Hagen. *Koloniale oorlogen in Indonesië: vijf eeuwen verzet tegen vreemde overheersing*. Singel Uitgeverijen, (2018): 615-671; Esther Captain and Onno Sinke. *Het geluid van geweld: Bersiap en de dynamiek van geweld tijdens de eerste fase van de Indonesische revolutie, 1945-1946*. Amsterdam University Press, (2022): 45-64.

⁶ Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 19-256.

⁷ Ibid., 328-45, Captain and Sinke, *het geluid van geweld*, 46-64; Oostindie et al., *Beyond the Pale*, 43-6.

⁸ Gert Oostindie. "Trauma and the Last Dutch War in Indonesia, 1945–1949." *The Cultural Trauma of Decolonization: Colonial Returnees in the National Imagination* (2020): 85-6; van Liempt, *Nederland valt aan*, 9; Rene Koekkoek, Anne-Isabelle Richard and Arthur Weststeijn. "Visions of Dutch empire: Towards a long-term global perspective." *BMGN: Low Countries Historical Review* 132, no. 2 (2017): 81-3.

⁹ NIOD. "Slachtoffers Nederlandse Bevolking (Cijfers)." NIOD. Accessed February 16, 2023. <https://www.niod.nl/nl/veelgestelde-vragen/verliezen-nederlandse-bevolking-cijfers>

Excessive violence and economic arguments

After Joop Hueting's infamous interview (revealing excessive violence by Dutch forces), the 'Excessennota' was published in 1969.¹⁰ Subsequently, scholars such as van Doorn and Hendrix, IJzereef, Groen, Harinck, Scagliola, Limpach and Lutikhuis published important works about the military side of the conflict,¹¹ but also the (structural) nature of Dutch excessive violence, and the reasons why it was hidden from public discourse.¹²

After the 2016 publication of Remy Limpach's 'Brandende Kampongs' revealed structural excessive violence by the Dutch,¹³ the Dutch government allowed and subsidized further research.¹⁴ This research was conducted by NIOD, KITLV, NIMH, and led to 13 books being published in 2022. The outcomes gave a clear answer: the violence was indeed structurally excessive, and many members of the Dutch governments in 1945-1949 knew about it.¹⁵ This recently established agreement in the literature provides a new opportunity to answer questions that previous works would not focus on because the excessive violence was an analytical focus point. It allows for a more cultural approach to the conflict, an angle that has rarely been centrally used in the literature on this conflict.

A majority of the literature neglects the economic arguments for the decolonization war, even though the initial reason why the Dutch colonized Indonesia was economic, and the primary reason for Operation Product was also economically motivated.¹⁶ An exception to the rule are Baudet and Fennema, who wrote about the political and economic consequences to the decolonization of Indonesia.¹⁷ They explained that the Dutch corporate life and government

¹⁰ Gert Oostindie, Ireen Hoogenboom, Tom van den Berge, and Bart Lutikhuis. "Alles is natuurlijk te begrijpen als je erover nadenkt" *Leidschrift* 31, no. oktober: Een beladen geschiedenis. De dekolonisatieoorlog in Indonesië, 1945-1954 (2016): 95-107.

¹¹ Christiaan Harinck. *Zoeken, aangrijpen en vernietigen! Het Nederlandse militaire optreden in Indonesië, 1945-1949*. Amsterdam: Prometheus: (2022): 19-98; Petra M.H. Groen "Militant response: The Dutch use of military force and the decolonization of the Dutch East Indies, 1945-50." *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 21 no. 3 (1993): 30-44.

¹² Stef Scagliola. "The Silences and Myths of a 'Dirty War': Coming to Terms with the Dutch-Indonesian Decolonisation War (1945-1949)." *European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire*, 14 no. 2 (2007): 256; W. J. Hendrix and J. A. A. van Doorn. *Ontsporing van geweld: het Nederlands-Indonesisch conflict*. Amsterdam University Press, 1970; Willem IJzereef "De Zuid-Celebes affaire." *Kapitein Westerling en de standrechtelijke executies*. Dieren: De Bataafsche Leeuw (1984); Petra Groen. "W. IJzereef, De Zuid-Celebes affaire. Kapitein Westerling en de standrechtelijke executies." (1986): 270-271; Rémy Limpach. *De brandende kampongs van Generaal Spoor*. Amsterdam: Boom (2016): 180-467; Bart Lutikhuis and A. Dirk Moses. "Mass violence and the end of the Dutch colonial empire in Indonesia." *Journal of Genocide Research*, 14 no. 3-4 (2012): 258; *Onafhankelijkheid, dekolonisatie, geweld en oorlog in Indonesië, 1945-1950*. "Een Korte Voorgeschiedenis Van De Onderzoeksopzet." Accessed January 16, 2023. <https://www.ind45-50.org/een-korte-voorgeschiedenis-van-de-onderzoeksopzet>.

¹³ Rémy Limpach. *De brandende kampongs van Generaal Spoor*. Amsterdam: Boom (2016): 180-467.

¹⁴ Lutikhuis and Moses, "Mass violence and the end of the Dutch colonial empire in Indonesia", 258.

¹⁵ Gert Oostindie. Rémy Limpach, Bart Lutikhuis, Remco Raben, Peter Romijn, Onno Sinke, Fridus Steijlen et al. *Over de grens: Nederlands extreem geweld in de Indonesische onafhankelijkheidsoorlog, 1945-1949*. Amsterdam University Press, 2022: 102.

¹⁶ Leigh Gardner and Tirthankar Roy. Chapter 2: 'Origins of Colonialism: Is There One Story?' In: *The Economic History of Colonialism*. Bristol: Bristol University Press (2020).

¹⁷ H. Baudet en M. Fennema, *Het Nederlands belang bij Indië. Analyse van de politieke en economische gevolgen van de dekolonisatie van Indonesië*. Utrecht-Antwerpen: het Spectrum, (1983).

resisted decolonization due to fear that the Dutch economy would suffer heavily by losing Indonesia.¹⁸ The fear led to the infamous ‘Indies lost, disaster born’ slogan.¹⁹

Media and public discourse

When it comes to public discourse after 1949, debates surrounding the war have been accurately characterized by Scagliola as a ‘Dutch silence’ by Scagliola.²⁰ This silence was most prevalent in the 1949-69 timeframe, as Doolan, van der Kaaij and Limpach all confirm.²¹ In the 2008-2022 period, works by Scagliola, van der Kaaij and de Jong have written about how and why the Dutch population had refused to come to terms with its colonial past after 1950.²²

Romijn identified a ‘long, Dutch’ Second World War (1940-9) in which the continuance of mass violence, war and oppression of a changing world made it difficult for the Dutch people and institutions to redefine their position in the world.²³

Raben and Romijn were one of the first scholars to write about public discourse during the conflict, analyzing how communication during this timeframe affected public support for the war.²⁴ This work is an exception to most of the literature, as public discourse during the conflict is sometimes alluded to in the literature, but is rarely the center of attention.

The literature rarely centrally analyzes the role of the broader media landscape in public discourse. Van Liempt hints at the awkward relationship between the media and the government at various times by highlighting how certain newspapers reported on the Indonesia question, while also stating that the chief editors of some of these newspapers were also very influential politicians of the ruling parties.²⁵ However, this relationship is not analyzed in depth, but merely descriptively mentioned.²⁶ In contrast, Zweers has written in-depth about the role of the media and press censorship during the conflict.²⁷ Zweers analyzes the role of Dutch military information services in distorting and influencing the reporting so that the Dutch public mostly received information that would persuade the public to support a military action.²⁸

¹⁸ Baudet and Fennema, *Het Nederlands belang bij Indië*.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Stef Scagliola. “The Silences and Myths of a ‘Dirty War’: Coming to Terms with the Dutch–Indonesian Decolonisation War (1945–1949).” *European Review of History*, 14 no. 2 (2007): 237.

²¹ Paul M.M. Doolan. “Collective Memory and the Dutch East Indies.” In *Collective Memory and the Dutch East Indies*. Amsterdam University Press, (2021), 63-198; Limpach, *de brandende kampongs van Generaal Spoor*, 8; Meindert van der Kaaij. *Een kwaad geweten: De worsteling met de Indonesische onafhankelijkheidsoorlog vanaf 1950*. Amsterdam University Press, (2022): 109-46.

²² Joop de Jong “Avondschoot.” *Hoe Nederland zich terugtrok uit zijn Aziatisch Imperium*, Boom, Amsterdam (2011); Joop de Jong, *De terugtocht. Nederland en de dekolonisatie van Indonesie*, 19-21, 319-28; Scagliola, *Last van de oorlog*, 133-248; Scagliola, *The Silences and Myths of a ‘Dirty War*, 243-52; van der Kaaij, *Een kwaad geweten*, 109-306.

²³ Peter Romijn. “De lange Tweede Wereldoorlog.” *Nederland 1940-1949* (2020): introduction.

²⁴ Remco Raben and Peter Romijn. *Talen van geweld. Stilte, informatie en misleiding in de Indonesische onafhankelijkheidsoorlog, 1945-1949*. Amsterdam University Press, 2022.

²⁵ Van Liempt, *Nederland valt aan*, 26-118.

²⁶ Ibid., 7-289.

²⁷ Louis Zweers. *De gecensureerde oorlog: militairen versus media in Nederlands-Indië 1945-1949*. Walburg Pers, (2013): 7-358.

²⁸ Ibid., 29-224.

Zweers focused on the manipulation of information by the DLC (Military Contacts Services) and the deficient character of Dutch journalists in Indonesia, which Stevens also does.²⁹

Trouw was a protestant newspaper whose chief editor was ARP (Anti-Revolutionary Party) member of parliament Sieuwert Bruins Slot; it was strongly aligned with the ARP party and was a proponent of the colonial war in Indonesia.³⁰ Trouw had been a resistance newspaper during WWII, as Parool had been, but surprisingly chose to adhere to ARP and Dutch pillarization in 1945.³¹ Bootsma's work about the history of Trouw also mentions the alignment of Trouw to ARP, and emphasized that the newspaper had a strong Christian faith which influenced how Trouw interpreted facts.³² Bootsma only briefly mentions the Indonesian conflict and explains that was a 'political organ' that opposed the legitimacy of the Indonesian Revolution because God opposed it. According to Bruins Slot and Trouw, Dutch authority over Indonesia was given by God, and the Dutch had a divine right (duty) to intervene militarily.³³

De Volkskrant was a catholic newspaper that was primarily read by KVP (Catholic People's Party) voters; its political chief editor was the leader of the KVP Carl Romme.³⁴ They were both proponents of the colonial war in Indonesia.³⁵ Bank wrote a work specifically about the role of Dutch Catholics during the Indonesian Revolution, which analyzes the KVP, but also the roles of the Dutch churches and smaller catholic political parties in the Netherlands. Van den Berg and Harinck also analyze the role of Dutch and Indonesian churches and the effect that the INR had on Indonesian Christians.³⁶

According to van Liempt, Parool was an exception in the Dutch media landscape as it often opposed and questioned the necessity for war in Indonesia.³⁷ It was aligned with the other ruling party in 1946, PvdA (Labor Party), and its chief editor was PvdA party member Gerrit Jan van Heuven Goedhart.³⁸ Mulder and van Koedijks argue about Parool that it was more independent than most newspapers during the INR.³⁹

The literature also rarely centrally analyzes the role of Dutch politics and the role of Dutch-Indonesian diplomacy in public discourse. An important scholar who has broken this trend, is (Joop) de Jong. De Jong centrally analyzes Dutch-Indonesian diplomacy (Linggadjati and Renville)⁴⁰ in the buildup to the two military operations, a similar approach to this research.

²⁹ R.J.J. Stevens "Manipulatie van informatie? De rol van de Nederlandse militaire inlichtingendienst in Indonesië ten tijde van het Nederlands-Indisch conflict 1945-1949." (1992): 149-68.

³⁰ Van Liempt, *Nederland valt aan*, 37-87.

³¹ Trouw archief. "De geschiedenis van dagblad Trouw". <https://trouw-archieff.nl/de-geschiedenis-van-dagblad-trouw>

³² Peter Bootsma. *Trouw. 75 jaar tegen de stroom in*. Amsterdam: Boom, 2018: 38-70.

³³ Ibid., 59-60.

³⁴ Van Liempt, *Nederland valt aan*, 26-45.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Marleen van den Berg, and George Harinck. *Voor de geest en het moreel van de troepen: De kerken en de oorlog in Indonesië, 1945-1950*. Uitgeverij Verloren, 2018.

³⁷ Van Liempt, *Nederland valt aan*, 68-118.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Gerard Mulder and Paul Koedijk. *Lees die krant! Geschiedenis van het naoorlogse Parool 1945-1970*. Meulenhoff, 1996.

⁴⁰ de Jong, *De terugtocht*, 90-96, 149-72.

De Jong also focuses on the international pressure regarding Dutch decisions, and the Dutch unwillingness to let go of the Dutch empire after WWII.⁴¹

Langeveld, Daalder and Gaemers, de Moor, and Giebels all centrally focus on the roles of specific Dutch political (and military) figures. Langeveld wrote the biography of (Prime Minister in 1945-6) Wim Schermerhorn, who, as chairman of the Commission-General had to guide the Dutch-Indonesian conflict to a peaceful solution; his important role in Dutch politics diminished after Operation Product in 1947.⁴² Daalder and Gaemers published a biography about Willem Drees, who became Prime Minister in 1948 and played an important role in Indonesia as the leader of the 1947 governing party PvdA.⁴³ De Moor, in his biography of General Simon Spoor, disputed the structural character of the excessive violence, and explained that Spoor had a genuine conviction that the Indies needed the Netherlands to grow into a 'maturity' level that would allow for possible independence, and that Spoor truly believed that the minority terroristic elements had to be eliminated before the local population would favor the Dutch again.⁴⁴ Giebels wrote the biography of KVP member Louis Beel, who became Prime Minister in 1946 and influenced many crucial decisions regarding Operation Product and Operation Kraai.⁴⁵

While these works were valuable additions to the existing literature, none convincingly answer the question of how the war was sold to public by analyzing various media outlets and the wider Dutch political landscape. Because most literature was focused on finding a post-war agreement on the nature of the excessive violence, or the roles of specific parties or newspapers, it did not provide a comprehensive framework which analyzes a combination of, and the interplay between, the actors who contributed to public discourse. The interpretive frameworks that both the Dutch government and the Dutch media used to make sense of the war, and its realities, are crucial. Therefore, this thesis aims to fill this research gap by researching public discourse in Dutch parliamentary debates and prominent Dutch newspapers.

⁴¹ de Jong, *De terugtocht*, 173-306.

⁴² Herman Langeveld, *De man die in de put sprong: Willem Schermerhorn 1894-1977*. Amsterdam, Boom: 2014.

⁴³ Hans Daalder and Jelle Gaemers. *Willem Drees, Daadkracht en Idealisme*. Uitgeverij Balans, 2014.

⁴⁴ Jaap de Moor, *Generaal Spoor. Triomf en tragiek van een legercommandant*. Amsterdam, Boom: 2011.

⁴⁵ Lambert Giebels. *Beel. Van vazal tot onderkoning 1902–1977*. Den Haag, SDU, 1995.

Methodology

Security culture

To analyze public discourse, this research will try to identify and analyze distinct features of a Dutch security culture.

Security culture is a relatively new concept in the field of security studies; it is a broader cultural explanation of security that aims to build on the narrower (but dominant framework in the SS field) Securitization theory.⁴⁶ In line with this research and its analysis of the literature on the independence war, security culture holds the belief that cultural aspects and processes are too often excluded from the conflict studies and security studies fields.⁴⁷ While securitization theory focuses only what is accepted as an existential threat by the mass audience and lays emphasis on the importance of a speech act,⁴⁸ security culture looks at the various concepts of security that are constructed (for instance by the media or extra-parliamentary groups), not only the one constructed by the political elite (as is generally the case with securitization theory).

A specific Dutch security culture is a topic that has not been explored thoroughly; a national (Dutch) version barely exists in the security culture literature. Beatrice de Graaf has written about Dutch security culture and briefly mentions the topic of colonialism and decolonization in Indonesia.⁴⁹ However, she mostly focuses on terrorism/terror beyond the independence war and after 1945-49.⁵⁰ Therefore, this research will also provide the necessary and novel contribution to Dutch security culture during the colonial war in Indonesia.

The relevance of this research is to establish how different actors (media and politicians) influenced one another and developed the existing Dutch security culture into publicly supporting a colonial war. Given the fact that the Dutch had been the victims of fascist occupation and had seen the destructive effects of war on society, it is interesting to understand how the Dutch government prepared its people to fight another war shortly after WWII ended. Therefore, it is historically relevant to re-examine this relationship of how the Dutch government attempted to legitimize this war to the Dutch public.

⁴⁶ Christopher Daase. "On paradox and pathologies – A cultural approach to security." In *Transformations of Security Studies*, (2015): 80-7.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Barry Buzan Ole Wæver, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde. *Security: A new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, (1998): 25-32.

⁴⁹ Beatrice de Graaf. "Terrorism in the Netherlands A History". *The Cambridge History of Terrorism*. Cambridge University Press, 2021: 333-4.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 333-360.

Therefore, this research will attempt to answer the main research question.

Main research question: How have security culture features in public discourse by the Dutch government and Dutch media impacted the Dutch-Indonesian conflict during the Indonesian War of Independence (1945-9)?

The following sub-questions will be answered in the substantive chapters to find an answer to the main research question.

Sub-research question 1: How have security culture features in public discourse by the Dutch government and Dutch media impacted the Dutch-Indonesian conflict during the early phase of the Indonesian War of Independence (1945-6)?

Sub-research question 2: How have security culture features in public discourse by the Dutch government and Dutch media impacted the Dutch-Indonesian conflict from the signing of Linggadjati until the end of Operation Product (1946-7)?

Sub-research question 3: How have security culture features in public discourse by the Dutch government and Dutch media impacted the Dutch-Indonesian conflict from the buildup of Operation Kraai until the end of the operation (1948-9)?

The research will use the following definition of security culture:

“1) an open, and contested, process of threat-identification and interest-assessment, including the drawing of lines between friends and foes, insiders and outsiders; 2) enabled by institutional structures and agents involved in these processes of threat-assessment and neutralisation; 3) resulting in practices and action repertoires that are introduced and implemented to defend the allegedly endangered interests.”⁵¹

This definition emphasizes the identification of threats related to the enabling institutional structures and agents (language used by the government and Dutch journalists) of threat assessment (why and how independence fighters and the Republic were portrayed as a threat). And it looks at the resulting practices that were introduced to defend the allegedly endangered interests (change of constitution for conscription, military operations, etc).

While securitization theory only identifies the perceived threat (which then becomes a threat because it is widely seen as one by the mass audience), security culture admits to the possibility of two threats. The word ‘allegedly’ implies that security culture distinguishes between what

⁵¹ de Graaf, “Terrorism in the Netherlands A History”, 333-4.

an objective threat to security is, and one that is subjectively created through one or multiple narratives. These threats can overlap (an objective threat can be felt subjectively), but they can also be separate.

Security culture is a more suitable method than securitization theory because the latter overly focuses on the political elite, disregarding the role of information and media. Furthermore, security culture can help fill the identified literature gap because it allows this research to analyze the variety of different 'Indonesian question' narratives that existed in a pillarized Dutch parliament, media landscape, and society. Analysing the security culture that the Dutch government and media developed, will give a more comprehensive analysis of how the Dutch interpreted the colonial war.

Methodological approach

This research will try to identify narratives and features of a security culture from the ground up (from the collected data), therefore the type of research can be characterized as inductive. The data analyzed in this research will be qualitative. The choice for this qualitative approach somewhat limits the generalizability of the research because this approach will not be able to handle a large sample size. However, this methodological limitation is partially compensated by the unique wide approach to the under-researched topic of Dutch public discourse during the decolonization war.

The research philosophy that underlies this research design is interpretivism. Therefore, it assumes that reality is observed subjectively and therefore acknowledges that the researcher of this research will not be able to observe (one) objective reality.⁵²

The method used to analyze data in this research will be empirical discourse analysis. Although there is no single (one) 'discourse analysis', discourse analysis rejects the realist notion that language is a neutral means of describing or reflecting the world. Social life is socially constructed, and discourse plays a crucial role in this.⁵³ Empirical discourse analysis does not use highly structured methods to code words and sentences in detail, but rather looks for broad themes and functions of language.⁵⁴

The identified themes, in combination with this analysis, will lead to a better understanding of how the Dutch government and media developed the existing security culture (collective of shared meanings and experiences) into supporting a colonial war. Discourse analysis is a suitable method because it allows this research to find a common thread in public discourse, to identify important terminology and to analyze the interpretive frameworks that Dutch people read daily. A limitation of researching newspapers is that news, especially in this timeframe consisted of bias, opinions, and socio-culture prejudices. However, secondary literature and political debates can make up for this limitation.

The three chosen newspapers are Trouw, de Volkskrant, and Parool. In a pillarized society, these newspapers were widely read and therefore had a substantial impact on public discourse

⁵² Jill Bleiker, Sarah Morgan-Trimmer, Karen Knapp, and Susan Hopkins. "Navigating the maze: Qualitative research methodologies and their philosophical foundations." *Radiography* 25 (2019).

⁵³ Rosalind Gill "Discourse analysis." *Qualitative researching with text, image and sound* 1 (2000): 172.

⁵⁴ Brian Hodges, Ayelet Kuper, and Scott Reeves. "Discourse analysis." *BMJ* no. 337 (2008): 570-1.

because Dutch citizens only received daily information about the war through newspapers (other forms of media did not report about Indonesia daily). The validity of this research is relatively high because many Dutch newspapers were pro-war, thus analyzing two pro-war newspapers and one opponent newspaper will give an accurate depiction of Dutch public discourse. De Waarheid, a communist newspaper, was even more outspoken in opposing the war, but reflected a smaller part of the Dutch population than Parool. These newspapers were also chosen because they reflect the pillarized nature of the Netherlands in 1945-9, along with the political ‘coloring’ that existed in the media landscape. The pillarized nature increases the reliability of this research as pillars (both newspapers and parties) were firm and consistent in their view of the war, as secondary literature and this research will show.⁵⁵

Per chapter, three crucial parliamentary debates, related to the conflict in Indonesia, will be analyzed to give insight into the political discourse and security culture that existed within the Dutch parliament. This research will only analyze parliamentary debates about the most crucial topics related to Indonesia. However, since the newspapers also cover many political issues, a primary focus of analysis will be on the newspapers.

Thematically, this research will analyze the newspapers and parliamentary debates based on three main themes and one subtheme. The order of these themes will differ per chapter, depending on the contextual relevance of a certain thematic order.

1. Security and military intervention: discourse regarding the use of force and military preparations.
2. Dutch political discourse: discourse concerning legitimacy and the Dutch empire.
3. Diplomacy: discourse related to diplomatic negotiations
4. (Sub-theme) Post WWII reconstruction: economic discourse.

Because the analysis will be conducted thematically and comparatively between timeframes, the Dutch security culture features in this research will be collected ‘loosely’. The features will not specifically distinguish between the three elements of the security culture definition, as this would create a repetitive and confusing analysis. However, to add an extra layer of analysis to the (final) conclusion, here, the identified security culture features will be categorized and compared using the three elements of the chosen security culture definition.

The chosen timeframes of the chapters will zoom in on the run-up to, and the processes of the decision to military intervention: the large military operations in 1947 and 1948-9. With these chosen timeframes, the analysis of public discourse will start with the political disputes between the Netherlands and Indonesia and will explain how it evolved into a military conflict between the two sides. This research will specifically analyze the evolution of public discourse from favoring a ‘diplomatic accord’ to favoring military interventions against the Republic.

The first chapter will focus on the beginning phase of the Indonesian Revolution (17-08-1945 until 14-02-1946) because this phase is relatively overlooked when it comes to the INR.⁵⁶ The

⁵⁵ Van Liempt, *Nederland valt aan*, 7-289.

⁵⁶ Captain and Sinke, *het geluid van geweld*, 17-27.

second chapter will focus on the timeframe from the Linggadjati Accord until the end of the first military offensive Operation 'Product' (15-11-1946 until 05-08-1947) to analyze public discourse in relation to the diplomatic accord and how it slowly changed towards favoring a large scale military intervention. The third chapter will focus on the aftermath of Renville and the buildup to Operation Product (18-10-1948) shortly after the operation ends (10-01-1949).

Chapter 1 The Future Right for Self-Determination

An analysis of the Dutch security culture during the beginning of the Indonesian National Revolution

*‘The Dutchman has his place in the Indies, not only in days of prosperity and blessings, but also in days of misery and suffering’.*⁵⁷

Trouw article following the Japanese capitulation in August 1945

This Trouw quote published in August 1945 accurately reflected the change in colonial rhetoric that had occurred late 19th century, similar to the civilization mission in other colonial empires.⁵⁸ In 1879, Kuyper (ARP) had argued for a colonial system which stopped economic exploitation, and where instead the Netherlands had a duty to educate the Indonesians, to increase their prosperity and offer independence in the long term.⁵⁹ 22 years later, PM Kuyper’s government turned this ‘civilization mission’ into official policy in 1901; Ethical Policy.⁶⁰ The Netherlands held an ethical responsibility for colonial subjects’ welfare.⁶¹ As this chapter will show, this colonial rhetoric of an ethical responsibility for the colonial subjects’ welfare was still prevalent in Dutch security culture during the INR.

The excessive violence and other developments in Indonesia after the proclamation of independence in August 1945 are often seen as a separate phase in the literature.⁶² Instead, this phase will be analyzed as part of the Indonesian National Revolution and as the buildup to the decolonization war. It is difficult to analyze the military interventions in 1947 and 1948 without having analyzed the narratives and military conflict that went on before this period.

In Dutch historiography, this violence has been characterized as the ‘Bersiap period’.⁶³ However, recent Dutch literature by Captain and Sinke called this into question, as it potentially makes Indo-Dutch suffering leading, and disregards the English, Japanese, Chinese, and Indonesian victims of excessive violence.⁶⁴ Therefore, this chapter shall not refer to the Bersiap period, but instead to the early phase of the Indonesian National Revolution (INR) or Indonesian War of Independence.

The initial Dutch response to the Indonesian proclamation of independence is not often linked to the historical and political context of the Netherlands in 1945, which this research will attempt to do. Therefore, this chapter will analyze the following sub-research question:

⁵⁷ Trouw 17-08-1945, “Ned. Indie en de bevrijding”

⁵⁸ Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 114-6.

⁵⁹ Ronald Frisart. “Ethische Politiek in Indië Móést Wel Stranden.” *Historiek*, August 12, 2022. <https://historiek.net/ethische-politiek-in-indie-moest-wel-stranden/145704/>; Annette Jenowein. ‘Wilskracht, durf en onverpoosden ijver’: Charlotte Jacobs (1847-1916), eerste vrouwelijke apotheker in Nederland en Nederlands-Indië. *Leiden University* (2019): 143-4.

⁶⁰ Frisart, “Ethische Politiek in Indië Móést Wel Stranden”

⁶¹ Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 116-7.

⁶² Captain and Sinke, *het geluid van geweld*, 26-9.

⁶³ de Kanttekening. “Uva-Hoogleraar: “‘Bersiap’ Is Als Historisch Begrip Problematisch.”” *de Kanttekening*, January 20, 2022. <https://dekanttekening.nl/nieuws/uva-hoogleraar-bersiap-is-als-historisch-begrip-problematisch4/>

⁶⁴ Ibid., Captain and Sinke, *het geluid van geweld*, 26-9

Sub-research question 1: How have security culture features in public discourse by the Dutch government and Dutch media impacted the Dutch-Indonesian conflict during the early phase of the Indonesian War of Independence (1945-6)?

I. **Dutch political discourse:** rhetoric concerning legitimacy and the Dutch empire.

Indonesia did not want to return to colonial rule by any country in August 1945.⁶⁵ Centuries of foreign occupation by various countries, growth in nationalism and anti-imperialist sentiments (both before and during WWII)⁶⁶, and a harsh 3-year occupation by the Japanese built up to Sukarno's declaration of independence on the 17th of August 1945.⁶⁷ The Dutch were slow in realizing that Indonesia had proclaimed independence,⁶⁸ with *de Volkskrant* being the first newspaper to publish about the Indonesian independence on September 26th, 1945.⁶⁹

As the Dutch attributed prestige and national identity to their previous 'accomplishments' in Indonesia, especially during the humiliation of German occupation,⁷⁰ the Dutch government did not accept this independence as legitimate.⁷¹ Instead, official government statements, and articles in *Trouw* and *de Volkskrant* reflected processes of delegitimization.⁷² Sukarno was repeatedly portrayed as a leader of an extremist group that had collaborated with Japan and was supported by the Soviet Union to undermine Dutch rule.⁷³ Moreover, the heterogeneity of the Indonesian peoples was emphasized to delegitimize the possibility of one overarching (Republican) government ruling Indonesia.⁷⁴ Dutch security culture saw the Japanese occupation of Indonesia as an unjustified interruption of the Dutch civilizing mission.⁷⁵ Therefore, the Indonesian Declaration of Independence was seen as an extension of this illegitimate counterclaim to Dutch rule.⁷⁶ Any Dutch military intervention could therefore be legitimized as a humanitarian action to save the Indonesians from these terrorists.⁷⁷ The Dutch

⁶⁵ Captain and Sinke, *het geluid van geweld*, 64.

⁶⁶ Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 355.

⁶⁷ Captain and Sinke, *het geluid van geweld*, 64.

⁶⁸ Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 355.

⁶⁹ *De Volkskrant* 26-09-1945, front page and p. 3; numerous *Trouw* and *Het Parool* newspapers published from 15-08-1945 until 01-10-1945.

⁷⁰ Willem Henri van Helsdingen and H. Hoogenberk. "Daar werd wat groots verricht." *Nederlandsch-Indië in de XXste eeuw* (1941).

⁷¹ *Het Parool* 02-10-1945, "Minister Logemann rekent op steun van de geallieerden"

⁷² *Ibid.*, *De Volkskrant* 26-09-1945, front page and p. 3; *Trouw* 15-11-1945, "Indonesische wandaden, 150 vrouwen en kinderen vermoord"; *Trouw* 26-11-1945, "Engelschen vernietigen radiostations van de rebellen"; *Trouw* 28-11-1945, "Rebellen te Bandoeng hijschen de witte vlag".

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *De Volkskrant* 12-09-1945, p. 3.

⁷⁵ Chris Lorenz. "De Nederlandse koloniale herinnering en de universele mensenrechten: De casus 'Rawagede'." *Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis* 128, no. 1 (2015): 129.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

failed to realize that many Indonesians were fed up with occupation, reflecting a persistent underestimation features in Dutch security culture of how widespread the wish for Indonesian independence was.⁷⁸

Contrarily, Indonesian nationalists felt strengthened in their independence claim by Queen Wilhelmina's speech during WWII (December 6th, 1942, often referred to as the '7 December speech') which had vaguely alluded to a possibility of independence for Indonesia.⁷⁹ The interpretation of this speech would play a crucial role in both the legitimization of colonial war and Indonesian independence.

De Volkskrant and Trouw continuously framed a Dutch return to Indonesia as an imperial responsibility for the Netherlands to restore order, alleviate suffering and lift Indonesia from poverty, arguing that they did not want to make profit similar to old-fashioned colonialism.⁸⁰

⁸¹ Trouw wanted a more equal relationship and called for a Dutch empire that consisted of two equal parts.⁸² The underlying intonation implicitly showed a notion of intellectual superiority of the Dutch over the Indonesians, who were still deemed unfit for self-rule.⁸³ It is similar to Ethical Policy's impact, as this had curbed racism and promoted the local people to 'fellow people', but at the same time still reflected racist thoughts because local people were deemed inferior and could only be elevated by the Dutch (or Europeans).⁸⁴

The Dutch government referred to the right of self-determination for all peoples only in February 1946,⁸⁵ when it proposed a shared imperial government (federal) structure as a transitional phase until the Indonesians would be ready for total self-rule.⁸⁶ By arguing that total self-rule would have fatal consequences for the Indonesian prosperity and culture and by shifting independence to an undetermined moment in the future,⁸⁷ the Dutch used the civilization mission and ethical policy rhetoric to legitimize the continuation of their colonial empire indefinitely.⁸⁸ Trouw heavily disagreed with the decision to promise full independence in the future, as maintenance of the empire was crucial for Trouw.⁸⁹ It heavily disputed the legitimacy of the Republic, and argued that the dispute in Indonesia was an internal affair between a (Dutch) government and rebels.

⁷⁸ Harinck, *Zoeken, aangrijpen en vernietigen*, 58.

⁷⁹ Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 299-307.

⁸⁰ Trouw 17-08-1945, "Ned. Indië en de bevrijding"; De Volkskrant 16-08-1945, p. 2; De Volkskrant 17-08-1945, 2; De Volkskrant 05-09-1945, p. 3.

⁸¹ Trouw 22-08-1945, "Hoe vinden we Indië terug, Zodra het scherm weer opgaat"; Trouw 22-08-1945, "Indië blijft Nederlandsch, Britsche bezetting beteekent geen gebiedsafstand"; Trouw 22-08-1945, "Indië's toekomst".

⁸² Ibid.; Trouw 15-08-1945, "Het heele Koninkrijk vrij".

⁸³ Trouw 22-08-1945, "Indië's toekomst".

⁸⁴ Jan Breman, "Koloniaal eerherstel, een vergelijkend perspectief". *De Gids* no. 154 (1991).

⁸⁵ Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 357.

⁸⁶ Trouw 17-01-1946, "Min. Logemann: Geen oorlog met Indonesië "; Trouw 11-02-1946, "Ned.- Indië vrij deelgenoot in het Koninkrijk, Recht van zelfbeschikking na overgangstijd".

⁸⁷ Trouw 11-02-1946, "Ned.- Indië vrij deelgenoot in het Koninkrijk".

⁸⁸ Trouw 17-01-1946, "Min. Logemann: Geen oorlog met Indonesië "; Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 117.

⁸⁹ Trouw 11-02-1946, "Het Koninkrijk".

In contrast to Trouw and de Volkskrant, Parool seemed less concerned with the Dutch imperial return to Indonesia, as it focused on other issues.⁹⁰ The journalistic impartiality of Parool was of a higher level than that of Trouw and de Volkskrant. The latter newspapers often indirectly twisted words or assumed intentions of Republican leaders, yet Parool was the only analyzed newspaper to quote Sukarno and elaborate on the nationalist's acts of defiance against Japanese occupation in September 1945.⁹¹

On the 25th of September 1945, the Dutch parliament reconvened for the first time since German occupation started in 1940; Wim Schermerhorn from VDB (Free-thinking Democratic League, a precursor to PvdA) was its Prime Minister, while Willem Drees from the SDAP (Labor Party, precursor to PvdA) was its Deputy Prime Minister. The parliament was designated as an emergency parliament, as the 100 elected members of parliament were not all present: throughout the war, various members of the Dutch parliament passed away, resigned, or were fired due to collaboration.⁹² 74 members convened in September 1945, who would only be replaced during the next elections;⁹³ These elections would eventually be held in May 1946. Therefore, the emergency cabinet's crucial decisions regarding the Indonesia conflict could be deemed undemocratic, especially because parliament was often bypassed.⁹⁴

It became a major issue in the second parliamentary assembly in 1945, when opposition ARP leader Jan Schouten scolded the Dutch government for the unconstitutional and undemocratic way in which the Dutch parliament had not been consulted in major decisions regarding Indonesia.⁹⁵ Schouten also believed that the violation of Dutch authority was a Communist and Japanese revolution, which the Dutch government had to be more vocal about.⁹⁶

⁹⁰ Het Parool 21-08-1945, "Geen strijd op Java"; Het Parool 15-08-1945, "Ned. Roode kruis gaat helpen"; Het Parool 04-09-1945, "Roode kruis op weg naar Indonesië"; Het Parool 15-08-1945, "Geallieerde operaties gestaakt"; Het Parool 23-08-1945, "70.000 Nederlanders in vrijheid"

⁹¹ Het Parool 25-09-1945, "Ons Rijk overzee"

⁹² Verslag der handelingen van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal gedurende de tijdelijke zitting 1945. 1e vergadering – 25 september 1945. Nr. 0000073956 (1945): 3.

⁹³ Ibid., 3-10.

⁹⁴ Stan Meuwese. Twee eeuwen dienstplicht. discipline, dienstweigering en desertie: deelnemen (of niet) aan de Nederlandse krijgsmacht in rechtshistorisch perspectief. Wolf Legal Publishers, (2017): 455.

⁹⁵ Verslag der handelingen van de Tweede Kamer, 1^e vergadering – 25 september 1945, 3-10.

⁹⁶ Trouw 17-01-1946, "Min. Logemann: Geen oorlog met Indonesie, Schouten: Op Java heerscht revolutie"

II. Security and military intervention: discourse regarding the use of force and military preparations

Due to the unexpected and sudden nature of Japan's capitulation on the 15th of August 1945, the Netherlands was not ready to militarily liberate (or re-occupy) and prevent a power vacuum from emerging in Indonesia.⁹⁷ Allied armed forces under British command took up this role until the Netherlands was ready to re-establish control over the 'Dutch Indies' again.

Trouw highlighted, in August 1945, that the early declaration of war (and fighting) against Japan in 1941-2 meant that the Dutch had contributed to the WWII victory.⁹⁸ Trouw admitted that the lack of visual and physical representation of Dutch troops during the Indonesian liberation would hurt imperial legitimacy and the ability to restore authority.⁹⁹ 'Since we cannot impress the Indies with military display, we must help the Indies and show that our help and governance is a blessing'.¹⁰⁰ The sincere nature of the 'civilizing mission' rhetoric can be questioned, as Trouw was eager to prove Indonesia that it needed the Netherlands.

In September 1945, Minister of War Meynen told 27 000 troops who were to be deployed: 'that they should remember to be builders and do everything in their power to ensure that the native people hold the white man in awe and reverence.'¹⁰¹ In January 1946, Meynen told troops in training: 'the duty to retain the overseas imperial territories for the Netherlands now rests on your shoulders. If we lose the Indies, then we are relegated to a small unimportant nation.'¹⁰² The prestige of keeping Indonesia and being respected as an imperial power, was important in Dutch security culture. These words reveal that politicians might have had different reasoning (white superiority arguments and a colonial mindset) behind sending troops to Indonesia than what they portrayed in public discourse. Government statements often emphasized an ethical civilizing mission, and a promise to stop colonial exploitation.

Parool described friction and the use of excessive violence between the Indonesians and Indo-Europeans already in September 1945.¹⁰³ Trouw mentioned it a month later, identifying this violence as a violation of Dutch authority.¹⁰⁴ Trouw believed this had to be countered with a military operation, to suppress the INR.¹⁰⁵ The Dutch government did not favor this option.¹⁰⁶

When compared to the other two newspapers, Parool uniquely made a distinction between the extremist groups who used excessive violence, and an older group of nationalists who promoted peaceful measures.¹⁰⁷ Indeed, the Indonesian nationalists were far from unitary as

⁹⁷ Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 355.

⁹⁸ Trouw 15-08-1945, "Het heele Koninkrijk vrij"; Trouw 18-08-1945, "Japan's houding, delegaties op weg naar Manilla"; Trouw 25-08-1945, "Een nieuwe taak".

⁹⁹ Trouw 25-08-1945, "Een nieuwe taak".

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Het Parool 13-09-1945, "Stoottroepen naar Indie"; Het Parool 29-09-1945, "27.000 man naar Indie"

¹⁰² Trouw 15-01-1946, "Minister Meynen sprak de troepen toe".

¹⁰³ Het Parool 21-09-1945, "Dreigt er een guerrilla op Java?"; Het Parool 25-09-1945, "Ons Rijk overzee"

¹⁰⁴ Trouw 15-11-1945, "Indonesische wandaden, 150 vrouwen en kinderen vermoord"; Trouw 26-11-1945, "Engelschen vernietigen radiostations van de rebellen"; Trouw 28-11-1945, "Rebellen te Bandoeng hijschen de witte vlag".

¹⁰⁵ Trouw 16-01-1946, "SCHERPE CRITIEK OP REGERINGSBELEID, De grens bereikt"

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Het Parool 25-09-1945, "Ons Rijk overzee"

younger Pemuda groups sought vengeance and violence, while older nationalists such as Sukarno and Hatta preferred political solutions to enhance the legitimacy of the Republic.¹⁰⁸

The Indonesian trauma of oppression, paired with the power vacuum (lack of authority and safety) that occurred in 1945 culminated in a period of vengeance-riddled and randomized violence against anyone who had assisted or had been a symbol of colonial oppression in Indonesia.¹⁰⁹ The increased violence in October and November strengthened the sense of urgency and necessity to deploy military troops and restore order and safety for Dutch nationals and other groups.¹¹⁰ It also led to a change of plans in November, as a report by various Dutch military commanders estimated that more (heavily armed) forces would be needed (75.000, almost twice as many as in October plans) to ‘liberate’ Indonesia.

On November 12th, 1945, the Dutch government decided to assemble a large force for deployment in Indonesia and made a schedule that would allow this force to be at full strength towards the end of 1946.¹¹¹ The decision to send a large deployment force delayed the schedule, as the Dutch had previously assumed to take over control from the British forces at the beginning of 1946. The new troop strength could only be achieved by deploying the First Division of the Expeditionary Force (20.000 men) which became available in October 1946, not in Germany, but in Indonesia.¹¹² Vice Admiral Helfrich and Lieutenant General van Oyen heavily protested this schedule, arguing that deploying smaller units of heavily armed troops as soon as possible would be much more valuable than waiting for 11 months before the troops would be up to full strength.¹¹³ The government stuck to the 12-November schedule, which meant that the Netherlands would only be able to restore its authority over Indonesia with its troops in 1947.¹¹⁴ In hindsight, this decision gave the Republic time to organize itself better politically and militarily.

By December 1945, the Dutch government was aware of the fact that the revolution was not to be underestimated, both in a military and a nationalist awareness sense, but attributed the reason for the nationalist revolution solely to the three years of Japanese occupation.¹¹⁵ The 8th Parliamentary Assembly, a crucial debate about the situation in Indonesia, showed that the political opposition in the parliament was ill-informed of the situation in Indonesia and that they relied on false rumors and bad intelligence which Minister Logemann mostly had to debunk.¹¹⁶ A reoccurring question in the debate was whether the Allied forces were doing enough to help the Netherlands restore order in Indonesia, especially in light of the supposed Dutch contribution to the WWII victory in Indonesia.¹¹⁷

¹⁰⁸ Captain and Sinke, *het geluid van geweld*, 65-7; De Jong, *De terugtocht*, 307.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 38-117; Harinck, *Zoeken, aangrijpen en vernietigen*, 58-9.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid*.

¹¹¹ Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 418-21.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 419-20.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 420.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*.

¹¹⁵ Handelingen Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. 8^e vergadering – 21 december 1945. Nr. 0000074099 (1945): 149-50.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid*. 137-66.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid*.

III. Diplomacy: rhetoric related to diplomatic negotiations

There were major differences of opinion within the Netherlands about the policy to be pursued in Indonesia.¹¹⁸ In December 1945, the Dutch government stated in a parliamentary debate that order and safety had to be restored before possible diplomatic negotiations would be considered; though later research has shown that the cabinet was also internally divided on this issue behind closed doors.¹¹⁹ In parliament, the government decided that it would not talk to Sukarno, but would consider talking to other nationalist leaders.¹²⁰ During parliamentary debates, the duty to restore order and safety mostly seemed to focus on Dutch nationals and Dutch-Indonesian peoples who had been attacked, not on other ethnic groups or Indonesians.¹²¹ Many politicians did not oppose diplomatic negotiations with the Republic nor the possibility of Indonesian independence, but a crucial precondition was that the Dutch empire had to be maintained in some form.¹²² A few politicians already favored Indonesian independence in 1945, though it reflected a large minority.¹²³

In contrast, *de Volkskrant* repeatedly attempted to link Sukarno and the Republic to Communism, which served as delegitimization of their rule and showed that *de Volkskrant* did not favor diplomatic negotiations while the Republic was in power.¹²⁴

Parool was the only newspaper that stated that it is important to report on both sides of the public discourse debate in the Netherlands. *Parool* identified the conservative side who wanted to retain Indonesia by remaining the owner and possessing Indonesia (*Trouw*, *de Volkskrant*, and *ARP*), and the radical side who wanted a ‘cordial cooperative structure and tantamount and equal parts of the kingdom instead of the old subordination’ (the government).¹²⁵ Towards the end of September 1945, *Parool* started supporting the radical side, emphasizing that time was a crucial factor in Queen Wilhelmina’s speech: elevation of Indonesia was promised immediately after the war, not ‘after an indefinite time’ as conservatives argued.¹²⁶

On October 2nd 1945, *Parool* uniquely spoke out against the government’s and the media’s portrayal of Sukarno and Hatta as traitors, fascists, and extremists.¹²⁷ *Parool* wrote that it made sense for Sukarno to work together with the Japanese, as his only goal was to achieve freedom and independence for his people, and that a majority of the people shared this sentiment.¹²⁸ *Parool* condemned the unequal colonial relations of the past, and the old colonial mentality, and understood that the Indonesian nationalists did not trust the Dutch.¹²⁹

¹¹⁸ Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 357.

¹¹⁹ Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 357.

¹²⁰ Handelingen Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. 8^e vergadering – 21 december 1945. Nr. 0000074099 (1945): 141, 48.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 137-66.

¹²² *Ibid.*; Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 357.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ *De Volkskrant* 27-09-1945, p. 3.

¹²⁵ *Het Parool* 26-09-1945, “Indonesië”

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ *Het Parool* 02-10-1945, “Wij: begrip. Zij: vertrouwen.”

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

IV. (Sub-theme) Post WWII reconstruction: economic discourse.

The underlying economic intentions of Trouw could already implicitly be detected in August 1945; ‘diplomatic observers believe that the Dutch will return to Indonesia as soon as possible. The [Indonesian] islands for which they fought so hard against the Japanese, are the backbone of the Dutch economy, and the immediate efforts to exploit the large rubber plantations and petroleum fields is expected.’¹³⁰

Trouw claimed to not want to return to a colonial form of one-way exploitation by the Dutch, but its message to start exploiting Indonesian resources as soon as possible so it can add to the Dutch economy revealed otherwise. This is a re-occurring phenomenon, as it reported the establishment of a rubber fund which will help rubber plantations and the local population; the Dutch government will temporarily ‘help’ by acting as the sole buyer on the domestic market, and as the only seller of Dutch Indian rubber on the global market. Trouw deemed this necessary because of various reasons¹³¹ but refused to explicitly point out the exploitative nature and the economic reasoning behind the Dutch return to Indonesia.

De Volkskrant seemed less concerned with economic reconstruction but placed reconstruction of Indonesia in a religious framework: it argued that Christian missionaries had to be sent to Indonesia.¹³²

¹³⁰ Trouw 25-08-1945, ‘Rush naar het Oosten, Engeland heeft voorsprong boven ons’.

¹³¹ Trouw 12-02-1946, “Rubberproblemen in Nederl.- Indie”

¹³² De Volkskrant 21-08-1945, front page

Conclusion chapter 1

The Dutch security culture in 1945-6 consisted of systemic underestimation, both of how widespread the sentiment of Indonesian nationalism was, and violence's intensity during the early phase of the INR. This underestimation also meant that militarily, the changed plan to deploy a large force, would only be possible towards the end of 1946. Though the decision to send a large deployment force acknowledged the excessive violence, its lack of urgency in hindsight allowed for the Republic to organize itself better.

While the emergency cabinet was not a representative reflection of the Dutch population anymore, a new government was only elected in May 1946, a year after WWII ended in the Netherlands. The emergency cabinet made important decisions regarding the Indonesia question, sometimes even bypassing parliament. Therefore, the Dutch security culture of this timeframe reflected undemocratic and perhaps even unconstitutional elements. The fact that an undemocratic government made these crucial decisions in an autocratic way was rarely mentioned in public discourse.

Dutch security culture included a civilization mission rhetoric that was in line with late 19th (and early 20th) century colonial thought. Government officials, *Volkskrant* readers, and especially *Trouw* readers believed that the Dutch were responsible for the liberation of Indonesia and had to aid the ('inferior') Indonesians to a level of 'civilization' which would enable independence. However, *Trouw* primarily favored a military intervention because Indonesia was seen as an inherent part of the Dutch empire. *De Volkskrant's* rhetoric was even more discriminative and wanted to reclaim the Indonesian colony. Though Dutch security culture emphasized that it wanted to protect the Indonesian population, parliamentary debates about restoring order and safety focused on the safety of Dutch nationals and Dutch Indonesians, not of the Indonesians.

Implicit language in public discourse reveals that there were still many conservative and nationalist ideas hidden in the norms and values of the Dutch security culture. These ideas reflected a pre-WWII world order when empires still ruled the world. Therefore, Dutch security culture foresaw an imperial necessity for the Dutch to return to Indonesia, as it would lose international prestige if the colonies were lost. Many supporters of a return to Dutch colonialism refused to acknowledge that a new world order was developing after the fascist oppression during WWII. Another underlying idea in Dutch security culture was that maintaining Indonesia as part of the Dutch empire would benefit the Dutch economically, something which, by some, was deemed necessary considering the post-WWII reconstruction of the Netherlands.

Dutch security culture consisted of one-sided processes of structural and personalized delegitimization, as Sukarno was often called a Japanese puppet, extremist, and communist. *De Volkskrant*, *Trouw*, and the Dutch government all used this type of terminology to characterize the Republic. The government believed that order and safety had to be restored by the Dutch before diplomatic negotiations with the Republic would be possible. The Dutch government refused to speak with Sukarno, making it difficult to find a diplomatic solution. Moreover, the 'proclamation of independence', which the Dutch did not accept as legitimate,

was mentioned only 1.5 months after it happened, which shows that Dutch security culture was slow in recognizing trends.

Parool, in many ways, had a unique post-WWII journalistic approach. It was the only newspaper out of the three analyzed newspapers to acknowledge and report on both sides of the public discourse debate, also making sense of why the Indonesians would want independence. Moreover, Parool was the only newspaper to distinguish that revolutionary violence by the pemuda's was not condoned by Sukarno and that there was a (generational) divide within the Indonesian nationalist movement. Dutch security culture did not acknowledge this distinction and instead saw the Republic as one large group of extremists who wanted to force independence through extremism. This inability to accurately assess the enemy (and its internal divisions) would remain a prevalent feature of Dutch security culture during the INR.

Chapter 2: 'A duty to restore peace and order.'

An analysis of how the Linggadjadi accord could not prevent the Dutch from launching Operation Product

More than a year after WWII ended in Indonesia, the violent character of the Indonesian Revolution and the Dutch response to it seemed to slow down. As diplomatic negotiations had stopped, the Dutch were pressured by the British (who were still militarily responsible for the national security in Indonesia) to resume the negotiations.¹³³ In September 1946, the Dutch sent a novel negotiation committee to Indonesia: the Commission General.¹³⁴ A period of deliberation and discussions followed in which the Malino Conference played an important role in finding a preliminary consensus: a promise of a Federal Indonesia along with a transition period within the Dutch empire.¹³⁵

The Dutch and the Republican government managed to come to a precarious preliminary agreement in November 1946 which defied the existing opposition (in both countries) to diplomatic negotiations; the Linggadjadi accord. Although it seemed as if Linggadjadi could prevent a further escalation of the military conflict that already took place in the first nine months of 1946, fighting and other accord violations continued to occur. After months of deliberation, the Dutch decided to launch a limited military operation in Indonesia to 'restore peace and order' on the 21st of July 1947. To examine how the Dutch came to make this decision, and slowly shifted from favoring a diplomatic accord to favoring a limited military solution, this chapter will analyze public discourse from the signing of the (preliminary) Linggadjadi Accord (15-11-1946), until the end of Operation Product (05-08-1947).

Therefore, this second chapter will analyze the following sub-research question:

Sub-research question 2: How have security culture features in public discourse by the Dutch government and Dutch media impacted the Dutch-Indonesian conflict from the signing of Linggadjadi until the end of Operation Product (1946-7)?

¹³³ Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 474.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 473.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 466-7.

I. Diplomacy: rhetoric related to diplomatic negotiations

In November 1946, the Netherlands and the Republic signed the Linggadjati Accord, a diplomatic agreement that attempted to settle the disputes between the two parties. The most important clauses will be shortly summarized.

In Linggadjati, the Netherlands conceded to recognize the Indonesian Republic as exercising the de facto authority over Java, Madura, and Sumatra, and conceded to alter the Dutch constitution so it would allow for the Republic's recognition (the Dutch government only fulfilled this promise in 1948).¹³⁶ In return, the Republic made a major concession by agreeing with the creation of the United States of Indonesia (USI). Along with Borneo and Eastern Indonesia, the Republic would be one of the ruling governments. Many Indonesian nationalists were not happy with this concession, because it drastically decreased their influence compared to the 1945 Republican independence proclamation.¹³⁷ The Republic also made an important concession in agreeing with a Dutch-Indonesian Union, albeit under the Dutch Crown.¹³⁸

The signing and ratification of Linggadjati led to many disagreements in the Dutch parliament and the KVP itself,¹³⁹ and the interpretation changed dramatically over time. Although the Accord was a 'preliminary accord with substantial compromises from two almost equal sides' in November 1946, the official accord (March 1947) diminished the equality of the Republic by relegating them to 'an Indonesian delegation'.¹⁴⁰ The KVP did not agree with the preliminary accord in November 1946, but informally agreed it because they wanted to prevent a fall of the cabinet.¹⁴¹ This informal agreement was also contingent on the fact that the KVP would get the opportunity to work out and interpret Linggadjati in a way that 'a reasonable influence of the Netherlands in the Indies could be maintained'.¹⁴²

In the following months, the Dutch began to interpret the accord as the Republic's acknowledgment of Dutch sovereignty over Indonesia.¹⁴³ Minister of Overseas Affairs Jan Anne Jonkman (PvdA), on behalf of the government, made statements in Dutch parliament on

¹³⁶ Justus M. van der Kroef. "Dutch Policy and the Linggadjati Agreement, 1946-1947." *The Historian* 15, no. 2 (1953): 165; Handelingen Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Geleidende brief van Minister van Overzeesche gebieden J.A. Jonkman inzake Ontwerp-overeenkomst Linggadjati. – 10 december 1946. Nr. 0000076534 (1946); Stichting Parlementair Documentatie Centrum. "Soevereiniteitsoverdracht Aan Indonesië in 1949." *Parlement.com* Accessed May 17, 2023.

https://www.parlement.com/id/vhm0l02igvut/soevereiniteitsoverdracht_aan_indonesie

¹³⁷ De Volkskrant 18-11-1946, "Toekomstige status van de Grote Oost".

¹³⁸ van der Kroef, "Dutch Policy and the Linggadjati Agreement", 165.

¹³⁹ Van Liempt, *Nederland valt aan*, 32-3.

¹⁴⁰ Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 505.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 508

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 507-8.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 505.

the 10th and 19th of December.¹⁴⁴ The equivalence between Linggadjadi's contracting parties was already greatly reduced in these statements.¹⁴⁵

De Volkskrant's response to Linggadjadi (which highlighted that the parliament was unhappy with the accord)¹⁴⁶ was reflective of Dutch pillarization because it showed the double role of KVP fraction leader Romme, who was also the political editor of de Volkskrant.¹⁴⁷ De Volkskrant, normally the mouthpiece of the KVP, criticized the government for possibly not adhering to the 7 December speech, and emphasized that the continuation of the Dutch Kingdom and empire had been the basis of the KVP electoral victory in 1946.¹⁴⁸ Linggadjadi heavily divided the KVP, because the compromises made to the Republic were deemed unacceptable by old colonialists in the party.¹⁴⁹ For instance, Charles Welter left the party, created a new Catholic National Party (KNP) and joined Gerbrandy's NCHR.¹⁵⁰

Parool's first response to Linggadjadi was Republican PM Sutan Sjahrir's interpretation. In contrast to the Dutch government's interpretation,¹⁵¹ Sjahrir believed that Borneo and Eastern Indonesia would voluntarily follow the Republic after they were put on equal footing.¹⁵² Sjahrir also emphasized that the Republic had compromised.¹⁵³ However, Sjahrir did not mention the dividedness that existed in Indonesia about Linggadjadi. While Sjahrir favored diplomatic negotiations to establish the Republic, many nationalists favored armed battle to fulfill the INR goals and thought that the Republican government had made too many concessions.¹⁵⁴

Two months later, in November 1946, Parool was the only newspaper to realize that both the Republic and the Netherlands were internally divided about Linggadjadi (extremist forces opposed it, while the Republican leaders/Dutch government favored it).¹⁵⁵ Parool was also the only analyzed newspaper to argue in favor of Linggadjadi.¹⁵⁶

Opinion polls showed that from October 1946 until the end of 1947, the Dutch public became increasingly interested in the Indonesia issue, which can probably be attributed to the

¹⁴⁴ Handelingen Tweede Kamer – Regeeringsverklaring in zake de ontwerp-overeenkomst van Linggadjadi. 25^e vergadering – 10 december 1946. Nr. 0000075785 (1946): 703-730; Handelingen Tweede Kamer – ontwerp-overeenkomst van Linggadjadi. 32^e vergadering – 19 december 1946. Nr. 0000075792 (1946): 1060; Het Parool 11-12-1946, "Regeeringsverklaring over Ned. Indië, Minister Jonkman over de beteekenis van het accoord van Cheribon".

¹⁴⁵ Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 508.

¹⁴⁶ De Volkskrant 15-11-1946, "Staten-Generaal zullen mede overleggen in zake Indië – Kamer niet geheel tevreden".

¹⁴⁷ Marcel Broersma. "De hand van Romme. C.P.M. Romme als staatkundig hoofdredacteur van de Volkskrant (1945-1952)." *BMGN-Low Countries Historical Review* 115, no. 4 (2000): 561.

¹⁴⁸ De Volkskrant 16-11-1946, "Het indische probleem"; Algemeen Secretariaat. *Het Urgentie Program Der Katholieke Volkspartij* (1946): 9.

¹⁴⁹ Bank, *Katholieken en de Indonesische revolutie*, 211-41.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁵¹ Het Parool 18-11-1946, "Positie van Groote Oost geregeld, Gelijkwaardige plaats in de Unie"; Het Parool 18-11-1946, "Aansluiting van Buitengewesten bij Republiek verwacht, geen Nederlandse troepen naar de binnenlanden"; Het Parool 19-11-1946, "Tekst der ontwerp-overeenkomst thans gepubliceerd".

¹⁵² Het Parool 18-11-1946, "Aansluiting van Buitengewesten bij Republiek verwacht, geen Nederlandse troepen naar de binnenlanden".

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 357.

¹⁵⁵ Het Parool 30-11-1946, "Geen uitstel!".

¹⁵⁶ Het Parool 30-11-1946, "Logemann beantwoordt critiek op Indonesisch accoord"; Het Parool 05-12-1946, "Revolutionnaire rechtsfeiten bouwstenen van nieuwe rechtsorde".

Linggadjati Accord, the deployment of conscripts, and the escalation of the military conflict in July 1947.¹⁵⁷ Parool published the results of a public survey (see below), where respondents were asked whether they were in favor, against, or felt neutral about the Linggadjati Accord. A slight majority (38%) agreed with Linggadjati, 36% opposed it; 26% had a neutral stance.¹⁵⁸ A large majority of conservative voters (opposition parties PvdV, CHU, ARP) opposed Linggadjati, while liberal voters (PvdA and CPN) were in favor of Linggadjati. What stands out is that KVP voters had no clear stance regarding Linggadjati: 30% was in favor; 33% opposed it, but the largest group, 37%, had no judgement of Linggadjati. It is reflective of the internal split that occurred in KVP over Linggadjati.¹⁵⁹ Some Catholics within the KVP supported the Republic's independence, while others (mainly those with a personal history in Indonesia) saw a Federal Indonesia as a necessary counterbalance to the Republic.¹⁶⁰

*Public opinion poll by NIPO (Netherlands Institute for Public Opinion) published in Parool.*¹⁶¹

| <i>Political conviction</i> ¹⁶² | <i>In favor of Linggadjati</i> | <i>Against</i> | <i>No judgement</i> |
|--|--------------------------------|----------------|---------------------|
| KVP | 30% | 33% | 37% |
| PvdA | 56% | 19% | 25% |
| ARP | 18% | 67% | 15% |
| CPN | 72% | 12% | 16% |
| CHU | 32% | 48% | 20% |
| PvdV | 12% | 77% | 11% |
| <i>All respondents</i> | <i>38%</i> | <i>36%</i> | <i>26%</i> |

| <i>Pol. overtuiging</i> | <i>Vóór „Linggadjati“</i> | <i>Tegen</i> | <i>Geen oord.</i> |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------|--------------|-------------------|
| Kath. Volkspartij | 30% | 33% | 37% |
| Partij v. d. Arbeid | 56% | 19% | 25% |
| Anti-Rev. | 18% | 67% | 15% |
| C.P.N. | 72% | 12% | 16% |
| Chr. Hist. | 32% | 48% | 20% |
| Partij v. d. Vrijheid | 12% | 77% | 11% |
| Alle ondervraagden | 38% | 36% | 26% |

¹⁵⁷ van der Kaaij, *Een kwaad geweten*, 62.

¹⁵⁸ Het Parool 06-12-1946, "Openbare meening over Linggadjati: Er voor: 38%; er tegen 36%; geen oordeel: 26%".

¹⁵⁹ Bank, *Katholieken en de Indonesische revolutie*, 236-7.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Het Parool 06-12-1946, "Openbare meening over Linggadjati"

¹⁶² Determined by asking the question: who did you vote for in the last elections (in May 1946).

II. Security and military intervention: discourse regarding the use of force and military preparations.

Because the excessive violence increased during the beginning phase of the INR, the Dutch decided to deploy more heavily armed troops in November 1945. For various reasons (setbacks in military training, having to wait for the First Division to become available) troop strength of the Dutch would only be at full strength towards the end of 1946.¹⁶³ Subsequently, the Dutch were not able to restore authority over Indonesia (the primary reason of deploying the troops) until early 1947.¹⁶⁴

When the large force arrived in Indonesia in late 1946, the fighting intensity (and the number of Indonesian victims) had decreased due to the diplomatic negotiations.¹⁶⁵ The Dutch government decided to keep the troops in Indonesia while the parties were trying to find a diplomatic solution.¹⁶⁶ The reason was that Dutch troops in Indonesia increased Dutch legitimacy in its attempt to restore authority, and also could serve as a bargaining tool (the Dutch could exert more pressure) against the Republic during the negotiations. In public discourse, the Dutch government legitimized this: ‘the Dutch troops have a duty to restore order and security, peace and freedom, regardless of the final Linggadjati accord’.¹⁶⁷

Throughout the analyzed timeframe, the Dutch military command despised the Linggadjati Accord and favored a large-scale military solution to the question.¹⁶⁸ The military command disagreed with a diplomatic solution because ‘it would be bad for troop morale, and the outcome of diplomatic negotiations could militarily have a negative impact.’¹⁶⁹ In practice, the Dutch military command repeatedly convinced Dutch soldiers that there was a necessity to remove the Republic’s extremist elements before peace and order in Indonesia could be restored.¹⁷⁰ General Simon Spoor believed that the majority of the population wanted the Dutch to restore order and peace, and that only an extremist minority wanted to use violence.¹⁷¹

Spoor attributed a political role to the Dutch military intelligence services (NEFIS, renamed in 1948 to CMI) and repeatedly warned politicians for the threat that Indonesia would fall prey to if the hot spots of nationalist extremists were not quickly eradicated: ‘world communism’.¹⁷² The military systematically framed Sukarno and Hatta as Japanese, fascist collaborators, something which the Dutch press often copied without doing further research.¹⁷³ The influence and pressure that the military command (especially Spoor, who secretly stationed spies in the

¹⁶³ Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 418-21.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Harinck, *Zoeken, aangrijpen en vernietigen*, 84-5.

¹⁶⁶ Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 502.

¹⁶⁷ De Volkskrant 21-02-1947, “Gen. Winkelman eist “andere politiek in Indië”, Spoor gaf reeds antwoord”.

¹⁶⁸ Zweers, *De gecensureerde oorlog: militairen versus media*, 49.

¹⁶⁹ Harinck, *Zoeken, aangrijpen en vernietigen*, 83.

¹⁷⁰ Harinck, *Zoeken, aangrijpen en vernietigen*, 85-6.

¹⁷¹ R.J.J. Stevens, “Manipulatie van informatie”, 150-3.

¹⁷² Ibid., 150-4.

¹⁷³ Zweers, *De gecensureerde oorlog: militairen versus media*, 31.

Hague)¹⁷⁴ put on Dutch politicians, and the way they influenced public discourse, was unknown to the public at the time and only recently has come to the attention of scholars.¹⁷⁵

Parool was the only analyzed newspaper to identify and condemn the military's interference in politics and called it 'an expression of a coup mentality that is forming in the reactionary officer circles'.¹⁷⁶ Parool was also the only analyzed newspaper which remarked that information provided by the military was 'contaminated' (reflected the military view, favoring a large-scale colonial war).¹⁷⁷

Another crucial issue that divided the Dutch parliament, and the political-military relations was the scale of a possible military operation. While Spoor and the military (and conservative politicians) favored a large-scale military operation to overthrow ('destroy') the Republic, many politicians (including KVP, and some of PvdA) who favored war, preferred a limited military operation mostly for economic reasons.¹⁷⁸ PvdA successfully prevented the military's preferred large-scale military operation, hence why Operation Product remained a limited operation.¹⁷⁹ However, Spoor's influence on the government's path from Linggadjati to Operation Product should not be underestimated.

A disagreement in Dutch-Republican Linggadjati negotiations was whether Dutch troops would remain on Indonesian soil. Although this question was not crucial to all politicians, it was to General Spoor, who successfully lobbied the government that this 'gendarmerie' question was vital to Dutch interests.¹⁸⁰ In public discourse, the government stated that Dutch troops had to remain in Indonesia because 'it would take years for the Indonesian could build up their own defense force'.¹⁸¹ The Dutch government and de Volkskrant¹⁸² failed to realize, that sending more troops violated Linggadjati. In article 16 of the accord, it was determined that it was officially signed, both sides would lower the number of troops.¹⁸³ The Indonesians could not accept Dutch troops on Republican soil, and it was one of the key disagreements that led the Dutch to launch Operation Product.¹⁸⁴

In Article 192 of the Dutch constitution, it was determined that conscripts could only be sent to the Dutch colonies with their consent. The Dutch parliament voted in favor of amending the constitutional article in May, October, and December 1946, to enable forcing conscripts to be sent to Indonesia against their will.¹⁸⁵ The change in the constitution was accepted by an

¹⁷⁴ Van Liempt, *Nederland valt aan*, 220-2.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 218-70; Zweers, *De gecensureerde oorlog: militairen versus media*, 30-49; R.J.J. Stevens, "Manipulatie van informatie", 154-68.

¹⁷⁶ Het Parool 30-11-1946, "Geen uitstel".

¹⁷⁷ Het Parool, 29-11-1946, "Besmette voorlichting"

¹⁷⁸ Harinck, *Zoeken, aangrijpen en vernietigen*, 87.

¹⁷⁹ Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 505-6; De Jong, *de terugtocht*, 130-1; Stichting Parlementair Documentatie Centrum. "Soevereiniteitsoverdracht Aan Indonesië in 1949."

¹⁸⁰ Van Liempt, *Nederland valt aan*, 242-3.

¹⁸¹ De Volkskrant 03-06-1947, "Aanvaarding van nota grondslag voor vermindering troepensterkte, Bij verwerping geen onderhandelingen – Streven naar andere oplossing"; Het Parool 11-07-1947, "Regering ziet gunstige keer in Indonesische conflict"

¹⁸² De Volkskrant 03-06-1947, "Troepen in Indië, Nog 7000 onder het maximum"

¹⁸³ Het Parool 19-11-1946, "Tekst der ontwerp-overeenkomst thans gepubliceerd".

¹⁸⁴ Van Liempt, *Nederland valt aan*, 206-10; Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 505.

¹⁸⁵ Stan Meuwese. "Een Terugblik Op De Militaire Dienstplicht." *Militair Rechdelijk Tijdschrift* (2019).

https://puc.overheid.nl/mrt/doc/PUC_271399_11/1/#:~:text=De%20eerste%20naoorlogse%20dienstplichtige n%2C%20opgeroepen,nieuwe%20grondwet%20formeel%20werd%20afgekondigd

overwhelming majority both in the First and Second Chamber: only the CPN (Communists) voted against.¹⁸⁶ Formally, the constitution was amended in January 1947; though the First Division of conscripts had already arrived in September-October 1946.¹⁸⁷ In March 1947, it became a criminal offense for conscripts to refuse military service because ‘there were significant interests for the Dutch and the Indies, and everyone had to fulfill their duty’.¹⁸⁸

In a Dutch senate debate (December 1946), CPN member Koejemans asked the question of why sending extra Dutch troops was deemed necessary in light of the recent diplomatic Accord (Linggadjati); not only had Linggadjati made the constitutional change of sending and forcing more conscripts to Indonesia redundant, it also went against the preliminary Accord.¹⁸⁹

Although Louis Beel’s (KVP; Prime Minister of the Dutch ‘Beel I’ government) brief answer did not seem to explain why the government found it necessary to send extra troops (against their will) to Indonesia, the constitutional change was still accepted by an overwhelming majority (28 in favor, 3 against).¹⁹⁰ This did not reflect public opinion, as there was great division about deploying conscripts to Indonesia. In an opinion poll held in July 1946 (Q: Are you in favor or against this deployment?) 50% of the men questioned were in favor; 41% were against.¹⁹¹ Of the women questioned, 36% were in favor and 44% were against.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁶ De Nederlandse Grondwet. “Grondwetsherziening 1946.” *Nederlandse Grondwet*. Accessed April 29, 2023. https://www.denederlandsegrondwet.nl/id/vjzkdnohadna/grondwetsherziening_1946

¹⁸⁷ Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden No. G428. “Publicatie van 31 december 1946, betreffende de plechtige afkondiging van de vastgestelde verandering in de Grondwet”. 2 Januari 1947; Harinck, *Zoeken, aangrijpen en vernietigen*, 74.

¹⁸⁸ De Volkskrant 14-03-1947, “Dienstweigeraars op een lijn met misdadigers”

¹⁸⁹ De Volkskrant 24-12-1946, “Troepenuitzending naar Indie, Eerste Kamer accoord”; Handelingen Eerste Kamer – Verandering van artikel 192 van de Grondwet. 12^e vergadering – 23 december 1946. Nr. 0000075354(1946): 102-3.

¹⁹⁰ Handelingen Eerste Kamer – Verandering van artikel 192 van de Grondwet. 12^e vergadering – 23 december 1946. Nr. 0000075354(1946): 106-7.

¹⁹¹ Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 475.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

III. Dutch political discourse: rhetoric concerning legitimacy and the Dutch empire.

De Volkskrant and Trouw were skeptical of the Republic's ability to rule Indonesia independently and argued that a Republican government would exploit the Indonesian people.¹⁹³ Conservative parties, such as ARP, argued that Linggadjati was unconstitutional and betrayed the 7 December speech because it would break the empire.¹⁹⁴ Schouten also said it violated the Christian responsibility of helping Indonesia.¹⁹⁵ This emphasis on Christian duty and a mission to evangelize Indonesia was a leading theme in Trouw, which interpreted the Indonesian Revolution as illegitimate because God had given the Dutch authority over Indonesia.¹⁹⁶ Trouw also legitimized Operation Product with this rhetoric: "the army performed a juridical function for which God has invested the government with the power of the sword"¹⁹⁷

Trouw's focus on Christianity could be found in de Volkskrant,¹⁹⁸ but the latter focused more on the economic necessity and prestige necessity of maintaining Indonesia as part of the empire.¹⁹⁹ ARP also believed in a European superiority and thought that the Dutch were essential to the post-WWII reconstruction of Indonesia.²⁰⁰ Though both KVP/Volkskrant and ARP/Trouw ridiculed the Republic and wanted to maintain the empire,²⁰¹ Trouw kept publishing the rhetoric that the Republic were Japanese collaborators following instructions from the Soviet Union; de Volkskrant stopped publishing this belief in 1946-7.²⁰²

On the 2nd of December 1946, former PM Gerbrandy delivered an important radio speech, which foreshadowed the establishment of the 'National Committee for the Maintenance of the Imperial Kingdom's Unity' (shortened to NCHR²⁰³) two weeks later.²⁰⁴ Gerbrandy was an

¹⁹³ De Volkskrant 03-12-1946, "Stortvloed van protesten uit verschillende kringen"; Trouw 27-06-1947, "Oproep van Dr. van Mook"; De Volkskrant 15-11-1946, "Staten-Generaal zullen mede overleggen in zake Indië – Kamer niet geheel tevreden"; Trouw 15-11-1946, "Jan Schouten: "Houdt Op!"".

¹⁹⁴ Trouw 15-11-1946, "Jan Schouten: "Houdt Op!"".

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.; De Volkskrant 15-11-1946, "Staten-Generaal zullen mede overleggen in zake Indië – Kamer niet geheel tevreden".

¹⁹⁶ Bootsma. *Trouw. 75 jaar tegen de stroom in*, 59-60; Trouw 23-11-1946, "Miskende tegenstelling"; Trouw 10-12-1946, "Evangelie fundament voor Indië's vrijheid"; Trouw 27-12-1946, "Nieuwe rechtsorde in Indië"; Trouw 21-07-1947, "De beslissing".

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ De Volkskrant 29-03 1947, "Kardinaal tot vertrekkende soldaten: Keer niet minder terug dan ge zijt gegaan."; De Volkskrant 08-05-1947, "Alles in een nieuw kleed, maar art. 177 is nog steeds van kracht".

¹⁹⁹ De Volkskrant, 20-12-1946, "Motie Romme in de Kamer, Steun aan de regering in beleid inzake Linggadjati"; De Volkskrant 18-01-1947, "Indonesië wereld-leverancier van kostbare grondstoffen"; De Volkskrant 15-03-1947, "Indië's opbouw eist orde"; De Volkskrant 03-01-1947, "De teruggave van Nederlands-Indië door de Engelse "beschermers"".

²⁰⁰ De Jong, *de terugtocht*, 59-63.

²⁰¹ Het Parool 18-11-1946, "KVP over toekomst van Indonesië, Vervulling der nationale verlangens"; De Volkskrant, 20-12-1946, "Motie Romme in de Kamer, Steun aan de regering in beleid inzake Linggadjati"; De Volkskrant, 20-12-1946, "Oppositie vraagt om Rijksconferentie".

²⁰² Trouw 11-06-1947, "Uitdaging"; Trouw 02-08-1947, "Chaos in de Republiek – Vernietigingsacties door plunderende bendes".

²⁰³ In Dutch: Nationaal Comité Handhaving Rijkseenheid.

²⁰⁴ De Volkskrant 03-12-1946, "Prof. Gerbrandy pleit voor een Rijksconferentie"

outspoken opponent of the Linggadjati agreement, which he called ‘a betrayal of the principles of the royal speech of 7 December 1942’.²⁰⁵ Gerbrandy and the NCHR opposed the Linggadjati agreement because it would lead to a dissolution of the empire, while the royal speech had promised to keep the empire intact.²⁰⁶

After the Linggadjati Accord was officially signed on March 25th, 1947, 80 Republican Accord violations were mentioned by *de Volkskrant* and *Trouw* in June 1947.²⁰⁷ The Dutch government used these violations as a legitimization to keep the Dutch troops in Indonesia, and eventually also to legitimize the military conflict in July 1947.²⁰⁸ However, the violations of Linggadjati by the Dutch were hidden from public discourse. For instance, the intimidating behavior of Dutch soldiers (who scolded and chased after cars with Republican license plates), the Dutch use of slave labor in Priok, and Westerling’s extreme cleansing actions (December 1946 until March 1947) could not even be published in *Parool*.²⁰⁹

These Dutch violations of Linggadjati were observed by van Heuven Goedhart, chief editor of *Parool* and member of the PvdA, on a journey paid for by the latter. Because PvdA had political responsibility for the extreme violence of Westerling’s DST units, they decided not to publish Goedhart’s stories and to hide these from public discourse.²¹⁰ PvdA did not want to take political responsibility for this violence, and the actions were hidden from public discourse.²¹¹ When socialist and communist newspapers published about it in July 1947, *Trouw* accused the leftist newspapers of communist tactics (purposely leaking this information when military action was near, to discredit the Dutch army and prevent military conflict).²¹² In July 1947, the Communists were the only Dutch political party which openly opposed military intervention in Indonesia; the government claimed this contributed to the unyielding attitude of the Republic.²¹³

This story reflects the Dutch (pillarized) media landscape in 1946-7. Although there was plenty of factual reporting available to newspapers from press agencies, the interpretation of those facts was constantly colored politically and ideologically.²¹⁴ Newspapers therefore rarely published something which went against the newspaper’s ideology or the affiliated party’s interests (*Parool* was an exception to the rule, as they occasionally published conservative

²⁰⁵ R. J. J. Stevens. "Een (buiten) parlementaire lobby: het Nationaal Comité Handhaving Rijkseenheid 1946-1950." (1996).

²⁰⁶ *De Volkskrant* 03-12-1946, "Prof. Gerbrandy pleit voor een Rijksconferentie"; *De Volkskrant* 24-03-1947, "Welter tot Kath. Volkspartij: Daden in plaats van lyrische ontboezemingen"

²⁰⁷ *De Volkskrant* 03-06-1947, "Troepen in Indië, Nog 7000 onder het maximum"; *Trouw* 11-06-1947, "Militaire acties op Java en Sumatra".

²⁰⁸ *De Volkskrant* 18-11-1946, ""Bestand" bij Semarang nog niet in werking"; *De Volkskrant* 12-03-1947, "Generaal Spoor verklaart: "Wapenstilstand wordt niet algemeen nageleefd""; *De Volkskrant* 03-06-1947, "Troepen in Indië, Nog 7000 onder het maximum"; *Het Parool* 21-07-1947, "Dr. Van Mook: Republikeinse strijdkrachten schonden bestand steeds"; *De Volkskrant* 21-07-1947, "Nederland zegt Militair Bestand en Linggadjati op, Republiek bleef in gebreke.

²⁰⁹ Van Liempt, *Nederland valt aan*, 149-52.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 74-152; Harinck, *Zoeken, aangrijpen en vernietigen*, 82-3.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*

²¹² *Trouw* 17-07-1947, "Zuid-Celebes".

²¹³ *Trouw* 25-07-1947, "Tweede Kamer achter de regering, Communistische motie verworpen, Minister Jonkman verdedigt regeringsbeleid".

²¹⁴ De Jong, *de terugtocht*, 62-3; van Liempt, *Nederland valt aan*, 77.

opinions and also was critical of the PvdA from time to time).²¹⁵ When Operation Product began in July 1947, Parool urged to focus on the continuation of diplomacy and Linggadjati's principles; it was the only analyzed newspaper to report that Operation Product could be seen as a colonial war.²¹⁶

The PvdA was internally divided on launching a military operation. PvdA war-opposers rarely stated their opposition openly, with Hein Vos being the exception.²¹⁷ Behind closed doors, Schaper, Bussemaker, and Buskes tried to align the PvdA with CPN's anti-war policy, while other PvdA members such as Oud strongly argued in favor of war.²¹⁸ After much internal deliberation PvdA eventually aligned itself with KVP to portray a unitary cabinet when Operation Product was launched.²¹⁹ KVP leader Romme had pressured PvdA leader Drees that his social legislation would not go through if PvdA disapproved of military action.²²⁰ Drees became a driving force in swaying PvdA members in secret party meetings in 1947, to maintain a cabinet that could carry out his social legislation. The role of Drees and Romme in steering the cabinet's course from diplomatic negotiations toward a military operation was not mentioned by the analyzed newspapers in 1946-7. Recent historiography has also only scarcely covered this topic.²²¹

The KVP, legitimized Operation Product in the *Volkskrant* as 'a necessity to prevent the prevalent unfreedom of the Indonesian peoples within the Republic, to prevent an unacceptable inequality for millions of Indonesians outside the Republic, and to prevent the removal between white and brown.'²²² Trouw argued in favor of military action to restore peace and order because the Republic did not accept the Dutch interpretation of Linggadjati.^{223 224}

10 days after Operation Product had started, the PvdA ministers favored resuming diplomatic negotiations and stopping the military operation. Despite its previous internal division, PvdA ministers prevented the continuation of Operation Product.²²⁵ The UN Security Council also pressured the Dutch government to end the operation; a ceasefire was agreed upon on the 5th

²¹⁵ De Jong, *de terugtocht*, 62-3; van Liempt, *Nederland valt aan*, 77.

²¹⁶ Het Parool 21-07-1947, "23 uur Javatijd: Nederland slaat toe, Dr. Beel proclameert: "politieone actie", Doel der regering blijft: Linggadjati"; Het Parool 21-07-1947, "Liberaal Engelse commentaar, "Koloniale oorlog," zegt Manchester Guardian".

²¹⁷ Stichting Parlementair Documentatie Centrum. "Ir. H. (Hein) Vos." *Parlement.com*. Accessed June 15, 2023. https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09llc8idtv/h_hein_vos

²¹⁸ Van Liempt, *Nederland valt aan*, 154-5.

²¹⁹ Het Parool 21-07-1947, ""Militaire actie onvermijdelijk" Verklaring P.v.d.A. en K.V.P.".

²²⁰ Van Liempt, *Nederland valt aan*, 27, 272.

²²¹ Ibid., 265-82; Broersma, "De hand van Romme", 569.

²²² De Volkskrant 21-07-1947, "Om vrijheid, eenheid en gelijkheid van blank en bruin – Gebruik van macht NU een plicht".

²²³ Trouw 17-07-1947, "De enige weg"; Trouw 26-07-1947, "mijn schild en mijn betrouwen".

²²⁴ Trouw 25-07-1947, "Verdere opmars der Nederlandse troepen op West-Java, Zuiveringsactie in het Oosten"; Trouw 25-07-1947, "Communique".

²²⁵ Burgers, *de garioeda en de ooievaar*, 505-6; De Jong, *de terugtocht*, 130-1; Stichting Parlementair Documentatie Centrum. "Soevereiniteitsoverdracht Aan Indonesië in 1949."

of August 1947.²²⁶ Shortly after Operation Product ended, it was seen as a success by the Dutch because crucial plantation and oil fields in Java and Sumatra had been occupied.²²⁷

IV. (Sub-theme) Post WWII reconstruction of NL: economic discourse.

As early public discourse focused more on political debates,²²⁸ the economic arguments were rarely explained in public discourse. However, the decision to launch Operation Product was rushed and mostly driven by financial and economic motives.²²⁹ The Dutch had a foreign exchange deficit, which they believed could only be solved by quickly resuming Dutch exports from Indonesia.²³⁰ For the Dutch government, the destruction of the Republic was not the goal of Operation Product: the goal was to regain control of the economic colonies and food production centers (hence, Operation Product).²³¹

In January 1947, *de Volkskrant* stated that both the preliminary Linggadjati accord and the Dutch parliament had paid little attention to the economic dimension of the agreement.²³² *Volkskrant* covered both the overwhelming amount of mineral resources that Indonesia had and the destructive impact of WWII on its (in)ability to export these resources, while also stating that it was the Dutch capital investments and workforce that allowed for the widespread exportation of these resources in the past.²³³ *De Volkskrant* implicitly hinted at a time-constrained pressure for the Dutch to militarily restore order so that the world economy and worldwide post-WWII reconstruction could be accelerated.²³⁴

The Commission General also emphasized in December 1946 that the transition period between the preliminary Linggadjati Accord and the final Accord should not take too long, for political and economic reasons.²³⁵ Minister of War Fievez in February 1947 noted with a sense of urgency that the military in Indonesia cost a lot of money, and therefore hoped that the military duties would soon be fulfilled.²³⁶ Gerbrandy also used this economic necessity argument as a reason why peace and order had to be restored quickly.²³⁷ As the First Chamber concluded, and *Volkskrant* and *Trouw* articles also reflected, the Linggadjati debates in Dutch public discourse moved from political debates in December 1946, to more economic-based debates as time progressed.²³⁸

²²⁶ Stichting Parlementair Documentatie Centrum, "Soevereiniteitsoverdracht Aan Indonesië in 1949."; Jan Hoffenaar "De Indonesische kwestie (1945-1949): De Nederlandse militaire inbreng nader bekeken." *Militaire Spectator* 156, no. 4 (1987): 173-4.

²²⁷ Hoffenaar, "De Indonesische kwestie (1945-1949)", 173-4.

²²⁸ *De Volkskrant* 03-03-1947, "Prof. Romme weer thuis: "de geest van onze troepen is magnifiek"".

²²⁹ Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 505; de Jong, *de terugtocht*, 110.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*

²³¹ Harinck, *Zoeken, aangrijpen en vernietigen*, 87.

²³² *De Volkskrant* 18-01-1947, "Indonesië wereld-leverancier van kostbare grondstoffen"

²³³ *Ibid.*

²³⁴ *Ibid.*; *De Volkskrant* 15-03-1947, "Indie's opbouw eist orde".

²³⁵ *De Volkskrant* 11-12-1946, "Hervormingswerk in overgangstijd"

²³⁶ *De Volkskrant* 13-02-1947, "Minister van Oorlog: Opbouw van ons leger kost veel geld".

²³⁷ *De Volkskrant* 15-04-1947, "Afschuwelijk regiem te Batavia moet vervangen worden".

²³⁸ *De Volkskrant* 03-03-1947, "Prof. Romme weer thuis: "de geest van onze troepen is magnifiek""; *De Volkskrant* 30-05-1947, "Een deel der troepen zal voorlopig in Indie blijven"; *Trouw* 22-07-1947, "Indische fondsen in herstel na lage opening".

Conclusion chapter 2

Although Linggadjati (with concessions from both sides) seemed to signify a diplomatic solution to the Dutch-Indonesian disputes in November 1946, months of debating about the interpretation of the final Linggadjati accord revealed its fragility. It also showed that Dutch security culture was not unitary; many politicians opposed Linggadjati, but many also favored it. This is in line with public opinion, as a 1946 poll showed that a slight majority of public opinion was in favor of Linggadjati. Whether one agreed with Linggadjati depended on political affiliation.

As time progressed, KVP steered the Dutch government towards interpreting the accord as the Republic's acknowledgment of Dutch sovereignty over Indonesia, while also increasingly diminishing the equal role and the responsibilities that were attributed to the Republic in November. Though the Dutch security culture seemed more aware of Indonesian nationalism than in 1945 and early 1946, it still underestimated and belittled the Republic. A crucial issue in diplomatic negotiations remained the increasing number of Dutch troops on Republican soil, which the Indonesians did not accept. Although Dutch security culture focused on the Republican violations of the Linggadjati accord, the Dutch violations were barely acknowledged or mentioned in public discourse.

Similar to the Dutch security culture in 1945 (and early 1946), an unconstitutional security culture element occurred. The constitution was formally altered in January 1947, while the first Division of conscripts had already been sent in September and October 1946. Dutch security culture did not necessarily reflect public opinion. While the constitutional change was accepted by a majority in the Dutch senate, a public opinion poll held in July 1946 showed great division in public opinion about supporting or opposing the deployment of conscripts to Indonesia.

Dutch security culture also included the use of structural excessive violence by Dutch troops, against Indonesian fighters and civilians. Dutch security culture in late 1946 and the first months of 1947 tolerated (Dutch government) and even applauded (Dutch military) this behavior for its 'military efficiency'.

Over time, General Spoor and the military command increasingly interfered in politics and influenced Dutch security culture (specifically confessional politicians) with misinformation spread through NEFIS. Prevalent was the idea that the Republic was led by a minority group of Japanese collaborators, controlled by the Soviet Union. Although *Volkskrant* and *Trouw* both ridiculed the Republic, it was mostly *Trouw*/*ARP* who copied this delegitimizing rhetoric to argue in favor of military action. As editorial offices were closely linked to the political elite, facts were constantly colored politically in Dutch public discourse.

A change in the Dutch security culture in 1946-7 compared to 1945 (and early 1946) was that *De Volkskrant* portrayed the Republic less as extremists or terrorists. *Trouw* continued to do this, which was amplified by the military information services' misinformation. For *Trouw*, maintaining the empire remained crucial in 1946-7, which was also important to *Romme's Volkskrant*. Although the debates about differing political interpretations of Linggadjati played a role in deploying Dutch armed forces in Indonesia in July 1947, the economic arguments for Operation Product should not be underestimated.

Chapter 3 'The Indies lost, Disaster Born'²³⁹

An analysis of how the Renville accord could not prevent the Dutch from launching Operation Kraai

Although the Dutch saw Operation Product as a success, it did not settle the 'Indonesian question'. Indonesian armed resistance continued during late 1947, strengthening the Dutch military's existing view that the Republican government had to be eliminated. Diplomatic negotiations continued under US pressure, leading to the Renville Accord on the 17th of January 1948.²⁴⁰ It was partially a re-confirmation of Linggadjati, but when compared, the Indonesian Republic's role during the transition period was reduced explicitly and its legitimacy was not fully granted; the Republic accepted this because it feared a new Dutch offensive.²⁴¹

During continued negotiations after Renville, in 1948, Dutch demands went further dismantled Linggadjati and Renville's previous agreements.²⁴² For instance, the Dutch demanded that the Republic would disband its armed forces. The 1947 Dutch plans had envisioned the Republic as being part of the Federation, but now began to see it as an alternative to the Republic.²⁴³

As guerilla fighting continued, the Republic could not disband its forces. Though the Republic made concessions in late 1948, the Dutch government kept pressuring the Republic to give in to their strict demands.²⁴⁴ As the Dutch could not keep their large troop force in Indonesia forever and the Republic would not accept Dutch demands (fully), the Dutch decided to launch a second military Operation (Kraai) to destroy the Republic.²⁴⁵

In this context, this chapter will examine Dutch public discourse, starting two months before the start of Operation Kraai (October 1948). It will do so by analyzing the following research question:

Sub-research question 3: How have security culture features in public discourse by the Dutch government and Dutch media impacted the Dutch-Indonesian conflict from the buildup of Operation Kraai until the end of the operation (1948-9)?

²³⁹ Translation of popular Dutch phrase during the decolonization war: Indië verloren, rampspoed geboren.

²⁴⁰ Stichting Parlementair Documentatie Centrum, "Soevereiniteitsoverdracht Aan Indonesië in 1949."; Hoffenaar, "De Indonesische kwestie (1945-1949)", 173-4.

²⁴¹ De Jong, *de terugtocht*, 150-4; Hoffenaar, "De Indonesische kwestie (1945-1949)", 174; Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 506.

²⁴² Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 506.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 505-8; Zweers, *De gecensureerde oorlog: militairen versus media*, 77-9.

²⁴⁵ Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 505-8.

I. Dutch political discourse: rhetoric concerning legitimacy and the Dutch empire.

In August 1948, Dutch national elections led to a so-called Roman-Red cabinet: KVP and PvdA, together with the VVD (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy) and CHU (Christian Historical Union).²⁴⁶ The elections were necessary because of a necessity for constitutional reform that allowed for the future independence of Indonesia in a Union structure.²⁴⁷ The constitutional reform required a 2/3rd majority in both chambers to enable the constitutional revision.²⁴⁸ The elections resulted in new political relations, which will be explained in this theme.²⁴⁹

In the 1948 elections, the PvdA lost two seats, which can probably be attributed to its capricious performance in the previous government and the dividedness about the Indonesian question. In its 1948 election program, PvdA argued for 'a Dutch-Indonesian Union, based on voluntariness and equality, and a reform of the Kingdom based on voluntariness.'²⁵⁰

The CHU re-used its 1946 election program entirely, making no changes. CHU was willing to give more political independence to Indonesia, as long as it remained in the Dutch empire.²⁵¹ The Indonesian question was not prioritized in the CHU's program, as it was issue #11 in a list of 19 urgent issues.²⁵²

The KVP election program stated the following about Indonesia: wanted to liquidate colonial relations and develop a strong foundation for a sustainable Dutch-Indonesian Union under the Dutch Crown.²⁵³ This would benefit both the Netherlands and Indonesia.²⁵⁴

The VVD's election program heavily criticized the previous government's track record with Indonesia (it mostly attacked PvdA).²⁵⁵ According to the VVD, the KVP-PvdA government had waited too long with restoring peace and order and argued that Operation Product was ended prematurely.²⁵⁶ VVD proposed a reform of the Kingdom into a community that consisted of two equal parts in a Union structure, united under the Dutch Crown.²⁵⁷ It promised that the Indonesians would be given the opportunity to self-rule in internal affairs.²⁵⁸ VVD gained two seats in comparison to the 1946 elections.

²⁴⁶ Stichting Parlementair Documentatie Centrum, "Soevereiniteitsoverdracht Aan Indonesië in 1949."; Hoffenaar, "De Indonesische kwestie (1945-1949)", 173-4.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Stichting Parlementair Documentatie Centrum. "Kabinetsformatie 1948." *Parlement.com*. Accessed June 17, 2023. https://www.parlement.com/id/vjbrgappfdxc/kabinetsformatie_1948

²⁵⁰ Verkiezingsprogramma PvdA (1948): 1-2.

²⁵¹ Algemeene vergadering. *Urgentie Program Christelijk Historische Unie* (1946); Algemeene vergadering. *Urgentie Program Christelijk Historische Unie* (1948).

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ F.K. van Iterson. "KVP Verkiezingsmanifest 1948". *Parlement en Kiezer* no. 32 (1948): 109.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie. "Dit is de inzet van onze verkiezingsstrijd". *Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse politieke partijen*.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

Drees became the new Prime Minister, in return for which the PvdA had to accept a few conservative changes to the cabinet; the most crucial Minister positions were given to the VVD (Minister of Foreign Affairs Dirk Stikker), and KVP (Minister of Overseas Territories Maan Sassen). The Dutch government's stance in negotiations with the Republic became more conservative compared to its center-left predecessor, because of the new composition of the government, and the distribution of the most crucial Minister positions to KVP and VVD.²⁵⁹

The new Dutch government had lost trust in Governor-General van Mook and forced him to accept a new position. Although van Mook had an exceptional and proven ability as Governor-General, he lacked a strong connection to any of the Dutch political parties and was also unaware of his political vulnerability as he often criticized Dutch politics.²⁶⁰ Formally, on November 1st, 1948, former PM Beel replaced him as the High Representative of the Crown.

On the 25th of October 1948, the Dutch parliament convened an additional debate about the new 'emergency law Indonesia'.²⁶¹ Consultations with the Federalists resulted in a draft regulation for the Indonesian regime during a transitional period.²⁶² This diminished the role of the Republic compared to Renville, as the Republic had to submit to an interim authority during a transitional period. The Netherlands would continue to exert a strong influence over Indonesia.²⁶³ As literature has shown, KVP, VVD and CHU saw this 'heavy Union' as a compensation for the loss of 'the Dutch Indies', and in practice was a Union-based perpetuation of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia.²⁶⁴

During the emergency law debate, it became clear that the CPN (Communist Party Netherlands), the only explicit Dutch proponent of the Republican independence wish, did not support Hatta's Republic anymore.²⁶⁵ This reflects a change in the Dutch public discourse. Because the Republic had defeated a Communist Revolution in September 1948 international support (USA) increased, but the CPN withdrew its support.²⁶⁶ Dutch politics was now more unitary in its opposition against the Republic.

Trouw summarized a parliamentary debate about the 1949 national budget in November 1948, promising its readers to provide the most important quotes that were said in this meeting.²⁶⁷ In line with Dutch pillarization in 1948, Trouw proceeded to only quote Schouten from opposition party ARP, the party Trouw aligned itself with. Schouten thought that the Dutch still had sovereignty over Indonesia, and therefore had the obligation to protect the millions of Indonesian lives who were powerless against the terror, revolution, and cruelty of the Republic.²⁶⁸ Although Schouten claimed that the lives of the Indonesians were of primary

²⁵⁹ Harinck, *Zoeken, aangrijpen en vernietigen*, 155.

²⁶⁰ P.F. Maas. "Dr. H. J. van Mook, onze laatste Landvoogd, tot ontslag gedwongen." *Acta Politica* 17 no. 3 (1982): 367-72.

²⁶¹ Original Dutch phrasing: Noodwet Indonesie. De Volkskrant 26-10-1948, "Kamer in extra-vergadering voor Noodwet-Indonesië"

²⁶² Thom de Graaf. "Een nutteloze noodwet. Een studie naar de grondwettigheid en de noodzaak van de Noodwet Indonesië 1948". *Politieke Opstellen 1982* (1982): 20.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ De Jong, *de terugtocht*, 159.

²⁶⁵ Handelingen Tweede Kamer – Mededeling besluit van de Centrale Afdeling — 1018. Ontwerp-Noodwet Indonesië. 7^e vergadering – 25 oktober 1948. Nr. 0000080934 (1948): 120-1.

²⁶⁶ de Graaf "Een nutteloze noodwet", 20.

²⁶⁷ Trouw 15-11-1948, "Indië in de kamer".

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

concern to him and that the maintenance of the royal empire was only secondary, one of the first things he said was that “if the government does not keep its words, if its actions do not conform to them, there will be seen an ever-increasing diminution not only of our prestige, not only of our dignity, but also of the influence which we have”.²⁶⁹ Schouten stated that the Republic was ruled by communism,²⁷⁰ and thus delegitimized the Republic as an illegitimate undemocratic actor that the Dutch could not have diplomatic negotiations with. This is similar to what Schouten said in the buildup to Operation Product.²⁷¹

²⁶⁹ Trouw 15-11-1948, “Indië in de kamer”.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Trouw 15-11-1946, “Jan Schouten: “Houdt Op!””.

II. Diplomacy: rhetoric related to diplomacy

As the Dutch had promised the federalist nationalists in the Renville Accord that an interim government would be established in Indonesia before the 1st of January 1949, it was clear that the Dutch felt a time-constrained pressure to resolve remaining disagreements quickly.²⁷² However, what was excluded from public discourse about Renville, was the fact that it arranged the independence of Indonesia in a federal-system structure on Dutch terms, a road to independence that was not agreed upon by the Republic.²⁷³

The conservative Dutch government increasingly began to push its own interpretation, even more so than in 1947. Although the Republic made concessions, the Dutch demanded that the Republic would disarm its forces because, according to the Dutch, sovereignty could only be transferred when the political leaders of the Republic were no longer influenced by their armed supporters.²⁷⁴ The Republic was even willing to let Dutch troops stay in Indonesia, but the authorization of who would be able to decide when to use these troops became a major issue.²⁷⁵ As the Republic found it a crucial precondition for Indonesia's independence to be responsible for its national security (the Dutch being responsible for this 'gendarmerie question' would perpetuate colonial rule) the Dutch and the Republic could not find an agreement.

On the 22nd of November 1948, the Dutch government decided that various ministers would travel to Indonesia to negotiate with the Republican government and the Federalist nationalists to find a diplomatic agreement.²⁷⁶ The government stated that a new military action could be prevented with these negotiations in Indonesia.²⁷⁷ However, most of the delegates who were sent, were proponents of military action: Ministers Stikker and Sassen, Lambertus Neher (PvdA), Romme, Hendrik Tilanus (CHU), and Hendrink Meijerink (ARP). The Dutch public at the time did not know that the cabinet was so internally divided about the Indonesia question that it was on the brink of falling.²⁷⁸ When the delegation returned, the Dutch government saw the negotiations as a disappointment.²⁷⁹ However, since many of these delegates were proponents of military action, the sincerity of this attempt to prevent military action by through diplomatic negotiations can be questioned.

Minister Stikker was the embodiment of the half-heartedness of the Dutch government. Both public opinion at the time and early historiography on public discourse saw Stikker as the political force who tried his hardest to find a diplomatic solution, but who was unable to do so because the KVP-trio Romme, Beel and Sassen made this impossible for him.²⁸⁰ However, later research has revealed that Stikker's half-heartedness, capriciousness, and his inexperience

²⁷² Trouw 20-11-1948, "Kabinet-Drees voor grote beslissingen"; P.F. Maas. "De Indonesië-politiek van minister mr. D. U. Stikker in memoires en geschiedschrijving." *Acta Politica*, 19 no. 3 (1984): 359-378.

²⁷³ Harinck, *Zoeken, aangrijpen en vernietigen*, 155; Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 506.

²⁷⁴ Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 506.

²⁷⁵ Het Parool 10-12-1948, "Interpretatie aide-mémoire het grootste struikelblok"

²⁷⁶ De Volkskrant 22-11-1948, "Sassen, Stikker en Neher Zondag naar Indonesië vertrokken".

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

²⁷⁸ P.F. Maas. "Stikker in 'Kaliurang', laatste halte op weg naar de tweede politieke actie, november-december 1948." (1982): 47.

²⁷⁹ Het Parool 10-12-1948, "Ministers brengen verslag uit, Contact met de republiek stelde op belangrijke punten teleur"; De Volkskrant 10-12-1948, "Verslag Stikker-Sassen, Overleg met Republiek stelde teleur"; Trouw 10-12-1948, "Regering over besprekingen, Contact met Republiek een teleurstelling".

²⁸⁰ Maas, "De Indonesië-politiek van minister mr. D. U. Stikker", 359.

did not allow him to make clear decisions or to think of alternatives when the situations asked for them.²⁸¹ Stikker often initiated divisions in the cabinet, which led to a zigzag policy without tangible results.²⁸² The definitive alienation of the cooperative federalists, who started working with the Republic, must be attributed to these inconsistent policies.²⁸³

Although Stikker voted in favor of military action in December 1948, Beel (and his ‘final plan’) played the largest role in ‘successfully’ pushing for military action when the cabinet was divided about a second military operation.²⁸⁴ On December 2nd, even PvdA party leader Marinus van der Goes van Naters (previously optimistic about diplomatic negotiations)²⁸⁵ wrote to Drees that military action seemed imminent because of the amount of Renville violations, and because there were ‘infiltrators’ on Dutch soil.²⁸⁶ Van der Goes van Naters was aware that the international response would be negative, and thus urged Drees to wait with the military action until after the UN had stopped convening, after December 16th.²⁸⁷ Operation Kraai was purposely planned by the Dutch government before Christmas, so that the UN Security Council would not be able to stop the military action immediately with a resolution.²⁸⁸

On the 13th of December 1948, the Dutch government declared that it had broken off diplomatic negotiations with the Republic.²⁸⁹ According to the Dutch, the Republic wrongly interpreted the Renville Accord, and therefore an agreement could not be reached.²⁹⁰ The Dutch demanded sovereignty and to bear the ultimate (formal) responsibility over Indonesia during the ‘transition phase’, and to have military troops be responsible for maintaining peace and order in Indonesia.²⁹¹

Parool was the only newspaper out of the reviewed ones that went past the government’s accusations of the Republican’s Accord violations and the alleged Republic’s inability to make concessions. Instead, Parool wrote that the Dutch were also not willing to make concessions and that the diplomatic negotiations were very one-sided.²⁹²

²⁸¹ Maas, “De Indonesië-politiek van minister mr. D. U. Stikker”, 376-7.

²⁸² Ibid., 377.

²⁸³ Ibid.; Trouw 02-12-1948, “Dr. Beel minder toegeeflijk dan Mr. Stikker?”

²⁸⁴ Maas, “De Indonesië-politiek van minister mr. D. U. Stikker”, 371-6; de Jong, *De terugtocht*, 222-5.

²⁸⁵ Trouw 25-11-1948, “Kamerleden-waarnemers naar Indië vertrokken”

²⁸⁶ Maas, “Stikker in ‘Kaliurang’, laatste halte op weg naar de tweede politieke actie”, 50.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.; de Jong, *De terugtocht*, 202.

²⁸⁹ Trouw 13-12-1948, “Besprekingen met Djokja afgebroken”

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² Het Parool 10-12-1948, “Interpretatie aid-memoire het grootste struikelblok”

III. Security and military intervention: discourse regarding the use of force and military preparations.

As the buildup to Operation Kraai has been explained, this raises a new question: what image did the politicians, and the media have of the violence that had been used so far, and the violence that was to be used?

Operation Kraai started on the 19th of December 1948. Beel, former head of the Dutch government, now the representative of the Dutch Crown in Indonesia, legitimized Operation Kraai by stating that peaceful solutions had failed and that the Republican territories had to be purged of terrorist forces.²⁹³ Beel also said that the Dutch had a sacred duty and responsibility, because of the history of Indonesia, and because of UN (which the Netherlands were a member of) Charter article 73, to promote the well-being of the inhabitants of these areas.²⁹⁴

Similarly, Trouw mentioned a responsibility and necessity for the Dutch use of military force to end the ‘Republican terror’.²⁹⁵ The government portrayed the decision to military action as a choice to ‘either abandon Indonesia to a dictatorship, or to restore order and peace’.²⁹⁶ This discourse strongly reminds of a colonial terminology that was seen in Trouw and Volkskrant in 1945-7: the civilization mission which legitimized using military force to keep sovereignty over Indonesia.

De Volkskrant also supported Operation Kraai, and countered the international rhetoric that the Dutch were suppressing the Indonesian nationalist wish for independence.²⁹⁷ Instead, de Volkskrant argued that federalists constituted a large majority in Indonesian nationalism and that the Dutch supported them.²⁹⁸ This is an interesting public discourse change, as Volkskrant had argued that nationalism was only a minority (elite-led) ideology in 1945-6. It showed that de Volkskrant’s colonial ideas in 1949 were less deeply rooted than Trouw’s.²⁹⁹ For Trouw, Indonesia was a vital issue. Whereas de Volkskrant (402) and Parool (530) published quite a few articles about Indonesia in the 19 October ’48 – 31 December ’48 timeframe, Trouw published almost three times as many: 1221 articles.

Parool condemned the decision to launch Operation Kraai. Parool opposed military action, as it would turn ‘the whole world, and the most important federal states of Indonesia, against the Dutch’.³⁰⁰ According to Parool, the Dutch government was more occupied with the Accord violations than finding a lasting diplomatic solution to the question.³⁰¹

The Dutch public broadly supported Operation Kraai. A public opinion poll by NIPO showed that many Dutch people were relieved by the military operation.³⁰² 61% of the respondents approved of Operation Kraai; 19% of the respondents disapproved of the action, while the

²⁹³ De Volkskrant 20-12-1948, “Dr. Beel voor Radio Batavia: vreedzame oplossing is onmogelijk gebleken”

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ Trouw 20-12-1948, “De Actie”

²⁹⁶ De Volkskrant 21-12-1948, “Indonesië prijsgeven aan dictatuur of orde en rust herstellen”

²⁹⁷ De Volkskrant 10-01-1949, “Onbuigzaam”

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ De Volkskrant 10-12-1948, “Opvatting van Djokja: Geen voorlopige regering zonder Republiek”

³⁰⁰ Het Parool 10-12-1948, “Interpretatie aide-mémoire het grootste struikelblok”

³⁰¹ Het Parool 20-12-1948, “Zware Beslissing, van Bestand tot Bestormen”.

³⁰² De Jong, *De terugtocht*, 199.

remaining 19% did not know whether they approved or disapproved.³⁰³ A majority of the population also believed that the UN Security Council had no right to intervene in this ‘internal affair’.³⁰⁴

In the buildup to Operation Kraai, the Republican violations of Renville were mentioned less often compared to the buildup of Operation Product. However, as Operation Kraai came nearer, the Dutch government and the three analyzed newspapers started emphasizing the Republican Renville violations.³⁰⁵ De Volkskrant and Trouw did not acknowledge the Republican concessions during diplomatic negotiations, while Parool did.³⁰⁶

Spoor’s military strategy (‘spearhead strategy’) underestimated the Republican fighting forces’ fighting power and only strengthened them into waging a guerilla warfare that the Dutch could never win.³⁰⁷ The Dutch eventually had to give in to the increasing international (USA) pressure and the growing list of military casualties by granting the Republic independence.³⁰⁸ An interesting phenomenon was that the guerilla tactics of the Republic increasingly blurred distinctions between civilians and fighters in 1947 and 1948.³⁰⁹ Nonetheless, this was contested in public discourse.³¹⁰ Whereas especially Volkskrant and Trouw had often emphasized the violent nature of independence fighters in 1945 and 1946, they rarely acknowledged that the local population started to participate in the colonial war against the Dutch. The Dutch military, similarly, underestimated the local population’s vulnerability to become a ‘plaything’, caught between the two warring factions. Hence, Indonesian civilians (voluntarily or coercively) fought on the Republican side.³¹¹ In contrast, the military expected that the local population would help eliminate the ‘extremist fighting forces’ if the Dutch targeted food and medical supplies (which would force Republic troops to ‘live off the lands’).³¹²

After Operation Kraai ended in January 1949, the Dutch Army and many Dutch politicians thought that they had accomplished the ‘(what they believed to be necessary’) elimination of the Republic.³¹³ As the Dutch had occupied most of Indonesia’s territory, and jailed many of the Republic’s political leaders, it assumed that it had eliminated the Republic as a political factor.³¹⁴ This was reflected in public discourse, as the Dutch government announced that it

³⁰³ De Jong, *De terugtocht*, 199.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

³⁰⁵ Het Parool 10-12-1948, “Ministers brengen verslag uit, Contact met de republiek stelde op belangrijke punten teleur”; De Volkskrant 10-12-1948, “Verslag Stikker-Sassen, Overleg met Republiek stelde teleur”; Trouw 10-12-1948, “Regering over besprekingen, Contact met Republiek een teleurstelling”.

³⁰⁶ Het Parool 10-12-1948, “Interpretatie aide-mémoire het grootste struikelblok”; De Volkskrant 10-12-1948, “Opvatting van Djokja: Geen voorlopige regering zonder Republiek”; Trouw 13-12-1948, “Besprekingen met Djokja afgebroken”.

³⁰⁷ Petra Groen, “Dutch Armed Forces and the Decolonization of Indonesia: The Second Police Action (1948–1949), A Pandora’s Box.” *War & Society* 4, no. 1 (1986): 92-99; Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 621; Harinck, *Zoeken, aangrijpen en vernietigen*, 156-7.

³⁰⁸ Zweers, *De gecensureerde oorlog: militairen versus media*, 240.

³⁰⁹ Harinck, *Zoeken, aangrijpen en vernietigen*, 202-3.

³¹⁰ De Volkskrant 07-01-1949, “Geen enkel teken van een guerilla op Java”

³¹¹ Scagliola, “The Silences and Myths of a ‘Dirty War’”, 244.

³¹² Harinck, *Zoeken, aangrijpen en vernietigen*, 192.

³¹³ Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 621.

³¹⁴ Ibid.; Zweers, *De gecensureerde oorlog: militairen versus media*, 298.

‘successfully completed Operation Product,³¹⁵ ignoring the fact that international pressure ended the action prematurely and that the Republic went underground while resistance continued. What also stood out is the absence of numerous and large articles (in Trouw it was not mentioned at all)³¹⁶ about the ending of the operation, as the beginning of the action had created much more news coverage.

Crucially, there were internal disagreements in the government about the political aims of the Operation Kraai; Minister Stikker wanted to rid the Republic of extremist elements so it could take place in the USI Federation, while others such as Sassen, Beel, and Spoor wanted to eliminate the Republic entirely to pave the way for a Federation without the Republic.³¹⁷ PM Drees did not even have a political aim in mind, he only wanted to stop the violations of Renville.³¹⁸ Though the decision for Operation Kraai seemed like a unanimous decision, the motives and end goals of the operation within the Dutch government were unclear and very different; the analyzed newspapers did not acknowledge this at the time.³¹⁹

Trouw wrote about ‘Spoor’s burning kampongs’ in November 1948.³²⁰ Accusations by PvdA party member Buskes that ‘kampongs were structurally burned by the Dutch military with instructions from higher command’, were refuted by Trouw.³²¹ Trouw emphasized that the military instructions which were given to the 7th December Division in 1946, strongly warned against burning kampongs, as it ‘could harm and thus alienate the local (innocent) population into joining ‘the army of marauders.’³²² According to Trouw, the ‘burning kampongs’ method was only used in case of ‘military necessity’.³²³

What was left out from Trouw’s story was that 1947 instructions on the use of force did not discuss the proportionality of violence, nor did they discuss the collateral damage or innocent victims of Dutch violence.³²⁴ The primary consideration in the use of force after 1947 remained the Dutch military’s safety, leading to a ‘shoot first, ask questions later’- mentality when it came to kampongs suspected of containing Indonesian fighters.³²⁵ Therefore, it can be concluded that Trouw showed itself to be journalistically subservient to the Dutch government and the armed forces, as it unquestioningly copied the military command and Dutch government’s effort to downplay the use of excessive violence.

³¹⁵ De Volkskrant 08-01-1949, “Negen Republikeinse leiders in vrijheid”; Het Parool 08-01-1949, “Negen leiders der Republiek in vrijheid gesteld”; Trouw 08-01-1949, “Nieuwe Fase”.

³¹⁶ Trouw 08-01-1949 (full newspaper); Trouw 10-01-1949 (full newspaper).

³¹⁷ Burgers, *de garoeda en de ooievaar*, 628-9.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 629.

³¹⁹ De Volkskrant 20-12-1948, “Acht uur na aanvang van actie werd Djokja bezet en Republikeinse regering geïnterneerd”

³²⁰ Trouw 30-11-1948, “Verbrande dessa’s”.

³²¹ *Ibid.*

³²² *Ibid.* (Dutch framed terminology for Republican forces: ‘Het leger der maraudeurs.’)

³²³ Trouw 30-11-1948, “Verbrande dessa’s”.

³²⁴ Harinck, *Zoeken, aangrijpen en vernietigen*, 179.

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, 180.

IV. (Sub-theme) Post WWII reconstruction of NL: economic discourse.

In November 1948, Trouw wrote about the huge amount of money that the Dutch had sent to Indonesia, alluding to the fact that prosperity in Indonesia had only scarcely increased to ‘keep a state organization afloat that was bound to drown’.³²⁶ Trouw emphasized that the money went to the wrong places, thus accusing the Republic of corruption. Trouw also found this problematic for the Dutch financial situation, as the Dutch had a 1.8 billion guilder BOP deficit.³²⁷ Trouw did not seem that interested in the economic side of the conflict during Operation Product, but its importance increased in 1948.³²⁸ As the revenues of certain products ‘flowed to the Indies instead of the Netherlands’, and as the political stalemate continued and companies could not exploit Indies’ resources to the fullest, the Dutch were unable to meet overdue dividend obligations.³²⁹

³²⁶ Trouw 16-11-1948, “Indie’s geldwezen wordt dagelijks meer verknoeid”.

³²⁷ Ibid.

³²⁸ Trouw 16-11-1948, “Ned.-Indische rubberproductie in 1949 hoger geraamd”; Trouw 19-11-1948, “Marshall leende ons \$80.000.000.”

³²⁹ Trouw 03-12-1948, “Productie 1948 “Amsterdam” Rubber belangrijk hoger geraamd”.

Conclusion chapter 3

As a conservative government was installed in August 1948 to enable a constitutional revision that allowed for the future independence of Indonesia, the security culture also became more conservative and pro-military action. Public discourse, except for Parool, did not acknowledge that the constitutional revision allowing Indonesian independence consisted of a federal Indonesian state on Dutch terms, where the Republic would have to submit to an interim authority, and would have to disarm its forces. This violated the Renville accord because the Republic had never agreed to transfer sovereignty and the responsibility over Indonesian security to the Netherlands. Instead, the media chose to focus on the Republican Renville violations. These violations were used as legitimization for the military operation, similar to Operation Product.

During the diplomatic negotiations, and even to a larger extent than in 1947, the Dutch were not eager to make concessions on the issues of sovereignty and security. Although the Republic made some concessions, Dutch security culture increasingly kept forcing its own interpretation and neglected the wishes of the Republic; Parool was the only analyzed newspaper to notice this. Dutch security culture in 1948-9 mainly consisted of ideas of superiority and a civilizing duty which assumed that they knew what was best for the Republic, often not considering what the Indonesian people wanted.

Internal cabinet debates about the political aims of Operation Kraai led to a situation where the political goals of the operation were unclear. Though most foresaw the destruction of the Republic as the goal, some did not agree with this and still wanted the (once purged of extremist elements) Republic to take place in the USI. This reflected a zigzag policy in Dutch security culture in 1948-9, without tangible results, which eventually also alienated the Federalists into cooperating with the Republic.

In December 1948, Dutch security culture (Drees government, de Volkskrant, and Trouw) believed that large-scale military intervention was necessary, as Operation Kraai was launched. Whereas Trouw kept attributing of importance to imperial prestige, and even the economic necessity of maintaining Indonesia in the empire, de Volkskrant toned down its colonial language compared to 1947; it attributed less importance to colonialist ideas. De Volkskrant even published occasional stories that reflected the Republican and Federalist views. The claims that the Republic were fascists or communists mostly disappeared in 1948-9, although Trouw did continue to claim that the Republican fighting forces were extremists. This can perhaps be attributed to Trouw's willingness to unquestionably copy facts which the military information services published; a reoccurring fact in Dutch security culture after 1946.

As it had been in 1947, Parool was critical of the Dutch military action and kept publishing the wishes and views of the Republican leaders.

In contrast to the Beel cabinet, the conservative Drees cabinet was warier of the Republic and argued that the Republic and its terrorist forces had to be purged before diplomatic negotiations with the other federal states could be resumed, a rhetoric that the Schermerhorn cabinet also believed in 1945. The delegitimization of the Republic as communists and terrorists/extremists was a prevalent theme in Dutch security culture throughout 1945-9, although de Volkskrant

stopped using this rhetoric in 1948-9, and the Beel government in 1946-7 also did not believe that all Republicans were terrorists.

The Drees cabinet legitimized Operation Kraai as a sacred duty and responsibility for the Dutch to promote the well-being of these inhabitants, both through the UN charter and the history of Indonesia. In retrospect, it can be seen as a final attempt of Dutch security culture to incorporate the civilization mission and arguments for (temporary) re-colonization in a new historical and international frame. The Drees cabinet often underestimated the importance of the new international world order, as it wrongfully assumed that it could convince the UN Security Council of the necessity of military action.

Final conclusion

As mentioned in this research's introduction; the identified security culture features will be categorized and compared using the three elements of the chosen security culture definition to add an extra layer of analysis to the conclusion.

1. Open contested process of threat-identification and interest-assessment. Drawing of lines between friends/foes and outsiders/insiders.

The threat-identification and interest-assessment processes in 1945-6 were slow to adapt to reality, underestimating both the violence and nationalist sentiments in Indonesia.

The most crucial interests of Dutch security culture in 1945-6 were identified as the imperial responsibility to liberate Indonesia from Japan, and the imperial responsibility to help the suffering, poverty struck Indonesians back on track toward wealth and prosperity.

The interest assessment process of Dutch security culture clearly reflected a civilization mission rhetoric, prevalent in the previous world order, which the Dutch governments and media would misuse to legitimize Operation Product (1947) and Operation Kraai (1948-9). Implicitly, the international prestige of maintaining the Dutch empire was a vital interest of Dutch security culture, especially given the humiliations that the Dutch suffered during WWII. This answers the question of why the Dutch government and many citizens were willing to wage a colonial war shortly after WWII ended. Given the fact that the Dutch troops were in Indonesia for a long time and the fact that the Netherlands were reconstructing their country, an economic necessity of maintaining Indonesia in the Dutch empire was also a feature of Dutch security culture. These two elements partially help explain how the Dutch government and media sold a colonial war to the Dutch public and the interpretive frameworks that the Dutch used to make sense of the war.

The threat-identification process of Dutch security culture was inaccurate, as Sukarno and the entire Republic were often portrayed as Japanese collaborators, communists, and extremists. Dutch security culture in 1945 widely attributed the nationalist wish to a minority group, which were deemed Japanese collaborators. In 1946-1949 this rhetoric of equating the Republic to communism, Japan, and extremism became less widespread but was still prevalent in the discourses of the military and political conservatives. Trouw and ARP, the military command, and Gerbrandy's NCHR committee argued that these extremists were a threat to the Indonesian population, and to Dutch interests of maintaining Indonesia within the empire.

Although the threat-identification and interest-assessment processes of Dutch security culture in 1946-7 were far from unitary, the Beel government identified the diplomatic accord as an interest that could eventually help solve the conflict without military intervention. Throughout the diplomatic negotiations, the Dutch government kept emphasizing how problematic Republican violations of Linggadjati were. However, the Dutch also broke the accord numerous times, which also occurred during the buildup to Operation Kraai. When Operation Product and Kraai were launched, Dutch security culture used Republican violations to legitimize the military intervention as an act of self-defense.

The ‘gendarmerie question’ was not a crucial interest to all Dutch politicians, but Spoor successfully (pressuring politicians) forced the Republic to accept Dutch troops on its soil. It was a crucial disagreement that led to Operation Product. The gendarmerie question was crucial for the Drees cabinet; the Dutch demanded to let their troops and Dutch authorities be responsible for Indonesian national security, and. It reflected a notion prevalent in Dutch security culture: the legitimization of Dutch troops in Indonesia to ‘restore peace and order’.

Three different assessed interests were detectable in Dutch security culture in 1946-7. Parool, CPN, and some PvdA members opposed military action against the Republic because it did not serve the Dutch nor the Republican interests. Trouw, ARP (and other conservative parties such as PvdV), and the military command strongly favored a large-scale military operation. This part of Dutch security culture believed that the destruction of the Republic was a necessary precondition before peace and order could be restored. KVP and de Volkskrant favored a limited military operation aimed at occupying economically beneficial territories and which would help maintain the Dutch Kingdom. As ‘keeping the cabinet alive’ was vital for both the KVP and PvdA, KVP managed to persuade PvdA to agree with military action after months of deliberation. In December 1948, Dutch security culture came to believe that large-scale military intervention was necessary, which led to Operation Kraai. In contrast to Operation Product, the Dutch military was authorized to ‘destroy’ the Republic.

2. Institutional structures and agents enabling these processes of threat-assessment and the neutralization of these threats.

Trouw was an important agent in Dutch security culture, explicitly arguing for the aid and liberation of Indonesians, while implying an economic and imperial prestige necessity for the Dutch to restore their authority. Trouw argued in favor of Operation Product because peace and order needed to be restored in Indonesia. According to Trouw, the Dutch were needed because the (‘inferior’) Indonesians would not be able to reconstruct their country themselves. For Trouw, maintaining the empire remained crucial. Trouw criticized the Beel government for the diplomatic Linggadjati Accord, which was deemed unconstitutional, and which did not fulfill the Dutch divine and Christian duty to help reconstruct Indonesia. Similar to Operation Product, Trouw framed Operation Kraai as a necessity and responsibility for the Dutch to end Republican terror and dictatorship, again portraying the Dutch as the saviors that the Indonesians needed.

De Volkskrant published one-sided colonialist arguments to argue that Indonesia was not ready for independence; they needed Dutch guidance. It also emphasized a religious responsibility to rebuild Indonesia. De Volkskrant agreed with Operation Product because the Indonesian people ‘had to be freed from Republican oppression’. Although de Volkskrant did not portray all Republicans as extremists or terrorists after 1946, they did believe that it reflected a minority group that would oppress other Indonesian peoples. De Volkskrant supported Operation Kraai because it believed that the Republic did not democratically reflect most of the Indonesians; instead, it supported the Federalists.

The Schermerhorn, Beel, and Drees cabinets, de Volkskrant, and Trouw had nationalistic and conservative ideas about the future of Indonesia, which they believed was inseparable from the Dutch empire. A speech by Minister Meynen to the Dutch troops, for instance, reflected a sense of white superiority over the Indonesians.

Parool was a unique agent in the 1945-6 and 1946-7 institutional structures, portraying both sides of public discourse and explaining the reasons why the Republic wanted independence

and the Republican interpretation of Linggadjadi. Parool was the only newspaper to notice the military's interference in politics in 1946-7, and how the information provided by NEFIS was contaminated with military command opinions. It also opposed Operation Product, and even called it a colonial war, in contrast to Dutch security culture ('police action'). Parool opposed Operation Kraai, and worried about the alienation of the Federalists.

The institutional structure enabling the threat assessment processes and its neutralization changed tremendously in 1948, as a conservative government was installed in August. Naturally, the Dutch security culture also became more conservative, and more favorable toward military action. However, the international community now also formed a crucial institutional structure in Dutch security culture, which limited the Dutch government's ability to make decisions. The Drees government did not acknowledge this, which is reflective of the fact that Dutch security culture was slow to adapt to the changed realities of the new world order emerging after 1945. In the conservative Drees cabinet in 1948-9, Renville's interpretation was heavily changed in favor of the Dutch, even more so than the Dutch favorable interpretation of Linggadjadi in 1946-7. While the Republic continued to make concessions, the Dutch increasingly pushed their own interpretation, without concessions.

An institutional structure that greatly influenced the threat assessment processes and the neutralization of these threats in the 1946-7 security culture was the Dutch military. General Spoor, the military command, and NEFIS' interference in politics was a novel element of Dutch security culture in 1946-7. General Spoor convinced confessional politicians, and his soldiers, to support large-scale military action, repeatedly framing the Republic as a minority group of violent extremists. Other influential agents in Dutch security culture responsible for hiding correct information and spreading disinformation in public discourse were Romme, Drees, Gerbrandy, and Beel, especially during the buildup to Operations Product and Kraai. As many pillarized Dutch media newspapers blindly copied information provided by NEFIS, and colored facts to be in accordance with the political ideology of the aligned party, the Dutch media landscape also played a crucial role in Dutch security culture.

General Spoor had a crucial role in Dutch security culture in 1946-9 and was responsible for the military threat assessment and the neutralization of these threats. However, Spoor's military strategy heavily underestimated numerous elements, such as the fighting power of the Republic, and their ability to recruit the local population into waging guerilla warfare. This is also why the Dutch military, and many politicians in 1949 falsely assessed that the military operation had been had successfully defeated the Republic.

3. Introduced practices and action repertoires used to defend the allegedly endangered interests.

A practice that was introduced in 1945-6 to defend the allegedly endangered interests, was sending a large deployment force to Indonesia. This decision acknowledged the intensity of violence in Indonesia, but still underestimated the widespread notion of nationalism and wanting independence. As it would take more than a year before the full force would be deployed, the lack of urgency benefitted the Republic, which had more time to organize a better political and military structure. In Renville and its aftermath, the federal structure introduced by the Schermerhorn cabinet in February 1946, was further adjusted to reflect Dutch interests, as the Netherlands would bear most of the sovereignty and responsibility over Indonesia so it could 'protect' Indonesia against the Republic.

Operation Product was launched on July 21st, 1947, primarily to defend the economic endangered interests of the Netherlands. Operation Kraai was launched on December 19th, 1948, primarily to 'defend the Indonesians' and the Dutch empire, but the political goals of this military action in Dutch security culture were not unitary.

In 1946-7, Beel's government believed that it could neutralize the Republican threat with the Linggadjati accord, by providing a counterbalance to the Republic: two other federal states. With the Linggadjati Accord, both sides made concessions on crucial issues. Whereas the Schermerhorn-Drees cabinet in December 1945 believed that safety and order had to be restored by Dutch troops before diplomatic negotiations could begin, the Beel cabinet believed that diplomatic negotiations could lead to a solution. Whereas the Drees cabinet also attempted diplomatic negotiations in 1948-9, it eventually also agreed that the Republic had to be destroyed before peace and order could be restored.

An action introduced in 1946 to defend the politically endangered interests, was a constitutional change that allowed the government to force conscripts to be deployed to Indonesia. This element of Dutch security culture could be seen as unconstitutional because the troops were already sent before the constitution was formally altered.

During late 1946 and early 1947, excessive violence used by Dutch troops became a tactic accepted by the military command and deemed effective in achieving military (purification) goals; it was condoned by the Dutch government and hidden from public discourse. Therefore, excessive violence was temporarily part of the Dutch security culture. When politicians started discussing the structural extent of excessive violence in 1948, media such as Trouw legitimized it as a military necessity.

Reflection

This research explored the interpretive frameworks of Dutch public discourse during the decolonization war and was able to detect various frameworks of interpretations across the analyzed newspapers and political debates in the 1945-9 timeframe. It has answered the question of how the Dutch, considering their WWII occupation, were willing to wage a colonial war in 1947 and 1948-9.

It has also answered the main question, namely that the existent Dutch security culture reflected an old world-order, and that many Dutch conservative politicians, the Dutch media, and surprisingly also the Dutch military (which was not part of the initial argument of this research) aided in maintaining the empire and arguing for the necessity of military action.

The use of three main themes and a subtheme allowed the research to be clearly structured, and to identify security culture features in different domains of public discourse. An element that made this thematic approach challenging, is that some issues overlapped between the themes. Moreover, though economic reasoning was often vital for political decisions, public discourse in the newspapers hardly reflected this.

Empirical discourse analysis has proven to be a valuable method in identifying and analyzing the broad themes and functions of language prevalent during this time. Its limitation was that most results were interpreted by one researcher, and therefore could have been influenced by the personal norms and values and biases of this researcher. However, the analysis of hundreds of articles, and a constant reflection of the researcher on the results' objectivity have tried to minimize these effects. The analysis of three different and widely read newspapers, and of crucial parliamentary debates have led to the identification of many security culture features, and the explanation of the most important interpretive frameworks in public discourse during the INR. A limitation of the chosen sources is that other primary sources (such as radio speeches or polygon journals) were not analyzed first-hand. The most important radio speeches were published in the newspapers with a summary and have been used as secondary sources of the government's statements at times. However, the interpretation and political coloring by the newspapers affected the validity of these findings somewhat.

Security culture has also proven to be a valuable analytical tool in analyzing the threat-identification and interest-assessment processes, the different enabling institutional structures and agents, and the resulting practices introduced to defend endangered interests. As predicted in the methodology, this at times allowed the research to distinguish between subjectively created threats and objective threats. It also allowed for a broader analysis of Dutch public discourse, as previous attempts mostly focused on individual political figures or specific Dutch parties. A limitation of this research is that these works could have been included in the historiography more thoroughly.

Building on this research's limitations, future research could investigate the following issues: the awkward relationship between the PvdA and Parool, the comparison between KVP and ARP views during the conflict, and the extent to which the discriminative language used by government officials behind closed doors was purposely left out of public discourse, and how widespread these notions of Dutch/white superiority were among the politicians at the time.

Bibliography

Primary sources

Algemeene vergadering. *Urgentie Program Christelijk Historische Unie* (1946).

Algemeene vergadering. *Urgentie Program Christelijk Historische Unie* (1948).

De Volkskrant. *Katholiek Dagblad voor Nederland*. Amsterdam: 1945-9.

Handelingen Eerste Kamer – Verandering van artikel 192 van de Grondwet. 12^e vergadering – 23 december 1946. Nr. 0000075354(1946): 101-7.

Handelingen Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Geleidende brief van Minister van Overzeesche gebieden J.A. Jonkman inzake Ontwerp-overeenkomst Linggadjati. – 10 december 1946. Nr. 0000076534 (1946).

Handelingen Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal gedurende de tijdelijke zitting 1945. 1^e vergadering – 25 september 1945. Nr. 0000073956 (1945): 3-10.

Handelingen Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal gedurende de tijdelijke zitting 1945. 2^e vergadering – 9 oktober 1945. Nr. 0000073957 (1945): 13-32.

Handelingen Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. 8^e vergadering – 21 december 1945. Nr. 0000074099 (1945): 137-66.

Handelingen Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal – Mededeling besluit van de Centrale Afdeling — 1018. Ontwerp-Noodwet Indonesië. 7^e vergadering – 25 oktober 1948. Nr. 0000080934 (1948): 113-41.

Handelingen Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal– ontwerp-overeenkomst van Linggadjati. 32^e vergadering – 19 december 1946. Nr. 0000075792 (1946): 1003-1062.

Handelingen Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal– Regeeringsverklaring in zake de ontwerp-overeenkomst van Linggadjati. 25^e vergadering – 10 december 1946. Nr. 0000075785 (1946): 703-730.

Het Parool. Vrij, onverveerd. Amsterdam: 1945-9.

Iterson, F.K. van. “KVP Verkiezingsmanifest 1948”. *Parlement en Kiezer* no. 32 (1948): 109-111.

Nederlandse Grondwet, de. “Grondwetsherziening 1946.” Nederlandse Grondwet. Accessed April 29, 2023.

https://www.denederlandsegrondwet.nl/id/vjzkdnohadna/grondwetsherziening_1946

Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden No. G428. “Publicatie van 31 december 1946,

betreffende de plechtige afkondiging van de vastgestelde verandering in de Grondwet”.
2 Januari 1947.

Trouw. Uitgever N.V. blad Trouw. Amsterdam: 1945-9.

Verkiezingsprogram PvdA (1948).

Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie. “Dit is de inzet van onze verkiezingsstrijd”.
Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse politieke partijen (1948).

Secondary sources

Bank, Jan. *Katholieken en de Indonesische revolutie*. Amboboeken, 1983.

Berg, Marleen van den, and George Harinck. *Voor de geest en het moreel van de troepen: De kerken en de oorlog in Indonesië, 1945-1950*. Uitgeverij Verloren, 2018.

Bootsma, Peter. *Trouw. 75 jaar tegen de stroom in*. Amsterdam: Boom, 2018

Bleiker, Jill, Sarah Morgan-Trimmer, Karen Knapp, and Susan Hopkins. "Navigating the maze: Qualitative research methodologies and their philosophical foundations." *Radiography* 25 (2019).

Breman, Jan. “Koloniaal eerherstel, een vergelijkend perspectief”. *De Gids* no. 154 (1991).

Broersma, Marcel. "De hand van Romme. CPM Romme als staatkundig hoofdredacteur van de Volkskrant (1945-1952)." *BMGN-Low Countries Historical Review* 115, no. 4 (2000): 561-584.

Burgers, Herman. *De garoeda en de ooievaar; Indonesië van kolonie tot nationale staat*. Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, (2010).

Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde. *Security: A new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

Daalder, Hans and Jelle Gaemers. *Willem Drees, Daadkracht en Idealisme*. Uitgeverij Balans, 2014.

Doolan, Paul M.M. "Collective Memory and the Dutch East Indies." *In Collective Memory and the Dutch East Indies*. Amsterdam University Press, 2021.

Frisart, Ronald. “Ethische Politiek in Indië Móést Wel Stranden.” *Historiek*, August 12, 2022. <https://historiek.net/ethische-politiek-in-indie-moest-wel-stranden/145704/>.

Gardner, Leigh, and Tirthankar Roy. *The Economic History of Colonialism*. Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2020.

- Giebels, Lambert. *Beel. Van vazal tot onderkoning 1902–1977*. Den Haag, SDU (1995).
- Gill, Rosalind. "Discourse analysis." *Qualitative researching with text, image and sound* 1 (2000): 172-190.
- Graaf Beatrice de. "Terrorism in the Netherlands A History". *The Cambridge History of Terrorism*. Cambridge University Press, 2021.
- Graaf Thom de. "Een nutteloze noodwet. Een studie naar de grondwettigheid en de noodzaak van de Noodwet Indonesië 1948". *Politieke Opstellen 1982* (1982): 20-37.
- Groen, Petra. "Dutch Armed Forces and the Decolonization of Indonesia: The Second Police Action (1948–1949), A Pandora's Box." *War & Society* 4, no. 1 (1986): 79-104.
- Groen, Petra. "Militant response: The Dutch use of military force and the decolonization of the Dutch East Indies, 1945–50." *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 21 no. 3 (1993): 30–44.
- Groen, Petra. "W. IJzereef, De Zuid-Celebes affaire. Kapitein Westerling en de standrechtelijke executies." (1986): 270-271.
- Hagen, Piet. *Koloniale oorlogen in Indonesië: vijf eeuwen verzet tegen vreemde overheersing*. Singel Uitgeverijen, 2018.
- Harinck, Christiaan. *Zoeken, aangrijpen en vernietigen! Het Nederlandse militaire optreden in Indonesië, 1945-1949*. Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2022.
- Helsdingen, Willem Henri van, and H. Hoogenberk. "Daar werd wat groots verricht." *Nederlandsch-Indië in de XXste eeuw* (1941).
- Hendrix, W. J., and J. A. A. van Doorn. *Ontsporing van geweld: het Nederlands-Indonesisch conflict*. Amsterdam University Press, 2016.
- Hodges, Brian, Ayelet Kuper, and Scott Reeves. "Discourse analysis." *BMJ* no. 337 (2008): 570-1.
- Hoffenaar, Jan. "De Indonesische kwestie (1945-1949): De Nederlandse militaire inbreng nader bekeken." *Militaire Spectator* 156, no. 4 (1987): 172-179.
- IJzereef, Willem. "De Zuid-Celebes affaire." *Kapitein Westerling en de standrechtelijke executies* (Dieren: De Bataafsche Leeuw (1984).
- Jenowein Annette. 'Wilskracht, durf en onverpoosden ijver': Charlotte Jacobs (1847-1916), eerste vrouwelijke apotheker in Nederland en Nederlands-Indië. *Leiden University*, 2019.
- Jong, Joop de. "Avondschot." *Hoe Nederland zich terugtrok uit zijn Aziatisch Imperium*, Amsterdam: Boom, 2011.
- Jong, Joop de. *De terugtocht. Nederland en de dekolonisatie van Indonesie*. Amsterdam:

- Boom, 2015.
- Kaaij, Meindert van der. *Een kwaad geweten: De worsteling met de Indonesische onafhankelijkheidsoorlog vanaf 1950*. Amsterdam University Press, 2022.
- Kanttekening, de. "Uva-Hoogleraar: "“Bersiap” Is Als Historisch Begrip Problematisch.”” *de Kanttekening*, January 20, 2022.
<https://dekanttekening.nl/nieuws/uva-hoogleraar-bersiap-is-als-historisch-begrip-problematisch4/>
- Koekkoek, René. Anne-Isabelle Richard and Arthur Weststeijn. "Visions of Dutch empire: Towards a long-term global perspective." *BMGN: Low Countries Historical Review* 132, no. 2 (2017): 79-96.
- Kroef, Justus M. van der. "Dutch Policy and the Linggadjati Agreement, 1946-1947." *The Historian* 15, no. 2 (1953): 163-187.
- Langeveld, Herman. *De man die in de put sprong: Willem Schermerhorn 1894-1977*. Amsterdam, Boom: 2014.
- Liempt, Ad van. *Nederland valt aan: op weg naar oorlog met Indonesië, 1947*. Uitgeverij Balans, 2012.
- Limpach, Rémy. *De brandende kampongs van Generaal Spoor*. Amsterdam: Boom, 2016.
- Lorenz, Chris. "De Nederlandse koloniale herinnering en de universele mensenrechten: De casus 'Rawagede'." *Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis* 128, no. 1 (2015): 109-130.
- Maas, P.F. "De Indonesië-politiek van minister mr. D. U. Stikker in memoires en geschiedschrijving." *Acta Politica*, 19 no. 3 (1984): 359-378.
- Maas, P.F. "Dr. H. J. van Mook, onze laatste Landvoogd, tot ontslag gedwongen." *Acta Politica* 17 no. 3 (1982): 367-384.
- Maas, P.F. "Stikker in 'Kaliurang', laatste halte op weg naar de tweede politieke actie, november-december 1948." (1982): 38-57.
- Meuwese, Stan. "Een Terugblik Op De Militaire Dienstplicht." *Militair Rechtelijk Tijdschrift* (2019).
https://puc.overheid.nl/mrt/doc/PUC_271399_11/1/#:~:text=De%20eerste%20naaorlogse%20dienstplichtigen%2C%20opgeroepen,nieuwe%20grondwet%20formeel%20werd%20afgekondigd
- Meuwese, Stan. *Twee eeuwen dienstplicht. discipline, dienstweigering en desertie: deelnemen(of niet) aan de Nederlandse krijgsmacht in rechtshistorisch perspectief*. Wolf Legal Publishers, 2017.
- Moor, Jaap de. *Generaal Spoor. Triomf en tragedie van een legercommandant*. Amsterdam, Uitgeverij Boom, 2011.

- Mulder, Gerard and Paul Koedijk. *Lees die krant! Geschiedenis van het naoorlogse Parool 1945-1970*. Meulenhoff, 1996.
- NIOD. "Slachtoffers Nederlandse Bevolking (Cijfers)." NIOD. Accessed February 16, 2023. <https://www.niod.nl/nl/veelgestelde-vragen/verliezen-nederlandse-bevolking-cijfers>
- Oostindie, Gert, Ireen Hoogenboom, Tom van den Berge, and Bart Luttikhuis. "Alles is natuurlijk te begrijpen als je erover nadenkt" *Leidschrift* 31, no. oktober: Een beladen geschiedenis. *De dekolonisatieoorlog in Indonesië, 1945-1954* (2016): 95-107.
- Oostindie, Gert, Rémy Limpach, Bart Luttikhuis, Remco Raben, Peter Romijn, Onno Sinke, Fridus Steijlen et al. *Beyond the Pale: Dutch Extreme Violence in the Indonesian War of Independence, 1945-1949*. Amsterdam University Press, 2022.
- Oostindie, Gert. "Trauma and the Last Dutch War in Indonesia, 1945–1949." *The Cultural Trauma of Decolonization: Colonial Returnees in the National Imagination* (2020): 85-109.
- Penders, Christian Lambert Maria. *The West New Guinea Debacle: Dutch Decolonisation and Indonesia, 1945-1962*. Brill, 2021.
- Raben, Remco, and Peter Romijn. *Talen van geweld. Stilte, informatie en misleiding in de Indonesische onafhankelijkheidsoorlog, 1945-1949*. Amsterdam University Press, 2022.
- Romijn, Peter. "De lange Tweede Wereldoorlog." *Nederland 1940-1949* (2020).
- Scagliola, Stef. "The Silences and Myths of a 'Dirty War': Coming to Terms with the Dutch–Indonesian Decolonisation War (1945–1949)." *European Review of History*, 14 no. 2 (2007): 235-262.
- Scagliola, Stef. *Last van de oorlog*. Amsterdam: uitgeverij Balans, 2002.
- Stichting Parlementair Documentatie Centrum. "Ir. H. (Hein) Vos." *Parlement.com*. Accessed June 15, 2023. https://www.parlement.com/id/vg091lc8idtv/h_hein_vos
- Stichting Parlementair Documentatie Centrum. "Kabinetsformatie 1948." *Parlement.com*. Accessed June 17, 2023. https://www.parlement.com/id/vjbrgappfdxc/kabinetsformatie_1948
- Stichting Parlementair Documentatie Centrum. "Soevereiniteitsoverdracht Aan Indonesië in 1949." *Parlement.com*. Accessed May 17, 2023. https://www.parlement.com/id/vhm0102igvut/soevereiniteitsoverdracht_aan_indonesi_e
- Stevens, R. J. J. "Een (buiten) parlementaire lobby: het Nationaal Comité Handhaving Rijkseenheid 1946-1950." (1996).
- Stevens, R. J. J. "Manipulatie van informatie? De rol van de Nederlandse militaire

inlichtingendienst in Indonesië ten tijde van het Nederlands-Indisch conflict 1945-1949." (1992): 149-68.

Trouw archief. "De geschiedenis van dagblad Trouw".

<https://trouw-archief.nl/de-geschiedenis-van-dagblad-trouw>

Zweers, Louis. *De gecensureerde oorlog: militairen versus media in Nederlands-Indië 1945-1949*. Walburg Pers, 2013.



PLAGIARISM RULES AWARENESS STATEMENT

Fraud and Plagiarism

Scientific integrity is the foundation of academic life. Utrecht University considers any form of scientific deception to be an extremely serious infraction. Utrecht University therefore expects every student to be aware of, and to abide by, the norms and values regarding scientific integrity.

The most important forms of deception that affect this integrity are fraud and plagiarism. Plagiarism is the copying of another person's work without proper acknowledgement, and it is a form of fraud. The following is a detailed explanation of what is considered to be fraud and plagiarism, with a few concrete examples. Please note that this is not a comprehensive list!

If fraud or plagiarism is detected, the study programme's Examination Committee may decide to impose sanctions. The most serious sanction that the committee can impose is to submit a request to the Executive Board of the University to expel the student from the study programme.

Plagiarism

Plagiarism is the copying of another person's documents, ideas or lines of thought and presenting it as one's own work. You must always accurately indicate from whom you obtained ideas and insights, and you must constantly be aware of the difference between citing, paraphrasing and plagiarising. Students and staff must be very careful in citing sources; this concerns not only printed sources, but also information obtained from the Internet.

The following issues will always be considered to be plagiarism:

- cutting and pasting text from digital sources, such as an encyclopaedia or digital periodicals, without quotation marks and footnotes;
- cutting and pasting text from the Internet without quotation marks and footnotes;
- copying printed materials, such as books, magazines or encyclopaedias, without quotation marks or footnotes;
- including a translation of one of the sources named above without quotation marks or footnotes;
- paraphrasing (parts of) the texts listed above without proper references: paraphrasing must be marked as such, by expressly mentioning the original author in the text or in a footnote, so that you do not give the impression that it is your own idea;
- copying sound, video or test materials from others without references, and presenting it as one's own work;

- submitting work done previously by the student without reference to the original paper, and presenting it as original work done in the context of the course, without the express permission of the course lecturer;
- copying the work of another student and presenting it as one's own work. If this is done with the consent of the other student, then he or she is also complicit in the plagiarism;
- when one of the authors of a group paper commits plagiarism, then the other co-authors are also complicit in plagiarism if they could or should have known that the person was committing plagiarism;
- submitting papers acquired from a commercial institution, such as an Internet site with summaries or papers, that were written by another person, whether or not that other person received payment for the work.

The rules for plagiarism also apply to rough drafts of papers or (parts of) theses sent to a lecturer for feedback, to the extent that submitting rough drafts for feedback is mentioned in the course handbook or the thesis regulations.

The Education and Examination Regulations (Article 5.15) describe the formal procedure in case of suspicion of fraud and/or plagiarism, and the sanctions that can be imposed.

Ignorance of these rules is not an excuse. Each individual is responsible for their own behaviour. Utrecht University assumes that each student or staff member knows what fraud and plagiarism



entail. For its part, Utrecht University works to ensure that students are informed of the principles of scientific practice, which are taught as early as possible in the curriculum, and that students are informed of the institution's criteria for fraud and plagiarism, so that every student knows which norms they must abide by.

| |
|---|
| I hereby declare that I have read and understood the above. |
| Name: Vincent Klein HKink |
| Student number: 1017926 |
| Date and signature: VVKI 22-06-23 |

Submit this form to your supervisor when you begin writing your Bachelor's final paper or your Master's thesis.

Failure to submit or sign this form does not mean that no sanctions can be imposed if it appears that plagiarism has been committed in the paper.