

The Dutch curfew riots



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Image (1) on title page: rioters seek the confrontation with the police in Rotterdam (ANP, 2021).

"A riot is the language of the unheard"

- Martin Luther King, 1968

Preface

In front of you lies my thesis for the Master Human Geography at Utrecht University. It took a bit longer than expected, but I am happy with the final result. Nearly two years ago I started writing this thesis on the Dutch curfew riots. In the meantime, the research design has changed a couple of times, but the subject remained the same. I have chosen this subject after I saw what impact the curfew riots made on myself, society and the neighbourhood I live in, as riots unfolded here during these violent days at the end of January 2021. Afterwards I asked myself the question why this happened in the neighbourhood I live in, and not in the neighbouring ones. This question has formed the foundation of my thesis. With this work I hope to give some insights into why some places are more prone to riots than others, and how they could be prevented in the future.

I would like to thank my supervisor Martijn Smit for his guidance, patience and useful insights during this process. I also would like to thank my parents, sister and all other people who supported me or gave me a helping hand. Without you it would have been much harder.

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Summary

In dit onderzoek is ingegaan op de achterliggende oorzaken van de avondklokrellen, die ontstonden na de invoering van de avondklok in januari 2021. Dit is gedaan vanuit drie verschillende invalshoeken; ruimtelijk, structureel en lokaal. Het ruimtelijke deel is statistisch onderzocht en werd onderbouwd door het concept *'the geographies of discontent'*. Deze theorie gaat ervan uit dat er bepaalde geografische regio's bestaan waar de inwoners vanwege hun sociale, economische en demografische kenmerken pessimistischer zijn dan landgenoten wonend in andere gebieden van datzelfde land. In het eerste deel is gekeken of aan de hand van deze kenmerken de avondklok-rellen verklaard konden worden. Uit de regressieanalyse bleek dat de variabelen bevolkingsdichtheid, migratiesaldo en criminaliteitspercentage statistisch significant waren ten aanzien van de aanwezigheid van rellen.

In het tweede, structurele deel zijn de rellen onderzocht aan de hand van krantenartikelen en een aantal al gepubliceerde rapporten over de rellen. De structurele factoren van rellen zijn de organisatie, motivatie en repressie. Uit het onderzoek bleek dat de avondklok-rellen gekarakteriseerd kunnen worden als georganiseerd, gemotiveerd door verschillende redenen en getracht onderdrukt te worden door de politie door de rellen te voorkomen nog voordat zij konden beginnen. Tevens is in dit hoofdstuk ingegaan op de impact van ruimtelijke verspreiding van de rellen door Nederland. Deze verspreiding werd geleid door sociale of geografische processen die mensen aanzetten het vertoonde gewelddadige gedrag uit andere plekken te kopiëren. Het daadwerkelijke proces van verspreiding werd geleid door verschillende social media platforms. Zij vormden de zenders waardoor beelden en berichten over de rellen daadwerkelijk konden worden verspreid en gaven de mogelijkheid met anderen hierover online te communiceren.

Bij de lokale invalshoek is gekeken naar welke lokale factoren van invloed waren op de avondklokrellen. Hiervoor is een specifieke casus onderzocht: de Schilderswijk. Dit is onderzocht aan de hand van krantenartikelen en rapporten. De resultaten lieten zien dat de geschiedenis en identiteit van de wijk erg belangrijk zijn in het ontstaan van rellen. Tevens kwam naar voren dat een groot deel van de deelnemers bij de rellen niet uit de wijk zelf afkomstig waren. Deze resultaten kwamen veelal ook terug in andere buurten binnen de onderzochte gemeenten.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Riots are globally on the rise (Korotayev et al., 2018). Since 2011, the number of riots worldwide have increased by 288 percent. Even in The Netherlands, a country indicated as one in which social unrest is usually rare, major riots broke out in January 2021 (Barrett, 2022). These riots started on January 23rd and lasted till the 26th of that month. The riots were initially caused by the anger of people towards the curfew- which was set on the same day- and other Covid-19 related restrictions (van der Linde, 2021). However, the introduction of the curfew was only the straw which broke the camel's back. The real causes of the riots have to be found in deeper layers of the society (Moors et al., 2022). The statement of Martin Luther King- quoted on page 2- is a striking example of this.

The riots took place in different municipalities, scattered around the country. An interesting remaining question is why specifically these municipalities were involved in the riots and which factors contributed to their occurrence. This question leads to the following research question:

Which spatial, structural and local factors contributed to the occurrence of the Dutch curfew riots in January 2021 in the involved municipalities?

There are multiple reasons why research on the curfew riots in particular and riots in general is necessary. It is relevant for society as forecasts for the coming years show that the number of riots will increase even more (Campbell & Hribernik, 2020). Research towards riots can give us an understanding why they occur and how they can be prevented from turning violent. The mayor of Den Bosch, Jack Mikkers, acknowledged right after the curfew riots the need for an independently conducted report regarding the riots in his city, to establish knowledge about the 'why's' and 'how's' of the riots (De Volkskrant, 2021a).

Furthermore, it is scientifically relevant as it fills two research gaps. Firstly, riots occur when tuck-away feelings of social discontent transform into violent action (Steur et al., 2017). Until now, rather than some attention in the media, not much scientific research has been done on social discontent (Steur et al., 2017). This research contributes to the further expansion of knowledge into this topic. Secondly, how individuals express feelings of social discontent differs considerably. Where some have used the ballot-box to express their feelings, others have used a far more radical approach by participating in a riot to demonstrate these feelings (De Ruyter et al., 2021). In the Western world, social discontent is lately approached in the literature through a more geographic lens, pointed towards the geographies of populist voting patterns and how discontent has (spatially) influenced electoral results (Segovia et al., 2021). Riots as a consequence of social discontent, while using this same geographic lens, have not been approached yet, which fills a second knowledge gap.

This thesis is structured as follows. In the next section (chapter 2), possible spatial explanations for the curfew riots are discussed using the concept of 'geographies of discontent'. Also, the existing literature of the structural factors and spatial diffusion of riots will be outlined there. Chapter 3 explains the methodology of this thesis and how this inquiry is being executed. In chapters 4, 5 and 6 the results are presented. First, the spatial factors contributing to the riots in the involved municipalities are discussed (chapter 4). Second, the

structural factors are explained and the impact of spatial diffusion demonstrated (chapter 5). Third, the local factors are investigated in a case study manner (chapter 6). Chapter 7 describes the lessons that can be retrieved for the prevention of violent riots in the future as part of the conclusion, by using the calculated odds of the regression analysis. This thesis will end with the conclusion (chapter 8) and the discussion (chapter 9).

Chapter 2: Theoretical framework

This theoretical framework starts with an exploration of social discontent and how this phenomenon is geographically formed in modern society. It continues with an explanation of how discontent can transform into riots, followed by a discussion of what riots actually are and how this form of civil unrest occurs.

An era of social discontent

We are living in an era of discontent (OECD, 2021). Feelings of discontent are not something from this century alone (Steur et al., 2017). However, over the last decade discussions about social discontent have sharply risen as a consequence of developments on all kinds of spatial scales. In the Western world, for example, increased feelings of social discontent are linked to a series of events; the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001 which formed a direct attack on the Western world as hegemonic power, the increase of migrants from poorer countries and the integration problems this caused, the financial crisis in 2007 which raised questions about the organisation of the economy (Steur et al., 2017) and more recently, the outbreak of Covid-19, which restricted individuals in all sorts of ways in their daily lives.

The causes of feelings of social discontent are not self-contained, discontent arises as a combination or convergence of multiple causes (Steur et al., 2017). Discontent is a physiological and sociological phenomenon, but its causes need to be examined in a much broader context (OECD, 2021). Research has demonstrated that it is based on real social, economic and demographic developments that are the result of actual global events (Steur et al., 2017). However, social discontent is above all a geographic phenomenon (Florida, 2021).

Social discontent is hard to define. The term refers to the feeling that individuals have of the society collapsing and that this process can hardly be stopped. It is often linked to the question of whether people can stick to their (former) standard of living, or whether their children will have it as good as themselves when they were young (Steur et al., 2017). Increased feelings of social discontent are however not equally felt among a population. These feelings are always stronger in particular places and among particular groups in a society (Dijkstra et al., 2019).

The geography of discontent

Social discontent is often directly related to places that are marginal in physical, economic, social or demographic terms (or a combination thereof), in that they are more prone to general feelings of discontent (De Ruyter et al., 2021), as the current literature on 'geography of discontent' would attest (Dijkstra et al., 2019). The notion 'geography of discontent' arose out of the observed close relationship between the geography of the 2016 Brexit voting results and the economic productivity patterns in the United Kingdom (McCann & Ortega-Argilés, 2021). In general, people living in regions which were economically weaker - i.e. regions whose economies were depending on 'old' industries instead of the knowledge or service sector - were much more likely to vote pro-Brexit (Shafique, 2016). In that same year this relationship also became visible in other countries, such as the US Presidential elections and the Renzi Referendum in Italy (McCann & Ortega-Argilés, 2021). Although each case was spatially slightly different, the common feature was that the

geographical divides in voting results reflected the spatial economic inequalities (McCann & Ortega-Argilés, 2021). Moreover, similar relations could also be found in other scientific arenas (Rodríguez-Pose & Dijkstra, 2020; Lee et al., 2021; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018).

The term geography of discontent can be defined as “*the unhappiness experienced by people living in a mix of stagnating and low-productivity regions- mainly rural areas and medium-sized and small cities- as a direct consequence of the limited opportunities and economic development prospects they face*” (Dijkstra et al., 2019; p. 744). Many Western communities or regions are locked-up in the middle-income trap, as they encounter increasing difficulties in sustaining economic growth, as they are no longer innovative enough to compete with the most productive regions in the high-skilled knowledge and service economies, and too expensive to compete with less economically developed regions in low-cost manufacturing (Dijkstra et al., 2019). This has led to a dramatic increase of feelings of discontentment of people living in these areas. They reacted by using the ballot-box to “*rebel against the feeling of being left behind; against the feeling of lacking opportunities and future prospects*” (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018: p. 190). This process is reflected in the rapid rise of votes for the extreme right and populist parties (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018; Dijkstra et al., 2019).

Discontent is most notable in the growing spatial separation of more innovative places versus left-behind regions (Florida, 2021). This is connected to a process of spatial segregation. A decade ago, Bishop (2009) published ‘The Big Sort’, in which he stated that social groups with similar socio-economic and cultural characteristics flock together into places that fit and reinforce their own norms and values. This results, broadly, on the one hand in the concentration of bigger, densely populated cities or tech hubs of highly educated individuals who work in knowledge industries with more open-minded, liberal or cosmopolitan values, and, on the other hand, in the concentration of individuals with a lower education and fewer skills in left-behind places, rural areas or suburbs who hold more traditional, family-centred values (Florida, 2021). This seems like a harsh process. However, this is not because individuals from lower socio-economic classes are spatially pushed aside by richer communities. Instead, this process occurs because similar people tend to cluster together in the same neighbourhoods, towns or cities as they share common economic structures, social networks, ethnic backgrounds and housing market preferences (van Gent et al., 2019).

Social discontent is a dynamic process that evolves historically across different places (Florida, 2021). It forms an economic and cultural transformation that occurred as the Western world developed from an industrial to a post-industrial society. Inherent to this economic process is a cultural transformation which dismantled the institutional and traditional structures of class and status (Florida, 2021). With the rise of capitalism around 1980, the transformation from an economy based on (heavy) industry to an economy based on services and knowledge began. This transformation led to rising unemployment among individuals with fewer resources or qualifications. For them, it became incredibly hard to find a new job in other economic sectors because their original line of work (industry) was declining or even disappearing (OECD, 2021). A fundamental characteristic of this new kind of economy is its duality; in that the economy is divided around an advantaged core of employees working in the finance, technology and electronics sector which comprises of about 20 percent of the workforce, and a less advantaged group of employees working in the more precarious, lower paid manufacturing and services jobs who comprises 80 percent of the workforce (Temin, 2017).

Crucially, this new kind of economy is bound to a specific geography. The opposite is true for the industrial economy, as manufacturing industries, physical skill and working-class jobs are less bound to specific places (Florida, 2021). This is visible with the faster movement of factories of industrial goods around the world. When the production of industrial goods is cheaper in other places, companies are eager to move, just as happened with the deindustrialisation of the Western world to low-wage countries (Das, 2017).

The modern knowledge based economy however is much more bound to specific places. It is organised in a small set of cities and centred around the clustering of skill, talent and knowledge (Florida, 2021). This clustering causes a divided spatial balance, as countries get polarised by leading economic centres which pull away from the rest of the society which can not cope with the economic developments. This results in the rise of a spiky, winner-takes-it-all geography, with a small number of geographic winners and a large number of geographic losers (Florida et al., 2020). The polarisation creates a cultural divergence between densely populated, cosmopolitan cities and less densely populated, traditional towns and rural areas (Florida, 2021). This spatial and social divide is however not as strict as it seems. The advantaged core and the less advantaged group do not live totally separate from each other in these two distinct geographies. The less advantaged group of employees form an important part of the modern cosmopolitan cities as they work in the service industry in support of their 'advantaged' counterparts, both in the consumption as in the production sectors (Sassen, 2001). Individuals of both groups thus live in different neighbourhoods of a place, as social groups cluster together, but not totally separate in different cities.

Places that are part of the geographic losers, that could not cope with the economic developments, are prone to more negative consequences in the form of in general higher crime rates (Matthews et al., 2001). In times of economic distress, crime increases. This is because laid-off workers, with no other qualifications to start working in other sectors, run out of money and options to pay their bills and see criminal activity as their only way out (McCormack, 2020). For these places, turning this tide is often hard, whereas the richer and more educated people leave and new corporations think twice before settling down in places marked by crime and violence (McCormack, 2020).

Several territorial factors that increase feelings of discontent have already been pointed out. Another important promoter of the geography of discontent is migration. The arrival of migrants to a new country often intensifies the economic and cultural fears among the local population (Dijkstra et al., 2019). These economic fears are mostly felt among the less educated and skilled - or unemployed - population. Those living outside of the dominant, urban economic centres. They are caused by an increase in economic competition as migrants are seen as an extra competitor for jobs (Dijkstra et al., 2019). The cultural fears stemming from the presupposed disappearance of the local or national identity or culture as a result of the arrival of migrants with different norms, cultures and religions (Rodrik, 2018). In this, multiculturalism is seen as something imposed upon by the government and as a threat to the national identity (Dijkstra et al., 2019).

Lastly, two individual characteristics can generally be defined among the inhabitants of the geographies of discontent. First, gender, as men are more prone to discontent than women (Florida, 2021). Second, age, as older people are generally less capable of dealing with the fast changing society (e.g. economic changes,

multiculturalism or migration) which causes an increase of discontent (Dijkstra et al., 2019). In places with a higher percentage of elderly or male inhabitants, feelings of social discontent are thus more likely to arise.

Civil unrest is on the rise

Social discontent can transform from feelings into direct action, often as a consequence of a specific incident or event. Hidden feelings of fear then come to the surface (Steur et al., 2017). Governments have tried to control these feelings by allowing organised demonstrations to express them. However, because of a decreased degree of organisation and an increased degree of individualisation in society, riots and disorganised protests have become much more common in the past decades (Krastev, 2014; Clover, 2016).

Data from various sources has confirmed this (OECD, 2021). According to the Mass Mobilization Data Project, the proportion of violent protests between 1991 and 2019 fluctuated severely. In 2019, 28,7 percent of all protests were violent, which is slightly higher than in 1991. The percentages dropped from 1991 slowly until it met its lowest point in 2003, where it fell as low as 15,6 percent, whereafter it increased slowly until 2010 (OECD, 2021). In the last decade in general and the recent years in particular, an explosive global growth in (violent) anti-government demonstrations, riots and general strikes was visible (Korotayev et al., 2018). This fast increase was a bit hindered by the Covid-19 pandemic and its accompanying measures to contain it. This marked reduction of protests only took a couple of months, whereafter it started to rise again and even exceeded its pre-pandemic peak (OECD, 2021). Forecasts for the coming years predict that the civil unrest in societies will increase even more (Campbell & Hribernik, 2020).

Feelings of social discontent do not often transform into actual civil unrest. This is usually set in motion by a specific incident or event. For instance, the killing of a (black) person by a (white) police officer, specific court or political decisions, the loss of an important sport game or the introduction of a curfew to battle the Covid-19 pandemic. These events, also referred to as flashpoints, are viewed as the necessary component that ignites the underlying tinder (Newburn, 2021). The flashpoints model, developed in 1989 by David Waddington and colleagues, explains how these critical moments occur and lead to a violent collective response (Waddington et al., 1989; Moran & Waddington, 2016). The model demonstrates that factors on different levels- structural, political, organisational, cultural, contextual, situational and interactional- can cause frustrations, which can create an explosive environment in which one provocative event or act can cause riots (Holdo & Bengtsson, 2019). The theory acknowledges that these factors on their own do not explain riots, as they only create a setting in which riots are more or less likely to occur (Holdo & Bengtsson, 2019).

Riots

The previous section showed that civil unrest in societies is increasing. However, civil unrest is still a broad concept. Civil unrest events span the full spectrum of intra-state conflicts, from civil wars, revolutions and coups to more 'peaceful' forms, such as demonstrations, riots and general strikes (Braha, 2012). In this thesis, the focus is on riots. A 'riot' is a concept which is hard to define. 'Riot' has a negative connotation and is mainly used by politicians or other institutions to describe a group of individuals who appear to pose a violent threat to the public order or the state (Newburn, 2021). The term is often used by politicians to label events of which they disapprove or see as illegitimate. On the other hand, those involved in events indicated as riots often eschew these terms, as they see their behaviour not as something illegitimate or unlawful. They prefer

alternative terminations such as uprisings, rebellions or freedom fights, as to render the resistance they feel against others or the government (Newburn, 2021). For these reasons, there is no agreed upon scientific definition. Many scientists avoid making any attempt in doing this (Newburn, 2021).

Riots are sometimes seen as a form of protest. However, from an analytical and empirical point of view, this is not the best way to understand and explain riots (Holdo & Bengtsson, 2019). Analytically, it is important to separate one phenomenon from another. Without this, the relationship between them can not be investigated. Protests and riots differ from each other in that protests, in contrast to riots, are seen as a more orderly and non-violent form of collective behaviour (Holdo & Bengtsson, 2019; Wilkinson, 2009). Empirically, the organisation and expectations of both phenomena are different. Protests usually require resources, organisation and are expected to have an impact on someone or something (Holdo & Bengtsson, 2019). By contrast, riots lack all of these things; there are no resources, there is no or just a minimal amount of organisation and participants have no reason to expect a positive reaction from most of the society (Kawalerowicz & Biggs, 2015). Riots and protests may be empirically connected, when, for example, peaceful protests culminate into riots when the desired expectations are not reached (Holdo & Bengtsson, 2019).

Structural factors of riots

The 'riot' literature emphasises both the role of structural factors that give individuals an incentive to participate and the process of diffusion through which riots spread between areas as most important contributors of riots (Aidt & Leon-Ablan, 2021). The structural factors that affect riots can be separated into three categories: motivation, organisation and repression (Aidt & Leon-Ablan, 2021). The first structural factor is motivation, because people need a reason to participate in a riot. There are many factors that can drive people to participate in a riot, such as grievances related to (structural) racism, political decisions, marginalisation, police violence, unemployment, poverty or conflicts between ethnic or religious groups (Haddock & Polsby, 1994; Shadmehr, 2014; Holdo & Bengtsson, 2019).

The second structural factor is organisation. Only when a sufficient number of participants show up, riots can occur (Aidt & Leon-Ablan, 2021). The literature regarding the role of the organisational capacity during riots takes two distinct directions; one sees riots as totally unorganised and spontaneous events whereas the other sees them as having some form of organisation. This view acknowledges the importance of an internal organisation and central leaders as vital parts to start and consolidate riots (Andrews & Biggs, 2006).

The third structural factor is repression. In general, one can expect that the number or intensity of riots will reduce or even disappear if the repression increases (Aidt & Leon-Ablan, 2021). Wilkinson (2009), for instance, argued that riots only occur in areas where the local government decided not to repress them. But again, the literature shows conflicting results as Opp and Roehl (1990) and Suh et al. (2017) found that repression just leads to more social unrest as it causes outrage among a population.

The influence of diffusion

Next to structural factors, riots arise out of the diffusion of social unrest between geographical areas. Usually, research on riots focuses on single events (Drury et al., 2020). However, most riots come in waves, with an initial riot followed by others in different locations (Andrews & Biggs, 2006; Baudains et al., 2013; Drury et

al., 2020). A good example of this were the English riots of 2011, where riots broke out in London directly after the fatal shooting of a local mixed-heritage man by the police. During the course of the following day, riots spread to other parts of London, and the next day to other parts of England (Drury et al., 2020). This underscores that riots often occur in spatial and temporal clusters (Bonnasse-Gahot et al., 2018). Earlier research has indicated that the influence of one riot on the possible diffusion to other riots is influenced by the intensity of the initial riot, weakened by the geographical distance and decays over time (Myers, 2010).

The diffusion identifies the so-called contagion or interdependence of riots (Drury et al., 2020). This phenomenon can be explained from both a psychological and geographical standpoint. Social contagion states that riots diffuse when the grievances underlying a riot in one place are recognised and shared in other places which inspires individuals in these places to behave similarly to address these grievances (Baudains et al., 2013). Alternatively, geographic contagion states that riots can occur in other places due to situational precipitators. When riots occur in one place, the situational circumstances for individuals in other places changes too. If it is perceived that the risks of participating are low enough, individuals may be encouraged to engage in the riots themselves in the places they live in, which makes the violent disorder spread (Baudains et al., 2013).

The most important means for the actual diffusion of riots are social networks, mass media and social media. Mobilisation on the local level between different places in the same area depends on social networks (Andrews & Biggs, 2006). The diffusion of riots to other places depends on the information transmission through social and mass media (Baudains et al., 2013). Mass media for a long time formed the most important distributor of news related to riots (Myers, 2000). Especially television broadcasts, but also newspapers and radio broadcasts, could escort riots and its accompanying rhetoric easily to a wide range of other places (Myers, 2000). Today, we can read, see and listen to nearly all news from all countries around the world. However, a 'new' transmitter for news has arrived globally.

The internet has opened up unprecedented opportunities for people to access and distribute information (OECD, 2021). The importance of social media, like Facebook and Twitter, for social movements and riots became clear during the Arab Spring and the Occupy movement, as they were used as a catalyst to spread these movements messages and to connect like-minded people from all over the world (Tremayne, 2013; LeFebvre & Armstrong, 2016). Recently, a new social platform emerged which was widely used during social uprisings and other forms of social unrest: Telegram. This social platform became popular among activists and is appreciated for its relative anonymity and its efforts to remain independent from state censorship (Wijermars & Lokot, 2021). The platform enables users, in contrast to Facebook and Twitter, to avoid the surveillance from governments or other 'third parties' in 'closed' channels and groups (Wijermars & Lokot, 2021). Where the aforementioned social movements in the earlier 2000s and 2010s were labelled as 'Facebook or Twitter revolutions', recent political uprisings in Belarus, Iran, Hong Kong and Russia could already be labelled as 'Telegram revolutions' (Williams, 2020). The global popularity and usage of the platform is expected to increase even more in the coming years (Wijermars & Lokot, 2021).

In her work, Tufekci (2014) credited social networks with three main areas of influence in the protests process; generating public attention, evading censorship from the state or other institutions and taking care

of the coordination and logistics. Social media has the ability to speed things up and to reach out to millions of people in a short period of time (Tufekci, 2014). Besides, everyone with access to the internet (that is not politically censored) gets the opportunity to express themselves. Due to the abundance of information available, situations can be better understood and there is less reliance on mass media sources or the state for information (LeFebvre & Armstrong, 2016). However, because many more individuals have the opportunity to share their opinion, there is a growing amount of fake news and incorrect information accessible (De Ruyter et al., 2021).

Summarising, in this theoretical framework different explanations for the occurrence of riots were discussed. First, as a consequence of increased feelings of social discontent. The concept of the 'geographies of discontent' demonstrated that these feelings are not equally shared among all parts of a country and how they can transform from feelings into riots. Second, as a consequence of structural factors and diffusion, as participating individuals need a motive, some form of organisation (or not) and are influenced by the repression tactics used by the police. Also, people are influenced by the behaviour of others in different places (social and geographic contagion) which are transmitted by social networks, mass- and social media platforms.

Problem statement

The theoretical framework shows that riots are a multifaceted phenomenon with many factors which come together during their occurrence. In this thesis, riots are studied (a) from a more geographic perspective, using the concept of geographies of discontent. This concept demonstrates that feelings of social discontent are much higher in certain geographic places as a consequence of their social, demographic and social characteristics. Social discontent can cause riots when tucked-away feelings of discontent come to the surface after a specific incident or event (flashpoint). Next to these spatial factors, the structural factors and influence of diffusion during the riots were studied (b), as they form vital components for the occurrence of them. Lastly, the curfew riots were studied from a local perspective (c), to investigate if there are more, locally infused factors which contributed to the occurrence of the riots. This study aims to answer the question whether there are spatial, structural and local factors of the involved municipalities which could explain the occurrence of the curfew riots. This leads to the following research question:

Which spatial, structural and local factors contributed to the occurrence of the Dutch curfew riots in January 2021 in the involved municipalities?

Which is divided in the following sub-questions:

- Which spatial factors contributed to the occurrence of the Dutch curfew riots in the involved municipalities?
- What were the structural factors and what was the impact of spatial diffusion on the occurrence of the Dutch curfew riots?
- What was the impact of local factors to the occurrence of the Dutch curfew riots?

Chapter 3: Methodology

This chapter outlines the methodology of this thesis. First, the philosophical stance of this research will be explained, followed by the research design. In this section, the units of analysis are discussed and a case description is given. Second, the data collection and the operationalisation of the variables will be outlined. Third, the data analysis methods are demonstrated, which entails a description of the logistic regression analysis and the way in which the analysis is executed. The chapter will end with the evaluation of the quality criteria.

Philosophical stance

This research was attempted to be executed from a positivist standpoint. This is “*an epistemological position that advocates the application of the methods of the natural sciences to the study of social reality and beyond*” (Bryman, 2016; p. 24). This standpoint states that social phenomena and hence knowledge has to be observed by the senses to be validated as knowledge. Also, science must be executed in a way that is value free (Bryman, 2016). In this research, we have aimed to find the sources from which the riots stem. The spatial factors are all based on sensible data in each municipality, for which the exact level of influence was studied. The sources used were all standardised and constructed by professional independent organisations (Central Office of Statistics and Kieskompas, who will be explained more in-depth later), so there is no difference between them. The structural and local factors were investigated using observations perceived by others, elaborated in newspapers or reports. The used newspapers and reports are all independently operating organisations. However, articles or reports are never written value free, as everyone has an opinion. Furthermore, this data is poorly verifiable.

In this research an attempt was made to use objectivism as the ontological position. This position “*asserts that social phenomena and their meanings have an existence that is independent of social actors. It implies that social phenomena and the categories that we use in everyday discourse have an existence that is independent or separate from actors*” (Bryman, 2016; p. 29). The riots can be seen as social order in that it applies pressure on participating individuals to conform to the requirements needed to start the riots and reproduce them over time. They were formed due to widely shared values and customs among people which socialised them to participate in the riots (Bryman, 2016).

Research design

This cross-sectional research entailed the collection of data on 352 municipalities at a single point in time in order to collect a body of quantifiable data in connection with 11 variables, which were then examined to detect patterns of association. This type of quantitative research is amplified with qualitative elements, by using a literature and newspaper review to complement and deepen the results and to find out which factors played a role on the structural and local level during the riots. Scientific literature on riots has demonstrated the importance of this two-sided method (Waddington, 1992). The used variables in the regression analysis and the way they were examined, will be discussed later in this chapter. Below, a general overview of the research methods used in this thesis is given.




Figure 1: general overview of the research methods used in this thesis (own work).

Units of analysis and case description

The units of analysis are the 352 municipalities of The Netherlands in 2021¹. During the curfew riots, riots occurred in 27 of them. These municipalities were found after an analysis on LexusNexis of 117 news articles, published between the 23rd and 26th of January 2021. In the analysis, the searchterms '*rellen*' (riots) and '*avondklokrellen*' (curfew riots) were used. This resulted in 163 results among the term '*rellen*' and 170 results among the term '*avondklokrellen*'. These numbers are much higher than the actual number of articles analysed (117). This has a number of reasons. Firstly, articles were left out because in these articles the riots were discussed in general and not in relation to specific municipalities. Secondly, articles were only incorporated when riots had actually happened. Articles describing the impact of social media during the riots, demonstrations which had not led to riots or interviewed people who wanted to participate in them, were not incorporated. Thirdly, some were left out because identical articles were published among different newspapers from the same publisher (i.e. AD, De Gelderlander and Brabants Dagblad) or from the same author. A map of all rioting municipalities can be found below.

¹ Nearly every year, the number of municipalities decreases in The Netherlands, as a consequence of municipal reorganisations (Rijksdienst voor Identiteitsgegevens, 2022). Mostly smaller municipalities have merged with bigger ones or combined together. This happens because it is easier for bigger municipalities to fulfil their tasks and they get larger budgets. Currently there are already 10 municipalities fewer than in 2021 (342). In comparison, in 1900 there were 1.129 municipalities (Rijksdienst voor Identiteitsgegevens, 2022).

Bonaire, Saba and Sint Eustatius are official municipalities of The Netherlands, but are left out in this research. This is because the curfew riots were only concentrated in the continental municipalities of the country, and not on these so-called special municipalities (*speciale gemeenten*).



Image 2: all municipalities involved in the Dutch curfew riots (CBS, 2021).

The Dutch curfew riots took place in The Netherlands between the 23th and 26th of January 2021. They were caused by anger against the Covid-19 measures in general and the curfew which was instituted on 23rd of January in particular (van der Linde, 2021). A nationwide curfew was used as the last resort as the country had been in a full lockdown since December 2020, but the number of infections did not decline fast enough. The introduction of the curfew instantly caused opposition among some of the Dutch inhabitants (van der Linde, 2021).

During the first night of the curfew, violent opposition against it took place in Urk where a group of youths began to riot. They sought confrontations with the police and set a Covid-19 testing site on fire (De Volkskrant, 2021b). In other places, protesters had gathered around to demonstrate, but this only led to minor violent actions. It only escalated in Stein (Ruiter, 2021). During the next day, illegal demonstrations against the curfew in Amsterdam and Eindhoven turned into violent riots (NOS, 2021a). In the evening, riots took place in Roermond, Stein, Tilburg, Oosterhout, Breda, Arnhem, Apeldoorn, Almelo, Enschede, Helmond, The Hague and Venlo (NOS, 2021d). In different cities an emergency order was enacted to prevent the gathering of larger groups of people (Leeuwarder Courant, 2021). On the third day, riots took place in even more municipalities. This time, The Hague, Sittard-Geleen, Helmond, Den Bosch, Rotterdam, Veenendaal, Amsterdam, Haarlem, Zwolle, Almelo, Oss, Kerkrade, Maastricht, Amersfoort and Nijmegen formed the battle sites of that evening (NOS, 2021e, NOS, 2021f). The fourth and last day was calm compared to the two before. Only in Amsterdam and Rotterdam small riots occurred, as well as some disturbances in Den Helder. However, these events were all under control within an hour (NOS, 2021b). The total number of people participating in the riots is unknown and hard to calculate due to the number of municipalities involved. Below, a timeline of the events is visible.




Figure 2: timeline of the Dutch curfew riots (De Volkskrant, 2021b; Ruiter, 2021; NOS, 2021b, NOS, 2021d; NOS, 2021e; NOS, 2021f).

Data collection

The data collection phase of this research began in January 2022. The data was collected using the following sources:

Newspapers

A newspaper review is a widely used method while researching riots (Wilkinson, 2009). The aim of the newspaper review was twofold. First, a newspaper review was used to find out in which municipalities riots occurred at the end of January 2021, as described earlier in this chapter. Second, a newspaper review was used in researching the second and third sub-questions. Using newspapers to review the riots on a neighbourhood and structural level increased the reliability of this research as it cross-checked the other sources (Wilkinson, 2009). Nearly all articles were published by NRC, De Volkskrant, Trouw, Vrij Nederland, Algemeen Dagblad and Omroep West.

Literature review

The aim of the literature review was to collect data on the research topic and create a scientific base. The literature about the ‘geographies of discontent’ and ‘riots’ offered plenty of knowledge around the occurrence of riots. Furthermore, with this secondary data the variables used for answering the first subquestion were determined.

In the theoretical framework literature regarding the geographies of discontent has been outlined. It showed which spatial factors can contribute to increased feelings of discontent. How people express these feelings can vary considerably, varying from more formal expressions of changing voting patterns to more informal practices such as statements made on social media platforms or even to direct social action, such as public protests or even riots (De Ruyter et al., 2021). Protests and riots are important indicators of social discontent, since they represent larger commitments from participants than other, less radical, expressions of discontent (OECD, 2021).

Official statistics

A list of potential independent variables was made based on a review of secondary data to analyse the potential spatial variables that contribute to the occurrence of riots. In order to create an actual analysis, accurate and reliable data per municipality was needed. This data was found at the Statline municipality datasets of the Central Office of Statistics (*Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek*, hereafter named CBS) and Kieskompas. However, the data for some variables offered problems and had to be left out of the research. For instance, data about ‘religion’ and ‘income inequality’ was only available until 2014 and 2018 respectively. For others, data was defined but not filled in, as was the case with ‘importance of the Dutch identity’ or ‘impact of globalisation’. In the past, there were many more municipalities compared to now, which was a problem for data which was published in earlier years. Data published in 2020 was nevertheless inserted into the dataset because this was still seen as accurate as the riots occurred in January 2021. It was estimated that the numbers used could not have changed significantly compared to the actual numbers of 2021. The way in which the data for these variables was recalculated is described in the appendix.

The third problem that emerged which led to the removal of some variables was that the data had many missing values. The variables ‘trust in institutions’ (*vertrouwen in instituties*), ‘trust in other people’ (*vertrouwen in anderen*) and ‘satisfaction in life’ (*tevredenheid met het leven*) had 134, 149 and 120 missing values respectively (out of the 352 observations per variable). The most common way to handle missing values is by simply omitting the variable, because many missing values reduce the statistical power of the conclusions (Kang, 2013). To test what the impact of the missing values was in this thesis the regression is done twice, with and without these three variables. The impact was quite big, so the variables were left out.

A last reason to remove potential variables from the analysis was that some variables were not suitable for this type of research design. Variables as ‘population development’ and ‘economic development’ have to be measured over time to determine the growth or decline. In a cross-sectional research such as this one the variables are measured at one point in time (Bryman, 2016). In the end, 11 independent variables remained. These can be found in Table 1. The variables are merged into three brought concepts. The column ‘source’, shows the scientific source(s) on which the variables were based. In Table 2 (found further in this chapter) the exact method by which the variables were analysed is outlined per variable.

Concept	Variable	Proxy	(Based on) source(s)
Influence economic factors on riots	Average income	Income per person	Dijkstra et al., 2019; Florida, 2021; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018
	Number of people having an industrial job	Industry	Dijkstra et al., 2019; Florida, 2021; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018
	Number of people unemployed	Unemployment rate	Dijkstra et al., 2019; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018
	Number of people with a low education	Educational level	Dijkstra et al., 2019; Florida, 2021
Influence demographic factors on riots	Number of people per km ² land	Population density	Dijkstra et al., 2019; Florida, 2021; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018
	Percentage of migrants among the whole population	Migration rate	Dijkstra et al., 2019; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018
	Average address density	Urbanity	Dijkstra et al., 2019; Florida, 2021; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018

	Number of men per 100 women	Sex ratio	Florida, 2021
	Percentage of young adults (15-30 years old) among the whole population	Age ratio	Dijkstra et al., 2019; Florida, 2021
Influence social factors on riots	Number of registered crimes per 1000 inhabitants	Crime rate	Florida, 2021
	Biggest political party	Voting behaviour	Dijkstra et al., 2019; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018; Florida, 2021

Table 1: operationalization of the independent variables (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018; Dijkstra et al., 2019; Florida, 2021).

Data analysis methods

After gathering all data the second phase of this analysis started in April 2022. In this phase, the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable has been explored with a logistic regression analysis. The following section describes how this analysis was conducted. The results of the analysis were used to answer the first sub-question.

Logistic regression analysis

A binary logistic regression analysis measures the relation between the dependent variable and independent variables. Because the dependent variable in this research is dichotomous, namely the presence or absence of riots, this type of analysis had to be used. The logistic regression process follows the same general principles as used in a regular linear regression analysis (Lammers et al., 2007).

The (binary) logistic models the probability of an event taking place. In this research is that the probability of riots taking place or not. The chance of riots is expressed as a value between 0 (the odds for riots is zero) and 1 (the odds for riots is one). It uses the dependent variable as a logit of P, where P is the probability that the dependent variable takes a value of 1 (Lammers et al. 2007). The natural logarithm in this research is:

$$P_{riots} = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + b_4X_4 + b_5X_5 + b_6X_6 + b_7X_7 + b_8X_8 + b_9X_9 + b_{10}X_{10} + b_{11}X_{11}$$

In this equation, P is the probability that Y equals the given X, wherein Y is the dependent variable and the X's form the 11 independent variables. B1 till B11 form the parameters of the independent variables and a is the intercept.

Model fit

In a binary logistic regression analysis, there is no agreed upon analogous measure, but multiple pseudo R^2 measures, each with some limitation. In this research, the Nagelkerke R^2 was used. An advantage of the Nagelkerke R^2 is that it can reach the value 1, in contrast to some of the other pseudo R^2 measures.

Wald statistic and regression coefficient

To assess the contribution of an independent variable in the model, the significance level of the Wald statistic was examined, which is used to assess the significance of the coefficients (Lammers et al., 2007). The Wald statistic is analogous to the t-test in a linear regression analysis. The statistic is the ratio of the square of the regression coefficient (B) to the square of the standard error of the coefficient (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000).

The regression coefficients (B) represented the change in the logit for each unit change in the predictor (independent variable) (Lammers et al., 2007). The coefficient thus shows how an independent variable will develop itself when a change in the unit of the variable appears. A positive value means a positive effect, and a negative value a negative one. Because it's easier to explain the analysis in terms of odds than in terms of logits, the expected regression coefficients (exp. B) were used. At a positive effect, the value of the expected B is higher than 1, when the value is between 0 and 1, the effect is negative.

As part of the conclusion, these odds for potential new riots were calculated per variable. To do so, all variables were categorised into three categories. These categories were set by equally distributing all observations over the three groups, this means that all groups had around 117 observations (352 divided by 3). For all these categories, the expected regression coefficients were analysed. This was done by creating dummy variables, one for each category. The first category functioned as the reference category.

Table 2 shows all variables including a label which explains the variable in brief, the measurement scale, the categorisation, and the source from which the data was collected.

Significance

The significance level in this research is defined as:

- *** Significant ($p < 0.01$)
- ** Significant ($0.01 < p < 0.05$)
- * Significant ($0.05 < p < 0.1$)

Variables	Label	Measurement scale	Source
<u>Dependent variable</u>			
Presence of riots	This variable shows if there were curfew riots in a municipality between 23 and 26 January 2021.	Dichotomous Values: 0. No Riots 1. Riots	Newspaper review

<u>Independent variables:</u>			
Income per person	The income per person entails the total income one gains out of labour, income insurance benefits or social service benefits. The average per municipality is calculated only over the people who have an income and are part of the labour force (everyone between 15 and 75 years old who have a job or who are actively searching for one).	Scale Values: (x 1.000 €) 1. 26,7-32,2 2. 32,3-34,5 3. 34,6-59,5	CBS (2021a)
Industry	The Dutch economy can be separated into four main sectors: industry and energy, commercial services, non-commercial services and culture, recreation and other services. This variable entails the percentage of all people having a formal job in the industry and energy sector out of all formal economic activities per municipality.	Scale: Values: (in %) 1. 2,4-14,4 2. 14,5-21,2 3. 21,3-50,1	CBS (2020a)
Unemployment rate	The unemployment rate entails the total number of unemployed people as a percentage of the total work force (all people between 15 and 75 years old who have a job or are actively searching for one) per municipality.	Scale Values: (in %) 1. 2,5-3 2. 3,1-3,6 3. 3,7-5,8	CBS (2020b)
Educational level	The educational level entails the total number of low educated people as a percentage of the total population per municipality. People are classified as low educated when their highest obtained certificate is primary education, pre-vocational secondary education, the first three years of senior general secondary education or pre-university education or the first level of secondary vocational education (<i>mbo-1</i>).	Scale Values: (in %) 1. 4-9,8 2. 9,9-11,7 3. 11,8-20,5	CBS (2020b)
Population density	The population density entails the amount of people per km ² land per municipality.	Scale Values: (in numbers) 1. 23-289 2. 299-786 3. 787-6650	CBS (2021b)

Migration rate	The migration rate entails the total number of migrants as a percentage of the total population per municipality. Someone is seen as a migrant as one is born outside The Netherlands or as one (or both) of someone's parents is born outside of The Netherlands.	Scale Values: (in %) 1. 4,3-11,8 2. 11,9-18,2 3. 18,3-56,2	CBS (2021c)
Urbanity	The urbanity is based on the average address density per municipality. For every address within a municipality the number of addresses within a 1 kilometre radius is calculated. The average value of all these addresses is the degree of urbanity.	Ordinal Values: 1. Urban (>2500) 2. Sub-urban (1000-2500) 3. Rural (<1000)	CBS (2021d)
Sex ratio	The sex ratio entails the number of men towards 100 women per municipality.	Scale Values: (in numbers) 1. 90-97 2. 98-100 3. 101-112	CBS (2021b)
Age ratio	The age ratio entails the total number of people between 15 and 30 years old as a percentage of the total population per municipality. ²	Scale Values: (in %) 1. 11,4-16,1 2. 16,2-17,4 3. 17,5-33,2	CBS (2020c)
Crime rate	The crime rate entails the total number of registered crimes per 1000 inhabitants per municipality. Registered crimes are crimes which are captured by the police in a police report.	Scale Values: (in numbers) 1. 14,4-28,9 2. 29-37,1 3. 37,2-74,1	CBS (2021e)

² The theoretical framework demonstrated that older people are generally more prone to feelings of discontent as they are less capable to cope with demographic, cultural and economic changes. In the regression analysis, however, the percentage of people with an age between 15 and 30 was measured. This is decided because the majority of the rioters involved in the curfew riots were of a younger age (Kreulen, 2021; Moors et al., 2022). Besides, when this variable is statistically insignificant, the occurrence of riots due to a higher percentage of older people is more likely.

Voting behaviour	Voting behaviour is calculated by the biggest political party per municipality. These were based on the results of the elections for the House of Representatives in March 2021.	Ordinal Values: 1. Left (BIJ1, PvdD, SP) 2. Centre left (Groenlinks, PvdA, DENK) 3. Centre ³ (D66, Volt, CDA, CU, 50 plus) 4. Centre right (VDD, SGP, BBB) 5. Right ⁴ (PVV, FvD, JA21)	Kieskom pas (2021)
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Table 2: Variables label, measurement scale and source for the logistic regression analysis (CBS, 2020a; CBS, 2020b; CBS, 2020c; CBS, 2021a; CBS, 2021b; CBS, 2021c; CBS, 2021d; CBS, 2021e; Kieskompas, 2021).

Quality criteria

The three most important criteria for the evaluation of quantitative social research are reliability, replication and validity (Bryman, 2016), whereby validity contains four categories (measurement, internal, external and ecological validity). This research will now be evaluated in terms of these criteria.

Reliability and measurement validity

These criteria are both related to the quality of the measures that were used to measure the concepts of this research (Bryman, 2016). In this research, the concepts used in the regression analysis are all quite broad, but also covered by a large number of variables. These variables were all precisely selected and used in earlier work to measure corresponding concepts. Also, they are all relatively stable over time.

Replicability

One of the strengths of quantitative research in general and cross-sectional research in particular is that it is good replicable (Bryman, 2016). In this research, the steps taken to achieve the final results are explained as comprehensively as possible to increase the replicability. For instance, by explaining how the municipalities where riots took place were analysed, how the variables were selected, how the variables were operationalized, how the variables with data from 2020 were analysed, and how the variable values were set.

³ Reference category: 'centre', categories 'left' and 'centre left' did not appear in the observations.

⁴ In the theoretical framework, voting for populist and extreme right parties was explained as a consequence of the increased feelings of discontent. In The Netherlands, discussions around which parties can be marked as populist and which not are not uncommon. In this thesis, the PVV, FvD and JA21 are defined as the populist parties for the elections for the House of Representatives in 2021, following the judgement of Dr. Matthijs Rooduijn (2021), who is populism expert and scientist/teacher at the University of Amsterdam.

Internal validity

The internal validity is typically weak. Cross-sectional research designs produce associations rather than causal relations (Bryman, 2016; p. 52). In this research, an attempt was made to cover the factors which caused the riots in the municipalities. As already established, riots are complex phenomena that are influenced by many different factors. The results in this thesis will explain the occurrence of the riots partly, but there are many more factors which were not touched upon in this research.

External validity

The external validity of this research is good. This criterion is concerned with the generalizability of the results to other societal or scientific contexts (Bryman, 2016). The findings in this research are based on Dutch municipalities. The results can be valuable for countries with similar economic, demographic and social characteristics. This is the case in most countries in Western Europe, Canada and the United States.

Ecological validity

The ecological validity of this research is questionable. Most cross-sectional research makes use of many research instruments. The ecological validity may be jeopardised by this because these instruments disrupt the 'natural habitat' (Cicourel, 1982). The regression analysis used in this thesis decreased ecological validity, as it made considerable use of research instruments and data to measure the relation between variables. The data used per variable comprised the numbers for the whole municipality, instead of the neighbourhoods or places inside these municipalities where they had occurred. This is thus not totally corresponding with reality. On the other hand, the more in-depth approach used to investigate the local factors (and to a minor degree the structural factors) increased the ecological validity as it gave a better representation of the actual occurred events.

Chapter 4: Spatial factors

Table 3: calculated parameters of the logistic regression analysis (own work)

Variable set	Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error
Dependent variable	Presence of riots		
Economic	Income p/p	-,084	,157
	Industry	,045	,039
	Unemployment rate	-,114	,971
	Educational level	,178	,189
Demographic	Population density	,001*	,000
	Migration rate	-,157*	,085
	Urbanity	-,841	,546
	Sex ratio	,061	,107
	Age ratio	,109	,112
Social	Crime rate	,238***	,056
	Voting behaviour (ref: centre)		
	Voting behaviour (centre right)	,861	1,070
	Voting behaviour (right)	1,455	1,658
Intercept		-16,117	13,307
Nagelkerke R ²		,564	
N		352	

*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%

In the table the results of the logistic regression analysis are presented. The table shows that ‘population density’, ‘migration rate’ and ‘criminality’ are the variables which are of statistical significance (Nagelkerke $R^2 = 0,564$, $N = 352$). This means that the chance that these variables are non-related to the occurrence of the riots is close to zero.

Discussion

The theoretical framework outlined 11 variables which could cause discontent to occur. These spatial factors showed that discontent is higher in specific places due to their economic, demographic and social characteristics. Feelings of discontent can cause riots when collective anger regarding various things create an explosive environment in which one provocative event or act causes these frustrations to turn into riots (Holdo & Bengtsson, 2019). In the binary logistic regression analysis the influence of these 11 variables on the occurrence of the 2021 curfew riots in the municipalities of The Netherlands were measured. In the following discussion the results of the analysis will be discussed more in-depth.

Economic factors

The results showed that none of the economic factors are statistically significant related to the occurrence of riots: this means that the chance is close to zero that the occurrence of riots is related to these variables. There are multiple possible explanations for this. The two most important ones are the state of the Dutch economy and the fact that the Netherlands is a welfare state. In a welfare state the primary task of the government is to protect the economic and social well-being of its citizens and to provide its citizens with the minimal provisions to have a good life. In the Netherlands, this can be found in the social safety net built for the unemployed and disabled, the fact that primary and secondary education is nearly free and that tertiary education can be followed against reduced costs and that everyone has access to decent healthcare, among others. Unemployed individuals or individuals who cannot work to their full potential thus still have an opportunity to live a relatively good and prosperous life.

When looking at the Dutch job market in 2021, the number of people employed reached its highest peak ever (more than 11 million people) and the number of unemployed individuals was lowest since the CBS started collecting data on this topic in 2003 (see Figure 3) (CBS, 2022). This is the case for both lower and higher educated individuals, as can be seen Figure 4. The demand for specialised and higher educated people increased over the last decades. This trend has not had direct consequences because the number of higher educated people has increased significantly (see Figure 5) (de Graaf-Zijl et al., 2015). Yet, the number of unemployed people with a lower education is permanently higher than those with a higher education (Figure 4). These trends seem to progress further in the coming years (de Graaf-Zijl et al., 2015). Also, the average incomes of the higher educated increased much more compared to lower educated people over the past decades, as can be seen in Figure 6 (de Beer, 2018). The income inequality between higher and lower educated individuals has consequently increased (de Graaf-Zijl et al., 2015).



Figure 3: number of unemployed labour force of The Netherlands (15-75 year) (CBS, 2023)




Figure 4: unemployment rate of the labour force (15-75 year) per educational level in The Netherlands (CBS, 2023)




Figure 5: educational level of 15-75 years old in The Netherlands (van der Mooren & de Vries, 2022)




Figure 6: average standardized income per educational level of households main breadwinners in The Netherlands (CBS, 2018)

The industrial sector has a less prominent role in the Dutch economy than 60 years ago. Since then the economy has developed from an industry-based economy to an economy based on knowledge and services (Hitzert et al., 2017). The number of industrial jobs reduced drastically because of this; in 1969 a quarter of the total employees were employed in the industrial sector, whereas in 2016 this number has reduced to less than 8 percent (see Figure 7) (Hitzert et al., 2017). There are three important processes which shaped this

process. First, a number of supportive activities were increasingly outsourced to the service sector, activities which the industrial sector used to provide. For instance, administration, catering, security and cleaning activities (van Hao et al., 2017). Secondly, many jobs were lost after companies moved their activities to low-wage countries in Asia or East-Europe (van Hao et al., 2017). Thirdly, employees were replaced by machines to increase productivity (van Hao et al., 2017).




Figure 7: all employed individuals and jobs in industrial activities as a percentage of all economic activities in The Netherlands (CBS, 2023)

The previous discussed elements of the Dutch economy are somewhat different from those described in the theoretical framework. The fact that the economy is increasingly concentrated around knowledge and services has raised the demand for higher educated people and lowered it for the lower educated ones. The income inequality between these groups has risen as part of this process. Another consequence of the shift in economic activities is a decreasing demand for industrial jobs. On the other hand, the unemployment rate is lower than ever before. There is an abundance of work for both higher and lower educated individuals (de Graaf-Zijl et al., 2015). Besides, there are much more higher educated people than in the past. Many individuals with a job which was previously part of the industrial sector still have that same job, but due to outsourcing this is now part of the service sector. Moreover, in the industrial sector the number of ‘older’ people (45 and older) participating is still significantly higher than in other sectors (CBS, 2022). This indicates that most individuals working in the industrial sector were not forced to find work elsewhere after the number of jobs shrank in the sector, but simply were not replaced after they left. So, the factors described in the theoretical framework as explanations for discontent are applicable for the Dutch context, but in a less decisive way. This could explain the lack of statistical significance for the occurrence of riots.

Demographic factors

Population density and migration rates were two of the three variables found to be statistically significant related to the occurrence of riots. This means that the chance that these two variables are non-related to the

occurrence of riots is close to zero. The data of these two variables showed that both the density and the migration rate of the municipalities involved in the riots scored high values compared to the non-involved ones. For the migration rate, this result reconfirms the literature. A higher proportion of people with a migration background in a specific place can cause economic and cultural fears among its native population which could increase feelings of discontent (Dijkstra et al., 2019). Furthermore, individuals with a migration background participated in the curfew riots themselves, mainly in the municipalities who can be classified as urban. Especially younger individuals with a migration background have a general higher feeling of being discriminated against and being excluded from the rest of the society (Moors et al., 2022). They do not feel represented by politicians or political institutions and belong to the social groups with the least votes during local or national elections (Lubbers et al., 2021). Their violent behaviour could be an expression to their feelings of discontent (as softer expressions such as changing voting behaviour is not an option as they generally feel an aversion towards politics) and to ask -unconsciously- attention for the social problems they face.

For the population density, the results are opposite to the literature. The data showed that municipalities where riots occurred can be characterised as densely populated places. This is in contrast to the literature, which states that feelings of discontent occur more often in more remote, less populated areas. A possible explanation for this is that discontent is a feeling and riots occur due to joint violent action. As described in the theoretical framework, discontent can transform into riots in specific environments. These inflammatory environments do not develop often, but when they do, they nearly always do so in densely populated urban areas (Hobsbawm, 2005). This is because urban centres are places where large diverse groups of people live close together, in which it is easier to find people with shared grievances and to mobilise them into violent action (Dorward & Fox, 2022). So, it can be true that there is more discontent felt among individuals living in less populated areas, but for riots to occur, more densely populated areas are needed.

Urbanity was however not statistically significant related to the occurrence of riots. The data showed that the municipalities involved in the curfew riots consisted of both urban, suburban and rural municipalities, but that most could be classified as urban or suburban. The literature indicates that discontent is much more common in rural areas and suburbs. The result could be explained by the fact that all three 'types' of environment were represented in the rioting municipalities. Again, the riots occurred mostly in central, (sub)urban sites where it is easier to mobilise people and assemble with individuals with the same grievances. The municipalities of Oss, Urk and Stein were the only exceptions. These exceptions do have one thing in common with the rest of the rioting municipalities, namely, that their population density is much higher than the non involved ones. This means that riots can occur in all types of environmental settings, but that the chance of actual ignition is by far the highest in densely populated areas.

Both the age and sex ratio came out of the regression analysis as statistically insignificant. The theoretical framework demonstrated that older people are generally more prone to feelings of discontent as they are less capable to cope with demographic, cultural and economic changes. The data showed that the involved municipalities had a slightly higher share of people with an age between 15 and 30 years old than the municipalities who were not involved. Reports after the riots outlined that the vast majority of the individuals involved in the riots were of a younger age, or even a minor (Kreulen, 2021; Moors et al., 2022). A possible

explanation for the discrepancy between the results and the actual event is that many individuals who participated in the riots assembled from various municipalities after rumours had spread for possible riots. Moreover, others nuance the role youngsters played in the riots. They were responsible for most of the destruction caused, but the role played by older generations must not be underestimated. They played their part by creating an inflammatory and aggressive environment wherein riots easily evolve by stirring up others (Moors et al., 2022). This means that the general higher discontent felt among older people can still be seen as an explanation for the occurrence of the riots as they acted as initiators.

For the sex ratio, the same conclusion holds true. Reports after the event showed that nearly all rioters were male, some sources even claim that up to 99 percent of them consisted of men (Weststrate, 2021). The literature shows that men are more prone to feelings of discontent. However, municipalities involved in the riots turned out to have exactly the same number of men in their population as municipalities who were not involved. This could again be explained by the fact that many people involved came from different, often neighbouring, areas (Moors et al., 2022), but also due to the fact that clearly only men inside their own municipality participated in them. The fact that discontent is felt more often by men can thus be reconfirmed and this contributes to the occurrence of riots.

Social factors

The crime rate was the last variable which proved to be statistically significant related to the occurrence of riots. The municipalities involved in the riots were found to have a much higher crime rate than the ones who were not involved. According to the theoretical framework, discontent can spur criminal activities as a consequence of economic and demographic decay in an area. Next to the fact that discontent can spark into riots, the threshold for individuals with a criminal background can be lower to start or participate in a riots, as using violence or attempting illegal activities is not something new (Mongale, 2022). Many people involved in the curfew riots also already had a criminal background (Moors et al., 2022).

The last variable measured, voting behaviour, was not statistically significant. The theoretical framework has pointed out that discontent led people to use the ballot box to battle against feelings of being left behind, by starting to vote for populist and (extreme) right-wing parties (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018). Data on the voting behaviour showed that only in a negligible number of municipalities right-wing, populist parties (PVV, FvD or JA21) were the biggest during the national elections of 2021. Some of these municipalities were involved while others were not involved in the riots. This means that municipalities where right-wing, populist parties were the biggest were not automatically the ones involved in the riots. This is also the case for centre and centre-right parties. This can be explained by the different ways in which discontent is being expressed. Rioting is one of the softest expressions of civil unrest (in comparison to civil wars, coups or intra-state conflicts), but is by far the most radical expression of social discontent (De Ruyter et al., 2021). ‘Soft’ expressions such as changing voting patterns are much more accessible for people to express their discontent than participating in a riot. Whereas right-wing, populist parties have gained support over the past years in some Dutch municipalities (Righton, 2021), this has not translated itself into more radical action from the people living in these municipalities in the form of riots.

Concluding remarks

The theoretical framework discussed several spatial factors for the occurrence of social discontent and how these feelings could be translated into the development of riots. The geographies of discontent formed the underlying theory for these factors. In the end, the spatial factors which contributed to the occurrence of riots were a high population density, a high percentage of migrants and a high crime rate. These three variables tested statistically significant in the regression analysis. Other variables which tested statistically insignificant, but are still important for the occurrence of riots were a high percentage of men and a mix of both older and younger participants. In this, the involvement of men from other municipalities or parts of the country were deemed necessary. These have to contain both younger and older individuals, as older individuals can create the setting in which riots easily occur and younger individuals consolidate this process by actually causing destruction and harm. The voting behaviour of people and the urbanity type of an area does not have any effect, just as the unemployment rate, income per person, educational level and presence of industrial economic activities.

After the discussion of all the results the question is whether the geography of discontent is existing in The Netherlands, and thus whether the different factors of this theory can be used for the explanation of the occurrence of riots. Broadly seen, the factors used in the theory could only to a limited extent explain the occurrence of riots. In earlier work, the consequences of discontented places have been translated to the effects on voting behaviour. This thesis has demonstrated that this theory cannot be used for the explanation of the occurrence of these riots. Discontent does exist among certain parts of the country, but most of the time not to a degree which makes them statistically significant to the occurrence of riots, because the translation of feelings towards direct action is still a bridge too far for most people.

Chapter 5: Structural factors and spatial diffusion

In the past section the results of the regression analysis were discussed, with a focus on the spatial variables and how those results were related to the actual reality. In this chapter, we will concentrate on what impact structural factors and the spatial diffusion had on the Dutch curfew riots.

Structural factors: organisation, motivation and oppression

The curfew riots could be characterised as organised, certainly in the first two days. In Urk, which formed the decor of the first night of rioting, a group of individuals had assembled to demonstrate against the curfew. This event quickly turned violent and caused confrontations with the police (De Volkskrant, 2021b). In Amsterdam and Eindhoven, where the first big riots occurred on Sunday the 24th during the day, influencers and leaders of national and local organisations against the Covid-19 measures evoked others to come to these municipalities and demonstrate against these measures and the government (Moors et al., 2022). Their presence attracted many people, varying from 'real' demonstrators, to fanatic football supporters, troublemakers or thrill-seekers. Some of them were consciously looking for riots. These demonstrations were forbidden earlier that week by the local municipalities (Moors et al., 2022). The riots in these municipalities were later that day copied in other municipalities. Most of them were, again, initiated by local leaders. On the third and fourth day, the riots occurred a bit more spontaneously, without any real leaders, as groups or individuals tried to coordinate various riots via social media (Heck, 2021). This resulted in many initiatives, but only a relatively small number of new riots, as individuals on social media refused to listen to each other or acted out of different motivations (looting or making a political statement) (Moors et al., 2022). The organised character of the riots are in line with the literature which emphasised the importance of some form of organisation during riots (Andrews & Biggs, 2006). Certainly during the first two days of the riots central leaders took the lead in starting them. Afterwards, the riots were still planned on social media, although without any real leaders.

The riots were motivated by various reasons. This is quite uncommon, as most riots occur after the shared grievances of a specific group of individuals come to an eruption of violence (Wilkinson, 2009). Some participants joined the riots out of boredom or sensation, while most of them really wanted to demonstrate their anger about the Covid-19 measures, national politicians and their feelings of being neglected by the government (Moors et al., 2022). The sharpening of further socially restrictive measures related to the containment of the virus and the institution of the curfew was for most the flashpoint which triggered the riots. However, underneath this, other processes fueled the anger of participating individuals already for a much longer period, such as the housing crisis, the climate crisis, distance felt to the labour market, cutbacks in healthcare and social institutions or institutional racism. The riots were an expression for the individuals involved to ask attention for these problems (Moors et al., 2022).

The first reports about the tactics of repression used by the police showed conflicting information (Moors et al., 2022). In general, the police tried to prevent the riots from happening, for instance by constantly analysing messages on social media platforms and visiting individuals who posted inflammatory messages on it. Also, they showed up in places where potential riots were announced to argue with those who showed up and

persuade them to leave (Moors et al., 2022). It is unknown whether this form of repression has reduced the number of riots, but it can be assumed that this at least has helped. On the other hand, some have argued that the police did not take enough time to get in conversation with potential rioters and moved too fast to the use of force. The involved individuals reacted to this by conducting more violence themselves, which shows that repression led to more violence during the riots (Moors et al., 2022). This is in line with the work of Opp and Roehl (1990) and Suh et al. (2017), who argued that an extensive use of force can lead to more violence.

Spatial diffusion

It seems that the diffusion of the curfew riots was caused by both social and geographic contagion. As stated earlier, there were multiple motivations to participate in the riots. Some participated out of boredom or in search of sensation, while others wanted to show their grievances about the political decisions made (Moors et al., 2022). This first 'group' of individuals, who acted out of boredom or sensation, were probably affected by geographic contagion, as they saw and evaluated the violent events happening in other places which lowered the threshold for them to engage in them as well. The other 'group', who acted to demonstrate their grievances, were probably affected by social contagion in their behaviour, as they recognized and shared the grievances underlying the riots on the first days, in particular in Eindhoven and Amsterdam, which inspired them to act similarly to address their own grievances. In the next sections the actual transmitters of the events will be outlined.

Mass media

Mass media only played a minor role in the transmission of the riots, as they only showed footage of events which had already occurred. A few mass media distributors even stopped broadcasting these images and videos of the riots after a few days, as they believed that these could cause more violence. This theory has however never been scientifically proven (Tindemans, 2022). Social media, on the other hand, had a far more decisive role.

Social media

Social media platforms played a vital role in three adjacent areas. First, these platforms- mainly Telegram, Facebook and Snapchat- enabled numerous people, often unknown to each other, to come in contact and share meeting points, videos and information about distinctive topics related to the riots, varying from instructions to make incendiary bombs to real time images of riots (NOS, 2021d). In most of those online groups, violence was glorified and the police, political institutions and politicians threatened (Oosterom, 2021).

Second, the broadcasting and sharing of (live) images, videos and messages had a glorifying effect on those who shared it (Wiering, 2021). On social media, especially among its younger users, a culture of status prevails. Users want to be seen, they feel a sense of satisfaction after their posts get shared or liked. Potential consequences are getting ignored and people are willing to go further and further in their quest for attention (Oosterom, 2021). Additionally, in live streams on different social platforms participants of the riots were supported and often commanded by their viewers to act more violently. This kind of 'support' actually caused more violence in most cases, with those involved gaining more status (Rijnmond, 2021).

Third, the broadcasting and sharing of (live) images and videos could cause copying behaviour among people in other places (Wiering, 2021). Potential rioters were stimulated by this content to act similar in places where they lived (Oosterom, 2021). These images and videos were used as a sort of propaganda tool, to show others that they needed to support the participating individuals in earlier events, with statements such as ‘we can not let down our brothers in Eindhoven and Amsterdam’. Often, the footage of what has happened in other municipalities were seen as a benchmark, which had to be surpassed. Potential rioters saw this as some form of prestige; to create bigger, more intense and more violent riots. They wanted to represent their own place of living (Oosterom, 2021).

Discussion

In the theoretical framework the structural factors were outlined. This research showed that the curfew riots could be characterised as organised, motivated by varying reasons and in most cases an attempt was made by the police to repress them before they could start. Next to these structural factors, the riots were much impacted by transmitters which made them diffuse across the country. Both social and geographic contagion influenced this process.

Social media has played an essential role in the actual transmission of the riots to other municipalities. The three discussed areas of influence that social media had on the riots are all in line with the work of Tufekci (2014). As demonstrated, the social media platforms used during the riots helped to reach out to thousands of people from all over the country. Individuals from other municipalities got inspired by this to repeat the violence in their own places of living as well as individuals from the involved municipality to go further and further in their use of violence. Furthermore, social media were used for the coordination and logistics of the events by providing a platform where individuals, mostly unknown to each other, could plan and coordinate new riots. Lastly, social media offered the opportunity to share news, information and opinions formed separate from the government.

The most used social media platforms during the riots were Telegram, Snapchat and Facebook (Moors et al., 2022). What stood out is that (potential) participants of the riots mainly communicated in openly accessible groups on these platforms. This is in contrast to the often praised main feature of Telegram, that enables users to communicate in closed groups, without the surveillance of governments or other third parties (Wijermars & Lokot, 2021). According to Dutch laws, the police are not allowed to intervene in closed groups. However, in open groups it is easier to attract much more people, which is why the organisers of the riots opted for them. Hence, the police already knew where the riots potentially were to occur, as they took part in these open chats and it became easier for them to take action (Moors et al., 2022).

Chapter 6: Local factors

In this chapter the impact of local factors for the occurrence of the curfew riots are studied. In the previous two chapters, the riots were studied from a more general standpoint. This chapter will take a more in-depth approach to the curfew riots, to investigate -if any- place specific factors impacted them. For this analysis only one neighbourhood was selected because many of the factors described in this chapter could be applied to the other involved neighbourhoods.

Case study: The Schilderswijk, The Hague

The selected neighbourhood for this chapter is the Schilderswijk, a neighbourhood in the municipality The Hague. A map of the neighbourhood can be found below.




Image 3: neighbourhood boundaries of the Schilderswijk (red) in the municipality The Hague (CBS & Topografische Dienst Kadaster, 2008)

History

The Schilderswijk is a district in the city of The Hague, with approximately 31.200 inhabitants, built in the 19th century (Gemeente Den Haag, 2021). The neighbourhood was initially projected as a residence for the more affluent in the society. However, the sales of houses did not take flight because the more wealthy citizens saw the surroundings as too soggy and were afraid to get sick due to the moisture. The district became a working-class neighbourhood with the start of the Industrial Revolution, when many people moved to the city to find work in the industrial sector. Due to the amount of space left in the Schilderswijk, the neighbourhood grew rapidly. The municipality of The Hague did not intervene with the development of the neighbourhood and left the building of new residents to private developers. These private speculators

constructed a large number of poorly built, cheap residences, the so-called revolution buildings (*revolutiebouw*) (Den Haag Centraal, 2020). Almost all of those buildings were demolished in the '70 and replaced by new ones due to urban renewal projects (Den Haag Centraal, 2020).

Just as the physical environment, the demographics changed as well from the '70 onwards in the neighbourhood. After the urban renewal projects, most of the original inhabitants could not afford to come back to the neighbourhood because of the increased housing prices or did not want to come back due to its bad reputation (Fogteloo, 2014). More and more immigrant workers settled down in the neighbourhood and at certain moments almost all inhabitants were immigrants. In 2021, more than 91 percent of the inhabitants were migrants. This is a high percentage compared to the average percentage of immigrants in The Hague (56,2 percent) (Gemeente Den Haag, 2021). This process changed the neighbourhood from a working-class to a multi-ethnic neighbourhood.

Social problems

Schilderswijk is a district characterised by a number of social problems. These problems are not something from the past years, but have developed decades ago. In 2007, minister Vogelaar from the ministry of Integration and Housing named the neighbourhood as one of the 40 districts (*Vogelaarwijken*) with the biggest problems, which needed extra investment to oppose the social, physical and economic problems. In these designated areas the quality of living lags behind compared to other districts. At that time the neighbourhood could be characterised as poor, with many low income households. The unemployment rate among its residents was high, in particular among its younger residents. Also, the amount of school dropouts was much higher than average, just as the low levels of education were. The physical environment was bad, with many low quality residences. Furthermore, the integration of newcomers in the neighbourhood was limited and the emancipation and integration of mainly non-Western women lagging. Above all, the crime rate in the neighbourhood was much higher than on average in other parts of the municipality (Lammers & Reith, 2011; VROM, 2007).

The neighbourhood has improved over time. These improvements mainly had to do with an abundance of projects started and investments done in the neighbourhood in the last century, focussed on integration, (youth) employment, political participation, the creation of social bonds or skills and the prevention of criminal activities and radicalization (Sterkenburg, 2020). These projects have had their impact, as the average household income increased, the relative amount of people who are employed increased, the amount of people with unemployment benefits decreased, crime rate decreased, the social cohesion (grade) increased, the amount of school dropouts decreased and the amount of people who are in good health increased (Gemeente Den Haag, 2021). The only elements that did not develop in a positive way are the increase of nuisance and degradation in the neighbourhood (Gemeente Den Haag, 2021). Still, when the numbers are compared to those of The Hague on average they are still on the downside of the table, as can be seen in Figure 8.




Figure 8: developments of The Schilderswijk compared to The Hague (Gemeente Den Haag, 2021)

Riots

Unlike all initiatives and improvements over the past years, some problems still remain, such as the distrust towards political institutions and the police, as residents feel being watched more than others (Sterkenburg, 2020). Some people who grew up in the neighbourhood feel like they have a distance from the rest of the society and that they are doomed to fail in their lives (van Staple, 2017). They lack perspective as they feel excluded by and discriminated against at school, on the job market and in the media (Sterkenburg, 2020). These feelings are mainly felt among its younger inhabitants, from which there are much more of than the municipality has on average (Gemeente Den Haag, 2021; Sterkenburg, 2020). Furthermore, due to its highly diverse population, the Schilderswijk lacks social control because nobody stands out (van der Poel &

Niemantsverdriet, 2020; Bouman, 2020). This is in correspondence with earlier studies who reported that in societies with a higher ethnic diversity violent crimes will increase (Alzheimer, 2007; Cole & Gramajo, 2009).

These components and the other problems existing have led in the past decades to various riots. In the '80s, riots occurred on nearly every new year's evening (van der Bol, 2011). In 2015, riots broke out after the death of Aruban Mitch Rodriquez due to excessive police violence in the Zuiderpark, a park close to the neighbourhood. The riots continued for several days and nights and were mainly ignited by perceived racism and violence expressed from the police in the neighbourhood (Kloos, 2015). Riots also occurred for several days in the summer of 2020. This time, the reason for the riots were undefined. Some say it came due to the Covid-19 restrictions; an expression to show the government that people disagreed with those (van Bekkum, 2020). Others say that it was set in motion due to boredom; the fact that everything was closed, people could not go on holidays and that people were not allowed to meet each other in groups; with the riots, people wanted to entertain themselves (van Bekkum, 2020). It was however not the first time that riots occurred in the neighbourhood during the summer months, just as with the new years evening riots during the '80, this was a more common phenomenon (van der Bol, 2011).

During the curfew riots in January 2021, riots occurred in Schilderswijk for two consecutive days. On Sunday the 24th, unrest broke out for the first time (Omroep West, 2021a). The group of rioters started fire in multiple places and sought the confrontation with the police and riot squads, who were pelted with fireworks and bricks. On the image below one of the many confrontations between the participating individuals and police is visible. Also, a community centre was attacked by a person who heavily damaged the windows with a hammer (Omroep West, 2021a). On Monday, the riots were repeated in the same way as the day before. Again, rioters sought confrontation with the police and riot squads by throwing bottles, fireworks and bricks towards them, whereafter a cat and mouse game started (Omroep West, 2021b). On Tuesday, things remained quiet unless calls for action on social media (Omroep West, 2021c). Five people were arrested during the two days of rioting. On Tuesday, two more men were arrested after being caught with a bag of bricks (Omroep West, 2021d).




Image 4: the police intervenes in the curfew riots in the Schilderswijk (van den Ende, 2021)

Involvement

Not only inhabitants of the neighbourhood were involved in the curfew riots in the Schilderswijk. Only a relative number of people from the neighbourhood took part in it, while most of the inhabitants wanted nothing to do with it and disapproved (Nederlands Dagblad, 2021). Most of the participants came from other parts of the city or even other parts of the country, who came to the neighbourhood after calls for action to riot on various social media platforms (Nederlands Dagblad, 2021). A striking example of this is that of a young local rap artist who made a call for action in the Schilderswijk to his online followers on the first day of rioting, as he is an inhabitant of another neighbourhood of The Hague (Heck, 2021). With this call, he attracted many individuals.

It is hard to predict where the rioters exactly came from and what the scope in terms of distance was. An investigation into the riots in Eindhoven, Den Bosch, Tilburg and Helmond showed that 47% of the detainees caught during the riots came from other municipalities than where the riots had occurred (Moors et al., 2022). The height of this number was mainly caused by the high percentage of Eindhoven (65%). When looking at the distance travelled by participants of the riots towards one of the involved municipalities the analysis demonstrated that only in Eindhoven (27%) and Den Bosch (8%) individuals from further away (>30 minutes by public transport or car, according to Google Maps) participated in the riots (Moors et al., 2022). In Helmond and Breda, nearly all participating individuals came from their own municipalities, or from municipalities nearby (<30 by public transport or car, according to Google Maps- 11% and 18% respectively) (Moors et al., 2022). Table 5 gives an overview of all percentages.

	Breda	Eindhoven	Helmond	Den Bosch
Number (N)	17	139	10	75
Own municipality	82%	36%	89%	69%
Close to municipality (<30 min)	18%	38%	11%	22%
Further away from municipality (>30 min)	0%	27%	0%	8%

Table 4: travel time of caught detainees during curfew riots in four involved municipalities (Moors et al., 2022).

The high percentages of involved individuals in Eindhoven from outside its own municipality compared with the three other municipalities can be explained in that national groups and influencers against the curfew and government had on forehand already announced to come to Eindhoven to protests (Moors et al., 2022). This attracted many people from all over the country, both individuals who supported them and their ideas and individuals who just came to riot and the sensation. This was not the case in the other municipalities, who attracted mainly individuals of its own municipality or of municipalities close to its own.

For the Schilderwijk, it is hard to say to what degree the neighbourhood attracted individuals from outside. This can only be estimated. In the neighbourhood, no demonstrations were announced and no influencers

or groups present. The riots evolved after ‘examples’ were set earlier that day in Eindhoven and Amsterdam after which calls were made on social media to support them. It can be assumed that the participating individuals in the riots of the Schilderswijk mainly consisted of residents of the neighbourhood, residents of other parts of the municipality The Hague and residents of neighbouring municipalities, corresponding with the patterns occurring in Helmond and Breda, and to a lesser extent to Den Bosch.

Identity

Historically, there are by far the most riots in The Hague in the Schilderswijk (or even one of the most in The Netherlands). This has nothing to do with the number of inhabitants with a migration background, as often referred to by politicians, but with the social structures presented for decades in the neighbourhood (Bouman, 2020).

In his book ‘Together for ourselves’ (*Samen voor ons eigen*), Diederick Klein Kranenburg (2013a) explains the historical background of the neighbourhood and analyses various characteristics of one of the most famous neighbourhoods of the country. He points out that from the Second World War onwards, the neighbourhood grew into a closed community with its own culture, manners and scrutiny towards its own residents. It could be characterised as a sort of caravan camp. Most of its inhabitants turned their backs on the rest of the society, and the rest of the society against them, who saw the residents as antisocial, underdeveloped and poor. Because of this, the neighbourhood developed a bad reputation (Klein Kranenburg, 2013a).

The neighbourhood consisted of multiple social enclaves (Klein Kranenburg, 2013a). Most people stayed most of their time inside the ‘borders’ of their own enclave. People who dared to come to other areas in the neighbourhood, were often viewed with suspicion or even dismissed from that area. These enclaves were formed per street or per streetblock and were dominated by the ‘leaders’ of these streets, who formed their own manners and rules. These manners and rules were somewhat different per street. However, one main element stood out and was for all enclaves the same, namely the norm that everyone had to distance themselves from the rest of the society (Klein Kranenburg, 2013a). Because of this, residents did the same work as others in the same social group and children went to the same schools. People who tried to get out of this bubble, by taking different work, following (extra) educational programmes or were in another way more in contact than strictly necessary with the outside world, had a hard time in the neighbourhood. They were seen and treated as outcasts, and sometimes even expelled from the neighbourhood, because making progress or getting more developed was seen as equal to breaking the norm with their own social group. The distaste towards the outside world went hand in hand with a deep and intense involvement inside one’s own social group. Here, people kept a sharp eye on each other (Klein Kranenburg, 2013a).

Institutions who represented the outside world, like the police, church or labour unions, had a bad reputation inside the neighbourhood (Klein Kranenburg, 2013b). The police were seen as an organisation who protected the rest of the society against them. These sentiments caused multiple incidents, confrontations and riots against the police over the years.

After more and more labour migrants arrived from the ‘70 onwards, the different social enclaves lost control over their territory (Klein Kranenburg, 2013a). Most of the social groups in the neighbourhood did not have

any problems with the migrants, but as their number increased, their own social structures fell apart. Due to the renovation of nearly all the houses in the neighbourhood many of the original residents had to leave and could not afford to come back due to the increased housing prices (Klein Kranenburg, 2013a).

Today, the characteristics and identity of the Schilderswijk are still partly the same, only the demographics have changed (Ramesar, 2013). Nowadays, there are still different social groups living side by side in the neighbourhood with their own manners and values, often infused by religion, who sometimes try to impose this on others in the neighbourhood (Klein Kranenburg, 2013b). Some of them still turn their back towards the rest of the city (Ramesar, 2013). Their position on the bottom of the social ladder pulls them back inside their own social and cultural world (Dam, 2014). Also, the distrust towards the police and government is still the same. All these elements cause a greater willingness to riot in the neighbourhood than in other parts of the municipality or country (Haspels - Goudriaan & Vos, 2021). Rioting and rebelling against the society can be seen as being part of the neighbourhood, as a tradition (Bouman, 2020).

Discussion

In this chapter the impact of the local factors to the curfew riots in Schilderswijk are discussed. There are multiple important factors which played a role in the start and consolidation of the riots. To start with, the many social problems presented in the neighbourhood offer a fertile ground to social unrest and feelings of social discontent. Not only in the Schilderswijk, but most of the other involved neighbourhoods have on average more social problems (Moors et al., 2022). Many structural conditions have improved over the past years, but in terms of these conditions the Schilderswijk still belongs to one of the worst of The Hague. For instance, the average low educational levels, the relatively low incomes, the relatively young population, the relatively high crime rate and the high percentage of unemployment. These factors have already been tested in chapter 4 as if they were related to the occurrence of riots. Most of them, except for the crime rate, tested to be insignificant. These factors could thus not be directly related to the riots, but could have contributed in some way as all these conditions together (plus the other ones discussed) could form the foundation for negative sentiments in the population. Variables which are found to be insignificant, are not directly unimportant or totally non related (Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008). This will further be discussed in the discussion (chapter 9).

Other elements which contributed to the riots in the Schilderswijk were its identity and history. The history and identity of Schilderswijk showed that it is a neighbourhood with a rich history of riots, one in which its inhabitants feel excluded from the rest of the society and one in which the reputation of the government and police has never been good. A similar pattern is visible in other involved neighbourhoods. For instance, Rotterdam-Zuid, Amsterdam Nieuw-West, Amsterdam-Oost, Urk, Graafsewijk (Den Bosch), Helmond-Binnenstad, Helmond-Noord, Hoge Vucht (Breda) and Tuinzigt (Breda), to name a few, were all involved in the curfew riots (Moors et al., 2022). These neighbourhoods are mainly old working-class neighbourhoods and can be characterised as places with on average more social problems and with a history of riots (Moors et al., 2022). When societal unrest occurs, the question for most of these neighbourhoods is not if riots are about to occur, but when they do. Simply said, the willingness to riot is higher in these neighbourhoods, caused by the social problems, history and identity.

Most of the participants of the riots in Schilderswijk probably came from the municipality itself or neighbouring ones. It seems that the distance travelled by individuals to the riot locations was not that big in most involved municipalities (travel time of <30 min). Only in municipalities where demonstrations were announced beforehand participating individuals came from further away. This result is in line with the findings in chapter 4, which did not find a significant relation between the number of men in a population and the presence of riots. However, most newspapers and reports reported afterwards that nearly all participants were men. The insignificance of this variable could thus be caused by the fact many participants (men) came from other municipalities than the ones on which they were analysed.

Chapter 7: Lessons for the future

In the three earlier chapters an attempt was made to analyse which factors have contributed to the occurrence of the curfew riots. In this chapter the results of the logistic regression analysis are analysed again, but this time by looking at the odds. Per variable category, the potential odds for new riots were calculated in the regression analysis, which means that only the spatial factors could be included. This way it is tried to investigate under which circumstances riots will appear faster, which could help municipalities in the future in preventing them. It is important to note that the occurrence of riots or civil unrest are extremely hard to predict. The theoretical framework has shown that there are multiple factors which could affect them. These are, in fact, poor predictors, because the occurrence of riots depends on many factors which are most of the time interconnected (Moors et al., 2022).

The results can be found in Table 6, at the column $\exp(B)$. The table also shows the Wald statistic, which shows how strong the contribution of a parameter is. When the odds are lower than 1, the odds for riots are lower than that of the reference category and the chance of riots will thus decrease. On the other hand, when the odds are higher than 1, the odds for riots are higher than that of the reference category and there will thus be a bigger chance for riots.

Table 5: the odds for future riots per variable (own work)

Variable set	Variable	Variable categories	$\exp(B)$	Wald
Dependent variable	Presence of riots			
Economic	Income p/p	Ref: low income		5,073
		Medium income	,161**	5,008
		High income	,495	,624
	Industry	Ref: low % of industrial activities		1,715
		Medium % of industrial activities	,447	,747
		High % of industrial activities	1,978	,450

	Unemployment rate	Ref: low unemployment rate		,142
		Medium unemployment rate	1,288	,020
		High unemployment rate	1,723	,081
	Educational level	Ref: low % of low educated people		6,463
		Medium % of low educated people	,347	1,235
		High % of low educated people	4,989	2,058
Demographic	Population density	Ref: low population density		,377
		Medium population density	1,669	,372
		High population density	1,429	,110
	Migration rate	Ref: low % of migrants		,464
		Medium % of migrants	1,378	,031
		High % of migrants	2,877	,272
	Urbanity	Ref: Urban		4,620
		Sub-urban	,125**	3,204
		Rural	,033**	3,768
	Sex ratio	Ref: low amount of men towards women		3,569

		Similar amount of men towards women	4,805**	3,559
		High amount of men towards women	3,764	1,490
	Age ratio	Ref: low % of 15-30 year old people		2,443
		Medium % of 15-30 year old people	,850	,017
		High % of 15-30 year old people	3,070	1,036
Social	Crime rate	Ref: low crime rate		2,513
		Medium crime rate	1,763	,099
		High crime rate	7,835	1,516
	Voting behaviour	Ref: centre		2,705
		Centre right	,544	,522
		Right	3,344	,672
Intercept			,007**	4,126
Nagelkerke R ²			,565	
N			352	

*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%

Discussion

The results show that the variables ‘medium income per person’, ‘sub-urban environment’, ‘rural environment’ and ‘medium amount of men towards women’ are statistically significant related to having a chance of riots. This means that the chance that these variables are non related to the chance for new riots is close to zero. The other variables were statistically insignificant. All variables will now be discussed per variable set.

Economic factors

Municipalities that can be classified as having a medium income on average have a 83,9 percent lower chance of having riots in the future than municipalities with on average a low income. Municipalities with on average a high income have a 50,5 percent lower chance of riots than municipalities with a low average income per person. This last percentage is however not statistically significant.

The other three economic variables are not statistically significant related to having riots in the future. For the variable 'industry', municipalities with a high number of people having an industrial job have the highest chance of riots, namely 97,8 percent more than municipalities with a few individuals working on industrial jobs. Furthermore, municipalities with a medium number of individuals working at industrial jobs have a lower chance of riots (55,3 percent lower) than municipalities with a low number of people working in this sector.

Municipalities with a high unemployment rate have the highest chance of riots. People residing in these municipalities have a 72,3 percent more chance of developing riots in their territory than people living in municipalities with a low unemployment rate. For people living in places with a medium unemployment rate this chance is 28,8 percent higher than for municipalities with a low unemployment rate.

The variable 'educational level' shows that municipalities with a high number of low educated people have the highest chance of riots, namely 398,9 percent higher than municipalities with a low number of low educated people. Municipalities with a medium number of low educated residents have the lowest chance of riots; 65,3 percent lower than municipalities with a low number of low educated people.

To prevent riots from happening in the future, attracting individuals from different economic backgrounds seems key for municipalities. Municipalities with an on average median income per person had a significantly lower chance of having riots. The other variables showed clear results, but it is uncertain that these variables have any influence on the occurrence of riots in the future.

Demographic factors

This second set of variables shows that municipalities who can be classified as urban have the highest chance of riots. This chance is 87,5 and 96,7 percent lower in municipalities who can be classified as respectively suburban and rural. Also, municipalities with an approximately similar number of men towards women have the highest chance of riots, namely 380,5 percent higher than in municipalities with less men than women. In places where men are dominant, the chance of riots is 276,4 percent higher than in municipalities where women are in the majority. This last result is however not statistically significant.

The other results of the demographic variables are all statistically insignificant. These results will be outlined shortly. Municipalities with a medium population density have the highest chance of riots when comparing them with municipalities with a low population density. This chance is 66,9 percent higher. In municipalities with a high population density, the chance for riots is 42,9 percent higher when compared to the municipalities with a low density.

The results for the migration rate show a clear pattern. When the migration rate is higher, the chance for riots is higher. The chance for riots is 187,7 percent higher in places with a high migration rate compared to one with a low rate and 37,8 percent higher in places with a medium migration rate.

Last, municipalities with a high percentage of individuals between 15 to 30 years old, have the highest chance of riots. This chance is 207 percent higher than at places with a low number of people in this age category.

On the other hand, at municipalities with a medium number of 15 to 30 years old, the chance of riots is 15 percent lower than in municipalities with a low number of people ageing 15 to 30 years old.

In conclusion, municipalities with an equal number of men towards women and a high (urban) address density have to be extra aware of the fact that the chance of riots is bigger in their municipalities than in municipalities who score differently on those variables.

Social factors

Both social variables were not statistically significant related to the chance of riots. According to the results, municipalities with a high crime rate have the highest chance of riots. This chance is 683,5 percent higher than in municipalities with a low crime rate. The chance of riots in municipalities with a medium crime rate is a mere 76,3 percent higher than in places with a low crime rate.

The municipalities where most individuals voted for a right-wing party the chance for riots was the highest, namely 234,4 percent higher than in municipalities dominated by a political party in the centre of the political spectrum. On the other hand, municipalities on the centre right have a 45,6 percent lower chance of riots compared to municipalities dominated by a political party in the centre of the political spectrum.

In conclusion, municipalities do not have to take these social factors into account when trying to prevent riots in the future. It seems better to focus on the earlier mentioned economic and demographic factors to do so.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

In this thesis the spatial, structural and local factors that contributed to the occurrence of the Dutch curfew riots in January 2021 were investigated. In this conclusion the key results of this investigation will be outlined.

The regression analysis demonstrated that the spatial factors contributing to the occurrence of riots were the population density, migration rate and crime rate. In the analysis, they tested to be statistically significant, which means that the chance that these factors are unrelated to the occurrence of riots is close to zero. The involved municipalities had on average a much higher score on all these variables than the non involved municipalities. Other important factors behind the establishment of the riots were a high number of men, consisting of a mix of both younger and older individuals. These variables tested insignificant, but newspapers and reports outlined that nearly all participants were men who came from other municipalities after calls to riot were made on social media and just because the riots attracted nearly only men from inside the involved municipalities. They consisted of a mix of both younger and older individuals, as large groups of younger individuals caused nearly all destruction, but they were led by a few older individuals who created an aggressive environment where riots easily evolved. The results showed that the geographies of discontent, which formed the underlying theory of this, could not be used to explain riots.

The structural factors showed that the riots could be characterised as organised and motivated by various reasons. The police tactics used to repress the riots were mostly focussed on preventing them, by continuously analysing social media platforms and showing up on places named as potential riot sites. This did not work in all municipalities, as some participants have argued that the police switched too fast to the use of force, which provoked more violence from the participating individuals. Next to the structural factors, processes of spatial diffusion have impacted the occurrence and development of the riots via processes of both social and geographic contagion. The actual transmission was led by social media platforms. These social media platforms- often open groups on Telegram, Snapchat or Facebook- formed a vital element during the riots by connecting thousands of (potential) involved individuals and coordinating newly planned riots, by increasing violence as individuals stirred up others online to go further and further in their violent actions, and, as it caused copying behaviour in other municipalities as individuals wanted to represent their own places of living.

The history and identity of the Schilderswijk demonstrated that local factors matter in the occurrence of riots. Just as with this neighbourhood, other involved neighbourhoods showed similar characteristics with the above average number of social problems, the aversion against the police and government, often felt sentiments as not being part of the society and in which riots are occurring more often. Due to their lower position on the social ladder the willingness to riot in most of the involved neighbourhoods is higher. Besides, the Schilderswijk, and other involved neighbourhoods, attracted individuals from other parts of the municipality or country during the riots.

Chapter 9: Discussion

In this chapter the results of this thesis will be evaluated and placed into perspective towards existing literature and knowledge. The chapter will end with suggestions for further research.

Riots are, first and foremost, an extremely hard phenomenon to investigate and predict (Moors et al., 2022). They occur as a consequence of many different processes, both individual and collective, and have thus many different causes (Dezecache et al., 2021). In this thesis, a spatial, structural and local perspective was taken to investigate the curfew riots. The riots were studied from a general and more in-depth perspective. This demonstrated that in trying to explain riots, all economic, demographic, social and cultural structures of a place need to be studied. There are however undoubtedly factors (e.g. individual psychological, group formation) which are not touched upon in this inquiry. This means that the results of this thesis needs to be placed into perspective, as they are part of a large puzzle which tries to explain riots.

Just like riots, social discontent is another complicated phenomenon to study. Feelings of discontent are different for everyone and can be caused by individual and structural (spatial) factors. In this study, only a number of these factors have been studied. More variables could not be included, as the lack of accurate data prevented this. Other or more variables could have given different results (Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008). The 11 variables used in this thesis thus only presents a fraction from how social discontent is being established by individuals. Furthermore, the variables were distilled from the concept of the geography of discontent. This theory arose out of the relationship between economically weaker places and their changing voting behaviour for more populist parties. In this thesis, this concept is tried to be used in explaining riots, as this had not been done yet. Chapter 4 demonstrated that this could only be done to a limited extent. The act of rioting is in the end a far more impactful and radical act than changing your vote to a different political party. This concept can thus best be used in explaining electoral results, and not for the occurrence of riots.

The units of analysis in this thesis were all municipalities of The Netherlands in 2021. However, as discussed in the analysis, both newspapers and reports reported that many individuals living outside the involved municipalities participated in the riots. The data used per municipality is thus not accurate in that it represents the characteristics for the population living there. The results would have been far more accurate if it could compare the rioting participants versus the non-rioting participants, per municipality or district.

The cult of statistical significance

This thesis is partly based on the significance testing of quantitative data. In science, significance testing has always formed a central part (Ziliak & McCloskey, 2009). Up to today, it is still widely used and recognized for the impact it made in the human understanding of chance and uncertainty (Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008). However, recently, critique regarding the use and unilateral focus on statistical significance came into light. In their book, Stephen Ziliak and Deirdre McCloskey (2008) stated that using statistical significance as the only tool in scientific and commercial testing, estimation and interpretation, is a mistake.

The main message of Ziliak and McCloskey is that there is a difference between statistical significance and substantive (i.e. policy/practical/economic/clinical etc.) significance (Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008). The main problem with statistical significance is that it only is a measure of relationships. In this, it can be really precise. However, the relevant question to ask is whether an effect is 'big' or 'small' remains unknown (Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008). On most occasions that one works with statistics, this last question should be the most important one, according to the authors (Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008).

Many researchers are so obsessed with statistical significance that they forget the more important aspects of research. Ziliak and McCloskey have created the neologism "oomph" for this, which describes the "*difference that a treatment makes*" (Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008, p. xvii), which stands for the real impact something has on something else. The authors argue that "oomph" dominates precision, but that in the scientific world nearly all attention is concentrated around the latter, which takes a disproportionate amount of attention away from the more promising and interesting areas of research (Kraemer, 2010).

In the end of their book, Ziliak and McCloskey discuss what there is to be done to improve statistical practice. Their main advice is to stop solving scientific problems using only statistical significance. Statistical significance should only be a tiny part of a whole inquiry (Ziliak & McCloskey, 2009). Furthermore, when something is measured and found out to be statistically insignificant, this does not mean that this is per definition unimportant. In the past, there was predominantly attention given to variables and inquiries who were statistically significant, those who were not, were dismissed or ignored (Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008). Also, the authors have pointed out that statistical insignificance does not mean that there are no relations. This all has to do with the way an inquiry is designed and the way variables are measured (Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008).

The regression analysis in chapter 4 showed that three of the 11 measured variables were significantly related to the occurrence of riots. The other eight were not and were thus unrelated, according to the theories around significance testing. In chapter 6, some of the variables tested earlier were explored on the neighbourhood level in the Schilderswijk. These variables and the other social problems existing in the neighbourhood form a fertile ground for an increased chance of feelings of social discontent or a general anger among its population which could increase the potential for riots or other forms of social unrest, certainly in combination with the factors not included in the regression analysis (structural factors, history, identity, social media), because variables that are tested insignificant are not automatically unimportant or non related (Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008).

Thus, the variables 'population density', 'migration rate' and 'crime rate' are related to the occurrence of riots. How big the "oomph" is, remains unknown. The other variables could have influenced the riots in some way, especially in combination with the other factors described in chapter 5 and 6, although they were measured insignificant. When the inquiry was designed in another way, this could have been the case already (Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008).

Further research

Further qualitative research on the curfew riots could be of great value. This thesis was mainly based on numbers and statistics. There is still a considerable lack of knowledge regarding the participants, only some basic information (Moors et al., 2022). The police and government kept most information about the rioters away from the public. This information, especially transcripts of the hearings of the police, can provide valuable knowledge about how and why involved individuals acted in the way they did. This could give important information on how to prevent future riots. The 2011 London riots form a good example of this. In the aftermath of the riots, information regarding the rioters was released by the Ministry of Justice and Home Office or could be requested by the Metropolitan Police Services. This data was widely used in many scientific inquiries (e.g. Baudains et al., 2013; Bell et al., 2014; Kawalerowicz & Biggs, 2015; Drury et al, 2020). Furthermore, many other investigations- both quantitative and qualitative- were held based on this data. For instance, *Reading the riots*, is a comprehensive inquiry with interviews of 270 directly involved participants of the riots ranging from rioters, to the police, court officials, magistrates, defence lawyers, prosecutors and judges (Lewis et al., 2011). This gave important insights into the nature, motivations, attitudes and experiences of those involved which could help to prevent similar events from happening in the future (Lewis et al., 2011).

Other further research could substantiate the results of the regression analysis. These results showed that the variables population density, migration rate and crime rate tested statistically significant to the occurrence of riots. In their book, Ziliak and McCloskey (2008) argue that significance testing is a good way to test the relation between two variables, but that it remains unknown how big (or small) this influence is. For future research it could be interesting to get to know the “oomph” of these relations.

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Images and figures

Images

Image 1: ANP. 2021. *Op de Beijerlandselaan in Rotterdam-Zuid zoekt een groep relschoppers de confrontatie met de politie*, [image], volkskrant.nl. Available at: <https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/dag-3-van-de-avondklok-in-nederland-rellen-plunderingen-traangas-en-ruim-180-arrestaties~b86fbc7f/> [Accessed: February 24, 2021].

Image 2: CBS. 2021. CBS Gebiedsindeling. Opgevraagd via Nationaal Georegister. [dataset]. Available at: <https://www.nationaalgeoregister.nl/geonetwork/srv/dut/catalog.search#/metadata/effe1ab0-073d-437c-af13-df5c5e07d6cd> [Accessed: April 24, 2023].

Image 3: CBS and Topografische Dienst Kadaster. 2008. *NL - 's-Gravenhage - Wijk 29 Schildersbuurt*, [image], wikipedia.org. Available at: [https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schilderswijk_\(Den_Haag\)#/media/Bestand:Map_-_NL_-_'s-Gravenhage_-_Wijk_29_Schildersbuurt.svg](https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schilderswijk_(Den_Haag)#/media/Bestand:Map_-_NL_-_'s-Gravenhage_-_Wijk_29_Schildersbuurt.svg) {Accessed: May 10, 2023}.

Image 4: van den Ende, D. 2021. *Mobiele Eenheid grijpt in bij onrust in Haagse Schilderswijk*, [image], Regio15. Available at: <https://www.omroepwest.nl/nieuws/4332693/mobiele-eeenheid-grijpt-in-bij-onrust-in-haagse-schilderswijk> [Accessed: May 10, 2023].

Figures

Figure 1: own work

Figure 2: all references can be found in the list of references prior to this

Figure 3: CBS. 2023. *Arbeidsdeelname en werkloosheid per maand*. [online] cbs.nl. Available at: <https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/80590ned/table?dl=19428> [Accessed: May 12, 2023].

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Figure 5: van der Mooren, F. and de Vries, R. 2022. Steeds meer hoogopgeleiden in Nederland: wat voor beroep hebben ze? [publication] CBS. Available at: <https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/longread/statistische-trends/2022/steeds-meer-hoogopgeleiden-in-nederland-wat-voor-beroep-hebben-ze-?onpage=true#c-1--Inleiding> [Accessed: May 13, 2023].

Figure 6: CBS. 2018. *Inkomensverschillen onder laagopgeleiden het kleinst*. [online] cbs.nl. Available at: <https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2018/23/inkomensverschillen-onder-laagopgeleiden-het-kleinst> [Accessed: May 13, 2023].

Figure 7: CBS. 2023. *Arbeidsvolume; bedrijfstak, kwartalen, nationale rekeningen*. [online] cbs.nl. Available at: <https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/84166NED/table?dl=64C3E> [Accessed: May 12, 2023].

Figure 8: Gemeente Den Haag. 2021. *Wijkprofielen*. [online] denhaag.incijfers.nl. Available at: <https://denhaag.incijfers.nl/dashboard/wijkprofielen/bevolking> [Accessed: June 1, 2022].

All references used in the tables can be found in the list of references prior to this or are of own work.

Appendix

Year of publication

For four variables, data over the year 2021 was not available during the time of data collection. This was the case for the variables ‘industry’, ‘unemployment rate’, ‘educational level’ and ‘age ratio’, for which the most recent data was published in 2020. This had some important consequences, because the number of municipalities had in 2021 decreased from 355 to 352. The municipalities Appingedam, Delfzijl and Loppersum were merged into the new municipality Eemsdelta and the municipality Haaren had broken apart and was divided over the municipalities Oisterwijk, Vught, Boxtel and Tilburg.

Because of their importance for this research, the variables were still added to the database, despite the fact that the values per variable could have changed. This was done after a recalculation of the four variables, so that the number of and same municipalities were equal for all variables. For the municipality of Eemsdelta, these values were calculated by adding the values of the municipalities Appingedam, Delfzijl and Loppersum. In doing this, the population size of each municipality was taken into consideration so that the average bore the weight of the differences in population size.

For the municipality of Haaren, it was more complex. In 2020, Haaren counted 14.370 inhabitants, who were divided as followed among its four towns:

- Helvoirt: 4865 inhabitants or 33,8% of the total population (joining Vught),
- Haaren (town): 5875 inhabitants or 40,9% of the total population (joining Oisterwijk),
- Biezenmortel: 1475 inhabitants or 10,3% of the total population (joining Tilburg),
- Esch: 2155 inhabitants or 15% of the total population (joining Boxtel).

These percentages were used to divide the variable values from Haaren among the four municipalities. This happened as follows: for example, the variable ‘age ratio’. Haaren had in 2020 2.405 people who had an age between 15 and 30 years old. This total number was divided among the four towns, along the percentage of inhabitants per town. Hereafter, this number was added to the total number of people with an age between 15 and 30 years old of the new municipalities. This number was again divided among the total number of residents in the four municipalities, to calculate the new percentages of people in the age category between 15 and 30 years old. At the total number of people for the four municipalities, the number of residents of the four towns were added up.

The other three variables were recalculated in a similar way. The only difference is that for the variables ‘industry’ and ‘unemployment rate’, the total number was not divided by the population, but by the total number of economic activities and the workforce respectively.